

## Chapter 13 The Social Contract *Noumenon*

### § 1. The Real Context of the Social Contract

This treatise has been an expedition of exploration that came to cover a great deal of territory. It has now come to its final leg, the Idea of the Social Contract *per se*. Considering the diversity of topic-material examined in the preceding twelve chapters, it seems prudent to undertake as the first step in this final leg a clear re-expression of its final aim. To do otherwise is to risk becoming one of Santayana's fanatics because we are about to encounter some very technical metaphysics.

#### § 1.1 Rousseau's Statement of the Problem and Its Solution

To begin, this seems likely to be a good point at which to remind ourselves where this treatise began. Rousseau presented the Social Contract as the solution to the problems posed by the demands for and of human freedom. Nothing that has transpired in these pages has in the least altered the nature of these aims.

*The Social Contract* opened with a sentence that has been called "the most famous in all political thought," and which is arguably among the most affectively powerful found anywhere in the great works of Western literature:

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 2]

Rousseau did not propose to do away with all chains. He was wise enough to have understood, at least intuitively, that ultimately all chains on human liberty save those of physical-natural laws are self-wrought. We are, each one of us, the blacksmith who forges whatever chains we ourselves place on our personal liberty of action, whether this be from Duties-to-Self in prudent or pragmatic choices in a state-of-nature, from moral custom, or from maxims of prudence in willful obedience to edicts of law. A man who is a law-abiding citizen is so because he *chooses* to not-be an outlaw or a criminal. A socio-paleolithic man living alone in the wilderness gives wide berth to the den of a grizzly bear out of prudent respect for how much less than the bear's his own physical power weighs in the balance. The notion that we each forge our own chains is inherent in the most widespread tenets of Christian theology and accounts for almost all self-consistent religious moral doctrine. Milton wrote,

Him followed his next mate,  
Both glorying to have 'scaped the Stygian flood  
As gods, and by their own recovered strength,  
Not by the sufferance of supernal power.  
'Is this the region, this the soil, the clime,'  
Said the lost archangel, 'this the seat  
That we must change for Heaven, this mournful gloom  
For that celestial light? Be it so, since he  
Who now is sovereign can dispose and bid  
What shall be right: farthest from him is best,  
Whom reason hath equaled, force hath made supreme  
Above his equals. Farewell, happy fields,  
Where joy forever dwells; hail, horrors; hail,  
Infernal world; and thou, profoundest Hell,  
Receive thy new possessor – one who brings  
A mind not changed by place or time,  
And what I shall be, all, but less than he  
Whom thunder has made greater? Here at least

We shall be free; the almighty hath not built  
Here for his envy, will not drive us hence:  
Here we may reign secure; and, in my choice,  
To reign is worth ambition, though in Hell:  
Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven. [Milton (1667), pg. 156]

The tenet inherent in almost all Christian doctrines of divine punishment<sup>1</sup> is that the punishment is merited by the unrepented actions and choices of the sinner in life – thus is of his own doing and choice. Dante put forward this notion in his imagery of Minos, Hell's dreadful judge:

So I descended from the first enclosure  
down to the Second Circle, that which girdles  
less space but grief more great, that goads to weeping.  
There dreadful Minos stands, gnashing his teeth:  
examining the sins of those who enter,  
he judges and assigns as his tail twines.  
I mean that when the spirit born to evil  
appears before him, it confesses all;  
and he, the connoisseur of sin, can tell  
the depth of hell appropriate to it;  
as many times as Minos wraps his tail  
around himself, that marks the sinner's level.  
Always there is a crowd that stands before him:  
each soul in turn advances toward that judgment;  
they speak and hear, then they are cast below. [Dante (c. 1319-21), pg. 28]

Hamlet confronts the Ghost and is told,

I am thy father's spirit,  
Doomed for a certain term to walk the night,  
And for the day confined to fast in fires,  
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature  
Are burnt and purged away. [Shakespeare (c. 1600-1), Act 1, scene V].

Finally, Dickens has Marley's Ghost confront Scrooge with this grim warning:

"It is required of every man," the Ghost returned, "that the spirit within him should walk abroad among his fellow-men, and travel far and wide; and if that spirit goes not forth in life, it is condemned to do so after death. It is doomed to wander through the world – oh, woe is me! and witness what it cannot share, but might have shared on earth, and turned to happiness!"  
Again the specter raised a cry, and shook its chain; and wrung his shadowy hands.  
"You are fettered," said Scrooge, trembling. "Tell me why?"  
"I wear the chain I forged in life," replied the Ghost. "I made it, link by link, and yard by yard; I girded it on of my own free will, and of my own free will I wore it. Is its pattern strange to *you*?"  
Scrooge trembled more and more.  
"Or would you know," pursued the Ghost, "the weight and length of the strong coil you bear yourself? It was full as heavy and long as this seven Christmas Eves ago. You have labored on it since. It's a ponderous chain!" [Dickens (1843), pg. 542]

This notion is not peculiar to Christianity. We find it in the *Torah*, the *Koran*, the *Bhagavad-Gita*,

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<sup>1</sup> the principal exceptions to this are predestination and the Catholic doctrine of Limbo, the first circle of Hell inhabited by those who lived before Christianity or without baptism [see Dante (c. 1319-21)].

and in the doctrines of *karma* in Eastern mysticism. Protestant doctrines of predestination that deny human freedom – e.g.,

The human will is like a beast of burden. If God mounts it, it wishes and goes as God wills; if Satan mounts it, it wishes and goes as Satan wills. Nor can it choose its rider. . . . The riders contend for its possession. . . . God foresees, foreordains, and accomplishes all things by an unchanging, eternal, and efficacious will. By this thunderbolt free will sinks shattered in the dust. [Luther (1525)]

– argue that man does not forge his own chains. But once human freedom of choice is denied, with it is denied all logical culpability and the Idea of morality itself is made self-contradictory outside the context of morality as *nothing* else than the logic of actions. For there then can be no objectively valid Obligation, no Duty, no citizen, no outlaw, and no criminal. Justice then has no real meaning whatsoever and nothing is left to law but organized vengeance in a state of nature.

Knowing that self-made "chains" could not be gotten rid of altogether, Rousseau sought instead to understand what smithing of chains might be possible that could simultaneously serve the purposes of civil order and still be held-legitimate by all men. He wrote,

One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 2]

Rousseau's answer was *by means of the convention of a social compact* based on the satisfaction of a certain *condition* of civil association and a *term* the compacting individuals must each satisfy. The condition he stated as,

The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. [*ibid.*, pg. 13]

The term he stated as,

Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will [of the association], and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole. [*ibid.*, pg. 14]

As I will show in this chapter, these accord with and are congruent with the mental physics of Self-determination, thus have objective validity for *homo noumenal* human Nature. The problem, which Rousseau did not successfully solve, lies in the empirical nature of human associations and in determining what *in concreto* the objects within these statements *mean*. What is "the whole common force," "the goods of each associate," the scope of how and manner in which the associates are held-to-be-united, what does it mean to "receive each member as an *indivisible* part of the whole," and, not least in importance, what is meant by "the general will"? These questions are empirical, and even within the delimited context of political government any propositions must likewise be empirical and, therefore, contingent. In the language of mathematics, the problem as he states it is left *ill-posed*. That is why he failed to solve it and why its solution has been historically elusive. Its resolution is provided by the metaphysic of the Social Contract.

If a social contract is to be anything but the idea of a phantom, it must be grounded in an objectively valid Idea congruent with the *homo noumenal* Nature of being-a-human-being. But the objective validity of any Idea can never be anything other than practical objective validity *as a regulative principle*. That is how we must *essentially* view the Idea of the Social Contract, and

this logical essence sets the requirements for and limitations on its deduction.

## § 1.2 The Headings of Approval in Accordance with Taste

Kant's headings of approval in accordance with taste are in the 2LAR arrangement [Kant (c. 1773-79), 15: 271]:

- **Quantity** – something that facilitates the differentiation of a manifold (*patterning* function);
- **Quality** – something that makes it possible to pull together a manifold (*coalescing* function);
- **Relation** – something that promotes intelligibility in sensations (*conceptualizing* function);
- **Modality** – something that promotes the distinction of a manifold from other manifolds (*precisioning* function).

These headings do not refer to any object of sensation or appearance because taste is adjudicated by the process of reflective judgment (specifically, aesthetical reflective judgment) and this process of judgment is entirely subjective. Hence, the headings of approval are synthetic functionals of a species of judgments called judgments of taste. These functionals pertain as equally to *Lust* in *psyche* (in which case, they are properly called functionals of taste) as to *Unlust* in *psyche* (in which case, they are properly called functionals of distaste).

Properly apprehending what Kant meant for us to understand by them requires us to set them in relationships to the four headings of judgments of taste Kant deduced in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* [Kant (1790)]. Their functional *Realerklärung* has its objective validity solely in their *application* in judgmentation in regard to what they do or lead to. In chapter 12 we saw that one important manifestation of judgments of taste, and the only one that directly concerns the subject-matter of this treatise, is that *human socializing and society formation originates from judgments of taste and develops as the capability for judgment of taste develops*.

Most Kant scholars tend to agree that *Critique of Judgment* (as it is commonly nicknamed) was a work of lesser writing craftsmanship than the first two great Critiques. Its organization is not all that systematic, it is difficult to follow, and in many places it is easy to interpret it to be making statements contradictory to other statements it had just finished making. In my opinion, Kant's brief little note in the *Reflexionen* [Kant (c. 1773-79), 15: 271] adds as much to the ability to comprehend *Critique of Judgment* as the *Critique* does to it. I find it something of a puzzle as to why Kant omitted the headings of approval from that work. Whatever the reason might have been, I will set them down here one by one in relationship to the pertinent conclusions Kant drew about the phenomenon of taste in the *Critique*.

**§ 1.2.1 Patterning.** In the *Critique* Kant wrote that all judgments of taste are *logically singular* judgments [Kant (1790), 5: 215] because they have *subjective* (aesthetical) validity but not universal *objective* validity. As incredible as it sounds, there actually *are* people who do not like Grape Nehi. However, Kant also tells us that the aesthetical Quantity of judgments of taste has *Allgemeinheit* (*subjective* generality/universality). Hence, a little boy who likes Grape Nehi thinks there is something wrong with another little boy who dislikes it because he thinks *everyone* ought to like Grape Nehi. Its likeability is, to him, *selbstverständlich*. We see adults being judgmental in the same way when one person says of another, "He has no taste."

The synthesis of the notion of a logically singular judgment (theoretical Standpoint) with an aesthetically universal one (judicial Standpoint) is *practically particular* (practical Standpoint). If you happen to be enraptured listening to Tchaikovsky's *Nutcracker Suite*, you are not enraptured by classical music in general but by that piece in particular. Hence in colloquial American speech we say of one little boy, "He is particular to Grape Nehi," and of another, "He isn't too particular to it." The practical notion of "having a fondness for" something is synonymous in expression in

American speech with making a judgment of the type logicians call "particular."

The capacity for being able to make such a judgment necessarily requires for its possibility a function of judgmentation that aggregates a multitude of *parástases* into a common set, and this set is called *the manifold* in extensive representation. In aggregating the manifold, some *parástases* are included, others excluded. The manifold is made a *parástase* differentiated from the *parástases* of all other manifolds.

Now, a *pattern* is an arrangement of form as a grouping or distribution of elements. In this context, a mathematical set *is* a pattern. *Patterning* is the act of representing such a form. The ability to carry out the act necessarily implies *a priori* the *Dasein* of a mathematical function for actualizing the act. This is the practical meaning of the patterning functional in the headings of approval in accordance with taste.

**§ 1.2.2 Coalescing.** It has been said, and I think fairly, that Kant's writing in *Critique of Judgment* approached the heights of opacity in his discussion of Quality in judgments of taste. The notion of the coalescing functional of taste brings, I think, a great deal more clarity to what Kant was saying in the *Critique*. The very first thing he tells us about judgments of taste is that they are *aesthetic* judgments [Kant (1790), 5: 203]. This means they are all adjudicated by the process of aesthetical reflective judgment, and this means that aesthetical reflective judgments mark what is to be consciously represented in the synthesis of apprehension. The process of aesthetical reflective judgment judges sense.

But judgments of taste pertain to the entirety of the process of *judgmentation*, not merely to just the process of reflective judgment. In *Critical metaphysics*, *motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation*. This is one of the fundamental animating principles of *psyche* [Wells (2009), chap. 4]. This point is crucial for correctly understanding what Kant had to say about the Quality of judgments of taste. The functional of Quality in judgment of taste services the motivational dynamic in judgmentation (figure 13.1).




Figure 13.1: Functional organization of the motivational dynamic in judgmentation.

Kant tells us that judgments of taste make no immediate reference to either appetitive power or to cognition of an object [Kant (1790), 5: 208-9]. They do not combine a satisfaction with the actual *Existenz* (or, in the case of distaste, with the actual non-*Existenz*) of any object. This is to say they do not pertain to any particular forms of appearances or acts of motoregulatory expression. For this reason, the satisfaction judged is said to be a *disinterested satisfaction*, by which he meant it pertained to no interest of appetitive power or of determining judgment. It does however pertain to an *aesthetic interest*, and this interest is none other than that of thorough-going harmony and agreement in the processes of perceiving – specifically, bringing equilibrium to the free play of imagination and understanding through judgmentation (figure 13.1).

This interest is served by affectively expedient representations of manifolds in sensibility. The functional of Quantity in judgment of taste aggregated a manifold in representation, but mere aggregation by itself is not sufficient for compliance with the Critical acroam of formal expedience. The manifold must be logically singular in its sensible representation. This means that the elements of the manifold are not merely heaped together side by side, so to speak, but *fused* into *one parástase*. This is what Kant meant when he wrote that the approval of taste requires "something that makes it possible to pull together a manifold." That something is a functional and, specifically, it is the coalescing functional of taste.

When the free play of the process of imagination and the process of determining judgment lock together to make a stable equilibrium cycle in their co-determined operations, this is, in a manner of speaking, "as good it gets" aesthetically for representation of perceptions. If the boxes in figure 13.1 were mathematical neural network subsystems, a neural network theorist would say that the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension, the processes of recognition and reproduction in imagination, and the process of determining judgment were in a state called a *resonance*<sup>2</sup>. This is a state of stable cyclic representing – what mathematical system theorists call a limit cycle – and the *Existenz* of such a cycle is necessary for the possibility of equilibrium. The divers moment-by-moment presentations in conscious sensibility are *fused together* by a stable cycle, and the process of achieving this stability is the practical meaning of the term accommodation of perception.

This mathematical explanation is the formal representation of a phenomenon long known to psychologists called *syncretism*. William James wrote,

The next point to make clear is that, *however complex the object may be, the thought of it is one undivided state of consciousness. . . . Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind. . . . An analysis of what passes through the mind as we utter the phrase the pack of cards is on the table will, I hope, make this clear, and may at the same time condense into a concrete example . . .*

It takes time to utter the phrase. . . . Every part of it will then stand for a fraction, every point for an instant, of the time. Of course the thought has *time-parts*. . . . Now I say of these time-parts that we cannot take any one of them so short that it will not after some fashion or other be a thought of the whole object 'the pack of cards is on the table.' They melt into each other like dissolving views, and no two of them feel the object just alike, but each feels the total object in a unitary undivided way. This is what I mean by denying that in the thought any parts can be found corresponding to the object's parts. Time-parts are not such parts. [James (1890), vol. I, pp. 276-279]

Elsewhere James remarks, "Anything that *can* be fused together *is* fused together." What he describes here is the general phenomenon of syncretism. Syncretism in general is not merely the

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<sup>2</sup> Resonance theory is a topic of major importance within mathematical neural network theory.

fusing of elements of perception in one moment in time, but pertains to the fusing of successive moments in time as well. This is a distinguishing character of syncretism that some ontology-centered psychologists have tended to overlook by focusing all their attention to mere syncretism at a particular moment in time. Syncretism belongs to the entirety of the cycle of judgmentation. The aesthetic functional of syncretism in judgmentation is the coalescing functional of taste.

