Chapter 3 Education as Public Institution

§ 1. Social Institutions and the Challenge of Mini-Communities

The phenomenon of mini-Communities poses the most perplexing challenges imaginable that must be faced by any Society and its institutions. Not one nation anywhere on earth is meeting these challenges with excellence. The best organized and governed ones are meeting them with waxing mediocrity. The majority are failing to meet them at all. Rulers in this last group sustain their rule by numerous tyrannies, enormities and injustices, and by provoking dog-fighting competitions setting mini-Communities against each other. This works for a time – sometimes for generations – while the tyrannized Society wanes. History tells this same story again and again, drawing a clear roadmap: These nations are all on the road to disintegration and can look to a future consisting of nothing better than a passing footnote in a history book. In all cases the social-natural root cause comes back to a single point: failure to competently manage the challenges posed by the phenomenon of mini-Communities and to sustain their cooperation.

The level of challenge a Society encounters due to the *Existenz* of mini-Communities within it generally increases as the population of the Society increases. There seems to be no great mystery here. The larger the population becomes, the more mini-Communities emerge within it, the smaller is the fraction of the population known personally by any one member, and the more granulated the social Molecule becomes. As challenges become more intense the demands these place on the Society's institutions become more formidably difficult to meet. As social institutions meet them with less and less success, a growing fraction of the Society's members find themselves unable to succeed in achieving aims that their Duties-to-themselves mandate. Their political liberty might remain undiminished for a time, but their civil liberty wanes as the corporate *Personfähigkeit* becomes less capable of enabling individuals to overcome hindrances frustrating their enterprises. A Society's institutions are its principal instruments for, as Rousseau put it, bringing into play the sum of forces marshaled from the citizenry and causing these forces to act concert. How well or how poorly they do so affects the welfare and the continued *Existenz* of the Society. Toynbee wrote,

> One source of disharmony between the institutions of which a society is composed is the introduction of new social forces – aptitudes or emotions or ideas – which the existing set of institutions was not originally designed to carry. The destructive effect of this incongruous juxtaposition of things new and old is pointed out in one of the most famous sayings attributed to Jesus: [Toynbee quotes the parable in *Matthew* IX. 16-17 about not putting unshrunken cloth on old clothes or new wine in old wineskins].
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> In the domestic economy from which this simile is taken the precept can, of course, be carried out to the letter; but in the economy of social life men's power to order their affairs at will on a rational plan is narrowly restricted since a society is not, like a wineskin or a garment, the property of a single owner but is the common ground of many men's fields of action; and for that reason the precept, which is common sense in household economy and practical wisdom in the life of the spirit, is a counsel of perfection in social affairs.
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> Ideally, no doubt, the introduction of new dynamic forces ought to be accompanied by a reconstruction of the whole existing set of institutions, and in any actually growing society a constant readjustment of the more flagrant anachronisms is continually going on. But *vis inertiae* tends at all times to keep most parts of the social structure the way they are, in spite of their increasing incongruity with the new social forces constantly coming into action. In this situation new forces are apt to operate in two diametrically opposite ways simultaneously. On the one hand they perform their creative work either through new institutions that they have established for themselves or through old institutions that they have adapted to their purpose; and in pouring themselves into these harmonious channels

> they promote the welfare of the society. At the same time they also enter, indiscriminately, into any institutions that happen to lie in their path – as some powerful head of steam which had forced its way into an engine-house might rush into the works of any old engine that happened to be installed there.
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> In such an event, one or the other of two alternative disasters is apt to occur. Either the pressure of the new head of steam blows the old engine to pieces, or else the old engine somehow manages to hold together and proceeds to operate in a new manner that is likely to prove both alarming and destructive. . . .
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> It is evident, then, that, whenever the existing institutional structure of a society is challenged by a new social force, three alternative outcomes are possible: either a harmonious adjustment of structure to force, or a revolution (which is a delayed and discordant adjustment) or an enormity. It is also evident that each and all of these three alternatives may be realized in different sections of the society – in different national states, for example, if that is the manner in which a particular society is articulated. If harmonious adjustments predominate, the society will continue to grow; if revolutions, its growth will become increasingly hazardous; if enormities, we may diagnose a breakdown. [Toynbee (1946), pp. 279-281]

There is no shortage of scholars and others who are prepared to take vigorous issue with how "evident" the truth of Toynbee's conclusions or the accuracy of his analysis are. Mental physics finds that there is a great deal of truth in Toynbee's conclusions, but it also warns us that he has not laid his hand on root causes here. It simply does not do to pin the cause on what he calls *vis inertiae* (literally, "force of inactivity"; by transferal, it is the tendency to remain inactive or unprogressive) without a clear and objectively valid explanation of what this *vis inertiae* is supposed to mean. By and large Toynbee leaves the impression that he had a very low opinion of most people. He did mistake the human nature of making satisficing choices for a dullness of wit he called "mimesis" (mimicry). His *A Study of History* seems by and large to treat this natural dynamic of judgmentation as if it were some sort of personal flaw. At times he treats his readers to some of the most nauseous rhetoric I have encountered in a scholarly work.

Nonetheless, his conclusion here – that a Society responds to change in its social environment by means of changes in its institutions with these changes being presented by the three outcomes he describes – is fundamentally correct. Furthermore, there is objectively valid grounding for his conclusion in the mental physics of human nature. He merely had an inadequate understanding of the root cause, not the net effect. Furthermore, it is important to not forget the principal empirical finding of Toynbee's study, namely, that *civilizations fall from within* (with some few exceptional cases of Societies that fall due to some overwhelming physical catastrophe[1]). This is what occurs when a Society's institutions respond to change by perpetrating and perpetuating injustices on some parts of its citizenry. The behavior of the institution discriminates against the interests of some subset of mini-Communities, and this sets the breakdown of that Society in motion.

[1] One documented example of this was the decimation by smallpox epidemic of many Native American Societies along the east coast of America during the colonial period. Evidence indicates that the first cases of this were caused by accidental transmission of a disease brought over from Europe. Later smallpox was deliberately introduced into some Native American populations as a form of biological warfare. Another but speculative example might be provided by the first fall of Minoan civilization in the 20th century B.C. Archaeology has uncovered evidence of the destruction of Minoan buildings and cities, followed by a 300 year dark age that seems to have ended by the 17th century B.C. It is not known, however, whether this historical blank spot in a thriving civilization was due to natural catastrophe – e.g. one or more massive earthquakes – or to an invasion of Crete by some unknown people. We have no convincing evidence pointing to the *Dasein* of hypothetical invaders, and this tends to make the earthquake hypothesis seem more likely because earthquakes do occur frequently in that region. But the fact is we do not actually know what caused Minoan civilization's disappearance from the record between *c*. 1900 and *c*. 1600 B.C.

Toynbee's pessimistic assessment was that this was the end in store for all civilizations. He conveyed this more by inference than outright statement. He did say that every twentieth century civilization except for Western civilization was already in the process of falling. The exception he made for Western civilization came by omission than by assertion. He speculated that it *might not* be in the process of disintegration at this time. This is far from being a ringing endorsement of Western civilization's prospects. Toynbee's outlook mirrors the earlier pessimism of Rousseau in *The Social Contract*.

If it was true that Toynbee's *vis inertiae* is some sort of dull-witted shortcoming inherent in the natures of all but a tiny minority of human beings[2], and that it was this *vis inertiae* that caused slothful inattentiveness to adapting a Society's institutions to its changing circumstances, there would be a discomforting inevitability to his gloomy assessment. But this part of Toynbee's thesis is a mere judgment of taste and utterly lacks objective validity. There *is* a *homo noumenal* basis in human Nature for something we might choose to label as a *vis inertiae*, but it has nothing to do with dull-wittedness nor with sloth in the dictionary connotation of laziness in that word.

This factor is nothing else than the satisficing character of judgmentation that reflects the impatient nature of the power of pure practical Reason, the master regulator of all non-autonomic human behavior. Not some, not most, but *all* human beings are satisficing problem solvers. Epistemologically, to be a satisficing problem solver and to be a rational problem solver are one and the same thing. This can in no way be accounted a shortcoming in human nature because the explicit character of *all* particular satisficing actions – and every action is an action taken *in the particular* – is not determined by some alleged flaw in human Reason by, rather, by what experiential circumstances a person *is capable of judging to be formally inexpedient* for Reason's innate drive to achieve a state of equilibrium in the person's state of *Existenz*. Reason pursues this in the quickest and most direct way it can discover. This is a kind of least-action principle.

What actions can be judged expedient, or cannot be judged inexpedient, is determined by a person's experiential inventory of knowledge of actions already tested and found *not-inexpedient* in the past. When a person expresses a satisficing action – an action he judges to be a means to a satisfactory outcome in terms of judgments of equilibrations – there is nothing that can properly be called "inert" about what he is doing even if the action is expressed in the form of a type α compensation behavior (an act of ignórance). Rather, every action expression expresses the contradictory opposite of indolence or laziness. If the action comes up short in the overall social expediency of its outcome, this is only because experience has come up short in the person's inventory knowledge of factors that turn out to be empirically non-negligible for the particular circumstance.

And what is the source of the individual's empirical knowledge here? Perhaps this is obvious to you already. This knowledge comes from: (1) his experience-to-date with mini-Communities that make up his personal society; and (2) his experience-to-date with field effects stemming from the operations of the institutions of the Society he lives in. His personal *civic education* is one such factor that stems from his Society's institutions and how they operate. It matters not in the least if the agents or patrons of any particular institution are cognizant that the institution's actions

[2] As a scholar Toynbee was pronouncedly misguided by the glandular opinions of the pseudo-philosopher Nietzsche. A central premise he rides to exhaustion in *A Study of History* is that civilizations are shaped by a tiny cadre of Nietzsche-like supermen he called "the creative minority." He makes fantastic attributions to this group, often speaking of them as almost Christ-like figures driven by some mystic inner power. The fall of civilizations, he more or less asserts, begins when "Orpheus, who has lost his lyre or forgotten how to play it, now lays about him with Xerxes' whip; and the result is a hideous pandemonium" [Toynbee (1946), pg. 279]. Hogwash. There is no cadre of Orpheus figures and no mystic spirit driving creativity. Toynbee very badly fails to understand the human nature of the social dynamic of leadership.

always have an educational effect. *They all always do have individual educational effects*, sooner or later in every single instance, on some portion of the members of the Society. All that matters is if these educational effects are accidental in the consequences or if the actions taken have been decided upon with cognizance of the likely lessons they will convey. The challenge that comes with this is: *the lesson will in all cases be interpreted by individuals within the context of their personal mini-Communities* and cannot be *presumed* to be the same for every member of Society.

Social science scholars and essayists have by and large failed to grasp and appreciate the mini-Community phenomenon and its importance to the nature of a Society. Not all, however, have failed to notice telltale signs of its challenges and their effects. Mill wrote,

> One of the strongest hindrances to improvement, up to a rather advanced stage, is an inveterate spirit of locality. Portions of mankind, in many other respects capable of and prepared for freedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest nation. Not only may jealousies and antipathies repel them from one another, and bar all possibility of voluntary union, but they may not yet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the union real, supposing it to be nominally accomplished. They may, like the citizens of an ancient community or those of an Asiatic village, have had considerable practice in exercising their faculties on village or town interests, and have even realized a tolerably effective popular government on that restricted scale, and may yet have but slender sympathies with anything beyond, and no habit or capacity of dealing with interests common to many such communities. [Mill (1861), pg. 45]

Even if a medium- or large-sized Society has been nominally formed, from the perspective of cognitively dark and affectively cold practical Reason one of the simplest and quickest types of satisficing actions people can take as a corporate mini-Community is reflected in an inclination of judgmentation I think most adults are likely to recognize:

> Among the tendencies which, without absolutely rendering a people unfit for representative government, seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There are two states of the inclinations, intrinsically very different, but which have something in common, by virtue of which they often coincide in the direction they give to the efforts of individuals and of nations: one is, the desire to exercise power over others; the other is disinclination to have power exercised over themselves. [*ibid*., pg. 48]

This tends to be more true for a mini-Community than it tends to be true for some individuals. What I mean by this can perhaps be best explained by an example. I personally have no desire at all to exercise any sort of power over *you* in the abstract. This is not because I cherish some regard for the abstract freedom of a stranger I have never met. To be honest about it, if you and I are strangers I don't particularly care one whit about your freedom except insofar as the exercise of your natural liberties can come into conflict with mine. Quite frankly, I think that for me to exercise power over you is likely to prove to be a great deal more trouble and bother for *me* than I think it's worth. I do, on the other hand, feel very strongly disinclined to allow you to exercise *any* power over me, and will only agree to it if you and I are bound to each other by a social contract made to our *mutual* benefit. If you will oblige yourself not to shoot at me unless I threaten to shoot at you, I'll happily reciprocate with a matching obligation of my own *and we will each gain a power over each other* in the form of a *civil right*. Rousseau wrote,

> The social treaty has for its end the preservation of the contracting parties. He who wills the end wills the means also, and the means must involve some risks, and even some losses. He who wishes to preserve his life at others' expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to give it up for their sake. Furthermore, the citizen is no longer the judge of the dangers to which the law desires him to expose himself . . .

