

Chapter 13 Purposive Orientation for Divine Community

1. The Aims and Method of this Chapter's Doctrine

If a practical purpose of afterlife is to provide people with opportunities to continue striving toward self-perfection and aims toward ultimate expression in a divine Community – as chapter 12 speculates – then one is led to ask, "What sort of Community or Communities would be suitable as image or images of a divine Community?" Are there deducible benchmarks or characteristics a person can use to inform or guide his or her own efforts to strive for self-perfection? If so, what might these be? What does life teach us about Communities if life is a necessary apprenticeship for afterlife?

The theology doctrines of every religion that has a theology all contain as part of the doctrine some set of moral teachings providing instructions to the faithful. Usually these take the form of examples of "good" behaviors and "bad" or "evil" behaviors. Often these make up the major fraction of the sacred writings of a religion (the rest of which largely consists of folklore histories and myths). These texts are often augmented, and the teachings explained in more detail, by additional works such as catechisms or other authoritative writings of clergy and religious scholars. Islam's Hadith is one such example. For Latter Day Saints, *Doctrine and Covenants* is another example. For Confucianism an example is provided by *The Works of Mencius*. One of the primary purposes of theology is to provide education to the faithful in how they are to understand and practice their faith. Thus theology must deal with a teaching challenge.

Its teaching challenge becomes more challenging when the population of a religion's faithful grows to include people whose native language differs from the language used in the religion's original texts. The problem of translation comes about because translating from one language to another is not a matter of substituting a word in language B for a word in language A. Translators try to translate ideas, not words, and the subtle and shifting nuances of words in natural languages can and frequently do introduce subtle and shifting nuances in attempting to convey a theological doctrine. What Abdullah Yusuf Ali said of translating the Quran might be equally well said of any religion's doctrinal and scriptural translations:

It is the duty of every Muslim – man, woman, or child – to read the Qur'an and understand it according to his own capacity. If anyone of us attains to some knowledge or understanding of it by study, contemplation, and the test of life, both outward and inward, it is his duty, according to his capacity, to instruct others, and share with them the joy and peace which result from contact with the spiritual world. The Qur'an – indeed every religious book – has to be read, not only with the tongue and voice and eyes, but with the best light that our intellect can supply, and even more, with the truest and purest light which our heart and conscience can give us. [Abdullah (1934), pg. ix]

English speakers catch a hint of the fragrance of translation challenges when they encounter some of the more common ambiguities in such basic words as Muslim vs. Moslem or Quran vs. Koran. Such pairings are often assumed by English speakers to be synonyms but how is one to really tell if they truly are?

The fundamental theologies and most of the written doctrinal works of all the major religions have been around for a very long time and so it is unsurprising that most of them were written with the more or less punitive attitude adopted by educators worldwide prior to the 19th century. For example, in ancient Egypt at the end of the 2nd millennium BC,

The method of instruction was very elementary and called for no initiative in the pupil: it depended for its effectiveness on his docility and therefore, as we might expect, made use of the most drastic corporal punishment, as did the classical education of a later date. The Hebrew word *musar* means both instruction and correction or chastisement. Here again the most vivid descriptions come from Egypt. "The ears of the stripling are on his back. He hears when he is being beaten." "You brought me up when I was a child," declares a grateful pupil to his master; "you beat me on the back and your teaching penetrated my ears." [Marrou (1948), pg. xvi]

Adults are less easy to intimidate than children but, nonetheless, threats of dire punishments continued to be the educational methodology used everywhere for everyone in the Western world until educational reforms in the 19th century began after the work of Pestalozzi [Wells (2013), chap. 9]. Pestalozzi's reforms seem to have reached every corner of education in the West *except* theology. For example,

Seest thou yon dreary plain, forlorn and wild,
The seat of desolation, void of light
Save what the glimmering of these livid flames
Casts pale and dreadful? Thither let us tend
From off the tossing of these fiery waves;
There rest, if any rest can harbor there [Milton (1667), pg. 154].

It seems to me that no one should be surprised by the fact that occasionally people who are poorly educated in the tenets of their religion commit shocking atrocities against "unbelievers." Who, after all, wants to risk going swimming forever in a sea of fire? A person: who makes it a duty to himself to avoid this; who thinks the ends justify the means; and further thinks the tenets of his religion call for 'cleansing' or 'purifying' the world of people who do not share his religion; is a person who easily inclines himself to start or participate in pogroms. When religious teaching is authoritarian, someone like Charlemagne finds it easy to slaughter "pagan" prisoners of war by the thousands [Wilson (2006), pp. 44-47].

It is no less a part of Critical theology than of any other to offer some professed instruction or guidance that might help to clarify the meanings and implications of its articles of faith. No one, however, can be forced to adopt any article of faith, and to try to do so would be to appeal to nothing more than a person's Duties to himself. In Critical theology, such an appeal carries no deontological moral weight whatsoever and this treatise rejects it. Any doctrinal article in this treatise, following from the premise of a Critical article of faith which you do not accept, is doctrine you can reject without any censure from me. Let "the best light your intellect can supply and the purest light your heart and conscience gives you" be how you guide yourself. If you do, you will be true to yourself.

For your convenience, the fifteen Critical articles of faith already enunciated are collected together in this chapter's endnotes. Many of these, you will recall, are postulated from what is known of the nature of being a human being, and that these postulates are proposed on the ground of the 3rd article of faith: Human beings are a reflection or image of God. As was the case in chapter 12, the methodology in this chapter must rely upon the dialectic method but it cannot ignore the nature of being a human being.

2. The Community as a Corporate Person

Every community is a group of people living in the same district, geographical area, etc. under the same laws. However, not every community is a Community. The latter is a *voluntary* association of people who join together *for* some common purpose or purposes. For example, a prison is a community comprised of prisoners, guards, and prison administrators. Quite obviously, the prisoners are people but, equally obviously, they do not voluntarily associate in the prison community. If they did there would not be any need for prison guards.¹ Another example is provided by the city of Babylon from circa 597 to 538 BC, the period in Jewish history known as the Babylonian Captivity, because the Jewish population of Babylon during this period were not living there by voluntary association; they were forced to live there by Nebuchadnezzar. *Politics* is the art of bringing Order to and maintaining it in a Society, and so every community is a political institution. A Community is a higher order of political co-*Existenz*.

¹ If you are forced to do something – i.e., act from a maxim of prudence so as to avoid some consequence you deem worse than the consequence which follows from your prudent action – your action is not "voluntary" other than in a context of a narrow sophism of semantics. If a robber were to threaten you with, "Your money or your life," would you regard handing over your wallet or your purse as "voluntary"?

All Communities involve some form of social convention. A form of convention in which the members intend to have the association serve as a means for each to satisfy his self-interested purposes but in which the terms of a social compact (which require reciprocal commitments to Duties and Obligations) are not met is called a *non-civil* convention. A Community with this form of social convention is called a *non-civil* Community. In a non-civil Community the association does not have a *civil* convention, *civil* rights or *civil* liberties. A *civil* convention is a form of association which will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and by which each associate, while uniting himself with all the other associates, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before joining the association. A *civil* Community is a Community having this form of social convention. A civil Community is a higher order of Community than is a non-civil Community.

The idea of a divine Community is that of an Ideal of the highest order of civil Community, i.e., the Object of a perfect institution of civil Community. Unless specified otherwise, when I use the word Community without an adjective modifier in this chapter what I mean is "civil Community."

Webster's dictionary (1962) lists 22 definitions of the word "order." This multiplicity of usages reflects the Latin root of the word – *ordo, ordinis* – which itself has 15 distinct definitions. Given this ambiguity of language, what do I mean here by saying one form of Community is of a "higher order" than another? In sociological contexts (social order), I use the word in its context of the 11th Latin definition of *ordo*, viz., an arrangement in a sequence, regular series, or succession in time, space, etc. [Glare (1996)]. This matches the contexts in which Kant most often used the term *Anordnung* in the Critical corpus. It is also a context which is congruent with the dialectic theorem in chapter 12 that afterlife is seriated with grades of Community.

