

The Challenge of Mini-Community

§ 1. The Mini-Community Factor

The phenomenon of mini-Community presents the most formidable challenges to successful institution in any free Society and poses the greatest threat of disintegrating that Society and its civil Community. Mini-Communities define themselves by the special interests that each holds for its members. Uncivic competition between *contradictory* special interests among divers mini-Communities leads to the emergence of dominant minorities who impose rulership over others in the Society. But *no one pledges his allegiance to a social contract so that others may rule over him to the uncompensated loss of his liberties*. The emergence of rulers always signals a breakdown of justice in a Society. No person obliges himself to allegiance to a despot regardless of the type of despotism. He might submit to a ruler out of prudent regard for his own safety and well-being, and that of others he cherishes in his personal society, but this is not the same thing as either Obligation or allegiance. Behind a facade of submission lurk social conditions, grounded in individual Duty-to-Self, that can be likened to a state of cold war threatening to erupt violently if the ruler relaxes his vigilance, loses his power to coerce, or weakens his grip. Locke wrote,

And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does thereby *put himself into a state of war* with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life; for I have reason to conclude that he who would get me into his power without my consent would use me as he pleased when he got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for nobody can desire *have me in his absolute power* unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, *i.e.*, to make me a slave. To be free from such a force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him as an enemy to my preservation who would take away that *freedom* which is the fence to it; so that he who *makes an attempt* to enslave me thereby puts himself in a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, *would take away the freedom* that belongs to anyone in that state must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that *freedom* being the foundation of all the rest . . .

This makes it lawful for a man to *kill a thief*, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretense be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would *take away my liberty*, would not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has *put himself into a state of war* with me, *i.e.*, kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself [Locke (1690), pp. 14-15].

The essence of every social contract is this: the members of a civil association *all consent* to alienate some of their *natural* liberties in exchange for guarantees of *civil* liberties and lawful possession of common *civil rights*. These are such that every citizen's pursuit of the fulfillment of his personal Duties-to-Self is left unhindered *save only* by his dutiful *obligatio externa* that he will at all times act to protect the common civil rights, acquired by social contracting, of *all* citizens. This alone is the foundation of a **civil convention**, *i.e.*, ***a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate and by which each associate, while uniting himself with all other associates, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before joining the association.***

There are myriad obstacles and antagonisms, which clashes between conflicting Duties-to-Self produce, that make the actual achievement of a civil convention the most difficult endeavor for any sizable population to achieve, and likewise make a Republic the most challenging form of civil association to institute and maintain. By comparison, the despotisms of monarchy/oligarchy

and democracy are easier to set up because both, at root, rule through force and an ever-present threat to impose sanctions in the attempt to coerce involuntary compliance of the ruled to the dictates of the rulers. All present-day governments, save but a few *Gemeinschaft* Communities such as those of the BaMbuti Pygmies, rule according to this doctrine and there are no current examples of an American Republic to be found anywhere. It is as Rousseau said long ago,

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 2]

In a Republic the institution of government and of all public Institutes is justified on the basis that it is the first Duty of all public agents, and, indeed, of all citizens, to uphold and defend the social contract of the Republic against the outlaw machinations and conspiracies of what George Washington called "the Spirit of Party":

All obstructions to the execution of the Laws, all combinations and Associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the Community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the Mirror of the ill concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils and modified by mutual interests. However combinations or Associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the Power of the People, and to usurp for themselves the reins of Government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion. [Washington (1796), pg. 968]

The political party system organized in the United States in the 1820s has done precisely this. The parties long ago confiscated and perverted the mechanisms of election to their private advantage. They allow citizens *only* to chose between faction-selected candidates or not vote at all. *All* are compelled to submit to the rule of the prevailing faction until the next election competition. *No one* is allowed to vote 'none of the above' or reject party tyranny. Governorships and legislatures are in this way exclusively reserved for the parties so that public offices are filled only by faction-selected partisans. Parties are well organized oligarchies and this is not a Republican governance.

It has been, and will continue to be for as long as there are human beings, the fate of all non-Republican Institutes to break down and eventually disintegrate because the enormities of non-Republican governance – whether this be in the form of political government or subtler forms such as economic governance – are *at best* asocial and *at root* deontologically immoral. Non-Republican leadership, over time, leads nowhere else but to the seeding and growth of Toynbee proletariats and the eventual relapse of Society into the gruesome and violent circumstances of state-of-nature coexistence. The collapse appears as internecine competitions erupting between mini-Communities as a result of clashes between their contradictory special interests.

The social contract basis of every civil Community was recognized by America's Founding Fathers, who stated the just basis of civil governance in the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or

abolish it and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. [The Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776)]

The American Republic constituted in 1787 and put into effect in 1789 recognized and stated six primary objectives of *all* Republican government *at all levels of government* in the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States:

We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. [Constitution of the United States of America (September 17, 1787)]

The Framers recognized that the civil convention established by the Constitution was neither perfect nor final, and they provided for its amendment as time and experience with the American Experiment brought to light the need to do so. If you read the records of the Constitutional Convention [Farrand (1911)] you might perhaps be able to sense the level of unease felt by the delegates at the threshold of completing their task. Benjamin Franklin put this into words:

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such, because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administrated, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a number of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an Assembly can a perfect document be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our states are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best. The opinions I have of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good [Benjamin Franklin (Sept. 17, 1787), in Farrand (1911), vol. II, pp. 642-643].

There is very little doubt that when the Founders and the Framers spoke of Government they were thinking and speaking specifically of political governance. The experience of the Industrial Revolution was yet to come to America's shores, it being yet a new phenomenon in England. The state of uncivic free enterprise in American commerce was, likewise, yet too recently developed in America [Wells (2013), chap. 5], had been too disrupted by the Revolutionary War, and social-natural economics was still too new a science for Americans to have yet recognized fully all the implications for governance nesting within economic institutions. Had this potential been better recognized, it seems to me highly likely the Framers might have attempted to protect the Republic from the factions of mini-Community arising from these special interests as diligently as they tried to protect it from the State factions [Hamilton *et al.* (1787-8), no. 10, pp. 51-59]. Social-natural political science was not so fully developed and refined in 1787 as Alexander Hamilton thought it to be [*ibid.*, no. 9, pg. 47].

At the most rudimentary level, the formidable challenge faced by all systems of Republican governance is the taming and moderating of factionism among mini-Communities by means of

catalyzing the transformation of *contradictory* special interests into limited spheres of merely *contrary* interests *in such a way* that *sufficient* satisfaction of *all* interests is made possible under social contract terms and conditions. One necessary condition of this is to cultivate and maintain in the Sovereign power – that is, the citizens of the Republic – sufficient knowledge that the citizens – *all* of them – are able to, as Mill put it, "work the machinery" of government:

But there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of government – possibly even desiring it – a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal existence. Thus a people may prefer a free government but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by artifices used to cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty: and though it may have been their good fortune to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it. Again, a people may be unable or unwilling to fulfill the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to practice the forbearance which it demands: their passions may become too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego private conflict and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed wrongs. [Mill (1861), pp. 4-5]

When you saw Franklin speak earlier of the people becoming "so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other," *this* is what he was talking about. This theme of Mill's was not unknown to America's Founding Fathers. Over sixty years before Mill wrote those words, Benjamin Rush had pointed out that a new kind of education was needed if future generations of Americans were to be able to preserve their new Republic. He wrote,

The business of education has acquired a new complexion by the independence of our country. The form of government we have assumed has created a new class of duties to every American. It becomes us, then, to examine our former habits upon this subject, and in laying the foundations for nurseries of wise and good men, to adapt our modes of teaching to the peculiar form of our government. [Rush (1798)]

Civil liberty never is a *right*; it is an *ability*. To keep it there are civic and civil Duties every citizen must take upon himself an Obligation to perform, and the most important of these day-to-day are those that work to moderate mini-Community faction. No person takes such Duties upon himself if he does not understand that by doing so he at the same time serves his own interests and protects his own civil liberties of action. Without these Duties 'citizen' is made an empty title, much as 'comrade' became one in the U.S.S.R. Franklin and a few others among the Founders understood that a national system of *public education* was necessary for the possibility of such a *Community* understanding and for the preservation of the Republic. Samuel Knox asked,

Is it to the honor of the freest country on earth – of the vindicators of that national independence which never could have originated, much less existed, but from the enlightened independence of the public mind, that the wisdom, philanthropy and patriotism of that man, "*who unites all hearts*,"¹ has never been treated even with the appearance of

¹ Knox is referring to George Washington. Washington had tried to convince Congress that it was vitally important to establish a national system of public education. Congress had ignored his addresses and arguments on that subject. Later, when some congressmen proposed instituting one, the effort was fore-closed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 10th Amendment. In making this interpretation, the

disrespect save in his liberal endeavors to cherish in maturity and perfection the all important object of [a] uniform national education? [Knox (1798), p. 32; quoted by Hansen (1926), pg. 111]

Institution of a national system of public education is challenged by the very same factors that provoke factionism in other spheres of government, namely, contradictory interests of divers mini-Communities. Among the Framers, Hamilton probably had the keenest foreboding of the mini-Community factor, incomplete as his foreboding might have been. He said,

I hold it, that different societies have all different views and interests to pursue, and always prefer local to general concerns. . . . Men always love power, and states will prefer their peculiar concerns to the general welfare; and as the states become large and important will they not be less attentive to the general government? [Farrand (1911), vol. I, pg. 295]

Public education is a Duty of and an Institute belonging to the judicial branch of a Republican government. As such, *its* governance faces challenges no less formidable than those faced by the overall institution of government. A Republican public Institute can only be governed by Republican methods and principles or it will sooner or later become an instrument of enormity rather than a servant of the people. But what form of governance does it require if it is to be able to face and overcome the challenges of mini-Community? I propose for you to consider that the most promising form for such governance is *Tocqueville governance*. But what is this? Before a satisfactory answer to this question can be stated, it is necessary to look into the mental physics that drives acts of institution in a stable Society dedicated to liberty with justice for all citizens.