> The death penalty inflicted upon criminals may be looked on in much the same light: it is in order that we may not fall victims to an assassin that we consent to die if we ourselves turn assassins. In this treaty, so far from disposing of our own lives, we think only of securing them, and it is not to be assumed that any of the parties then expects to get hanged. [Rousseau (1762a), pp. 36-37]

Rousseau embeds some tacit assumptions in these remarks, and these assumptions provide a good example of the first part of what I said above, namely that it is easier for a mini-Community acting as a corporate person to exercise a power *other* people that no member of that Community would allow *them* to exercise over him. Rousseau presumes that each and every member of the Society understands all the terms and clauses of their social contract in the same way and with the same meanings. This is buried deep inside his remark about "the dangers to which the law desires him to expose himself to." If a person thinks a particular law is outside the terms and conditions of the social contract, and if he does not expressly agree to be bound by such an extra-social law, then he is indeed the judge of the law and possessor of an unalienated liberty to disobey it. If the law is in fact beyond the horizon of the agreed-upon social contract, it is an *unjust* law and the individual is not morally obligated to obedience of that law.

And this is where one of the many challenges of the mini-Community phenomenon comes to light. It is far more usual for the members of a small mini-Community to share among themselves a more or less common understanding of the broader Society's social compact than it is for them to share, as corporate person, a common understanding between themselves and another mini-Community. Beyond the scale of a small *Gemeinschaft* mini-Community, it quickly becomes unrealistic to expect a common understanding to be in place among all citizens of a Society. In the history of human Societies, some partial understanding usually can be found, but this understanding of the terms and conditions is generally quite limited. Mill wrote,

> Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it[3], everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in a society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury or molestation. [Mill (1859), pg. 63]

Montesquieu seems to have come within a whisker of properly identifying the phenomenon of mini-Community as a decisive factor in the successes or failures of nations. His writing on this topic profoundly influenced the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Montesquieu wrote,

> It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his

[3] By "contract" Mill means an explicit legal contract spelling out all the terms and conditions of association in the Society. Virtually no Society uses such a device outside the world of commerce. At best there might be a Constitution or a set of By-laws, or a covenant in place. These almost never attempt to cover every conceivable contingency that might be encountered, and attempting to cover them all *a priori* is a futile undertaking. That futility is what he means by saying "no good purpose is *answered* by inventing" such a contract. To think otherwise is a popular error of people whose habitual social style is called Analytic.

> country.
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> In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected. [Montesquieu (1748), pg. 120]
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> If a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign power; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection.
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> To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are equally liable[4], whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself, and no form can redress it.
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> It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to live under the government of a single person had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republic together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a confederate republic.
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> This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of further associations till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the whole body. [*ibid*., pg. 126]

A confederate republic is what the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were aiming to achieve. Alexander Hamilton stated this explicitly in *The Federalist* (no. 9). Indeed, this is what the Framers understood and meant by the word "republic."[5] They designed the institutions of the new general government accordingly. James Madison wrote,

> The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican? It is evident that no other form of government would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. . . .
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> If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government that derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is *essential* to such a government that it be derived from the great body of society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is *sufficient* for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been, or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican

[4] Montesquieu defined "republic" as being either a democracy or an aristocracy.
[5] The democracy form of Montesquieu's "republic" is today called a "representative democracy," and this is the form of government the general government of the United States gradually morphed into during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I think the Framers would be appalled by this change, Hamilton not least of all, because most if not yet all its enormities Montesquieu predicted have come to pass or are coming to pass in the United States. Judging by his words in *The Federalist* (no. 39), I am pretty close to certain that Madison would deny "the honorable title of (confederate) republic" to the current form of the institution of general government in the United States.

> character. . . .
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> The proposed constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them again, it is federal, not national; and finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. [Hamilton *et al*. (1787-8), no. 39]

It was this mixed form of the institution of general government, partly federal and partly national but strictly neither, that was the first distinction between a confederate republic and a republic in general. The second mark of distinction, and the one that distinguishes the distinctly American form of republic from a representative democracy (which is a republic but not a confederate republic in Montesquieu's terminology), was the mixed character in the way the offices of its chief administrators – Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court – were to be filled. The House of Representatives was to be directly elected by district – a national form; Senators were to be appointed by the states – a federal form; the President was to be appointed by a special body of citizen electors elected directly by the people but apportioned state by state – neither a federal nor a national form; Justices of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate – another mixed form neither strictly national nor strictly federal in its character.

It is probably unfortunate that the Framers adopted the habit of abbreviating the phrase "confederate republic" to simply "republic" because it was their express intent to avoid a purely Montesquieu-like form of representative democracy. This is documented with unmistakable clarity in the records of the Constitutional Convention [Farrand (1911)]. There is very little doubt that the Framers thought they had done the best job practically possible for the design of a confederate republic. On September 17, 1787, delegate Ben Franklin expressed the general sentiments of the Convention delegates with the following words:

> I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller consideration to change opinions even on important subjects which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment and to pay more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others differ from them it is so far error. . . . But though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said, "I don't know how it happens, Sister, but I meet with nobody but myself that's always in the right" . . .
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> In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and I believe that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt, too, whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does . . . Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better,

> and because I am not sure that it is not the best. [Farrand (1911), vol. II, pp. 641-643]

The Framers were wise enough to know that the Constitution had to have the flexibility to harmoniously adapt the institutions of government to unforeseeable changes in the social environment of the United States, and for this reason they built the provision for constitutional amendments into the Constitution. They were confident that they had erected a constitution sufficiently self-protected against future corruptions that would degrade its confederate republic character. In this last opinion, though, they made three errors in judgment that would eventually make the confederate republic vulnerable to devolution into a representative democracy.

The first was that they left the decision of how to constitute the Electoral College in the hands of the individual state legislatures, not foreseeing that this would facilitate the capture of this important election mechanism by state political parties. The second was that they did not foresee the coming Industrial Revolution, which would fundamentally change the nation's economic fabric from one of independent entrepreneurs to one of capitalist entrepreneurs/wage laborers and open a great economic gap between the wealthiest and least-wealthy Americans. The third was that they did not foresee advances in technology, particularly that of the passenger railroad and the telegraph, that would empower isolated local political parties to overcome constitutional defenses, erected expressly to forestall the enormities of political party faction, and form national political parties – a form of corporate person George Washington called the rankest Spirit and greatest enemy of popular government. The first passenger-carrying railroad in the United States went into operation on December 30, 1830, between Charleston and Hamburg, South Carolina. The first commercial telegraph company, founded by Samuel Morse, began operation in 1845 with a telegraph line between Philadelphia and New York City. Both innovations quickly grew.

In all this we have dramatic historical illustrations of the power of mini-Communities to alter and effect social institutions in a general Society. These particular examples illustrate ways in which corporate persons formed by special-interest mini-Communities can alter both economic and political institutions in a Society as well as produce new institutions. They also illustrate how what Mill called "the hindrance of an inveterate spirit of locality" can produce competitive dynamics within a Society injurious to justice and conducive to uncivic rivalries working to cause the breakdown of the Society. The greatest omission and most dangerous error in the history of social science theories has been ignórance of the powerful effects of mini-Communities on the social institutions in a Society. Its best defense against this is the institution of public education.

§ 2. A Society's Interest in Systematic Institutions of Education

The real *Dasein* of every Society is owed to a singular fact. Every Society represents a union of free individuals who have jointly chosen to band together in mutual association because by doing so each individual is able to realize gainful benefits to his *Personfähigkeit* by alienation of some of his natural liberties in exchange for civil liberties protected by civil rights. This is the practical essence and root of all social contracts as well as the determining factor in socialization. Man has no social instinct and so every act of socialization traces its root cause back to individual choices to fulfill some Duty-to-oneself by means of Self-imposing an Obligation-to-others on the condition that these others will in turn impose upon themselves an Obligation-to-the-individual. *There is no other natural cause of socialization*. Rousseau wrote,

> The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got

> from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it forever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man. [Rousseau (1762a), pg. 19]

But precisely because man has no social instinct, he must *learn* that civic life offers these personal benefits. It follows that individual acts of educational Self-development (ESD) whereby a person learns of these benefits underpin the formation and continuation of all Societies. Furthermore, to secure the protections of civil rights for himself he finds that it is in his own self-interest that these be secured for the other members of the Society to which he belongs. If he also understands that the first condition for securing civil rights for himself and others is the continuation of the Society itself, then he can also understand that it is the foremost civic Duty of every citizen in a Society to secure the Society's maintenance and continued *Existenz*. However, these are all empirical lessons each individual must learn because there is no underlying natural instinct for or innate understanding *a priori* of these Duties. He learns such lessons through ESD experiences provoked by his *Existenz* as a person in a Society.

Every social institution a Society establishes as part of its manner of social governance ***is*** an institution of education in the context that institutional actions ***provoke*** some kinds of educational activities by one or more members of that Society. In this way they all provoke educational Self-development by those individuals. This is so regardless of whether or not the agents of an institution intended for their actions to provoke acts of ESD. An institution, or part thereof, wherein these provocations are conscious, intentional, and designed is usually called an education institution, and such an institution usually follows some more or less systematic methodology in carrying out its appointed educational role. Institutions wherein agents' ESD provocations are unconscious or unintentional almost never have a systematic organization behind the institution's provocations of ESD, although the operations of the institution often fall into habitual patterns of institutional behaviors that provoke widespread patterns of ESD reactions in the population.

So it is, for example, that the majority of Americans have learned to regard the tax collecting agencies of government with a mixture of hostility and resigned acceptance that a tax collecting function is necessary. Many Americans have developed maxims to the effect that, although somebody has to pay taxes, their overriding duty-to-themselves is to pay as little in taxes as possible – if necessary, by requiring others to pay more in taxes. This is an uncivic attitude in the context that it promotes state-of-nature competitive rather than socially cooperative behaviors.

A similar and more instructive example is provided by the American Revolution. The flash-point for the colonies' revolt against Great Britain originated from a widespread opinion that it was *not* socially necessary for colonists to pay taxes into the overseas coffers of Great Britain. The British government, seeking to recoup expenses that had been incurred from the French and Indian War in America, held that it was only fair to British Society as a whole that the colonists should contribute to the maintenance and defense of the British Empire. The colonists didn't see it that way, and the British government made no effort to negotiate an understanding with them on this point. They relied instead on rulers' actions to impose taxes by force. Ultimately these actions provoked an unintended ESD lesson among the roughly one-third of the colonists who formed a corporate person known as The Patriots: namely, that Americans would be better off if they were not part of the British Empire. At its root, the American Revolution had very little to do with a three penny tax on tea and everything to do with the perceived injustice of a far-away government imposing new acts of rulership on a people who had for over a century not been required to put up with the impositions. The government's actions were interpreted as being in violation of a tacit and long-standing social contract between the colonists and the Crown government. A few British

statesmen recognized what was really going on and smelled sulfur in the air:

> Reflect how you are to govern a people who think they ought to be free, and think that they are not. Your scheme yields no revenue; it yields nothing but discontent, disorder, disobedience; and such is the state of America, that after wading up to your eyes in blood, you could only end just where you begun; that is, to tax where no revenue is to be found [Burke (1774)].

Unfortunately for the British government, Burke and his like-minded colleagues were in the minority in the British Parliament and Americans learned that they wished to be independent.

