

## Chapter 14 Perfecting Humanity in One's Own Person

### 1. Reconciliation, Versatility and Cooperation

In chapter 13 it was deduced that the ideal of divine Community lies astride the catalytic reactive axis of the corporate personality circumplex. Its circumplex quadrant represents a synthesis of the Amiable and the Expressive corporate personality homologues of human social styles. Now, a corporate person is a mathematical noumenon – an abstract person – but a Community is an association of real human beings. This means that even a divine Community is composed, in roughly equal numbers, of individuals who each bring to it their own social styles: Amiable, Expressive, Driver, and Analytic. To make a Community in the image of divine Community requires that members of the Community must be able to *reconcile* themselves with the corporate personality of that Community. To reconcile oneself in this context means to *make* one's own social style congruent with the mores and folkways of the Community.

For example, a person who is a Driver is habitually inclined to feel frustration or impatience at what he regards as a seemingly endless process of consensus building; an Amiable regards consensus building as essential. An Amiable is habitually inclined to feel frustration or unease with the push to settle things and obtain results that a Driver regards as essential. *Both* must have or develop the versatility to cooperate and co-exist harmoniously in a Community, where regulations of mores and folkways *require* willingness to *commit* to a mutual Obligation for the reconciliation of differing viewpoints and Desires.

Psychologically, the versatility of your social style is a measure of the degree to which you demonstrate an ability to modify your social style to better conform to the habitual interpersonal styles of other people. By doing so, you both make them feel comfortable in dealing with you and engender their trust. It is because psychologists actually can measure this ability that such a *subjective*-sounding idea is provided with *objective* scientific validity. In Critical terminology, versatility is the principal quantity by which a noumenon (the *ability* that is measured) is connected with the world of human experience. As for the ability itself, Wilson *et al.* call it Versatility (note that the term is capitalized):


Versatility is your willingness and ability to make temporary adjustments in your assertiveness and responsiveness styles. The extent to which you are versatile is a critical factor to begin, build, and sustain relationships. [Wilson *et al.* (2011), pg. 34]

They explain that *assertiveness* is the way in which you are perceived as trying to influence the thoughts and actions of others. *Responsiveness* is the way in which you are perceived when expressing your feelings when relating to others [*ibid.*, pp. 24-32].

In the example given above, a person whose habitual social style is that of a Driver must learn to project himself less assertively and express himself more responsively when he is interacting with a person whose habitual social style is that of an Amiable. An Amiable person, on the other hand, must learn to do the opposite: project himself more assertively and express himself less responsively when interacting with someone whose social style is that of a Driver. Generally speaking, the four major classifications of interpersonal social style are defined in terms of high and low assertiveness and responsiveness:

Amiable:	low assertiveness, high responsiveness;
Expressive:	high assertiveness, high responsiveness;
Driver:	high assertiveness, low responsiveness;
Analytic:	low assertiveness, low responsiveness.

As Leary found and reported in 1957, the interpersonal social style a person habitually exhibits tends to be expressed in a reflex-like manner, i.e., "automatically" without thinking about it [Leary (1957), pg. 92]. This is a lingering effect of the radical egocentrism we are all born with. What one must learn is how to "de-center" one's habits and develop the habit of making oneself aware of others' social styles.



**Figure 1:** The 2LAR structure of the motivational dynamic and its synthesizing functions [Wells (2009), chap. 10].

In terms of the Critical epistemology of the phenomenon of mind, willingness to commit oneself to an Obligation for reconciliation with others in a Community is grounded in one's motives of behavior. In other words, this willingness pertains to what Critical theory calls a person's motivational dynamic [Wells (2009), chap. 10]. Figure 1 depicts the logical structure of the motivational dynamic. To step back for a moment in order to better "see the forest for the trees," perfecting humanity in oneself is a matter of determining the grounds of one's *motives*, i.e., determining your reasons for choosing how you will act in particular circumstances. Kant's word for this idea was *Bewegungsgrund*, literally "motive ground" [Kant (c. 1777-1780) 28: 254]. He called a *Bewegungsgrund* an "intellectual appetite." An appetite is the practical representation (in the process of pure practical Reason) of a purpose.


What this means on a practical level is: *first* you must conceptualize the idea of this and understand it to be an important factor in choosing how to act (which is part of structuring your manifold of concepts); and then, *secondly*, you must practice acting from such motive grounds in order to develop practical maxims for it (in your manifold of rules). Once you have achieved the second step, practicing Versatility is no longer a matter of "going through the motions" (acting on pretense) but, rather, you have *made the maxim a part of your personality*. You *make* it supersede your old practical rules and maxims borne out of childish egocentrism and replace them with what Piaget described as "de-centered" action schemes, i.e., actions taken in which the actor is cognizant that other people do not think the same things he thinks, do not perceive things the same way he perceives them, and do not make the same judgments of right and wrong that he makes. As long as this cognizance is absent or only vaguely perceived, cooperation is grounded in maxims of prudence only (duties to oneself) and cooperative actions are amoral. To perfect humanity in your own person, you must make cooperation truly moral (grounded in reciprocal duties and mutual Obligation). None of us start out this way in life. People have to *learn* to do it. Piaget wrote,

We now come to the attachment to social groups. Durkheim very reasonably remarks in this connection that the child is neither fundamentally selfish . . . nor purely altruistic . . . but both egoistic and altruistic, though to a lesser degree than the adult. This state of things is, in our opinion, bound up with the phenomenon of childish egocentrism . . . For in childhood, society and the individual are as yet undissociated, so that while the child is in the highest degree suggestible to his adult surroundings . . . he yet contrives in a purely unconscious manner to reduce everything to his own point of view. This state of things combines very easily with the psychological attitude that characterizes conformist societies . . . but it is strongly opposed to cooperation, in so far as the latter implies personalities that are both conscious of themselves and able to submit their point of view to the laws of reciprocity and universality. [Piaget (1932), pg. 368]

*Cooperation* is the practical *outcome* that *reconciliation* of social styles is intended to produce. In

general, any cooperative action can be classified according to one of three general categories: *uncivic* cooperation; *non-civic* cooperation; or *civic* cooperation [Wells (2014), chap. 4]. It is the third of these that pertains to perfecting humanity in your own person. Moreover, all acts of cooperation involve at the minimum at least two persons because it takes two or more people for any action to be called cooperative. Furthermore, each person's type of cooperation might be different from those of the other people. For instance, Person 1 might be enacting civic cooperation while Person 2 might be enacting uncivic cooperation. This matters in terms of the corporate person of a civil Community, but it does not in terms of perfecting humanity in your own person because this only depends on *your* motive for cooperation, not on the motives of other people. "If they answer not your call, walk alone" [Tagore (1905)].

Let us assume for the sake of specificity that the cooperating persons are all associates belonging to the same civil Community (deontological *citizens* of that Community; see figure 2). Acts of *uncivic* cooperation are motivated from grounds of Duties-to-Self and also involve some transgression of the Community's social contract. A deontological **transgression** is any deed contrary to duty. Only a person who is a deontological citizen can commit a transgression because a **citizen** is a member of a Community who accepts mutual Obligations to-and-with its other members and who accepts the performance of acts of citizenship as a reciprocal Duty he owes to the Community. Someone who is not a deontological citizen cannot commit a transgression because he has obligated himself to no reciprocal duties to the Community. Such a person is called an *outlaw* (figure 2). The mutual relationship between an outlaw and the members of a civil Community is called a *state-of-nature* relationship. An *unintentional* transgression is called a **moral fault**. An *intentional* transgression is called a **moral crime**; a person who commits a moral crime is called a *criminal* [Kant (1797) 6: 224]. An outlaw and a criminal are both persons who *unchoose themselves* as members of the civil Community. But a person who commits a moral fault has not unchosen himself as a member of a Community. He has made an error in judgment and, although he is bound by Duty to make restitution for harm caused by his unjust action, his action does not constitute a just ground for expelling him from membership in the Community. A criminal's action does.



**Figure 2:** A Community embedded within a larger Society and its relationships with outlaws and criminals. The deontological citizens are those individuals contained in the inner oval who have put themselves under Obligation to the Community's social contract.

Acts of non-civic cooperation are also grounded in a person's Duties-to-himself but do *not* involve any transgression. His action does not contradict the terms and conditions of the Community's social contract nor is the action required by it. For example, if you hire someone to mow your lawn for you this form of cooperation is a non-civic cooperation because you are not duty-bound to hire someone to do it nor is any other person duty-bound to accept your offer of employment. In Kant's terminology, the matter is one of *obligatio interna* [Kant (c. 1784-85) 27: 269-271] and falls within the actor's civil liberties *permitted* under the terms of the social contract. The cooperation is neither deontologically moral nor immoral.

Civic cooperation is motivated from grounds of reciprocal Duty. This means cooperation is necessitated by the person's self-Obligation to fulfill the terms of his Community's social contract. Here there are two general grounds from which a Duty arises. The duty may be co-determined with and conditioned upon a reciprocal duty pledged in exchange by another person or group of people (*obligatio externa*); or it may be that the cooperating persons are both acting under duty to their *corporate* person as duties with regard to its situation (*obligatio interior*). An example of the latter would be people cooperating to fill and place sandbags when their town is threatened by an impending flood but their own homes are not.

Reconciliation *as a principle of actions* (a *Bewegungsgrund*) is grounded in the motivational dynamic; reconciliation as a matter of obligation is a practical principle of *social* morality. Kant drew very careful distinctions between the idea of *obligatio* (literally, "pledging") and *obligatione* ("legal liability") [Kant (c. 1777-80) 27: 268]. Critical *obligatio* does not mean a person takes some sort of oath or verbally makes some sort of promise (e.g., "I pledge I will do such-and-such"). Oaths and promises can be falsely made or made without a person really committing himself to carrying them out when an occasion would demand he do so. Instead, *obligatio* means the person *makes* a practical maxim (in his manifold of rules) which, when evoked by circumstances, acts as a law of *self-compulsion*. The corresponding action he then expresses is *practically necessitated*, i.e., made necessary by his private moral code. If he is cognizant of the obligation created by an act of *obligatio*, the person *understands* the obligation as a theoretical imperative (that is, he understands it as a duty he is *bound* to fulfill). *Obligatio* binds the person to fulfill a specific or specified obligation. The set of all a person's maxims of obligation (structured into his manifold of rules) is called his *laws of Obligation*. Kant wrote,

An act is called a *deed* so far as it stands under laws of Obligation and, hence, so far as the subject, in doing it, is regarded from the freedom of his choice. By such an act the agent is regarded as the *author* of its effect and this, together with the act itself, can be *imputed* to him [Kant (1797) 6: 223].

An *obligatio* is therefore an effect for which the cause rests in a person's power of free choice. There is an important consequence of this that carries a deep *theological* implication. There are two ways a person can be compelled (forced to do something). He can be self-compelled by the force of his private moral code; or he can be pathologically compelled (by force or threat of force, or by laws of physical nature). Acting under pathological compulsion results from maxims of prudence. Kant tells us,

The more a man can be morally forced, all the more at liberty he is; the more he is pathologically forced, though this occurs only in a comparative sense, all the less at liberty he is. It is peculiar: the more anyone can be forced in the moral sense, the more at liberty he is. I compel a person morally through *motiva objective moventia*<sup>1</sup>, through motives of Reason, along with his greatest freedom, without any impulse. Hence it takes a greater degree of freedom to be morally forced, for in that case *arbitrium liberum*<sup>2</sup> is more powerful – it can be forced through motives and is free of [sensuous] stimuli. So the more anyone is free of stimuli all the more can he be morally necessitated. Liberty waxes with the degree of *Moralität*<sup>3</sup>. [Kant (c. 1777-80) 27: 268]

---

<sup>1</sup> "motives that stir the senses"

<sup>2</sup> "free choice"

<sup>3</sup> the system of hypothetical imperatives in a person's manifold of rules

The 8th article of Critical faith is: God values freedom. Kant's observation quoted above regarding the human nature of self-compulsion (tenets of *obligatio*) – i.e., the liberty of a person acting from *obligatio* rather than from pathological compulsion (maxims of prudence) – is wholly congruent with the 8th article of faith. The idea of legal liability (*obligatione*) arises as a consequence of the fact that human beings can only communicate pledges to one another (*obligatio externa*) by means of expressing promises, oaths, or affirmations. If I say to you, "I promise you I will do such-and-such," you have no way of being certain if I have actually made fulfilling my promise an *obligatio* or if, instead, I really have no intention of keeping my promise to you. All you can do is wait and see if I keep that promise.