**§ 1.2.3 Conceptualizing.** Motivation is the accommodation of perception. *Concepts are an instrument of judgmentation for achieving accommodation of perception.* Indeed, from the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics, *formal expedience for accommodation of perception is the purposive function of the manifold of concepts in judgmentation and concepts are an instrument of motivation.*

Kant wrote that Relation in a judgment of taste has a form of expedience as its ground. The approval of taste is, in this context, the approval of an "in-forming" of overall perception. Concepts in the manifold of concepts are *made symbolic in intuition* when their intuitions are first marked by reflective judgment in the process of thinking. This is the meaning of the Latin word *informatio*, the act of mental conception. A judgment of taste makes no direct reference to appetitive power, *but the symbolism built into a concept does* through teleological reflective judgment (all meanings are, at root, practical), and marks the intuition as expedient in motivation. All concepts *originate* as intuitions in sensibility, and all intuitions are *made* intuitions by being marked as such by an act of reflective judgment. The possibility of the act necessarily requires an *a priori* function to realize the act; this is the conceptualizing functional of judgment of taste. This functional *is* the "something that promotes intelligibility in sensation."

James also wrote,

The function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct and permanent subject of discourse is called CONCEPTION; and the thoughts which are its vehicles are called *concepts*. . . . The word 'conception' is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither the mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but the relation between the two, namely the *function* of the mental state in signifying just that particular thing. [*ibid.*, pg. 461]

Had Kant still been around in 1890, he would have said that James got this right. What did not occur to James is that his function is the Relation functional of judgment of taste.

**§ 1.2.4 Precisioning.** I use the word "precisioning" to mean *the act of making precise*. It is not a word found in Webster's Dictionary (or, at least, wasn't in 1962), but it is the proper direct translation of the Latin word *praecisio*, which to the Romans meant the act of amputation or the act of lopping off an extremity. This is what we do when we make a concept precise; it is every bit as important to specify what the concept *does not* mean as it is to specify what it *does* mean, and in some cases the former is more important than the latter. We "lop off" connotations and contexts that are outside the sphere of its Object. Kant used a Germanized form of the word *praecisio* in the *Reflexionen*. In figure 13.1 this is what the function of abstraction in the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension does in the making of an intuition.

Modality in judgment is always a judgment of a judgment. Kant tells us that Modality in a judgment of taste ascribes a conditioned necessity to the judgment:

Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be recognized *a priori* that everyone *will feel* this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me; nor a practical necessity where through ideas of a rational will, fit for rules for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary consequence of an objective law and signifies nothing other than that one by all means (without a further aim) ought to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called

*exemplary*, i.e., a necessity of the assent of *all* to a judgment that is esteemed as an example of a universal rule that one cannot state. Since an aesthetic judgment is not an objective and cognition-judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Much less can it be embraced from the universality of experience (from a prevailing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly procure such sufficient covering to this, but no concept of necessity grounded on these judgments is permitted. [Kant (1790), 5: 236-237]

The person will ascribe assent to his judgment of taste by everyone else. He will be nonplussed to discover someone else does not assent to it, and will feel that everyone *should* agree with his judgment of taste. This is the peculiarity of aesthetically conditioned necessity.

This natural imputation the person makes – that everyone else necessarily feels the way he does about something – is a central feature of egocentrism. Egocentrism is vividly displayed by young children and this aesthetic Modality is still discovered in the behavior of adults. It is an ascribing of what is usually called "common sense" to people in general. But, in fact, the notion of common sense is refuted empirically and the idea of a common sense is a mere fiction of the phenomenon of judgment of taste. Nonetheless, the conditioned necessity of Modality in taste gives rise to attempts to communicate the fundamentally *autistic* experience of feelings, and this is what gives rise to the Idea of *sensus communis* discussed in chapter 12 earlier.

The Idea has objective validity only as a regulative principle of judgmentation for communicating affectivity. Here the *exemplary* character of Modality in taste comes to the fore in expression by means of the person using an object as an example because he supposes everyone else will feel about that object as he does. Hence arise such vivid metaphors as "icy rage" or "burning passion." It gives rise to some of the most stirring passages of imagery in great poetry, as, e.g., exemplified by

'Tis the last rose of summer  
Left blooming alone; All her lovely companions  
Are faded and gone. No flower of her kindred,  
No rose bud is nigh To reflect back her blushes  
Or give sigh for sigh.  
I'll not leave thee, though lone one!  
To pine on the stem; Since the lovely are sleeping,  
Go, sleep thou with them. Thus kindly I scatter  
Thy leaves o'er the bed Where thy mates of the garden  
Lie scentless and dead.  
So soon may I follow  
When friendships decay, And from Love's shining circle  
The gems drop away. When true hearts lie withered  
And fond ones are flown, Oh! who would inhabit  
This bleak world alone! – Thomas Moore, *The Last Rose of Summer*

Does this say "loneliness" to you? If it doesn't, you probably don't like Grape Nehi.

Now, in some contexts the image of a rose seems to implicate joyous feelings, e.g.,

O, my Love is like a red, red rose,  
That's newly sprung in June.  
O, my Love is like the melody  
That's sweetly played in tune. – Robert Burns, *A Red, Red Rose*, st. 1

In other contexts, such as Moore's above, the image is used to opposite effect. All meanings are conditioned by contexts. But why do human beings *have* notions of contexts? There are no

specific local laws in either the process of determining judgment, of reflective judgment, or of practical judgment that stands as a "law of context" for thinking, affectivity, or action. How, then, are contexts possible? The answer is that contexts manifest the precisioning functional of taste in the *overall process* of judgmentation. The functional of Modality in taste, precisioning, stands as the "something that promotes distinction from all other possibilities" *by forming context*.

§ 1.3 First Examination of the 2LAR structure of the Social Contract

I stated in chapter 12 that the Idea of the Social Contract is an Idea of an optimization process for the motivational dynamic. Now, every optimization processes requires: (1) a standard of optimization, and this is the Modality notion of optimization; (2) an Object that contains the idea of an object being optimized, and this is the Quantity notion of optimization; (3) an ideal, i.e., the representation of a perfect instantiation, and this is the Quality notion of optimization; and (4) a process of optimization, and this is the Relation notion. We have now come to the point where we can identify *approval of taste* as the Modality notion of the Idea of the Social Contract. Taste sets the standard *a priori* for human socialization and Community-formation, and we have seen that this is an aesthetical standard in Critical metaphysics.

Next to be taken up is the Quantity notion, the what-that-is-being-optimized. I have previously given a few broad hints as to what this something is. It is time to be specific. A person enters into (or refuses to enter into) Obligations of Community in order to serve a Duty-to-himself, and this Duty is nothing else than Progress and Order in his *Personfähigkeit* (power of his person). The notion of *Personfähigkeit* is the notion of Quantity in the Idea of the Social Contract.

Now, the idea of *Personfähigkeit* is an idea of an Object. Its introduction and explanation so far has employed the theoretical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. *Prima facie*, this is enough to alert us to an upcoming issue with which we must deal, because taste belongs to judicial Standpoint. We cannot put a proper 2LAR together out of notions in different Standpoints.




Figure 13.2: Thinking and judgmentation structure

This issue will soon be dealt with. Right now let us review the headings of *Personfähigkeit*. These are: (1) physical power of the person, which is Quantity; (2) intellectual power of the person, which is Quality; (3) tangible power of the person, which is Relation; and (4) the person's power of persuasion, which is Modality.

The ideal of optimization for the motivational dynamic is easily grasped. Its idea has been a recurrent theme throughout this treatise. The original notion of Quality optimization of the motivational dynamic is *equilibrium*, the notion of final purpose in the *homo noumenal* person and *the* fundamental law of pure practical Reason. Equilibrium is the effect sought after in all Reason-governed actions of the human being, and lack of it is the first cause of all acts of pure Reason. I have not yet presented a 2LAR structure for equilibrium, but that will soon be done.

Lastly, the notion of Relation for the Idea of the Social Contract must be identified. This is the notion of the process of optimization by which phenomena of social compacting are made actual. We earlier saw that Kant defined Critical anthropology as the empirical science of what man makes of himself. This notion, that it is the person who *makes himself* the person he chooses to become, has been central to all the notions and ideas of Critical *Moralität* with which we have dealt in this treatise. The notion is basic in the Idea of Self-determination and human freedom. Now, grounding every idea of an empirical science there must be a metaphysical Idea of the Object of that science, and this Object *can never be empirical*. We have already come across the Idea of Relation for the context of the Idea of the Social Contract. It is *the anthropological person*.

I think it not-unlikely that the notion of regarding the anthropological person as either any sort of process or as any sort of notion of Relation might strike many people initially as being very strange indeed. We do not, after all, usually put the idea of a person into an idea of person-as-process in our experiential dealings with the world, and the most typical contexts putting "person" together with the word "relation" are contexts such as "Uncle Marvin" or "Aunt Hazel." What in the world, then, does it mean to say there is a notion of the anthropological person that is a notion of Relation in a process of optimization?

The very question presents the clue to the answer. At the end of his life, Kant was wrestling with the question of man and man's place in the world. It is, likely enough, probably still true that most people from time to time will ask those famous metaphysical questions, "What is the Meaning of Life?" and "What is my Purpose in this World?" For many people these questions might occupy no more than an occasional few minutes of sublime and melancholy reflection before type- $\alpha$  compensation behavior rides to the rescue of equilibrium and one "deals with" the issue by "getting on with life." Some poets, on the other hand, seem to get a sublime satisfaction out of obsessing on them for a longer while than most people, as, e.g., Housman tended to do:

The time you won your town the race  
We chaired you through the market-place;  
Man and boy stood cheering by,  
And home we bore you shoulder-high.

Today the road all runners come,  
Shoulder-high we bring you home,  
And set you at your threshold down,  
Townsmen of a stiller town.

Smart lad, to slip betimes away  
From fields where glory does not stay  
And early though the laurel grows  
It withers quicker than the rose.

Eyes the shady night has shut

Cannot see the record cut,  
And silence sounds no worse than cheers  
After earth has stopped the ears:

Now you will not swell the rout  
Of lads that wore their honors out,  
Runners whom renown outran  
And the name died before the man.

So set, before its echoes fade,  
The fleet foot on the sill of shade,  
And hold to the low lintel up  
The still-defended challenge-cup.

And round that early-laurelled head  
Will flock to gaze the strengthless dead,  
And find unwithered on its curls  
The garland briefer than a girl's.     – A.E. Housman, *A Shropshire Lad*, XIX.<sup>3</sup>

For Kant, a professional philosopher of the first rank, it seems almost a duty of his office that he should eventually have to come to grips with such questions.

In his case, his grappling is preserved in the pages of his unfinished last work, the *Opus Postumum* [Kant (1804)]. For Kant, with that theocentric bias that seems characteristic of him, the answer was to be sought in a system of, as he put it,


God, the world and consciousness of my *Existenz* in the world  
in space and time.  
The first is *noumenon*, the second *phaenomenon*, the third causality of the  
Self-determination of the Subject into consciousness of his personality:  
That is, in freedom in relationships of the All of Being in general.  
[Kant (1804), 21: 24]

Perhaps a somewhat long-winded and rather grandiloquent way of asking "Why am I here?" and "What's this all about?", but here we have it.

We will, of course, forego Kant's recourse to the mysticism of God, as this is neither suitable nor possible for any purpose of science, nor is it necessary for the Idea of the Social Contract. For our purposes God is not our *noumenal* Object but, rather, this role is filled by the synthesis of Kant's other two notions named here. This is the synthesis of *homo phaenomenal* Object and *homo noumenal* causality of the Self-determinations of men as freely-acting beings. The first references a notion of substance & accident, the second a notion of causality & dependency, and therefore the synthetic outcome references a notion of the category of community in Critical metaphysics [Kant (1787), B: 111-112]. The synthetic Object is man as *concurrently* object-in-Nature and partial-cause-of-Nature. This contains the notion of man-in-*commercium* with the world, and that is the contextual notion of the anthropological person *as a cosmological principle* for the Idea of the Social Contract.

We have for the four headings of the anthropological person: *psyche*-teleology (Quantity), *psyche*-aesthetics (Quality), *Anordnungsvermögen* (Relation) and *Anordnungskräfte* (Modality). The first two headings are the divisions of the Self-composed person, while the latter two are the divisions of the orderly person.

<sup>3</sup> Housman (1859-1936) makes my personal top tier list of all-time-most-gloomy-poets. This excerpt, "To an Athlete Dying Young," is one of his more upbeat stanzas in *A Shropshire Lad*. You might think he was one of those poets traumatized by World War I, but *A Shropshire Lad* was written in 1896.



**Figure 13.3:** 2LAR structure of the Idea of the Social Contract.

The Modality heading for the Idea of the Social Contract is the approval of taste. We have just looked at its four 2LAR headings of patterning, coalescing, conceptualizing, and precisioning. Except for the heading of equilibrium, the heads of the 2LAR of the Social Contract Idea have themselves been presented as 2LARs. Mathematically, this means the Idea of the Social Contract is minimally represented by the structure of a 4LAR. Once each of the sixteen 4LAR headings are explained in terms of three synthetic functionals (*momenta*), the number of mathematically possible *forms* of social contract capable of being synthesized is an impressive 43 million ( $3^{16}$ ).

If we had a list of names for each of these possible forms and read one name every second, it would take a little over one year and four months of continuous reading just to read the list (four years if one only read for eight hours a day). The impracticality of attempting such a Walrus-and-the-Carpenter exercise, i.e.,

The Walrus and the Carpenter  
Were walking hand in hand:  
They wept like anything to see  
Such quantities of sand.  
"If this were only cleared away,"  
They said, "it would be grand!"

"If seven maids with seven mops  
Swept it for half a year,  
Do you suppose," the Walrus said,  
"That they could get it clear?"  
"I doubt it," said the Carpenter,  
And shed a bitter tear.

– Lewis Carroll, *The Walrus and the Carpenter*

is, I trust, *selbstverständlich* to you. Even a partial analysis proceeding from 4LAR *momenta* presumes we already knew some select subset of social contract forms that were empirically most important – but to make such a selection we would still first have to have the entire list of 43 million forms and then we would have to examine the entire histories of every social science and every social practice capable of being made a science in order to have a basis for selection. It is therefore clear that simple-minded analysis has already run its course at the 4LAR division, and if the Idea of the Social Contract is to yield up a *useful* theory, we must resort instead to *general principles of synthesis* that can be applied to the list of headings we already have. To have real objective validity for science, these principles must be *grounded in Critical metaphysics*.

The names of the grounding acroams for deducing them are provided in figure 13.3 at the four arrow tips. These names are likewise the names of the four headings of Critical metaphysics proper, i.e., Rational Physics (metaphysics of Quantity in epistemology), Rational Psychology (metaphysics of Quality in epistemology), Rational Cosmology (metaphysics of Relation in epistemology), and Rational Theology (metaphysics of Modality in epistemology). The epistemological topics of these four branches are, respectively, Objects of outer sense (Quantity), Objects of inner sense (Quality), Nature (Relation), and Reality-in-general (Modality) [Wells (2009), chapter 2]. The acroams themselves are none other than the transcendental Ideas, the regulative first principles of mind-in-action. Because (1) the Idea of the Social Contract is to be an Object of science, and (2) all useful sciences are practical, the transcendental Ideas must here be viewed from the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology.

The four governing acroams are these. For Rational Physics we have ***the acroam of practical unity in the synthesis of appearances***. The physical Idea breaks down into four headings as: in Quantity, Axioms of Intuition (the extensive magnitude in an intuition is the aggregation of effects in sense of those practical acts of appetitive expression that are validated under the manifold of rules); (2) in Quality, Anticipations of Perceptions (the degree of perception is a consequence of the regulation of sensibility through validation acts of reflective judgment); (3) in Relation, Analogies of Experience (the rule of determination of relationships in perception is the enforcement of continuity in *Self-Existenz* by acts of validation in practical Reason); and (4) in Modality, practical Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General (practical impossibility = those acts that cannot be validated under the condition of the manifold of rules are impossible; practical actuality = the act of reflective judgment that coheres with the conditions of the manifold of rules becomes an action; and practical necessitation = that whose context with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of valuation is made necessary).