§ 2. Mental Physics and Social Institution

§ 2.1 Synthesis of the Manifold of Rules

Practical knowledge of experience precedes cognizance of objective knowledge. Put another way, all human knowledge of experience, represented by concepts in the manifold of concepts and adjudicated by the process of determining judgment, is preceded by the representation of practical rules of action in the manifold of rules adjudicated by the process of practical judgment in pure practical Reason. This *theorem* of mental physics is supported by conclusions obtained from psychological experiments conducted forty years ago by Piaget and his coworkers [Piaget (1974)]. Piaget's findings were, of course, merely empirical; mental physics brings to light the deeper-lying natural explanation for the merely empirical results Piaget's team obtained.

Relationships among representations and information flows in the phenomenon of mind are illustrated in figure 1 along with the major processes of noetic representation, thinking, and judgmentation [Wells (2009), chap. 1-2]. The process of Reason is the master regulating process for all non-autonomic actions of a human being, and all human knowledge of experience is represented in the knowledge structures called the manifold of rules and the manifold of concepts.

Strictly speaking, what is represented in the practical manifold of rules are rules of motoregulatory expressions and sequences of expressions that arise from the process of reflective judgment (and its non-structured manifold of Desires) which have not been discovered in actual experience to violate the formula of the master regulatory law of pure Reason (the **categorical imperative** of pure practical Reason). At root, practical Reason is a 'negative' process in the sense that its rule structure (the manifold of rules) depicts only actions that have *not* been found to violate the dictate of the categorical imperative. All 'positive' rules of motoregulatory expression

Court ignored the intention of the Constitution stated in its Preamble. It has done this many times in its rulings since its establishment in 1789 and, by this ignorement, has institutionalized many enormities.




Figure 1: Structure and organization of the phenomenon of mind.

arise from the impetuous emotivity of representations of teleological reflective judgment. The synthesis of appetite in practical Reason exerts a veto over the rulings of reflective judgment for those expressions that have been discovered by experience to be contrary to achievement of equilibrium (which *is* the fundamental law of the regulation of pure Reason). Human Reason is an objectively dark and affectively cold process; Reason knows no objects of Nature and feels no feelings. It regulates for the total achievement of equilibrium *and nothing else*.

Mental physics tells us that Freud's tripartite division of mind in terms of ego, id, and superego was on the right track and has the merit that his model [Freud (1920); (1923)] contains a great deal of truth despite several important flaws in his overall theory. The correspondence is not one-to-one, but, roughly, the function of Freud's ego more or less matches the function of the process of determining judgment, that of id more or less matches reflective judgment, and superego more or less aligns with practical judgment (figure 1). Freud regarded id as an unconscious part of mind but this is not correct and it should, rather, be regarded as a *non-objective* mental process because representations of reflective judgment are (1) affective perceptions (which are conscious) and (2) motoregulatory connections (which are not conscious representations). It is an "irrational" process only in the context that the manifold of Desires is not a structure and its representations are not conserved. Freud was correct to regard superego as "the repository of an individual's values, including his moral attitudes" to the extent that the manifold of rules is a value structure and its practical rules do carry the force of what can be called the individual's private "moral code" insofar as a moral code is regarded as that which legislates what is to be regarded as "right vs. wrong" and "good vs. evil." Freud was, furthermore, correct to regard ego as an "arbitrator" as well as a process representing "the individual's picture of reality"; this is indeed the role of determining judgment in the judgmentation loop (figure 1). However, it must be kept in mind that determining judgment does not determine its own employment. This is set by transcendental regulations of thinking (called the transcendental Ideas) contained in the process of speculative Reason (figure 1). In regard to the subject-matter of this paper, the mental physics which is key to governance is that pertaining to the operation of the manifold of rules.




Figure 2: Structures of polysyllogisms in a manifold of representations. A polysyllogism is an outcome of a process of synthesis, either a regressive synthesis (prosyllogism) or a progressive synthesis (episylogism). Representations connected in the series formed by a polysyllogism are themselves representations of wholes that contain within them the constituent earlier representations. These constituent representations are said to be assimilated into the representation of the polysyllogism.

In particular, human practical rule structures are important determiners of two factors that can not be ignored when considering the institution of a system of education. The first is a scale phenomenon immediately involving mini-Community mores and folkways; the second factor is one arising from the fact that every human being in a Society is simultaneously a member of more than one mini-Community.

Manifold structure is organized by the synthesis of inferences of reason (*Vernunftschluß*). There are two general forms of Relation for inferences of reason in transcendental Logic that pertain to manifold structuring and produce distinct forms. The first form is the hypothetical inference or *polysyllogism* (of which there are two kinds, the prosyllogism and the episylogism) [Wells (2011a)]. The second general form is the disjunctive inference of reason [Wells (2012c)]. Both forms are composed from more primitive inference structures called categorical inferences of reason [Kant (1800), 9: 122-128].

Figure 2 depicts the structure of polysyllogisms. A polysyllogism takes already-formed series of categorical propositions, that are composed as a series of *predications*, and reorganizes them as a series of *consequences*. The distinction here is that a consequence (*Consequenz*) implies not merely a succession but a *necessary* succession. This distinction is a very subtle one and of a dynamical nature that transcendental Logic covers but traditional formal logics wholly omit – an omission that, all by itself, renders these purely *mathematical* logics insufficient to be representative of *laws* of thinking or action. Pure Reason is called upon to do something that no merely mathematical abstract logic (be it an "Aristotelian" or a "symbolic" logic) *can* do: *it makes the laws of thinking and action*, from the raw *materia* of actual experience, *that govern human actions and reasoning*. This *ability* goes to the heart of the psychology of human intelligence. The traditional formal logics cannot do this; rather, they are properly likened to rules of proper grammar – "approved" ways to speak that a speaker might or might not follow. This is why a logician can tell you nothing about psychology, and probably one of the reasons Piaget's research




Figure 3: The making of a disjunctive inference of reason in the formation of classifications.

finding that "logic" is *developed* and not *innate* in human intelligence [Piaget (1953)] apparently came as such a big surprise to logicians and bestirred a rather pronounced amount of controversy within the American psychology community (which, up through the 1950s, was dominated by the false doctrine of logical positivism in America). Piaget found,

Psychologically, operations are actions which are internalizable, reversible, and coordinated into systems characterized by laws which apply to the system as a whole. They are actions since they are carried out on objects before being performed on symbols. They are internalizable since they can also be carried out in thought without losing their original character of actions. They are reversible as against simple actions, which are irreversible. . . Finally, since operations do not exist in isolation they are connected in the form of *structured wholes*. [Piaget (1953), pg. 8]

Piaget's findings are empirical – i.e., "if you look, this is what you will observe" – and he made no hypotheses in his theory attempting to explain the deeper nature of his findings. This deeper explanation is what Kant's transcendental Logic and the theory of mental physics provides. As Piaget elsewhere put it, "Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action." Mental physics tells us that Piaget's statement is true and objectively valid.

It is especially in regard to the idea of *structured wholes* that real significance for hypothetical inferences of reason stands out. The simple little three-step series of predication put together by the categorical inference of reason carries no necessity. By this I mean that evocation of one of the rules (or concepts if one is dealing with the manifold of concepts) does not imply the evocation of an entirety of rules (or concepts) connected in the manifold. In contrast, evocation of a rule (or concept) that has been structured into a polysyllogism *necessitates* the evocation of the entire chain *as a structured whole*. To provide an illustration of what this means, both biological and cognitive neuroscience employ the hypothesis that motor control of voluntary and learned movements is effected by "programs" that are formed within the motor cortices such that signal afferents from the motor cortex "set off" a long chain of "sub-programs" elsewhere in the motor hierarchy. Taken in the whole, this effects the intended movement [Brooks (1986), pp. 6-16].

This is a neurological idea that is congruent with both Piagetian psychology and the theory of mental physics. Logically, so-called "motor programs" correspond to polysyllogism structures.

Polysyllogism structures are structures of assimilation. However, assimilation by itself is not a sufficient capability for producing intelligent behavior. It must be balanced by accommodation, which in turn implicates the necessity for an accommodating process. This is the role performed by the disjunctive inference of reason. Perhaps the most intuitive way to look at disjunctive inferences is to think of them as structures of Classifications [Wells (2012c)]. Figure 3 illustrates a basic disjunctive manifold structure. Figure 4 illustrates a more complicated case of a manifold structure containing multiple disjunctions standing under one major representation c.

The manifold structure again represents structured wholes. Disjunctive inferences provide for the ability to differentiate among represented members of the divided whole such that variations in the evoking stimuli can be accommodated by variations in the actions (or Objects) associated with the manifold representations. This capability, too, is hypothesized by neuroscientists in the study of the motor hierarchy [*op. cit.*, Brooks (1986)] and, again, mental physics tells us the hypothesis is objectively valid. Furthermore, Piaget's theory of class representation also calls for structure accommodation and is, likewise, objectively valid according to mental physics.