An *obligatione externa* is a liability attached to failure to perform some action a person has promised to perform. Others can justly hold him culpable for such a failure and justly compel him to negate any injustice perpetrated by it. All contract law is grounded in the idea of *obligatione externa*. So, too, is the idea of the social contract of a civil Community. An *obligatione interna*, on the other hand, is a wholly subjective *internal liability* subsisting in a dissonance between a representation of a theoretical imperative in the manifold of concepts and a practical tenet in the manifold of rules. Either the concept of an action or the cognizance of the result of that action after it is expressed provokes a feeling of *Unlust* in reflective judgment. Perception of such a feeling is called **conscience**.

The legal code of a civil Community is an attempt by its members to codify, define, and explain what the Community's expectations are for all its members under the terms and conditions of their social contract so all its citizens know how to abide by it. **Unjust** means *anything that breaches or contradicts the condition of a social contract*. **Justice** is *the negating of anything that is unjust*. True justice requires the civil Community's citizens give their individual *consents* to civil laws and moral expectations of the Community's mores and folkways through *obligatio* and not through pathological compulsion. **Consensus** doesn't necessarily mean "I agree with this"; it means "I do not-disagree with this," i.e., "I will willingly go along with it despite any reservations I might have." True Community consensus arises out of the leadership dynamics of the Community and subsists in mores, folkways, and civil laws each citizen binds himself to through *obligatio*. However, the possibility of obtaining any such consensus is absolutely grounded in interpersonal interactions and communications, and if this is to be possible people must be able to reconcile their differing social styles. Hence reconciliation is made a principle of actions (a *Bewegungsgrund*).

In divine Community, a *legal system* can be nothing else than a means to serve its *justice system*. If a Society declares by fiat that justice means "the fair and proper administration of laws" and "just" means "legally right; lawful; equitable," as *Black's Law Dictionary* does [Garner (2011)], then a Society can have a legal system *but it does not have a justice system* because it declares justice to be another name for its legal system. Rulership is the relationship between a ruling leader and one or more followers in which Self-determination of behavior by a follower is grounded in Duties-to-himself conditioned by precepts of self-protection from possible actions the ruler is at liberty to take unilaterally. The follower is said to be *subjugated* by the ruler. A ruler is a leader whose leader's actions are premised on tenets of a rulership relationship between himself and the follower, and who is at liberty to unilaterally take actions the follower judges to be detrimental to his welfare and counter to his purposes. God is a supreme leader (9th article of faith) **but God is not a ruler**. A *divine Community has no ruler*. The concept of justice set out in *Black's Law Dictionary* is deontologically erroneous and is premised upon the *asocial* idea of rulers. Laws can be made that are unjust; one purpose of a justice system is to discover and correct unjust laws to bring them into conformity with the terms and conditions of the Community's social contract.

This is an important aspect of perfecting humanity in one's own person, and it is one that people whose habitual social style is that of a Driver or an Analytic are likely to have the most difficulty with. The task of being a legislator is inherently analytical because, as the lawyers say, a law consists of technicalities. Technicalities are things Analytics excel at. The inclination to act as a ruler is an inclination people who are highly assertive (Drivers and Expressives) are prone to commit as a moral fault. This is not to say that

Amiables and Analytics are *immune* from any such inclination; they are not. But the high assertiveness character of Drivers and Expressives make them *more prone* to assume the mantle of a ruler. John Adams blamed this inclination on human passions:

A regard to the sentiments of mankind concerning him, and to their dispositions towards him, every man feels within himself; and if he has reflected and tried experiments, he has found that no exertion of his reason, no effort of his will, can wholly divest him of it. In proportion to our affection for the notice of others is our aversion to their neglect; the stronger the desire of the esteem of the public, the more powerful that aversion to this disapprobation; the more exulted the wish for admiration, the more invincible the abhorrence of contempt. Every man not only desires the consideration of others, but he frequently compares himself with others, his friends or his enemies; and in proportion as he exults when he perceives that he has more of it than they, he feels a keener affliction when he sees that one or more of them are more respected than himself.


This passion, while it is simply a desire to excel another by fair industry, in the search of truth and the practice of virtue, is properly called *Emulation*. When it aims at power, as a means of distinction, it is *Ambition*. When it is in a situation to suggest the sentiments of fear and apprehension, that another who is now inferior will become superior, it is denominated *Jealousy*. When it is in a state of mortification, at the superiority of another, and desires to bring him down to our level, it is properly called *Envy*. When it deceives a man into a belief of false professions of esteem or admiration, or into a false opinion of his importance in the judgment of the world, it is *Vanity*. These observations alone would be sufficient to show that this propensity, in all its branches, is a principal source of the virtues and vices, the happiness and misery of human life; and the history of mankind is little more than a sample narration of its operations and effects. [Adams (1790), pg. 340]

An *inclination* is an habitual *sensuous* appetite. But *all moral maxims are intellectual appetites*. Habits of inclination subsist in practical maxims in one's manifold of rules, and these begin to be constructed very early in infancy. They immediately, or almost immediately, satisfy practical Reason's *impatient* demand for equilibrium. But all inclinations are pathological determinations of appetite. Perfecting the humanity in your own person requires the cultivation and development of moral appetites by means of which a person makes himself self-compelled by motives – hence the relationship between them and the motivational dynamic. So it is that one's development of moral maxims of reconciliation, Versatility, and cooperation are essential to perfecting humanity in your own person. The good news is that maxims of this sort *can be learned*. But you must *choose* to learn them.

## 2. Optimizing the Motivational Dynamic I: *Personfähigkeit* and Equilibrium

Self-perfecting your capacities for reconciliation and Versatility is a task a person of faith must set for him- or her-self in order to perfect humanity in one's own person. Civic cooperation is the benefit these capacities bring to divine Community. Now, as I stated above, *willingness to commit* to an Obligation of reconciliation arises out of motives and so perfecting humanity in your own person calls upon your power to self-organize and self-regulate your personal determinations of motives. It is this power that Critical theory calls *the motivational dynamic* (figure 1).

The 11th article of Critical faith states that divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall, not by individuals. Divine Community is an expression of this fulfillment. An individual who chooses to not pursue perfection of humanity in his own person cannot thwart divine purpose because no human being can thwart a divine purpose (10th article of faith). An individual who does choose to pursue perfection of humanity in his own person contributes *ipso facto* to pursuing perfection of humanity overall. Humanity, again, is mutual sympathetic participation by a Community of people subsisting in unselfish active commitment to a social compact. But the Idea of a social contract is the practical Idea of an *optimization process* for the *corporate* motivational dynamic of a civil Community [Wells (2012), chap. 12, pg. 414; chap. 13 pp. 456+].



**Figure 3:** 4th level analytic representation (4LAR) of the Idea of the social contract. An Idea is a pure *regulative principle* of actions. Acting on principle means acting from grounds in a regulative principle of actions.

Optimization in general is the activity of perfecting some object by minimizing degrees of difference in intensive magnitude between the state of the object, as determined by a measure of its perfection, and a standard of perfection. The human nature of a *communal* process of carrying out this activity is deduced from fundamental principles of the phenomenon of mind in Wells (2012), chapters 12-13. Figure 3 illustrates the 4LAR structure of this optimizing. At the risk of sounding a little too "Zen" about it, perfecting humanity in your own person aims at more than merely becoming fit for membership in a divine Community; it means "becoming One with this Community." But we must keep in mind that God values freedom (8th article of faith), and so "becoming One with the Community" does *not* imply losing your own personal identity or sacrificing your personal liberty of action. It *does* require that you choose to alienate *some* of your natural liberties in favor of exercising only *civil* liberties. Uncivic conduct is an exercise of a person's natural liberty but it is not the exercise of civil liberty. It must instead be called *licentiousness*. Licentiousness is contrary to perfecting humanity, both generally and in your own person.

*Personfähigkeit* ("the power of a person") is the organization of the capacities of a person for realizing or attempting to realize the objects of his appetites. *Corporate Personfähigkeit* is the idea of generalizing individual *Personfähigkeit* to deduce animating principles which apply to the civic cooperations by people in a Community insofar as these cooperations are aimed at satisfying individuals' interests in such a manner that their individual interests do not conflict with the *common* interests of the Community. When applied to the mathematical object of a corporate person, an animating principle is a principle of *kinesis* (change of any kind) in co-determinations of all its members' activities. The *common interests* of a Community are comprised of the set of *congruent* mini-Community interests shared by multiple mini-Communities. An interest of a person A and an interest of a person B are said to be congruent interests *if and only if a satisfaction of interest by either person does not necessarily prevent the satisfaction of interest by the other person* [Wells (2017), chap. 11]. Individuals' interests and special interests of mini-Communities can be selfish interests but in a civil Community they cannot be licentious interests. A "zero sum game" (as this term is used by game theorists and economists) always involves incongruent special interests and, therefore, zero sum games are always contradictory to civic cooperation in a civil Community. Participation in one is therefore always *at best* a moral fault in a civil Community. Zero sum situations must always be transformed into non-zero sum situations in a civil Community.

I think a simple example is in order here to clarify what this idea of "transforming" a situation means. A "sport" is a recreational activity engaged in for pleasure. A competitive sport is a sport engaged in by two or more people or by two teams of people that involves *civic* competition. The specific actions of the competitors are immediately directed at satisfying whatever condition is defined to constitute "winning" the game – and so the immediate actions of one competitor are in real opposition to those of the other. However, the *common interest* involved is nothing else than *to have fun* and enjoy the competition. "Winning" is not fundamentally relevant to the motives of the competitors; having fun and enjoying each other's companionship is. This motivating factor is what makes the competition *civic* and is what is meant when people talk of "good sportsmanship." The maxim of good sportsmanship is, "It doesn't matter if you win or lose; what matters is *how you play the game*." When this maxim is perverted, as Red Saunders and Vincent Lombardi did when they said, "Winning isn't everything; it's the *only* thing," the competition becomes *uncivic* – a zero sum game. Far too often, professional sports are perverted into being *unsportsmanlike*. It is worth noting that Piaget discovered the original motivation of little boys to compete with each other in game-playing and sports is an entirely *civic* motivation:

Towards the age of 7-8 appears the desire for mutual understanding in the sphere of play . . . This felt need for understanding is what defines the third stage. As a criterion of the appearance of this stage we shall take the moment when by "winning" the child refers to the fact of getting the better of the others, therefore of gaining more marbles than the others<sup>4</sup>, and when he no longer says he has won when he has done no more than to knock a marble out of the square, regardless of what his partners have done. As a matter of fact, no child, even among the older ones, ever attributes very much importance to the fact of knocking out a few more marbles than his opponents. Mere competition is therefore not what constitutes the affective motive-power of the game. In seeking to win the child is trying above all to contend with his partners *while observing common rules*. The specific pleasure of the game thus ceases to be muscular and egocentric and becomes social. [Piaget (1932), pg. 42]

Piaget also found little girls attribute even less importance to "winning" than little boys do. Perhaps you might find it surprising – perhaps even eyebrow raising – that the moral judgments of little children in regard to sportsmanship are morally superior to those of most adults. Because little children grow into adults, you might perhaps find it disturbing that the *transformation* implies something in Society *teaches* most children to *unlearn* their original moral judgment. I do. Here perhaps we encounter a situation one can regard as an exemplar *in concreto* for the wisdom of a moral lesson found in the Old Testament:

and a little child will lead them. [Isaiah 11:6]

Probably the most frequent examples of competition among adults – both *uncivic* and *civic* – are found in business and commerce. It is fair to say that a great many empirical examples of competition found in free enterprise are *uncivic* in their social nature. However, *free enterprise is not inherently uncivic*. It is quite possible to transform a Community's free enterprise activities into *civic* free enterprise activities [Wells (2017)]. Striving to do so is another particular example of striving to perfect humanity. Effecting such a transformation is clearly a difficult undertaking but not one human nature makes impossible.

Corporate *Personfähigkeit* is the idea of Quantity in figure 3 and is, in turn, logically divided into the four heads of personal, intellectual, tangible, and persuasive powers of the corporate person. These ideas originated in Kant's ethics theory [Kant (1793-4) 27: 593-602], [Kant (1797) 6: 444-446], but, owing to Kant's theocentric orientation, his development of them was unsatisfactory. Proper deontological treatment of the power of a person was provided in Wells (2010), chap. 7, pp. 260-267, and Wells (2012),

<sup>4</sup> The game of marbles was once almost universally popular with little boys in Europe and America. In the U.S. its popularity had waned almost to the point of nonexistence by 1960, although why this happened after centuries of popularity is unclear. Fathers taught the game to their sons, and their sons passed it on to their sons generation after generation. In 1932 it was the most popular game played by little boys in Switzerland so Piaget chose it as a vehicle for his research on the development of childish moral judgment.



chap. 11, pp. 360-366. Detailed particular examples of striving to perfect corporate *Personfähigkeit* in terms of these four subheadings are provided in Wells (2014) and Wells (2017).