This context differs from that used for the Critical term Order, which corresponds to Webster's 8th definition of "order." In Critical terminology, Order is an Object subsisting in the preservation of the degree of all kinds and amounts of objective good people deem to already actually exist. Both terms differ from Webster's 10th definition of "order," which Critical theory terms "Weberian order," i.e., a prescribed maxim, rule, convention, or law of behavior intended to govern social actions. A legal order issued by a judge is an example of a Weberian order².

Communion with God is a recurring theme in Christianity. The Ideal of divine Community pertains to this directly. One example of Christianity's notion of communion with God is provided by:

[T]hat which we have seen and heard we proclaim also to you, so that you too may have fellowship with us, and indeed our fellowship with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ. [1 John 1:3]

Similar and congruent notions are expressed in Islam and Judaism as well as in Eastern religions, although in the cases of the latter a not-insignificant exercise in abstraction is needed to bring this out.

In order to understand the Ideal of divine Community, two additional Ideas are required: the Idea of a body politic; and the Idea of a *corporate person* [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 467]. A human being as a person is understood as a unity, i.e., *one* indivisible thing. But what about a population of people?

A body politic is the regulative Idea of the *totality* of all members of a Community. A corporate person is the regulative Idea of the *oneness* of the Community of a group of people regarded as a body politic. The distinction between the totality of *all the members* of a Community and the oneness of *the Community* is important. Every Community has a totality of all its members, i.e., a body politic. But not every Community can be said to be a corporate person or have a "corporate personality"³. This is because

² This term derives from Max Weber's socioeconomic theory [Weber (1920)].

³ The idea of a corporate personality is obviously a metaphor based on the idea of a human personality. Human personality (*Personlichkeit*), from the theoretical Standpoint, is the entirety of the *nexus* of practical rules in the manifold of rules regulating a person's habits expressed by his physical and mental activities. A Community quite

one of the most frequent characteristics of a Community is its division into *mini-Communities*. Even if a mini-Community can be identified as being a corporate person, that mini-Community might – and often does – have a different "corporate personality" than other mini-Communities in the greater Community [Wells (2014), chap. 4]. Furthermore, mini-Communities are not permanent social entities. It has been empirically shown that they come into and go out of being as time passes [Wells (2013), chap. 11]. Further complicating this picture, generally each person is a member of *more than one* mini-Community simultaneously. This is because mini-Communities coalesce around particular special interests of the individual that happen to coincide with those of others to form a set of mini-Community common interests. These become the basis for the mini-Community association [Wells (2012), chap. 11, §5]. The challenge of mini-Communities poses not only one of the greatest problems of and risks to Societies and Communities, and is at the root of imperfect institution of Community in life [Wells (2014), chap. 5], but also is to be regarded as a challenge in a seriated afterlife of continual striving to *perfect* humanity (i.e., mutual sympathetic participation in and unselfish commitment to a social compact of Community).

Generally every human Society with a population large enough that individuals do not personally know all the other members *granulates* into interacting sets of mini-Communities. These are defined by special interests common to a mini-Community's members but not shared by members of other mini-Communities. Figure 1 provides a mathematical illustration of a hypothetical case of this. When members of one mini-Community do not know anyone who is a member of a different mini-Community, their understanding of people in that other mini-Community is based on stereotyping its members as *abstract persons*. Members of a particular mini-Community generally share some set of mores, folkways, and behavioral social norms but these can differ from those followed by members of other mini-Communities. Such differences can and frequently do lead to tensions between mini-Communities.




Figure 1: Hypothetical example of a Society granulated into mini-Communities (MC). The numbered circles represent specific individuals. Individuals 1-4 are members of mini-Community A (MC A) plus one of the other four mini-Communities. Within each mini-Community most of the members do not personally know most of the members of the other mini-Communities. Individuals 1-4 are termed mini-Community "ambassadors." Some pairs of specific mini-Communities might not have any ambassadors who make a direct social connection between them (e.g., MC B and MC D, MC C and MC E, or MC D and MC E).

obviously has no manifold of rules or common process of Reason. But it (or the mini-Communities within it) does have its customs, folkways, mores, and laws that, to a degree, tend to govern, moderate, or regulate the behaviors of its people. These provide it with a homologue of the process of Reason and its manifold of rules.




Figure 2: Illustration of a Society divided into castes comprised of diverse mini-Communities.

Whatever set of mores, folkways, and norms of social expectations characterize a mini-Community functions as a homologue for the "personality" of that mini-Community. It is this homologue I called the "corporate personality" of a mini-Community. It is true that usually *some* of these norms (but not all of them) are shared by members of other mini-Communities; a Society where this is not the case is one that would be politically unstable to a high degree and prone to break down and disintegrate into a multiplicity of disunited Societies. Anthropologists have found that there is one stubbornly universal characteristic that appears in every Society. This characteristic can be called "parochialism" in the sense that its members tend to have narrow and corporately selfish interests, opinions, views, and activities. If you prefer a different word, "provincialism" is a frequent descriptive synonym. Haviland *et al.* tell us,

Anthropologists have been intrigued to find that all cultures tend to see themselves as the best of all possible worlds. This is reflected in the way individual societies refer to themselves: Typically a society's traditional name for itself translates roughly into "true human beings." In contrast, their names for outsiders commonly translate into various versions of "subhumans," including "monkeys," "dogs," "weird looking people," "funny talkers," and so forth. We now know that any adequately functioning culture regards its own ways as the only proper ones, a view known as ethnocentrism. [Haviland *et al.* (2008), pg. 323]

Ethnocentrism is but one ingredient in parochialism more generally regarded. Mill wrote,

People are accustomed to believe . . . that their feelings on subjects of this nature are better than reasons and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them in their opinions on the regulation of human conduct is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. [Mill (1859), pg. 5]

Social mores often almost carry the force of law in a Society. Indeed, it is not unusual to find mores codified into laws and then enforced by the governing body of the Society using raw force or the threat of raw force on those whose personal moral codes would gainsay them if not for maxims of prudence. One frequent consequence of this is the emergence of caste Societies. The most frequently recurring example

of this is illustrated in figure 2. In this example, a dominant minority *rules* over the majority of the population, this majority being weakened by its own divisions into non-cooperating or uncooperative mini-Communities. The term "dominant minority" was coined by historian Arnold Toynbee. In studying the histories of the rise and fall of ancient civilizations he found that these were not unrelated to one another but, rather, had to be seen as successions of earlier-to-later civilizations. Toynbee wrote,

When we pass from the 'unrelated' civilizations . . . to those later civilizations that were in varying ways and degrees related to 'civilized' predecessors, it is obvious that in their case . . . the principal and essential challenge was a human challenge arising out of their relationship to the society to which they were affiliated. This challenge is implicit in the relation itself, which begins with a differentiation and culminates in a secession. The differentiation takes place within the body of the antecedent civilization when that civilization begins to lose the creative power through which, in its period of growth, it had at one time inspired a voluntary allegiance in the hearts of the people below its surface or beyond its borders. When this happens, the ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failing vitality by being disintegrated into a dominant minority, which rules with increasing oppressiveness but no longer leads, and a proletariat . . . which responds to this challenge by becoming conscious that it has a soul of its own and by making up its mind to save its soul alive. The dominant minority's will to repress evokes in the proletariat a will to secede; and a conflict between these two wills continues while the declining civilization verges towards its fall, until, when it is *in articulo mortis*, the proletariat at length breaks free from what was once its spiritual home but has now become a prison-house and finally a City of Destruction. [Toynbee (1946), pg. 77]

Toynbee's term "proletariat" was defined as "any social element or group which is in some way *in* but not *of* any given society at any period of that society's history" [*ibid.*, pg. 11 fn]. This usage is not the same as how the word "proletariat" was used in the Communist propaganda of Marx and Engels. To distinguish them, I call Toynbee's term a "Toynbee proletariat." A dominant minority caste is found in every caste Society and its appearance foretells the eventual disintegration, fall, and disappearance of that Society. He found that in general *civilizations fall from within*, and the dominant minority is the principal cause of that fall. It is very clear that any caste Society is pursuing the diametric opposite of self-perfection in its social evolution. An example in more modern times was the partition of India into the separate Societies of India and Pakistan. In this case, most of the converts to Islam in the antecedent Indian Society came from the ranks of India's "untouchables" caste, and India's Muslims became the Toynbee proletariat that forced the country to be divided when the British raj ended [Collins and Lapierre (1975), pp. 30-36].