The educating actions of the British government were unintentional and non-systematic, but this does not mean that recognizable education institutions are necessarily systematic. Here is an example, a delightful one, of an institution of education that has no schools at all. Anthropologist Colin Turnbull, best known for his study of the Congo's BaMbuti Pygmies, tells us,

> Like children everywhere, Pygmy children love to imitate their adult idols. This is the beginning of their schooling, for the adults will always encourage and help them. What else is there for them to learn except to grow into good adults? So a fond father will make a tiny bow for his son, and arrows of soft wood with blunt points. He may also give him a strip of a hunting net. A mother will delight herself and her daughter by weaving a miniature carrying basket. At an early age boys and girls are "playing house." They solemnly collect the sticks and leaves, and while the girl is building a miniature house the boy prowls around with his bow and arrow. He will eventually find a stray plantain or an ear of corn which he will shoot at and proudly carry back. With equal solemnity it is cooked and eaten, and the two may even sleep the sleep of innocence in the hut they have made.
>
> They will also play at hunting, the boys stretching out their little bits of net while the girls beat the ground with bunches of leaves and drive some poor tired old frog in toward the boys. If they can't find a frog they go and awaken one of their grandparents and ask him to play at being an antelope. He is then pursued all over the camp, twisting and dodging among the huts and the trees, until finally the young hunters trap their quarry in the net, and with shouts of delight pounce on him, beating him lovingly with their little fists. Then they roll over and over in a tangle with the net until they are exhausted.
>
> For children, life is one long frolic interspersed with a healthy sprinkling of spankings and slappings. Sometimes these seem unduly severe, but it is all part of their training. And one day they find that the games they have been playing are not games any longer, but the real thing, for they have become adults. Their hunting is now real hunting; their tree climbing is in earnest search of inaccessible honey; their acrobatics on the swings are repeated almost daily, in other forms, in the pursuit of elusive game, or in avoiding the malicious forest buffalo. It happens so gradually that they hardly notice the change at first, for even when they are proud and famous hunters their life is still full of fun and laughter. [Turnbull (1961), pp. 128-129]

The BaMbuti are able to maintain this charming institution and the rest of their *Gemeinschaft* Society only because of a special circumstance. The other inhabitants of the Congo, who the BaMbuti regard with humorous contempt, dislike and fear the deep forest. Consequently, the BaMbuti have been able to pick and choose when they will or will not have contacts with people outside their Society. There is – and I personally think this is unfortunate – strong reason to think that this self-isolation will not be sustainable much longer as outside Societies make increasing inroads into places now occupied by the deep forest. In this eventuality, the future of the BaMbuti will probably end up similar to the developing future of the Kalahari Bushmen. Most aspects of this probable future can only be described as bleak, uncertain, and dangerous. Barnard explains the current situation faced by today's Bushmen in the following way:

> [In] the 1970s and 1980s [the *!Kung's*[6]] way of life was disrupted by a war in Namibia between South Africa and an independence movement called SWAPO . . . At that time, South Africa ruled Namibia as a colony called South-West Africa. South African soldiers set up an army base near Gautsha, at Tsumkwe. . . . Many [*!Kung*] people from Gautsha went to Tsumkwe. A generation of children grew up there without learning the skills needed to survive in the bush. They are now going to school and learning new skills, such as farming and wildlife management. The *!Kung* have to decide how they are going to cope with modern life, while at the same time try to keep what they can of their traditional skills and knowledge of the environment.[7] These survive only by being passed from one generation to another, but learning new skills depends on getting an education in school. In the past every *!Kung* child knew where and when to gather many kinds of wild plants, how to hunt, and how to live well with few possessions. Now they can't do these things as easily as they could, but they can't get enough schooling to get jobs elsewhere in Namibia either. They have a very difficult future. [Barnard (1993), pp. 22-23]

Such historically has been the case for most *Gemeinschaft* Societies when they are absorbed by larger ones. Similar social forces are having similar effects in the cases of Australia's Aborigines, Indonesia's Dayaks, and Canada's Inuit and Cree. Historical outcomes for the divers Native American Societies in the United States – all of which were far more advanced civilizations at the time they encountered Caucasian-European settlers than are today's BaMbuti (who constitute a natural society) – do not paint a rosy historical picture of the BaMbuti's future.

When the education institutions maintaining the mores and folkways of a Society are smashed and broken, the damage to the Society's way of life does not last just a few years but for generation after generation. The usual consequence is the disintegration of that Society and, for its people, the start of a long Dark Age that ends only if and when some entirely new civilization slowly forms. The kingdom of Charlemagne was called the Holy Roman Empire but, as Voltaire wrote, it was "neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire." Charlemagne at least saw that the reestablishment of institutions of education was needed to hold his conquests together and effectively administer them. His effort to do so – the Carolingian Renaissance – failed because he lacked one of the ingredients essential for success: Charlemagne's kingdom had no competently trained corps of teacher-agents[8]. This agency is the first to disappear when the education institution breaks down. The Kalahari Bushmen are experiencing this disappearance now.

Society institutions that are ignorant of their educational role, or that are unsystematically put together to carry out this role, or that are systematically organized on the basis of some paradigm, opinion, theory or ideology running contrary to human nature, generally muddle into habituated institutionalized practices that granulate and eventually disintegrate their Society by repeated violations of its social contract. This is because they fall into dogmatic methods of operation that serve some fraction of the Society's mini-Communities but disserve others. The social dynamic

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[6] The largest group of Kalahari Bushmen. There are an estimated 35,000 of them living in Namibia, Botswana, and Angola. *!Kung* is pronounced like "Kung" preceded by a popping sound for which there is no equivalent phoneme in the English language.

[7] The Kalahari is a desert that doesn't look like a desert. If you and I were dropped somewhere in the middle of it during the dry season all by ourselves, we'd likely survive about three or four days.

[8] Charlemagne tried to solve this problem by ordering the various monasteries in his kingdom to start and operate public schools to teach his future civil servants reading, writing, and arithmetic. Unfortunately for his effort – and European history – the monasteries were corporate persons whose real allegiance did not lie with Charlemagne. They all paid lip service to his edicts – it was foolishly unwise to disobey an order from Charlemagne – but did little to make his enterprise a success. When Charlemagne died they stopped so much as paying lip service to it. If Charlemagne's effort had succeeded the medieval Dark Age in Europe might have ended three centuries sooner than it eventually did. In his dedicated commitment to education, Charlemagne was a true rarity among kings. Today's world seems to lack his equal among its rulers.

that follows from the nature of being-a-human-being is hardly surprising. Internecine competition events erupt within the Society, enormities are perpetrated and perpetuated, and a Toynbee proletariat begins to form. In revolutionary America, this Toynbee proletariat came to be called The Patriots. Toynbee expounded his idea of a proletariat in the following words:

> [The] principal and essential challenge [during the fall of one civilization and the genesis of a new one out of the ashes] was a human challenge arising out of their relationship to the society to which they were affiliated. This challenge is implicit in the relation itself, which begins with a differentiation and culminates in a secession. The differentiation takes place within the body of the antecedent civilization when that civilization begins to lose the creative power through which, in its period of growth, it had at one time inspired a voluntary allegiance in the hearts of the people . . . When this happens, the ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failing vitality by being disintegrated into a dominant minority, which rules with increasing oppressiveness but no longer leads, and a proletariat . . . which responds to this challenge by becoming conscious that it has a soul of its own and by making up its mind to save its soul alive. The dominant minority's will to repress evokes in the proletariat a will to secede; and a conflict between these two wills continues while the declining civilization verges towards its fall until, when it is *in articulo mortis*[9], the proletariat at length breaks free from what had once been its spiritual home but has now become a prison-house and finally a City of Destruction. . . . The secession of the proletariat is the dynamic act in response to the challenge . . . and in this dynamic separation the 'affiliated' civilization is born. [Toynbee (1946), pg. 77]

We have to peer through the thick fog of Toynbee's mysticism to get to the point, but the point is nonetheless lurking in the fog. The dominant minority consists of those people who have gained the physical power to ***rule*** the Society and coerce its members into compliance with its edicts and rulings. The oppression Toynbee refers to subsists in numerous and repeated violations of the Society's basic understandings of its civil convention (its social contract) perpetrated on part of the Society's citizenry. This citizenry does not "respond by making up its mind to save its soul alive"; the disaffected people involved merely revert to serving their individual Duties-to-themselves and cease to hold themselves to be under an Obligation of allegiance to a Society in which they no longer deem themselves treated as equal members. When enough people have chosen moral secession from the old Society, then civic Duties are no longer observed, the Society is no longer able to function, and its former union splinters into groups of competing corporate persons whose relative relationships with each other are state-of-nature relationships. The old Society is dead and a lengthy interregnum ensues before a new one comparable in scope and population forms. This new Society is said to be "affiliated" with the old one only by the nominal classifications of later historians. This classification amounts to, in a manner of speaking, these later historians saying to themselves, "Say, didn't these guys used to be the Minoans?" If enough of them say, "Why, yes! They were!" then modern Crete is "affiliated" with the vanished civilization of the Minoans by terminological fiat. One might just as well say today's Tel Aviv government is affiliated with the Court of King Solomon, or that the government in Cairo is affiliated with the pharaohs, or that the American Tea Party is affiliated with the Patriots. All three propositions are humbug. A logical connection of convention is not a real connection in nature, human or otherwise.

Shorn of its mysticism, Toynbee's analysis of the character of the fall of civilizations – and, by extension, that of Societies – is congruent with a known property of self-extinguishing behavior observable in particular types of embedding field network instantiations. In the embedding field theory of competitive networks this property is known as "quenching." Furthermore, Toynbee's dominant minority phenomenon is likewise seen in instantiations of competitive embedding field

[9] "at the point of death"

networks that exhibit a contrast enhancing behavior that produces what embedding field theorists call "the 0-1 distribution" in its responses to stimulations. Closed form mathematical theorems of necessary and sufficient conditions for quenching and 0-1 network behaviors have only been achieved for a restricted set of special cases [Grossberg (1973)], but the phenomena have been observed in many networks that do not fall into this restricted class. The presence or absence of quenching and 0-1 behavior is known to depend upon parameters that, using social chemistry terminology, pertain to interaction bond and field bond functionals in the network, rather than upon special topologies in embedding field networks exhibiting mathematical competition. Thus, while the lack of general theorems of quenching and 0-1 distribution applicable to every embedding field network is something of a nuisance for network theorists, the *Dasein* of the phenomena themselves are empirically quite general in extent[10].

All this is to say Toynbee got the outcome right despite severe shortcomings in his attempt to explain the causality of the effect. What, then, does all this have to do with systematic *vs*. non-systematic institutions of education? We can appreciate this by turning to Toynbee's findings that concern the growth of civilizations. We have to amputate a great deal of gangrenous Nietzschean flesh having to do with Toynbee's mystic notion of supermen, but his objectively valid finding, pruned of the worst of its Nietzschean humbug, is buried in Toynbee's following remarks:

> All acts of social creation are the work either of individual creators or, at most, of creative minorities; and at each successive advance the great majority of the members of the society are left behind. . . . The very fact that the growths of civilizations are the work of creative minorities carries the implication that the uncreative majority will be left behind unless the pioneers can contrive some means of carrying this sluggish rearguard along with them . . .
>
> The problem of securing that the uncreative majority shall in fact follow the creative minority's lead appears to have two solutions, the one practical and the other ideal. . . . The direct kindling of creative energy from soul to soul is no doubt the ideal way, but to rely on it exclusively is [an impractical] counsel of perfection. The problem of bringing the uncreative rank and file into line with the creative pioneers cannot be solved in practice, on the social scale, without bringing into play the faculty of sheer mimesis . . .
>
> Mimesis may lead to acquisitions of social 'assets' – aptitudes or emotions or ideas – which the acquisitors had not originated and which they would never have possessed if they had not encountered and imitated those who possessed them. [Toynbee (1946), pp. 214-216]

I doubt if anyone will greet it as front-page news that inventions are the product of inventors,

[10] I have observed these phenomena many times in my own technical work on neural networks. I have further observed that the same network structures can be made to exhibit or not exhibit these properties according to parametric variables I assign to them, thus demonstrating that they do not depend on network topology but only upon network parameterization. Some of these parameters are ones that are autovariable (adaptive) in networks. Because, like other theorists, I have not been able to come up with general theorems for the observed network behaviors, these results are not publishable according to habitual standards the journal literature imposes today on scientific papers. It is for this reason one does not find documentation of the effect in the corpus of published technical literature.

Although it isn't very popular to put it this way, the science community does impose institutionalized censorship on the publication of results through standards that are used in the peer review process. Young assistant professors, who do not wish to be denied tenure and dismissed from their academic positions, do learn to live with the censorship. In time it becomes a matter of habit to suppose this censorship is correct scientific methodology rather than the dogma it in fact is. I find it interesting to note that Einstein's 1905 paper on the special theory of relativity could not be published today under the constraints today's peer review standards impose on the literature. But saying this is about as popular with our science clergy today as Averroism was with the bishop of Paris in the thirteenth century. Human nature does not change.

innovations are the product of innovators, and inventions and innovations that change things over a broad front are relatively infrequent. Clearly an invention or an innovation is a creative act, but that doesn't mean the inventor or the innovator is some sort of ingenious *Übermensch*. If you have a mind to, take a stroll through the Patent Office's documentation of inventions and you'll find: that there are a great many of them; that most of them are "one hit wonders" (an individual's one and only patent); and that there are a lot more people who never patent an invention than there are people who do. Very few inventors – Thomas Edison for example – ever become very widely known even if their creations become very popular. How many people, for example, know that the high school diploma – that ubiquitous document of achievement presented annually across the length and breadth of the United States – was invented by an otherwise forgotten man named William Welch who lived in an obscure little Iowa town named Maquoketa? Not many. Not even very many people who live in Maquoketa today have ever heard of him.

Nor is it correct to imply – as Toynbee is prone to do when he is in the grip of his *Thus Spake Zarathustra* flatus – that the phenomenon of what he called "the uncreative majority" happens because most people are uncreative sluggards capable of nothing more than monkey-see-monkey-do imitation. Mental physics tells us that people – *all* people – innovate if, and only if, an easy, satisficing response to a disturbance does not lie ready-at-hand. Furthermore, learning some whizzy new gadget exists, one that you didn't even know you "wanted" or "needed" before you learned of it, is itself a tension-producing disturbance event *if* you subsequently *change your behavior*. People experiencing *Existenz* in a state of equilibrium (people who are "tranquil") do not change their behavior patterns unless something disturbs their equilibrium.