The title heading for Quality in figure 3 is equilibrium. Here equilibrium refers to the equilibrium of the corporate person. This is an idea that requires very careful and penetrating treatment in order to obtain an objectively valid homologue to personal equilibrium in a human being. A Community is not a real person (it is a mathematical object) nor is it said to have mental functions or exhibit a phenomenon of mind. Consequently, deduction of the objectively valid explanation for corporate equilibrium is very mathematical. Fortunately, the end results can be stated in terms comprehensible to people who are not mathematicians. Corporate equilibrium is characterized by the presence of four qualities in the Community: consensus; cooperation; civic competition; and civil tranquility [Wells (2012), chap. 13]. These four qualities do not align one-to-one with the four functions of the Quality of equilibrium shown in figure 3 (accommodation, assimilation, scheme-regulating, and scheme-determining) but they are products of syntheses of these functions. Consensus, cooperation, and civic competition have already been discussed here; but what does civil tranquility mean?

For a human being, Critical tranquility is a state of mind that results from being sufficiently satisfied in relationship to one's general state of life and desiring nothing more or different in this relationship [Wells (2010), chap. 7, pg. 256]. Civil tranquility is collective tranquility in the members of a Community insofar as this pertains to relationships among its members. Just as equilibrium in a human being does not (and cannot) imply a static state of *Existenz*, neither does civil tranquility imply a static state of Order in the Community. Rather, it implies a balance of Order and Progress in civil life [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 481] because both of these are demanded by individuals as conditions for committing themselves to their association in a civil Community. Individuals seek Progress in their own personal welfare and that of their families at least up to a point where they find themselves contented with their lives. Indeed, this is what is properly called "the pursuit of happiness." Kant noted,

Contentment with our entire *Existenz* is happiness; among human beings this also calls for physical causes, i.e., welfare. That happiness which is independent from physical causes is bliss. [Kant (1776-95) 18: 460]

In the pursuit of happiness, individuals frequently find themselves competing with others to obtain some particular ends or benefits. Uncivic competition, of course, is contradictory to civil tranquility. However, *non-uncivic competition can in fact promote cooperation* in a Community. Civic competition can go even further and lead to *civic* cooperation. Perhaps, after some reflection, this is not surprising. Importantly, though, this is not merely an opinion. It is a fact for which there exists a mathematical proof known as Grossberg's theorem [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 478], [Grossberg (1978; 1980)]. This theorem, along with another one called Grossberg's consensus theorem, establishes the subheadings of accommodation, assimilation, scheme-regulating, and scheme-determining in the 2LAR of equilibrium of the corporate person [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 478-483]. For theological purposes we need not dig deeply into these mathematical theorems; it is enough to understand corporate equilibrium in terms of consensus, cooperation, civic competition, and civil tranquility.

In the end, the leadership dynamic in a civil Community by which these four qualities are brought about comes down to interpersonal relationships among the Community's citizens. It is here where perfection of one's Versatility in accommodating yourself to the social styles of other people and assimilating their styles into your own understanding of their behaviors is key. *Your* striving to perfect humanity in your own person *participates immediately* in perfecting humanity overall when your efforts remain oriented toward consensus, civic cooperation, civic competition, and civil tranquility. By such immediate participation, you make yourself become a person who thereby is more fit and suitable for afterlife participation in a divine Community. Indeed, it is proper to say that by choosing this orientation for yourself, you are at the same time choosing to seek membership in divine Community.

There are eight animating principles for the corporate person of figure 3 [Wells (2012), chap. 13]. Because a corporate person is a mathematical noumenon, the specific technical statements of these principles are of a mathematical sort and, in their mathematical formulations, are important for a Critical doctrine of political science and of practical use to Critical political scientists<sup>5</sup>. For you, as an individual citizen of a civil Community, a synthesis of these mathematical principles leads to five **principles of civic conduct** by which you should govern and regulate your own behaviors as part of this Community. These are deduced by applying the Critical grounds of the eight animating principles to the individual. They are:

1. Commit and attend to civic Duties in accordance with the Community's social contract;
2. Commit to an *obligatio externa* of assisting and participating in the providing of civic education for every member of the Community<sup>6</sup>;
3. Do not engage in uncivic social interactions or activities;
4. Engage in and express cooperation with other members of the Community; and
5. Engage only in civic competitions.

### 3. Optimizing the Motivational Dynamic II : The Anthropological Person

An animating principle of a corporate person is a principle of *kinesis* in the co-determining of all its parts. Corporate *Personfähigkeit* and equilibrium are defined by animating principles. A *Community*, on the other hand, is an idea of a Society. A Society, like a corporate person, is a mathematical object and so is also defined practically by principles. These principles are not *animating* principles because the logical essence of the concept of Society subsists in understanding it in terms of relationships and associations. Society is an idea of *form* for which a corporate person is the corresponding idea of *matter*. To put this another way, the corporate person is the *composition* of a Community, its Society subsists in its *nexus* of social networks. A corporate person has *animating* principles; a Society has *organizing* principles. Figure 3 contains this distinction in its depiction.

Many people hold with a popular notion that human beings are innately endowed with a social instinct. This notion is incorrect. If human beings had an innate social instinct there could be no sociopaths like Albert Anastasia, Ted Bundy, or John Wayne Gacy. However, one *can* say with objective validity that human beings have a capacity to "develop a taste" for society. In Critical epistemology, **taste** is the aesthetical capacity for judgmentation of an object or mode of representation *through* a subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction in which there is no *objective* interest. Taste is a selection of that which is generally engaging according to laws of sensibility. Kant wrote,

Taste is a social (sensuous) judgment about that which satisfies, but not immediately through sense and also not through general ideas of Reason. Taste goes to the *agreeable*, the *beautiful* (noble), and the *touching*. . . . Taste makes its enjoyment communicable; it is therefore a means and an effect of the union of people. [Kant (c. 1773-79) 15: 334]

He also tells us,

Moral taste is the capacity to find satisfaction in that something by which good belongs to *universality*. Aesthetic taste [is] the capacity to find satisfaction in that which by sensuous satisfaction goes to universality. Moral taste concerns intentions, aesthetic taste the means to carry them out. Moral feeling is the capability to be moved by the moral as a mainspring. [*ibid.* 15: 335-336]

From this it is not difficult to see that the human capacity for taste underlies organizing principles of

<sup>5</sup> Critical politics is the art of bringing Order to and maintaining it in a Society. Critical political science is the science for understanding this art, and a Critical political scientist is a practitioner of this science.

<sup>6</sup> Civic education is the teaching and learning of civil liberties, civil rights, civic Duties and civic Obligations of a Community.

Society. One organizes something for a purpose (intention, hence moral taste) and by means judged suitable for realizing this purpose (hence, aesthetic taste). We have in this an immediate tie-in between the capacity and capability of human taste and *anthropology*. Kant defined anthropology as *a systematic doctrine containing our knowledge of man*. Kantian anthropology is the Critical science of man's actual behavior and what he makes of himself. It has for its topic subjective laws of free choice<sup>7</sup>. He said of it,

A doctrine of the cognizance of the human being, systematically drawn up (anthropology) can be in a physiological or a pragmatic point of view. Physiological cognizance of the human being concerns the investigation of what *nature* makes of the human being, pragmatic of what he makes of himself, or can and should make of himself, as a free-acting being. [Kant (1798) 7: 119]

The inner perfection of the human being subsists in that he has in his dominion the employment of all his capacities in order to subject them to his free choice. [*ibid.* 7: 144]

Personally, I have no reasonable doubt that Kant intended to someday develop Critical anthropology as an empirical science. Time, however, ran out on him before he could carry out this project. Kant (1798) is merely a manual for his course in anthropology (as he himself said) and not the doctrine of a science. As a consequence, deduction of the heading of Relation in the Idea of the social contract (the anthropological person) was a task left to be carried out by others, which it was in Wells (2012), chapters 12-13. Further elaboration of these ideas is presented in Wells (2014), chapter 4.

Societies are constituted by people and the things said to "motivate a Society" overall arise from human motivations that produce what are sometimes described as "animations" of a Society. This latter notion is a homologue of human animation. In Critical epistemology, animation is the reciprocal co-determination of *nous* (the mental faculty of a person) and *soma* (the physical faculty of a person) by *psyche* (the human faculty of animating principles of being-a-human-being)<sup>8</sup>. Human beings are animated beings; Societies are not and can be said to be "animated" only in terms of appearances of *organized* human behaviors. Because such organized effects are made actual by means of individuals' judgments of taste, we can logically speak of something that can be called an "anthropology of taste" [Wells (2012), chap. 12, pp. 439-442]. Kant conjectured that such a theory could be based upon four synthetic factors:

1. Movement [*Bewegung*] (and occupation) of mind through sensation (sense);
2. Order [*Anordnung*] through ideas (the power of judgment);
3. Movement [*Bewegung*] (and occupation) of mind through ideas (spirit);
4. Order [*Anordnung*] through sensation (taste). [Kant (c. 1773-79) 15: 341]

Here Kant does not use the word "spirit" in a religious connotation. Rather, he uses it as a term for the animation of sensibility by means of an Idea. In his notes he wrote:

<sup>7</sup> Critical anthropology as a science is not the same thing as what modern day anthropologists describe anthropology as being. For example, Haviland *et al.* (2008) explain anthropology as "the study of humankind in all times and places." Kant would not disagree with this description but it is reasonably safe to say he would regard it as too vague. Of course, Haviland and other anthropologists do augment this description with others. Haviland *et al.* recognize four "fields within the discipline." These are: physical anthropology (humans as biological organisms); cultural anthropology (studying the contrasting ways groups of humans think, feel, and behave); archaeology; and linguistics (the study of languages). They likewise stress that the unity of archaeology as a field of study subsists in taking a holistic view and approach to archaeological questions. Again, Kant would not disagree with this insofar as such studies make up parts of the whole of Critical anthropology. He would question if modern day anthropology is constituted as a *systematic* doctrine, however, and demand of it that it produce practical as well as evidentiary findings. A doctrine that is only descriptive is just a natural history, and a doctrine that cannot be practically applied in actual usages is properly called a useless doctrine.

<sup>8</sup> In Critical terminology, a faculty is the form of an ability insofar as the ability is represented in an idea of organization.

Spirit is the inner (animating) principle of the animation of thinking (powers of the mind). Soul is that which is animated. Consequently, spirit animates all talents. It commences a new series of thoughts out of itself. Hence Ideas.

Spirit is original animation, namely that which comes from ourself and is not derived. (Naturalness is receptivity of the powers of mind, talent the spontaneity). [Kant (1773-79) 15: 415]

Similarly, he does not use the word "soul" in a religious context either. Rather,

Soul is a unity as the object of inner sense, but I cannot infer from that that it persists as an object of outer intuition. [Kant (1776-95) 18: 32]

In Kant's four synthetic factors above we find two kinematic Objects (movement of mind; order) and two means or *modi operandi* (through sensation; through ideas). Kant's word translated here as "order" is *Anordnung*, meaning "an arrangement in a sequence, regular series, or succession in time, space, etc." I call "order" a kinematic Object here because Kant is talking about the *making* of such an arrangement. That a "movement of mind" is also kinematic is, I think, quite obvious because the Greek root of our word "kinematic" is *kinesis* – change of any kind – and comes from Aristotelian philosophy [Aristotle (4th cent. BC) Bk. II, pp. 348-9 (111<sup>b</sup>5+)]. The movement of mind Object grounds the concept of what I call "the Self-composing person" [Wells (2012), chap. 12, pg. 439]. The order Object grounds the concept of what I call "the orderly person" [*ibid.*, pg. 440]. In each case, the concept is logically subdivided into a matter term (*modus operandi* of sensation) and a form term (*modus operandi* of ideas). The combination by synthesis of the Self-composing person and the orderly person is what I call **the anthropological person** [*ibid.*, pp. 439-442].

The deductive arguments for the anthropological person are arguments that have objective validity only for real persons (human beings). The *social homologue* of this concept that appears as the Relation term in figure 3 is derived by adding to idea of the anthropological person an additional factor in the phenomenon of being-a-human-being. This factor is what Kant termed the *sensus communis* of human beings [Kant (1790) 5: 293-296]. He wrote,

One often gives the name of a sense to the power of judgment, when what is noticed is not so much its reflexion as merely the result of that, and speaks of a sense of truth, a sense for propriety, for justice, etc., although one surely knows, or at least properly ought to know, that is it not a sense in which these concepts have their seat, and that these even less could have the least capability for the pronouncement of universal rules; but rather that a representation of truth, decency, beauty, or justice could never this way come into our thoughts if we could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher faculty of knowledge. . . .