Many Societies today deny the *Dasein* of castes within themselves. This is generally nothing but a self-comforting propaganda deception. Substitute words are often used in these cases, e.g., words like "class" (as in "middle class," "upper class," etc.). For example, in the present-day United States the Republican and Democrat political parties vie with each other to establish their "party bases" as dominant minorities exercising *rule* over the majority of Americans (rather than striving to perform government services *for* them). Perhaps nothing to date demonstrates this more clearly than the incompetent performance and antisocial partisan competition of the U.S. 115th Congress. As Toynbee gloomily forewarns, this is a political trend that has only one eventual outcome: civil war and the disintegration of the Society of the United States. We are watching these parties bringing about the end of the American civilization.

The imperfections in and hypocrisies of granulated Societies can be regarded as conflicts of corporate personalities. In relationship to the idea of divine Community, individual striving for self-perfection goes hand in glove with social striving for perfecting the corporate personality of mini-Communities. Let us examine in more detail this homologue between human personality and corporate personality.

3. The Personality Style Circumplex and Human Personality

From the theoretical Standpoint of Critical epistemology, personality is the entirety of the *nexus* of practical rules in the manifold of rules regulating a person's habits expressed by his physical and mental

activities. The Object of this *Realerklärung* is obviously a mathematical noumenon because the manifold of rules in practical Reason is a supersensible object not open to immediate observation by empirical science. Its objectively valid connection to human experience – the idea of its principal quantity – comes from a dictionary idea of personality, *viz.*, habitual patterns and qualities of behavior of an individual *as expressed* by physical and mental activities and attitudes [Webster (1962)]. The empirical scientific study of such "habitual patterns and qualities of behavior" is usually called *interpersonal psychology*. The label "interpersonal" is applied because the pertinent patterns and "qualities of behavior" are expressed during person to person interactions and described by the psychological impact one person's externalized expressions have on another person. This normative viewpoint is adopted by psychologists because it was discovered in the early days of interpersonal psychology research in the 1950s that how *you* understand your own personality and how *other* people understand it are generally different. Leary, one of the early pioneers of this field of psychology, tells us,

What a person does in any social situation is a function of at least two factors, (1) his multilevel personality structure and (2) the activities and effect of the "other one," the person with whom he is interacting. . . . The basic unit involved here is the interpersonal effect. We determine the interpersonal meaning of any behavior by asking, "What is this person doing to the other? What kind of relationship is he attempting to establish through this particular behavior?" . . . We are concerned at this level with *what* one person communicates to another. . . . In studying the interpersonal purposes which underlie human behavior, the following hypothesis has developed. It seems that in a large percentage of interactions the basic motives are expressed in a reflex manner. They are so automatic that they are often unwittingly and often at variance with the subject's own perception of them. This facet of behavior is therefore a difficult one to isolate and measure. It is often un verbalized and so subtle and reflex as to escape articulate description. [Leary (1957), pp. 91-92]

The manifold of rules and the manifold of concepts are two quite different mental structures. While concepts do affect possible action expressions, the action actually expressed is *immediately* regulated by a person's appetitive power in practical Reason; and this power is determined by the manifold of rules. What we need from science is a way to relate a person's internal rule structure to his external expressions of behavior. Scientific success in this endeavor has come a long way since the 1950s using a methodology first introduced by psychologist H.S. Sullivan and more quantitatively refined by Leary. Robert Plutchik and Donald J. Kiesler were also important contributors to this progress. The method, initially developed by Leary and refined through the later work, is called a *circumplex model*. More recently, Wells observed that a number of circumplex models proposed by various researchers in personality psychology, managerial psychology, and psychiatry could be united in a single common circumplex model. He called this unifying model a "personality style circumplex model" [Wells (2012), chap. 8, §2]. Figure 3 illustrates the basic form of this model. Because this model is the starting point for understanding the ideas of corporate persons and corporate personality, its key ideas are propaedeutic to the discussion of corporate personality. Further details of Wells' model are provided in the references cited above.

Critical theory holds that the manifold of rules underlies empirical expressions of behavior. The manifold itself is, of course, not empirically observable. Its *Dasein* is posited necessarily and practically as the efficient cause of expressed behaviors. Because the manifold of rules for each person differs from those of other people, two different people can exhibit quite different behaviors under identical circumstances. Figure 4 illustrates this concept. Figure 4(A) illustrates the entirety of an individual's manifold of rules correlation with behavior; figure 4(B) illustrates the putative subset of this manifold that is provoked under some particular circumstance or in some particular situation. Because construction and adaptation of a person's manifold of rules is on-going, his expressed behaviors undergo gradual adaptation over time and at adaptation rates which differ from person to person. We say things like, "He has grown much more mature now than he was just ten years ago," to describe this commonplace phenomenon. Indeed, a great deal of the material in management training courses is aimed directly at producing this sort of behavior modification so that the trainee will become a more effective manager.




Figure 3: Personality style circumplex model. The polar coordinate (θ) identifies specific types of behavior expression characteristics. The radial coordinate (ρ) denotes the intensity with which the behavior is expressed. The black dot denotes a specific type of motoregulatory expression. The greater the radius and the more habitual the expression, the more the behavioral expression approaches that associated with a personality disorder. The yellow circle denotes a part of the manifold of rules theoretically imputed to underlie the expression of the behavior.




Figure 4: Hypothetical overlay of the manifold of rules on the personality style circumplex. (A) Hypothetical depiction of a person's full manifold of rules (yellow). (B) Hypothetical depiction of the submanifold of rules evoked during a particular situation or circumstance (purple).

To facilitate the practical application of this theory, the circumplex is broadly subdivided into eight octants by four bipolar axes (social-antisocial; gregarious-individualistic; idiosyncratic-emulative; and teetly processive-catalytic reactive). At an even greater level of detail, sixteen subdivisions are used. This




Figure 5: The D-PIPOS model. Figure 3 is further subdivided into sixteen sections with the characteristic labels for specific behavioral expressions added. These labels originate from the work of Kiesler [Kiesler (1983); (1985)].

Also added to the circumplex are the circumplex locations of ten personality style/personality disorder classifications defined by psychiatrists in the DSM-IV diagnostics manual [Sperry (2003)].

is illustrated in figure 5, which is called the D-PIPOS circumplex model [Wells (2012), chap. 8].

The first two things to emphasize about this model are: (1) every person typically exhibits more than one personality style depending on where he is and what his situation is; (2) there is no one personality style that is inherently better in any way than any other style. Intensities and rigidities of expression great enough to be called "personality disorders" are socially worse than normal range personality styles, but these extremes of behavior are matters of passion⁴, enthusiasm⁵, fanaticism⁶, and inadequate development of the person's manifold of rules pertaining to human social interactions.

You can get an initial feel for the D-PIPOS model by examining the labels given to its four quadrants (Amiable, Analytic, Driver, Expressive), octant axes (social, gregarious, idiosyncratic, teetly processive, antisocial, individualistic, emulative, and catalytic reactive), and its sixteen labels for expressions (warm, trusting, deferent, submissive, unassured, inhibited, detached, hostile, cold, mistrusting, competitive, dominant, assured, exhibitionist, sociable, and friendly). Detailed explanations for each of these sixteen terms was given in Kiesler (1983); (1985). The other terms are found in Wells (2012), chap. 8.

⁴ Passion is an appetite of inclination that makes determinability of choice by means of objective first principles difficult or impossible. A passion is an habitual sensuous purpose a person has made into a maxim in his manifold of rules.

⁵ Enthusiasm is originality in the use of the power of imagination combined with an elevated degree of desire such that concepts produced in the free play of imagination and determining judgment are valued for the beauty of the notion and are not made to harmonize with other general concepts in understanding. The word enthusiasm carries a connotation of fanaticism.