Neither the manifold of rules nor the manifold of concepts contain any representations prior to experience (no **objective a priori** knowledge). Both manifolds are built up during the process of human development as consequences of the master regulation of non-autonomic actions by pure practical Reason. Among other things, this means the activities of new-born infants are products of the process of reflective judgment (approximately Freud's "id") and are impetuously expressed. Intelligence, however, begins to develop almost at once as the infant's sensorimotor experience provokes representation in, first, the manifold of rules and, later, in the manifold of concepts. It is a long process that continues throughout an individual's lifetime. At any point in his lifetime, the person's manifold of rules contains the representations of rules that are not yet under conditions of




Figure 4: Disjunctive manifold structure involving multiple disjunctions. D1 and D2 are the higher level representations of disjunction, which the members of the disjunctions stand under.

any *higher* rules and stand only under regulation by the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. These highest rules are the *imperatives of Reason*. From the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology, they are regarded as *practically-hypothetical* imperatives because they are (always) conditioned by the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. When they are regarded from the theoretical Standpoint they are *theoretically-categorical* imperatives of action because if one of them is evoked by a reflective judgment *the person will act according to the structured whole standing under this imperative*. It is because of this and by means of it that human beings *develop* rules of Obligation (and, later, conceptualize cognitions of Duty from appearances of experience). The rule structure under the practical imperatives is, thus, the point of contact between human Self-determination and social phenomena of mini-Community, mores and folkways (moral customs), and interpersonal interactions. Individual human beings are the "social atoms" of Society, and the rules and processes necessitated by the mental physics of the manifold of rules are, in this context, the basis of social-chemistry bonding and antibonding.

§ 2.2 Practical Obligation and Duty

I have gone into the level of detail just presented because if one is to adequately understand the nature of competition and the emergence of cooperation in social environments then one must appreciate the nature of Obligation in judgmentation and determination of appetitive power in pure practical Reason. Two closely related but distinct technical terms are used in the Critical theory. The first is *Verbindlichkeit*, which I render in English as Obligation (capitalized). The second is *Obligation* (a German word), which I render in English as obligation (not capitalized). The distinction between these two terms is a distinction of Critical Standpoint, with Obligation belonging to the practical Standpoint and obligation to the theoretical Standpoint. These two terms were used by Kant in the formulation of deontological ethics. I have previously presented basic explanations for these terms in Wells (2012b), chapter 6, pp. 154-158, and so here I limit the discussion to a general synopsis. Obligation and obligation are fundamental to the nature of social-chemical bonding and antibonding, and so to mini-Community formation and breakdown.

Obligation (*Verbindlichkeit*) is an overall orientation of judgmentation in the determination of an appetite.² This orientation is such that the person's action is **made necessary** (necessitated) by a practically-hypothetical imperative in his manifold of rules. The imperative is practically *unconditioned* and so has the "force" of a *moral* imperative for the acting person; he *must* take the action. Practical orientation means the determination of an action by judgment of the expedience of the action for the purpose of achieving a *state of equilibrium*. Equilibrium is judged to be achieved by the negation of feelings of *Lust per se* in reflective judgment. (*Lust* is pronounced "loost"). That a human being always acts in the particular with actions oriented toward negation of feelings of *Lust per se* is an acroam of Critical metaphysics. This acroam is called the *Lust* principle and is the Critically correct restatement of an idea Freud called the *Lustprinzip*.

An obligation (*Obligation*) is a ground for an act that originates in the manifold of rules and is expressed by practical Reason to speculative Reason (ratio-expression), thereby effecting an employment of determining judgment and thinking in judgmentation. The notion of a ground for an act directly implies a structured whole in the manifold, i.e., a polysyllogism structure that has been constructed within the manifold of rules. Here is a tie point between the actions undertaken by a human being and the transcendental Logic discussion above, thus obligation is understood as

² An appetite is the representation of a practical purpose and is regarded from the practical Standpoint as the self-determination of a person to express an action through the representation (via the judgmentation loop) of something in the future as an effect of this self-determination. The process in practical Reason by which appetites are represented is called the **appetitive power** (*Begehrungsvermögen*) of practical Reason and the act of representing an appetite is called **appetition** (see figure 1).

a proposition in a logic-of-action from the theoretical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics.

Both Obligation and obligation pertain to *forms* of representation and their context is that of a subjectively sufficient ground for *how* the acting person makes the Self-determination of his action (*Existenz* of his act). However, no representation is complete without a *matter* of representation being made part of it. Human actions are expressed at objects, and in this sense obligation can be regarded as a formula, hence pertains to the form of the manifold of rules. A formula requires *terms* to "fill in its blanks" and provide it with a matter-to-be-formulated. The matter term combined with an obligation is called a **duty** (*Verpflichtung*). A duty is a *necessitated action* represented in a formula of obligation. It is the "what is done" combined with the "how it is done" of an obligation form. The acting person is said to act "to satisfy a purpose."

Obligation (*Verbindlichkeit*) is similarly a "how" term *for the overall cycle of judgmentation* (whereas obligation pertains to the processes of appetite and expression). An obligation is a specific reference to the manifold of rules (because it is a ground), whereas an Obligation is a specific reference to the equilibrating *process* of judgmentation that goes to the general regulation of human acts and actions under the master formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. The categorical imperative regulates for the achievement of a state of equilibrium (and *nothing* else) and, in this context, the manifold of rules is correctly regarded as the legislation of Reason governing acts of equilibration. Now, in all but a relatively-few relatively-naive cases when actual experience has not yet gainsaid impetuous acts of teleological reflective judgment, achieving equilibrium requires assistance from concepts in determining judgment's manifold of concepts. A concept is *a rule for the reproduction of an intuition* in sensibility (processes of apprehension and apperception in figure 1). The re-introduction of a concept (via the synthesis of reproductive imagination) into sensibility stimulates changes in sensuous representation that alter both affective perception and objective perception (intuition). Conceptualization *makes an intuition symbolic of a meaning implication* and thereby affects the emotivity of acts of reflective judgment and its manifold of Desires (see figure 1). **Concepts alter action expression.** Figure 5 depicts the logical process flow for the synthesis in judgmentation. The process is a multiple-loop feedback process co-determining sensibility, appetite, and the manifolds of judgments.




Figure 5: Synthesis process in judgmentation. P.J. denotes a determined practical judgment.

So it is that while practical Reason knows no objects and feels no feelings, acts of appetite and ratio-expression interact with and reciprocally co-determine representations of both by means of orienting the employment of determining judgment in judgmentation. Now, the manifold of concepts is a structure and is subject to the same rules of transcendental Logic that apply to the synthesis of the manifold of rules. As is the case for the manifold of rules, at every moment in time the manifold of concepts contains some concepts that do not stand under higher concepts. These concepts are said to be *practically unconditioned* by other concepts and *highest concepts* in the current manifold. Because concepts determine the symbolism of intuitions for meaning implications and action expression, those highest concepts that pertain to the understanding of actions the person holds-to-be-binding actions (logically-obligated action) are called *theoretically categorical imperatives of understanding*.

In *Laying the Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals* [Kant (1785)] and *Critique of Practical Reason* [Kant (1788)], Kant devoted much discussion to categorical imperatives. What he did not do was properly distinguish between *the* categorical imperative of practical Reason and the merely theoretically-categorical imperatives represented in the manifold of concepts. The distinction I have pointed out between *the* categorical imperative (the master regulatory law of Reason), the practically-hypothetical imperatives of the manifold of rules, and the theoretically-categorical imperatives of the manifold of concepts follows from this: Kant called *the* categorical imperative 'the fundamental *law* of Reason.' But he also frequently said "categorical imperatives" only express an "ought to," and he made it very clear that it is within the power of human beings to act contrary to their "categorical imperatives." Anything that can properly be called a *law* of pure Reason *can never be an "ought to."* Scientific laws governing the Nature of an Object *are* categorical, but anything characterized as an "ought to" implies there is necessarily some *condition* under which it is not followed or obeyed. It is *practically-hypothetical*. It follows that Kant cannot place the unconditioned concepts in the manifold of concepts in the same class as *the* categorical imperative of pure Reason. Despite the fact that they are *theoretically* unconditioned in *understanding*, those unconditioned concepts that stand in a direct relationship with the determination of actions are therefore merely hypothetical imperatives when regarded from the practical Standpoint. Furthermore, concepts stand only in a *mediate* relationship to appetitive power and the determination of appetites. This is why the unconditioned concepts in the manifold of concepts do not *necessitate* actions (whereas the unconditioned rules in the manifold of rules *do* necessitate actions). That is why I draw the distinction between "theoretically-categorical" imperatives (which are found *only* in the manifold of concepts) and the practically-hypothetical unconditioned rules in the manifold of rules which *always* stand under *the* categorical imperative.

A theoretically-categorical imperative is an idea, in the manifold of concepts, of a theoretical tenet the person holds to be a precept of objective moral law (*Sittengesetz*). A necessitated practical *act* in accordance with an idea of objective moral law, such that this moral law excludes all sensuous inclinations from serving as a objective ground for the action, is called a **Duty** (*Pflicht*). A Duty is a matter term that is combined with an Obligation to make a complete representation. One can properly say that Duty is to judgmentation what duty is to action. The combination of Duty and Obligation is called a **practical officium**, and the combination of duty and obligation is called a **theoretical officium** [Wells (2012b), pp. 154-158]. A person acting from an orientation of Duty or a cognition of duty is a person who is *acting from principles*. A person acting from Obligation is acting from practical tenets without cognizance of objective principles of his actions. A person who is acting from a cognition of duty *is* cognizant of the concept of his action. It is precisely because of this *cognizance* that he *can* act contrary to Duty.