By *sensus communis*, however, must be understood the Idea of a *communal* sense, i.e., a capacity of judgmentation that in its reflexion seizes in thinking (*a priori*) everyone else's act of taking into consideration an object as a matter of importance or respect, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on judgment. [Kant (1790), 5: 293-294]

The Critical significance of people's capacity for *sensus communis* is that if we lacked this capacity human beings could never organize themselves into Societies. Without *sensus communis* a person would not be able to "de-center" his thinking (in Piaget's terminology) and would remain mired in the moral realism of young children. Thus, the social homologue in figure 3 of the anthropological person is a representation of people's abilities to come to agreement on objective matters, social mores, and folkways. The human capacity for *sensus communis* is necessary for the possibility of what Critical social contract theory calls **Volks-society** [Wells (2012), chap. 12, pp. 431-433]. Indeed, *social contracting subsists in the process of perfecting Volks-society*.

This process of perfecting *Volks*-society is empirically observed to progress in stages. Santayana broadly classified this progression into three stages: natural society; free society; and ideal society [Santayana (1905), pp. 137-159, 184-205]. Natural society is socialization grounded in personal affective judgments reciprocated among a group of people. Free society is socialization grounded in unanimities of *meanings* shared by a group of people. Ideal society is socialization grounded in *symbolic* thinking and judgmentation insofar as the meanings of the *symbols* come to be shared by people who collectively constitute a civil Community. An ideal society is a Society with symbolic ideals. The anthropological person of figure 3 is the concept that groups of people *can* come together and, over time, come to make Progress in this process of perfecting Society by their organizing of human civil Community. Critical *taste* is a *sine qua non* for natural societies, *ideas* for ideal societies.

There are four organizing principles for the social anthropological person homologue [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 492]. These are:

1. The association (civil Community) will defend with its whole common force the person and goods of each associate in such a manner that each individual, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before joining the association (principle of *psyche*-teleology and the essential necessary condition of a social contract);
2. Living in a socially contracted environment of Community must be such that the expectation for fulfillment of the condition of the social contract may not be frustrated because of perpetuations of injustice (principle of *psyche*-aesthetics, also called the principle of justice);
3. Each person in the Community pledges himself to Obligations he acknowledges he owes to the Community (principle of *Anordnungsvermögen*, also called the principle of civic cooperation); and
4. Each individual puts his person and all his power in common with all the other associates under the supreme direction of their general will as this general will is gauged and recognized through social institutions; and, in his corporate capacity, each associate is to regard every other associate as an indivisible part of the whole Community (principle of *Anordnungskräfte*, also called the principle of citizenship and the essential necessary term of a social contract).

These are the organizing principles, by which Communities are instituted by humankind, stated in the form of ideals of Critical citizenship. To the extent that the people in a Community perfect their own moral commitment to behave in accordance with these principles, the more the Community itself is made more perfect and the further along it is advanced through Santayana's stages of natural, free, and ideal society. These stated ideals and the moral commitments they explain sound simple enough, but you do not have to be a professional scholar of history to know that living up to them is a great challenge. We know of very few Societies whose people ever have, and the ones we do know about are all tiny *Gemeinschaft* Communities such as those of the BaMbuti Pygmies, the Kalahari Bushmen, and the original Pilgrims who first settled the Plymouth Colony in America and were signatories to the Mayflower Compact in 1620 [Jernegan (1929), pp. 119-122]. In no great modern city or any nation on earth do we find a citizenry living up to these ideals. What Mill said of the suitability of a people for institutions of government and enjoyment of liberty applies no less to meeting the challenges facing them on a moral plane in living up to the requirements of these four organizing principles:

On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and it must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfill its purposes. The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the conditions of self-restraint, which are

necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation. . . .

But there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of government – possibly even desiring it – a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal existence. Thus a people may prefer a free government, but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by artifices used to cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty; and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely to long enjoy it. Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to practice the forbearance which it demands: their passions may be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego private conflict and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed wrongs. In such a case, a civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic: to be one over which they do not themselves exercise control, and which imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions. [Mill (1861), pp. 4-5]

So too it is with civil Community in all its spheres and institutions. There was once a time when Mill's lesson was taught to every schoolchild in America, but this has not been so since the 1950s [Wells (2013), chap. 15], and the seeds of the devolution in American public education were planted in the early years of the 20th century [*ibid.*, chap. 14]. As I write these words, the general government of the United States is in its second month of shutdown, calls for secession from the union have been heard in some states, and American political parties no longer stand for anything except reelection. In Great Britain, voices in Scotland calling for secession from the United Kingdom have been heard. In France there have been violent antigovernment riots in Paris. In Germany, Nazism is resurging. Russia again has a czar. Toynbee warned that civilizations fall from within, and even in 1946 he was worried that such a collapse was already underway in Western Europe and the United States:

We might subject the disintegrations of our other civilizations to a similar analysis in all cases where we possess sufficient evidence to make such examination remunerative. . . . We have, however, already adduced enough evidence of the rhythm of disintegration to apply this rhythm to the history of our own Western Civilization in order to see if it throws any light upon a question which we have several times asked and never yet professed to answer: the question whether our own civilization has suffered a breakdown, and, if so, what stage it has now reached in its disintegration. . . .

These considerations and comparisons suggest that we are already far advanced in our time of troubles, and, if we ask what has been our most conspicuous and specific trouble in the recent past, the answer clearly is: nationalistic internecine warfare . . . Thus, in our own history too, we find what we have come to recognize as the typical pattern of a time of troubles: a breakdown, a rally and a second relapse. . . . This swift succession of catastrophic events on a steeply mounting gradient inspires a dark doubt about our future, and this doubt threatens to undermine our faith and hope at a critical eleventh hour which calls for the utmost exertion of these saving spiritual faculties. [Toynbee (1946), pp. 551-554]

The appearances and evidences of which Toynbee wrote, often verbosely and sometimes obscurely, are of a character more succinctly expressed by Yeats:

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;  
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed and everywhere  
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;

The best lack all convictions, while the worst  
Are full of passionate intensity. [Yeats (1921), pg. 76]

Living up to the ideals and commitments of the organizing principles of the anthropological person is not easy to accomplish. The challenges are significant and the topic of this treatise's next chapter. One of the most challenging of them is stereotyping but there are others rooted in human inclinations as well.

But perfecting humanity in your own person requires nothing less than rising to meet these challenges. Specifically, it requires perfecting your *habitual commitment* to what Kant called *Sittlichkeit*: custom or folkway assigned a *deontologically* moral significance in its meaning. Habitual *expression* of this in your actions is the root meaning of the Greek idea of *κοινωνία* ("koinonia"), which in English is rendered as communion, association, or partnership. *κοινωνία* can rightly be called "the spirit of fellowship." It is expressed by civic cooperations with others when your skills and talents, along with theirs, can contribute to the welfare of the group, the Community, or some subset of its citizenry.

Mill said almost everyone continually mistakes custom as first nature [Mill (1859), pp. 4-5] but it is not. It is always the product of social consensus and social norms. Neither is *Sittlichkeit* a static thing. It changes and evolves over time as human conditions and circumstances change. This means that part of habitual commitment to *Sittlichkeit* includes not merely habitually keeping up with these changes but also making it habitual to actively participate in their making and amendment. Habits do come to constitute a "second nature," but this is a nature entirely within the power of human beings to create.

Every human being makes for him- or her-self practical tenets and maxims in the manifold of rules that for all practical purposes constitute a personal and private moral code. *Sittlichkeit* in a civil Community results from its deontological citizens coming to a consensus on expectations for behaviors insofar as these behaviors involve interpersonal interactions. Such a consensus, again, calls for Versatility and civil cooperation. Furthermore, the norms of behavior involved must be made recognizable by citizens, and this means, at the minimum, that *objective* exemplars reflecting *subjective* moral judgments must be made and agreed upon. This does not mean that either consequentialist or virtue ethics provide means for this accomplishment. It does mean a civil Community must establish institutions for the purpose of constantly evaluating and reevaluating the norms of *Sittlichkeit* that are to prevail in the Community, as well as in the mini-Communities embedded in it, so that these norms are fit, suitable, and expedient for conditions prevailing in the Community.

Furthermore, the *Dasein* of mini-Communities within an over-all Community makes *diversity and non-uniformity* of moral customs and folkways a necessary element in the organization of corporate anthropological personhood and the institutions by which people, as Mill put it, "work the machinery" of organized Society. People exhibit a habit of overgeneralizing rules to the point where many people are unable or unwilling to comply with them. This was a fault of habit the ancient Greeks were particularly notable for in their exhibitions of the false maxim that "if a little of something is good then more of it must be better." Forbearance of overgeneralization is one of the forbearances Mill's earlier quotation must be understood to include. Inclinations to overgeneralize stand in close relationship to stereotyping because both are susceptible to excessive abstraction and dogmatization.

A person's *practice* of perfecting humanity in his own person in regard to anthropological principles can probably best be exemplified by four personal maxims supporting the four principles stated above:

Maxim 1: Make it your maxim that acting with charity for others in the civil Community is a categorical imperative of civic Duty. Charity is the voluntary giving of necessary aid to those in the civil Community in need of aid to overcome threats to their health, safety, security, or ability as citizens to fulfill *their* Duties to the civil Community. This maxim serves the principle of *psyche-teleology*;

Maxim 2: Make it your maxim that civil disobedience of unjust laws is a categorical imperative of

civic Duty, and tolerate no unjust institution to be perpetuated. "Unjust" is anything that breaches or contradicts the condition of the civil Community's social contract. This maxim serves the principle of justice (principle of *psyche*-aesthetics);

Maxim 3: Make it your maxim to employ your skills and talents in *κοινωνία* with others when by your shared contributions Progress *with preservation of Order* can be realized or when Order in the civil Community is threatened and must be protected. This maxim serves the principle of *Anordnungsvermögen* (principle of civic cooperation);

Maxim 4: Make it your maxim to hold bigotry in every form to be a moral crime when it is intentional and a moral fault when it is unintentional. Bigotry is obstinate or ideological attachment to a particular party, sect, faction, opinion, or dogma with excessive prejudice. Bigotry violates the principle of *Anordnungskräfte* (principle of citizenship). This maxim is a maxim of citizenship.

Because no other person can *force* you to make any of these maxims your own, binding yourself to them is an act of *Self-obligatio* and an exercise of the power of your own free choice (*arbitrium liberum*). In committing yourself to them, you are exercising none but your own natural liberty. No ruler forces you to commit yourself to them and no authority figure other than you yourself decrees them.

The organizing principles of the anthropological person outlined above are conceptual – which is to say objective – understandings of general marks of *Sittlichkeit* (moral custom) and *κοινωνία* (communion) in a civil Community. But, it must be asked because in all cases the roots of social morality rest entirely in the subjective judgments of human beings and so must be *deontological*, how can human beings ever come to objective agreement about them? Is this even possible? The answer is: it lies within human nature to accomplish this. The power to do so is found in human judgments of *taste*, and this takes us into the Modality heading of judging *standards* for striving to perfect the optimization of humanity in a civil Community and in your own person.

#### 4. Optimizing the Motivational Dynamic III: Approval of Taste

However much truth might be found in the saying, "There is no accounting for taste," this does not mean human judgments of taste are capricious. Each capacity of human judgment – determining, reflective, and practical – has laws governing its process. To say "taste is capricious" amounts to saying the capacity for judgment of taste is a *lawless* capacity, and to say such a thing is self-contradictory. How, then, are we to understand judgment of taste and, by extension, its homologue in civil Communities?

Kant noted,

Taste is selection of that which is generally engaging according to laws of sensibility. It chiefly goes to sensuous form; for with respect to this there are rules that are valid for all. [Kant (c. 1773-79) 15: 273]

Sensuous form in Critical epistemology refers to what Kant called the pure intuitions of sensibility for inner and outer sense. The names he gave these, respectively, were *subjective* time and space. As explained in Wells (2009), chap. 3, the processes of representing these forms of sensuous intuitions are *mathematical* processes. Specifically, the synthesis of subjective time produces a formal *ordering* structure and the synthesis of subjective space produces a formal *topological* structure. In the 1950s and 1960s, the work of the Bourbaki mathematicians proved that these structures are two of the three types of mathematical "mother structures" *from which all of mathematics can be derived*<sup>9</sup> [Wells (2006), chap. 21, pp. 2073-2077], [Wells (2014), chap. 14, pp. 435-439]. If human beings did not possess capacities for generating these structures, mathematics would not be possible for us at all. I find it interesting that Kant almost but not quite anticipated the Bourbaki's findings by roughly 170 years:

<sup>9</sup> The third Bourbaki mother structure is algebraic structure.



