Chapter 11 Community

1. Freedom, Liberty, and Citizenship

The ideas of communities, societies, and human nature are inextricably bound up with one another. In consequence, the topic of this chapter is an enormously complex subject, as you probably already know. The "social atoms" of communities and societies are individual human beings, and while human beings are much more alike than they are different, the differences do matter in communities and societies. As social atoms, the *Existenz* of human differences means that a "periodic table" of human atoms would have such an enormous number of entries compared to a chemist's periodic table of the elements that it would make the latter seem an almost trivial taxonomy. Human psychology and the nature of being-a-human-being are themselves topics of great complexity and, because they underpin theories of community and society, I'm sure you can appreciate that this treatise can barely scratch the surface of these sciences as a practical matter. In this treatise it is necessary to instead call upon findings from previous works on the social-nature of communities and societies. It is quite possible to make Critical sciences of sociology and human interpersonal psychology. Such sciences are properly called *social*-natural sciences because their methodologies and theoretical primitives are necessarily different in kind from those of physical-natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology [Wells (2012), chap. 1].

Theology, as I said before, is not and cannot be a science nor can it be a philosophy. It is what it is: theology. It is philosophical because it must call upon ideas of philosophy (particularly, metaphysical ideas). It is mathematical because its central Objects are ideas of deities and supernature and all ideas of these are defined concepts –that is, "made" concepts – and all such concepts belong to Slepian's Facet B. It is not a science because, by definition, science is the study of nature while theology is a doctrine of supernature. Theology has no less dignity because of this. The questions to which it seeks answers are of enormous interest to people and have been since before history began. What dignity would physics have if no one cared why water freezes in winter or why an arrow shot into the sky falls back to earth or why corporeal objects exhibit the properties they exhibit? If people were as indifferent to these things as is an iguana, the science of physics would not exist at all. The foundation of the dignity of any field of human inquiry is the same: that people are interested in having answers to their questions.

I just called people the social atoms of communities and societies. Clearly this is metaphorical. But a metaphor is an inference of analogy, and inferences of analogy not only can be but often are starting points for disciplined scientific study. I offer for your consideration the idea that we can regard human social-natural phenomena in terms of the idea of a discipline that can properly be called the "social chemistry" of human interactions [Wells (2012), chap. 2]. As a science, social chemistry is a nascent field of study. People often speak metaphorically of the "chemistry" between two or more people, and this is an insightful way to look at it. But only in the last few years has work begun which aims at building a disciplined whole of knowledge around this idea. That work is found in Wells (2012). This treatise on theology calls upon ideas of social chemistry as part of discussing and explaining phenomena of human community. In the next chapter these lessons will be used to speculate upon the supernature of afterlife.

Human atoms differ in kind from the corporeal atoms of physics because human beings exhibit what Critical metaphysics calls *freedom*. Freedom is ***the capacity for one's Self-determination to take action***. This is a notion of teleological causality & dependency *necessary* for explaining human mental nature but entirely outside the scope of objective validity for physical-natural sciences. The latter call exclusively – and properly so – upon the notion of physical causality & dependency. An atom of oxygen determines nothing; everything it does is determined by physical laws over which an oxygen atom "has no say." *Why* this is so is a question physics cannot answer; physics asks *how* things work, not why they work this way. When a physicist strays into seeking "Why?" explanations, he trespasses into territory foreign to and outside the scope and competency of his science.

If God created you and put you here then he endowed you with the capacity of freedom. However, he also created you in physical form and by doing so placed limits on your capacity to do things. Herein lies the difference between *freedom* and *liberty*. **Liberty** is *freedom plus the ability to realize the action undertaken*. **Natural liberty** is liberty such that the ability to realize the undertaking of an action is constrained only by physical laws of Nature. Natural liberty places a check on impetuous acts of reflective judgment, and by doing so can be said to incline a person to develop higher maxims of prudence, skill, and social morality. It is not-improper to regard freedom as a *gift*, liberty as a *condition* guiding a person's Self-development.

There is an important distinction between natural liberty and civil liberty. **Civil liberty** is liberty bound by deontological Obligation to participate as a citizen in a civil Community. Because no person can impose any Obligation on another person, Obligation to participate as a citizen in a civil Community is always a Self-made Obligation a person *chooses* to impose *upon himself*. Participation as a citizen in a civil Community always involves the voluntary alienation of particular natural liberties in exchange for the benefits of support, protection, and succor that citizenship in a civil Community provides.

A *civic action* is an action operationalized by an individual that is congruent with his Duties under the terms of a social contract. Deontologically, a **citizen** is a member of a Community who accepts mutual Obligations to-and-with its other citizens and who accepts the performance of acts of citizenship as a reciprocal Duty he owes to the Community. **Citizenship** is the actuality of individual actions congruent with conventional general standards of expectations for civic actions. It is grounded in reciprocal Duties of association. *Real* citizenship is a social dynamic of relationships and subsists only in the practical actions of individuals[1]. Herein lies an important distinction between a civil liberty and a civil right. A **civil right** is any object *defined by the civil convention* that is regarded under that convention as an intangible property possessed by every member of the civil Community and expected as a benefit of citizenship in that Community. The first necessary condition for practical *Existenz* of a civil right is a social contract to which every citizen pledges his allegiance. The second is that every citizen faithfully fulfill his Duty to uphold the civil rights of *all* fellow citizens. The entirety of the membership of a communal association, whose members have bound themselves to each other by a social contract, is called its **Sovereign**. This idea of citizen sovereignty was the most fundamental principle of the American Revolution and the basis for the Republic of the United States of America. James Madison wrote,

> If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, and for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is *essential* to such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is *sufficient* for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. [Hamilton *et al.* (1787-8), no. 39, pg. 210]

Through admission as a citizen of a civil Community, a person obtains particular civil rights but *only* in exchange for pledging himself to fulfill particular Duties, the principal Duty being a Duty *to safeguard all*

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[1] Deontological citizenship is not at all the same thing as nominal citizenship. The latter is merely a title conveying particular legal rights and liberties that are bestowed upon a person by legal fiat. In any country, many of its citizens are merely nominal citizens because they do not hold themselves to be obligated to fulfill the basic terms of their social contract in regard to their fellow countrymen. For example, white nationalists in the United States are nominal citizens but deontologically they are not citizens at all. Rather, they are deontological outlaws.

the civil rights of every other citizen in his Community. Rousseau wrote,

> This formula [of the social contract] shows us that the act of association [as a citizen] comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part. . . .

> As soon as this multitude [the citizens of the Community] is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity. . . .

> In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do no less harm to others than the payment is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a *persona ficta*, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfill the duties of a subject. The continuation of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic. [Rousseau (1762), pp. 16-17]

Becoming a citizen of a civil Community is a twofold form of agreement: the agreement of the individual to bind himself under Obligation to the Community's social contract; and the acceptance by all other members of the Community of that individual *as* a member of their Community possessing all the civil rights bestowed by the Community. Failure to fulfill the Duties of a citizen by a member is a moral ground for *expulsion* of that member from the Community by its members; failure of the Sovereign to meet the Sovereign's Duty to guarantee and safeguard the civil rights of a citizen is ground for that citizen to *withdraw* his allegiance to the Community. This is called **moral secession**: the withdrawal of a citizen from a Community or Society *without transgression* that is justified by a perpetuation of injustice committed by the Sovereign through violation of the condition of the social contract. A moral secessionist reverts to outlaw status in a state of nature relationship with his former association and does not thereby become a criminal. He freely alienates all his civil rights and civil liberties and regains all his formerly alienated natural liberties. All the members of the association who acquiesced in the perpetuation of injustice are morally culpable for his act of secession and have committed a deontological moral transgression by failing to carry out their Duty to commit their persons and powers to maintenance of the civil Community.