This doctrine contains core ideas in the theory of deontological ethics. If we take a step back from the blur of details above, the principal implications all this has for our present topic are these. First, the manifold of rules contains in its structure an *evolving personal 'moral code'*

governing the person's Self-determined actions in all circumstances that provoke his rules of practically-hypothetical imperatives. This personal moral code differs from one person to the next but, because all people are more alike to each other than they are different, there is likewise a great similarity in individuals' experiences tending to produce many points of congruence in the individual moral codes of persons living in the same general social and physical environments. From these arise moral customs in a Society. Second, in all situations in which the circumstances involve the social contract of a Society *the orientations and actions of individuals in regard to their judgments concerning the social contract are at root moral judgments.* In matters of social competition, the wry witticism, "Right is what *I* do; wrong is what *you* do," is in fact an uncomfortably true description of the character of social-chemistry. *Every* human being develops and acts upon personal Duties-to-himself. These Duties antecede reciprocal Duties and, indeed, *without them no social Duties could ever be formed.* The consequence of this is: All public institutions in a Society involve at their roots deontological moral judgments. It can fairly enough be said that all social contracting is moral contracting, and this is why actions contradicting understandings of a Society's social contract produce passionate and sometimes violent reactions.

§ 2.3 Kant's Moral Categories of Relation

The special interests that characterize particular mini-Communities are interests that bind their members together in the social chemistry of their associations. Mini-Community interests are the collective pairs of congruent interests of its members. Interests, in their turn, are inseparable *at root* from Obligations in individual judgmentations. The practical implication of this is that all mini-Communities have a common moral foundation regardless of whether or not the matter of this foundation is what we by tradition *call* "moral" according to ontology-centered ethics.

When I say the foundations of every mini-Community are moral foundations, I specifically mean *deontological* (epistemology-centered) ethics. Only deontological ethics can provide for an objectively valid science of phenomena of moral custom in Societies. Enlightened institution calls for a design *téchne* that takes into proper account deontological implications. For that reason, its scientific practice requires an understanding of objectively valid ideas of the Self-determinations of appetitive power insofar as these ideas have deontologically ethical pertinence for social contracting and can be applied to associations of interacting persons.




Figure 6: 2LAR structure of Kant's moral categories.

In *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant laid out a classification schema for analyzing these sorts of ideas [Kant (1788) 5: 65-67; Wells (2012b), chap. 6, pp. 158-183]. I call the theoretical ideas of this system of classification and schematization for imperative-conditioned Self-determinations of appetitive power *Kant's moral categories*. Kant's schema can be usefully employed to analyze the nature of social-chemical bonding and antibonding forces in a Society. Figure 6 lays out the 2LAR structure of Kant's schema.

Kant laid out this 2LAR in *Critique of Practical Reason* without offering to explain its entries, an omission for which he was roundly and, I think, properly criticized. His explanations of these terms are scattered more or less haphazardly throughout the Kantian corpus. Critical explanations for each term are collected and summarized in Wells (2012b), chap. 6, pp. 182-183, with more detailed discussions of each provided in its preceding pages. Short explanations of each are provided in Wells (2014). In this treatise the moral categories are used to describe human behaviors in the formation of personal societies and mini-Communities. One thing to bear in mind in this regard is that Kant's moral categories of Quantity, Relation, and Modality are not primitive, i.e., not *momenta* of the phenomenon of mind. They are, rather, abstract characterizations of macroscopic factors in determinations of interpersonal relationships. Nonetheless, they have direct pertinence for many of the functions of public instructional education [Wells (2012a)] because an understanding of them counters a natural human tendency for what Piaget called egocentrism and provides a learner with better intellectual tools for making his semantic interpretations and instrumental expressions during his social intercourse with others. Put less technically, understanding these categories helps the learner learn how to improve interpersonal communication skills that all civic Community-building depends on.

The moral categories of most immediate relevance for phenomena of personal society and mini-Community formation are the categories of Relation. This is because these categories are those which distinguish two general forms of asocial Duty-to-Self from Community-producing reciprocal Duties that social contracting and moral customs depend upon for their possibility. They pertain objectively to the forms of connection between a Duty and a person whose situation is held-to-be the object for which the Duty is held-to-be obligatory.

The logically-categorical category of Relation is *Relation to personality*. This is Relation in the *nexus* of tenets of actions that pertain to the person's **Self-respect**. Self-respect is the first pure *a priori* interest of practical Reason to act for the practical perfection of the individual's structure of his manifold of rules such that this manifold is made to stand in absolute coherence with the formula of the categorical imperative so far as the person's overall knowledge of experience permits [Wells (2012b), chap. 6, pp. 179-181]. Every human being *makes himself* the person he becomes by the structures of practical rules and objective concepts he constructs in the making of his experience. The tenets of action pertaining to the person's perfection of himself are, practically speaking, *constitutional* for the core of *who he is*. Duties and duties that are combined in Obligations and obligations, respectively, – forming out of the person's self-perfecting actions – are those that stand with primacy of place in the individual's determinations of his appetites. Values encoded under practically-hypothetical imperatives of Self-respect are the prime values held-to-be-binding by the person. The Duties connected in these values are his basic *Duties-to-himself*. They pertain to what Kant called his Self-disposition, i.e., *his real capacity to make himself be as he chooses to be*. His private moral code with regard to tenets of Self-respect can rightly be called the person's *moral personality* at its core. If you want a person to become your implacable deadly enemy, insult his tenets of Self-respect and hinder his efforts to perfect his own person. I don't know why you might want to do such a foolish thing but, if you do, before you do I would advise you to ponder the wisdom in the words of Ali ibn Abu Talib:

He who has a thousand friends
Has not a friend to spare,

And he who has one enemy
Will meet him everywhere. – Ali ibn Abu Talib, *A Hundred Sayings* (7th century AD)

The asocial forms of government – monarchy/oligarchy and democracy – both tend to produce actions of rulership that contradict tenets with Relation to personality held by the governed. In the government form of monarchy/oligarchy, where rulership is explicitly exhibited, this leads to state-of-nature relationships between the ruling class and the ruled class. The dominant minority of rulers maintain their rulership by their ability to coerce the majority by force. As Mill put it,

The rulers were conceived . . . as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest . . . Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying upon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak and claws. [Mill (1859), pp. 1-2]

In such a Society there is no social contract between rulers and ruled, although there almost always is one – usually a very tenuous one – among the rulers and, separately, among the ruled. Probably the most practically-effective rulers' social contract documented in Western history is that of the ancient Spartans, whose militarized Society was expressly designed to keep their Helot slave population in awe, in subjugation, and under absolute control. It lasted for three centuries.

The harpies in a democracy are shadowy because ruling minorities hide behind the slogan "majority rule." As Mill pointed out [Mill (1861), pp. 75-92], the practicality of voting as a means of determining "the will of the majority" has a fundamental and fatal flaw: In any nation with a population too large and too widely distributed geographically to make feasible direct voting by *all* citizens on *every* issue, the mechanisms of a democratic-republic actually lead to a system where laws are passed by *a majority of a majority*, which can and often does represent the interests of *only a minority of citizens*. Where democracy and monarchy functionally differ is: in a democracy, who the ruling minority is tends to be fluid, changeable issue-by-issue, and difficult to identify. It produces a Society of political cannibals. Over time a democracy is more likely than a monarchy/oligarchy to offend *everyone* by insulting piecemeal *every* citizen's tenets of Duty-to-himself in regard to personality. Hereditary monarchies, by contrast, tend to do this mainly after an heir who is socially incompetent ascends to the throne. Even then monarchical Society can fall back upon the respite-giving expedient of assassination, thereby replacing one easy-to-identify villain with a new one judged to be less villainous. Historical monarchies that had long dynasties are usually those whose ruling families have devoted a great deal of successful effort to educating the heirs and preparing them to rule.

Democracy in the form of a democratic-republic is more stable than Athenian-style democracy because its party-faction election mechanisms facilitate periodic replacement of one caste of rulers by another – a bloodless and often easier alternative to assassination. Its mechanisms also make explicit identification of members of the current ruling caste more difficult. For this reason, a democratic-republic is in principle more capable of stability than a monarchy. It always offers the body politic a hope of having less predatory rulers. More time can elapse before a sufficient number of enormities are perpetrated to result in a large enough Toynbee proletariat to tip the Society into breakdown and disintegration. Divide-and-rule tactics can be timed so that members of proletariats die of natural causes at a rate matching the rate of enemy-creation. The unstable examples of Societies *claiming* to be democratic-republics tend to actually be oligarchies where

the rulers are more easily identifiable because they are from a specific tribe, ethnic class, or economic caste. These are identifiable, providing specific enemies when a Toynbee proletariat is enraged by affronts to Duties-to-Self-with-regard-to-personality and opts to enact a genocide.

The logically-hypothetical category of Relation, *Relation to the situation of the person*, is likewise a Relation producing Duties-to-Self. In this case, however, the Relation is Relation in a *nexus* of tenets of action pertaining to how the person deals with contingencies of external Nature affecting his personal well-being. Duties-to-Self in regard to the situation of the person are the primary cause of competition in Society, especially in cases where people regard the social environment as a zero-sum game (i.e., improvement of the well-being of one person can be had only at the expense of the well-being of another person). If you want to see a more or less obvious example of such a competition, try standing between two seven-year-olds with one ice cream cone and asking, "Which *one* of you wants this?" Incidents where competitive conflict occurs are less provocative of social breakdown because they often remain *impersonal*, giving maxims of prudence more opportunity to produce individual re-equilibration because they do not *necessarily* provoke hypothetically-practical imperatives in the manifold of rules³.