Now space and time are those intuitions upon which pure mathematics bases all its cognitions and judgments, which at the same time appear as apodictic and necessary; for mathematics must first present all of its ideas in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition; i.e., it makes them up, failing which (since mathematics cannot proceed analytically, namely through the analysis of concepts, but only synthetically) it is impossible for it to take a step as long as it lacks pure intuition, in which alone the subject-matter for synthetic judgments *a priori* can be given. [Kant (1783) 4: 283]

*Taste* requires, in addition to these pure intuitions, an act of reflective judgment as well. The laws of sensibility (transcendental aesthetic) are laws governing the synthesis of pure intuition [Wells (2009), chap. 3], but *selecting* from among possible intuitions in apprehension those that a human being becomes conscious of likewise requires laws, viz., rules of aesthetical reflective judgment. Kant noted,


In everything that is to be approved in accordance with taste there must be something that facilitates the differentiation of the manifold [in sensibility] (patterning); something that promotes intelligibility (relationships, propositions); something that makes the pulling of it together possible (unity); and finally, something that promotes its distinction from all other possibilities (*praecisionis*). [Kant (c. 1773-79) 15: 270]

These "somethings" are the capacities for *patterning*, *conceptualizing*, *coalescing*, and *precisioning*, respectively. In terms of 2LAR headings (figure 3), these are Quantity, Relation, Quality, and Modality terms, respectively, and are collectively called *the approval of taste* [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 451-456]. The best *practical* explanation of what these are and how they work is provided by mathematics – not the art and science of *being* a mathematician but, rather, by examination of their appearances in the practice of *doing* everyday mathematics. Wells (2014), chap. 14, provides an exposition of this.

Patterning is the act of representing a pattern. A pattern is an arrangement of form as a grouping or distribution of elements. Coalescing is the aesthetic function of syncretism in judgmentation. Syncretism is the tendency in cognition to fuse together as much in sensibility as possible in forming an intuition. Conceptualizing is the aesthetic function of making an intuition expressible in the actions of a person in such a way that it is expedient for a purpose of practical Reason as well as motivationally expedient for the manifold of concepts. It is a function that assigns practical *meanings* to concepts. Precisioning is the aesthetical function of giving a distinct context to a concept and ascribing to this context a subjective necessity. In doing so, other contexts outside the scope of the concept being made precise are "lopped off" (the Latin root, *praecisio*, literally means the act of amputating). Recognizing patterns, coalescing details to make *one* object, conceptualizing practical meanings, and delimiting precise contexts are all acts a person almost never notices as he carries them out but which can be recognized for what has been done if you reflect introspectively upon what seems to happen as you perceive and think about it after the fact.

A Community, however, has no phenomenon of mind, no human motivational dynamic, and no human capacity of taste. The matter homologue for the organizing principles of Society must be deduced from fundamental principles of Critical epistemology, and this deduction is carried out in Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 487-490]. The resulting principles are:

1. Principle of patterning: the dynamics of social equilibration in the corporate person act as a synthesizer of the private moral codes of the persons in the Community to produce a practical system of moral custom. This principle is also called the principle of emerging *Sittlichkeit*;
2. Principle of coalescing: global practical optimization of *Sittlichkeit* is effected through competition among the Duties-to-Self of the persons in the Community;
3. Principle of conceptualizing: competitive global consensus in cooperations is exhibited by emergence of constituted man-made institutions of communal self-governance manifested in processes of reviews, evaluations, checks and balances, and social refinements that serve the function of perfecting civil tranquility in the Community;
4. Principle of precisioning: the ideal of absolute non-expression of civil untranquility within the Community is the standard of gauging civil Community.



**Figure 4:** The empirical Enlightenment idea of the perfectibility of Man and his institutions.

Just as is the case for the organizing principles of the anthropological person, these *societal* principles must have corresponding expressions in maxims by which an individual can strive to perfect humanity in his own person. If anything, the four principles just enumerated are even more abstractly mathematical than are those of the anthropological person, and so these maxims require a more careful deduction.

The challenge I find myself facing here as an author is that these maxims are valid for and take place in a very specific *context*; namely, the context of civil Community. Principles of Modality – and this is what the organizing principles of approval of taste listed above are – are principles of *judgments of judgments*. They add nothing to your understanding of an *object* but only pertain to relationship to your faculty of knowledge, i.e., to how the object is related to your empirical understanding of it and the manners in which you use this understanding [Kant (1787) B: 266]. The object in this case is nothing less than the Ideal of divine Community; the organizing principles above pertain to perfecting institution of this special Society and so the challenge is: how does one intelligibly explain the *maxims* without having to *first* thoroughly explain the Society that gives them their context? In education this challenge is known as the "problem of prerequisites in curriculum design"<sup>10</sup>. For the topic presently at hand, background material to help understand the object exists – e.g. Wells (2012), chap. 13, and Wells (2017), chap. 9 – but if I were to say, "First go study these materials," that would be unacceptably lazy authorship on my part.

Rather than do this, a reasonably good place to begin explaining the object, insofar as it pertains to the organizing principles, is an idea born of what is called the Enlightenment Age of the 18th century in Europe. This idea is the idea of *the perfectibility of Man and his institutions*, and it was a general theme among Enlightenment Age authors. Figure 4 illustrates this idea in 2LAR form [Wells (2014), chap. 1, pp. 14-22]. The personal maxims of approval of taste obtain their deontological *moral grounding* from how they serve the perfectibility of civil Community in the process of striving to perfect divine Community. This is because perfecting humanity in your own person prepares you and makes you fit to take part in perfecting humanity in divine Community.

The **principle of justifiable institutions** is: *all human institutions are justifiable only if they contribute to the advancement and welfare of the instituting Society*. It is not enough for an institution to merely do no harm to Progress and the general welfare; an institution must make on-going positive contributions.

<sup>10</sup> For example, suppose you want to go to a university and major in a particular subject. Before you can even begin to study that subject, you are required to have a high school education; before you can get a high school education, you must have a middle school education; and before you can have a middle school education you must have an elementary school education. This is an example of the "the problem of prerequisites." The challenge for educators is figuring out how to design a curriculum and its system of prerequisites in such a way that it doesn't take students until they are 70 years old to begin their college studies.

The term welfare means *the state of being or doing well in life*. Personal welfare is perhaps not too ambiguous a term because every person judges it subjectively by his state of tranquility or lack thereof. Tranquility, again, is a state of mind that results from being sufficiently satisfied in relationship to one's general state of life and desiring nothing more or different in this relationship. However, the principle of justifiable institutions applies to Society, not individuals, and the institutes to which it applies are those which in some way affect *public* welfare.

It matters not if the institute itself is instituted for private purposes. A civic institute is constitutive of a mini-Community, and if it produces effects on others who are not members of its mini-Community then these others become *stakeholders*<sup>11</sup> of that institute and *ipso facto* the institute is deontologically *non-private* and falls within the scope of the principle. In relationship to an overall civic Community, a *non-civic institute* affects only its own mini-Community members and only in this context can it be regarded as a private institute with its own private special interests. An *uncivic institute*, in contrast, is an institute whose corporate conduct is hostile to deontologically valid interests<sup>12</sup> of another citizen insofar as that citizen is at civil liberty to pursue satisfaction of that interest. No uncivic institute is justifiable – because its actions and conduct are unjust – and the principle of justifiable institutions *prohibits its institution*.

I think it would be difficult to overstate the essential importance of the idea of *civil* liberty in this context. Civil liberty is liberty bound by deontological Obligation to participate as a citizen in a civil Community. The *condition* every person demands of the civil Community is that others will defend and protect with their whole common force the person and goods of each associate in such a way that each associate can unite himself with all the other associates while still obeying himself alone. However, the others demand a *quid pro quo* in exchange for this defense and protection; namely: that each citizen pledge to voluntarily alienate some of his *natural* liberties of action; put his person and all his power in common with those of the other associates under the supreme direction of the general will; and that each associate, in his corporate capacity, regard every other associate as an indivisible part of their whole body politic. This is the *term* of their social contract. The term "general will" means the unity in acting to improve the communal idea of ethical and moral perfection of the association through on-going processes of review, evaluation and refinement taking as their aliments all factors pertinent to achieving and maintaining civil tranquility within the Community. The logical essence of general will is that it is the process of judging *judgments of Community governance*. Participation *as a citizen* means it is a civic Duty to participate in this process of governance. An individual is *not* at civil liberty to refuse to so participate. *It is not enough* to be a law-abiding citizen; you also have to contribute to governance.

Perhaps the most frequent examples of institutions in a Society are found in commerce. Commerce is the reciprocal exchange of wealth-assets. A wealth-asset is any good for which its use negates unwealth. **Unwealth** is lack of what is practically needed to attain a state of satisfaction. You or someone in your family is engaged in commerce as either a Duty-to-Self or as a Duty to your family mini-Community. This engagement takes many forms [Wells (2017)], but one circumstance that almost always attends it is the *Dasein* of competitors vying to possess the same wealth-asset. Now, what is *practically needed* to attain a state of satisfaction in regard to wealth-assets is, beyond a certain point, a subjective judgment. If you and your family are well-fed, adequately clothed, adequately sheltered from the environment, and adequately protected from disease or threats to your personal safety, your *basic human needs* are satisfied. But most of us Desire more than just basic need satisfaction. Basic need satisfaction goes to *inalienable* natural liberty, and no civil Community can justly demand any person alienate this because it is not possible for a human being to alienate the liberty to satisfy basic needs without violating a fundamental obligation-to-Self. Herein lies a subtle distinction between inalienable natural liberty and unalienable natural liberty. Unalienable means the condition of being something a person is unwilling to alienate

<sup>11</sup> A stakeholder is any person who has a deontologically valid interest in an object. The object is called the object of the stake.

<sup>12</sup> A deontologically valid interest is an interest grounded in a person's satisfaction of Duties or Obligations.

although it is potentially within his capacity to do so. Inalienable means the condition of being absolutely beyond the ability of a person to alienate.

Suppose, therefore, that some person A thinks that nothing short of accumulation of a vast quantity of wealth-assets will ever provide him with a state of satisfaction he craves. It is possible to think so because there is no objectively valid real notion of a highest state of well-being, that notion being an infinite notion. The condition of being or doing well can only be *negatively* judged in terms of the diminution and negation of *Unlust*. Put another way, a person can judge his own *lack* of personal welfare but there is no standard by which *perfect* welfare can be determined. Deontologically,

The idea of happiness is not one such as Man has abstracted by chance from his instincts and so derived from the animality in himself; on the contrary, it is a mere Idea of a state to which he would make the latter [his animality] adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible). He sorts this out himself and indeed in different ways through his complicated understanding by imagination and the senses; yes, and what is more, he amends these so often that this nature, even if it were to be totally subjugated to his choice, nevertheless could by no means undertake to determine a general law with this unstable concept, and so harmonize with the purpose that each arbitrarily intends for himself. But even if we either reduce this to the genuine urge of nature in which our species generally agrees, or, on the other hand, raise our skill so high as to provide for such an imagined purpose, yet even so what Man understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own proper natural purpose (not purpose of freedom), would never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the type to stop anywhere in possession and enjoyment and to be gratified. [Kant (1790) 5: 430]

No *individual* can justify with objective validity accumulation of an unlimited quantity of wealth-assets. But, equally, no *Society* is competent to set *arbitrary* limitations on wealth-asset accumulation and remain faithful to the condition of its social contract. For example, the principle of *egalitarianism* cherished so much by so many people is *deontologically unjust*. Unity in the terms *and* conditions of the social contract can be upheld only by means of a convention that accumulation of wealth-assets by person A is unjust if and only if this accumulation *causes actual harm* to others by producing for them a condition of *actual unwealth in regard to their basic needs*. You are at civil liberty to engage in civic commerce. You are not guaranteed success in your enterprise. You *are* guaranteed succor and assistance if your efforts leave you destitute and in need of help from others. You are *not* at civil liberty to conduct your affairs and enterprises in such a way that *you* cause *others* to have to render assistance to those your competitive activity has bested commercially. There is a fine balance that must be made here, by civil convention, and ensuring this balance is maintained is one of the essential functions of Community self-governance [Wells (2017)]. Here we see one of the many challenges the phenomenon of mini-Community poses. Institution of commerce by ways and means that strive to perfect achievement of this balance is what is meant by the idea of *civic free enterprise* [Wells (2017)].