⁶ Santayana wrote, "Fanaticism consists in redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim." [Santayana (1905), pg. 13]

Table 1: Kiesler's Sixteen Segment Descriptions

Label	Mild-Moderate Level	Extreme Level	D-PIPOS Quadrant
Dominant	controlling	dictatorial	Expressive
Competitive	critical/ambitious	rivalrous/disdainful	Expressive
Mistrusting	suspicious/resentful	paranoid/vindictive	Driver
Cold	cold/punitive	icy/cruel	Driver
Hostile	antagonistic/harmful	rancorous/sadistic	Driver
Detached	aloof	escapist	Driver
Inhibited	taciturn	unresponsive	Analytic
Unassured	self-doubting/dependent	abasing/helpless	Analytic
Submissive	docile	subservient	Analytic
Deferent	respectful/content	ambitionless/flattering	Analytic
Trusting	trusting/forgiving	gullible/merciful	Amiable
Warm	warm/pardoning	all-loving/absolving	Amiable
Friendly	cooperative/helpful	devoted/indulgent	Amiable
Sociable	outgoing	frenetically gregarious	Amiable
Exhibitionist	spontaneous/demonstrative	histrionic	Expressive
Assured	confident/self-reliant	arrogant/rigidly autonomous	Expressive

Kiesler provided synonym/antonym descriptors of expressive behaviors, as they often appear to others, for each of his sixteen segment labels. He based these on dictionary definitions of the words finally used for descriptors [Kiesler (1983)]. Because these terms are dictionary-based, they do not always align synonymously with psychiatric technical terms for personality disorders (e.g. "histrionic"). He further broadly classified the intensity of the behavioral expression into two levels (mild-moderate and extreme) which correspond to inner and outer radial positions (ρ) in figure 5. Kiesler's descriptions are provided in Table 1. Kiesler's circle represents behaviors in a continuum, however, and his descriptions are not meant to be "crisp" and "definitive" in terms of how one might interpret another's behavior. He described his naming process as a "laborious and obsessive pursuit" of the labels ultimately selected [*ibid.*] and there is a noticeably subjective quality in them. In later years he continued to tinker a bit with his labels after his initial publications, e.g. Kiesler (1985)⁷. This makes his labels hard for a layman to apply.

One issue that always attends the problem of psychological labeling is context bias. A researcher always has some quite specific set of circumstances in mind when conducting a study. In Kiesler's case, he was interested in adult two-person interactions that could be characterized by motivational factors called "control" and "affiliation." While specificity is required for research findings to have useful application, it is also a classic source of unintentional systematic bias in psychology especially important in evaluating empirical ratings used to measure and characterize the effects under study [Wells (2012), chap. 8]. William James wrote of what he called "the misleading influence of speech" in psychology. He said,

Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men today employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal passions of our life . . . and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity . . . are the only facts of a subjective order which this vocabulary deigns to note by special words. . . . The absence of a special vocabulary for subjective facts hinders the study of all but the very coarsest of them. The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. [James (1890), vol. I, pp. 194-196]

Kiesler did not make a public report to us about the details of how he assembled his system, referencing instead his own unpublished manuscripts [Kiesler (1973); (1982)]. One always risks overgeneralizing a

⁷ The labels used in figure 5 and table 1 are those Kiesler used in an unpublished 1982 manuscript that is no longer available because Virginia Commonwealth University has removed Kiesler's original website link. However, these labels do not differ egregiously from those he used in Kiesler (1985).

specific psychological finding because specific contexts and circumstances involved in any one study tend to hide the fact that the action of every human being is always regulated *holistically* by his mental structures of rules and concepts. Figure 4 above tries to illustrate this point. The D-PIPOS model attempts to reduce the level of context-dependent stereotyping inherent in specific studies by means of a systemic integration of results from multiple social situations. The resulting model is empirical – hence imperfect – but is conjectured to provide a broader and less stereotyped picture of interpersonal interactions. For the purposes of this treatise, the broadest and most general empirical characterization is that of the quadrants of the circumplex (Amiable, Expressive, Driver, and Analytic). Unless you have had more detailed training in psychology, this coarser level of classification is the safest and most reliable level for you to use. Kiesler's labels, and those of the psychiatric personality styles, can be used to "color" your understanding of figure 5, but the quadrant labels are the most important. These are described as follows:

Amiable: Quiet. Unassuming. Supportive. Warm. Friendly listeners. Easy to get along with. Enjoys personal contact. Shares responsibility. Concerned about collaboration, providing support, and reaching agreement. Requires extensive data for decision-making. Prefers to have consensus before moving ahead. Focused on personal ties before goals.

Expressive: Energetic. Inspiring. Emotional. Fast paced. Comfortable taking social initiative. Engages freely in friendly conversation before tackling tasks. Futuristic. Talkative. Intuitive. Willingly shares ideas, insights, dreams, and visions. Risk-taker. Competitive. Spirited. Creative. Enthusiastic. Likes an audience. Ambitious.

Driver: Businesslike. Results-oriented. Likely to take charge and take initiative. Likes challenges. Makes quick decisions. Direct and to the point. Strong opinions and convictions. Hard-working. Efficient. Confident and competent. Productively coordinates the work of others. Likely to challenge new ideas. Quick to respond. Inclined to correct, modify, or add to others' ideas. Straightforward. Responsible. Makes things happen.

Analytic: Detail oriented. Deliberate. Well organized. Listens to and studies information carefully before weighing all alternatives. Lets others take social initiative. Prefers an efficient businesslike approach. Prefers information presented in systematic manner. Conservative and practical. Technically oriented. Relies on structural approach and factual evidence. [Wilson (2011)]

Concordances with Kiesler's labels are discussed in Wells (2012), chap. 8. The descriptions given above apply to the mild-to-moderate level of interpersonal expression.

4. Corporate Personality

The D-PIPOS model just discussed pertains to individuals and their interactions with one or only a few other people at a time. However, it has long been observed that when people interact with one another in larger groups, the behaviors of the individuals in the group are altered by what are sometimes called "interworking effects." Group behavior, Reber & Reber tell us, is "a kind of emergent property of a group and not simply the summation of the individual behaviors of individuals in the group" [Reber & Reber (2001), "group behavior"]. People use terms like "groupthink" and "mob psychology" to refer to this phenomenon that "people are different when in groups than they are one-on-one." The social dynamic that underlies this phenomenon is called "leadership" [Wells (2010)].

The idea of corporate personality is based on this long-observed phenomenon. More specifically, it pertains to how people outside a Community or mini-Community view that Community or mini-Community as a body politic and *abstract person*. All mini-Communities are composed of individual people (the social atoms of every Society). The macroscopic gross behaviors that characterize any particular mini-Community as a Society are consequences of on-going syntheses of the action-reaction dynamics of emotive expressions operationalized by individuals as they interact. The habitual and typical *modi operandi* resulting out of this synthesis are said to **govern** the actions of the group.




Figure 6: Circumplex model of corporate personality governance.

This governance of the group behaviors of a Community as a homologue of individual personality can be characterized macroscopically in terms of two factor axes: cooperation vs. egocentric behaviors and social vs. asocial behaviors. From the judicial Standpoint of Critical epistemology, **Community governance** is defined as *a set of co-determining emotivity operationalizations that characterize leader-follower dynamics purposively aimed at maintaining and perfecting a relationship of civil Community among a group of persons*. As such, we can overlay the axes of the personality style circumplex of figure 5 onto these two factor dimensions and so characterize the leadership dynamics of a corporate body of people in terms directly analogous to the personality styles of human beings. Mathematically, this defines the noumenal idea of corporate personality specifically and in behavioral terms. Figure 6 depicts this. The axes of figure 5 are rotated to properly align them with the factor axes characterizing group behaviors.

The names assigned to the four quadrants of figure 6 were chosen by analogy with the four most common forms of human political governance as these types of governance are socially characterized by typical behavioral traits they are seen to exhibit. The correspondences between governance dynamics of a group and the social styles of individuals are summarized in Table 2 below.

Sociologists introduced the term *Gemeinschaft* (German for "community") as a rather vague description of characteristics often seen in small communities (e.g., villages, rural communities and the like). Critical theory explains *Gemeinschaft* as *governance of a Community through loosely organized cooperations by groups of individuals on specific matters of direct interest to them, and in which cohesion of governance is primarily reliant upon citizens' civic conformity to Community mores and folkways*. One primal example of *Gemeinschaft* governance is found in the BaMbuti groups of the Congo [Turnbull (1962)].