I think it is likely all of us are familiar with instances in which a person who, while demanding the protections of civil rights, refuses to lend his aid to protecting the civil rights of others. Such a refusal is not civil liberty but rather natural *licentiousness*. Deontologically, a **transgression** is *any deed contrary to duty*. This includes deeds that are acts of omission. An *unintentional* transgression is, deontologically, a moral *fault*. An *intentional* transgression is a moral **crime** regardless of whether or not that transgression is a matter of some legislated law. A deontological criminal is any person who commits a crime. Because a crime is an intentional transgression of duty, and only deontological citizens oblige themselves to duties to the civil Community, only a citizen can commit a crime. A person who does not pledge himself to reciprocal duties of citizenship is an **outlaw**. An outlaw's actions in violation of any civil right of any citizen of a civil Community is an *attack* on that Community and *all* of its citizens, and it is the civic Duty of *every* citizen to defend every other citizen from any and all such attacks. An outlaw is a *potential* enemy of a civil Community unless he obligates and pledges himself to alienate his natural liberties to do any harm to any of its members. A criminal is an actual *traitor* to his Community. Rousseau further tells

us,

> From whatever side we approach our principle, we reach the same conclusion: that the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights. Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every act of Sovereignty, i.e., every authentic act of the general will, binds or favors all the citizens equally so that the Sovereign recognizes only the body of the nation and draws no distinctions between those of whom it is made up. What, then, strictly speaking, is an act of Sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no one but their own will . . .

> We can see from this that the sovereign power, absolute, sacred, and inviolable as it is, does not and cannot exceed the limits of general conventions, and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and liberty as these conventions leave him; so that the Sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on another, because, in that case, the question becomes particular and ceases to be within its competency. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 34]

Rousseau's doctrine of the social contract is an empirical doctrine grounded in human nature. There are myriad details and questions attending its correct understanding, and these are dealt with in Wells (2012). Phenomena of Community are to be viewed under Critical theology as *lessons* by means of which a person has the opportunity to come to an understanding of the meaning of humanity, and through the lens of which life can be viewed as preparation for afterlife. This treatise examines a number of these lessons.

2. Human Beings Have No Innate Social Instinct

Deontologically, an ***instinct*** is a capacity determined as a sensuous appetite for an activity without cognition of an object of desire. It is regarded as appetite carrying the Modality of actuality, i.e. assertoric appetite [Wells (2009), chap. 9]. Instincts are regarded as "blind" appetites and they are innate to human beings in our nature as *homo phaenomenon*. Historically, the idea of "instincts" has been a controversial subject for ontology-centered psychology, but Critical metaphysics provides practical objective validity for understanding this idea [*ibid*.]. This section deals with a common fallacy, namely, the supposition of what is called man's "social instinct."

If God created you and put you here, then he also *necessitated* your Self-construction of Obligation to yourself and Duty to yourself. What he did not do was instill within you any innate reciprocal Obligations or reciprocal Duties regarding Society. *Man has no innate social instinct*. However, he did place you in an environment of total dependency upon your parents or other caregivers when you were an infant. In this environment you learned your first attachments to other people and, for the great majority of people, your first experience of social bonding (typically to your family) and your first rudimentary lessons pertaining to reciprocal Obligations and Duties. But how far *you* will *choose* in life to extend these lessons and perfect your Self-commitments to a Community he left to your capacity of freedom and your capabilities of natural liberty. Gregarious *inclinations* you develop *through experience* offer you a possibility to obtain a moral apprehension of an afterlife in a divine Community.

My statement, "man has no innate social instinct," runs contrary to what many people presume because human beings do exhibit gregariousness, some to a greater degree and some to a lesser. But social associations and commitments *originate* out of Duties and Obligations to oneself (as discussed in chapter 10) and by learned habits of the child's initial situation of dependency upon its caregivers. That human beings appear to lack an *innate* social instinct is perhaps best evidenced by phenomena of autism and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). Estimates for the number of children with some form of ASD range as high as 1 in 68 according to the Center for Disease Control. Other estimates vary widely. Autistic children

often are found to have biological pathologies but it is not necessarily the case that children exhibiting ASD are found to have any *clear* biological disorder. Greenspan and Wieder wrote,

> Autism is a complex developmental disorder involving delays in and problems with social interaction, language, and a range of emotional, cognitive, motor, and sensory abilities. Specific behavior – such as bodily spinning, lining up toys, or repeating words without apparent purpose or meaning – is often observed as well, but as we will show later, these symptoms arise from more fundamental problems in relating, communicating, and thinking. They are not specific to autism. Language, thinking, and social skills for a child with autism or autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) vary according to where he or she falls on a spectrum. [Greenspan & Wieder (2006), pg. 3]

It is perhaps tempting to dismiss the phenomena of autism as evidencing human lack of an "innate social instinct" because "people with autism have something wrong with them," but this is type-α compensation (ignórance behavior) that ignores a basic fact of human mental nature. This fact is: human beings cannot communicate their affective perceptions *per se* to other people. Instead, we find that we communicate these in the form of objective metaphors and similes other people understand only in terms of affective perceptions they have known themselves. This is the original meaning of the word "autism" prior to 1912 (when psychiatrist Eugen Bieuler specialized it as a psychiatric term). However, it is reported that the word was used prior to 1800 (albeit rarely). Its Greek root means "self orientation" and carries a connotation of being something no one else can fully understand. It is only since Bieuler's day that the word acquired a pathological psychiatric connotation and only since 1944 that it has been a medical term. Reber and Reber tell us,

> The general meaning [of autism] is reflected in the roots of the word: *aut = self* and *–ism = orientation* or *state*. Hence, the tendency to be absorbed in oneself; a condition in which one's thoughts, feelings, and desires are governed by one's internal apprehensions of the world. [Reber & Reber (2001), "autism"]

Piaget used the word in this connotation, and without any implication of pathology, in his early work. If someone tells you, "You don't know how I feel," you should understand that *you really don't*. Empathy does not mean understanding. Empathy is an affective perception, not a conceptualization.

Using pathological autism to justify dismissal also ignores evidence of what psychiatrists have recently taken to calling "the broad autism phenotype" [Groot & Strien (2017)]. There is a broad range of behaviors that go into comprising social functioning. People said to be "on" the autistic spectrum are those whose behaviors are in some way regarded as extreme and severe enough to present difficult challenges to functioning "normally" in social situations. The situation here is analogous to the difference psychiatrists draw between a "personality style" and a "personality disorder." Behaviors and expressions said to reflect someone's "personality" can be thought of spanning a continuum of characteristics ranging from healthy to pathological. A personality "style" is on the "healthy" end of this spectrum whereas a personality "disorder" is on the pathological end [Sperry (2003)]. Similarly, behaviors and expressions said to reflect social interactions, interpersonal communication, etc. can likewise be seen as a spectrum, the "broad autism phenotype," with autism and ASD occupying the unhealthy or pathological end of this spectrum. By "healthy" I mean "conducive to a state of good physical and mental welfare."

I do not mean to minimize in any way the seriousness of pathological autism and ASD, but the fact is that drawing a line between what is a disorder or disease and what is not is at best an arbitrary decision based on social norms. This is something demonstrated by the fact that psychiatrists continually refine how to "make this call." The medical community quite naturally focuses its attention on the "unhealthy" end of the spectrum and almost all of what you read and hear about autism and ASD is slanted toward this end. Inaccurately *labeling* a child as "autistic" can be cruelly unjust to the child, and labeling a child "autistic" is something non-professionals (amateurs), *especially* teachers and school counselors, have no business doing. The consequences can be far too serious to tolerate quack "diagnoses."