For Rational Psychology we have ***the acroam of practical absolute unity of the thinking Subject*** (the human being). The psychological Idea breaks down as: (1) in Quantity, unconditioned unity of the rules of action in the multiplicity in subjective time; (2) in Quality, unconditioned unity of value (compatibility of desires and the rule structure of the manifold of rules); (3) in Relation, unconditioned unity of all three-way relationships of interest, valuation, and cognition; and, (4) in Modality, unconditioned unity in the apperception of coherence in the Ideal of *summum bonum*. The Ideal of *summum bonum* is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason.

For Rational Cosmology we have ***the acroam of practical absolute completion in any series of conditions***. The cosmological Idea breaks down as: (1) in Quantity, absolute completeness in the composition of all wants; (2) in Quality, absolute value in the division of a given whole of *Existenz* = every fine division or breakdown of detail is grounded in an absolute value, vested in the making of that division or breakdown, that stands as a regulative principle of a reason for doing an analysis; (3) in Relation, the principle of the origin of appearances through conformity with an equilibrated structure of practical rules; and (4) in Modality, the principle that absolute completeness of the changeable in appearance is sought through apperception of *Existenz* in relationship to the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*.

Finally, for Rational Theology we have ***the acroam of practical absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thinking in general***. The theological Idea breaks down as: (1) in Quantity, the principle of synthesis of all practical perfections in one Object, namely *universal law* subsisting in a manifold of rules; (2) in Quality, the regulative principle of good choice under an original Ideal of absolute goodness (i.e., the Ideal of *summum bonum*); (3) in Relation, the principle of structuring the context of actions in the manifold of rules in Relation according to the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*; and (4) in Modality, the principle of coherence of all actions with the Ideal of *summum bonum*.

Although the terminology of Rational Theology borrows heavily from religious terminology (another gift, perhaps, of Kant's theocentric bias, although the specific terminology was current in philosophy in his day), you can see (I hope) that Rational Theology is a scientific metaphysic and has nothing whatsoever to do with any religious doctrine or with any notions of deities. Real science can never venture beyond its proper boundaries, where theory and empirical experience are connected, and journey into the speculative fogbank of the supernatural. Any doctrine that proposes to do so, no matter how rational it might sound, is a pseudo-science. It matters not if the deity in question hurls lightning bolts or is vested in any specious notion of the pseudo-causative magic of mathematical probability theory *or any other secondary quantity of pure mathematics*<sup>4</sup>. *In mundo non datur casus, in mundo non datur fatum*. If one thinks otherwise, he is no more a real scientist than the shamans of so-called creation science or the South Pacific witch doctors of the cargo cult who built totemic air traffic control towers after the end of World War II<sup>5</sup>.

The gathering, tidying up and elucidation of Kant's Critical acroams in 2LAR form and in full context with the Critical Standpoints was carried out in Wells (2006) and presented in rather more digestible form in Wells (2009). The accomplishment is greatly indebted to Palmquist's discovery of Kant's system of perspectives [Palmquist (1993)]. Wells (2011) provides a concrete illustration of how the acroams are formally employed in the synthesis of a theory. I deem it not-unlikely that whole volumes could be written on the subject of how to apply the acroams efficiently. I think that the development of social-natural sciences likely will eventually bring this to pass. At the present state of the sciences and for the purposes of this treatise, however, what seems to me to be most logically essential is to clearly set out a few crucial points on the context of their proper employment. With the context in hand, application-in-detail can follow at a later time.

First, many of the specific terms used in the statements of the acroams above – such as "want," "value," "valuation," and "enforcement of law" – are technical terms in the mental physics of the motivational dynamic. I refer the reader who wishes to understand these terms in more detail to Wells (2009), chapter 10, as the source of consultation. Second, one must note the thorough-going context of the categorical imperative and the process of practical perfection that envelops the practical Standpoint of the transcendental Ideas. The Idea of the Social Contract is intimately bound up with the individual human being's development of his personal practical tenets and maxims in his manifold of rules, and therefore is intimately bound up with Critical *Moralität*. Third, and probably most important of all, the acroamatic regulations pertain immediately to the general determination of *actions taken in the particular*. The early chapters of this treatise set out the mathematical idea of social-chemistry and the theory of embedding fields as the mathematical context for scientific development of social-natural theory. The middle chapters were concerned with elements of the empirical psychology of interpersonal interactions. The governing acroams of figure 13.3 reinforce the individual human being as the social atom and our proper topic of research and theory. *All broader social effects are cooperative phenomena that emerge as direct consequences of person-to-person social chemistry*. In making this statement, I do not present it as a speculative opinion merely. *The evolutionary development of global social regularities out of interactions is a mathematical outcome of the theory of embedding fields* and therefore is an already-known theorem of mental physics [Grossberg (1982), pp. 379-424]. The only thing that has been added to the mathematical development carried out by Grossberg is the real context of mental physics, which establishes *practical objective validity* for the *mathematical* theory.

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<sup>4</sup> Physics, I am sorry to report, has fallen heavily into the trap of such pseudo-causative speculation over the course of the past forty years. All doctrines based on this un-lovely form of deity are specious. I implore the community of physicists to turn back from this course before you make yourselves become modern Neo-Platonists and succumb to Baconian idol-worship. That is the path physics is taking today.

<sup>5</sup> If you are a young adult in high school or college and planning to become a professional scientist, you can benefit yourself greatly by reading Feynman (1974). It wouldn't hurt your teachers if they did so, too.

Finally, there is an important context for *doctrine of method* in building social-natural science. I said earlier in this treatise that social-natural science differs in kind from physical-natural science in that causation in the former must be treated as teleological causation, formally written in integral form and in accordance with the formal requirements of Margenau's law, whereas causation in the latter can never be other than physical cause-and-effect forms formally written in differential equation form. In *Critique of Judgment* Kant wrote,

An organized being<sup>6</sup> is thus not a mere machine, for that has solely *moving* power, but it [an organized being] has *developing* power, and indeed one that it imparts to matter which does not have it (it organizes): thus [it has] a self-propagating developing power which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that is, mechanism). . . .

The idea of a thing as in itself natural end is therefore not a constitutive concept of understanding or of reason, but it can still be a regulative idea for the reflecting power of judgment, for investigation into objects of this kind and pondering their highest ground in accordance with a remote analogy of our own causality in accordance with purposes; the latter not, of course, on behalf of range of knowledge of nature or its original ground, but rather, on the contrary, on behalf of the very same practical capacity of reason in us, in analogy with which we regard the cause of that purposiveness. [Kant (1790), 5: 374-375]

In the context of the Critical *Realerklärung* of life, a human being as *homo phaenomenon* is **dead-matter** and all his corporal *kinesis* is to be explained by physiology and biophysics in accordance with physical causality and dependency. A human being as *homo noumenon* is a very different matter altogether, because as *homo noumenon* a human being is **live-matter**. He is the original source and original cause of his own spontaneity and mental *kinesis*, the source of his own non-autonomic motoregulatory expressions, and the agent of his own actions. The Nature of his causality in this case does not lie in his physical Nature but, rather, his mental Nature, and this is the realm of *psychological* causality and dependency – which *is* teleological causality and dependency according to *purposes*. The student studies tonight *because* he has an exam tomorrow *and he wants to do his best on it*.

When a scientist develops a theory, he is acting in his capacity as *homo noumenon*. Behind his specific activities of theory-development, he has a purpose for what he is doing. It follows from this that *all* theories, physical-natural as well as social-natural, *are purposive in their origin*. The scientist can and does use (and occasionally misuse) teleological thinking to *guide* his contemplations of physical-nature. We have, however, come to understand that with regard to dead-matter experience, teleological causation is not objectively valid reasoning. It does not rain so that the crops will grow; the crops grow partly because it rained. The mere fact that beavers build dams does not make a beaver a civil engineer. An amoeba does not *hunt* for nutrients.

But when a scientist is studying social-Nature, he is studying phenomena for which the *root* causation lies in the *homo noumenal* Nature of human beings, and *here* the causation of mechanism (physical causality and dependency) is the causation that lacks objective validity. Nonetheless, the objective validity of positing the *Dasein* of human *developing power* is still vested in *empirical* experience, therefore laws of teleological causation *must necessarily be framed in mathematical form* by which it is possible to re-frame them in the form of differential equations that produce the empirical (temporal) form of "A occurs then B follows" – and this is Margenau's Law. Physicists know this under various names, such as Hamilton's principle or the principle of least action, *and they use this principle all the time* in their most fundamental theories. It is perhaps the most common example of teleological reasoning leading to non-teleological theory. This is basically a matter of convenience for a physical-natural scientist, and a

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<sup>6</sup> in other words, a human being

kind of luxury he has at his disposal. His mathematical tool for doing this is the calculus of variations. *For a social-natural scientist it is not a luxury but rather a necessity for his doctrine of method* because mechanistic causality and dependency lacks objective validity in application to phenomena of mind. **Social-natural science differs in kind from physical-natural science.** It cannot obtain its paradigms from the physics of blocks sliding down inclined planes.

## § 2. The 2LAR of Equilibrium

Critical *equilibrium* is a closed cycle of activity in which there are no innovations. Activity of this sort has a form that system theorists call a *limit cycle*. Regarded as an Object, equilibrium *per se* belongs to the logical division of *psyche* in the Organized Being model of mental physics because it pertains to the reciprocity of *nous* and *soma*. It is reflected in *nous* by the formula of the categorical imperative and manifested in *soma* by the phenomenal *Existenz* of various sorts of biological cycles (e.g. circadian rhythm, sleep-wake cycles, so-called "biorhythms," and other phenomena generically termed "biological clocks").

Adequate technical understanding of equilibrium does, of course, require a fuller explication than the *Realerklärung* just given provides. Although this explication has been part of the theory of mental physics from the beginning [Wells (2006), chapters 4, 15; Wells (2009), chapter 4], it came as a mild shock to me when writing this treatise when I realized that I have not before set down the 2LAR structure of equilibrium. Figure 13.4 corrects this embarrassing omission. It would seem that my vocational practices and training has provided me with such a taste for the notion of equilibrium that the notion has become *selbstverständlich* to me. On the other hand, the simple fact that a lot of technical training went into this developed "taste for equilibrium" is more than enough to warn that the notion is not so obvious to everyone. Because I somewhat pride myself in being clear, accurate and precise in my technical work, I probably would have found my prior omission of figure 13.4 more embarrassing were it not for the fact that a great many other technical people (e.g., psychologists, system theorists, mathematicians, physicists, physiologists) also treat this important notion so casually that I suspect it is *selbstverständlich* to them as well. Some scientists (neural network theorists come to mind) seem to take the idea so much for granted that they don't even mention it in their work even as they employ its notion.

The notions of equilibrium, adaptation, and schemes lurked just at, and more often just below, the surface in Piaget's earliest work in the 1920s [Piaget (1928) and (1930)] at a time when his attention was obviously given primarily to childish egocentrism and syncretism. Nonetheless, we find in these works *en passant* references or allusions to ideas that later became central in his work. For example, ideas first appearing in Piaget (1930) were later central in Piaget (1952).




Figure 13.4: 2LAR structure of *noumenal* equilibrium.

By the 1940s Piaget had more clearly become cognizant of the role equilibrium was playing in his research, e.g. Piaget (1947), but it wasn't until the 1970s that equilibrium had climbed to such a level of importance in Piaget's findings that he devoted a work specifically to it [Piaget (1975)]. Half a century might seem to most like a long time in coming but, on the other hand, although mathematicians have well-wrought common definitions for the concepts of limits and cycles, mathematics does not *yet* have a *generally* agreed upon definition for "limit cycle" accepted by all mathematicians. This is despite the importance the idea of a limit cycle has in the mathematical theory of autonomous systems (a class of Objects that are also sometimes called automata; the interested reader can refer to Boyce and DiPrima (1969), pp. 415-419). System theorists tend to bury the notion of equilibrium under the idea of stability-vs.-instability, and physicists tend to hold to entirely-too-narrow snippets of the idea. Among empirical scientists generally, only psychologists, psychiatrists and biologists have very much of a firm a grip on equilibrium's collar.

That equilibrium is a limit cycle is an exact theorem of mental physics and is derived directly from Critical epistemology. In probing deeper into the nature of this Object, i.e. in examining its Critical ontology, the first level of analytic representation divides it into two *functional invariants* of Organized Being. These are *adaptation actions* and *acts of organization*. That the ideas of adaptation and organization are objectively valid, and that it is objectively valid to call them functional invariants, was established in Wells (2006). Each of these, in turn, logically divides into its own matter-and-form structure, yielding Quantity and Quality from adaptation actions, and Relation and Modality from acts of organization (figure 13.4).

Historically, the empirical grounds necessitating the positing of the real *Dasein* of adaptation action, and its logical division into explicative and implicative functionals of actions, were discovered first [Piaget (1930), pp. 236-237]. Piaget wrote,

Up until [about age 3 years], reality coincided almost entirely with desire, and existed on a single plane, so to speak, without the child having ever become clearly conscious of intentions contrary to his own or definitely independent of them. The questions asked relate simply to the names of objects and to the place which they occupied after they have disappeared. Roughly speaking, the child takes cognizance at about three years old of the resistance set up by things and people; discord arises between desire and its realization. For a mentality that has not yet learnt to distinguish between thoughts and things, between animate and inanimate, between ego and non-ego, this discord can only be conceived as an intentional resistance on the part of people and things. The real, henceforth, becomes crowded with intentions ascribed first to other people, then to things . . . Thus the whole world becomes peopled in various degrees – not, it is true, with personified spirits, because at this age the child is still unconscious of its own personal unity and does not think of ascribing intentions to definite "I's" – but with intentions that are impersonal, so to speak, or at any rate improperly localized and multiform. . . .

This intentionalism gives rise to two fundamental categories or primitive functions of thought: the *explicative function* and the *implicative function*. These do not represent two separate departments of the mind, but describe two moments which are present in all mental activity. The explicative function is the centrifugal moment, in which the mind turns to the external world; the implicative function is the centripetal, in which the mind turns inwards to the analysis of intentions and their relations. . . .

The explicative functions arise out the need felt by the child, as soon as he becomes conscious of intentions, to project these into the world around him. . . . Thus the explicative function has two poles – psychological explanation and material explanation. These poles are close together at first and not easily distinguishable, but as time goes on they grow more and more distinct, though always held together by the fact that both are rooted in one and the same desire for explanation.

Owing to the fact, moreover, that the idea of intention first appears through the resistance

of reality, and in particular through the resistance of persons, everything seems to the child to obey some sort of necessity which is both moral and physical. Everything seems to him to be as it should be. So that the child's tendency will be, not only to project intentions into every object so as to explain events, but also to seek to account for everything, to justify every event, and to look for the connections existing between intentions. The explicatory function was centrifugal in this sense, that from the intention it sought to draw out the material consequence, the resultant act or event. The direction of the implicatory function is, on the contrary, centripetal, in the sense that from the intention, the mind seeks to trace its way back to the directing motive or idea. The explicatory function tends toward things, the implicatory function tends towards ideas or judgments. . . .

Thus the implicatory function also has two poles. First a psychological pole which it shares with the explicatory function and which causes the child to ask: "Why do people do so? etc." . . . The other pole is made up of questions about names, definitions, the reason for judgments, in a word, about everything concerning logical justification. . . . Thus the pole which is common to both functions, i.e., the psychological pole (psychological justification and explanation) serves both as a starting point and as a point of divergence for the two functions, explicatory and implicatory, which are at first confused and then grow more and more distinct. [Piaget (1930), pp. 232-236]

This lengthy quote, taken from the second edition of Piaget's first book, concerns the initial point of exploration in his work. Out of it grew, over time, more and more refinement to the nature of these "functions" (if Piaget had been a mathematician, he would have called them "functionals" rather than "functions"). This refinement eventually led to the more precise terms *accommodation of action schemes* (for the explicative functional) and *assimilation in action schemes* (for the implicative functional). Piaget studied the phenomena of assimilation and accommodation, and later also came to comprehend them as two poles of adaptation phenomena. Hence, as he later put it,

Now, to avoid the difficulties of teleological language, adaptation must be described as an equilibrium between the action of the organism on the environment and vice versa. . . . Mental assimilation is thus the incorporation of objects into patterns of behavior, these patterns being none other than the whole gamut of actions capable of active repetition. . . . This being so, we can then define adaptation as an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation, which amounts to the same as an equilibrium of interaction between subject and object. [Piaget (1947), pp. 8-9]

Piaget studied the phenomena of assimilation, accommodation and adaptation, but phenomena are insufficient for real-explanation, as every good theorist knows. In Critical theory, the more primal *Realerklärung* must be sought, and objective validity established, according to an unbending criterion of *what is necessary for the possibility of experience*. The phenomena come to us out of facts of experience. The *explanation* of phenomena can come from nowhere else but the soil of Critical epistemology. Explanation is something humans do; phenomena never explain themselves. Therefore *empirical* assimilation and accommodation require transcendental (that is, Critical) Ideas of assimilation and accommodation for their real-explanation (*Realerklärung*). This is, of course, what mental physics brings to the topic. Adaptation as equilibrium *means the synthesis of assimilation-and-accommodation through actions*.