I might be tempted to say Societies lack this concept of justice but to say this would be untrue. For example, the children's game of marbles when played "for keeps" is an early form of commerce in which the marbles are wealth-assets. Piaget found that institutions of the game by boys around age 12 or 13 exhibit concern for and rules governing precisely this type of civic enterprise balancing:

Our three legal experts also point out the measures of clemency in use for the protection of the weak. According to Vua [age 13] "*if you knock out three [marbles] at one shot and there's only one left [one marble in the square] the other chap [the opponent] has the right to play from half-way [half-way between the 'coche' and the square]*"<sup>13</sup> *because the first boy has made more than his 'pose.'*" Also: "*the boy who has been beaten is allowed to begin*" [the next game]. According to Gros [age 13], "*if there is one marble left at the end, the boy who has won, instead of taking it, can give it to the other chap.*" And again, "*When there's one boy who has won too much, the others say 'coujac,' and he is bound to play another game.*" [Piaget (1932), pg. 49]

<sup>13</sup> Coche, pose, and coujac are technical terms in the game of marbles that Piaget's Swiss boys used.

Perhaps such examples make you wonder, as I sometimes do, if little boys might not have a stronger judicial grasp of civic free enterprise than most adults seem to. The institution of commerce is just one example among many of human institutions. The principle of justifiable institutions applies to all of them.

The **principle of progressive education** is: *education is the principal means for Progress in any Society* [Wells (2014), chap. 1, pp. 16-18]. Like the previous principle, it is a principle of composition for human institutions and speaks to purposiveness in *what* institutions are to be made for the perfection of Man. The word "education" in this principle does not just mean "schools." In Critical epistemology the term **education** means *the acquisition, development or perfection of knowledge, skill, mental capability, practical character, or aesthetical taste by an individual*. An educational activity is any activity by which an individual makes an undertaking to develop and perfect his own knowledge, skill, mental capabilities, practical character or aesthetical taste. Educational Self-development is the idea of an individual's determination of a choice to be or not to be educated through the undertaking of an educational activity.

A citizen can only participate in and contribute to Progress in his civil Community by means of choosing to undertake educational Self-development. Schools are institutes established to provide and stimulate *some* of a child's educational Self-development, but educational Self-development continues to be essential in adulthood for a person to be, as Mill put it, "fit for liberty" as a participant in self governance of a civil Community. **Governance**, from the judicial Standpoint of Critical epistemology, is a set of co-determining emotivity operationalizations that characterize leader-follower dynamics purposively aimed at maintaining and perfecting a relationship of civil Community among a group of persons. **Government** is the system of institutions formed by members of a Society for the purpose of realizing Order and Progress through the dynamics of governance. The 6th article of faith (God values never-ending striving for perfection), 8th article (God values freedom), and 9th article (God is a supreme and supremely sublime benevolent leader) conjointly imply that perfecting humanity in your own person requires you to undertake Self-education (educational Self-development) to develop the knowledge, skill, mental capability, practical character, and aesthetical taste to make you fit to participate in governance, and that this participation is necessary for participation in perfecting humanity in a divine Community.

Most people do not think of governance or government in educational contexts but, as Mill pointed out, every system of governance and every government *is an institute of educational Self-development in those who are governed*. Mill wrote,

We have now . . . obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its actions upon men, and by its actions upon things; by what it makes of the citizens and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them and by means of them. Government is at once a great influence acting on the human mind, and a set of organized arrangements for public business. [Mill (1861), pp. 20-21]

In divine Community *no one is permitted to rule*. Governance occurs by means of the leadership dynamic of the Community and leadership dynamic is the potential power of spontaneity in the reciprocal relationships between two or more people by which the Self-determinations of actions by followers are stimulated by the actions of *momentary* leaders [Wells (2010), chap. 6, pp. 224-227]. Perfecting humanity in yourself requires Self-development of your ability to be a leader as well as a follower and of your taste for governed civil liberty *without* rulership.

Montesquieu wrote,

Better is it to say that the government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the

humor and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established. The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of their wills. "The conjunction of those wills," as Gravina again very justly observes, "is what we call the civil state." Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied. They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another. [Montesquieu (1748), vol. I, pg. 6]

You might presume that the last line of this quote is inapplicable to divine Community; after all, should we not expect there to eventually be only *one* of these? But the presupposition *ignores the phenomenon of mini-Community*. Change Montesquieu's "nation" to "mini-Community" and his maxim returns to full relevance. Ignoring Montesquieu's maxim of adapting governance (via laws) to the people of particular communities, provinces, states, and nations without at the same time taking into account the readiness of their people, in terms of the state of their educational Self-development, is a great error. Fervor for enthusiastically doing so is the ignorant moral realism of ethnocentrism. It is a moral fault the political faction in America who call themselves "progressives" consistently exhibits time after time in their fervor for non-consensus democracy – which, by the essence of its non-consensus character, not merely invites but *requires* the tyranny of rulership. And what does it profit Mankind to replace one kind of tyranny with another? "What does it profit a man to gain the whole world yet forfeit his life?" [Mark 8:36].

A law commands respect and voluntary compliance only if those governed by it consent to it. Building consensus is often a lengthy and sometimes seemingly daunting process, but it is the only alternative to the tyranny of rulership. It is interesting to note that here, again, we find young boys, around the age of 11 to 12, seem to have a better grasp of this principle than many adults do. Piaget found that at this stage,

Interest seems to have shifted its ground since the last stage. Not only do these children seek to cooperate, to "fix things up" as Vua puts it, rather than to play for themselves alone, but also – and this undoubtedly is something new – they seem to take a peculiar pleasure in anticipating all possible cases and in codifying them. Considering that the square game is only one of the five or ten varieties of the game of marbles, it is almost alarming, in the face of the complexity of rules and procedures of the square game, to think of what a child of twelve has to store away in his memory. . . . Throughout this fourth stage, then, the dominating interest seems to be in the rules themselves. For mere cooperation would not require such subtleties as those attending the disposition of the marbles in the square [.]. The fact that the child enjoys complicating things at will proves that what he is after is rules for their own sake. We have described elsewhere the extraordinary behavior of eight boys of 10 to 11 who, in order to throw snowballs at each other, began by wasting a good quarter-of-an-hour in electing a president, fixing the rules of voting, then in dividing themselves up into two camps, in deciding upon the distances of the shots, and finally in foreseeing what would be the sanctions to be applied in cases of infringement of these laws. [Piaget (1932), pp. 49-50]

Personally, I disagree with Piaget calling this "good quarter-of-an-hour" a waste of time; the purpose of a game is to have fun, and if establishing rules promotes this purpose, the time is not wasted. But the point I wish to emphasize here is that governance by consensus is one of the very early products of socialization.

The examples provided by these little boys demonstrates not just that Community self-governance by consensus building comes *naturally* to human beings. It is also very clear that past experiences of the individual boys plays an integral role in their efforts to perfect the enjoyment of the game. As Vua, one of Piaget's young "legal experts" in the game of marbles, put it,

*The fact is, answered Vua, that sometimes people play differently. Then you ask each other what you want to do. – And if you can't agree? – We scrap for a bit and then we fix things up. [ibid., pg. 49]*

This behavior reflects nothing less than social educational Self-development from divers experiences. As Turnbull's study of the BaMbuti clearly showed in many places, in that *Gemeinschaft* Society they also

"scrap for a bit and then fix things up" [Turnbull (1962)].

**4A The Maxim of Patterning:** Humanity in your own person goes to Obligations to yourself, i.e., to your overall orientation of judgmentation in self-determining your appetites such that your actions are necessitated (made necessary) by practical moral imperatives. The principle of patterning for the organizing principles of Society in figure 3 tells us that social dynamics act as a synthesizer of the private moral codes of the persons in the Community to produce a practical system of moral custom. *Institution* of this practical system in your civil Community requires reconciliation of your personal moral code with those of other citizens of the Community, both interpersonal and in interactions between your mini-Communities and those of others in the general Community, by means of mutual sympathetic participation by every person subsisting in *unselfish and active* commitment to your social compact.

Patterning is the act of representing a pattern, and a pattern is an arrangement of form as a grouping or distribution of elements. As this pertains to approval of taste in the context of civil Community, what is being arranged is moral custom and, insofar as moral customs are codified, social *laws* to govern the Community. All such laws are *necessitated* relationships made necessary by synthesis of individual moral codes. But this synthesis is made by agreements and consents of *people*, the Community's citizens. If your personal moral code is to be reconciled with those of other people, *you must participate* in the making of this synthesis and you must hold yourself bound by its outcomes.

*Conflicts* arise when *your* special interests, or those of a mini-Community in which you are a member, are incongruent with those of another person or mini-Community. A person A's interest is incongruent with a person B's interest if satisfaction of either person's interest *necessarily* thwarts satisfaction of the other person's interest. What the *synthesis* must accomplish is the transformation of incongruent special interests into congruent ones, i.e., produce modifications of opposing special interests in such a way that person A's satisfaction of his interest does not of itself prevent person B from satisfying his. This, for instance, is why a "zero sum game" in matters of *civil* liberties is not permissible in a civil Community.

Humankind is not lacking in tenets that bespeak, however imperfectly, to ideals of this sort. Christianity has its "golden rule":

So whatever you would like others to do to you, do also to them, for this is the law and the prophets.  
[Matthew 7:12]

Kant found different alternate ways of expressing this:

So act that the maxim of your will could always be valid at the same time as a principle of a universal legislation. [Kant (1788) 5: 30]

Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. [Kant (1785) 4: 421]

Act as if the maxim of your act were to become by your will a *universal law of nature*. [*ibid.*]

So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. [*ibid.* 4:429]

He explained,

Thus the principle of every human will as *a will giving universal laws through all its maxims*, provided it is otherwise correct, would be very *well suited* to be the categorical imperative by this: that just because of the Idea of giving universal law *it is grounded in no interest* and, therefore, among all possible imperatives, can alone be *unconditional*; or, better still, by converting the proposition, if there is a categorical imperative (i.e., a law for the will of a rational being) it can only command that everything be done from the maxim of one's will as a will that could at the same time have for its

object itself as giving universal law; for only then is the practical principle, and the imperative that the will obeys, unconditional, since it can have no interest as its ground. [*ibid.*, 4: 432]

These *theoretically categorical* imperatives, and others like them, are expressions of an *ideal*. They provide concepts by which a person can try to understand how moral and civil behavior ought to appear. They are, to put it a little differently, ideas for what sort of *patterns* to look for in moral customs, civil law, and civil governance. Some of these ideas – especially Kant's – tend to be expressed at such a high level of abstraction that an individual can have a great deal of difficulty *in trying to apply them*. Even the "golden rule," while seemingly simple enough in its expression, leaves blank practical means by which a person can ascertain whether or not he has given adequate attention to *the scope of the context* in which he is trying to apply it. At issue is this: approval of taste is, for any individual, *subjective* but a maxim of approval of taste applied to perfecting humanity in your own person needs to be both practical and objective. It needs to be practical because, if it is not, you won't be able to make use of it. It needs to be objective because if it is to be reconciled with others' maxims, *they* must agree with *you* on the *object* of a moral custom, civil law, or a reconciliation of special interests.

The only way such a maxim can be practical is if you *act* on it. The only way it can be objective is if others *likewise* agree to it. Both necessarily require *participation* in the leadership dynamic of the civil Community. Participation requires you to *take an interest* in what is or is to be *instituted* by the civil Community (or more locally by mini-Communities) and, if the institution *as being proposed* is in conflict *incongruently* with your own special interests, that you take an *active* part in the process of institution to help insure that institution is *justifiable*. However, your participation cannot be aimed narrowly at merely preserving or protecting your own special interest; it must be aimed more broadly at reconciliation and transformation of all stakeholders' special interests so as to bring them into congruence with one another. You must be a law-contributing citizen and, *at the same time*, a law-moderating citizen. Thus we come to the maxim of patterning for perfecting humanity in yourself:

Maxim 1: Make it your maxim to always be interested in institutions of the Community and actively participate in the moderating of incongruent special interests to help convert these into congruent special interests.

There is, however, an important *limitation* affecting your ability to undertake the participation called for by maxim 1. The idea of this limitation takes us directly to the coalescing function of approval of taste.

**4B The Maxim of Coalescing:** Deduction of the principle of coalescing in the corporate Community is grounded in the regulative principle of *good choice* in Critical metaphysics. The standard gauge for this principle is the Critical Ideal of *summum bonum* ("highest good"). This is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Perfect realization requires unconditioned coherence in a practical context and is the standard gauge of practical perfection.