Mimesis, far from being "uncreative," is in fact a manifestation of a personal innovation. In 1970 no one knew they "needed" a cellular telephone; how many people do you encounter now during your normal day who have them constantly glued to their ears? Quite frankly, what so many people can apparently find to be so constantly chatty about somewhat puzzles me. But habituated judgments of taste are like that. I still nurse a grudge that they quit making Grape Nehi soda pop and still wonder why Maid Rites failed to conquer the fast food universe. Judgments of taste are personal and subjective, and new habits begin with them.

Speaking of Maid Rites, it is also untrue of *homo noumenal* human nature that a person's decision *not* to embrace some innovation is the result of dim wits or lack of imagination. Human beings self-determine their actions as a response to whatever might be stimulating disturbances to their equilibria, and they do so based on the mental physics of the motivational dynamic of judgmentation. "Creative innovations" just coming to a person's attention are "creative" or "innovative" only insofar as they have some relationship to whatever current set of problems the person is attempting to equilibrate or if *learning* of the "innovation" stimulates a new disturbance of its own[11]. Otherwise they are neither creative nor innovative. These are judgments of taste.

For example, in the mid 1970s I was working in California's Silicon Valley as a lab engineer for the Hewlett Packard Company. The company was in the dawning days of a business surge that eventually made it the world's largest computer company. At the time another young fellow named Steve Wozniak (who was then, like me, still a newcomer to HP's workforce) brought an idea to our management for something he called a "personal computer." They turned it down, signed the invention rights back over to Woz, and he teamed up with another youngster named Steve Jobs to start the Apple Computer Company. Some folks today say the newspaper headlines should have read "Oops! HP Dim Wits Let Personal Computer Get Away!" Stupid blunder, right?

Well, no. First of all, what sort of gadget do you want to call a "personal computer"? I know

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[11] The psycho-noetic regulatory mechanism underlying this mental phenomenon is called "the aesthetic Idea" in Critical metaphysics. It is the synthesizing function of continuity in perception.

about four different definitions various folks have used over the years. If you want to use the simplest and most honest definition, a "personal computer" is a completely functioning computer designed and intended for use by one single person. Under that definition, the first one was the IBM 610, introduced in 1957 for a mere $55,000 apiece. IBM sold about 100 of them.

If you mean a computer like what most of us call a "PC" today, that would be the Olivetta Programma 101, introduced in 1965 with a price tag of $3200. Olivetta sold 44,000 of them. A computer of this class was originally called a "desktop calculator." The Olivetta machine was the first. The second was the HP 9100A, introduced by Hewlett Packard in 1968 (price tag: $5000). The 9100A launched the line of PCs that HP still manufactures today.

If you mean a hobbyist computer that actually sold in the tens of thousands of units, that would be the Altair 8800, introduced in January 1975 in *Popular Electronics* magazine. I remember reading the article. This kind of machine was originally called a "microcomputer" and that's what the Apple I, Woz's design , was. It didn't last very long in the marketplace.

If you mean a consumer electronics product, originally dubbed a "home computer" by the gang of youngsters and enthusiasts that jumped on them, I'd say the Apple II and the PET 2001 were the first viable ones. They were both introduced in 1977. Neither was a particularly big market win, and the home computer, re-named the "personal computer" for the second time by IBM, didn't really start to take off until the IBM PC was introduced in 1981.

As for dim wits, if dim wits were involved then you'd have to say two of them were Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, co-founders of HP and two of the smartest guys I've ever known. It's worth remembering that back then the mountains of computer gold – billions of dollars – were being made in the minicomputer and desktop calculator markets. HP chose to go where the money was. I thought then and I think now that it was the right decision for that time. The real profits to be made in today's personal computer business started when the technologies of the "home computer" and "desktop calculator" merged. By that time, HP was already either the second- or third-largest PC manufacturer in the world (I don't remember which it was).

The public thinks PCs were a technical marvel from the beginning, but they really weren't all that hard to invent. I designed my first one in 1975 when I was a 21-year-old, wet-behind-the-ears whippersnapper rookie engineer. At the time we called them "microcomputers." HP put it inside an electronic instrument, called the HP 4942 Transmission Impairment Measuring Set, not on somebody's desk. Microsoft, not Apple or Radio Shack or *Popular Electronics*, really created the PC business. Most people aren't aware that a far larger number of computers have been tucked away inside other more profitable gadgets than have *ever* been placed on people's tables or desks.

My point is that the phenomenon of mimesis is the outcome of cohesive leadership dynamics. Toynbee was right about leadership being the key factor even though he credited it to the ridiculous metaphor of Orpheus' lyre-playing. It's just as well he didn't exert himself on this. He'd have gotten it wrong anyway because he didn't understand what leadership really is and he mistook it for rulership. Charlemagne ruled his kingdom, but he didn't lead it. If he had, the monks would have cooperated with him in the education enterprise of the Carolingian Renaissance instead of passively resisting it and thereby helping it to fail.

Growth, Progress and Order come from cooperative dynamics arising out of competitive ones, and these depend on the sorts of interaction- and field-bonding functionals that are dynamically established within the embedding field networks of corporate persons. These functionals, in turn, depend very heavily on the occurrence of educational Self-development events. The appropriate question for a social-natural science of education is therefore: what specific causal factors and ESD events underlie Order and Progress (or their absence) in a Society? Understanding this, in turn, provides objectively valid bases in principles objectively valid in human nature needed for

systematically designing and structuring institutions of education.

§ 3. The Prime Objective of a Society's System of Education

A ***system*** in general regarded from the practical Standpoint of Critical ontology is *a set of interdependent relationships constituting an object with stable properties*. The object in this case, viewed epistemologically, is that which constitutes a unity under one Idea. As we have just seen, every Society has education institutions set up within its social institutions regardless of whether or not the organizers of the Society intend it. We have also just seen it is necessary, for the protection of the civil rights of the members of that Society, for it to be the common Duty of members of the general body politic to organize the educational functions of its social institutions systematically. This is because civil rights cannot be protected by anything else than the Society itself acting in its corporate capacities. Therefore, protection of the Society's *Existenz* and continuation is the first prerequisite for its capacity to protect civil rights. If the Society's social institutions are not organized to be systematic in performing their educating roles this protection is not adequately provided by those institutions. It follows that this Idea, as a practical regulator of social organization, is ***the Idea of a Society's system of education***.

The Idea can be stated in the form of a social objective: ***The prime objective of a Society's system of education is protection of the Society's* Existenz *and continuation as this is afforded by the protection of its citizens' civil rights***. This is the Critically proper understanding of the social purpose of an education system. Properly understood in this context, *a Society's system of education is a function primarily belonging to its justice system and secondarily belonging to the functions of its legislative and executive systems*. Its principal character of being a function of the justice system of a Society stems from the Critical *Realerklärung* of justice. ***Unjust*** means *anything that breaches or contradicts the terms of the social contract*. ***Justice*** is *the prevention and negating of anything that is unjust*. Failure to protect and enforce the civil rights of citizens under their social contract is unjust, and this is why the education system's social role, the protection of civil rights, places it squarely within the general sphere of the justice system.

I emphasize that a Society's justice system is the system for preventing and negating anything that is unjust. The ancillary functions – courts, legal codes, judges, attorneys, law enforcement agencies, etc. – *serve the justice system* as practical means for carrying out *its* function. There is a prevailing myth today in the United States, and elsewhere in the West, that goes, "the justice system is about the law, not about justice." There could hardly be a more thoroughly destructive and *uncivil* thesis than this one. This uncivil tenet is itself the product of satisficing reasoning historically enabled by the abject failure of ontology-centered philosophy to be able to define the concept of "justice." The prime objective of any legal system *is to serve the justice system*. The justice system is *exclusively* about justice, *never* about the law, because a law is never anything more than an empirical social rule. Because every law is an empirical tenet, *laws are sometimes unjust*. When one is, it is in contradiction with the continued *Existenz* of the Society and, therefore, it is the Duty of a citizen to not-obey an unjust law. This is the Critical concept of *civil disobedience*. It is always the civic Duty of a citizen to preserve justice in his Society[12].

This places the Idea of a system of education in its proper Critical context within the concept of a Society. It has been a peculiarity of history that this context has rarely been understood in the constitutions of formal systems of social governance (i.e., systems of government). In one way it is not especially difficult to qualitatively appreciate why this has been so. All governance systems take their forms from the forms of the Communities they govern and the social compacts that form them. Relatively more primitive Societies, i.e. those labeled natural societies by Santayana,

[12] I have previously discussed this thesis in greater detail in another essay, *The Idea of the American Republic* [Wells (2010a)].

have relatively uncomplicated social compacts establishing relatively fewer civil taboos. As a consequence, there are fewer actions their members hold to be unjust and their justice systems are correspondingly simpler and adequately administered by satisficing consensual compromises when matters of dispute arise. Personal friendships tend to be of this social-nature, as are tiny *Gemeinschaft* Societies like those of the BaMbuti Pygmies. Turnbull provides an insightful analysis of the BaMbuti justice system:

> Cephu had committed what is probably one of the most heinous crimes in Pygmy eyes, and one that rarely occurs.[13] Yet the case was settled simply and effectively, without any evident legal system being brought into force. It cannot be said that Cephu went unpunished, because for those few hours when nobody would speak to him he must have suffered the equivalent of as many days solitary confinement for anyone else. To have been refused a chair by a mere youth, not even one of the great hunters; to have been laughed at by women and children; to have been ignored by men – none of these things would be quickly forgotten. Without any formal process of law Cephu had been firmly put in his place, and it was unlikely he would do the same thing again in a hurry.
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> This was typical of all Pygmy life, on the surface at least. There was a confusing, seductive informality about everything they did. . . . There were no chiefs, no formal councils. In each aspect of Pygmy life there might be one or two men or women who were more prominent than others, but usually for good practical reasons. This showed up most clearly of all in the settling of disputes. There was no judge, no jury, no court. . . . Each dispute was settled as it arose, according to its nature.
>
> Roughly, there were four ways of punishing offenses, each operating as an efficient deterrent but without necessitating any system of outright punishment. In a small and co-operative group no individual would want the job either of passing judgment or of administering punishment, so like everything else in Pygmy life the maintenance of law was a co-operative affair. Certain offenses, rarely committed, were considered so terrible that they would of themselves bring some form of supernatural retribution. Others became the affair of the molimo[14], which in its morning rampages showed public disapproval by attacking the hut of the culprit, possibly the culprit himself. Both these types of crime were extremely rare. The more serious of the other crimes, such as theft, were dealt with by a sound thrashing which was administered co-operatively by all who felt inclined to participate, but only after the entire camp had been involved in discussing the case. Less serious offenses were settled in the simplest way, by the litigants themselves either arguing out the case, or engaging in a mild fight. . . .
>
> In fact, Pygmies dislike and avoid personal authority, though they are by no means devoid of a sense of responsibility. It is rather that they think of responsibility as communal. If you ask a father, or a husband, why he allows his son to flirt with a married girl, or his wife to flirt with other men, he will answer, "It is not my affair," and he is right.

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[13] Cephu had violated group cooperation during a hunt and had attempted to withhold his catch from other members of the BaMbuti camp.

[14] The molimo is a sort of semi-religious festival peculiar to the BaMbuti, the rules of which seem to be rather loose. It involves the use of a sort of trumpet, called the molimo, that proxies in a sense as the voice of the forest. Exceptional skill at being able to mimic the sounds of the forest on the molimo trumpet is highly honored. The forest itself is as close as the BaMbuti come to approximating any sort of deity. Hence they call themselves "the people of the forest." An arrested civilization they may be, but the BaMbuti are thought to be the oldest civilization in Africa and they might be the oldest civilization on earth. They certainly do not envy the rest of us; rather, they tend to regard all people "not of the forest" as bumbling, inept, stupid, and to be tolerated much as one tolerates the antics of very young children. This attitude of tolerance makes them highly versatile at adapting to the cultural styles of other people when they choose to have contact with them. They are masters at allowing outsiders to think themselves superior to the people of the forest, even though the BaMbuti really regard outsiders as almost hopelessly inferior to themselves.

It is *their* affair, and the affair of the other men and women, and of their brothers and sisters. He will try to settle it himself, either by argument or by a good beating, but if this fails he brings everyone else into the dispute so that he is absolved of personal responsibility.