The fact that empirically a "spectrum" is observable means that the *Existenz* of pathological autism and ASD is not an objectively valid excuse for a dismissal of "something is wrong with these people." The *fact* is children diagnosed as being "on" the autism spectrum can and do respond to clinical treatment. This is, in my view, more than enough evidence by itself to justify not dehumanizing people said to be "on" the autism spectrum. Dr. Greenspan wrote,

> Perhaps the most vivid understanding of the fundamental way emotions influence cognitive growth comes from observing autistic children. These children, who suffer some of the most severe biologically based thinking and language problems imaginable, can teach us a great deal by how they learn to think, relate, and communicate. The children my colleagues and I work with have very serious deficits related to clear neurological problems, such as poor ability to process sounds, comprehend words, and plan sequential movements. Diagnosed between eighteen months and four years of age, these youngsters display a variety of bizarre and disturbing behavior . . . but almost no ability to respond to even the most basic attempts at communication. [Greenspan (1997), pg. 13]

> Working with these children, we found that the basic unit of intelligence is the connection between a feeling or desire and an action or symbol. When a gesture or bit of language is related in some way to the child's feelings or desires – even something as simple as the wish to go outside or to be given a ball – she can learn to use it appropriately and effectively. [*ibid*., pg. 16]

It is no part of the aim of this treatise to expound upon disorders – whether personality or autistic – but factors of psychology and psychiatry are pertinent to understanding the phenomenon of human social Community. In particular, if divine purpose is empirically reflected in human Community and Kant's notion of humanity, then understanding human experience pertaining to Societies and Communities, especially in view of the fact that human beings have no innate social instinct, is pertinent to theology.

3. Communities, Civil Communities, and Societies: Basic Definitions

Relationships among human beings are complex and oftentimes subtle phenomena. Understanding them better calls for improved social-natural sciences, and these are improved by establishing classifications by which the presence or absence of specific characteristics of human relationships are delineated. Antoine Lavoisier, who is generally credited with turning chemistry from a qualitative science into a quantitative one and is popularly considered to be the father of modern chemistry, wrote:

> The impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a science from the science itself is owing to this, that every branch of physical science must consist of three things: the series of facts which are the objects of the science; the ideas which represent these facts; and the words by which these ideas are expressed. Like three impressions of the same seal, the word ought to produce the idea, and the idea to be a picture of the fact. And, as ideas are preserved and communicated by means of words, it necessarily follows that we cannot improve the language of any science without at the same time improving the science itself; neither can we, on the other hand, improve a science without improving the language or nomenclature which belongs to it. However certain the facts of any science may be, and, however just the ideas we may have formed of these facts, we can only communicate false impressions to others while we want words by which these may be properly expressed. [Lavoisier (1789), pp. xiv-xv]

From Newton to Lavoisier to Faraday to Fermi, history has demonstrated the truth of these words in the physical-natural sciences again and again. One of the just criticisms that can be leveled against today's science education and educators is that today's students are not being adequately educated about this fact. One of the just criticisms that can be leveled against the "social sciences" is that these fields of study too much ignore this fact. If there are ever to be *social*-natural sciences on par with the fecundity of *physical*-natural sciences, this is a situation that must be changed.

The nomenclature I use in this treatise was first introduced in Wells (2012). Abercrombie *et al*. tell us,

> The term community is one of the most elusive and vague in sociology and is by now largely without specific meaning. At a minimum it refers to a collection of people in a geographical area. [Abercrombie *et al.* (2006), "community"]

This will not do. The Critical doctrine of the social contract [Wells (2012)] defines a social-natural **community** as a group of people living in the same district, geographical area, etc. under the same laws. The laws referred to in this definition are the man-made laws, either statute or common, members of the community are expected and required to follow. This qualifying specification is made to distinguish a community from lawless populations who happen to live near each other. Examples of the latter would include the mountain men living in the North American Rocky Mountains from 1810 through the 1880s and the "49ers" living in mining camps and isolated settlements in California's Gold Country during the gold rush of 1849. The *Dasein* of laws in a community implies the *Dasein* of at least a minimal social compact binding upon interrelationships among all members of that community.

A **Community** (capitalized) differs from a community. A social-natural Community is a voluntary association of people who join together for a *common* purpose. For example, having a common purpose distinguishes a Community such as a subdivision with a homeowners' association from other subdivisions who have no homeowners' association; it also distinguishes it from the general community of the city or county in which the subdivision is located. Homeowners' associations generally have special contractual rules ("covenants") that their association enforces for such purposes as maintaining property values, providing safe playgrounds for their children, supplying lawn irrigation water, or promoting the aesthetic attractiveness of the subdivision. Agreeing to be bound by such covenants is a legal condition required by contract that is placed on home buyers at the time of purchase.

A Community is further subdivided as either a civil Community or a non-civil Community. A civil Community is an association of people sharing a civil convention that establishes common civil rights and civil liberties and a common system of governance. A non-civil Community is a Community in which the association does not involve a civil convention establishing civil rights or civil liberties. For example, a homeowners' association typically does not have a special convention of civil rights distinguishable from those it inherits from a larger Community (e.g., a town, city, state, or nation) of which it is a part. The association is therefore a non-civil Community embedded within a larger civil Community. The adjective **civil** means "applying to the collective conduct or behavior of a Community as this conduct or behavior affects one or more individual persons in the Community." The adjective **civic** means "applying or pertaining to rightful conduct or behavior of an individual in his social interactions in a Community."

As you can see, any particular Community can contain within itself distinguishable sub-Communities of people distinguished by special interests that are common to its members but not shared in common with the rest of the Community. One class of sub-Community of special importance in social contract theory is called a ***mini-Community***. A mini-Community is a civil Community constituted as a proper subset defined by the intersect of its members' societies. The importance of the mini-Community subsists in its civil convention that establishes special and distinguishable civil rights and civil liberties that are not binding upon people who are not members of it. For example, a particular church might have doctrinal laws not binding on people who do not belong to that church but which are held-to-be-binding on church members. Violation of such doctrinal laws might, for example, lead to the violator being excommunicated or shunned by the other church members.

There is another facet of mini-Community that poses great challenges to the stability and even survival of the greater Community of which it is embedded. In almost all cases, *human beings are simultaneously members of more than one mini-Community*. Figure 1 illustrates one fairly common example of a person's membership in multiple mini-Communities. The reasons mini-Communities pose important and difficult issues for the greater Community include: (a) mini-Communities are rarely organized very formally and seldom have a written social contract; and (b) they are formed independently of each other and therefore their implicit social contracts can conflict with each other.

Figure 1: Illustration of multiple simultaneous mini-Communities in which a Person P is a member. Also shown are two other groups of people who are not members of Person P's mini-Communities (denoted by being placed outside the yellow circle) and with whom Person P has either no relationships or is antibonded in unfriendly relationships.

   The adjective **social** means "of or having to do with human beings living together in situations requiring them to have dealings with one another." A community, Community, or mini-Community is always an instantiation of a situation to which the term "social" applies. Understanding social situations calls upon two abstract *mathematical* ideas designated by the terms "society" and "Society." Today's field of study called sociology does not operate with adequate definitions for either term. The *Dictionary of Sociology* tells us,

> The concept [of society] is a commonsense category in which 'society' is equivalent to the boundaries of nation states. While sociologists in practice often operate with this everyday terminology, it is not adequate because societies do not always correspond to political boundaries. [Abercrombie *et al*. (2006), "society"]

To put it bluntly, sociology today does not have a definition of "society"; it has peculiar examples to which it applies the term as a description. It does not have a concept of Society at all.

   Because "technically, sociology is the analysis of the structure of social relationships as constituted by social interaction" [*ibid*., "sociology"], "commonsense" would seem to argue that "society" and "Society" ought to be ideas of structures "of social relationships as constituted by social interactions." But here we find there is a twofold perspective on how such relationships must be viewed: the perspective of the individual; and the perspective of a population of individuals. The first perspective is pertinent because individual human beings are the social atoms of social relationships. The second is pertinent because social interactions by definition involve the actions of more than one individual and these actions are reciprocally determining for further interactions. Such a population can be regarded as a *social molecule*.