As for organization, the real-explanation of organized phenomena seems to have proved more elusive to Piaget's admittedly considerable powers of explanation. The only place in the corpus of his work where he turns to the task of discussing the topic of organization in its own right comes over the space of a relatively few pages in the front of Piaget (1952). Even here his treatment of it is rather Platonic, does not actually follow proper logical form (an argumentative shortcoming for which Cicero would have likely jumped on him), and is more or less unsatisfactory. In my

opinion, Piaget's training as a zoologist likely led him to view the idea of organization as more or less *selbstverständlich*, and if so then he was a victim of his own judgmentation of taste.

What he did say that is objectively valid was,

This leads us to the function of *organization*. From the biological point of view, organization is inseparable from adaptation: They are two complementary processes of a single mechanism, the first being the internal aspect of the cycle of which adaptation constitutes the external aspect. With regard to intelligence, in its reflective as well as in its practical form, this dual phenomenon of functional totality and interdependence between organization and adaptation is again found. Concerning the relationships between the parts and the whole which determine the organization, it is sufficiently well known that every intellectual operation is always related to all the others and that its own elements are controlled by the same law. Every scheme is thus coordinated with all the other schemes and itself constitutes a totality with differentiated parts. Every act of intelligence presupposes a system of mutual implications and interconnected meanings. The relationships between this organization and adaptation are consequently the same as on the organic level. [Piaget (1952), pg. 7]

Phenomena we say manifest an idea of organization are again the empirical grounds that necessitate positing the real *Dasein* of organization. But, as in the case of adaptation, it is not sufficient to stop at these, and more primal explanation must be sought in Critical epistemology. This is, again, what mental physics brings to the topic by establishing the Critical *Realerklärung* of organization. If we look aside from Piaget's Platonic mathematical musings in *Origins* and give our attention instead to *how he used the idea in his theory*, what we find is that in all cases where notions of organization underlie explanation, these are notions of *functional regulating of scheme Gestaltung* and *functional determining of scheme forms*. The base in phenomenal experience for objective validity in these notions are behavioral phenomena exhibited as repetitive actions and compensation behaviors that are understood by inferring functional coordinators said to reflect an underlying *regulation* of action schemes. Piaget made this somewhat clear (although I think he might have made it much more clear than he did) in Piaget (1975).

Critical equilibrium, in its explanation in terms of adaptation and organization, pertains to the fundamental properties of *psyche* called *Lust-Kraft* and *Lust-organization* [Wells (2009), chapter 4]. *Lust-Kraft* is the synthesizing function of *Lust per se* in the adaptation dimension of *psyche*. *Lust-organization* is the function of unity in *psyche* for the practical and judicial Standpoints, and is the second dimension (the organization dimension) of *Lust per se*. Critical equilibrium is a primal notion of the basic governing acroam of animation in *psyche* called the *Lust Principle*<sup>7</sup>. Figure 13.5 presents the 3LAR structure of *Lust per se* in *psyche* just described.

As the functional of Quality in the Idea of the Social Contract, equilibrium is governed by the Critical acroam of the practical Psychological Idea: *practical absolute unity of the thinking Subject*. The objective validity of this Idea is entirely vested in understanding it as a regulative principle of pure Reason. Re-examining the four 2LAR headings of the Idea, what I call to your attention and consideration is that these headings: (1) refer to the motivational dynamic in the act of judgmentation; (2) that the Idea explicitly references the rule structure of the manifold of rules; and (3) that its Modality (the determining factor in judgment) indirectly references the categorical imperative by its reference to the Ideal of *summum bonum*. This means *equilibrium function is a function operating on and with the person's structure of practical tenets and maxims that make up and constitute his personal and private moral code*. Refer now back to Piaget's observation, "everything seems to the child to obey some sort of necessity which is . . . moral." Piaget seems to have seen this as an interesting peculiarity. *But it is more than this*. It is mental physics in action.

<sup>7</sup> not to be confused with Freud's *Lustprinzip*. See Wells (2009), chapter 4, pp. 159-162.




Figure 13.5: 3LAR structure of *Lust per se* in psyche.

The Critical Quality inherent in every social contracting phenomenon is therefore a moral Quality. But this is a *Moralität* which is: (1) *essentially* practical and deontological; (2) peculiar to each specific person (no *a priori* universal moral law applying to everyone); and (3) a product of each person's individual experience because the manifold of rules is a *constructed* manifold. The empirical character of the child's development of moral judgments is a direct consequence of the deontological Quality of equilibrium in social intercourse. It is, therefore, a logically essential factor in all psychological interpersonal interactions (chapter 8) and in all objectively valid theory of social chemistry.

### § 3. The Animating Principles of *Personfähigkeit*

We now turn to Quantity in the Idea of the Social Contract and its *a priori* regulation by the Critical acroam of practical Rational Physics. This is *Personfähigkeit* (power of the person). Its four headings, again, are physical power subsisting in capacities of body (Quantity), intellectual power subsisting in knowledge, intelligence and judgment (Quality), tangible power subsisting in stock of material personal goods, fungible skills and stock-of-time (Relation), and persuasive power subsisting in ability to sufficiently communicate thoughts and ideas to other persons and thereby gain their consent, cooperation or agreement (Modality).

The practical acroam of the Physical Idea is *practical unity in the synthesis of appearances*. Now, the notion of unity in the transcendental Ideas is a notion of one-ness, i.e., the notion of an object as *one thing*. The acroam itself is grounded in the unity of an Organized Being, specifically a human being. However, the *context* of the Social Contract is not an individual person but rather that of a Community of persons. Quantity in the Idea of the Social Contract is therefore not the *Personfähigkeit* of a single individual but, rather, must be a regulative Idea of the one-ness of the Community group of persons *regarded as a body politic*. This is a **corporate person** representing an abstract object (the Community). How, then, are we to understand the notion of the power of a corporate person?

To ask this is to inquire into what Critical ontology calls an **Ideal for understanding**. This Ideal is an Ideal of Critical Modality and, hence, an Ideal of the-object-in-Reality. In what way are we to understand the corporate person as an object-in-Reality? This inquiry begins with the 2LAR depiction of the Ideal in its four Critical headings. These are:

- in Quantity – the Critical acroam of *entis realissimi*<sup>8</sup>, which states: a real object has oneness;
- in Quality – the Critical acroam of *ens originarium*<sup>9</sup>, which states: the *Existenz* of an object is predicated from grounds;
- in Relation – the Critical acroam of *ens summum*<sup>10</sup>, which states: all real things have a context within All-of-Reality; and
- in Modality – the Critical acroam of *ens entium*<sup>11</sup>, which states: all real things are necessarily coherent in Reality.

The acroam of Quantity in Rational Physics states that the extensive magnitude in an intuition is the aggregation of effects in sense of those practical acts of appetitive expression that are validated under the manifold of rules. **Magnitude** is a *determination of an object according to which the apprehension of its intuition is represented as possible only through the repeated positing of homogeneous parts*. **Extensive magnitude** is *magnitude in which the representation of the parts precedes and makes possible the magnitude of the whole*. The acroam is an acroam of extensive magnitude standing as the major premise applied in the context of *entis realissimi* to the notion of Quantity in *Personfähigkeit* (the minor premise). The homogeneous units of extensive magnitude in Community are the physical powers of the individual persons who in aggregation compose that Community. In social-chemistry terminology, the corporate person is a *social molecule*.

Just as a molecule of water (H<sub>2</sub>O) is not a molecule of hydrogen (H<sub>2</sub>) and a half molecule of oxygen (O<sub>2</sub>) but is a different chemical entity, so the corporate person is a different entity than the persons who comprise it. Likewise, just as removing any atom from a molecule of water destroys the water molecule, so also removing any person from the body politic of a Community destroys that specific social-molecule. A new Community molecule might be a reaction product of this removal, but it will not be *the very same* Community. Critical ontology establishes objective validity for Rousseau's term clauses that each person *combines his personal power with those of every other person*, and that the Community regards each person in it *as an indivisible (non-separable) part of the whole*. But with this comes a mutation problem we must address.

What we understand with more clarity from the Critical analysis is that what is combined to form the body politic is the *physical* power of each person in it. This is to say that it is not enough for a person to merely be physically present in the geographic locality of the Community. Rather, his presence must be *civilly active*. He must personally *do something*, which is to say that each person must accept and attend to specific **civic Duties**, for the performance of which he can justly be held accountable by the Community-as-corporate-person. We will call this ***the animating principle of physical power of the corporate person***.

The acroam of Quality states that the degree of perception is a consequence of the regulation of sensibility through validation of acts of reflective judgment. Now, the notion of "degree of perception" is a very subtle notion in Critical epistemology and, indeed, in all of philosophy proper. Superficially regarded, the notion seems *selbstverständlich*. One can effortlessly distinguish between "bright light" and "dim light." It "hurts more" to have a tooth yanked out

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<sup>8</sup> "most real of being"

<sup>9</sup> "original being"

<sup>10</sup> "highest being"

<sup>11</sup> "essential being"; "being-in-essence." In Critical metaphysics, "being" all by itself is not a real predicate. "To be" is "to be *something*." Kant's four "*ens* terms" analyze what is necessary for holding-to-be-a-real-something. A real something possesses something in its extensive magnitude that composes its state-of-being, something in its intensive magnitude that originally distinguishes it as real, something that stands as a condition for completion of its *nexus* of in Nature, and something that delimits the scope of its coherence for determining its specific Reality (it's "quintessence" or "quintessential being") within All-of-Reality.

(without benefit of modern anesthetics) than to have a hair yanked out. What could be more self evident than this? However, the minute one digs a little deeper into what is meant by this notion, a host of perplexing issues are encountered. Bergson was probably the first philosopher to haul these issues squarely into the light and present the perplexities the notion of "degree of perception" contains [Bergson (1910)].

The notion of "degree" can be loosely described as "the amount of a quality." The meaning implication here is entirely bound up in *how to determine* "the amount of a quality." The idea is an entirely mathematical concept and belongs to the mathematical idea of ordering ( $A > B$ ; "x is less than y"; &etc.). What is *being ordered* pertains to intensive magnitude in a composition, and the mathematical *quantitative measure* ("the amount") of such an ordering most often employs the number-entity that mathematicians call a "real number."

***Intensive magnitude*** is a unity in which the idea of multiplicity can be represented by only an approximation to negation. If we say that darkness is the negation of light, then the intensive magnitude of light is represented (measured) by approximating "how far it is from not-being-light," i.e., how much of a diminution of "the quality of being light" is required to extinguish the perception of its appearance. *The quality is presented as a unity* – either there-is or there-is-not a "quality of light" perceived. The *degree* of that quality is a measure of the intensive magnitude of its real *Existenz* but is *understood* only by the notion of an opposition required to extinguish it.

To understand the Idea of the intellectual power of a corporate person we apply the acroam as major premise in the context of *ens originarium* and look for the grounds from which the *Existenz* of a corporate intellectual power can be predicated with objective validity. It is fairly trivial to see at the outset that corporate intellectual power cannot be predicated as some sort of summation of the individual intellectual qualities possessed by the persons in the Community. A quality we can realistically regard as being-an-intellectual-power does not come out of merely heaping individual opinions, judgments, and beliefs on top of each other and hoping these will somehow melt into a public power of knowledge, intelligence and judgment. If one piles things in a heap, one gets a heap – a multiplicity, not a unity. I think it likely that the experience of attending one Iowa political caucus would suffice to demonstrate the empirical un-reality of the notion of coalescence-by-heaping. Rousseau thought that voting could/would create consensus. He could hardly have been more naive in thinking so. Voting doesn't produce consensus; at best it produces mere concord, which is not at all the same thing as consensus<sup>12</sup>. At worst it produces disunity and anti-bonding. In like manner, the Idea of intellectual power of the corporate person is not the same thing as aggregated individual intellectual powers.

Here is where something Mill wrote has immediate pertinence for the question at hand:

When an institution, or a set of institutions, has the way prepared for it by the opinions, tastes, and habits of the people, they are not only more easily induced to accept it, but will more easily learn and will be, from the beginning better disposed, to do what is required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into such action as enables them to produce their best results. It would be a great mistake in any legislator not to shape his measures so as to take advantage of such pre-existing habits and feelings when available. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to elevate these mere aids and facilities

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<sup>12</sup> In Latin, *concordo* means "to be on good terms, to live in harmony." *Consensus* derives from *consentio* (to be of the same mind; to join in sensation) plus the suffix *-tus*, and thus means "the action that results from unanimity of mind or sensation." Modern English, unfortunately, has over time transferred the context of consensus over to the context of concord by letting the notion of "real unanimity" be replaced by that of "a willingness to acquiesce." My friend, if it's your cherished dream to ride over Niagara Falls in a barrel, I'll hold your coat for you and won't stop you from attempting it. But I think you're stupid to try it and I'm not coming with you. I'll *concord* with your trying it but don't expect *consensus* that it's a good idea.

into necessary conditions. People are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to; but people also learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first. There are abundant instances in which a whole people have been eager for untried things. The amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances, is itself one of the elements of the question. It is a quality which different nations, and different stages of civilization, differ much from one another. The capability of any given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of government cannot be pronounced on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity, must be the guides.

There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and advocate a particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for accepting or claiming, but also for working the institution [Mill (1861), pp. 7-8].


The body politic is an institution. Corporate knowledge *of* that institution is commonly understood knowledge, as an *intellectual property* of the corporate body, of concepts required to satisfy the conditions of its real *Existenz* and to fulfill those terms *that delimit the means* by which these conditions can and must be met and thereby *embody* its knowledge. Critical *intelligence per se*

is the *ability* of the Subject to which degree it has the power to represent what cannot by its own quality occur in the senses. The sensuous object is sensible; what otherwise is no part of [the sensuous] but is judged by intelligence is intelligible. In the old schools, the first was called *phaenomenon*, the latter *noumenon*. [Kant (1770), 2: 292]

This is the *Realerklärung* of intelligence from the theoretical Standpoint and is as much as to say that intelligence is the intelligible Nature of a human being regarded as *homo noumenon*. From the judicial Standpoint, intelligence is the capacity for adaptation of mental structures; from the practical Standpoint, intelligence is the capacity to constitute a state of equilibrium towards which tend all successful assimilatory and accommodatory interactions between an Organized Being and its environment.

The body politic is an organized institution, not an Organized Being. *Ipsa facto*, it cannot be held, with objective validity, to possess in itself any *power* of intelligence *per se* nor even so much as any sort of power of sense. Any objectively valid notion of corporate intellectual power can only subsist in a unity of manifested intellectual skills and talents of its members for making *practical judgments of civil actions*. However, the *ground* for positing the *Dasein* of any such corporate ability must be such that it is phenomenally available to the members of the Community, and this means an organized institutional capacity to provide actual means by which individual persons can each acquire and develop such skills and talents. ***The animating principle of intellectual power of the corporate person*** is the institution of means for the civic education of every member of the Community. ***Civic education*** is the teaching **and** learning of civil liberties, civil rights, civic Duties and civic Obligations of the Community. Providing the institution is a Community Obligation pledged to every member, and the member's participation, whereby each to the best of his personal ability accomplishes the aim of the institution, is a civic Duty owed by each member. It is a citizen's Duty to learn how to be a citizen.