Structures of obligation-to-Self in regard to external situation begin forming very early in a child's mental development. Conceptualization of these maxims as duties-to-Self are relatively slow to develop but evidence for *Dasein* of these concepts appears early in the behaviors of very young children. Such behaviors are already being exhibited by children in the late sensorimotor stage of development and the early stages of pre-operational thought [Piaget (1947), pp. 132-170]. By the time a person is an adult, practical tenets of obligation-to-Self are so thoroughly established in his manifold of rules, and concepts of duties associated with them so broadly established in his manifold of concepts, that many people mistake their understanding of these duties as being instinctive, intuitive, or even innate knowledge. Many religions routinely denounce 'selfish people' as part of an ontology-centered doctrine of virtue ethics and, in almost the same breath, evoke their members' tenets of obligation-to-Self ("Do *this* or you will go to hell"). Apparently the logical contradiction inherent in this sort of preaching goes unrecognized. One can wonder how much more successful they would be if they did recognize it because you cannot easily persuade a person to develop *mutual* Obligations by making a practice of regularly provoking his tenets of obligation-to-Self. We most often *do* what we most often *rehearse*.

This brings me to the main idea of this section. It is this: Obligation- and Duty-to-Self in regard to the situation of the person is the efficient condition for the development of Obligations and Duties of the third type: mutual Obligation and reciprocal Duty. These are the Obligations and Duties recognized by all Societies as the foundation of a Society's mores. They are necessary conditions for the possibility of all social contracting. It is as Locke pointed out:

Men being . . . by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this state, and subjected to the power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the *bonds of civil society* is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. [Locke (1690), pg. 52]

³ Episylogisms "travel down and away" from hypothetically-practical imperatives, so provocation of a lower rule does not provoke higher ones. Prosylogisms "travel up and toward" imperatives. So it is that, for example, asking a seller to lower his price might provoke a situation where he will not sell to *you* at *any* price. *How* a person came to structure a polysyllogism greatly affects how he reacts to an external situation provoking a particular rule in his manifold of practical rules. For example, H.R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, followed a maxim: Dissent Equals Disloyalty. He made disagreement into a matter of personal honor calling for severe retribution [Rather & Gates (1974), pp. 273-293]. Bullies tend to do this too.

There is a necessary condition for maintaining civil allegiance, namely, that the Community forego committing affronts to Duty-to-Self in regard to personality. But it is Duty of the second type (those with regard to the situation of a person) that motivates pledging to reciprocal duties and individual construction of maxims of mutual obligations. This is a *term* every person expects and requires from his civil Community. Rousseau wrote,

The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced [by himself] to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some of the advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment that took him from it forever [Rousseau (1762), pg. 19] .

A Toynbee proletariat has morally seceded from the parent Society and withdraws allegiance to the old Society even while, as is usual, its members continue to live within it. But they are no longer bound to it by Obligation or Duty. They are *in* it but not *part of* it. The proletariat and the parent Society become, each relative to the other, *mutually outlaw*. They co-exist in a state-of-nature with the proletariat generally concealing itself through maxims of prudence (Duty-to-self in regard to their situation) until the time comes when they openly break with the old order and the Society disintegrates and falls. This event may be, and often is, a long time in coming but, when it comes, it comes with surprising swiftness. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and disintegration of its old Eastern Bloc alliance is an historically recent example.

§ 2.4 Kant's Moral Categories of Modality

After the moral categories of Relation, those of Modality most pertain to social institution. The logically-problematic category is the *permitted and unpermitted*. An act is *permitted* if the action is not proscribed by a moral maxim or law. The action is then said to be morally indifferent and permitted actions do not antagonize the person when others enact them. He might not approve of the action, but he will not regard it as an enormity if someone else enacts it. These types of actions make up the bulk of what are called folkways. An act is *unpermitted* if it is proscribed by a moral maxim or law held-to-be-binding by the person. He will not commit such an action, and he will not tolerate its commission by others. It is important to recognize that this and the other categories of Modality describe how an *individual's judgment* of actions connects with his own subjective state according to his personal moral code in his manifold of rules. Other people can and often do disagree over what actions are to be permitted and what actions are not to be permitted in a Society. "Disagree" is perhaps a too deceptively mild word to use here; among disagreements of this sort there are many that historically have provoked extreme violence.

For an example illustrating the sort of extreme passion disagreements over the morality of an action can provoke, I think one can hardly do better than the subject of pederasty. In ancient Helena pederasty was permitted. However, there were many who morally opposed hedonistic excuses for engaging in it. This resulted in many restrictions and conditions being adopted regarding under what circumstances and by what actions pederasty was permitted, and at what age a boy was permitted to be engaged in *and expected to seek out* such a relationship⁴. Probably

⁴ The practice was institutionalized as part of a boy's education [Marrou (1948), pp. 26-35]. The boy was expected to propose the relationship; the man he made it to could either accept or refuse his proposition.

the most famous documentation of Hellenic attitudes toward pederasty was written by Plato in his *Symposium*. This is the dialogue where the terms 'Platonic love' and 'soul mate' originated.

In contrast, the people of ancient Judea and Israel morally condemned pederasty in and of itself, made it a capital crime, and declared it to be a sin against God. The Apostolic Fathers of early Christianity adopted this proscription and likewise condemned "the corruptors of God's creatures" [Didache: V, pp. 316-319]. If you have ever noticed and wondered about the occasionally obvious hostility of early Middle East Christians toward "the Gentiles" appearing here and there in English translations of the Bible⁵, Hellenic pederasty is one of the sources of it.

Thus here is an example of different Societies setting up opposite conventions of moral custom regarding the same action. Both conventions worked for their Societies but could not be exported from Helena to the Middle East or *vice versa*. What is significant about this example is that for *both* conventions it was necessary for the people in each respective Society to come to *common consent* over precisely what the convention permitted and what it did not permit. Judaic and Christian Societies had the simpler convention: pederasty was not permitted under *any* circumstance. In Helena the convention was more complicated but, nonetheless, violators of it were held to be morally culpable for their transgressions. For example, the practice of pederasty as advocated by the organization that was known as NAMBLA (the acronym stands for "north American man-boy love association") would have been condemned in Athens and in Sparta. In America the moral custom proscribing pederasty is so absolute that there are university philosophy departments who will not put *Symposium* on any required reading list they issue to their students out of concern that members of the public might accuse them of in some way promoting or condoning the practice – a maxim of prudence on their part. The main lesson to be had from this example is: every public institution must be attentive to those moral customs of their Society that fall under the category of permitted and unpermitted actions.

The logically-assertoric category of Modality is the category of *Duty and contrary to Duty*. This is the contextual determination of what a duty asserts in its meaning implication, both as to the actions a duty requires and as to actions that a duty requires the person to refrain from doing. Because of the individual characters of people's private moral codes, this category has immediate pertinence to constructions of special interests but has limited significance for institution design. Its pertinence to the latter is indirect and largely confined to a requirement that the Institute's agents be vigilant in maintaining their corporate understanding of distinctions between common interests and special interests. Maintaining this vigilance is one of the foremost expectations for the judicial function that is to be made part of the governance of every Republican Institute⁶.

However, the logically-apodictic category of *perfect and imperfect Duty* does have a direct

⁵ "Gentile" is neither a Hebrew nor a Greek word. Its introduction into translations of Biblical texts is owed to early Latin translations (the Vulgate Bible of the 4th century AD, translated by St. Jerome) as a context-dependent rendering for the Hebrew word *goy* and the Greek word *ethnos*. These words in more general contexts mean "nation" or "people."

⁶ The governance of any Institute is itself an institution within an institution. A Republican Institute must be governed as a Republic, and this means that the organization of the mechanisms by which it internally governs its own operations is functionally comprised of its own executive, legislative, and judicial functions along with the necessary checks and balances needed to prevent these functions from being confounded and corrupted [Wells (2010), chap. 12]. No *Republican* Institute can be governed by a system that effects governance by monarchy/oligarchy or non-consensus democracy. No Republic can suffer non-Republican Institutes within it without becoming corrupted and turned away from being a Republic. Taylorism notions of 'efficiency' and 'utility' are poisonous to a Republican Institute because these are purchased at the price of stunting its people. As Mill said, "a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished" [Mill (1859), pg. 97]. This applies to *all* types of Societies.

Pertinence for institutionalizations. A perfect Duty is the matter of a social Obligation, i.e., it is defined by mutual Obligation and concerns relationships of a person and the situation of another person. For a perfect Duty to exist there must be some mutually accepted social contract binding them and an *obligatio externa* each has sworn to the other. Matters of experience associated with such a Duty can be legally defined and, by accepting the mutual Obligation, a person grants a warrant to other designated persons for legally compelling him to act in fulfillment of his pledge. A business contract is one example of a legally binding agreement (*obligatione externa*) a person can be lawfully compelled to fulfill by designated authority figures acting under due process of law in his Society. Contracts define perfect duties.