If you ask a Pygmy why his people have no chiefs, no lawgivers, no councils, or no leaders[15], he will answer with misleading simplicity, "Because we are the people of the forest." The forest, the great provider, is the one standard by which all deeds and thoughts are judged; it is the chief, the lawgiver, the leader, and the final arbitrator. [Turnbull (1961), pp. 109-125]

Turnbull relates a couple of anecdotes that illustrate the most serious form of punishment that the BaMbuti mete out to criminals. This is to be labeled an "animal" – in other words, not a person of the forest – and ostracized from the group to fend for oneself. The forest, then, presumably deals with the person's punishment. Cephu came very close to suffering this sentence. But even in cases like this the BaMbuti justice system tends towards the mercy of pardon because it is very effective at eliminating recidivism. Turnbull relates one example in which a Pygmy, a youth named Kelemoke, was ostracized:

I came across only one instance of the first type of crime. We had all eaten in the evening and were sitting around our fires . . . when all of a sudden there was a tremendous wailing and crying from Cephu's camp[16]. A few seconds later there was a shouting from the path connecting the two camps and young Kelemoke came rushing through our camp, hotly pursued by youths who were armed with spears and knives. . . . Kelemoke tried to take refuge in a hut, but he was turned away with angry remarks, and a burning log was thrown after him. Masisi yelled at him to run into the forest. His pursuers were nearly on top of him when they all disappeared at the far end of the camp. . . .

I asked Kenge what had happened. He looked very grave now and said that it was the greatest shame that could befall a Pygmy – Kelemoke had committed incest. In some African tribes it is actually preferred that cousins should marry each other, but among the BaMbuti this was considered almost as incestuous as sleeping with a brother or sister. I asked Kenge if they would kill Kelemoke if they found him, but Kenge said they would not find him.

"He has been driven to the forest," he said, "and he will have to live there alone. Nobody will accept him into their group after what he has done. And he will die, because one cannot live alone in the forest. The forest will kill him. And if it does not kill him, he will die of leprosy." Then, in typical Pygmy fashion, he burst into smothered laughter, clapped his hands, and said, "He has been doing it for months; he must have been very stupid to let himself be caught. No wonder they chased him into the forest." For Kenge, evidently, the greater crime was Kelemoke's stupidity in being found out. . . .

For a long time that night the camp was alive with whispered remarks, and not a few rude jokes were thrown about from one hut to another. The next day I went to Cephu's camp . . . All the youths told me not to worry about Kelemoke, that they were secretly bringing him food in the forest, he was not far away.

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[15] Technically, Turnbull is not quite correct in saying the BaMbuti have no leaders. Leadership is a social dynamic, and within it who is acting as a leader changes fluidly from moment to moment. At some time or another every Pygmy, even a child, acts as the leader-of-the-moment. Rather, it is technically correct to say the BaMbuti have no authority figures or appointed officers [Wells (2010b)]. BaMbuti Society is as pure an example of a *Gemeinschaft* Society as can be found anywhere.

[16] Cephu's camp was a mini-Community within the larger BaMbuti camp. Kelemoke was Cephu's nephew. Cephu's mini-Community had been allowed to attach itself to the bigger group because it was too small to successfully carry out hunts and survive on its own in the forest. To use an American colloquialism, they were the group who "lived on the wrong side of the tracks" within the BaMbuti civil Community.

> Three days later, when the hunt returned in the late afternoon, Kelemoke came wandering idly into the camp behind them, as if he too had been hunting. He looked around cautiously but nobody said a word or even looked at him. If they ignored him, at least they did not curse him. He came over to a bachelor's fire and sat down. For several minutes the conversation continued as though he were not there. I saw his face twitching, but he was too proud to speak first. Then a small child was sent over by her mother with a bowl of food, which she put in Kelemoke's hands and gave him a shy, friendly smile.
>
> Kelemoke never flirted with his cousin again[17], and now, five years later, he is happily married and has two fine children. He does not have leprosy, and he is one of the best liked and most respected of the hunters. [*ibid*., pp. 111-114]

The social institutions of a Society are manmade products of social conventions. As Societies grow and become more complex dynamical systems, their institutions by and large tend to evolve from prior and simpler institutions. If these past institutions have worked well enough to function without very much controversy, their incorporation into the systems of social institutions in the more complex Society tend to occur by satisficing adjustments rather than out of any analysis of how well or even whether the old institution is well-suited to the new situation. By and large, this has been the historical manner in which institutions of education have been put together. There have been few instances where radical or revolutionary innovation has attended the design of an institution of education (the Spartan *agoge* being one example). In particular, the social objective of the educational institution has usually been treated as if it were *selbstverständlich*, which means its convention has been established primarily through judgments of taste rather than objective design. Certainly its social-operational character, as part of the justice system, has not been clearly recognized, nor has the institution of a system of public schooling had its stated objectives grounded in the prime objective of education institutions.

All *civil* social institutions take their fundamental justifications and all the expectations of authority vested in them from their Society's social contract. Ultimately these justifications and expectations of authority arise from the objectives of social governance. Some institutions of government, such as those in the United States, attempt to more or less explicitly state these objectives in *practical* terms, i.e. in terms of what governance is expected to accomplish or facilitate. For example, government at all levels in the United States obtains its authority from just six fundamental objectives of governance that are stated in the Constitution of the United States. These are:

1. to form a more perfect union;
2. to establish justice;
3. to insure domestic tranquility;
4. to provide for the common defense;
5. to promote the general welfare; and
6. to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

The U.S. Constitution itself, which defines the form and convention for the general government, is subservient to these general objectives. They apply to *all* levels of government in the United States. The generality of these objectives is the reason they are stated in the Preamble rather than the main text of the Constitution, and why the Preamble explicitly states that these objectives are

[17] Apparently just flirting with one's cousin is held to be incestuous. It isn't clear whether the BaMbuti would have been so easily forgiving if the incident had involved actual sexual intercourse or if Kelemoke had been older. The fact that Kelemoke did not come down with leprosy was apparently taken to mean the forest had pardoned him. In a number of ways this anecdote reminds me of the morality lesson in *John* 8: 3-11 and Jesus' admonition to the adulteress, "Neither do I condemn you: go, and sin no more."

the reasons why the Constitution itself was to be ordained and established. This interpretation of the intent of the Preamble is documented more or less clearly in the records of the 1787 Constitutional Convention's Committee of Detail:

> A preamble seems proper not for the purpose of designating the ends of government and human polities – this display of theory, howsoever proper in the first formation of state governments, is unfit here; since we are not working on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by society, and interwoven with what we call the rights of states – Nor yet is it proper for the purpose of mutually pledging the faith of the parties for the observance of the articles – This may be done more solemnly at the close of the draught, as in the confederation – But the object of our preamble ought to be briefly to declare, that the present federal government[18] is insufficient to the general happiness, that conviction of this fact gave birth to this convention; and that the only effectual mode which they can devise for curing this insufficiency is the establishment of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary. [Farrand (1911), vol. II, pp. 137-138]

The ***first principle of public education*** is ***all the institutions of government in a Society necessarily effect educating actions that provoke educational Self-development events in the Society's citizens***. Historically, the institution of government by a Society has been done without the institutors of government institutions being cognizant of this principle. This has been a primary cause of the failure of Societies and the fall of civilizations throughout human history as Societies become larger and more complex. It is dubious that the BaMbuti are even cognizant that they have an institution of public education and they certainly do not have any formal government. It seems likely this will be true in every natural society. However, the BaMbuti have experienced no social ill effects of this lack of cognizance because their social organization is based upon very tiny *Gemeinschaft* civil Communities and corporate persons. If for whatever reason the BaMbuti were to undertake a process of aggregation to form larger (free society) tribes their current simple system of social governance would very soon come under pressure to adapt into a new form.

§ 4. Mini-Communities and Other Objectives of Education

Public education is only one part of the general idea of education. As a social institution, it is that part of education that serves common interests of all members of a Society. A social-natural idea of education in general cannot stop at this interest, however, because of the phenomenon of mini-Communities in a Society.

In the United States, as well as in a number of other countries, it has been traditional to make a logical distinction between different institutions of education based upon such factors as: who pays for the costs of operating an institution of education; how the governing body administering an institution is comprised; the sort of topical subject-matter taught by an institution; the membership composing its student body; &etc. A typical distinction, for example, is a distinction made between "public vs. private education." In the U.S. this distinction usually denotes an economic distinction: an institution of education is public if it is paid for entirely or largely by tax revenues collected by agencies of government and is available to anyone, and it is private if it is paid for entirely or largely by a selected student body and other members of mini-Communities in which the students are members. The most common examples of such mini-Communities include the families of the students or a religious mini-Community to which the students belong.

The divers traditional conventions of classification clearly have practical bases. If attention is restricted to just the contexts of these practical considerations, the nominal distinguishing marks

[18] The general government established under the Articles of Confederation.

that differentiate between, e.g., primary school vs. middle school vs. high school vs. state college, or between sectarian school vs. nonsectarian school, seem *selbstverständlich* and reasonable to at least those people whose daily commerce of life requires them to pay attention to the details of education within their Society. However, in most Societies this fraction of the population makes up a typically small number of members of its citizenry and the rest of the population typically pays little attention to the institutions unless some sort of dispute or dissatisfaction over some issue arises and the institution is made part of this issue. When this happens, the phenomenon of adult egocentrism (which I discussed in *The Idea of the Social Contract*) tends to lead to mis-communication and conflict between people because of individual judgments of taste that Bacon called idols of the market.

Put plainly, the word "education" simply doesn't mean the same thing to all the divers people who become involved in controversies concerning institutions of education. At the same time, the parties to the dispute usually presume that the word means the same thing to the other parties as it does to them. If during their debates or arguments it becomes clear to the disputing parties that they do not have a common understanding of the meaning of "education," the natural process of judgmentation of taste called moral realism [Wells (2012)] typically leads to each party accusing the other being "in the wrong" about "what education really is." Seen from the perspective of mental physics, the actual situation here is that all parties are holding with ideas of the meaning of "education" that are correct in some pertinent contexts but incorrect in also-pertinent others.

The practical consequence of adult egocentrism and moral realism for the institution of education functions within a Society is simply this: the traditional and nominal methods that have long been employed for classifying these functions is an inadequate foundation for an objective and social-natural approach to the problem of education in a Society. Indeed, what we should expect to find is that a sound foundation for classifying the functions of institutions of education can only be sought from a basis in the populations of divers mini-Communities within the Society. This is because an enduring system of systematic education institution must account for the divers special interests of mini-Communities in the manner in which the divers institutions themselves are defined and structured. It follows that Society's prime objective for public education institution cannot be served by any hierarchical or centralized administration of education functions. Different mini-Community interests imply that different and special-interest objectives be recognized for different education functions.

Yet, if the Society is to be systematic in its institution of education these divers and sometimes competing special interests must all be assimilated into a common system capable of accommodating the diversity. This implicates a wholly different approach to the governance of the education function than dogmatic nominalism in education theory has historically produced.

§ 5. Dogmatic Nominalism in Traditional Concepts of Education

Lack of cognizance of the education role of social institutions of governance is directly related to low degrees of cognizance of governance functions in institutions more obviously intended to serve an educating function. As I discussed at length in *The Idea of the Social Contract*, all social governance functions and institutions are ultimately grounded in the social mores and folkways of the Society. It is, therefore, not surprising that the earliest known institutions of education in larger Communities had a vocational orientation as well as a moral one insofar as we regard morality in terms of *Sittlichkeit*, i.e., the moral customs of a Society.[19] It is likewise unsurprising

[19] I might be risking a bit of redundancy here, but it bears repeating that a Society is that which is composed of citizens, i.e., individuals possessing particular civil liberties under the protection of civil rights. It is not sufficient to only look at the population in a particular geographic region because this population has most often historically been comprised of two (and often more) separate and distinct corporate persons, between

that social forces inevitably are reflected in institutions of education.

In the case of the BaMbuti, where we find a nearly utter lack of concepts of government and officials, governance is merely governance through moral custom. Furthermore, they almost completely lack concepts of division-of-labor. What concepts they do have of it – women build the huts; men do the hunting, with women and children acting as beaters to drive the game to the men; and men perform the molimo – are based on strictly practical differences in physical *Personfähigkeit*. Hunting is not "a man's job"; it is merely one of a man's social roles. Hut-building is not "a woman's job"; it is merely one of her social roles. In other words, the BaMbuti lack the concept of *vocation* and so it is not surprising that their institution of education for children merges the teaching of moral customs and practical skills seamlessly. They are a hunter-gatherer Society living at the civilization level of natural society.

Larger Societies, those that are said to live at the civilization level of a free society, more generally have division-of-labor institutions, a stratified social hierarchy, and a concept of vocations. The most numerous class of examples historically is the class of what we call caste systems, and in these we usually find a sharp division between a ruling caste and subjugated castes. This is uncivil Community comprised of granulated corporate persons, each of which might or might not form its own civil mini-Society. In these cases institutions of education for children exhibit distinct caste differences based upon the particular form of corporate person peculiar to the child's social situation. Historically, here also we most often find a logical and merely nominal division being made between institutions called education institutions (schools) and institutions referred to by such names as apprenticeship. All are in fact *real* education institutions, but the distinction between vocational education and socio-moral ("liberal") education is practically made with a sharper logical scalpel. The two functions usually merge only within the ruling caste, for whom ruling *is* the vocation, whether as a minor official, as an oligarch ("aristocrat" or "noble"), or as a monarch.