Table 2: Correspondences of Corporate Personality and Human Social Styles

Factor Quadrant	Governance Label	Personality Style
Social-Cooperation	<i>Gemeinschaft</i>	Amiable
Social-Egocentrism	republic	Expressive
Asocial-Egocentrism	monarchy/oligarchy	Driver
Asocial-Cooperation	non-consensus democracy	Analytic

The polar opposite of this is the *monarchy/oligarchy* form of governance: *governance of an association through rulership of the majority of its people by a single ruler or by a small and select class of rulers*. This sort of Society is inherently a caste Society and it is the type of governance found most often throughout human history. While there is every reason to think early Man lived in isolated or semi-isolated *Gemeinschaft* Communities, as populations grew and Communities came into more contact with one another, Societies overall lost this social and cooperative character, castes formed, and the Society *lost its character of civil Community* overall. Such a Society can appropriately be called *antisocial* because the special interests of a small subset of its people are made to override those of other castes within it. A dominant minority *rules*; the other castes are *subjugated*. Between the dominant minority and the rest of the Society a state of co-*Existenz* is set up that philosophers like Locke and Rousseau termed a *state of nature*. In such a state there is no overall social morality. Non-benevolent competition between its subgroups (many of which might themselves still be mini-Communities but in outlaw relationships with other groups) characterizes the leadership dynamics of the overall Society.

Although it often is, monarchy/oligarchy governance is not always instituted among men because of sinister or malign motivations. It can and is known to sometimes arise out of good intentions. There is an old saying, often misattributed to St. Bernard, that goes, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." Mill commented,

It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed reformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary public improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the intractableness, the perverting obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a strong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such direction for the realization of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element: the improvement of the people themselves. [Mill (1862), pp. 30-31]

He also warned,

A state which dwarfs its men in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands, even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of the machinery to which it has sacrificed everything will, in the end, avail it nothing for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish. [Mill (1859), pg. 97]

Such is the path any Society embarks upon when its corporate person devolves into monarchy/oligarchy social governance. Its breakdown and fall might – and often does – come slowly but it does come inevitably. But turning to its polar opposite, the *Gemeinschaft* corporate person, one should beware of letting its label, "Amiable," lead one into a false impression that, in the words of the young idealists of the 1960s, "peace, love, and harmony" reigns unbroken within such a Community. It helps if you keep in mind that an alternate and equally appropriate description for *Gemeinschaft* Community is *consensus democracy* and reflect upon what can happen when someone obdurately thwarts achieving consensus. If you push someone to the point where he or she says to himself, "I can't take this anymore," their reaction becomes what Wilson *et al.* call "Back-Up Behavior" [Wilson (2011), pg. 59]. The Wilson description of Amiable social style in the previous section speaks to the *values* of an Amiable person, to his or her "moral compass." It does *not* describe what this person does when those values are consistently trampled upon to the point where Back-Up Behavior ("getting one's back up") is provoked. The same source who provided that earlier description also tells us,

The initial Back-Up Behavior of Amiables is called Acquiescing. They manage stress and tension in

their relationships by limiting exposure to the cause of their woes. They opt to surrender or give up, which is their way of taking flight from the situation. . . . They might even go so far as to concur with you in a meeting to avoid creating new tension, and then retract the agreement later. . . . If you keep Amiables in Back-Up too long . . . you may never regain their trust. . . . Amiables will tend not to forget, and if pushed far enough, will not forgive ever! The message you'll get from an Amiable who is Acquiescing is, "I give up. We will do it your way . . . until I get the chance to do it my way." That chance begins the first moment you are out of sight. [Wilson (2011), pp. 140-141]

It is quite possible, and without much effort, to cause an Amiable to thoroughly hate your guts.

Acquiescing behavior in Amiable corporate persons (*Gemeinschaft* Communities) is the real behavior, in psychological terms, when we look at historical incidences of small Communities being subjugated by some militarily stronger Society. It is an old myth, propagated by rulers, that a conquered people submit to their subjugation solely because of fear. The remark above about "that chance begins the first moment you are out of sight" applies equally to corporate persons. Charlemagne, the most powerful king of Dark Age Europe, was just one of many kings throughout history to get a lesson in this:

Saxony and Frisia . . . were conquered lands whose subjection had been bought at the cost of much Frankish blood. Moreover, they were restless under the hand of their overlord and required close supervision from the imperial center. An additional complication was their political structure. They had no single king or duke with whom Charles [Charlemagne] and his agents could negotiate. The land was dominated by regional warlords. . . . The peace Charles had imposed in 785 lasted for ten years. Then, between 795 and 802, a series of risings flared up like sudden conflagration in a fire-blackened landscape. Charles' mounting irritation showed itself in increasingly draconian measures. [Wilson (2006), pp. 100-101].

To this I will add the observation that these "increasingly draconian measures" also had a limited run of success. By 843 Charlemagne's empire was undergoing disintegration. No single ruler ruled continental Europe again until Napoleon, whose empire didn't last very long either. When Alexander the Great died in 323 BC revolts broke out in every major city in Greece and his empire died with him.

Translating the Amiable social style to the governance of *Gemeinschaft* Community does not imply everything is always calm, reasonable, peaceful, and non-competitive. After all, the population of a *Gemeinschaft* Community is still comprised of individuals with Driver, Analytic, Amiable, and Expressive social styles. Turnbull vividly documented how raucous, noisy, and occasionally violent life in a BaMbuti Community could be [Turnbull (1962), pp. 109-125]. What keeps their Community a civil Community is that, in the end, everyone in it ultimately abides by and governs his own actions according to a code of right-conduct and a commitment to consensus that comprises their social contract. Turnbull remarked, following one particularly contentious incident he observed, that

This incident illustrates one of the most remarkable features of Pygmy life – the way everything settles itself with apparent lack of organization. Cooperation is the key to Pygmy society; you can expect it and you can demand it; and you have to give it. . . . In fact, Pygmies dislike and avoid personal authority, though they are by no means devoid of a sense of responsibility. It is rather that they think of responsibility as communal. If you ask a father, or a husband, why he allows his son to flirt with a married girl, or his wife to flirt with other men, he will answer, "It is not my affair," and he is right. It is *their* affair, and the affair of the other men and women, and of their brothers and sisters. He will try to settle it himself, either by argument or a good beating, but if this fails he brings everyone else into the dispute so that he is absolved of personal responsibility. [Turnbull (1962), pp. 124-125]

This is *Gemeinschaft* Community: no rulers, no judges, no laws, no fixed authority figures; just a general and all-encompassing commitment to *social* responsibilities and *communal* consensus. It is, in other

words, truly *consensus* democracy in action. Under the Critical articles of faith, divine Community is logically alike (though not identical) because: (a) God values freedom; (b) God is a supreme leader, not a monarch; and (c) human beings are a reflection or image of God.

The practical and historically demonstrated unsustainability of *Gemeinschaft* Communities comes out of an impracticality, namely the impracticality of exercising consensus democracy once a population grows too large to sustain it and individuals no longer know all the other members as real persons (substituting stereotypes of their more distantly located neighbors in place of this knowledge). The political evolution of New England townships in the first century of the American colonies provides an excellent example. When first established, the settlement was small and the people politically governed themselves by direct democracy. Each town had a central meeting house where both town meetings and church services were held (figure 7). As the population grew and people became more geographically spread out, it became increasingly impractical for everyone to journey to the meeting house. The township became divided into parishes and local governance became more predominantly centered in these parishes. As population growth and dispersal continued, and especially after the original Puritan Society gave way to what we now call Yankee Society, the parishes gave way to districts – generally beginning as school districts – and the central authority of town government broke down [Cubberley (1919), pp. 41-43].