The acroam of Relation states enforcement of continuity in Self-*Existenz* by acts of validation in practical Reason is the rule of determination of relationships in perception. Continuity in Self-*Existenz* refers to the Relation functional in the metaphysics of continuity, called the judicial Idea [Wells (2009), chapter 7, pp. 264-268]. Figure 13.6 illustrates the 2LAR of the judicial Idea.



**Figure 13.6:** The synthesis of continuity in *Self-Existenz* (the judicial Idea of continuity).

The synthesis of the judicial Idea (continuity in *Self-Existenz*) is a unification function. It joins teleological reflective judgment to Relation in adaptive *psyche* (somatic organization) under the Relation principle of continuity, *in mundo non datur casus* (chance is not given in the sensible world). The *momenta* in figure 13.6 are defined in Wells (2009), chapter 7, and these all pertain to the person's capacity for acting as the agent of his own causality & dependency phenomena through the motivational dynamic of judgmentation. When applied in the context of the corporate person the functional headings have the following interpretations: (1) in Quantity, actions taken by members are indicative of corporate unity or disunity; (2) in Quality, members can perceive communal disunity and trouble; (3) in Relation, actions reflect personal interests and intents; and (4) in Modality, all individual actions are taken in pursuit of happiness. Nothing in the Community happens by chance because chance is not an agent-object. It is merely an idea:

As we have seen constantly by contrast with operations, chance is gradually discovered, and it is by constant reference to the structures of operations that chance is finally understood and yields a system of probabilities. . . . The first [stage of development of the idea of chance] is before seven or eight years of age and is characterized by the absence of what are properly called operations, that is, a type of reversible composition. . . . From seven or eight to eleven or twelve years of age, a second period is characterized by the construction of operative groupings of a logical order, and by numerical sets, but on an essentially concrete plane, that is, related to objects which are able to be seen or handled in their actual relationships. Finally, a third period begins at eleven or twelve years of age characterized by formal thought, that is, by the possibility of tying together one or several systems of concrete operations at the same time, and in translating them into terms of their hypothetical-deductive implications, that is, into terms of the logic of their propositions. . . .

During the first of these three periods (before seven or eight years), the child does not distinguish the possible from the necessary. . . . His thought oscillates between the predictable and the unforeseen, but nothing for him is either predictable for certain (by which we mean deriving from necessity), or absolutely unforeseen (that is, fortuitous). . . . At this age there is neither chance nor probability because the system of reference based on deductive operations is lacking. . . . At about seven or eight years of age logical-arithmetical operations appear and this begins a second period marked by the first development of the idea of chance. . . . During the first period there is no differentiation between what is deducible and what is not. . . . During the second period there is a differentiation and hence an antithesis between chance and operations, these latter

determining the domain of the deducible while chance defines, therefore, the domain of the impossible and irreversible. In the course of stage III, on the contrary, there is a synthesis between chance and operations, the latter allowing the field of fortuitous distributions to be structured in a system of probabilities by a sort of analogous assimilation of the fortuitous with the operative. [Piaget & Inhelder (1951), pp. 212-216]

One important consequence this has for science is general is this. While stochastic models (that is to say, mathematical models incorporating notions of probability and statistics) have *strictly* formal and practical uses in science – incorporating unmodeled factors and unpredictable events ("fortuitous" occasions, i.e., coincidence)<sup>13</sup> into the study of complex systems – *no real ontological significance can ever be attached to these purely mathematical constructs.*

The judicial Idea is a law of *nous-soma* reciprocity in judgmentation. To apply the acroam in the context of the Social Contract, we apply it as the major premise in the context of *ens summum* and seek the *natural context* (context in Nature) in which the object has its real objective validity. The object in this case is the corporate person, and this object has real objective validity only for *phenomena* of social intercourse. Empirical appearances of such phenomena always involve actions in which the employment and/or acquisition of tangible powers of the interacting persons play a nucleating role. These employments are manifested in terms of tangible goods, fungible skills (intangible goods) and, always, investments of stock-of-time by the interacting persons (all the interacting persons *do something*). Furthermore, these employments always involve *attempts at exchanging* of these goods, even if the exchange is exhibited in nothing more than the *bonhomie* between a story-teller and a story-listener (an exchange that invests in social-chemical bonding)<sup>14</sup>. Understood in this context, the tangible power of a person *functions* like a "medium of exchange" or a "currency" or "money" in a *commercium* of social interaction.

As is discussed in a later section, the purposiveness in an exchange-attempt is directed at value structures of the interacting persons. Value structure is the practical manifold of rules insofar as this structure is viewed in a context with the presentations of reflective judgment. A value structure is a system of self-organizing transformations through adaptation, in relationship to which values constitute conditions for the assertion of rules. Value *per se* is the unity of the value structure regarded as the substratum upon which all particular values are viewed as limitations of value *per se*. In this context, social interaction can properly be said to be *valuable*. The proper epistemological *Realerklärung* of "value" is that a specific value is the form of an affective perception of a desire presented in an aesthetic Relation of sense-of-interest and understood from the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics proper. Motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation into the person's value structure<sup>15</sup>. All specific actions of motoregulatory expression are assimilation attempts and result in either a successful assimilation (satisfaction) or a frustration of assimilation (dissatisfaction). In the case of the latter, equilibrium is not achieved and further accommodation is necessitated under the

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<sup>13</sup> "Random" is just a word that means "unpredictable." "Unpredictable" means nothing more and nothing less than that one's model of Nature lacks a structured series of condition-conditioned prosyllogisms that permit a judgment of necessity, and that experience has demonstrated that the actual occurrence of some event *A* neither precludes nor foreshadows the actual occurrence of some second event *B*. Invocation of probability and statistics is merely a usefully refined way of saying, "I don't know for sure. Maybe." If one *reifies* probability by ascribing real ontological significance to it, one is doing nothing else than invoking the supposition of a miracle, and that is not *science* but rather a brand of religious Neo-Platonism.

<sup>14</sup> I am a person who enjoys telling a good story just as much as listening to one. I can testify that, for me, nothing takes the fun out of story-telling more than the appearance that the listener is not listening. That situation is called a failed exchange-attempt. People who don't listen to my story-telling probably don't like Grape Nehi.

<sup>15</sup> This is an animating principle of *psyche*.

formula of the categorical imperative.

Now, this explanation is the personal explanation, by which I mean that it is an explanation in terms of the motivation of the individual in a social exchange. To understand the concept in the context of a corporate person, we must regard the exchanges themselves as acts of attempted assimilation internal to the corporate person. Put in more concrete terms, the corporate person contains a system of social interactions in which purposiveness in *global* determination of social exchange dynamics is directed to adaptation of *the system* towards perfecting an *overall condition of equilibrium* in the system. Under the acronym of Relation, **the purposiveness subsists in employing individual tangible powers in such a way to continue the *Existenz* of a corporate person.** It is manifested by acts of individual tradeoffs done to reach a *cooperative* consensus.

Because such an equilibrium state can only be held objectively valid in terms of *expressed* actions of the individual persons, the *appearance* of the equilibrium state can only be judged in terms of actual appearances of individual actions and *never* in terms of the (unobservable by others) internal equilibrium states of the individuals (their particular mental states of equilibrium). Put in other words, equilibrium (and non-equilibrium) for the corporate person as system of social interaction is a notion having objective validity only with respect to *commercium* in social interactions. The empirically-based idea of *civil tranquility* is grounded in this Critical context of general *commercium*. Furthermore, because empirical appearances within this context all involve the employment of tangible power of the person by each person, it is appropriate to call the system of social *commercium* in the corporate person a **generalized system of social economy**. By this I mean *a system of self-regulating transformations within a corporate person actualized by means of social interactions employing personal tangible powers.*

**Social-economic utility**, a mathematical object, is defined by *degree of value satisficing in a generalized system of social economy*. Perfection of value satisficing (that is, acting to achieve global Progress in value realization) *in* this system can be properly called **social-economic utility optimization**. This is a notion of intensive magnitude for which the *degree of social-economic utility* is measurable only by means of a mathematical order structure. This is the analogue for the corporate person to perfection of the power of his person by the individual human being. (It is also the *real ground* for economics' notion of utility and for the notions of utilitarianism in consequentialist moral theory).

**Value-satisfaction** in the context of an Organized Being (a human being) is *the experience of a satisfaction resulting from an act of valuation in appetitive power*. However, a corporate person does not have a "corporate appetitive power" nor does it "experience" anything since it is not itself a living being. A different *mathematical* definition is required in this context. **Value-satisfaction in a corporate person** is measured by *degree of global non-equilibrium in the cyclic dynamics of social interactions occurring within the Community*. Value satisficing interactions reduce this and so value-satisfaction is a measure of *social-economic utility Progress available*. The degree of value-satisfaction measures *lack* of stable cyclic closure in action schemes of social interactions. This *observable* phenomenon is grounded in expressions of social conflict within the Community (civil un-tranquility), and this must be so because the opposite quality, Community satisfaction, is *not* an observable phenomenon of group-level human social-Nature. A high degree of value-satisfaction indicates the association is failing to satisfy its members.

From here we can come directly to the principle we seek. **The animating principle of tangible power of the corporate person is social-economic utility optimization**. By this last term I mean *minimization of the degree of intensive magnitude of uncivic social interactions within the Community*. Note that it is not objectively valid to speak of maximizing the degree of intensive magnitude of social-economic utility because there is no objectively-valid measure of this. Intensive magnitude is a unity in which the idea of multiplicity can be represented by only an

approximation to negation. Properly speaking, the internal social dynamic of the corporate person is not aimed at maximizing communal happiness but, rather, minimizing *disutility*.

The 19th century Scottish essayist and historian Thomas Carlyle used to refer to political economy and economics as "the Dismal Science." Perhaps there is nothing more to it than my own personal judgment of taste, but I find it humorous that the real objective validity in such a basic economic notion as "utility" has none but a "negative" measure in social-natural science, implying Carlyle was not too far off base in the way he regarded the science of economics. By the way, this *also* implies that social-natural economics has more to do with deontological morality than with Epicurean good. *Civil* social-natural economic systems are institutions of *Moralität*.

I think there is something it is wise to re-stress at this point. The corporate person is a pure *noumenon* and, more particularly, a secondary quantity of Critical mathematics. The objective validity of applying its idea to social-Nature is found nowhere else than in principal quantities of Critical mathematics that immediately reference phenomenal objects. This is why actual social interaction actions must be taken as the factors that ground objective validity for the mathematical *theory*. These considerations are requirements of the Critical doctrine of method in metaphysics.

When we speak of measures of social-economic utility, we are likewise dealing with objects of pure mathematics – therefore definable objects – and the same considerations regarding ground of objective validity *of the measures* apply. Furthermore, in view of combinatorial catastrophe in the complexity of understanding nature (which was discussed earlier in this treatise), any practical approach to theory-making must take into account and exploit the twin tactics of model order reduction and scientific reduction. This means that, as Bacon told us so long ago, science must approach its mission-of-understanding in careful ascending *and lateral* steps and not expect to achieve a "grand unified theory homerun" with its first swing of the research bat. Mathematical definition of the measures of social-economic utility must begin with special cases studied by the special social-natural sciences. But this must also be done keeping the long-term objective of eventual unification of theories in mind, and this means the special social-natural sciences cannot be isolated in silos because continuity of *Existenz* depends on divers interacting social factors.

I also want to re-stress the point that *the first steps have already been taken* by Grossberg. Community continuity in *Existenz* depends on *cooperative* consensus. Two large fractions of the population of a Community can consent to go to war with each other, but such a large scale social interaction breaks the continuity in self-*Existenz* in the Community. Each faction concentrates on optimizing its own social-economic utility at the expense of the other. This produces disruptive competition, the antithesis of cooperative consensus. As the measure of corporate value-satisfaction rises, this means the Community has "farther to go" in keeping itself together and whole as a united association. A rising degree of corporate value-satisfaction implies a growing fraction of the population is being pushed toward secession and forming a Toynbee proletariat.

Grossberg wrote,

The following problem, in one form or another, has intrigued philosophers and scientists for hundreds of years: How do arbitrarily many individuals, populations, or states, each obeying unique and personal laws, ever succeed in harmoniously interacting with each other to form some sort of stable society or collective mode of behavior? Otherwise expressed, if each individual obeys complex laws, and is ignorant of other individuals except via locally received signals, how is social chaos averted? How can local ignorance and global order, or consensus, be reconciled? This paper discusses a class of systems in which this dilemma is overcome. [Grossberg (1982), pg. 401]

Grossberg does not write the "last word" on the theory, but he does write the seminal "first word" on it. When one considers the importance of achieving practical and useful social-natural science,

it is something of a disturbing puzzle that this paper has received so little attention in the broader community of science (other than, perhaps, to note that this community is a community, not a Community). The animating principle of Relation is a principle of Community survival.

Finally, we come to persuasive power of the corporate person. The Critical acroam of Modality in practical Rational Physics states that the modal requirements for acts of impetuous reflective judgment presenting impossible, actual and necessitated actions all depend on the coherence of these presentations with the manifold of rules in practical Reason. For the case of the corporate person, we must understand the acroam in the context of *ens entium* and seek the context for coherence in Reality in the dynamics of the corporate person.

Again, the *noumenal* corporate person *per se* has no personal manifold of rules, no personal capacities for perception or consciousness, and no personal capacities for reflection and reasoning. The corporate person is an institution and, as an entity, is understood with objective validity only through the system of self-regulating transformations that define its structure. It is, furthermore, an open system. Its *real* social atoms come and go (people are born, people die, people move into the community and move away from the community). What real meaning, then, is there for the notion of a corporate persuasive power?

The answer to this question turns out not to be too difficult, although the explanation in detail is rather lengthy [Wells (2010)]. ***The persuasive power of the corporate person subsists in the social-dynamic of leadership.*** Leadership is not a personal quality, i.e. a quality possessed by any person. Rather, it is a social-dynamic requiring a minimum of two people participating in it – a leader and a follower. ***Leadership is the reciprocal relationship between two or more people by which the Self-determination of actions by the follower is stimulated by the actions of the leader.*** The person who acts as the leader is the person who takes some initial action, to which the other person subsequently reacts. A successful leader action is one for which the follower's Self-determination produces behaviors (actions) congruent with the leader's intent. An unsuccessful leader action is a leader action for which the follower's Self-determination produces behaviors opposed to the leader's intent. A non-successful leader action is a leader action for which the follower's Self-determination is contrary to (but not contradictory to) the leader's intent. Furthermore, *who is acting as the leader changes from moment to moment in the dynamic.*

The persuasive power of the corporate person is manifested by the constitution and organization of various levels and instances of authority figures, officials, and, above all, the expectations of authority held by the members of the Community. Political, social, commercial, and other institutions within a civil Community all manifest, in one way or another, the dynamics of leadership. Persistently unsuccessful or uncivil leadership dynamics leads to the rupturing of the Community. This is a perennial, centuries-old phenomenon manifested in cases ranging from the breakup of friendships, the failure of commercial entities, and the fall of entire civilizations. I think it likely that you probably can therefore appreciate the immense importance of persuasive power in the corporate person. Proper coverage of the phenomenon of leadership takes an entire treatise to explain and, as this has already appeared [Wells (2010)], I shall say no more about it here other than to say that self-governance of civil Community ultimately comes down to being a matter of the acumen exhibited by the members of the Community in managing the psychological tensions that *always* result from *all* leader actions.

The measure of *sustainability* in both civic and civil relationships is manifested by social bonding, *unsustainability* by social anti-bonding. Because the latter can mathematically be regarded as "negative bonding," factors of: *positive persuasion* are manifested within the embedding field system of the corporate person by the generation or strengthening of social-chemical bonds and the weakening or annihilation of social-chemical anti-bonds (generation activity); *negative persuasion* by the generation or strengthening of social-chemical anti-bonds

and the weakening or annihilation of social-chemical bonds (annihilation activity); *lack of persuasion* by stasis in the functional structure of social-bonding relationships. The practical principle follows at once from this. **The animating principle of persuasive power of the corporate person** is: *corporate persuasive power is measured by the degree of generation/annihilation activity in bonding and anti-bonding leadership events in the embedding field representation of the corporate person.* A positive measure of corporate persuasive power signifies growth and sustainability for the Community, a negative measure signifies disintegration for the Community. Absence of bonding relationships signifies the non-*Existenz* of the Community. Figuratively speaking, one can say this signifies the final "death" of a corporate person. Presence of anti-bonding relationships with the absence of bonding relationships signifies the harshest of conditions of the state of nature.