   Abercrombie *et al*. lamented that "no definition [of sociology] is entirely satisfactory because of the diversity of perspectives which is characteristic of the modern discipline" [*ibid*.]. But a *science* is a doctrine constituting a *system* in accordance with a principle of a disciplined whole of knowledge, and a social-natural science is a natural science whose topic concerns the mental Nature of being a human being

insofar as the topical phenomena of the science co-involve two or more human beings. Sociologists from the beginning of the field up to today are not particularly known for mathematical scholarship, but the Objects of "society" and "Society" are supersensible Objects – noumena – and all such Objects are always mathematical Objects.

In Critical theory, a **society** is "the mathematical object of a mathematical concept formed by an individual and: (1) suitable for one or more of his purposes; (2) having its principal quantities represent appearances of individuals; (3) having no ontological significance whatsoever; and (4) in logical essence, the concept is a concept of relationships and associations." The idea of society pertains to the perspective of the individual. A Critical **Society** is "the Object understood as a higher concept of divers individual concepts of society retaining what is contained in common among these divers concepts and manifested by a mathematical field construct" [Wells (2012), chap. 10]. A mathematical **field** is a mathematical representation of objects in an objective space and objective time which describes the ways objects interact and affect one another's accidents of appearance. One does not need an academic degree in mathematics to adequately grasp these ideas.

Let us begin with "relationships and associations." From the social perspective there are three models of basic relationships and associations between an individual and other people (the people who make up the membership of that individual's society). These are illustrated in figure 2. The **outlaw relationship** is the relationship between an individual who holds himself to no Duties or Obligations of a social contract to the other people who make up his society. The outlaw relationship is reciprocal: the individual is an outlaw in relationship to the society *and the society is equally outlaw in its relationship to that individual* because – by rejecting social contract commitments – the society likewise has no deontological Duties or Obligations to the outlaw individual. Let us recall the example of Krista from chapter 10 and her version of "the golden rule": "Do unto others before they do unto you." Krista binds herself to no social contract Obligations; she is, therefore, a deontological outlaw rather than a deontological criminal.

The **citizenship relationship** is a *mutual* relationship of Duties and Obligations established between an individual and others (his society) by one or more social contract(s). This co-binding is indicated in figure 2B by the green line capped by squares on both ends. The squares represent *bonding* relationships. A *bond* is a representation of a determination of appetition by a person that produces or expresses cooperation responses by that person in relationship to another person or to the social environment. Citizenship in this context is deontological citizenship as defined earlier. Krista is a *nominal* citizen of the United States, made so by legal fiat, but she is not and apparently never was a deontological citizen.


Figure 2: The three models of social relationships between an individual and his society. The black arrows denote social interactions. Green and red lines denote bonding and antibonding relationships [Wells (2012), chap. 10].

The **criminal relationship** can be regarded as a synthesis of the first two. A criminal feigns appearances of a citizenship relationship with others but in fact takes upon himself no tenets of reciprocal Duties or Obligations. He might have never bound himself in citizenship or he might have done so in truth but later transgressed his allegiance – that is to say, become a secessionist but not a *moral* secessionist. A moral secessionist commits no transgression because his withdrawal is in response to a perpetuation of injustice committed by his fellow citizens through violation of the condition of their social contract. A criminal, on the other hand, withdraws without such a just cause and places his Duties to himself above those reciprocal Duties to which he had pledged himself. The dual nature of the criminal relationship is indicated by the two connection lines in figure 2C. The green line depicts the criminal's expectations of concrete benefits to himself he hopes to obtain from Society. The red line denotes the maxims and tenets of Duties to himself upon which he bases his own actions in regard to the situations of others in disregard of or opposition to reciprocal Duties and Obligations of citizenship.

Because no one can read another person's mind, practical distinction between an outlaw and a criminal requires the latter to have overtly expressed an action the former has not. This action is called a **pledge** [Wells (2012), chap. 10]. As an action, a pledge is an expression by which a person binds himself to the fulfillment of an obligation. In the case of a citizen, the pledge can properly be called a *pledge of allegiance* binding the pledger to fulfill all Duties and Obligations of the social contract and all its terms and conditions. The pledge is made to *all other members* of the civil Community and they, by their acceptance of the individual as a member, make an implied reciprocal pledge to him *in their corporate capacity as members of the Sovereign*. This reciprocal pledge does not require each citizen of the civil Community to explicitly make this pledge to each newly admitted citizen because it is the civil Community as a corporate whole (a "body politic") who reciprocates on behalf of *all* its citizens in accordance with the fundamental terms of their social contract [Wells (2012)]. The pledge of a citizen is not and cannot be made *to God*; it *must* be made to all the other citizens by virtue of their *corporate* membership in the civil Community.

Once made, this pledge cannot be *unilaterally* withdrawn except for just cause (specifically, perpetuated violation of the condition of the social contract[2]). This is why Krista, who made no such pledge, is a deontological outlaw instead of a deontological criminal. It is why Benedict Arnold, who did make such a pledge[3], was a deontological criminal instead of a deontological outlaw.

4. Social Chemistry I: Interactions and Interpersonal Associations

Communities, communities, societies, and Societies all have their roots in human personal interactions and interpersonal relationships that arise out of these interactions. Further complexities in the organization of these occur through the human capacity for abstract thinking involving an important type of noumenon, called an abstract person, that *every* human being comes to develop as a higher concept in his manifold of concepts. Personal interactions and interpersonal relationships are the basis for how every individual comes to develop these additional complexities. **Social chemistry** is a fittingly apt name for a doctrine of these phenomena[4].

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[2] In American history perhaps the most famous statement of just cause for moral secession is found in the Declaration of Independence.

[3] Members of the Patriot party pledged to each other their "lives, fortunes, and sacred honor" in the revolutionary cause. Arnold joined the Patriot party when he enlisted in the Continental Army. In 1780 he betrayed his pledge by conspiring with British general Sir Henry Clinton to turn the American fort at West Point over to the British.

[4] The name is metaphorical and suggested by analogy to physical-natural chemistry. A *doctrine* is that theoretical knowledge in which one comes across the grounds for how an object-matter can be trained up or the rules hit upon according to which a good product can be produced. The idea of a doctrine of social chemistry was introduced in Wells (2012). As a social-natural science, social chemistry is in its infancy. Physical-natural chemistry is a more difficult science than physics; social chemistry as a social-natural science is an even more challenging science.

Figure 3: Social chemistry of a two-person interaction. The two people are represented by two circles depicting them as the social atoms in interaction. The yellow annulus depicts their environment, which includes physical objects and factors affecting them as well as other people in the union of their two personal societies. The two self-loop arrows depict each person's self accommodations (accommodations each makes to his manifold of concepts and manifold of rules). The arrows running from one person to the other denote their interactions. The heavier arrows from the annulus to each person denote the effects of the environment on that person. The heavier arrows from each person to the annulus denote the effects of that person on the environment. [Wells (2012), chap. 9]

Let us begin with a general mathematical representation of social chemistry for the simplest case, that of a two-person interaction. Figure 3 depicts this. The figure caption explains the symbols used in this figure. As I suspect you can tell from the figure and caption, even the most basic two-person interaction is a very complex social phenomenon. The individual social atoms are theoretically described by the nature of being-a-human-being. Adequate mathematical representation of the interaction arrows is also quite challenging as it must call upon ideas from the psychology of human personality and human interpersonal relationships. In mathematical terms, each interaction arrow is comprised of a set of functions rather than just a single function and interaction effects are heavily dependent on the persons' inner mental states.

Fortunately, the treatise before you is about Critical theology and not about a mathematical doctrine of social chemistry[5]. For this reason, it does not require readers to have any extensive backgrounds in mathematics and merely qualitative descriptions of these factors serve its purposes well enough. Three possible basic types of interpersonal associations can arise from the social chemistry of figure 3.