An imperfect Duty, by contrast, has reference to *obligatio interna* or *obligatio deliberatus* and is a Duty-to-Self. No other person can lawfully compel the acting person to act upon a duty belonging to this category. It has no social contract implication and is an entirely private concern. The distinction between a perfect Duty and an imperfect Duty goes to the core of justice in the legal code of a Society. Mill was expressing his own opinion when he wrote,

The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of the society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot be rightfully compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil should he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. . . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. [Mill (1859), pg. 8]

There are a few flaws in Mill's essay here – for instance, he makes his scope too broad by failing to limit it to the *citizens* of the civil Community; the notions of warrants and rights have no context outside of membership in the civil association – but on the whole Mill's principle takes its point of origination from the distinction between perfect and imperfect Duties. Indeed, when one person enters into a relationship of *obligatione externa* in his dealings with another, he himself *grants* a specific warrant to compel when necessary; the nature of the *obligatio* (pledging) he and the other person exchange is a false pledge without this warrant. Institution of justice in the legal code of any civil Society and in any of its Institutes comes down to careful deontological consideration of whether the matter at hand is one of perfect or imperfect Duty. For example, in a Society in which freedom of religion is one of the guaranteed civil rights of the social contract, *every* religious law – that is, *any* law grounded in *any* religious doctrine – is an unjust law and a violation of the social contract. *The law perpetuates an enormity*. Punitive tax codes intended to deter behaviors that are not themselves illegal are unjust laws and *criminal* violations of the social contract because such laws attempt to coerce behaviors over matters of imperfect Duties-to-Self. Emerson demonstrated an intuitive grasp of the nature of imperfect Duty when he wrote,

Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. . . . No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names, very readily transferrable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. . . . What I

must do is all that concerns me; not what the people think. This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. [Emerson (1841), pp. 26-27]

If an Institute is to be and remain a just Institute and an instrument for Order and Progress in its Society, if it is to succor Relations of reciprocal Duty of one person to the situations of others (upon which liberty and justice in a civil Community depends), if it is to combat the phenomenon of moral secession by Toynbee proletariats (with its accompanying breakdown and disintegration of the Society), then it is crucial that the judicial function incorporated into its institutional structure devote sufficient effort to ensuring that the distinction between perfect and imperfect Duties be kept clear so as to prevent the Institute itself from trespassing into private matters where it has neither jurisdiction nor warrant under its Society's social contract.

§ 3. Stereotyping

Mini-Communities achieve potential for breaking down their parent Society when they grow to be so large that the members do not all know one another personally. The reason is because it is at this point where individuals *must* develop maxims and habits of thinking about other people in terms of **stereotypes**. In time individuals come to lose touch with other people because they become too accustomed to thinking in abstractions that seriously disrupt their objectively valid judgments of semantic messages during social interaction. A sense of how this corrodes Union in a Society was poetically conveyed in the opening lyrics of a 1960s song:

Hello darkness, my old friend
I've come to talk with you again
Because a vision softly creeping
Left its seeds while I was sleeping
And the vision that was planted in my brain
Still remains
Within the sound of silence. – Paul Simon (1964), *The Sound of Silence*




Figure 7: Two person Weaver's model of interpersonal communication.

Psychologists define a *transaction* as "a behavioral event or aspect thereof the essential nature of which is captured by interactions between the actor, other individuals involved and the environment" [Reber & Reber (2001)]. The specific type of transaction pertinent to the topic of this treatise can be called a *communication transaction*, i.e., a transaction by which information is passed from one individual (the transmitting person or TP) to another (the receiving person or RP). Verbal and non-verbal expressions by the TP are perceived by the RP, who must interpret the meaning(s) of what the TP is expressing. Figure 7 illustrates a Weaver's model of such a transaction process. The expressions of the TP plus the meaning he intends to convey by these expressions to the other person is called an *evoking message*. The effect of his expressions on the RP is called an *impact message* [Kiesler *et al.* (1997)]. *Interpersonal communication* consists of a series of such transactions in which the individuals involved alternate between who is acting as the TP and who is acting as the RP. Psychological theories seeking to describe this process are usually called interpersonal communication theories. In the terminology of these theories, the TP is often called "the encoder" and the RP is called "the decoder" because the information exchange process must attempt to *represent* messages through words and so-called 'body language.' What is communicated from one person to the other is subject to various distortions such that the evoking message and the impact message have different meanings. In figure 7 the interpreted impact message is called the *semantic message* and is associated with the emotivity and ratio-expression responses of the RP said to be evoked by the expressions of the TP [Wells (2011b)].

The interpersonal communication process is very complex, made more so by the fact that one person's expressed reactions to the evoking message (both verbal and non-verbal) are perceived by the other person as another message. The semantic message he makes out of this acts in turn to evoke an expressed response from him, which the other person again interprets as a semantic message, etc. Since the 1950s psychologists have been working to develop mathematical models for breaking down this complex process into simpler parts observable by psychologists. An overview of this empirical science is provided in Wells (2012b) chapter 8. Factors of mental physics directly involved with this are discussed in Wells (2012b) chapter 7. Dynamical aspects of social-chemistry arising out of interpersonal communication are discussed in Wells (2012b) chapter 9. All socialization depends on these aspects of direct person-to-person communication at the level of the social atoms, i.e., the real persons involved in these transactions.

Seen in this context, one might expect small *Gemeinschaft* Communities would be the most stable forms of Society, and if such a Community is sufficiently isolated and has a sufficiently small population, this would be so. Compelling direct evidence of this is found in the fact that BaMbuti Pygmy Society is, so far as we know, the oldest Society on Earth, dating back from before the time of the pharaohs of ancient Egypt [Turnbull (1961)]. However, historical and anthropological data also tell us that most *Gemeinschaft* Communities do *not* exhibit this stability once they come into continuous contact with other Societies or the population of the Community grows beyond some crucial number of people. For example, the *Gemeinschaft* Community that once characterized Kalahari Bushman Society is currently undergoing the last stages of social breakdown and is expected to soon disappear [Barnard (1993)]. In this case, breakdown followed their coming into close contact with larger African Societies, particularly those in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa. The breakdown is proceeding despite conscious efforts to preserve Kalahari culture being exerted by various concerned organizations in Botswana and Namibia. There is concern that BaMbuti Society in the Congo will soon meet the same fate as a result of encroachments into the forest lands by Bantu Society.

One can conclude from this that *Gemeinschaft* Communities are vulnerable to population growth and contact with outsiders' Societies. However, mere contact *per se* is not itself a root cause of social breakdown and disintegration. We find evidence for this in the historical record from the case of the Syriac Society of *circa* 974 BC [Toynbee (1946), pp. 16-20], an ancient

Society whose breakdown was interrupted by a series of outside conquerors who ruled the entire Middle East up through *circa* 620 AD. It was only *after* the period of conquest and occupation that disintegration of Syriac civilization occurred. After an interregnum it was succeeded by the Abbasid Caliphate and establishment of Islamic Society. The point I wish to emphasize is that the fall of Syriac Society was *interrupted* for centuries then resumed *after* the conquerors lost power. Another and contemporary data point is provided by the *Existenz* of some long-lived street gang Societies in the U.S. Thus the actual causes of breakdown must lie at a deeper factor level.

It cannot be claimed that all causal factors are known at present, but almost certainly one major cause can be traced back to a natural human phenomenon directly related to the size of the population. This is the phenomenon of **stereotyping** and it is directly related to breakdown of interpersonal communication among the members of a Society. In the social sciences there are three common usages of the word 'stereotype' (two nouns and one verb):

- stereotype:** 1. n. A set of relatively fixed, simplistic overgeneralizations about a group or class of people.
- 2. n. Within a culture, a set of widely shared generalizations about the psychological characteristics of a group or class of people.
- 3. v. To form or utilize such sets of beliefs, to classify or categorize an individual on the basis of them. [Reber & Reber (2001)]

When a population grows to the point where it becomes practically unfeasible for a person in the Society to know all his fellow citizens in his own personal society, yet each person is aware there are others who are strangers to him also belonging to his general Community or Society, stereotyping is his natural tactic for understanding his relationships with these others. This even applies to the mini-Communities to which he allies himself. It must, of course, be recognized that, unless these mini-Communities are small enough for him to know each member, he understands his divers mini-Communities by using stereotyped abstractions of them as *corporate persons*. His expectations for how he should interact with others in his mini-Community, and his expectations for how they will interact with him, become based on models of others as **abstract persons**. Please recognize that these expectations *include* the individual's expectations of behaviors that are grounded in the mini-Community's mores and folkways. Therefore, interpersonal interactions are always 'colored' by the individual's moral judgments, i.e., semantic messages will be composed in part of meaning implications that evoke maxims in the individual's personal moral code that he has built up from experience in his manifold of rules.

When an individual resorts to stereotyping what he does is substitute a model of an abstract person in place of actual knowledge of experience that comes from real interactions with another individual. Furthermore, human beings learn fairly early in life, through such socialization processes as contact with other children during elementary school, that there is "more than one kind of person." Consider as an example the sort of basic stereotyping a little boy exhibits when he speaks of "good guys" and "bad guys." Psychological studies [Piaget (1932)] bring to light the fact that human beings go through a series of stages in the development of their moral judgments and their understanding of empirical rules (figure 8). Although less thoroughly studied, there is also evidence pointing to a finding that an individual, when faced with an unfamiliar or unexpected circumstance, also *re-stages* earlier stages of his development in response to these circumstances (figure 9) [Wells (2012b), chap. 5].

The importance of the ability of individuals to develop higher schemes and higher concepts pertaining to social interactions that are productive of Order and Progress in a Society is, I presume, more or less obvious to you. However, those vital for the emergence of cooperations and greater social unity are products of real human interactions. Put simply, stereotyping affects judgment of semantic messages in ways that short-circuit this development. An abstract person is




Figure 8: Empirical stages of the development of moral judgment and rule cognizance [Piaget (1932)].




Figure 9: Phenomenon of re-staging earlier stages of moral judgment and rule cognizance in response to new situations and circumstances. As an individual becomes older and gathers more experience, his manifolds of rules and of concepts undergo accommodations producing more highly developed schemes of equilibration. However, an accommodated rule structure loses none of its former abilities to assimilate data of perception, which means that old scheme structures continue to underlie the newer ones. An individual encountering a new situation or circumstance that his newer scheme structures are unable to immediately assimilate will revert back to his earlier scheme structures and develop new accommodations to their structures based upon this old (less developed) rule structure. Hence, for example, one and the same person might judge the death penalty as being "immoral" yet revert to an earlier stage of development and demand the death penalty be applied to, for instance, a person who has murdered one of his children.

not a real person. It is, rather, a mathematical Object who does not actually exist. The more that an individual falls back upon schemes evoked by stereotype concepts, the more habitual these schemes become in his representation of practical appetites. It is not going too far to say that the more habitualized to stereotyping a person makes himself, the less his world is going to be populated by real people. Natural stereotyping tends, first, to depersonalize others, then to dehumanize them. This is what, at root, is being referred to when someone says of someone else, "he treats people as objects." That is precisely what an habituated stereotyper does.