#### § 4. The Animating Principles of Equilibrium

The basic acroam of the equilibrium functional is the general acroam of practical Rational Psychology with its four headings of Quantity, Quality, etc. The general Idea is: absolute unity of the thinking Subject. However, the corporate person is not a real Organized Being. Rational Psychology is the Critical metaphysic of objects of inner sense, but a corporate person has no sense at all, either inner or outer, does not think, and so does not have a psychology of its own *per se*. We might suppose psychology in the context of a corporate person would mean social psychology and organizational psychology. These, however, are at present merely empirical social sciences, not social-natural sciences, and so we cannot look to them to provide fundamental principles of equilibrium in the social composition of a corporate person.

Yet, at the same time, to ask "What is the psychology of a corporate person?" is not in the same class of questions as "What is the psychology of a chemical reaction?" would be. The latter is an absurd question because dead matter has no psychology. The perplexity involved in inquiry concerning the psychology of a corporate person stems from this: Although a corporate person is composed of living matter (human beings), the *corporate person has no mind*. Psychology proper, freed from the prejudices of 20th century American behaviorism, is a science of mind. It does not do, either, to proclaim by arbitrary fiat that the "mind" of a corporate person is some sort of summation of the minds of the individual members of the Community.

But at the same time, it is also not proper to regard the corporate person as a machine of some kind or the idea of corporate person psychology as being some sort of "machine psychology." The corporate person is composed of human beings and the nature of causality & dependency for its social atoms is teleological causality & dependency. The causality & dependency of a machine can never be otherwise than physical causality & dependency (the causality of efficient causes). A nation going to war "knows" (metaphorically speaking) it is going to war. Its dynamics do not merely bump along from one set of efficient causes to the next until – surprise! – it "discovers" that it is involved in a war. To the extent that its people (social atoms) act with foresight and purposiveness, so the corporate person can be said to operate with foresight and purposiveness. Imagine how surprised you'd be if you went to work at the car factory one morning and found out that everyone was going to be making pillows or picking corn that day instead of producing cars.

The perplexity we encounter here is a pseudo-puzzle. It comes from slipping into a regard for the corporate person as an idea with *ontological* significance. It is an easy slip to make. The well-known legal fiction of regarding a public stock company (a stock corporation) as being a "legal person" (along with the fiction that such an entity has civil rights) has by now been drummed into modern Western habits of thinking. But for all that, it is still an ontological fallacy. The corporate person is a *mathematical* entity and its nature is a mathematical, hence epistemological, nature. *That* is the context in which its *logical* essence must be regarded. Logical essence is the

fundamental idea that all grounding predicates (necessary marks) of a thing in total constitute the concept of the thing in its complete determination as an object<sup>16</sup>.

The context of the notion of *ens* in the Ideal for understanding the corporate person is the context of logical essence. We must understand the idea of the corporate person in such a way that the idea has pertinence for empirical experience, thus its logical essence subsists in the idea that its mathematical concept is *made-capable* of explaining social-natural phenomena. This is the context in which we must understand the functional of equilibrium in the corporate person as the Quality functional in the Idea of the Social Contract.

Seen in this way, the principle of *entis realissimi* (a real object has one-ness) is applied in this case as the notion of what is logically essential *in the idea* of a corporate person for the premise to hold true that the mathematical corporate person describes social-Nature in a Community. The practical acroam of psychological Quantity (unconditioned unity of the rules of action in subjective time) is in this case so conditioned by the context that our *understanding* of the notion of unity of the rules is an understanding of mathematical action predications parameterized in a representation of *objective time*<sup>17</sup>.

Now, mathematical action predications are represented in an embedding field graph by real number mathematical structures. Real numbers, however, are always *secondary* quantities of pure mathematics because a real number is never an object of any possible experience. No matter how long you live, you will never have any immediate contact in experience with the number  $\pi$ , although you might have a great many immediate contacts with phenomena the number  $\pi$  is used to explain. The importance of understanding this very clearly is something that, at least in modern times, was first pointed out by information theorist David Slepian [Slepian (1974)]. Objectively valid understanding of the meaning implications of secondary quantities of mathematics requires a transformation of some sort be made on such quantities to yield a principal quantity – a quantity that can be unambiguously placed in one-to-one correspondence with phenomenon. In Critical mathematics, this is accomplished by the use of set membership theory<sup>18</sup>. The secondary quantity is an element of a set-membership solution set [Combettes (1993)] and the solution set is taken as the representation of a principal quantity. It is always possible to obtain the principal quantities of a theory by this method. In point of fact, this is what the technique of renormalization used in the theory of quantum electrodynamics does; not to put too fine a point on it, *but that's why that theory works*, i.e. demonstrates its objective validity.


In an embedding field graph system modeling social-chemistry dynamics, e.g. figure 13.7, the quantities of empirical interest are the bonding and anti-bonding functionals. These would be represented in an embedding field graph by activity variables and functions of activity field variables, and those representations are the ones pertinent to physical action expressions and mental acts. In figure 13.7,  $a_{12}$  and  $a_{21}$  directly correspond to expressed physical actions, while the others correspond to mental acts. Re-representation in principal quantities is required for them.

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<sup>16</sup> One of the most pernicious errors of non-Critical philosophy is the presupposition that there is some ontological significance to every object. That is simply not true, but its supposition is required if one's system of metaphysics is ontology-centered. Mathematical objects have no ontological significance.

<sup>17</sup> Because a corporate person has no inner sense, and subjective time is an object of inner sense, "time" in its context can only be a *required* objective representation, and this is objective time. The representation is required because subjective time is a form of human intuition that is *understood* as a mathematical ordering functional. That is the *function* of objective time: a mathematical *parástase* of ordering.

<sup>18</sup> As a note of possible interest to those readers who are professional mathematicians, there seems to be a very strong resemblance between set-membership theory and Robinson's theory of non-standard analysis. I haven't had time to verify this yet, but I think when the comparison is made what it will show is that the set-membership method and the method of non-standard analysis [Robinson (1996)] will be found to be isomorphic mathematical forms. I would be delighted if some of you would check this out and let us know.



**Figure 13.7:** Simple social-chemistry model form of two persons interacting within an environment.

With these issues raised and settled, we can now turn to the objectivity issue for equilibrium in the corporate person. The contextual question is: *By what logical property do we recognize unity of rules of action by means of principal quantities?* What is being asked here is: what is it in a model that provides a meaning implication for real phenomena? For the Quantity functional of equilibrium, "unity of rules of action" is manifested by **cooperation** of the social atoms. Thus the logical essence of Quantity is that of what system theorists called a *cooperative system*. Here is one concept for which Grossberg's theory has fundamental pertinence. He wrote,

A competitive system can sometimes appear to be cooperative. For example, Grossberg (1973) proved that competitive schemes . . . can amplify the activities of all the competing populations, thereby making it appear that an increase in one population's activity has increased other populations' activity. This property can drive all system activities into the range where they are most sensitive to each other's signals. . . . Nonlinear interactions are required to achieve self-tuning, but the system's properties can look linear to a macroscopic observer . . . Thus a system that looks linear and cooperative to an untutored observer can, in reality, be nonlinear and competitive. [Grossberg (1980)]

It is not necessary to go into the mathematical details in this treatise, but Grossberg's non-intuitive finding (namely, *competition can result in cooperation*) is central to understanding the corporate person in terms of its behavioral properties. First, it has been shown in this treatise that individual reasons for joining in a civil association are grounded in maxims and tenets of Duties-to-Self. A number of my more liberal humanist friends do not like this idea. They presume that any such grounding means the association must be competitive and, therefore, un-civil and amoral at its roots. *This is not true*. What Grossberg's theorems prove is that *cooperative actions and behaviors can emerge from competitive dynamics*. They will not necessarily do so, as Grossberg also proves, but his theorems show there are a vast number of very practical cases where it *is* true and where the cooperation is *robust*. So long as Menon the Thessalian has not stolen your silverware and is occasionally treating you to dinner, *he is actually being cooperative* even if he harbors ulterior designs on your silverware. In economics, conspiracies in restraint of trade (price fixing) are actions taken by competing commercial entities whose officers figure out that all their businesses will benefit from cooperation. I call this the Lucky Luciano Principle.

At the mathematical core of this is a theorem Grossberg called the global consensus theorem [Grossberg (1978)]. Although "consensus" is used in Grossberg's paper in a specialized context, it was a well-chosen word because mathematical consensus as he used the term does in fact trace by a relatively straightforward pathway to the usual meaning implication of that word in non-technical language. One thing that is key to the global consensus theorem is the presence within the system of a mathematical function Grossberg called *the adaptation level*. He wrote,

The results herein hold because, despite essentially arbitrary irregularities and non-linearities in local system design, there exists a powerful symmetry in the global rules that bind together the interacting populations. This symmetry is expressed by the existence of a mean competition function or adaptation level,  $c(x)$ . It can be caused by the existence of long range interpopulation interactions that have comparable effects on all populations, but otherwise represent an essentially arbitrary competition. The results herein therefore suggest that a breakdown in symmetry in competitive systems, say due to the existence of asymmetric biases in short-range interpopulation interactions<sup>19</sup>, is a basic cause of oscillations and chaos in these systems . . . There appears to exist a complementary, or trade-off, between how global the adaptation level ("communal understanding") is and how freely local signals ("individual differences") can be chosen without destroying global consensus. [Grossberg (1978)]

To put a finer point on it, the dynamics of the system contain both the potential for social order *and* the potential for producing a granulated society and even a disintegrating civilization.

We must have a bit of a care with Grossberg's term "adaptation level" because he does not use the word "adaptation" here in the same context in which it is used in this treatise. When one looks at "what the math is doing" in the system, one sees that the adaptation level function is responsible for individual nodes in the graph (individual people or groups of people) *accommodating* their activities due to activities at other nodes. Accommodation in this context means modification of existing activity patterns, and the process of this accommodation does fall under a general notion of differentiation. Thus, while it is a few steps removed from a principal quantity that represents accommodation in the technical sense of either Piaget or mental physics, nonetheless *that* principal quantity traces back to *this* secondary quantity, which we can properly call a *Grossberg accommodation*. This brings us directly to the principle we seek. ***The animating principle of accommodation in the corporate person is: Existenz of adaptation level function(s) in the embedding field graph of the corporate person.***

Next we consider the *ens originarium* context (the *Existenz* of an object is predicated from grounds). The object in this case is that which is represented by the mathematical concept of equilibrium. The practical acroam of Quality is: unconditioned compatibility of desires and the rule structure. Now, again, the corporate person is not an Organized Being and it has no manifold of rules nor does it have any representation of desires. We again restrict ourselves to the context of the logical essence of Quality in equilibrium (the notion of assimilation). Here we remember that assimilation is the implicative action functional and it pertains to the incorporation of factors into action schemes in such a way that a stable cycle of activities results. *But mathematically this is to say that the system is self-stabilizing.* The *Dasein* of assimilation is *manifested* by stable behaviors that *globally* conserve the actual *Existenz* of the system. By "conserving the actual *Existenz* of the system," I mean that an ungranulated corporate person does not become granulated (e.g. by the formation of a Toynbee proletariat subpopulation within it; once this occurs we do not have one corporate person but, rather, two or more<sup>20</sup>).

<sup>19</sup> for example, criminal or outlaw behavior by individuals nominally within the Community.

<sup>20</sup> Contrariwise, if two corporate persons "fuse" to make a single new corporate person, they are said to have reciprocally assimilated each other, and this, clearly, is a manifestation of real assimilation.

Grossberg proved a minor theorem, Lemma 1 in Grossberg (1978), that is the mathematical statement of the stability criterion that grounds the manifestation of assimilation by properties of secondary quantities in the embedding field graph. The proof of this lemma is based upon four necessary mathematical conditions which, briefly, are called the smoothness condition, the non-negativity condition, the boundedness condition, and the competition condition. In order to give the proper Critical interpretation to the meaning implications of Lemma 1 (and of the consensus theorem itself), there is a terminology issue we must address and an interpretation issue we must likewise address. Grossberg uses two technical terms, "stability" and "jump cycles" [Grossberg (1980)] that, in Critical metaphysics, *both imply equilibrium assimilation*. Indeed, in Critical epistemology a jump cycle (e.g.,  $v_1 \rightarrow v_2 \rightarrow v_3 \rightarrow v_1$  & etc.) is immediately interpretable as the manifestation of a stable equilibrium cycle. Grossberg, however, calls a jump cycle an "oscillation." The mathematical descriptor of what he called "stability" *is not an immediate expression of objectively valid equilibrium*. It is the representation of what mathematicians call a "fixed point solution." Now, the principal quantities to which these secondary quantities must lead are all actions or mental activities and objective validity for these principal quantities requires them to be cyclic in objective time.

There is no particular difficulty in obtaining principal quantities in the case of jump cycles, but the other case requires real interpretation. The interpretation, however, turns out to be pretty straightforward. The defining condition for the latter case is simply that the real number approaches a steady-state value (i.e., the time derivative of its function goes to zero). The only way this can be correctly interpreted as signaling an objectively valid real state of equilibrium *is if the real number is interpreted in the principal quantity as a self-concatenating activity expression*. In Piaget (1952) such a self-concatenating activity *cycle* is called a **circular reaction**. If a secondary quantity in an embedding field graph belongs to the class of fixed point solution functions, its *only* objectively valid principal quantity interpretation is that the secondary quantity implicates the representation of a circular reaction.

With this metaphysical issue cleared up, the animating principle can be stated. ***The animating principle of assimilation in the corporate person is: that the embedding field graph system conforms to the mathematical conditions of smoothness, non-negativity, boundedness and competition.***

For the scheme-regulating functional of Relation, the psychological Idea is unconditioned unity (one-ness) of all three-way relationships of interest, valuation and cognition. The Ideal of understanding for this case, *ens summum*, is the principle that all real things have a context within All-of-Reality. Here, then, the inquiry is into the questions of how we are to understand the ideas of Community interest, Community valuation, Community cognition, what communal action schemes are, and how such schemes are regulated. Now, a scheme in general is that which can be generalized and repeated in an act or an action. The notion of context for this functional, then, is to be sought as something that stands under an idea of a communal or Community action. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that not every person in the Community can be expected to carry out or perform the *same* action or even to act to fulfill the same goals.

Critical interest is anticipation of a satisfaction or dissatisfaction combined with the representation of the *Existenz* of some object of desire. A Community interest, then, is some general anticipation or expectation shared by the people in the Community which, when realized, satisfies everyone's expectations, and when unrealized or contradicted provokes them in some way. The first is manifested by civil tranquility ("business as usual"), the second by manifestations of civil unrest ("unusual business," i.e., unusual actions being taken by some fraction of the members of the Community). Again, it must be recognized that not every person in the Community will necessarily be satisfied (in the first case) or dissatisfied (in the second).

Critical valuation is the practical validation of actions as being in formal compliance with the condition of the categorical imperative. Now, the corporate person *per se*, having no mind, has no categorical imperative of pure Reason. Furthermore, it has no common and collective manifold of concepts and no common intuition, therefore no cognition *per se*. The contexts in both cases, therefore, must be *phenomenal* analogues of some sort to these *individual* human characteristics.

Furthermore, valid understanding of the scheme-regulating functional of the corporate person is an understanding of its *form*. Relation in equilibrium is the form of acts of organization. The matter of acts of organization is what is meant by the Modality of equilibrium (the scheme-determining functional). Now, the logical essence of any categorical imperative is an essence of form. Kant wrote,

When I think of my *hypothetical* imperative in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain; I do not know this until the condition is given to me. But when I think of my *categorical* imperative I know immediately what it contains. For here the imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity of the maxim to be in conformity with this law; but the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, so that nothing remains with which the maxim of the act is to conform but the remaining universality of the law in general, and that conformity alone the imperative properly represents as necessary. [Kant (1785), 4: 220-221]

The single universal *every* member of the Community demands of the Community – because this was the grounding reason for his joining the association at all – is the expectation and demand for Order and Progress, i.e., the preservation of the goods he has (whatever it may be he holds to be an object of good) and the improvement or enlargement of them. Not every member necessarily gives Progress the same degree of priority, but every member of the Community categorically demands the former (Order). We may call Order and Progress the *common cause* of the Community. It is the logical substance and *sine qua non* of Community in general and the universal *interest* of the Community.