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[5] Practitioners of the physical-natural science of physics are fond of calling it "the queen of the sciences" as if an understanding of physics is adequate for understanding all other sciences. It is true that physics makes up a *part* of the doctrines of other physical-natural sciences, but it is erroneous to think the study of physics alone is enough to understand *any* other physical-natural science. It is true that physics is the most *mathematically* advanced physical-natural science but it owes this standing to the fact physics is actually the *simplest* physical-natural science. All other physical-natural sciences are actually much more challenging to understand than physics. The whole is more than any one of its parts. As for human mental nature and social-natural science, physics says *nothing* that is objectively valid and any claim on its part to do so is nothing but an empty boast and an article of faith held by physicists. There are no "happy electrons," no "pontifical cells"; there is no "mind dust" and no god of mathematical probability.

Figure 4: The three basic types of interpersonal associations in in social chemistry. [Wells (2012), chap. 10]


Figure 5: Two-person Weaver's model of interpersonal interactions [Wells (2012), chap. 9].

Figure 4 illustrates these three cases. These are called **interpersonal associations**. By analogy with chemical bonding phenomena studied in chemistry, the three types of association are called non-bonding associations, bonding associations, and antibonding associations. In social chemistry terminology, a *bonding factor* is any mathematical object having a meaning implication effect in semantic representing or the determination of appetition by a person that produces or expresses *cooperation* responses by a person in relationship to the other person or the social environment. An *antibonding factor* is any mathematical object having a meaning implication effect in semantic representing or the determination of appetition by a person that produces or expresses *competition* responses by a person in relationship to the other person or the social environment. If neither of these factors is present in the situation, the result is a *non-bonding* association (figure 4A). The terms "semantic representing" and "determination of appetition" are understood in terms of the two-person Weaver's model depicted in figure 5 [Wells (2011)]. Appetition is the act of representing an appetite by the process of the appetitive power. Semantic representing is the synthesis of an intuition that presents a semantic message. A semantic message is a representation of a

message that can be associated with emotivity and ratio-expression by a meaning implication. In meta-physical terms, a message is the persistent object of a succession of appearances for which the objective *nexus* depends upon the comprehension of these appearances all in the same intuition. Put less grandly and more practically, a message is more or less what you think it is, i.e., what you perceive "the other person is telling you" by means of his words, tone of voice, body expressions and actions. If what you perceive is what he intended for you to perceive then the two of you have "communicated." If not, then the two of you have miscommunicated.

The non-bonding association is the most frequent one. Here neither person feels any particular social bond or anti-bond with the other. You pass a stranger in the grocery store and smile "out of politeness." The other person smiles back and both of you go on your separate ways. Someone passing by stops and asks you, "Do you know where John Smith lives?" You point and say, "That's his house over there." The two of you neither cooperate nor compete. Interactions are casual, civic, and proceed according to the folkways of your Society.

A bonding association (figure 4B) is one in which the two individuals "feel an attraction" for each other in some way (not necessarily the *same* way for each). Each might be trying to use the other as a means to his own ends but, if so, each one's ends are congruent with the other's ends. Mutual cooperation results from their association and generally characterizes their relationship. The two individuals, metaphorically, "bond together" to form a "social molecule" in at least some situations and circumstances, and their joint actions typically exhibit different behaviors than either would usually express if left to himself. Each one benefits in some way from their association. Bonding associations are the basis for establishing social compacts. One very common one is what we call "friendship."

An antibonding association (figure 4C) is one in which the two individuals "feel a repulsion" for each other. Their actions tend to "push them apart." They do not cooperate with each other and not infrequently their actions oppose each other's goals. To **compete** is to take action such that the actions of two or more persons are in mutual real opposition to one another (*Entgegensetzung*) so that the effect of each person's action wholly or partially negates the effect of the other's. Two persons whose actions compete are called competitors. The antibonding association is the basis for *uncivic* competition[6]. It opposes establishing of social compacts and tends to break down ones that might have previously existed. Antibonding tends to produce outlaw interrelationships between individuals.

It is possible, and not-uncommon, that any one particular interaction might have an antibonding quality to it but both individuals "set this aside" to preserve cooperative relationships with each other. A husband and wife might have an argument but "kiss and make up" afterward. This is an instance where the *overall association* is a bonding association and the antibonding interaction is just a temporary disturbance to this association. Reequilibration is achieved when each *reaffirms* to the other that their bonding relationship is still intact. By this they are, in effect, re-pledging themselves to each another.

When a bonding association exists, it generally takes a series of antibonding interactions to upset and rupture that association. Antibonding actions in this case are said to be *perpetuated* by one or both individuals. This is why the concept of moral secession requires perpetuated injustices in order to be held-to-be a withdrawal *without transgression* from a social compact.

The three forms of association depicted in figure 4 are the basic forms. Other hybrid forms are possible and can be regarded as syntheses of these three. One of these is particularly worth mentioning: the *false*

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[6] Sports and other games are examples of what we call *civic* competition. Civic competitive games are actually examples of cooperation (despite the opposing actions of the players) because the real purpose is simply to "have fun" within the bounds of what we call "good sportsmanship." Unsportsmanlike conduct goes against this purpose and corrupts the purpose of the game. *Professional* sports tend to be unsportsmanlike in numerous ways although in probably the majority of cases they involve elements of both bonding and antibonding associations. Competition *per se* is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. *A* competition is one or the other so far as it is civic or uncivic.

bonding association. This association is the synthesis of figures 4B and 4C. In false bonding, the inter-action from, let us say, Person 1 to Person 2 is a bonding interaction (green line with square endpoint) with a bonding intention by Person 1, but the interaction from Person 2 to Person 1 is one deliberately presenting a false appearance of a bonding interaction that masks an antibonding *intention* by Person 2. Such an association is typical, for example, of an habitual spouse abuser. Cases of "scammers" and "con men" likewise are examples. Political party propaganda provides another example of false bonding association and when a political party or candidate engages in it this is a deontologically *criminal* action. While antibonding associations typically set up outlaw relationships between people, the false bonding association sets up a criminal relationship in which Person 2 is the deontological criminal and by his actions forfeits *all* his civil rights because he ceases to be a deontological citizen of the Community.

5. Social Chemistry II: Stereotyping, Abstract Persons, and Granulation

Every human being understands other people by means of two types of concepts: people as *real persons* and people as *stereotypes* ("abstract persons") [Wells (2012), chap. 10]. The first type of understanding uses empirical concepts of specific individuals grounded in immediate sensible experiences of interacting with them. These concepts comprise the understanding of another person *as one really knows* that person because the concepts arise from immediate experience. They have *real* objective validity[7].

The second type of understanding uses concepts that are also empirical but *lack* grounding in actual sensible experience. These concepts are products of inferences of analogy. An **inference of analogy** is an inference of judgment by which marks of one object's concept are made part of the representation of the concept of another object. Analogy proceeds under the rule of principle of specification: things of one genus that agree in many marks agree in *all* marks as they are known in one object but not in the other. The inference *transfers* the marks of one object *to* the object of inference. But because this transferal is made without actual observation of these marks in the object of inference, the concept of that object is a *made* concept – in other words, it is a *mathematical* concept. An inference of analogy is produced by the process of reflective judgment and, while it is grounded in a *subjectively* sufficient condition of formal expedience for practical judgment, the concept lacks *objectively* sufficient grounds for holding-to-be-true. Understanding of the object (a person in this case) is an abstract form of understanding not based upon one's actual experience with that person but, rather, upon this abstract transferal of characteristics taken from a different person or persons who are made to serve as exemplars of a stereotypical Ideal.