For the corporate Community the principle of coalescing states that global practical optimization of *Sittlichkeit* is effected through competition among the Duties-to-Self of the persons in the Community. For the perfection of humanity, this competition must be civic competition and requires competitors to come to better understandings of what their Duties-to-Self are, not from a perspective of egocentrism but rather from a de-centered perspective. Only from such a *social* perspective can competitors reach a true *reconciliation* of oppositions between their respective ideas of Duties through *conditioning of each person's Desires*. The aim of the social principle of coalescing is perfection of civil tranquility in the Community. The consequence of imperfections in interpersonal competitions among Duties-to-Self is that eventually one person or group of persons will come to make his or their Duties-to-Self *dominate* those of other people at the cost of perpetuating the *Existenz* of incongruent special interests in the Community. Perpetuation of incongruent special interests is the root cause of what Toynbee called *enormities* in Society. He warned:



Ideally, no doubt, the introduction of new dynamical [social] forces ought to be accompanied by a reconstruction of the whole existing set of institutions, and in any actually growing society a constant readjustment of the more flagrant anachronisms is continually going on. But *vis inertiae*<sup>14</sup> tends at all times to keep most parts of the social structure as they are, in spite of their increasing incongruity with new social forces constantly coming into action. In this situation the new forces are apt to operate in two diametrically opposite ways simultaneously. On the one hand they perform their creative work either through new institutions that they have established for themselves or through old institutions that they have adapted to their purpose; and in pouring themselves into these harmonious channels they promote the welfare of society. At the same time they also enter, indiscriminately, into any institutions which happen to lie in their path – as some powerful head of steam which had forced its way into an engine house might rush into the works of any old engine that happened to be installed there.

In such an event, one or the other of two alternative disasters is apt to occur. Either the pressure of the new head of steam blows the old engine to pieces, or else the old engine somehow manages to hold together and proceeds to operate in a new manner that is likely to prove both alarming and destructive.

To translate these parables into terms of social life, the explosions of the old engines that cannot stand the new pressures . . . are the revolutions which sometimes overtake anachronistic institutions. On the other hand, the baneful performances of the old engines which have stood the strain of being keyed up to performances for which they were never intended are the social enormities which a 'die-hard' institutional anachronism sometimes engenders. . . . If harmonious adjustments predominate, the society will continue to grow; if revolutions, its growth will become increasingly hazardous; if enormities, we may diagnose a breakdown. [Toynbee (1946), pp. 280-281]

What Toynbee called *vis inertia* is, at root, caused by human type- $\alpha$  compensation behavior (ignorance). This behavior is, likewise, at the root of lingering egocentrism in adults. Overcoming *vis inertia* in reconciling incongruent Duties-to-Self between individuals and overcoming the human tendency to choose type- $\alpha$  compensation<sup>15</sup> in favor of better compensations are one and the same thing in social and interpersonal contexts.

To achieve de-centering, make such reconciliations, and find civic conditions for your Desires, you must develop a habit of undertaking a peculiar type of *educational Self-development*. This type of learning is expressed by the aphorism, "never judge a man until you've walked a mile in his shoes." This can be called *the maxim of empathy*. But acting upon this maxim can be emotionally and psychologically quite stressful because in order to act upon it you must overcome the natural impatience of the process of practical Reason and *delay* the satisfaction of achieving reequilibration. It is far easier, by means of stereotyping other people, to dismiss their legitimate interests of Duties-to-themselves. I know of one associate professor of psychology who counsels that "walking a mile in the other person's shoes" is terrible advice because of the psychological and physiological stress following this advice causes. He is correct about it being stressful – particularly if you make a habit of avoiding it – but no one ever said that perfecting humanity in your own person is *not* a stressful undertaking. Indeed, this is why the phrase used in this treatise is "*striving* for perfection." To strive is to struggle. The asocial forms of governance (monarchy/oligarchy and non-consensus democracy) in effect substitute enormities subjugating people through force or the threat of force in place of the struggle attending acting upon the maxim of empathy.

The maxim of coalescence in approval of taste follows from this immediately. It is:

Maxim 2 (the maxim of empathy). Make it your maxim to try to understand the situations of others that affect their Duties-to-themselves before you make judgments about their motives and characters.

<sup>14</sup> the power of inertia.

<sup>15</sup> The process of practical Reason is an *impatient* process. It seeks to achieve reequilibration by the quickest means it can find. However, reequilibration achieved through type- $\alpha$  compensation results in *unstable* equilibrium because underlying causes of the disturbance of equilibrium are left unresolved by it.

**4C The Maxim of Conceptualizing:** Conceptualizing is the intelligibility function of approval of taste but what does this mean? What is "intelligibility"? Kant's word that is rendered as "intelligibility" in English was *Begreiflichkeit*, which comes from the verb *begreifen*, "to comprehend." Kant himself equated *begreifen* to the Latin word *comprehendere* [Kant (1800) 9: 65]. Intelligibility in approval of taste is synonymous with comprehensibility.

Kant taught that to comprehend is the highest degree of knowledge:

[To] *comprehend* something (*comprehendere*), i.e., to know through Reason or *a priori* to the degree that is sufficient for our aim. For all our comprehension is only *relative*, i.e., sufficient for a certain aim: we fully comprehend nothing absolutely. [Kant (1800) 9: 6]

Taste is an aesthetical capacity in human beings, and this means that the conceptualizing function of taste, while it does pertain to concepts, *immediately* pertains to the *aesthetic context* of concepts, i.e., to their presentation in terms of connections of desire in a manifold of Desires. Such connection is, from the judicial Standpoint of Critical epistemology, what is meant by Kant's transcendental Idea that he called *ens summum* ("highest being"). The conceptualizing function pertains not only to concepts but, more broadly, to *using* concepts to construct higher ones (comprehensive concepts), the real meanings of which are structured as actions in the practical manifold of rules in Relation to the Ideal of *summum bonum*. This latter is the explanation of the conceptualizing function from the practical Standpoint of epistemology.

Now, desires are not concepts; they are affective perceptions. The process of teleological reflective judgment connects desires to possible (impetuous) action expressions to form a manifold of Desires. These action expressions might be approved by the appetite of practical Reason or they might be vetoed by practical judgment as contrary to practical Reason's pure categorical imperative (i.e., its formula for regulation of actions to produce a state of equilibrium) [Wells (2009), chap. 7]. Concepts are rules for the reproduction of intuitions in sensibility. As such, one can properly say we "remember" concepts. But desires are not like this. They are not "remembered"; they are "regenerated" by reintroduction of concepts into sensibility<sup>16</sup>.

Comprehending concepts by means of higher ones enhances the scope of a person's possible emotivity responses (motoregulatory expressions) by, so to speak, "enriching" the manifold of Desires in specific situations and circumstances. This not only benefits an individual's capacity for versatility in interpersonal interactions; it also benefits him in terms of avoiding or managing frustrations and overcoming obstacles that might hinder satisfaction of his interests. Managerial psychologist Harold Leavitt put it this way:

Frustration is a "feeling" rather than a "fact." It is a feeling that arises when one encounters certain kinds of blocks on paths to certain kinds of goals. These feelings arise when the block seems insurmountable and when the failure to surmount it threatens one's personal well-being – when the goal involves the self.

When people encounter such obstacles, they react with aggression; aggression mostly toward the obstacle when the person is sure of his own ability and aggression mostly toward oneself when the person is pessimistic about his ability, i.e., when he has had a history of failure.

Many obstacle situations are depriving rather than frustrating because the obstacles do not seem insurmountable or the goals are not central to the self. Some people may therefore meet fewer frustrations than others because they have more ways around more obstacles or because their self-esteem does not have to be proved again by every new problem they encounter. . . . Other people – parents, peers, managers – have a good deal to do with the development of self-confidence and hence

<sup>16</sup> The manifold of Desires is not a structure because it is not conserved. Non-conservation is why desires are not "remembered." If a person is said to be "bad tempered," for example, it isn't his desires that make him so; it is the structure of his manifold of concepts acting to regenerate "bad tempered emotivity" that makes him so. This is why, for instance, "anger management" and Versatility can be *learned*.

with the ways people deal with obstacles. For self-confidence is tied to success, and success is in large part what other people may decide it is. [Leavitt (1972), pp. 38-39]

Having "more ways around an obstacle" is what comprehensibility brings to the manifold of concepts in terms of how concepts can be *practically employed*. The word "intelligence" fundamentally means your capacity to adapt to situations, overcome obstacles, and so make your efforts successful. Hence, you can perhaps see why conceptualizing is called the intelligibility function of approval of taste.

Now, what does this all imply for perfection of humanity in your own person? Hopefully, you perhaps can now see that conceptualizing is not merely some coldly logical or analytical practice. On the contrary, it involves desires, it involves values, and it involves expedient actions as well. Santayana wrote,

If we appealed more often to actual feeling, our judgments would be more diverse, but they would be more legitimate and instructive. Verbal judgments are often useful instruments of thought, but it is not by them that worth can ultimately be determined.

Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulses, and from the irrational part of our nature. The rational part is by its essence relative; it leads us from data to conclusions, or from parts to wholes; it never furnishes the data with which it works. If any preference or precept were declared to be ultimate and primitive, it would thereby be declared to be irrational since mediation, inference, and synthesis are the essence of rationality. The ideal of rationality is itself as arbitrary, as much dependent on the needs of a finite organization, as any other ideal. Only as ultimately securing tranquility of mind, which the philosopher instinctively pursues, has it for him any necessity. In spite of the verbal propriety of saying that reason demands rationality, what really demands rationality, what makes it a good and indispensable thing and gives it all its authority, is not its own nature, but our need of it both in safe and economical action and in the pleasures of comprehension. [Santayana (1896), pg. 14]

Perfection of humanity in one's own person takes for its orientation and goal perfection of humanity overall, the Ideal of which we are calling divine Community. "All comprehension is relative," as Kant said; and it is in the context of relationship to perfection of humanity overall that you must look at conceptualizing for perfection of humanity in yourself.

The Enlightenment principle of Relation is the principle of human determinability of Progress. Santayana's classification of stages of Society – natural to free to ideal – clearly depends on development of progressively higher concepts of it that people come to comprehend, accept and share. This progression of comprehension regarding human Society is grounded in approval of taste and, especially, its heading of Relation: conceptualizing. Santayana wrote,

Free society differs from that which is natural and legal precisely in this: that it does not cultivate relations which in the last analysis are experienced and material, but turns exclusively to unanimities in meanings, to collaborations in an ideal world. The basis of free society is of course natural, as we said, but free society has ideal goals. Spirits cannot touch save by becoming unanimous. [Santayana (1905), pg. 146]

Ideal society . . . is the society of symbols. . . . Symbols are presences, and they are those particularly congenial presences which we have inwardly evoked and cast in a form intelligible and familiar to human thinking. Their function is to give flat experience a rational perspective, translating the general flux into stable objects and making it representable in discourse. They are therefore precious, not only for their representative or practical value, implying useful adjustments to the environing world, but even more, sometimes, for their immediate or aesthetic power, for their kinship to the spirit they enlighten and exercise. [*ibid.*, pp. 196-197]

The Principle of human determinability of Progress states: human beings design lines of human Progress. Progress is itself of course the Object of an idea, and an indistinct notion of it acquires first

glimmerings of meaning in free Societies. It does not truly become symbolic of something until people have gotten used to its growing idea in free Society. It is unfortunately also true that men design lines of human retrogression that arrest and break down Societies. When Santayana wrote the words above in 1905, few ordinary citizens of the European great powers had so much as an inkling that a long and largely progressive era the continent had been enjoying was entering its twilight. Ten years later, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East were ablaze with World War I.

The maxim of coalescing and the maxim of conceptualizing intertwine with each other as means and ends. It is certainly not a rare occurrence to find two or more groups of people who all think themselves to be in agreement about some symbolic ideal (e.g., "justice") and yet hold diametrically opposite ideas of how to bring about attainment of this ideal. The old idiom, "the devil is in the details," is nowhere more truly said than under these circumstances. The organizing principle of conceptualizing in the Idea of a social contract calls for processes of reviews, checks and balances, and social refinements that serve the function of perfecting civil tranquility in the Community. It is *formally* by means of such processes that people try to extend and perfect their aims in striving to realize (make real) an ideal Society.