Free society Communities, even uncivil ones, tend to have long historical durations exceeding the lifetimes of individuals. It takes only a few generations before people come to take their social institutions for granted and regard nominal distinctions being applied to them dogmatically as unquestioned traditions. Well before the nineteenth century began, Americans and Europeans both accepted unquestioningly the nominal distinction between "training" (vocational education) and "education" (socio-moral liberal education). For example, Tocqueville provided this account of education institution in the antebellum United States prior to the Industrial Revolution gaining a sweeping hold over American Community:

> It is not only the fortunes of men that are equal in America; even their acquirements partake in some degree of the same uniformity. I do not believe that there is a country in the world where, in proportion to the population, there are so few ignorant and at the same time so few learned individuals. Primary instruction is within the reach of everybody; superior instruction[20] is scarcely to be obtained by any. This is not surprising; it is, in fact, the necessary consequence of what I advanced above. Almost all the Americans are in easy circumstances and can therefore obtain the first elements of human knowledge.

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whom there is no *civil* Community. The feudal division between a caste of nobles and a caste of serfs is one example. Feudal Japan provides an example of a mildly complex caste system in which the ruling class was comprised of the samurai caste of oligarchs and their soldiers with the figurehead caste of the emperor and his court, who were used by the samurai caste as a tool for maintaining a condition of social Order. When we speak of *Sittlichkeit* proper, this exists only within particular castes and not between them. Inter-caste relationships are relationships of subjugation, ruler to ruled. The *uncivil* Community is an amalgamation of distinct mini-Society castes.

[20] i.e., what we now know as high school and college.

> In America there are but few wealthy persons; nearly all Americans have to take a profession. Now, every profession requires an apprenticeship. The Americans can devote to general education only the early years of life. At fifteen they enter upon their calling, and thus their education generally ends where ours begins. If it is continued beyond that point, it aims only at a specialized and profitable purpose; one studies science as one takes up a business; and one takes up only those applications whose immediate practicality is recognized.
>
> In America most of the rich men were formerly poor; most of those who now enjoy leisure were absorbed in business during their youth; the consequence of this is that when they might have had a taste for study, they had no time for it; and when the time is at their disposal, they have no longer the inclination.
>
> There is no class, then, in America, in which the taste for intellectual pleasures is transmitted with hereditary fortune and leisure and by which the labors of the intellect are held in honor. Accordingly, there is equal want of the desire and the power of application to these objects. A middling standard is fixed in America for human knowledge. All approach it as near as they can; some as they rise, others as they descend. [Tocqueville (1836), pp. 51-52]

The last paragraph fits most Americans fairly well today, one difference being that attendance of junior high (or "middle") school and at least part of high school is now mandatory for young people below a specified age of majority. A second difference is that more young people now attend some form of college that by and large did not exist in Tocqueville's day, whether this is a trade school, community college, four-year college, or a public university.

What did Tocqueville mean by his remark that an American's education "generally ends where ours [a European's] begins"? He tells us what he means, and in doing so paints an interesting picture of the early nineteenth century United States:

> The observer who is desirous of forming an opinion on the state of instruction among the Anglo-Americans must consider the same object from two different points of view. If he singles out only the learned, he will be astonished to find how few they are; but if he counts the ignorant, the American people will appear to be the most enlightened in the world. The whole population, as I observed in another place, is situated between these two extremes.
>
> In New England every citizen receives the elementary notions of human knowledge; he is taught, moreover, the doctrines and evidences of his religion, the history of his country, and the leading features of its Constitution. In the states of Connecticut and Massachusetts, it is extremely rare to find a man imperfectly acquainted with all these things, and a person wholly ignorant of them is a sort of phenomenon.
>
> When I compare the Greek and Roman republics with these American states; the manuscript libraries of the former, and their innumerable rude population, with the innumerable journals and the enlightened people of the latter; when I remember all the attempts that are made to judge the modern republics by the aid of those of antiquity, and to infer what will happen in our time from what took place two thousand years ago, I am tempted to burn my books in order to apply none but novel ideas to so novel a condition of society [as New England].
>
> What I have said of New England must not, however, be applied to the whole Union without distinction; as we advance towards the West or the South, the instruction of the people diminishes. . . . But there is not a single district in the United States sunk in complete ignorance, and for a very simple reason. The nations of Europe started from the darkness of barbarous conditions, to advance towards the light of civilization . . . Such has not been the case in the United States. The Anglo-Americans, already civilized, settled upon that territory which their descendents occupy; they did not have to begin to learn, and it was sufficient for them not to forget. . . . Education has taught them the utility of

> instruction and has enabled them to transmit that instruction to their posterity. In the United States society has no infancy, but it is born in man's estate. . . .
>
> It cannot be doubted that in the United States the instruction of the people powerfully contributes to the support of the democratic republic; and such must always be the case, I believe, where the instruction that enlightens the understanding is not separated from the moral education which amends the heart. . . .
>
> In the United States politics are the end and aim of education; in Europe its principal object is to fit men for private life. . . . In Europe we frequently introduce the ideas and habits of private life into public affairs . . . The Americans, on the other hand, transport the habits of public life into their manners in private; in their country the jury is introduced into the games of schoolboys, and parliamentary forms are observed in the order of a feast. [*ibid*., pp. 315-318]

This cannot be accurately said of the United States today. The change is a legacy of an uncivil character the Industrial Revolution in the United States took on in the decades after Tocqueville wrote these words, and of American education being "Europeanized" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Culturally, if not politically, the U.S. was re-colonized by Europe.

Tocqueville's remarks about education in antiquity and his casual interjection of the concept of leisure into the topic of education also bears a bit closer scrutiny. What was classical education in antiquity like for the Greeks and the Romans? These are the ancestral sources of the Western traditions of schooling Tocqueville described. Marrou compiles for us a glimpse of this, although a degree of caution is called for before applying his revisionist views of history. In Greece,

> The family could not be the educational center. The wife was kept in the background: she was considered fit enough to look after the baby, but no more: when the child was seven it was taken out of her hands. As for the father, he was absorbed in public affairs, for we must not forget that we are speaking of what was originally an aristocracy; he was a citizen and a man of politics before he was head of the family. . . .
>
> Nor could the work of education be carried on at school. In the earliest times schools did not exist, and when they did come into being they always tended to be looked upon rather contemptuously, because the masters were paid for their services and the school itself existed merely to give technical instruction, not education. I should like to emphasize this fact for a moment. When we think of education we mean, in the first place, the schools: hence the sometimes excessive importance we attach to teaching-problems in modern society. This is a heritage and survival from medieval times: it was in the monastic schools of the Dark Ages that a bond grew up between the schoolmaster and the spiritual director.
>
> For the Greeks, education – *παιδεία* – meant, essentially, a profound and intimate relationship, a personal union between a young man and an elder who was at once his model, his guide and his initiator – a relationship on to which the fire of passion threw warm and turbid reflections. . . . Throughout Greek history the relationship between master and pupil was to remain that between a lover and his beloved: education remained in principle not so much a form of teaching, an instruction in techniques, as an expenditure of loving effort by an elder concerned to promote the growth of a younger man who was burning with the desire to respond to this love and show himself worthy of it.
>
> This characteristic is all the more noticeable because education in the Greek classical period always preserved some of the aristocratic heritage of its earliest days. In the beginning, it developed in response to the needs of a wealthy class who lived in aristocratic style and had no need to provide young men with technical education that would enable them to earn their daily bread. And so it was primarily moral, consisting in the formation of character and the development of personality, with a background of polite society that was both sporting and worldly, and proceeding under the direction of an elder man and in an atmosphere of close friendship.

> When, later on, in different circumstances, there arose a different type of education more directly concerned with professional efficiency, it was still under the shadow of masculine erotic love that this high technical education flourished: no matter what branch was involved, it was carried on in the atmosphere of spiritual communion that was created by the disciple's fervent and often passionate attachment to the master to whom he had given himself, whom he took as his model, and who gradually initiated him into the secrets of his science or art.
>
> For a long time, the lack of proper educational institutions meant that only this one type of thorough-going education was possible – the type whereby a disciple was attached to a tutor who had honored him by summoning him to his side, by electing him. Let us emphasize the *direction* of this vocation: it was a call from above, to one whom the tutor deemed worthy. For a long time the opinion of antiquity was to despise the teacher who made a business out of teaching and offering his learning to the first customer who came along. The communication of knowledge, it was believed, should be reserved for those worthy of it. In this, public opinion showed a profound sense of the high dignity of culture and its necessarily esoteric character – a sense which we in the West have lost but which still persists in the East – in Islam, for example, where the Platonic belief in the superiority of oral teaching over the impersonality of the written word is still very much alive. [Marrou (1948), pp. 31-33]

Rousseau advocated adoption of much this same sort of education in *Émile* except that he favored beginning the education process much earlier than adolescence and imagined that somehow it would not of necessity be restricted to only members of a Society's upper caste. *Émile* is a thoroughly impractical prescription insofar as life in most modern Societies is concerned.

What Marrou describes is not, of course, a Society-wide picture of education but merely that which was open to high-born youths of the upper caste. Nor does this aspect of the institution explain where a child learned how to read and write – those, at any rate, who did. Durant provides us with a wider view as the institution of education was found in ancient Athens:

> Athens provides public gymnasiums and palaestras[21], and exercises some loose supervision over teachers, but the city has no public schools or state universities, and education remains in private hands. Plato advocates state schools[22], but Athens seems to believe that even in education competition will produce the best results. Professional schoolmasters set up their own schools, to which freeborn boys are sent at the age of six. The name *paidagogos* [pedagogue] is given not to the teacher but to the slave who conducts the boy daily to and from school; we hear of no boarding schools. Attendance at school continues till fourteen or sixteen, or till a later age among the well to do. The schools have no desks but only benches; the pupil holds on his knee the roll from which he reads or the material upon which he writes. . . . The teacher teaches all subjects, and attends to character as well as intellect, using a sandal[23].
>
> The curriculum has three divisions – writing, music, and gymnastics; eager modernists will add, in Aristotle's day, drawing and painting. Writing includes reading and arithmetic, which uses letters for numbers. Everyone learns to play the lyre, and much of the material of instruction is put into poetical and musical form. No time is spent acquiring any foreign language, much less a dead one, but great care is taken in learning the correct usage of the mother tongue. Gymnastics are taught chiefly in the palaestra, and no one is considered educated who has not learned to wrestle, swim, and use the bow and sling.

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[21] a public place for wrestling and athletics.
[22] We saw earlier what sort of state schooling system Plato advocated.
[23] to flog the pupil when he thinks this is necessary. It would seem things weren't so different for Greek boys as for the Akkadian pupil we met in chapter 1. In Sparta the difference was that instead of using a sandal the "spiritual director" used a whip and didn't hesitate to draw blood.

> The education of girls is carried on at home, and is largely confined to "domestic science." Outside of Sparta girls take no part in public gymnastics. They are taught by their mothers or nurses to read and write and reckon, to spin and weave and embroider, to dance and sing and play some instrument. A few Greek women are well educated, but these are mostly hetairai[24]; for respectable ladies there is no secondary education . . . Higher education for men is provided by professional rhetors and sophists, who offer instruction in oratory, science, philosophy, and history. These independent teachers engage lecture halls near the gymnasium or palaestra, and constitute together a scattered university for pre-Platonic Athens. Only the prosperous can study under them, for they charge high fees; but ambitious youths work by night in mill or field in order to be able to attend by day the classes of these nomadic professors. [Durant (1939), pp. 288-289]

What we see here is private institution of instructional education. It is not free-of-charge, not state-supported, and it is non-trade-related. It was limited by economics almost exclusively to the higher castes of Society who composed the citizenry. In Attica, where Athens is located, only around 43,000 out of a total population of around 315,000 people are citizens. Manual laborers, workingmen, traders, and, of course, slaves were excluded from citizenship, and for them (and only some of them) the only institution of instructional education was the trade institution of apprenticeship or, in some cases, a guild. It was nearly impossible for a boy to escape a lifetime lived in the caste into which he was born.