The act of stereotyping *per se* is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. Rather, the act *per se* is nothing more and nothing less than a necessitation of practical Reason in its regulative acts to establish and maintain a state of equilibrium as demanded by the categorical imperative. Without the capacity to stereo-type, you could never form ideas such as "human beings," "society," or even "food." Stereotyping is an essential act in making every kind of classification of objects. Psychology as a science would not be possible without the capacity to stereotype. Indeed, even the word "stereotype" is the product of stereotyping because general usages of the word derive from its use in printing (where it refers to a solid printing mold or plate which, once cast, is difficult to change). If you are a human being then you will and you do construct stereotype concepts and there is nothing you can do to change that.

However, the *uses* to which a stereotype is put *can* be labeled good, bad, or neutral according to moral contexts of how the concept is used. Scientific stereotypes, when used legitimately according to norms of scientific practices, are neutral because they are ideas for understanding facts. Every human being uses stereotype concepts to understand other human beings. Unfortunately, it is possible to use stereotype concepts maliciously, and when a person does so use it the *use* to which he puts it can be imputed to be a moral transgression. One example of this is **bigotry**: obstinate or ideological attachment to a particular party, sect, faction, opinion, or ideological dogma with excessive prejudice. **Racism** – a belief or opinion

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[7] Sensation is the condition of reality in construction of the manifold of concepts [Wells (2009), chap. 5].

that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race – is another example of bad usage of stereotypes. A third example is the stereotype concept of a "businessman" when that concept is combined with the notion that a "businessman" is an inherently better or more capable leader or administrator *merely because* the person is a "businessman." This is a special case of bigotry and one that is objectively invalid because there are so many examples of "businessmen" who drive their businesses into bankruptcy. Yet a fourth is **nationalism** – belief or opinion exalting one nation over all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests above those of other nations or supranational groups – when it is used to rationalize and perpetuate unjust treatment of citizen mini-Communities.

When stereotyping is combined with the phenomenon that human beings are usually members of many mini-Communities and mini-societies, one of the principal threats this combination can pose to a Society and its social contract is that of **granulation**. **Granulated socialization** is a complex social environment in which the person regards himself and all the other associated people as being members of the same abstract Society, but which he further subdivides into logical sub-Societies. Specific individuals or groups of individuals are classified by the person as belonging to one or more of these sub-Societies. The person regards his relationships with these sub-Societies as non-bonded, bonded or antibonded relationships, depending on what specific tenets or maxims he applies to the particular sub-Societies. A **granulated society** is a society with granulated socialization by the person whose society it is. A **granulated Society** is a Society in which granulated socialization hinders the achievement of equilibrium in the corporate person of the Society [Wells (2014), chap. 4].

Figure 6 illustrates the idea of granulated socialization. Granulated socialization can and does lead to the formation of bonded mini-Communities within a Society. However, it also can and does lead to anti-bonded mini-Communities. These two phenomena are the roots of what James Madison called *factions*. Uncivic competition between factions threatens to cause an arrested overall Society and further threatens to bring about its breakdown and even its disintegration through moral secession by large numbers of citizens. The present day antibonding association between the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. is an example of an internecine granulation that threatens the *Existenz* of the United States itself.


Figure 6: Illustration of the idea of granulated socialization of a person's society. The green connection denotes the person's bonding association with the abstract entity (a stereotype) he regards as his personal society. The blue connection denotes his bonding association with a particular sub-society within his general society. The red connection denotes his antibonding association with another sub-society which he regards as part of his society overall but not one of his personal mini-Communities. The third sub-society in this figure represents other people he regards as being "in" his society but with whom he has non-bonding association.

Figure 7: Example of personal Community-building through association in mini-Communities. MC denotes a mini-Community. The yellow ovals denote the person's mini-Community bonds. A: The person is a citizen of two mini-Communities (MC 1 and MC 2); one of these (MC 2) has formed a bonding relationship with a third mini-Community (MC 3). B: Because of his membership in MC 2 and its bonding association with MC 3, the person gives himself an obligation to likewise form a bonding association with MC 3, thereby extending his own set of mini-Community associations even if he does not personally know any member of MC 3.

A mini-Community or a mini-society can itself be regarded as an abstract person. Because it is comprised of real people, this abstract person is called a *corporate* person. Its membership is made up of people who share some set of common interests not common to *all* citizens of the general Community. These interests are called the *special interests* of their corporate mini-Community. The interests of a mini-Community are the set of all pairs of *congruent* interests common to every pair of persons belonging to the same mini-Community. An interest of a person A and an interest of a person B are said to be **congruent interests** if and only if a satisfaction of interest by either person does not necessarily prevent the satisfaction of interest by the other person. These personal interests do not need to be the *same* interest; it is sufficient if both interests can be simultaneously satisfied. **Common interests** are sets of congruent mini-Community interests shared by two or more mini-Communities. It is important to take note that the abstract person defined by an idea of mini-Community is not the same thing as the object of the *legal* idea of an *artificial person*. The latter is a legal idea of an entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being by legal fiat.

Mini-Communities play a key role in an individual's building up and augmenting his membership in multiple mini-Communities. Figure 7 illustrates an example of this. Through his pledging of allegiance to the social contract of one mini-Community (MC 2 in figure 7A), the person finds he must likewise obligate himself to bonding association with another mini-Community (MC 3 in figure 7A), even if he does not personally know even one single member of MC 3, because his mini-Community MC 2 shares a bonding association with that mini-Community. This *obligatory* bonding *with the abstract person* MC 3 can and often does lead to the person himself becoming a citizen of mini-Community MC 3.

Unfortunately, bonding association with MC 2 can also lead to an antibonding association with another abstract person (mini-Community) if the person's mini-Community is in an antibonding association with that mini-Community. This is called the phenomenon of *enemy building* and is illustrated in figure 8. *This is the threat* posed by granulated Societies and the existence of factions within those Societies. It is one of the ironies of deontological moral phenomena that Duties and Obligations sometimes do create *antisocial* relationships among mini-Communities that cause disruptive granulations within a Society.

Figure 8: Illustration of enemy building through mini-Community association. The blue lines denote bonding associations. The red lines denote antibonding associations. Because of his bonding association with MC 2 (figure 8A), the person makes it his maxim to regard himself as being in an antibonding association with MC 3 even if the person does not know even one single member of MC 3 (figure 8B).

There is another pernicious effect of stereotyping, one frequently found in uncivic propaganda. This is what I call a ghost community [Wells (2014), chap. 5]. A **ghost community** is an identifiable set of people who are mathematically grouped together by fiat and stereotyped *as if they did* constitute a mini-Community or mini-Society. As an Object, a ghost community has no real *Existenz*, is not a corporate person, has no corporate *Personfähigkeit*, does not constitute an anthropological person, and has no corporate homologue of a 'personality.' Note that it is the *set* that is identifiable and it is identifiable solely by means of the characteristics used to define it by fiat. The fact there are no real people in it constituting any actual Community is irrelevant. When a stereotype is oversimplified and overgeneralized to define a ghost community, the use to which it is put is always self-serving to the inventors in some way and it is often used to rationalize extreme acts of injustice.

So-called "conspiracy theorists" (a term I claim is oxymoronic because conspiracy "theories" usually are not theories at all; they are problematic fictions of someone's imagination) and despotic governments – e.g. the Nazi government of Germany from 1933 to 1945 – often invent ghost communities for the purpose of propaganda aimed at uniting some people by means of rationalizing unjust persecution of other people. The most pernicious example of this in the 20th century was the idea that all Jews were members of an international conspiracy to seize the economies and enslave the people of every nation. In the 21st century, so far, the so-called "Trump movement" in the United States provides an alarmingly pernicious example of a so-called "conservative" ideology that engages in ghost community conspiracy theories on a daily basis. There has been malicious demagoguery in U.S. politics before, dating back to the founding of the Republic[8], but never one as extremely antisocial and deontologically criminal as the Trump movement; and there has never been a case of a more openly seditious administration of the general government of the United States before. All stereotypes are abstractions. Invention and malicious use of ghost community propaganda based on them seems to be a story as old as civilization itself.