The psychological phenomenon of egocentrism is the extreme example of stereotyping. Egocentrism is, in the context of human socialization, nothing else than the presupposition by a person that other people see things the way he does, thinks the same things he does, feels the same way he does regarding situations and events, and understands things the same way he does. This is nothing else than a stereotyping by which a person models other people in his own image. Childish egocentrism is a prominent feature in early child developmental psychology. Age and increasing socialization gradually allows the child to, as Piaget liked to put it, "de-centralize" himself and develop true cooperative behaviors. This is what occurs as the child advances through the stages depicted in figure 8. However, at no point in any person's life are the phenomena of egocentrism and moral realism entirely eradicated. They reoccur during each re-staging episode depicted in figure 9. The principal observable difference between childish egocentrism and adult egocentrism lies in the time required for an individual to pass through the figure 8 stages of moral judgment and rule cognizance. Where vestiges of egocentrism remain, there also one will find maxims of stereotyping at work. The difference between an adult and a small child is that the latter stereotypes in his own image, the former by using divers models of abstract persons.

I have been discussing the social disbenefits of stereotyping. I must, however, also point out that stereotyping is naturally necessitated by the demand of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. The imperative regulates for the person to seek and achieve re-equilibration after disturbances to his equilibrium. Practical Reason, in addition to being objectively dark and affectively cold, is also an *impatient* process. Its regulation seeks achievement of equilibrium in the most efficacious way a person can discover and as soon as this is achieved *the person is satisfied*. All human beings are *satisficing* decision-makers, *satisficing* conceptualizers, and *satisficing* actors. Well-meaning people who try to persuade others that they should never stereotype people are making an utterly futile effort because stereotyping is a key equilibration tactic.

People who are unable to discover healthy means by which they can achieve re-equilibration are in trouble. The psychological consequences of failure to equilibrate are quite severe and include neuroses of various kinds as well as out-and-out breaks with sensuous reality (psychosis).

As one example of the sort of trauma such a situation can evoke, let us look at the very sad case of a ten-year-old Swedish boy we will call Patrik. Patrik was a normal, gregarious boy who trusted people and saw the world as a place of goodness and safety. Then one day he was lured from the street into a building and sexually molested by a stranger pretending to be a policeman. It was a terrifying experience for him, and in its immediate aftermath Patrik was in hysterics. The criminal was soon caught, convicted, and sent to prison, but Patrik suffered from neuroses so severe that he received treatment at the Rädde Barnen Boys' Clinic. The clinical report tells us:

Patrik changed after the assault. He became timid and anxious, even though he tried to be like he was before. He was overwhelmed with fears. He laid kitchen knives beside his bed at night. He wanted to be armed in case his assailant should climb in through his window while he was in bed.

Patrik started sleeping in his mother's bed. He had nightmares about being abducted by strangers, locked in and murdered. When he woke up from these nightmares he lay

thinking that maybe his assailant was on his way in through the window to kill him, or that he was hiding behind the shower curtain. The fact that Patrik lived on the fourth floor and that the perpetrator was now being held in detention by the police did not lessen his fear.

During the abusive act Patrik had shut his eyes and turned his head aside. This reaction now turned into a tic. Patrik couldn't stop blinking his eyes. His schoolmates asked him if he had got something in his eyes.

Patrik became extremely afraid of adult male strangers. When he walked along the street he took careful note of all the men he encountered. When he saw someone he thought looked odd, he went out into the middle of the street or over to the other side to avoid meeting that particular man. When Patrik rode a bus or sat eating hamburgers with his mother, a strange man sitting nearby could trigger olfactory perceptions similar to those he had experienced during the assault. Then Patrik got frightened and had to change seats. His mother couldn't smell anything unusual. [Nyman & Svensson (1995), pp. 11-12].

At the time this report was written, Patrik still suffered from psychological trauma produced by the attack. I do not know if he has ever recovered. This little boy became hyper-vigilant and entrapped in an unhealthy scheme of re-equilibration. It shattered his happy, innocent world and replaced it with one populated by fearsome, omnipresent monsters disguised as strange men. His monsters are, of course, stereotype images of the molester. The stereotype seems to be preventing him from engaging in normal social experiences through which he might be able to discover type- β compensations that could help him to re-normalize his world. No doubt it seems odd to infer that this scheme could in any way be called "satisfying," but the fact is Patrik uses it to protect himself as much as he can and in that context it is a satisficing solution for him. 'Satisficing' does not mean 'happy.' In point of fact, Patrik's scheme is non-robust inasmuch as he now finds many normal situations disturbing – and that is one characteristic of a persistent neurosis. Bigots are examples of people who have developed neurotic schemes for maintaining equilibrium. Cases of bigotry illustrate in a particularly clear fashion type- α compensation by stereotype (ignorance).

Patrik's case is an extreme example, but all of us make monsters in our worlds to some degree. This is one of the ill effects of stereotyping. However, without stereotypes all of us would find it extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to function in a Society. If you did not have a stereotype of "the honest shopkeeper" would you dare to buy anything at any store? If you did not have stereotypes of "a good person" would you dare to talk to a stranger or live in a city or town? If you did not, as Patrik apparently did not, have stereotypes of "bad guys," could you protect yourself from getting into dangerous situations? None of us can hope to personally know everyone, and stereotypes are one method by which each of us is able to function in the world.

As a mathematical Object, a stereotype is a simplified model, which means it is a model in which a large number of knowable factors have been deliberately left out because their omission is deemed to have no practical impact on model predictions and results. When this sort of model is scientifically constructed – a process called 'model order reduction' by system theorists [Wells (2011c)] – the omitted factors are in fact negligible in the contexts where the model is used. Science and engineering would both be fatally handicapped if they did not use reliable reduced-order models. When a reduced order model models human behavior it is then properly called a stereotype. Psychologists have developed a number of techniques for producing good stereotype models based on what is called 'empirical factor analysis.'

However, the overwhelming majority of stereotype models are constructed by lay people and this construction is generally unscientific. The models are based upon presuppositions, biases, and other subjective judgments of taste. Almost all existing classifications of mini-Communities are of this sort, and it is this sort of stereotyping that most often has misleading and disbeneficial outcomes. Let us call this 'subjective stereotyping' to distinguish it from 'scientific stereotyping.'




Figure 10: Personal society formation through stereotyping. A: The society of the person before he becomes cognizant of mini-Community 3 (MC 3). B: The society of the person resulting from his indirect knowledge of MC 3 via his experience of how his fellow members in mini-Community 2 (MC 2) regard and understand MC 3. To the person *all* members of MC 3 are stereotyped as abstract persons. Depending upon the relationships between members of MC 2 and MC 3, the person might form social chemical bonding relationships with the corporate person of MC 3 if such bonding previously exists between MC 2 and MC 3. Contrariwise, the person might form antibonding relationships with MC 3 if this is the relationship previously set up between MC 2 and MC 3.

The distinction between subjective and scientific stereotyping is a matter of degree. To have a *perfect* scientific stereotype we would need a perfect (absolutely complete) hierarchy of scientific reduction [Wells (2011c)], and Critical metaphysics teaches that such a thing is an object forever beyond the horizon of possible human experience. Lack of knowledge of all pertinent factors plus an unavoidable degree of influence from judgments of taste ensure that *all* stereotypes – like all scientific models in general – contain some degree of subjectivity. *Reliable* stereotype models keep this subjectivism at the minimum possible, but no model can legitimately claim to have eliminated it altogether. This is something even many scientists tend to forget, and the fault for this lies with the schools and curricula of science because these generally do not teach – or even appreciate – the art and science of model-making. The student is left with the mistaken notion that scientific models must be the results of "brilliant insights" rather than being themselves products of sound scientific method. Presently, relatively few professors have acquired the professional competence to teach model-making, and fewer still actually teach it at all.

The significance of all this for institution of education is this. Practical institution is going to be heavily influenced by unscientific stereotyping, both on the part of the institutors and on the part of the citizens who must accept the form of institution if justice in Society is to be upheld. It follows that *methods of institution design* must be made cognizant of the types of stereotypes that proposals must deal with *as well as* those prevailing among the citizens who must be persuaded to accept the institution in a Republic. Of these, one of the most important pertains to mini-Community formation and dynamics. *Mini-Communities are stereotypes.*

Figure 10 illustrates an example of how stereotyping can affect an individual's determination of his personal society. Figure 10A presupposes the person already knows at least some members of a mini-Community MC 2 and that he has associated himself in this mini-Community. Union of the person and MC 2 forms a particular corporate person when viewed from a perspective of his overall society. This figure also presupposes that the person knows no one from mini-Community MC 3 but that interaction relationships already exist between MC 3 and his MC 2 associates.

As a member of MC 2, and knowing nothing of MC 3 directly obtained by *his* experience with any of its members, the person must form his opinions of MC 3, and determine his attitudes and actions pertaining to it, from what he learns of it from other members of MC 2. If the existing relationship between MC 2 and MC 3 is congenial and cooperative, he will form social-chemical bonding relationships with MC 3 in his dealings with its members. If the existing relationship is one of competition and conflict, the person will adopt antibonding relationships with members of MC 3. However, since the person has no direct knowledge of any members of MC 3, he finds it to be necessary to regard MC 3 and all of its individual members as abstract persons (stereotypes). Hence, "all congressmen are crooks," or "all lawyers are shysters," or "all Christians are good people⁷," &etc.