However, New England managed to hold on to some of its original *Gemeinschaft* character at the level of its townships until well into the 19th century in spite of the fact that its initial character of consensus democracy soon gave way to that of non-consensus democracy (figure 6). With the exception of Rhode Island, non-consensus democracy was a corporate personality congenial with the anti-episcopal character of New England's Calvinist religions. French political writer Alexis de Tocqueville greatly admired the character of New England townships and Yankee Society:

In America not only do municipal bodies exist, but they are kept alive and supported by town spirit. The township of New England possesses two advantages which strongly excite the interest of mankind: namely, independence and authority. Its sphere is limited, indeed; but within that sphere its action is unrestrained. This independence alone gives it a real importance, which its extent and population would not. . . .

In the American townships power has been distributed with admirable skill for the purpose of interesting the greatest possible number of persons in the common weal. Independently of the voters, who are from time to time called into action, the power is divided among innumerable functionaries and officers, who all, in their several spheres, represent the powerful community in whose name they act. [Tocqueville (1836), pp. 66-67]

Figure 8 provides a comparison between Puritan New England and the Rhode Island colony.




Figure 7: Illustration of the 1642-1760 evolution of New England townships as the colonial population increased.




Figure 8: Corporate personalities of the Puritan New England and Rhode Island colonies [Wells (2013), chaps. 1-2].
A: New England colonies other than Rhode Island. B: Rhode Island.

The colonies in New England – with the exception of Rhode Island – were intended by their colonizers to be "Bible Commonwealths" and, specifically, Puritan "Bible Commonwealths." Puritanism was one of the several species of Calvinist religions that came into being during the Reformation in Europe. While one might think that a Society based fundamentally on religion would steer itself toward a theocracy (monarchy) form of corporate personality, such an assumption would be untrue of Puritan Communities. Calvinism generally is anti-episcopal; this means it is opposed to the sort of hierarchical and monarchy-like character of Episcopal religions such as is characteristic of the Catholic and Anglican churches. It is true that the Commonwealth governors of New England favored theocratic rulership but this did not sit at all well with the local congregations. The religious tenets of Calvinism recognize only one ruler, God, and explicitly require the church to be divided into parishes and church officers to be elected by members of the congregation [Wells (2013), chap. 2, pp. 34-35], [Calvin (1559)]. Non-consensus democracy was, literally, written into the social contract of Puritan (and, later, Yankee) Society by Calvinist doctrine. The Analytic character of non-consensus democracy is asocial in the context that rules are codified into laws intended to be both impartial (therefore, impersonal) and enforced. Tocqueville observed,

It was never assumed in the United States that the citizen of a free country has a right to do whatever he pleases; on the contrary, more social obligations were there imposed upon him than anywhere else. No idea was ever entertained of attacking the principle or contesting the right of society; but the exercise of its authority was divided, in order that the office might be powerful and the officer insignificant, and that the community should be at once regulated and free. In no country in the world does the law hold so absolute a language as in America; and in no country is the right of applying it vested in so many hands. The administrative power in the United States presents nothing either centralized or hierarchal in its constitution; this accounts for its passing unperceived. The power exists but its representative is nowhere to be seen. [Tocqueville (1836), pg. 71]

When this non-centralized and non-hierarchical character disappears from a Society then the Society's corporate personality is devolving into monarchy/oligarchy.

Rhode Island, on the other hand, was a quite different Society compared to the rest of New England. The fundamental tenet of non-consensus democracy – "the majority rules" – makes no secret of the fact

that it is a form of rulership even though this rulership is *called* "popular." In actuality, though, "the majority" seldom rules in a non-consensus democracy. Laws are instead written and codified not by "the majority" of its people by, rather, by a *majority of an elected majority*. This majority of a majority quite often, in fact, represents only a *minority* of the overall population [Mill (1862), pp. 76-77]. We see this quite clearly today in the United States: roughly one-third of American voters identify themselves as "Democrats"; roughly one-third identify themselves as "Republicans"; the remaining one-third do not identify with either political party. Because each political party primarily represents only its "base" voters, whichever party has the majority in Congress is in fact representing a *minority* of Americans. Non-consensus democracy is riddled with factions and ought to be recognized for what it is: rule of the majority by a minority. It differs from monarchy/oligarchy only in that the ruling minority *today* can be deposed and replaced by a different ruling minority *tomorrow* if the voters choose to do so.

The original settlers of Rhode Island were either people who were outlaws (people who did not commit themselves to accept being ruled by their more numerous neighbors and so would not consent to their social contract) or outcasts (people who were exiled from a colony because they questioned or would not conform to its rules). Individuals who ended up settling in colonial Rhode Island were for the most part individuals who would have chosen to live quite independently of one another had it not been that conditions there were hostile to such total independence and their Duties to themselves mandated cooperation with one another for their mutual benefits.

The *gregarious axis* in the D-PIPOS circumplex means *characterized by operationalization expressions conveying a trusting and forgiving, respectful and content personality style*. This is a characterization constituting the boundary between the Amiable and the Analytic social styles (table 1 and figure 5). From the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology, *cooperation* means collective behaviors of a group of interacting people within a leadership dynamic in which each individual acts from a basis of Duties according to his personal and private moral code but in such a way that he interacts congruently with the Duty-determinations of the other people. To congruently interact in this context means that satisfaction of Duty by one person in the group does not thwart satisfaction of Duty by another person in the group. This characterizes the corporate personality of colonial Rhode Island Society almost perfectly, as figure 7(B) indicates. Colonial Rhode Island's corporate personality could almost be described as "mind your own business and I'll mind mine; but if you need a helping hand I'll extend it to you if you'll do the same for me." Seen this way, I don't find it surprising that Rhode Island was the *only* state to *not* send a delegation to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and was the *last* state to ratify the Constitution. As the smallest (least populous) colony in America, Rhode Island adopted a nearly perfect balance between *Gemeinschaft* and non-consensus democracy corporate personality.

The colonial population of New England was socially very homogeneous compared to America's Middle and Southern colonies. Most New Englanders came from England, but the other two colonial regions contained significant minority populations from other European (and, later, African) countries. This comparative non-homogeneity, quite naturally, led to differences in their corporate personalities. Figure 9 graphically illustrates these differences.

In the Middle Colonies the presence of significant minorities emigrating from other countries meant that the population in these colonies also brought with them different Society backgrounds as well as different religious backgrounds. There were a far greater number of significant sociopolitical mini-Communities there than were found in New England. Differences in the mini-Community special interests did not favor a non-consensus democracy personality; there simply would have been too many laws that too many people would see as unjust or bigoted against their mini-Community. The immediate consequence of this was a clockwise rotation away from *Gemeinschaft* Society toward that of a republic. The social strength of a republic is that, as special interest factions multiply, no one faction is easily able to dominate the others, who can combine to thwart such a threat of minority domination. It is precisely this strength that




Figure 9: Corporate personalities of the Middle and Southern colonies with comparison to New England [Wells (2013), chap. 1]. A: The Middle Colonies (yellow). B: The Southern Colonies (yellow).

is sacrificed when a *small* number of political parties are able to establish themselves around a party "base" but, at the same time, sway larger and generally unorganized or disorganized groups of people to back their candidates by means of propaganda. For a long time, American political theorists who praised "the two-party system" misunderstood what happens to this system once party officials realize the mechanism of primary elections can be dominated by a small minority and leave the majority of people no candidates to choose from other than another party's candidate. Michael Barone wrote,

[The two party system] forces politicians . . . to come up with some combination of public policies that is capable of winning the approval of 50 percent of the people. It restrains the fissiparous tendencies of political ideologues and idealists, who seek to impose their will on a majority of those who reject their views. . . . When parties have an incentive to win 50-plus percent of the vote, they also have an incentive to moderate regional enthusiasms, to compromise ideological principles, and to unite voting blocs with very different cultural backgrounds and attitudes and very different economic interests and goals. [Barone (2001), pp. 80-81]

Unfortunately this is untrue, as the U.S. Congress has been demonstrating now for 25 years and counting. Two-party governance produces non-consensus democracy at best and eventually produces monarchy/oligarchy governance. It does nothing, in actual fact, to moderate ideologies and is a recipe for despotism.