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[8] Concern over problems of civil unrest and insurrection brought about by demagogues was one of the earliest concerns expressed by delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. It was one of the central issues in their debates of May 31st, 1787 [Farrand (1911), vol. I, pp. 45-61]. Concerns over this ran deeply enough that some of the delegates had misgivings over or opposed outright the making of democratic elections any part of the Constitution.

Figure 9: Gear train analogy of social field effects.

Churches have not been innocent of engaging in stereotyping productive of social granulation. Some so-called "fundamentalist" denominations – regardless of the major religion within which they are grouped – employ the propaganda tactic of telling their members they are being "persecuted" by others. They use this as a means of uniting their membership in a common cause of "self defense" against a non-existent threat and for defining ghost communities alleged to threaten them. For example, when one of my nephews was in college he voiced a disagreement with a fundamentalist opinion of another person in one of his classes. That person reacted by going on a rant during which she claimed he was "persecuting Christians." When my nephew replied that he was a Catholic, she responded by saying, "Catholics are not Christians." When authority figures of any church or religious cult use words like "blasphemy" and "heretic," this has often historically been a prelude to defining ghost communities and subsequently targeting people for persecution. The infamous Spanish Inquisition from 1478 to 1834 is one well known example of this.

6. Social Chemistry III: Factions and Toynbee Proletariats

If it was practically possible, most people would probably prefer to "live and let live" and ignore all but a select handful of people in communities with whom they form mini-Community bonding associations. In practice this is rarely possible because remote actions of strangers have a way of rippling through Society in such a way that individuals find themselves affected in one way or another by these actions. This is what I earlier called a "field effect" of social dynamics. A field effect can be likened by analogy to the action of a mechanical gear train such as that illustrated in figure 9. In this, a person A's action interacts with another person, B, whose reaction affects a third person, C, whose reaction affects yet another person and so on until some person E is remotely affected as a consequence of person A's original action – an action and a person which and who can be completely unknown to person E. As population sizes increase these field effects become increasingly complicated and more unpredictable. When someone speaks of "unintended consequences" of some action, this is the sort of thing being referring to.

If the remote effect A's action has on E is an effect E regards as beneficial to himself in some way, with at most only minor ill effects easily taken care of by some accommodation E can easily make, then any disturbance to E's personal equilibrium is minor and, in most cases, he feels no inclination to undertake an effort to understand what has happened in deeper detail. This habit of disinclination is what the old adage "never look a gift horse in the mouth" means on a practical level. However, it can also happen that A's action might have remote effects on *other* people whose reactions also ripple through Society to affect person E in unbeneficial ways. Generally, these ill effects on E are not manifested at the same time and he might not even know the beneficial and unbeneficial effects on himself are linked in any way. This is the downside to the "never look a gift horse in the mouth" maxim. Mill wrote,

> Everybody has two kinds of interests, selfish and unselfish interests. . . . Everyone has present and distant interests, and the improvident man is he who cares for present interests and does not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former. [Mill (1861), pg. 71]

Figure 10: Illustration of a sociopolitical spectrum.

Unbeneficial effects of remote actions produce more serious disturbances to person E's equilibrium and he will seek to establish a reequilibration for himself by actions that ameliorate or moderate the effects. If he can accomplish this by himself and without resort to either moral secession from his Community or criminal action, things usually will go no further so far as person E is concerned. Most people do a remarkably good job of settling themselves into their Society in a state of domestic tranquility[9]. There are exceptions to this, of course, particularly when individuals are living in a state of poverty relative to other people in their Community. However, as Eric Hoffer noted,

> The poor on the borderline of starvation live purposeful lives. To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility. The goals are concrete and immediate. Every meal is a fulfillment; to go to sleep on a full stomach is a triumph; and every wind-fall is a miracle. What need could they have for "an inspiring super-individual goal which would give meaning and dignity to their lives?" They are immune to the appeal of a mass movement. . . . Misery does not automatically generate discontent, nor is the degree of discontent directly proportional to the degree of misery. Discontent is likely to be highest when misery is bearable; when conditions have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within reach. A grievance is most poignant when almost redressed. . . . The intensity of discontent seems to be in inverse proportion to the distance from the object fervently desired. . . . Our frustration is greater when we have much and want more than when we have nothing and want some. We are less dissatisfied when we lack many things than when we seem to lack but one thing. [Hoffer (1951), pp. 27-30]

Hoffer's "poor on the borderline of starvation" are in circumstances where they have no time for anything else than striving to fulfill their immediate Duties to themselves in regard to their situations. This is why they "are immune to the appeal of a mass movement." A "mass movement" implies the *Dasein* of at least some rudimentary common cause as the basis for some limited social compact with others in the mass movement. "The poor on the borderline of starvation" have not the "luxury" of making bonds of *reciprocal* Duties and Obligations. They have, to put it in other words, enough on their hands in just getting by from day to day without taking on any additional burdens that accompany becoming a "social revolutionary" and bringing down upon themselves the wrath of others in their community.

But this changes radically when a person discovers there are others with whom he can associate in such a way that by their *united* actions as a mini-Community *each* can better fulfill, or thinks he can better fulfill, his individual Duties to himself and thereby achieve a better state of personal welfare. This is the basis in human nature underlying the formation of factions, whether these factions are civic, outlaw, or criminal in relationship with the Society in which they live. Factions generally strive either: to effect a change of some kind in the mores or folkways of a Society; or to prevent such a change from occurring. We can speak of *degrees of enthusiasm* for or against changes away from the existing social norms and arrange these on a "sociopolitical spectrum" such as the one figure 10 illustrates.

Every stable Society has a social mean established by its mores and folkways. Changes corresponding to

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[9] Tranquility is a state of mind that results from being sufficiently satisfied in relationship to one's general state of life and desiring nothing more or different in this relationship.

Figure 11: Antibonding mini-Community granulation by uncivic interactions.

those that most of the Society's citizens easily accommodate themselves to are said to be **moderative** changes. As a particular change becomes more difficult for some people to accommodate themselves to, and which effect a more significant alteration in folkways or mores, enthusiasm *for* that change is said to be **anti-conservative** because the change will effect a shift in the mean of the Society's social norms. The opposite reaction – that is, enthusiasm for opposing the change and minimizing any shift in overall mores or folkways – is said to be **conservative** because a conservative faction seeks to limit the overall scope of effects this change would produce and preserve as much of "the traditional way" as is possible consistent with redressing whatever injustices the change seeks to negate. Both anti-conservative and conservative enthusiasms are to some degree antisocial inasmuch as the change either, on the one hand, is provocative of a loss of domestic tranquility for some citizens or, on the other hand, inasmuch as a *lack* of change serves to perpetuate injustices within the Society. Civil resolution of whatever condition is the impetus for change is possible if the two opposing factions take care to keep their interactions civic and such that it is possible for both factions to give their allegiances to a new understanding of their common social contract *or* its *consensual* amendment to accommodate change in such a way that injustices are not perpetuated and new injustices are not created. A change *might* be put into law but this is actually irrelevant because the situational context is one of *justice*, not law.