But a "population" has no comprehension *per se*; only the individuals who make up a population have this. Where there exists a multiplicity of ideas about what the Object – the symbolic ideal – actually looks like (appears to be), what is constitutive of the *matter* that review processes, checks and balances, and social refinements must work with? Again, clearly, this matter must subsist in individual human beings. How does an individual *cultivate* it? How do groups of individuals draw it out so that they can find a common comprehension of it? After all, the methodology of Piaget's boys, "we scrap for a bit and then fix things up," breaks down as soon as the population involved reaches a level almost alarmingly low. The "scrapping" goes on, but the "fixing up" is no longer brought about by it. Enlightenment Age theorists proposed that "science" was the answer to the problem. But what is "science"? They proposed no answer to *this* question that all of them agreed on; by doing so, the Enlightenment Age left "science" to linger as just another vague symbolic ideal.

I think it almost goes without saying that in order to "draw something out" of an individual, that something must first exist within that individual. Before human beings collectively can be determiners of Progress in perfection of humanity by means of human institutions, individuals must conceptualize comprehensions of Progress and, because there can be no real Progress without Order (preservation of the degree of all kinds and amounts of objective good people deem to already actually exist), individuals must likewise comprehend Order. Only then can people collectively reconcile their understandings and seek consensus about objective *formalities* of reviews, checks and balances, and refinements. These latter activities are activities of educational Self-development carried out cooperatively and interactively by these people. Kant said,

By education the human being must therefore 1) be *disciplined*. To discipline means to seek to prevent animality from harming humanity, both individual and social. Discipline is therefore merely restraint of wildness.

2) The human being must be *cultivated*. Culture includes teaching and instruction. It is the procurement of skill. This is possession of a capacity which is sufficient for any arbitrary purpose. It determines no ends at all, but leaves this to the later circumstances.

Some skills are good in all cases, i.e., reading and writing; others only for some purposes, i.e., music, which makes us popular with others. Because of the multitude of purposes, skill becomes, as it were, infinite.

3) It must be seen that the human being becomes *prudent* also, suited for human society, popular, and influential. This requires a certain form of culture, which is named *being civilized*. For this are needed manners, good behavior and a certain prudence in virtue of which one is able to use all human beings for one's own final purposes. It conforms accordingly to the changeable taste of each age. Thus just a few decades ago ceremonies were still loved in social intercourse.

4) One must also pay attention to *moralization*. The human being should not merely be skillful for all sorts of purposes, but become of the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are of necessity approved by everyone and which can be at the same time ends of everyone. [Kant (1803) 9: 449-450]

Herein we find the maxim of conceptualizing for perfecting humanity in one's own person. Kant's remarks above can be summarized as

Maxim 3 (the maxim of comprehension). Make it your maxim to strive to make your comprehension of humanity more complete by means of on-going educational Self-development of your Self-discipline, cultivation, prudence, and morality.

In this maxim, emphasis is laid on making your educational Self-development activities *on-going*. Staying aware of and up to date on unfolding current events, actively making yourself informed about scientific findings and political issues, researching the history and moral character of candidates for public office, verifying the veracity of your sources of information . . . these and many other activities all go into bettering your comprehension of the Society of which you are a part. Educational Self-development is a *lifelong* undertaking and a deontologically civic Duty.

**4D The Maxim of Precisioning:** Precisioning is the Modality principle of approval of taste. As such, the principle pertains to the relationship of the person to his/her judgments of taste. Its deduction is grounded in Critical metaphysics by a transcendental acroam Kant called the Idea of *ens entium* ("being of beings"). In medieval Latin tradition, *ens entium* was used to refer to God but this is not what Kant meant by the term. He equated it to *das Wesen aller Wesen* ("the essence of all essence") [Kant (1787) B: 606-607]. *Ens entium* is the Idea of necessary *coherence* in satisfaction, expedience, desire, and actions in accord with the Ideal of *summum bonum* [Wells (2006), chap. 4, pp. 287-288]. Coherence (*Zusammenhalt*) is the necessary form of complete congruence among all Objects in the *nexus* of judgments under the Critical principle of thorough-going determination. This is the *Realerklärung* of coherence from the empirical reflective perspective. From the transcendental reflective perspective, we are not conscious of a state of real coherence; rather, we are conscious only of the *violation* of this form in the act of thinking. This consciousness is presented in affective perception under the principle of formal expedience, and its judgment belongs to the process of reflective rather than determining judgment.

Precisioning is the act in judgmentation by which *complete* congruence of satisfaction + expedience + desire + action is determined inasmuch as a person has knowledge to achieve it<sup>17</sup>. It does this by "lopping off" parts of representations (of desires, cognitions, and action expressions) which, if left in and included in the final determination of judgmentation, would produce internal contradictions and real oppositions in that determination. In more common psychological terms, precisioning can be said to aim at or at least improve a person's feelings of tranquility.

But, quite obviously, people can and do fail to achieve this aim sometimes – perhaps because of lack of empirical knowledge of external factors and circumstances, perhaps because of lack of practical rules of prudence, perhaps because of the automatism of unthinking habits of behavior. Approvals of taste need experience and practice to *improve* the precisioning of judgments.

To use an example that is not without its charms in a certain sense, below the age of around 7 years a little child doesn't really know what a "lie" is. Piaget found,

The most primitive and, at the same time, from our point of view, the most characteristic [childish]

<sup>17</sup> You have likely heard the phrase "unintended consequence." An unintended consequence is something that happened as a result of some action that the agent of the action did not foresee and often did not desire. Unintended consequences provide concrete examples of *incongruities* among satisfaction expedience, desire, and action.

definition [of a lie] we were able to find was a purely realistic one: a lie is "a naughty word." Thus the child, while perfectly well acquainted with a lie when he meets one, identifies it completely with the oaths or indecent expressions which one is forbidden to use. . . . For nothing, after all, is more completely external to the moral consciousness, nothing is more like an unmotivated taboo than an interdiction with regard to language. Why is one word perfectly proper, while another arouses everyone's indignation? The child doesn't know in the least. He submits to the linguistic constraint and accepts this mystery without question. But this surely is the very type of those obligations which remain foreign to his practical understanding. . . . It should be noted in the first place that no mere verbal confusion is here at work. The child who defines a lie as being a "naughty word" knows perfectly well that lying consists in not speaking the truth. He is not, therefore, mistaking one thing for another, he is simply identifying them one with another by what seems to us a quaint extension of the word "lie." . . . There seems therefore to be only one explanation: to tell a lie is to commit a moral fault by means of language. And using naughty words also constitutes a fault committed by means of language. So that for a little child, who really feels no inner obstacle to the practice of lying, and who at six years old still lies more or less as he romances or as he plays, the two types of conduct are on the same plane. When he pronounces certain sentences that do not conform to the truth (and which his parents regard as genuine lies) he is astonished to find that they provoke the indignation of those around him and that he is reproached for them as a fault. When he brings in certain expressive words from the street, the same thing happens. He concludes that there are things one may say and things one may not say, and he calls the latter "lies" whether they are indecent words or statements that do not conform to the truth. [Piaget (1932), pp. 140-142]

I trust you can intuit a connection here between "make believe" (childish romancing) and "making things up." As he grows up, the child comes to make a distinction between "lies" and "naughty words" that conforms with the distinction adults make. And this is an example of precisioning improving as a child gains more experience. Early on, he *overgeneralizes* the meaning of the word "lie"; later he undoes this and makes the meaning of the word "lie" more precise. Indeed, when an *adult* overgeneralizes something, we can see this as a manifestation of the same childish moral realism responsible for equating "lies" with "naughty words" that has lingered on into adulthood.

When a person *delimits a context*, this too is an act of precisioning. For the context of perfecting humanity in one's own Self, precisioning of approval of taste pertains to the aim of improving the degree and extent of domestic tranquility in the Community overall. Mini-Communities and incongruent special interests of individuals and mini-Communities are the principal contributors to disturbances of this tranquility. These disturbances are warded off and eliminated by precisioning of special interests – lopping off those parts of them that provoke conflicts of interest – and seeking and finding common grounds of interest. We call the latter people's "common interests." The maxim of precisioning follows from this at once:

Maxim 4 (the maxim of common interests). Make it your maxim to always seek for a common interest as a ground upon which satisfaction of your special interests can be brought into coherence with the special interests of other people.

Bringing about such a coherence often require individuals to rethink their special interests and recast them into modified forms – using precisioning to "lop off" those parts of them that are not actually necessary for satisfaction. By this process, special interests are made to become *civic* special interests.

In light of the part maxim 4 plays in promoting tranquility in the Community, it would be not-incorrect to nickname this maxim "the blessed is the peacemaker" maxim. This nickname is suggested by a verse in the New Testament,

Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the sons of God. [Matthew 5:9]

In this verse, the word "peacemakers" (εἰρηνοποιοί) does not refer to those who do not fight but, instead,

to those who actively bring conflict to an end. It is in this context that the nickname is appropriate.

## References

- Adams, John (1790), *Discourses on Davila*, in *The Portable John Adams*, John Patrick Diggins (ed.), NY: Penguin Books, 2004.
- Aristotle (4th cent. BC), *Topics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), vol. Aristotle II, pp. 272-739, 1997.
- Garner, Bryan A. (2011), *Black's Law Dictionary*, 4th pocket edition, St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters.
- Grossberg (1978), "Competition, decision, and consensus," *Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications*, **66** (1978), 470-493.
- Grossberg, Stephen (1980), "Biological competition: Decision rules, pattern formation, and oscillations," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, **77** (1980), 2338-2342.
- Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay (1787-8), *The Federalist*, NY: Barnes & Nobel Classics, 2006.
- Haviland, William A., Harald E.L. Prins, Dana Walrath, and Bunny McBride (2008), *Anthropology: The Human Challenge*, 12th ed., Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Jernegan, Marcus Wilson (1929), *The American Colonies: 1492-1750*, NY: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.
- Kant, Immanuel (c. 1773-79), *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band XV, pp. 55-654, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928.
- Kant, Immanuel (1776-95), *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, 2nd part, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band XVIII, pp. 3-725, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928.
- Kant, Immanuel (c. 1777-80), *Metaphysik L<sub>1</sub>*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band XXVIII, pp. 167-350, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1968.
- Kant, Immanuel (1783), *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band IV, pp. 253-383, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911.
- Kant, Immanuel (c. 1784-85), *Moralphilosophie Collins*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band XXVII, pp. 237-473, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1974.
- Kant, Immanuel (1785), *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band IV, pp. 385-463, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911.
- Kant, Immanuel (1787), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 2nd ed., in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band III, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911.
- Kant, Immanuel (1788), *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band V, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1913.
- Kant, Immanuel (1790), *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band V, pp. 165-485, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1913.
- Kant, Immanuel (1793-4), *Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band XXVII, pp. 476-732, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1975.
- Kant, Immanuel (1797), *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, Band VI, pp. 203-493, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1914.

- Kant, Immanuel (1798), *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band VII*, pp. 117-333, Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1917.
- Kant, Immanuel (1800), *Logik*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band IX*, pp. 1-150, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923.
- Kant, Immanuel (1803), *Pedagogik*, in *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Band IX*, pp. 437-499, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923.
- Leary, Timothy (1957), *Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality*, Eugene, OR: Resource Publications, 2004.
- Leavitt, Harold J. (1972), *Managerial Psychology*, 3rd ed., Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Mill, John Stuart (1859), *On Liberty*, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002.
- Mill, John Stuart (1861), *Representative Government*, Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publications reprint.
- Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat Baron de (1748), *The Spirit of Laws*, in two volumes, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, ISBN 978-1-57392-949-3.
- Piaget, Jean (1932), *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, NY: The Free Press, 1965.
- Santayana, George (1896), *The Sense of Beauty*, NY: Dover Publications, 1955.
- Santayana, George (1905), *Reason in Society*, vol. 2 of *The Life of Reason*, NY: Dover Publications, 1980.
- Tagore, Rabindranath (1905), "Ekla Chalo Re," Bengali patriotic song.
- Toynbee, Arnold (1946), *A Study of History*, abridgment of volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell, NY: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Turnbull, Colin M. (1962), *The Forest People*, NY: Simon and Shuster.
- Wells, Richard B. (2006), *The Critical Philosophy and the Phenomenon of Mind*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2009), *The Principles of Mental Physics*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2010), *Leadership*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2012), *The Idea of the Social Contract*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2013), *Critique of the American Institution of Education*, vol. II of *The Idea of Public Education*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2014), *The Institution of Public Education*, vol. III of *The Idea of Public Education*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wells, Richard B. (2017), *Civic Free Enterprise*, available free of charge from the author's web site.
- Wilson Learning Corporation (2011), *The Social Styles Handbook*, Astoria, OR: Nova Vista Publishing.
- Yeats, William Butler (1921), "The Second Coming," in *Yeats's Poetry, Drama, and Prose*, James Pethica (ed.), NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.

Author's website: <http://www.mrc.uidaho.edu/~rwells/techdocs>