National political parties did not exist in colonial America. Without the corrupting influence of such outlaw mini-Communities, a republic corporate personality worked well enough for the people of the Middle colonies. Representative delegations from their divers mini-Communities met in assemblies and, through debates and negotiations, crafted compromises in legislating laws that people would *consent* to follow even if they did not actually agree with these laws entirely. The Constitution agreed upon in 1787, after American independence from Great Britain, is a sterling example of this [Farrand (1911)]. Benjamin Franklin eloquently expressed its practical and civic character in a speech at the end of the Constitutional Convention. He delivered this speech on September 17th, 1787:

I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them. For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of

being obliged by better information or fuller consideration to change opinions even on important subjects which I once thought right but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed, as well as most sects in Religion, think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others differ from them it is so far error. . . . But though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady, who in a dispute with her sister said, "I don't know how it happens, Sister, but I meet with nobody but myself that's always right!" . . .

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe further that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with these men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an Assembly can a perfect product be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does . . . Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best. [Farrand (1911), vol. II, pp. 641-643]

The Southern colonies, which more closely mirrored Britain in its corporate personality and class system, swung even further toward the individualistic axis that marks the boundary between a republic and a monarchy/oligarchy caste system. The *individualistic axis* in the D-PIPOS circumplex means *characterized by operationalization expressions conveying a competitive and ambitious, suspicious and jealous, cunning and opportunistic personality style*. This is the boundary between the Expressive and Driver social styles. Nonetheless, the deeply rural Southern colonies, with their inhomogeneous populations and pluralities of religion, still retained much character of a republic even if its pronouncedly visible caste system tended toward feudalism among its "planter aristocracy."

The republic corporate person, if it does not rotate too far away from the catalytic reactive axis in figure 6, is a practical institution for holding on to the social dimension of corporate personality without sacrificing too much of the *Gemeinschaft* character of its numerous mini-Communities. As is suggested by figure 5, the catalytic reactive axis is the boundary line between Amiable and Expressive social style, and on the republic side of this axis operationalizations shift from a sociable to an exhibitionist character. Exhibitionist expression is spontaneous and demonstrative rather than merely outgoing (Table 1). The label "catalytic reactive" is meant to imply the stimulation of a *cooperative* leadership dynamic without also provoking fundamental changes in or degradations of a Community's ability to preserve social *Order* (preservation of the degree of all kinds and amounts of objective good people deem to already actually exist). Egocentrism begins to eclipse cooperation (figure 6) but nonetheless avoids subjugation of local mini-Community interests by those of despotism in a centralized power.

5. Doctrinal Implications of Corporate Personality

The previous section reviews the empirical nature of human corporate Communities. What about divine Community? Divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall, not by individuals (11th article of faith). Humanity is mutual sympathetic participation by a Community of people subsisting in unselfish active commitment to a social compact. If there are dialectic inferences that follow from this article, a person can use knowledge of these implications to understand and choose how to strive for self-perfection suitable for participation in divine Community. Can such inferences be drawn? and, if so, what are they?

Human nature cannot be ignored in striving to answer such questions as this. A human being makes

himself the person he chooses to become (13th article of faith). A doctrine sets and requires standards for what sort of person a person of faith should choose to become. But doctrinal standards cannot be such that they require people to surpass limitations of human nature. If they do, human beings cannot fulfill them and then *such a doctrine is of no practical use* in providing guidance to the followers of a faith. Indeed, such a doctrine would set standards people could only fail to live up to. A supremely sublime benevolent leader (9th article) would not hold people reflecting his image (3rd article) to such a standard because by doing so he would sacrifice his authority to lead. A good father might require his four-year-old son to feed the pigs on the family farm, but he would not require him to overhaul the tractor's engine.

There are, consequently, two aspects or dimensions to be considered here. The first pertains to what sort of Community ideal is to serve as the goal for a person's striving to make himself suitable for membership in divine Community. The second pertains to what behaviors a person must cultivate in himself in order to progress toward this ideal in the face of challenges that limitations of human nature throw up against his efforts. This aspect or dimension is the one which pertains to the individual's striving *to perfect humanity in his own person*. Divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall (11th article of faith) but a person who chooses to not seek to perfect humanity in his own person chooses at the same time to not contribute to seeking perfection of humanity overall. By making such a choice, he exercises his liberty of *unchoosing* himself for membership in divine Community (12th article of faith).

The present chapter of this treatise is aimed at understanding the first aspect or dimension: purposive orientation for divine Community. Therefore the remainder of this chapter is aimed at finding an ideal toward which on-going striving for perfection in afterlife (6th article of faith) logically progresses. Chapter 14 turns its attention to the second aspect: striving to perfect humanity in one's own person.

Every Society is composed as an aggregation of the personal societies of its people. A personal society consists of a person, whose personal society it is, and other people with each of whom that person shares some kind of cooperations in their interpersonal relationships [Wells (2012), chap. 2]. Cooperation is a defining mark of a society, and an overall Society is the mathematical noumenon subsisting in the unity of all of these people and their cooperations with each other. When these relationships also involve, and their preservation is contingent upon, binding mutual Obligations and Duties – that is, social contracts of one form or another which pertain to the individuals' congruent common interests – then personal societies unite into mini-Communities. But, and at the same time, among the conditions necessary for the possibility of such a union to hold is the condition of respect for each others' individuality and personal civil liberty in pursuit of fulfillment of each person's Duties to himself. Hence egocentrism (self concerns) and cooperation are both present in every mini-Community union [*ibid.*, chap. 11].

Significantly complicating the overall social situation is that every person is simultaneously a member of multiple mini-Communities, whereas the other members of each one are not necessarily members of each others' *same* mini-Communities. Neither are their divers memberships mutually exclusive. In mathematical terminology, Societies are multi-dimensional organizations. This situation presents what I have called *the challenge of mini-Community*. It is, I think, the principal reason why sociology has always seemed intractable to being made into an exacting empirical-rational science.

A corporate person, as a noumenon, subsists in its mini-Community and the social compact – be it formal and written or informal and identifiable only by moral customs (mores and folkways) – that regulates its people. As Montesquieu said,

Manners and customs are those habits which are not established by legislators, either because they were not able or were not willing to establish them. There is this difference between laws and manners, that the laws are most adapted to regulate the actions of the subject, and manners to regulate the actions of the man. There is this difference between manners and customs, that the former principally relate to the interior conduct, the latter to the exterior. [Montesquieu (1748), vol. I, pg. 300]




Figure 10: The three logical *momenta* of aggregation in the perfecting of a Society as a unity. CP denotes corporate person.

As an ideal of perfection, divine Community pertains to more than merely the binding of one person to the corporate person of a mini-Community or the binding of two corporate persons with one another. Its scope is nothing less than the mutual binding of *all* persons and corporate persons in *one* unity. For this, there are three logical *momenta* of Quantity in such perfecting. Figure 10 illustrates them. These logical functions are: 1) the singular function in mutually binding an individual to the corporate person of a mini-Community; 2) the particular function in mutually binding two corporate persons in a higher mini-Community; and 3) the universal function in mutually binding corporate persons in the Community overall. The challenge is that expressed in the Latin motto *E pluribus unum*: one out of many. A civil Community is, as Rousseau said, "a moral and collective body" comprised of its members [Rousseau (1762), pg. 14]. A divine Community is the most complete and morally excellent embodiment of this.

Aristotle taught that moral excellence is found in the mean between two extremes of vice, one of excess and one of defect or lack [Aristotle (date unknown), pg. 92-95]. In the context of divine Community, I think it is not difficult to see in figure 6 that such a mean is to be sought in the social hemisphere of corporate personality; and, furthermore, that this hemisphere is centered around the axis labeled catalytic reactive in that figure. The catalytic reactive axis is characterized by operationalizations that stimulate a cooperative leadership dynamic without provoking fundamental changes in or degradations of a Community's ability to preserve social Order. Social Order, again, subsists in the preservation of the degree of all kinds and amounts of objective good people deem to already actually exist. The catalytic reactive axis lies at the boundary between a *Gemeinschaft* Community and a republic Community.