In the case of Patrik, the trauma he experienced produced a very clear stereotype – men who were really fearsome monsters. In his case, the subjectivity at work within his stereotype is more or less obvious. The monsters were "men who looked odd" [Nyman & Svensson (1995), pg. 11]. Patrik's stereotype completely dehumanizes his molester, as his therapy sessions demonstrated:

In the playroom at the Boys' Clinic, Patrik built a replica of his bedroom. A mattress represented his bed, and the red and white parachute was his cover. The big brown teddy bear became the perpetrator who came in through the window. Patrik attacked the teddy bear with a sword. He slashed wildly at the teddy bear. The therapist encouraged Patrik to say what he felt when he was hitting the teddy bear.

"You slimeball! You aren't going to do that anymore. You pig! Go home and [expletive deleted] your girlfriend instead. No, I take it back, you don't have a girlfriend! You shouldn't mess with kids! Slimeball! Pig!"

Patrik slashed at the teddy bear where his genitals would have been if he had had any. He slashed and shrieked. [Nyman & Svensson (1995), pg. 74]

The violence of Patrik's emotions exhibited here is not-unusual among little boys who have been victims of sexual molestation. It belongs to a class of violence that not-infrequently attends other kinds of insults to a person's Duties-to-Self in regard to personality.

Between the social-chemical antibonding exemplified by Patrik in regard to his molester and the social bonding and/or antibonding relationships possible in the more general schematic of figure 10 there is a great step-up in complexity. Even when an individual is said to be bonded (or antibonded) with other members of a mini-Community, all actual instances of social intercourse involve direct interactions between real people. The *effect* of population-level interactions on one particular individual, and of his actions on others, can however be indirect. Figure 11 provides a simplified illustration of the general idea here.

Figure 11 depicts a specific individual, Person 1, who experiences direct interactions with two other people concurrently with other person-to-person interactions represented by the heavy blue lines emerging from and going into a social environment. At the same time, all three persons depicted in the figure each experience the effects of their own physical interactions with their physical environments. The small black arrows denote physical expressions that convey evoking and impact messages between the individuals. Weaver's models for the individuals model effects

⁷ Of course, most people know there are some people of Christian faiths who are 'bad people' (sinners). To resolve the antinomy this sets up, many Christians restrict their definition of 'Christian' to "people who belong to *my* church (the 'true faith')." 'Sinners' found within *that* mini-Community can then be regarded as having "fallen away from the faith" (e.g., 'Jack Mormons' within the Mormon Community) and either be remonstrated to repent or excommunicated. I think I do not need to remark that this same mini-Community dynamic is also found in Islamic, Jewish, and, indeed, *all* religious Communities, some more tolerant, some less. History's pages are stained by pogroms and enormities this stereotyping dynamic has produced.




Figure 11: Simplified illustration of person-to-person interactions within a social environment of a Society and the physical environment in which the persons live.




Figure 12: Gear train analogy of indirect social interaction effects in a population.

of semantic messaging (as per figure 7). Mathematically, each arrow in figure 10 is to be regarded as a functional, i.e., a *set* of expressive operationalizations between individuals codetermining the reactions of each. The self-loops (e.g. Person 1 to Person 1) represent changes the person effects on himself. It is, I trust, clear that even without the additional interactions from the social environment and the physical environments, interaction complexity increases at least as quickly as the factorial of the number of persons involved. For example, with two people the number of person-to-person interaction functionals is $2! = 4$. For three people, it is $3! = 6$, etc. By the time five people are interacting in a group, the number of transactions is up to 120 functionals. General system theorists call this a *field effect*. Combating computational complexity in the combinatorial explosion of the number of field effect functionals is the principal reason why scientists must resort to reduced-order models in order to analyze and understand social phenomena. The best presently known method for this employs embedding field models and the embedding field theory first formulated by Grossberg [Grossberg (1971)].

When the social environment must also be considered – and this is always the case – then the situation is made even more complex by indirect effects. I mean by this that the action of *any* person in the environment has the potential to affect any or all three of the persons depicted in figure 11. Furthermore, since the effect is not necessarily *directly* reciprocal and because time lags are often involved, these complexities further obscure analysis and understanding. Indirect effects can be usefully viewed using a gear train analogy such as depicted in figure 12.

In these considerations is found the reason and need for mini-Community modeling and the treatment of mini-Communities as abstract persons. It is also a principal reason human beings resort to stereotyping. If Patrik's situation had been confined to just himself and the molester, it is doubtful that he would have suffered the degree of trauma his experience produced. But the unfortunate (for him) fact is that Patrik lives in a Society where he must encounter many strangers and now, because for him there are people and there are monsters in his world, his interpretations of semantic messages he "receives" from the Society around him must of practical necessity be based upon stereotyping. It is the fragility and non-robustness of his schemes for interpreting semantic messages that produces the severe neurosis afflicting him. Here it is important to note that subjective determinations of reflective judgment – which are always non-objective – stand in *immediate* relationship with the process of appetition, the practical manifold of rules, and the process of practical judgment. *Objective* judgments stand only in a *mediate* relationship with practical Reason (figure 1). Meaning implications associated with object-concepts are, in a manner of speaking, *both filtered and 'colored' by subjective reflective judgment*. This is why, as Patrik's therapists noted,

The feeling of terror he had experienced during the abuse had burnt itself into his mind. He couldn't get rid of his fear. Even though he knew the perpetrator was in prison, he was still afraid he was standing behind the shower curtain or hiding under his bed.

"I know it isn't so, it just feels like it," said Patrik. His fear was stronger than his reason. . . .

When he had drawn [a picture of] the incident, he was asked to draw how the little boy in the picture could escape or defeat the perpetrator. Patrik then drew a boy with a spray can in his hand with "knockout drops" that he sprays on the perpetrator. The perpetrator puts his hands over his eyes and falls down. When the perpetrator is lying on the ground, the boy sticks a sword in his stomach. . . . Patrik's imagination now got carried away. The perpetrator was dead, but that wasn't enough. He was to be thrown into a rubbish container and sent to Africa. There his body was to be strung on a big hook and thrown into the ocean to the sharks. When the sharks had eaten up his body, his skeleton was to be put in another box.

"And then what happens?" asked the therapist.

"Then he comes alive again," replied Patrik. [Nyman & Svensson (1995), pp. 73-75]

Translated into mental physics terms, Patrik's *concept* of the molester's *Existenz* is understood with the Quality of reality, whereas his imaginative ideas of killing him are not. For Patrik the fundamental meaning implication of his concept of the molester is tied to this real *Existenz*, and the severity of his neurosis indicates that this meaning implication involves the highest level tenets and imperatives in his manifold of rules. His imaginative concepts of killing or imprisoning the molester simply do not evoke rules at these higher levels of the manifold, and so just the concept of the *Dasein* of his molester – by provoking higher rules in the manifold – overrides all lower level judgmentation dynamics. Almost by definition, a psychological trauma is an event that provokes major accommodations in the manifold of rules – which is something non-traumatic events do not normally accomplish. The initial accommodation immediately *following* the attack, when Patrik was again *physically* safe, was established by the impatient character of the equilibration process, and the unfortunate result was a non-robust accommodation mere speculative reasoning has not had the capacity to change.⁸ He was able to cope with the actual attack, but not with *anticipations of possible* future attacks. He fears *what might be*, not what was.

⁸ During the actual attack Patrik *in fact* exhibited what I would rank as a great deal of courage. He was *not* a timid or anxious boy prior to the sexual assault. The damaging accommodation took place in the minutes *after* what Patrik judged to be a life-threatening situation had passed and he ran home.

Mini-Communities do not have manifolds of rules or cycles of judgmentation. However, the cooperative social dynamics that characterize them *do* tend to produce a sort of mob psychology affecting its members. This mob psychology can be *likened to* action-determining judgmentation in the individual. Although the mathematics required to prove it has not been done to date, I have conjectured that, just as cooperation arises from competition dynamics, so also it might be the case that competition dynamics within a broader scope of a Society might arise from cooperation dynamics within mini-Communities. In developing mini-Community models as abstract persons, it is this 'mob psychology' factor that likely should be made the center for theory development. This is, provisionally, an initial guiding principle for scientific stereotyping.

§ 4. Brief Summary

This paper has dealt at an introductory level with key and major issues the *Dasein* of mini-Community presents as a social challenge. These challenges must be successfully met by every public institution design or, sooner or later, the Institute will fail. Duties-to-Self, reciprocal Duties affecting mores and folkways, and the phenomenon of stereotyping are all non-negligible factors for the design of social institutions.

This is not a radical new finding. Knox touched upon the mini-Community factor in his 1797 plan for the institution of public education in the United States:

The good effects of [a national system of public education] are almost self-evident. In the present state of education, however ably and successfully conducted in particular local situations, the nation is, in a great measure, incapable of judging its condition or effects. Diversity of modes of education, also, tend not only to confound and obstruct its operation and improvement, but also give occasion to many other inconveniences and disagreeable consequences that commonly arise in the various departments of civil society or even [in] the polished enjoyment of social intercourse. [Knox (1797), pp. 69-70]

Smith, too, commented – although with greater specificity of a few particulars – on issues that trace their roots back to the issue of the phenomenon of mini-Community [Smith (1797), pp. 60-65]. Design of the institution of public instructional education has had to face the challenge of mini-Community from the earliest days of the post-Revolutionary War United States. The nation's historical efforts to met these challenges have been satisficing actions ultimately grounded in subjectively sufficient reasonings, but not scientific design principles of *téchne*. We have been following that fine old British tradition called "muddling through change."

§ 5. References

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