If, however, faction interactions are made *uncivic* this merely increases antibonding antagonisms between the factions and *pushes* each toward more extreme enthusiasms for their own positions. Figure 11 illustrates this "social-chemical repulsion" effect. At the left hand extreme of figures 10 and 11, the enthusiasm is called **reactionary**; the interests of the faction are given over to blanket prevention of change without regard for redressing moral grievances of others in Society or preserving its social contract. At the right hand extreme, the enthusiasm is called **reconstructionary** because this enthusiasm disregards respect for the Society's social contract and seeks instead to establish a radically new one – one that has no concern for whether or not it can gain the *consensus* of the other faction. Reactionary and reconstructionary enthusiasms produce poisonous granulations within a Society, and these poisonous relationships eventually lead to the Society's civil *breakdown* and subsequent *disintegration*. As Toynbee famously said, "Civilizations fall from within," and uncivic antibonding interactions between factions are the direct cause of this effect. Referring to those factions known as "political parties," John Adams wrote,

> In elective governments, where first magistrates and senators are at stated intervals to be chosen, these, if there are no parties, become at every election more known, considered, and beloved by the whole nation. But if the nation is divided into two parties, those who vote for a man become the more attached to him for the opposition that is made by his enemies. This national attachment to an elective first magistrate, where there is no competition, is very great. But if there is competition the passions of his party are inflamed by it into a more ardent enthusiasm. If there are two candidates, each at the head of a party, the nation becomes divided into two nations . . . and are soon bitterly enraged against each other. [Adams (1790), pg. 162]

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Similarly, George Washington wrote,

> I have already intimated to you the danger of Parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on Geographical distribution. Let me now take a more comprehensive view and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party generally.
>
> This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human Mind. It exists under different shapes in all Governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.
>
> The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissention . . . is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an Individual: and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of Public Liberty. [Washington (1796)]

The foresight of Adams and Washington was vividly and horribly demonstrated by the collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1930s Germany with the subsequent takeover by the Nazis. At the time of this present writing, the phenomenon is being repeated in the United States, where the two major political parties have made themselves into criminal institutions, sustained by propaganda and impassioned to *rule* rather than *govern* the nation. Unless systematic injustices *each* is perpetrating are redressed, eventually the consequences will be civil war and the disintegration of the American Republic.

Neither Adams nor Washington seem to have recognized that, in addition to mini-Community factions, there is a third factor that arises from uncivic competition among factions. This factor is what historian Arnold Toynbee called a "proletariat" and what I call a **Toynbee proletariat** (to distinguish it from how that word came to be used in the propaganda of Marx and Engels). A Toynbee proletariat is any group of former citizens who have morally seceded from their former Community or Society and reverted to outlaw status with respect to those still belonging to their former association [Wells (2010) chap. 10], [Wells (2012) chap. 7, 11]. Social justice cannot arise from asocial principles and much less from anti-social ones. Moral secession is grounded in perpetuations of injustice by the other members of a civil Community. As factions push each other toward increasingly antisocial extremes and vie with each other for *rulership* of the Community, unjust laws tend to be legislated and come to perpetuate injustices that give rise to Toynbee proletariats. *Perfecting* an Ideal of humanity in a divine Community *necessarily* implies learning how to institute a system of *justice* under which Toynbee proletariats no longer arise.

Kant employed the term *Schuldigkeit* to mean a duty or obligation with a connotation that a person is responsible for carrying it out and culpable for neglecting it [Kant (1797) 6: 227]. Establishing justice and seeing to its maintenance is a *Schuldigkeit* for every citizen of a civil Community, and it is even more so for those citizens of a Community who are made authority figures (e.g., governors and administrators) of that Community because this is an expectation of authority the other citizens have for anyone who holds such an office or appointment[10]. Uncivic competition between antibonded factions invariably leads to neglect of the *Schuldigkeit* of establishing and maintaining justice because factions favor their own members with prejudice against the civil rights of members of other factions. But because this prejudicial favoring can only be effected by force or the threat of force – whether through fiat of unjust law or by raw physical force – the end result is the replacement of civil governance by rulership. Rulership subjugates citizens and stands in flat contradiction to civil Community and in real opposition to its *Existenz*. A

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[10] Again, expectation of authority is the demand by citizens of a Community that a person holding a position as a designated authority figure possess the *Kraft* of authority and will actualize it for the benefit of their common association. Authority is possession of the *Kraft* of causing something to become greater, to increase, to be strengthened, or to be reinforced in some way.

Toynbee proletariat is a symptom of the overthrow of a civil Community by a tyranny of rulership.

Deontologically, a **republic** is *governance of a Community: (1) without rulership; (2) in which all expectations of authority are derived from a common set of generally-agreed-to objectives of governance; and (3) which is administered by officials, appointed either directly or indirectly by* <u>consent</u> *of the citizens, who pledge themselves to faithfully carry out particular* Schuldigkeit *specific to the expectation of authority assigned to their office* [Wells (2012), chap. 11]. Uncivic competition between antibonded factions, when either faction temporarily prevails by means of the rulership of unjust laws, is in real opposition to the continued *Existenz* of a republic. *Black's Law Dictionary* makes an uncivic error by defining "justice" as "the fair and proper administration of laws" because *the purpose of laws is to* **serve** *justice*, never to *define* it. Justice is the negating of anything that is unjust and it has no other objectively valid definition. Indeed, *it is the duty of every citizen of a civil Community to oppose and refuse to obey an unjust law*. Thoreau wrote,

> After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. . . . Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first and subjects afterward. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. . . . Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made agents of injustice. . . . All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. [Thoreau (1849), pp. 2-3]

A Toynbee proletariat is effectively in a practical state of revolution even when, as is most often the case, these people conceal their outlaw relationship with the Community from which they have morally seceded. Their withdrawal from allegiance to that Community is without moral transgression because it is that Community, through perpetuated acts of injustice by its Sovereign, that broke their social contract by failure to uphold to the contract's fundamental condition, i.e., that the association will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of *each* associate in such a way that each associate can unite himself with all the other associates while still obeying himself alone. *Concealment* by a proletariat of its outlaw relationship with its former Community is nothing more and nothing less than an act of prudence based on Duties to themselves in the face of the transgression of reciprocal Duty by their former Community. Every member of a Toynbee proletariat was once a deontological citizen of a civil Community but is no longer. No member of a Toynbee proletariat is a criminal because his secession from that Community is without moral transgression.

7. Lessons of Empirical Community

Critical theology strives to attain an understanding of divine supernature and religious faith by means of objectively valid understanding of human nature and human-natural social and moral interrelationships and interactions. Introductory ideas of social chemistry are part of developing this understanding, as are ideas of Community and social contracting discussed above.

This chapter has provided a basic overview of the phenomenon of human Community in human mental nature, and it has taken a brief look some important ways in which people's attempts to form and maintain civil Communities go wrong. Although some of the material presented here might appear to be limited to political phenomena pertinent to nation-states, *all* of the principles discussed here apply to *all* other types of Communities including those pertaining to business and commerce [Wells (2017)], institutions of public education [Wells (2014)], and religious Communities.

The material contained in this chapter pertains immediately to *empirical* human experience. But now we must ask: how is any of this pertinent to Critical theology and, in particular, to a Critical idea of divine Community? Two of the previously stated articles of faith are: (a) divine purpose finds its expression in divine Community; and (b) life is an apprenticeship for afterlife. Lessons gained from human empirical experiences with phenomena of Community are, in accordance with (b), lessons pertaining to afterlife as *Existenz* in a divine Community.

One empirical lesson is that *civil* Community is a deontologically *moral* Community founded upon reciprocal Duties and Obligations. A second lesson is that people can and do fail to establish associations in civil Communities, and *if* such a Community is established it can fail *later* due to the phenomenon of mini-Community when there arise within it antibonding associations and uncivic competitions between antibonded factions. A third lesson is that all Communities are products of human choice and are initiated through the exercise of human *natural* liberty. Every institution of *civil* Community necessarily involves voluntary alienation by its members of particular natural liberties in exchange for obligating oneself to exercise only *civil* liberties, and that the giving of this voluntary consent by an individual reciprocally requires the consent by the other citizens to obligate themselves to a *quid pro quo* of guaranteeing and enforcing particular civil *rights* to all citizens. A fourth lesson is that deontological *justice* is essential for the institution of a civil Community and to the ability to sustain and maintain this Community. All these lessons are discussed in much deeper detail in the references cited in this chapter.

What we must do next is to carry these merely empirical lessons forward and discuss implications these phenomena of *human nature* hold for ideas of divine Community in supernature. The next chapter of this treatise has for its topic discussion of these implications.

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