Early Roman education institution was very different from the Greeks and, in attitude if not in method, forever remained different. Marrou writes:

> The difference between the Romans and the Greeks arose in the first place because two different stages of development were anachronistically brought into contact with each other. What is commonly known as "Roman" virtue was simply the moral outlook of the old city-state. To this the Romans of Republic times – hardy, unbending types, hardly better than barbarians – remained loyal, in contrast to the Greeks of the same time – men who were highly developed intellectually, highly civilized . . . Roman civilization was not simply Greek civilization all over again; it was archaic in its own way. . . . This was particularly true in education: right to the end Latin education remained in some ways different from classical Greek education, despite the fact that it modeled itself on it very closely. . . .
>
> It can be summed up in a few words. When you look to its origins you find that is was an education, not for knights as in heroic Greece, but for peasants. . . . This explains the highly original characteristics of the earliest Roman education; it was a peasant education adapted for an aristocracy. To understand its essentials, we have simply got to look at the way our own young village people are educated today. The chief thing that education means to them is being initiated into a traditional way of life. . . . This is the kind of thing we must have in mind when we try to imagine the old Roman education. Its fundamental idea, the thing it was based on, was respect for the old customs – *mos maiorum*[25] – and to open the eyes of the young to these, to get them to respect them unquestioningly as the ideal, as the standard for all their actions and all their thoughts, was the educator's main task. . . .
>
> The basis and backbone of this education was the family . . . and nowhere is this more evident than in the matter of education. In the eyes of the Romans the obvious place in which children should grow up and be educated was the family. Even under the Empire, when it had been the custom for a long time to educate children together in schools, they still went on . . . discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems; and it was not always the old one of keeping the child at home . . . that was given up. . . . In Rome it was not a slave but the mother herself who brought up her child, and even in the greatest

[24] courtesans; essentially the Greek equivalent of Japanese *Geisha*.
[25] "ancestral custom" but with a conceptual emphasis on its greatness and importance

> families she considered it an honor to stay at home so that she could do her duty and be as it were a servant of her children. . . .
>
> From the age of seven onwards the child ceased, as in Greece, to be entirely in the hands of the women, but in Rome he came under his father. This is absolutely typical of the Roman way of teaching. The father was looked upon as the child's real teacher, and even later on, when there were proper teachers, they were still supposed to behave more or less like fathers.
>
> While the girls tended to remain at home with their mothers, industriously spinning wool and doing the housework . . . the boys went off with their fathers, right into the "curia" even when the Senate was sitting in secret, and so they saw all sides of the life ahead of them, learning from his precepts and still more from his example. . . .
>
> When the boy was about sixteen, this home education came to an end. There was a ceremony to mark the beginning of the next stage: he took off his toga edged with purple and any other marks of childhood and put on the *toga virilis*[26] instead. He was now a citizen. But he had not finished his education. There was his military service, and before that, usually, a year spent in "preparing for public life" – *tirocinium fori*.
>
> And now, unless there was some exceptional reason, it was not his father who took him in hand but some old friend of the family who had had experience of politics – someone rich in years, experience and honors. . . . Theoretically the *tirocinium fori* was supposed to end after a year, and the young Roman was supposed to go off to the army, but politics was far too serious a matter to come to an end as quickly as that. The young aristocrat went on following a successful politician around – who might be his father, but usually was someone else. . . .
>
> When we come to examine the content of this old system of education, we find, in the first place, a moral ideal; the essential thing was the development of the child's or the young man's conscience, the inculcation of a rigid system of moral values, reliable reflexes, a particular way of life. On the whole, as I have said, it was the old city-ideal, and meant sacrifice, renunciation, absolute devotion to the community, the State . . . Roman culture always remained aristocratic. [Marrou (1948), pp. 229-235]

What Marrou describes here in specifics is, of course, the education institution for young Roman patricians. A Roman boy of the plebian class would receive the plebian version of this, likewise learning his father's trade, the same veneration for *mos maiorum*, and the model way of life for a Roman plebe. A Roman patrician became a high ranking officer in the legion; a plebe could reasonably aspire to rise to centurion, a rank with grades loosely comparable to the highest grades of non-commissioned officer up to the junior and middle officer ranks in a modern army.

When Rome overpowered Greece, the ever-pragmatic Romans took what they liked from the Greek institutions of education and adapted them to traditional Roman ways. Whatever else is to be said for the Roman Republic, they were first rate assimilators of foreign novelties they deemed practical and useful. During the European Dark Ages, after institutions of education collapsed throughout the old Empire and the institution of "lettered" education withdrew to the monasteries, much of its old Roman character survived, altered primarily by devotion to scripture replacing devotion to *mos maiorum* and reverence for God and Church replacing duty to the state. The Church based its model, and its education institution, on that of the Roman aristocratic system.

§ 6. The Reestablishment of Instructional Education in Europe

The term "dark ages" was originally applied to Middle Age Europe following the disintegration and collapse of the Western Roman Empire. As David Knowles wrote,

[26] "robe of manhood"

> neither the age of Bede in Northumbria nor that of Isidore in Spain deserves the epithet of gloom, but both these areas of light were in fact eclipsed before long and if we look only at the area bounded by the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine and the western sea there is little of educational and literary activity in the seventh and eighth centuries save in a few monasteries. Public schools had long ceased to be, and the study of letters was preserved only in monasteries and a few bishops' households; the enlightened bishops were in most cases themselves monks. . . . Elementary education, where it existed at all, was almost entirely personal – that of the gifted priest teaching his clerk or a forward boy of his parish. In consequence, the legislation of King Charles the Great [Charlemagne] was epoch-making [Knowles (1962), pg. 65]

Charlemagne recognized that he had need of literate civil servants to administer his great kingdom. In 789 A.D. he issued a capitulary stating:

> In every bishops' see, and in every monastery, instruction shall be given in the psalms, musical notation, chant, the computation of years and seasons, and in grammar; and all books used shall be carefully corrected. [*ibid*., pg. 66]

Charlemagne's policy was dictated through a number of such capitularies, issuing orders all to the effect that

> In the villages and townships the priests shall open schools. If any of the faithful entrust their children to them to learn letters, let them not refuse to instruct these children in all charity . . . when the priests undertake this task, let them ask no payment, and if they receive anything, let it be only the small gifts offered by the parents. [*ibid*.]

Monasteries had already long been engaged in the education of oblates – boys and youths bound over to the monasteries by their parents and obliged to one day become priests – because priests needed to be able to read and write in Latin and do such arithmetic as required to know, e.g., when Easter and other holy days came. It was natural, therefore, that Charlemagne turned to them to educate his corps of civil servants and commanded that their teaching function be suitably expanded for this purpose.

The bases of medieval instructional education were "the nine liberal arts" established by Varro (115-27 B.C.) in the last century of the Roman Republic: grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, medicine and architecture. During the Roman Empire, all but the first three of these had fallen out the Roman curriculum until the next four were reintroduced in the last century of the Roman Empire *c*. 410-429. By then medicine and architecture had long been professional trades and were privately taught using a master-apprentice system. These trades vanished from Europe when Rome fell, although they flourished in Byzantium and in the Syriac civilization of Islam during the golden age of Moslem Scholasticism (*c*. 750-1200). They were not reintroduced into Europe until the end of the Dark Ages[27].

Although the Carolingian Renaissance failed and vanished not long after Charlemagne's death, in another context it can be said to have succeeded in the sense that it had a kind of delayed reaction effect. Knowles explains this in the following way:

> In the first place, the legislation of Charles and his immediate successors was something new. Even if it rested in part on practice of ancient decrees, it was novel in its crisp

[27] It is something of an irony that Europe owes much of its intellectual and civilized rebirth to Islam. Books became valuable property in Europe during the Dark Ages. When the knights of the Crusades invaded the Middle East, they discovered a treasure trove of books there, which they proceeded to bring back to Europe as plunder. These books had a large role in helping the European Renaissance to happen.

> precision and universal application. Though soon neglected in practice, it remained . . . as a memory, a precedent and a basis for future action and law. Secondly . . . the Carolingian revival did not wholly vanish from Europe. Like a fire in dry grass it passed here and there, always alive at this monastic center or that. And finally, the teaching and example of Alcuin . . . had given a new impetus and technique to the copying of manuscripts; this continued without abatement at very many monasteries, more methodically and with a wider scope than before . . .
>
> From the time of Alcuin onwards there were in northwestern continental Europe two types of schools, in accordance with Charlemagne's legislation, viz., the cathedral or episcopal school and the monastic school. The cathedral school, theoretically existent in every bishopric but in fact by no means common, was conducted either by the bishop himself or (more frequently) by a school master . . . His pupils were boys and young clerks of every age, destined for the priesthood and often living with the canons, at cathedrals where the chapter followed a rule, very much on the same terms as the children of the cloister lived with the monks. The monastic school was, in the intention of both Charlemagne and Alcuin, made up of two branches, one consisting of the children and young monks of the house . . . and the other of the extern school for clerks conducted by the monks. Outside the classes of the clerks and monks few of this period would have received any schooling in letters.
>
> Of these three schools only one was permanent and ubiquitous, the internal monastic school . . . Of the other two, the bishop's school often disappears, and in the monasteries either a lack of pupils or motives of reform often led to the suspension of the extern school. For two centuries after Charlemagne, therefore, the monasteries and the monks were the chief seats and agents of culture on the Continent, and these are the centuries known with some justice as the monastic or Benedictine centuries. . . . Soon after the end of Erigena's career [*c*. 877] the Carolingian renaissance foundered under the stress of dynastic and feudal wars and invasions of the Northmen, and a century (880-980) began which . . . was as dark as any that had gone before it. [*ibid*., pp. 69-71]

When the darkness finally began to lift after the first Crusade and European civilization began its long road back, it was inevitable that at the center of the recovery was the Church, filling the essential role in reestablishing primary and, eventually, higher institution of education. There is utterly no reason to presume no Michelangelos and no Leonardos lived in Europe during the Dark Ages. Works such as theirs requires the sustenance of a civil Society to succor the division of labor that makes it possible for human beings to turn their attention and energies to arts and crafts that do not immediately serve raw survival or, as in the case of the BaMbuti and their molimo, the functions of cooperative social bonding (which themselves serve the function of survival). No Progress beyond the level of tiny *Gemeinschaft* civil Community is possible without the division of labor, and the division of labor requires the institution of education both for the productive special arts and crafts and for the arts and crafts of competent management of social governance. Without systematic and competent institution of general education, the highest achievable level of human *Existenz* is, as Hobbes put it, "nasty, brutish and short."

The reinstitution of primary education in Europe made possible its Progress from natural society to free society. Its further advance towards ideal society was made possible by the re-institution of higher general education and a wholly new institution called the *studium generale* – the first universities. There was a pattern by which institution of higher education became established in Europe, and Knowles describes this pattern for us:

> In the century before the outlines of the university began to crystallize there were four types of *foci* of higher education: the monastery, the cathedral school, the urban school and the individual and often peripatetic master.
>
> The monastic school at this time was almost exclusively domestic, that is, it existed for

> the benefit of the monks alone. Nevertheless, since the monastic body was large and influential, and counted among its members a majority of the thinkers and writers of all kinds prior to *c*. 1150, the schools of the cloister were still of significance. In general they continued throughout this period to give the traditional literary education, and they were *ex hypothesi* impervious to the direct influence of the great secular masters . . . On the whole the chief significance of the monasteries continued to lie in their possession of rich libraries and their facilities for the multiplication of texts, and their principal literary pursuits were the writing of history and the continuation of the unsystematic, meditative treatment of theology. . . .
>
> The cathedral school was at once the most universal and the most stable center of enlightenment. In law and theory . . . each cathedral possessed a school, and in the period 1050-1200 most of the important sees in central, northern and northeastern France did in fact have such a school . . . These schools had a fixed point, so to say, in the official chancellor who had, under the bishop, the duties of organization and teaching . . .
>
> Urban schools were in the eleventh century restricted to northern Italy, where in large part they took the place of the cathedral school of the north. . . . Finally, the eleventh century saw the rise of a new class of teacher, the professional master who moved from school to school or from place to place, carrying with him or attracting a numerous following by virtue of his purely personal qualities. . . . This class, by their acceptance or assumption of the title of 'sophist,' themselves recognized their affinity with the Greek sophists of the age of Socrates. [*ibid*., pp. 76-78]

It was out of this foundation that the first universities arose. Pedersen tells us,

> The strong economic and political changes in medieval society following the first millennium were accompanied by a rapid transformation within higher education. To a great extent this development can be attributed to the steadily increasing contact with 'Arab' culture, mediated by the hard work of translators. Through these efforts Latin Europe came into possession of a scholarly literature of great extent for the first time since antiquity. Some of this literature was of high quality and comprised crucial parts of the best literary legacy of Greek scholarship, along with the works of many greater thinkers and men of learning who had worked within Islam. In reality this was a true explosion of information that would clearly mean an enormous intellectual challenge for twelfth-century teachers and science. . . . In this context it can be understood that the schools of the twelfth century reacted to this challenge in the most logical way, namely by specializing. Everywhere we can spot a tendency to divide up the work by subject. This had the most far-reaching consequences for the whole system of education. [Pedersen (1997), pg. 122]
>
> It should be noted that the twelfth-century schools of Paris, Bologna, and Salerno won their renown as *studia generalia* by the merit of their own teaching efforts, not as any result of prompting or support from the social authorities or the church. It was the learned world itself that by its own efforts lifted the schools above the earlier level of excellence. On the other hand, it cannot be emphasized enough that these specialized schools, far more of course than the lower cathedral schools, addressed the growing needs of society in just those categories of higher education that were most needed by producing teachers, physicians, jurists, and theologians. It was the use society made of the teaching of specialized schools that determined their success. A *studium generale* which for example had Greek as its specialized subject would have been received with enthusiasm by the scholars of the middle ages, but would not have thrived in the twelfth century simply because it was irrelevant to the needs of society.
>
> Another result of the specialization, from a medieval point of view, was rather more alarming. Though it is true that a more solid education could be had within a *studium generale* than elsewhere, this was at the expense of completeness. Anders Sunesøn experienced this when consciously or otherwise he prepared himself to become archbishop of Denmark. While he could better obtain the necessary theological grounding in Paris than