Community valuation is not an empirical observable because the simple fact that persons do not act out does not necessarily imply everyone validates a given social situation. There may, after all, be other factors (e.g. "fear of the authorities") that, as a Duty-to-Self, might prevent any one particular individual from giving expression to his dissatisfaction. *Disvaluation*, on the other hand, *is* an empirical observable because a person who is satisfied does not act out a frustration.

As for the notion of Community cognition, this is the notion of some sort or form of "communal understanding." Here we already have a *strictly formal* mathematical interpretation for this notion that has already been introduced. It is Grossberg's mathematical construct of an adaptation level function,  $c(x)$ , insofar as it is possible to obtain a measure of degree for how global (within the Community) this level is. This is accomplished by a set of functions to which Grossberg did not attach a name; they are equations (19) in Grossberg (1978) and we will call them *ignition functions* because they define what Grossberg called an "ignition." An "ignition" is the onset of enhanced activity by some subpopulation of nodes in the embedding field graph of the corporate person.

Ignition in one part of the population means that the activity of this group competes with the activities of other groups (in other words, tends to suppress the others' activities), and so an ignition "ignites competition" within the population. The onset of competition (ignition) causes the adaptation level  $c(x)$  to change [Grossberg (1980)], and so long as  $c(x)$  is time varying, we cannot say that the Community has a stable understanding of the social situation.

New *patterns of behavior* emerge when activity "ignites" anywhere in the population. We cannot say that *there is consensus in the Community* so long as  $c(x)$  continues to vary in time. As

$c(x)$  changes, other "ignition points" may occur within the Community (i.e., one part of the Community reacts to what another part of it is doing). In this case,  $c(x)$  *regulates the activities within the Community*. ***The animating principle of scheme regulation in the corporate person is time variation in Community adaptation level (time variation in communal understanding)***.

Finally we come to the scheme-determining functional for equilibrium in the corporate person. The psychological acroam of Modality here is unconditioned unity (one-ness) in the apperception of all perception in the Ideal of *summum bonum*. The Ideal of *summum bonum* is, again, the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative. In this case, we are dealing not with the categorical imperative in individuals but, rather, in the mathematical form of a categorical imperative for the corporate person. But what constitutes "the apperception of all perception" in a mathematical entity that, *per se*, neither apperceives nor perceives?

This is to ask into the logical essence of *ens entium* for the corporate person, which is to ask, What constitutes necessary coherence in Reality for a corporate person? This is nothing else than *to provide an objectively valid mathematical definition of coherence in a corporate person*. Here, once again, Grossberg has already done this for us. *Practical coherence in a corporate person is the satisfaction of global consensus according to Grossberg's global consensus theorem*. All activity schemes that do so in what Grossberg called *weak global consensus* [Grossberg (1978)] mathematically constitutes the analogue in a corporate person to "unity in the apperception of all perception in the Ideal of *summum bonum*."

Perfection, however, is not an end that is achieved but rather a goal that is pursued. In this context, we can say that the activities in a corporate person necessarily aim at Community perfection. To inquire into the scheme-determining functional is to inquire into the condition in the state of the corporate person under which "pursuit of perfection" is held to occur in the Community. The objectively valid mathematical definition of this idea is provided by what Grossberg called *a competition threshold* [Grossberg (1980), equation 8].

Here Grossberg uses the word "threshold" in an unusual technical context. By "unusual" I only mean he uses it a way that most people do not and, quite likely, would not even think of using. To most people the notion of a "threshold" is the notion of some number or magnitude that marks a boundary between two different states, conditions, etc. When someone says something like, "By golly, that's it! I've had enough!" we are likely, at least in America, to say something has "crossed his threshold" or "set him off." Grossberg uses the word in this same spirit. The ***activity state*** of an embedding field graph is a vector  $x$  having elements  $x_i$  denoting activities at each node in the graph. The set of all possible  $x$  vectors is called the ***activity space*** of the embedding field graph. A ***competition threshold*** is ***a region in the activity space of an embedding field graph that marks a boundary between regions where ignition events occur and regions where they do not***. Because this region is a function of adaptation level, it is a dynamically-varying (that is, time-varying) region, but at any particular point in objective time  $t$  it is completely definable.

Formally, Grossberg distinguishes between two kinds of ignition regions, positive ignition regions and negative ignition regions. Because the competition threshold is time-varying, *so are these regions*. Furthermore, these two types of regions can intersect. In this intersect, the activities of some part of the population are being suppressed and in other parts they are being aroused. The intersect topology can be complicated, i.e., there can be multiple intersecting regions that are separated from each other by regions where there is no intersection between positive and negative ignition regions. Because the competition threshold is time-varying, so also is this topology, *and the topology determines the pattern of activity enhancement and diminution that takes place in the embedding field graph*. Furthermore, these regions are maximally separated from fixed-points of stability in the state of the embedding field graph. It is proper to say they are regions of most intensely dynamic competition. Because the time-varying behavior of the competition threshold

region determines the specific patterns of activity undergoing change in the system, our animating principle comes directly from this. ***The animating principle of scheme-determination in the corporate person is determination by competition threshold.*** With this we have our complete set of fundamental animating principles of equilibrium for the Idea of the Social Contract.

## § 5. The Organizing Principles of the Anthropological Person

The Idea of the Social Contract is an Idea of an optimization process for a motivational dynamic. We have so far covered the animating principles of the object being optimized (and this is corporate *Personfähigkeit*) and the animating principles of the ideal of optimization (social equilibrium). We next turn to the organizing principles of the process of optimization itself, and these are the organizing principles of an anthropological person. The governing acroam of Rational Cosmology calls for absolute completion of any series of condition-to-conditioned, and the word "absolute" means "being valid in every respect and without restriction." From the practical Standpoint, the class of series with which we are dealing is the series of purposive actions.

Absolute completion of the series is achieved, in the ideal, only at the highest condition. From a theoretical perspective this is, of course, a representation of what we tend to call "*the* reason for (doing) everything." In Christianity, Islam and Judaism, this is what God personifies. Aristotle's idea of this ideal was called "the unmoved prime mover." For a real person in the real world, it is the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason and, in any specific action the person expresses, it is the set of highest unconditioned rules in his manifold of rules (the practical hypothetical imperatives of his present rule structure). How, though, are we to understand this notion in the context of the anthropological person?

The acroam of Quantity in the cosmological Idea is absolute completeness in the composition of all wants. Want is the Quantity functional in the motivational dynamic. It means representation *in concreto* of a condition for adjusting accommodation of perception (Critical motivation) through behavior grounded in the causality of freedom according to particular standards *a priori*. In the context of *entis realissimi* for organizing principles of society, to inquire into this is to seek an answer to the question, "What does every person want that he can obtain by means of social contracting?" The answer to this question is straightforward. For the individual human being, it is tantamount to noting *every person makes of himself the best person he can within the limitations to his liberty of action imposed by his Personfähigkeit*. This is the *logically singular notion* of anthropological person as an organizing principle. The *logically particular notion* is the notion of interacting persons who each individually obey this law of their *homo noumenal* Nature. The *logically universal notion* is the notion of an organizing principle for an homogenizing integration of individual liberties of action through interpersonal interactions. ***This logically universal notion is the contextual notion of the entis realissimi of Relation in organized society.***

The functional of Quantity in the anthropological person is *psyche*-teleology, the idea of movement and occupation of mind through ideas. Society, of course, has no mind of its own and so we must understand what *psyche*-teleology implicates for Community living. To ask this is to ask, "What is the principle of society under which every person is most able to make the best of himself he can?" The latter part of this question is the absolute ground for the *Dasein* of the phenomenon of human society. It is the one goal that can be held with practical objective validity to be the foremost aim of every member of a voluntary association. The organizing principle follows directly from this consideration. ***The organizing principle of psyche-teleology in the Idea of the Social Contract is the condition of social contracting.*** Rousseau stated this condition and in doing so stated the principle: ***The association will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of each association in such a manner by which each***

***individual, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before joining in the association.*** I mentioned previously, most recently at the beginning of this chapter, that in making this statement Rousseau's principle was congruent with the principles of mental physics. Now we have seen that this is so. Rousseau got this right.

The practical acroam of Quality in the cosmological Idea is absolute value in the division of a given whole of *Existenz*. Absolute value is a practical notion for which the Ideal is a primitive value from which all other values obtain what is specifically valuable about them. Valuable means the ability to value a representation, and for this ability a represented Desire in the manifold of Desires must be in conformity (not conflict) with the individual's manifold of rules. The primitive value for an individual in an action performed is Critical good (necessary object of appetitive power) while the primitive value for an individual in an action refused is Critical evil (necessary object of the power of detestation, i.e., an "anti-good"). Practical judgments of Critical good and evil are grounded in this primitive determining factor of practical appetition.

Now we ask after the *ens originarium* of context for *psyche*-aesthetics (the Quality functional of the anthropological person). The Ideal of *ens originarium* states that the *Existenz* of an object is predicated from grounds, and so we are asking, "On what ground is the practical objective validity of the individual's expectation for wants-fulfillment by means of making a social compact based?" The individual can judge well enough for himself agreement that his wants-expectations are being met, and he can likewise judge for himself opposition to his wants-expectations. But in a social contracting situation he finds himself confronted with the need to judge what wants he can best satisfy by means of his natural liberty vs. what wants he can best satisfy by sacrificing natural liberty in exchange for civil liberty. This is the subcontrarity judgment each person must make in associating or not-associating himself with others.

*Psyche*-aesthetics is the functional of Quality in the anthropological person. It is the Idea (regulative principle) of movement and occupation of mind through sensation, and this Idea references *psyche* through the Quality of psychic *Lust-Kraft*, i.e., adaptation measurement (figure 13.5). Adaptation measurement, as an act of *psyche*, falls under the animating principle of somatic *Kraft*, which states: reciprocity through somatic *Kraft* is the determination of a condition, called an *elater animi* ("driver of mind") through which the structuring of somatic actions expresses acts of aesthetical reflective judgment in composing the form of a system of values, desires and interests [Wells (2009), chapter 4]. To ask, "What is the *ens originarium* context of *psyche*-aesthetics in the context of social contracting?" is to ask, "What is the measure of the value and interest in and a desire for social contracting that functions as *elater animi* of a regulative principle of movement and occupation of mind through sensation?" In relationship to the motivational dynamic, this question is pertinent to *drive* (the functional of Quality in the motivational dynamic) [Wells (2009), chapter 10].

As Quality, this measure will be that of an *intensive* magnitude – a unity that can only be measured in relationship to negation. The positive expression of our question is, "What drives social contracting?" but the capacity for adaptation measurement is not referenced to something that is realized but, instead, something that is *unrealized* as determined by *aesthetical* reflective judgment. At root, this is not an object of appearance but, instead *an orientation of feeling* – a felt disappointment or *frustration*. The context, therefore, is the context of the notion of a primitive *and common* ground of frustration in social intercourse in relationship to the Idea of the Social Contract. *What* is it that is a common ground of frustration in civil Community? The answer is: *unmet expectation of fulfillment* of the condition of a social contract. Perception of an unmet fulfillment of the condition of a social contract is *felt as the frustration called unjustness*. Anything perceived as failing to meet the expectation for fulfillment of the condition of social contracting is *perceived as unjust*. Justice *per se* is thorough-going negation of anything that is unjust. Injustice *per se* is contradiction of justice. The organizing principle of *psyche*-aesthetics

follows upon this context: ***The organizing principle of psyche-aesthetics in the Idea of the Social Contract is the principle of justice: living in a socially contracted environment of Community will not frustrate the expectation for fulfillment of the condition of social contracting through perpetuation of injustice.*** We can properly say, then, that injustice is socially immoral.

The functional of Relation in the anthropological person is *Anordnungsvermögen*, the Idea of the order of mind through the power of judgment. This is the functional of external Relation between person and World. The Idea references logical expedience through teleological reflective judgment. The cosmological Idea of Relation is the acroam that appearances originate through conformity with an equilibrated structure of practical rules. What we must do is understand this acroam in the context of *ens summum* (all real things have a context within All-of-Reality). Appearances are objects of intuition, and so our search for the context begins with the context of assimilation in perception, thus with the animating principle of Relation in *psyche*: Motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is acting to assimilate perception by adaptation [Wells (2009), chapter 4].

I suspect it is very likely that at one time or another you have either said or heard it said of someone, "He only hears what he wants to hear" or "He only sees what he wants to see." I suggest for your consideration the following proposition: such phenomena are manifestations of something very deeply embedded in human *psyche* – namely, manifestations of the animating principle of Relation in *psyche* enacted in ratio-expression by means of type- $\alpha$  compensation behavior (ignorance). Concepts are instruments of judgmentation and tools for the organization of motivation. Ratio-expression exerts its regulation on sensibility and the process of reflective judgment through concepts. It is through concepts that egocentrism in rule practice eventually gives way to cooperation in rule practice and moral realism gives way to rule cognizance in moral judgments. Concepts are the sculptor's tools of ratio-expression for accommodating perception so that perception and the unconscious structure of the manifold of rules are brought to conformity. The manifold of Desires is not a structure; it is not self-conserving. The manifold of rules cares nothing for objects of appearance. The structure of the manifold of concepts is used in the process of judgmentation to orient the equilibrating process of the motivational dynamic by providing an object to the action. This is the condition for the possibility of *drive state*, the functional of Relation in the motivational dynamic (enforcement of law; conditioning of Desires; organization of motivation) [Wells (2009), chapter 10].

Now, social contracting forms and *structures* a Community, and a Community *per se* has no manifold of rules, no manifold of concepts, no manifold of Desires and no processes of judgment in a motivational dynamic. The context we seek for *Anordnungsvermögen* in social contracting must instead be some practical analogue of these capacities of individual persons. We see empirical manifestations of this analogue in the daily commerce of civil organizations: councils, legislations, courts, debates, etc. extending back in history just as far as the historical record is extant. Human institutions for realizing a capacity for social order are as old as societies and are found at every social level. Such institutions are products of objectively structured acts.<sup>21</sup>

However, beneath these manifested empirical experiences there must lie a practical grounding for objective social organizing. Ultimately this must come down to practical acts by individual persons that make judgments of *necessitated* (made necessary) empirical principles (theoretical tenets) of organized social structure possible. It is the principal that make it possible for acts and actions by individuals individual members of the Community to judge what is and is not civic, what is and is not civil in contracted social organization. Further, this principle must be objectively valid and grounded in the *homo noumenal* Nature of our social atom. Otherwise the

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<sup>21</sup> Structuring, again, is the act of putting into effect the operation of one or more self-regulating transformations in a structure. A structure is a system of self-regulating transformations.

principle could be nothing more than a mere empirical convention. The principle, in other words, must be a natural practical principle of social structuring.

Social structuring manifests acts of cooperation. When we examined the idea of equilibrium in the corporate person, we saw that cooperation, if it is manifested at all, emerges in the corporate person out of the forces of competition. There are two ways in which cooperation can be manifested.

The first is *uncivic* cooperation, where the cooperation of each individual is predicated strictly upon Duties-to-Self and the maxims of cooperation are prudent or pragmatic and contain no notion of real *union* in Community. This is not the cooperation of contracting but, rather, the cooperation of armistice and truce.