The implication here is that neither a pure *Gemeinschaft* Community nor a pure republic is the ideal of divine Community we seek. Why not? Why wouldn't the axis labeled "social" naturally be the correct center of a divine Community? First, the term "social" only means of or having to do with human beings living together in a situation requiring that they have dealings with one another. Bearing in mind that the axes in figure 6 are bipolar, it would be just as correct to label the social axis as the *un-antisocial* axis. A *Gemeinschaft* Community is not at all an example of a perfect Community. Preservation of Order is indeed the central focus of Community life in a *Gemeinschaft* Community, but this central focus also reveals a significant *lack* in its character; namely, lack of Progress.

Progress subsists in increasing the kinds and amounts of objective good people deem to be possible to realize (make actual). The idea of *striving to perfect* is inherently an idea of Progress, and Progress is an Object in which the idea of *change* is inherent. The high central value a *Gemeinschaft* Society places on Order promotes social mores and folkways that are not merely conservative but, indeed, reactionary. This is because *overenthusiasm* for Progress not-infrequently brings with it loss, for at least some people, of some good these people do not want to sacrifice in exchange for increasing the amount of some other good. Maccoby presented an example of this he found during his study of a Mexican village:

Historically, the jungle fighter⁸ has been an entrepreneur and empire builder. In the Mexican village we studied, Fromm and I found that a small group of bold and innovative jungle fighters was the first to break away from the traditional practices; these villagers were the first to buy tractors, which they also rented out to others, the first to try out new farming methods with chemical fertilizers, and were the most likely to become middlemen. . . .

In the "developing" village, such jungle fighter entrepreneurs were the new men and were known as the "progressives." They were the ones who opposed traditional fiestas as a waste of money and a temptation to drunkenness. They argued that the money would be better spent for new roads useful for their agribusinesses and for schools, which gave their children a chance to prepare for university careers. When the small landowners or artisan-craftsmen spoke for the traditional ways, the entrepreneurs accused them of opposing progress. Their wealth, new values of material accumulation, and modern methods deepened the class divisions in the village and destroyed traditional limits and protections against envy. [Maccoby (1976), pp. 73-74]

Maccoby's example illustrates that placing a high value on Progress can create one of Aristotle's "vices of excess." Lack of Progress weighs in the balance against *Gemeinschaft* Society as an ideal of divine Community. Excesses of Progress weigh in the balance against republic Society being the model for the ideal of divine Community. Pure *Gemeinschaft* Societies, such as the Congo's BaMbuti Pygmies, are generally what Toynbee called "arrested civilizations." We have ample reason to think BaMbuti Society has existed since before the time of the Egyptian Pharaohs and that it has not significantly changed in all those thousands of years. However, as Toynbee also noted, arrested civilizations almost always go on to become *fallen* civilizations – civilizations that disintegrate and disappear. Indeed, *Gemeinschaft* Society is extremely vulnerable to breakdown and disintegration merely because of increasing population. BaMbuti Society was protected from this for thousands of years by the isolation afforded to them by the Ituri Forest. The same was true for a long time in the case of the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert. However, now other people are pushing into these areas and destroying their isolation. It is reported that the Bushman Society is already undergoing breakdown [Barnard (1993)] and some, including some BaMbuti, fear BaMbuti Society will soon meet with the same fate [Turnbull (1962), pp. 262-263].

On the other hand, when a republic breaks down it tends to end in the despotism of monarchy/oligarchy. It might perhaps go through a stage in which it undergoes a kind of psychotically bipolar turn from being a republic to becoming a non-consensus democracy, but the ultimate result is the same either way. It can not be proven that prehistoric *Gemeinschaft* Societies were likewise vulnerable to such a bipolar social disorder – flipping from *Gemeinschaft* to monarchy/oligarchy – although Maccoby's Mexican village can be seen as an example of exactly this. Indeed, there have been many who have speculated that early civilizations, in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, arose concurrently with the invention of armies pulled together by prehistoric Napoleons. In all cases, these early civilizations were absolute despotisms of the monarchy/oligarchy class.

But if *Gemeinschaft* corporate personality exhibits lack of Progress while republic corporate personality exhibits excesses of Progress leading to loss of social Order, it follows that if any sustainable mean

⁸ "Jungle fighter" is Maccoby's term for the Driver social style. He took a generally dim view of Driver personality. Andrew Carnegie was not a person Maccoby admired.

between these defects exists at all, it must subsist in a balancing of their two characters. Such a balancing point is precisely what the catalytic reactive axis in figure 6 denotes.

Corporate personhoods subsist in the interactive operationalizations of their members. If one examines Kiesler's labels for these on either side of the catalytic reactive axis he finds they are labeled: 1) friendly; 2) sociable; 3) exhibitionist; and 4) assured. How are we to understand the meanings of these labels? Kiesler tells us they mean:

- 1) Friendly: readily works or acts together with, or facilitates, aids, or assists others; expresses friendliness and agreeableness, readily agrees, consents, or conforms to others; readily accedes, assents to, or concurs with the opinions, feelings, or actions of others; shows awareness and regard, or positive, sincere, and thoughtful consideration for others; speaks and acts with politeness and good manners; readily aids, assists, succors, supports, or is of service to others; expends time and resources to facilitate the actions or tasks of others;
- 2) Sociable: shows interest in and concern about others and their affairs; readily talks to or gets to know others, readily associates with others and be in the company of others; readily directs his attention outside himself;
- 3) Exhibitionist: inclined to talk freely or a great deal with others; being unreserved in speech; easily joins in conversations, revealing one's thoughts, feelings, and beliefs; speaking or acting passionately, letting one's feelings show; being inclined to be influenced easily by the ideas, plans, or opinions of others, or to conform one's own opinions, values, activities, etc. to direct, insinuated, or implied pressure from others;
- 4) Assured: presents oneself as sure, clear, certain, firm and resolute, and as calm, tranquil, or serene, competent, and poised in pursuing daily life or in interactions with others. [Wells (2014), chap. 5, pp. 143, 146]

For many people each one of these operationalizations is foreign to their habitual social styles, and in every Community there are individuals for whom each one of these is the polar opposite of operationalizations they feel comfortable with. However, *no* person is innately *incapable* of adopting them or of learning how to be comfortable with them. Wilson *et al.* (2011) refer to this capability as "versatility." Furthermore, versatility *can be learned*. One merely has to choose to do so. How to do so, and the challenges one must learn to overcome in order to do so, partly make up the topic of the next chapter.

The operationalizations described above are clearly people-oriented in their emphasis. However, this does not mean there is no place in this type of Community for people whose social styles fall into the Driver and Analytic quadrants. Indeed, there is an empirical need for them because of one lack found to be characteristic of the Amiable and Expressive social styles. People in these latter quadrants are very good at focusing on interpersonal details but pay for this focus by a habit of *not* being focused on details of inanimate things [Wilson (2011)]. The *practicality* of plans and proposed solutions to problems, however, depends as much on attention to these things as they do attention to people factors. Focus on the inanimate factors is the special skill Analytics and Drivers bring to the effort. There is no one social style *generally* "better" or "superior" to any other. But, clearly, because both interpersonal and inanimate factors are essential for the overall Community of the whole corporate person, versatility is a necessary skill *all* its members must seek to develop and make habitual.

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Endnotes

Critical Articles of faith:

1. God exists.
2. God created human beings and the temporal universe, and did so for some divine purpose.
3. Human beings are a reflection or image of God.
4. Faith takes priority over belief.
5. Human beings make their own necessities. Therefore, if any transcendent absolute necessities exist they exist because God makes them so.
6. God values never-ending striving for perfection.
7. God values humility and so humility is a virtue.
8. God values freedom.
9. God is a supreme and supremely sublime benevolent leader.
10. No human being can thwart a divine purpose. If his actions are in opposition to a divine purpose, they serve it mediately by serving as provocations for actions by others that do agree with it.
11. Divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall, not by individuals, and finds its expression in divine Community.
12. Every person unchosen for membership in divine Community has unchosen himself.
13. Every person makes himself the person he chooses to become.
14. Life is an apprenticeship for afterlife. Its lessons of virtue and morality are necessary preparations for afterlife *Existenz* by a being possessing free will.
15. Faith in the *Dasein* of afterlife is necessary if human life is to have any purpose or meaning.