> elsewhere, there was no way that he could also find there the qualifications in law that were so necessary for a prelate. As a result, he was obliged to supplement his education in Paris with a course of study in Bologna. Numerous other students had the same experience, and consequently the itinerant student became a typical figure of the twelfth century. [*ibid*., pp. 133-134]

One of the reactions of many university administrators – primarily university presidents and provosts – to the severe economic downturn in the U.S. at the end of the second Bush administration has been the mantra, "We can't afford to be everything to everybody." This is an entirely predictable satisficing response to the economic hardships of the recession, and one that belongs to specialized doctrines peculiar to business schools and folklore lessons laypeople take from their personal experience of managing household economics. In the case of the university administrators, the conviction is genuine, the idea no doubt seems *selbstverständlich*, and speeches to this effect leave with faculty and political audiences a vague impression that here, at last, is a new idea in the management of higher education. It is not a new idea. It only seems to be new because these people are ignorant of the history of the enterprise they have been entrusted to administer and manage. This "discovery" and the logical conclusions drawn from it have taken place and been reached before: in the twelfth century in Europe. What has *not* been part of the reasoning and planning processes of today is any analysis of *all* the consequences of the decisions taken then. One unasked question that needs to be asked is: Is the phenomenon of what Pedersen called "the itinerant student" possible in today's socio-economic environment? And if it is not, what is the consequence of this? Could the Church's institution of education have stabilized and nurtured the genesis and growth of Western civilization if the phenomenon of the itinerant student had not happened? This should be doubted. It did not happen during the Carolingian renaissance.

§ 7. The Social-Natural History Lesson of the European Dark Age

We probably know more about the last Dark Age in Europe than about any other dark age we know of from the archeological record. Certainly much more is known about it than has yet been learned about the dark age that occurred between the fall of Syriac civilization and the rise of today's two Islamic sub-civilizations, those called the Iranic and the Arabic. If philosophers and historians ever succeed in turning the social science of history into a social-natural science of history, perhaps it will be discovered that a figurative Comstock Lode of scientific wealth lies just beneath our feet. Personally, I think this is much more likely than not.

In the final analysis, Europe emerged from the medieval Dark Ages because one Society survived the fall of the Western Roman Empire: the Western Christian Church, later known as the Roman Catholic Church. I call it "the Church" here simply for the convenience of brevity (without religious or theological prejudice, without intent to imply either favor or censure). Prior to 1054 A.D., it was the only Christian church in Europe. Consequently, it was catholic by virtue of the absence of any other sects.[28] As a Society, the story of the Church is one of the more peculiar ones in Western history. Originally it was a loosely associated set of *Gemeinschaft* mini-Communities principally bound together more Platonically than actually by the teachings of the Apostles and the Apostolic Fathers – most notably St. Paul, St. Peter, Clement, Hermas, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Barnabas. Durant describes the genesis of the Church:

> It began in the spiritual hunger of men and women harassed with poverty, wearied with

[28] If you're wondering, No, I am not a Catholic nor was I brought up as one. Neither do I bear Catholicism any enmity. I am critical of its doctrines on some points, and just as critical of those of all other religious sects on other points, in matters of physical- and social-natural science. Also if you're wondering, No, I am not an atheist either and no, I'd rather not have any evangelists knocking on my door, thank you.

> conflict, awed by mystery, or fearful of death. To millions of souls the Church brought a faith and hope that inspired and canceled death. That faith became their most precious possession, for which they would die or kill; and on that rock of hope the Church was built. It was at first a simple association of believers, an *ecclesia* or gathering. Each *ecclesia* or church chose one or more *presbyteroi* – elders, priests – to lead them, and one or more readers, acolytes, subdeacons, and deacons to assist the priest. As the worshipers grew in number, and their affairs became more complex, the congregations chose a priest or layman in each city to be an *episcopos* – overseer, bishop – to coordinate their functioning. As the number of bishops grew, they in turn required supervision and coordination; in the fourth century we hear of archbishops, metropolitans, or primates governing the bishops and the churches of a province. Over all these grades of clergy patriarchs held sway at Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Rome. . . .
>
> The gravest problem of the Church, next to reconciling her ideals with her continuance, was to find a way of living with the state. The rise of the ecclesiastical organization side by side with the officials of the government created a struggle for power in which the accepted subjugation of one to the other was the prerequisite of peace. In the East the Church became subordinate to the state; in the West she fought for independence, then for mastery. In either case, the union of Church and state involved a profound modification of Christian ethics. [Durant (1950), pp. 44-46]

With the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Church gradually came to take the institution of the monarchy/oligarchy form for its institution of government. Originally (and still today in the Eastern Orthodox Church) the word "pope" just meant "father" and was the title given to every priest. The corporate person of the Church, as it took shape in the sixth century, was a heavily granulated Society originally held together by the power of the emperors in Constantinople. The principal and most important division within its Society was that between the Greek-Orthodox faction and the Latin-Roman faction. The monarchy of the Church came to rest in the hands of the Latin-Roman faction, primarily because the Greek-Orthodox faction was both more loco-nationalistic in the attitudes of its mini-Communities and because this faction was severely weakened by the conquest of most of the Middle East and North Africa by the Syriac-Islamic civilization.

The Church monarchy in Rome held the Church together as a single corporate person until the great schism between East and West became final in 1054. Afterwards, the corporate person of the Roman-Catholic Church was maintained until its further disintegration in the Reformation movement that swept through Europe in the sixteenth century. The groundwork of the ascendancy and domination of the Church under the Bishop of Rome was laid by one of history's more remarkable men, Pope Gregory the Great (540-604 A.D.). It was Gregory who transformed the office of Bishop of Rome into what may be history's most unique monarchy, the Papacy:

> While Benedict and his monks peacefully worked and prayed at Monte Cassino, the Gothic War (536-53) passed up and down Italy like a withering flame, leaving disorder and poverty in its wake. Urban economy was in chaos. Political institutions lay in ruins; in Rome no secular authority survived except that of imperial legates weakly supported by unpaid and distant troops. In this collapse of worldly powers the survival of ecclesiastical organization appeared even to the emperors as the salvation of the state. In 554 Justinian [the Roman emperor in Constantinople] promulgated a decree requiring that "fit and proper persons, able to administer the local government, be chosen as governors of the provinces *by the bishops and chief persons* of each province." But Justinian's corpse was hardly cold when the Lombard invasion (568) subjected northern Italy again to barbarism and Arianism, and threatened the whole structure and leadership of the Church in Italy. The crisis called forth a man, and history once more testified to the influence of genius.
>
> Gregory was born at Rome three years before Benedict's death. He came of an ancient

> senatorial family, and his youth was spent in a handsome palace on the Caelian Hill. On the death of his father he fell heir to a large fortune. . . [He] used the greater part of his fortune to found seven monasteries, distributed the rest to the poor, laid aside all vestiges of his rank, turned his palace into the monastery of St. Andrew, and became its first monk. . . . Out of this peace he was drawn to serve Pope Pelagius II as ambassador to the imperial court at Constantinople. . . . In 586 he was recalled to Rome and became Abbot of St. Andrew's. In 590 a terrible bubonic plague decimated the population of Rome; Pelagius himself was a victim; and at once the clergy and people of the city chose Gregory to succeed him. . . .
>
> He was now fifty, and already bald, with large head, dark complexion, aquiline nose, sparse and tawny beard; a man of strong feelings and gentle speech, of imperial purposes and simple sentiments. . . . Though always ailing and prematurely old, he spent himself in ecclesiastical administration, papal politics, agricultural management, military strategy, theological treatises, mystic ecstasies, and a solicitous concern with a thousand details of human life. . . .
>
> His administration of the Church was marked by economic wisdom and stern reform. He restored discipline in the Latin monasteries, and regulated their relations with the secular clergy and the pope. . . . He checked exploitation on the papal estates, advanced money to tenant farmers, and charged no interest. But he collected due revenues promptly . . . and received, for the Church, legacies of land from barons frightened by his sermons on the approaching end of the world.
>
> Meanwhile he met the ablest rulers of his day in political duels, won often, sometimes lost, but in the end left the power and prestige of the papacy, and the "Patrimony of Peter" (i.e., the Papal States in central Italy) immensely extended and enhanced. He formally acknowledged, but in practice largely ignored, the sovereignty of the Eastern emperor. . . . In the few years of peace allowed him he turned happily to the task of spreading the Gospel through Europe. He brought the rebellious bishops of Lombardy to submission, restored orthodox Catholicism to Africa, received the conversion of Arian Spain, and won England with forty monks.
>
> He dominated the end of the sixth century as Justinian had dominated its beginning; and his effect on religion was exceeded in this epoch only by that of Mohammed. He was not a learned man, nor a profound theologian . . . But this same man, superstitious and credulous, shattered with a terrified piety, was in will and action a Roman of the ancient cast, tenacious of purpose, stern of discipline, prudent and practical, in love with discipline and law. [*ibid*., pp. 519-524]

Whether or not the Church in the West would have survived without Gregory we will never know. We do know that under him it did, and that he united it into a unified corporate person. He did not, however, turn it into the temporal-political superpower it later became. That fell to his successors to accomplish:

> But the repeated humiliations of the papacy by the Eastern emperors, the weakening of Byzantium by Moslem expansion in Asia, Africa, and Spain, by Moslem control of the Mediterranean, and by the inability of Constantinople or Ravenna to protect the papal estates in Italy from Lombard assaults, drove the popes to turn from the declining Empire and seek aid from the rising Franks. Pope Stephen II (752-7) . . . in a move fraught with political consequences, turned to the Franks, Pepin the Short came, subdued the Lombards, and enriched the papacy with the "Donation of Pepin," giving it all of central Italy; so was established the temporal power of the popes. This brilliant papal diplomacy culminated in the coronation of Charlemagne by Leo III (800); thereafter no man could be an accepted emperor in the West without anointments by the pope. The harassed bishopric of Gregory I had become one of the greatest powers in Europe. When Charlemagne died (814), the domination of the Church by the Frank state was reversed; step by step the clergy of France

> subordinated its kings; and while the empire of Charlemagne collapsed, the authority and influence of the Church increased. [*ibid*., pg. 525]

The institution of education was vital to the survival of the Church and this institution played a major role in the Church gaining and then maintaining its supremacy of power in medieval Europe. It is not without sound reason that in eighteenth century France the Church was called the Second Estate and wielded more practical power than the King of France. The European kings commanded armies; the Church commanded the authority to excommunicate the kings themselves or soldiers in their armies who served King before Church. The latter power proved far more potent than the former until after the Reformation began. The consequence was an uneasy cooperation between kings and the Church in Europe in which the Church exploited the dual mini-Community memberships of the common people, who belonged to both their king and to the Church. The former ruled their lives, that latter their devotion and ultimate fealty.

Politically, the Dark Ages in Europe were a chaos of disunity, poverty, ignorance and violence. Looming over this, however, was the spiritual unity only the Church provided through its corporate *Personfähigkeit*. The Church maintained and strengthened this *Personfähigkeit* through and by its institution of education. Contrast this with the Christian East, which remained mired in dark age ignorance until the time of Czar Peter the Great in Russia. The difference between East and West here was far less a matter of feudal politics and far more a matter of the fact that in the West the Church established, for its own purposes, a broad institution of education reaching beyond the walls of monasteries, and the Eastern Orthodox Church did not.

Dark ages are not caused by the sword. In those cases for which we have sufficient evidence to form an objectively grounded judgment, they are led by the breakdown of corporate powers of persuasion – Modality in corporate *Personfähigkeit* – followed subsequently by the breakdown of the remaining powers of corporate *Personfähigkeit*. Communities that had at one time advanced to the higher levels of civilization and power might fall to the sword of an external enemy, but they prepare the conditions and invite the fall through the disintegration of their social institutions of education. We can liken this to an HIV infection; this infection destroys the immune system of the body politic, and then the outside hostile force acts as a second infection bringing a *coup de grace* to which the body politic finally succumbs.

§ 8. Empirical Reality Check

Critics of Toynbee's thesis that civilizations fall from within can and do point to what many scholars think are historical counterexamples. If these were in fact real counterexamples, they would have fundamental and generally negative implications for what you have just read and would provide rational grounds in opposition to the social-natural theory in this treatise.

In chapter 4, however, I show that this is not the case. Instead these apparent counterexamples are appearances of what I call *the phenomenon of interruption*. Let us turn to that discussion now.

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