The other is *civic* cooperation, and this is the type of cooperation in the context of social contracting. It is based on a notion of servicing Duties-to-Self by means of reciprocal Duties-to-others and is grounded in a ***principle of civic cooperation: each person in the Community pledges himself to Obligations he acknowledges he owes to the Community.***

In modern times oaths and pledges have come to be regarded cynically. In medieval Europe oaths were either taken to God or God was taken as witness of the oath so that, in a manner of speaking, a Christian man taking an oath (or, in some sects, "making an affirmation") was in effect granting a warrant to and laying an obligation on God to punish oath-breaking. Oaths were tricky things because the line here between prayer and blasphemy was a thin one. Later, in what was known as the European Age of Enlightenment, oaths were still something people took very seriously and as something upon which personal honor and reputation was staked. Thus the words of the American *Declaration of Independence* ended with the sentence

And, for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

Pledges were oaths taken seriously enough that two of the Virginia delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, Edmund Randolph and George Mason – both having already voted "aye" on the Constitution itself – refused to sign it or make any pledge to support it. In Farrand's *Records* it is recorded that

Mr. Randolph then rose, and with an allusion to the observations of Doctor Franklin, apologized for his refusing to sign the Constitution, notwithstanding the vast majority and venerable names that would give sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said, however, that he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution without doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment – He refused to sign because he thought the object of the convention would be frustrated by the alternative which it permitted to the people. Nine states will fail to ratify the plan and confusion must ensue. With such a view of the subject he ought not, and he could not, by pledging himself to support the plan, restrain himself from taking such steps as might appear to him most consistent with the public good. [Farrand (1911), vol. II, pp. 644-645]

Although oaths and pledges have largely "gone out of style" and become mere rituals today, it is a deontological principle that *in any civil Community pledges of Obligation must be integral parts of the social contract* and intentional pledge-breaking must be treated as a deontological crime.

Lastly, we have functional *Anordnungskräfte*, the Idea of the order of mind through taste. This is the function of a notion of *Existenz* as person-in-the-World-and-World-in-the-person. The manifold synthesis of this power references subjective expedience through aesthetical reflective judgment under the cosmological acroam of Modality. The acroam states that absolute

completeness of the changeable in appearances is sought through apperception of *Existenz* in relationship to the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*. *Summum bonum*, again, is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative. The context of this functional is the notion of the *ens entium* of community, i.e., the necessity of coherence in Reality. It was previously shown that in the context of the Idea of the Social Contract the categorical imperative is the law mandating equilibrium in Community. The Modality of taste is the Modality of subjective necessity and it seems readily enough apparent that here the principle is ***the principle of citizenship: Each associate is to put his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will and, in their corporate capacity, each associate is to regard every other associate as an indivisible part of the whole.*** This is nothing else than the *term* of social contracting, the Obligation each associate takes on as anthropological person and which is justly demanded of *every* person in the Community.

We see here that, again, Rousseau got this right in *The Social Contract*. He wrote,

[Each] man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has. . . . The public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name *city*, and now takes that of *Republic* or *body politic*; it is called by its members *State* when passive, *Sovereign* when active, and *Power* when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of *people*, and severally are called *citizens*, as sharing in the sovereign power, and *subjects*, as being under the laws of the State. [Rousseau (1762), pp. 14-15]

The ambiguous phrase in this principle is "the general will." But the notion of a general will is not a notion of Relation in the Idea of the Social Contract. It is instead a notion of Modality (metaphysical *nexus*) and we will find it in the organizing principles of approval of taste.

## § 6. The Organizing Principles of Approval of Taste

A Community *per se* has no motivational dynamic and no capacity of taste. The social atoms out of which it is comprised each have their own motivational dynamic and their own taste. We have seen that cooperation in Community, when it appears, is an emergent mathematical property of the dynamics of equilibrium in the corporate person. So, too, is the standard of optimization, a societal approval of taste.

The patterning function (Quantity in approval of taste) falls under the governing acroam of *entis realissimi* in practical Rational Theology: synthesis of all practical perfections in one Object, namely *universal law* subsisting in a manifold of rules. A Community *per se* has no manifold of rules but it does have an emergent manifold of moral custom (*Sittlichkeit*) and, in Communities sufficiently large that an institution of government is set up, a legal code of some sort emerges. In practical effect, the dynamics of equilibration in a Society *act as a practical synthesizer* of the private moral codes of the persons in the society, and the phenomenon of social *Sittlichkeit* emerges from this practical synthesis. The synthesis does not even require cognizance of the divers rules that are produced, and often an individual person may have nothing more than strictly practical knowledge of these rules.

The more *Gemeinschaft*-like the Community is, the less formal and practically significant the legal code phenomenon will be and phenomena of *Sittlichkeit* will tend to be the dominating patterns of social life. The larger the Community becomes, the less it will exhibit the characteristics of *Gemeinschaft* and the greater the practical role of a government and a legal system will become. The patterning functional is understood by the patterns of social rules that

emerge from the equilibrium dynamics of social living. **The organizing principle of patterning is the principle of emerging *Sittlichkeit* in Community.** Legal systems are merely the outcome of rational cooperative acts for improving the general level of cognizance of Community *Sittlichkeit*.

The Quality functional of coalescing falls under the theological acroam of *ens originarium*, which is the regulative principle of good choice under an original Ideal of absolute goodness, i.e., the Ideal of *summum bonum*. The Ideal of *summum bonum* in a Community is, similarly to the manifold of social *Sittlichkeit*, an emerging Quality characterizing the dynamics of equilibration. This Quality does not require explicit universal cognizance on the part of the persons living in the Community because this *summum bonum* is merely a practical orientation expressed in the adaptation process of social equilibration. This is manifested by behavioral trends in the activities of the population that result in *kinesis* of *Sittlichkeit* in manners that act to maintain and sustain civil tranquility within the Community. The Quality of the synthesizing actions of practical equilibration in the corporate person thus follows a **principle of global optimization of *Sittlichkeit* through competition among the Duties-to-Self of the persons in the Community.**

The conceptualizing function falls under the theological acroam of *ens summum*, which is the regulative principle of structuring the context of actions in the manifold of rules in Relation to a transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*. The evolution of a practical system of communal *Sittlichkeit* is a logically-essential competitive process. In such a process initial *conflicts* and clashes between individual private moral codes are so likely to occur that one can call the *Dasein* of such conflicts almost certain.

However, here we must bear in mind the isomerization Self-action in the social-chemical structure of interpersonal interactions. Judiciously considered, these conflicts are disturbances to individuals' states of equilibrium, stimulating feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* that these individuals must subsequently attempt to extinguish through their individual processes of reevaluation and ratio-expression. This process, moreover, leads to cognizance of the situation and accommodation of perception through conceptualization (figure 13.8).




Figure 13.8: Synthesis in the motivational dynamic of the individual

This reevaluating synthesis necessarily produces accommodations in individuals' manifolds of concepts and also can occasion accommodations in individuals' manifolds of rules. *It is not necessary that each individual develop precisely the same concepts or precisely the same new tenets of practical rules.* If the combined effect of individual evaluation efforts succeeds *globally* in reducing or eliminating interpersonal conflict, that *means* individual conceptualizations are *similar enough or compatible enough* to modify what Grossberg called "local biases" in the embedding field graph and thereby stabilize the social system.

The reevaluating synthesis is manifested in the Community by the emergence of processes of review, formal evaluations of situations, and refinements through cognized and *communicable* rules of conduct (legislations, man-made laws) whose only requirement for the sustaining of the Community is that they be agreed to by all of its citizens. As Mill noted,

We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force that works the machine. . . . [All] the difference between a good and a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in the community to bear upon the administration of justice and making it duly operative on the result. . . .

A similar distinction exists in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of administration. Their machinery is good when the proper tests are prescribed for the qualification of officers . . . ; when the business is conveniently distributed among those who are to transact it . . . ; when each individual knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when the best-contrived checks are provided . . . But political checks will no more act of themselves than a bridle on a horse without a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too passive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part, little benefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus. . . .

What we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of its general constitution. All government which aims at being good is an organization of some part of the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community for the conduct of its collective affairs. . . . The greater the amount of these good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in organizing, and the better the mode of organization, the better will be the government. [Mill (1861), pp. 19-20]

*If a civil Community emerges out of the competitive dynamics of equilibration<sup>22</sup>, then some form or forms of constituted institutions of self-governance will emerge out of the overall actions occurring in the corporate person. What we see in this is another emergent organizing principle. **The organizing principle of conceptualizing in the Idea of the Social Contract is emergence of constituted, man-made institutions of communal self-governance manifested by processes of reviews, evaluations, checks and balances, and social refinements that serve the function of perfecting civil tranquility in the Community.***

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<sup>22</sup> There is no *a priori* guarantee that the corporate person will always be able to reach a state of equilibrium. Instead of a cycle of equilibrium, the result could be a *rupture*. (Recall that Grossberg's theorems have conditions the system must satisfy for global consensus to result). In this case the civil Community disintegrates and granulates. The immediate corollary to Mill's observation is this one: If the selected officials holding the duties of administration of communal governance are stupid, or if they do not accept the accepted premises of the purpose of the institution they administer and act instead according to their personal concepts, local biases will be produced that lead to communal granulation and breakdown.

Finally we come to the precisioning functional, which falls under the theological acroam of *ens entium*: coherence of all actions with the ideal of communal *summum bonum*. Now, personal Ideals of *summum bonum* are just that – personal and individual. The notion of *communal summum bonum* is the notion of an ideal acceptable to and accepted by all citizens in a civil Community. This is manifested by **Grossberg consensus** emerging from the synthesizing effect of competitive interactions in the embedding field graph of the corporate person.

The predication of an actual *Dasein* of such coherence is grounded in actual expressions of actions by members of the Community that exhibit *a practical unity in orientation of choices* made by individuals *understood in the context of improving communal deontological ethics and moral perfecting of the association*. Where the actual *Existenz* of such collective actions that *practically* exhibit a consensus of *unity in orientation of choice* is taking place, the practical meaning implication is the real *Dasein* of consensus as a necessitated implication made necessary for the possibility of explaining the actual coherence being exhibited by individual actions. The aggregate actions of individuals are all expressions of individual choices, and where these actions demonstrate coherence in orientation with respect to Community interpersonal relationships, this *appearance of coherence* regarded as a *transcendental Object* has a name and it is called *the general will*. Thus, the *Realdefinition* of the **general will** is: **unity in acting to improve the communal idea of ethical and moral perfection of the association through on-going processes of review, evaluation and refinement taking as their aliments all factors pertinent to the maintaining and sustaining of civil tranquility with the Community.**

This is the real Nature of the Reality of the notion of general will. It is a practical, not a theoretical, Nature and for this reason the many historical efforts to provide a *theoretical* explanation of general will have been unsuccessful. The Object was sought in ontological understanding, but it subsists in epistemological understanding.

There is, moreover, a Critical consequence attending the real Nature of general will. General will is a *pure noumenon* and, as such, it is a supersensible Object and can never be an empirical object of immediate experience. This means there can be no *positive* demonstration of its *Existenz*. The only possible empirical demonstration is a negative one. This is to say that we cannot know from empirical experience the actual presence of general will but can only know from empirical experience of its non-presence, i.e., its *Nichtsein*. *Nichtsein* of general will is demonstrable in experience by actions expressive of *civil untranquility*. Strikes, protest demonstrations, riots, etc. – all these actions express the non-*Existenz* of civil tranquility, i.e. civil untranquility. *Nichtsein* of general will means non-*Dasein* of *civil Community*.

Objective validity of the idea of a general will, however, must always necessarily be grounded in the regulative principle of a Critical Idea. This principle is the principle of precisioning. **The organizing principle of precisioning is: absolute non-expression of untranquility in the embedding field graph of the corporate person.** Lack of civil tranquility, especially in its early stages of development, is usually not visible to either the larger part of the population of the Community or, especially, to its administrators of civil institutions. Malcontent, an isomerism Self-excitation (figure 13.7), is a largely autistic character of aesthetical reflective judgment in the social taste of the individual. Furthermore, as a Toynbee proletariat begins to form, it will often do so as a secretive cabal. This has the most profound implications for the constituting of robust institutions of review and evaluation, a topic I have discussed at length previously in Wells (2010), chapter 12. General will is a mathematical object, and this fact effects all considerations in attempting to measure or ascertain its actual *Existenz* in Community.

Once again, the practical issues of determining a general will are less daunting in small and *Gemeinschaft*-like Community structures, increasingly more daunting and difficult as the scale of a Community grows in size. Herein lies the practical efficacy of Tocqueville governance.




Figure 13.9: 4LAR structure of the Idea of the Social Contract

## § 7. Summary and Brief Remarks

The formal objective of this treatise has now been achieved. The Idea of the Social Contract is a mathematical Object represented by a 4LAR structure of animating and organizing principles. Figure 13.9 illustrates the Idea of the Social Contract. It is a practical Object mathematically constituted by eight animating principles of the corporate person and eight organizing principles of society, all sixteen of these principles being deduced through Critical synthesis from grounding transcendental Ideas of Critical epistemology. In summary, the regulating principles of the Social Contract are as follows.

### Animating Principles of the Corporate Person

- (Quantity of Corporate *Personfähigkeit*) Principle of physical power of the corporate person: Each person in the Community accepts and attends to specific civic Duties for the performance of which he can justly be held accountable by the Community-as-corporate-person.
- (Quality of Corporate *Personfähigkeit*) Principle of intellectual power of the corporate person: The institution of means for the civic education of every member of the Community. Providing the institution is a Community Obligation pledged to every member. The individual member's participation in the institution, whereby the aim of the institution is accomplished by every member to the best of his personal ability, is a civic Duty owed by each member.
- (Relation of Corporate *Personfähigkeit*) Principle of tangible power of the corporate person: Social-economic utility optimization.
- (Modality of Corporate *Personfähigkeit*) Principle of persuasive power of the corporate person: Corporate persuasive power is measured by the degree of generation/annihilation activity in bonding and anti-bonding leadership events in the embedding field graph representation of the corporate person.
- (Quantity of equilibrium) Principle of accommodation in the corporate person: *Existenz* of adaptation level function(s) in the embedding field graph of the corporate person.
- (Quality of equilibrium) Principle of assimilation in the corporate person: Conformity of the embedding field graph system to the mathematical properties of smoothness, non-negativity, boundedness, and competition.

- (Relation of equilibrium) Principle of scheme-regulation in the corporate person: Regulation by objective time variation in Community adaptation level (communal understanding).
- (Modality of equilibrium) Principle of scheme-determination in the corporate person: Determination by competitive threshold.

### Organizing Principles of Civil Society

- (Quantity in the anthropological person) Principle of *psyche*-teleology in the Idea of the Social Contract (the condition for social contracting): The association will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of each associate in a manner such that each individual, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before joining the association.
- (Quality in the anthropological person) Principle of *psyche*-aesthetics in the Idea of the Social Contract (the principle of justice): living in a socially contracted environment of Community may not frustrate the expectation for fulfillment of the condition for social contracting because of perpetuation of injustice.
- (Relation in the anthropological person) Principle of civic cooperation: Each person in the Community pledges himself to Obligations he acknowledges he owes to the Community.
- (Modality in the anthropological person) Principle of citizenship (the term of the social contract): Each associate is to put his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, as the general will is gauged by and recognized through social institutions, and, in his corporate capacity, each associate is to regard every other associate as in indivisible part of the whole.
- (Quantity in the approval of taste) Principle of patterning (emerging *Sittlichkeit*): The dynamics of social equilibration in the corporate person act as a synthesizer of the private moral codes of the persons in the Community to produce a practical system of moral custom.
- (Quality in the approval of taste) Principle of coalescing: global practical optimization of *Sittlichkeit* is effected through competition among the Duties-to-Self of the persons in the Community.
- (Relation in the approval of taste) Principle of conceptualizing: Competitive global consensus in cooperations is exhibited by emergence of constituted, man-made institutions of communal self-governance manifested in processes of reviews, evaluations, checks and balances, and social refinements that serve the function of perfecting civil tranquility in the Community.
- (Modality in the approval of taste) Principle of precisioning (principle of Grossberg consensus): the ideal of absolute non-expression of civil untranquility within the Community in the embedding field graph of the corporate person in its environment is the standard of gauging civil Community.

The technical definitions of the various terms used in these principles (and, especially, that of the notion of general will) have also been provided in this chapter. All that now remains to conclude the business of this treatise is to make a few closing remarks pertaining to some special implications of the Idea of the Social Contract and other remarks pertaining to doctrine of method for applying the Idea in the special social-natural sciences.

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