

## Chapter 17 Life After Life

### 1. What Does One Do in Afterlife?

In chapter 16 it was explained that one of the common themes found in the theologies of all the major religious genera is that *Existenz* in afterlife is earned by merit. In the Abrahamic faiths this merit is called "righteousness"; in Hinduism it is called *dharma*; in Buddhism it is called *karma*; and in Chinese folk religion it is called *bao ying*. Critical *life*, however, is the capacity of a being to take action in accordance with laws of appetitive power. Therefore, to be "alive" in afterlife means expressing actions. But what sort of actions? What does one *do* in afterlife? The major religious genera, if not totally silent on this question, at best speak in low whispers. They all agree that afterlife *Existenz* will be pleasant for those who merit it<sup>1</sup>, and if that is enough to satisfy you, there's nothing wrong with that. It expresses trust in God's benevolence and I find no fault with this. Trust in God's benevolence is subjectively necessary if a person is to pursue the labors of self-perfection out of self-commitment to reciprocal (moral) Duty rather than from grounds in self-love that really are nothing more than maxims of prudence.

But many people are curious about this question – and are so without distrusting in God's benevolence. After all, as the adage goes, "eternity is a long time." If earthly temporal life is an apprenticeship for afterlife and a necessary preparation for afterlife *Existenz* for a being possessing free will (14th article of Critical faith), "preparation to do what?" does not seem like an unreasonable question.

Are there any usefully informative dialectic characterizations one could explore in regard to curiosity about afterlife activities? Aquinas thought so:

Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it; and so every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. . . . Therefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that in which he is most intent, and that in which especially they wish to pass their time with their friends[.] Accordingly, since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that a man's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative. [Aquinas (1267-1273), "Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life," Question CLXXIX, Art. 1]

However, Aquinas is not referring to "life in general" here. He is following Aristotle's philosophy:

Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, [is] and therefore the same division applies to intellect and human life. [*ibid.*]

Specifically, Aristotle wrote,

We may say then . . . that that which has soul is distinguished from that which has not by living. But the word living is used in many senses, and we say a thing lives if any one of the following is present in it – mind, sensation, movement or rest in space, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth. Consequently all plants are considered to live for they evidently have in themselves a capacity and first principle by means of which they exhibit both growth and decay . . . This, then, is the first principle through which all living things have life, but the first characteristic of an animal is sensation . . . But for the moment let us be satisfied with saying that the soul is the origin of the characteristics we have mentioned and is defined by them, that is by the faculties of nutrition,

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<sup>1</sup> This ignores those doctrines holding that there is a hellish afterlife. The 6th dialectic theorem of Critical theology states there is no hellish afterlife. To hold that there could be such a thing is to attribute an element of malevolence to God through analogy to the sorts of vindictiveness and desires for revenge some human beings express.

sensation, thought and movement. . . .

Now of the faculties of soul which we have just mentioned, some living things . . . have all, others only some, and others again only one. . . . Plants have the nutritive faculty only but other living things have the faculty for sensation too. But if for sensation, then also for appetite . . . In addition to these senses, some also possess the power of movement in space and others again, *viz.*, man . . . have the power of thinking and intelligence. [Aristotle (c. 335-322 BC), pp. 78-83]

This is Aristotle's famous division of "soul" into the nutritive soul, the appetitive soul, and the rational soul. Only human beings and gods, he tells us, possess the rational soul<sup>2</sup>. Aquinas is confining himself to man, the "rational soul," and is transforming Aristotle's word *psyche* (ψυχή; one translation of this word is "soul") into a Christian context that is foreign to Aristotle's philosophy.

Next Aquinas asks (and answers) whether this twofold division – contemplative life and active life – is a sufficiently complete description:

As stated in the foregoing Article, this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellectual knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative. [Aquinas (1267-1273), "Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life," Question CLXXIX, Art. II]

At first glance (and, perhaps, even at second glance) this seems like it covers everything. Is it not true that you can quietly *think* (contemplate) about something or you can actually do something that *effects* something else in the world around you? Yes, of course; but if you probe a little deeper, you discover that this neat twofold division into opposites doesn't actually cover everything because it leaves out *being affected by* things (reacting). Aquinas' division covers the theoretical and practical Standpoints but omits the judicial Standpoint. The omission is understandable; the Greeks – especially Plato and Aristotle – thought "emotions" and affectivity belonged to the irrational ("animal") part of Man and were therefore "not intellectual." Aquinas seems to have been of the same opinion, although I find it hard to see how anyone who has read Augustine's *Confessions* could fail to note how *his* frequent outbursts of affective emotivity seemed to motivate his intellectual reflections on theology:

My mind is burning to solve this intricate puzzle. O Lord my God, good Father, it is a problem at once so familiar and so mysterious. I long to find the answer. Through Christ I beseech you, do not keep it hidden away but make it clear to me. Let your mercy give me light. To whom am I to put my questions? To whom can I confess my ignorance with greater profit than to you? For my burning desire to study your Scriptures is not displeasing to you. Grant me what I love, for it was your gift that I should love it. [Augustine (c. 397-400), pg.. 270]

Like Aristotle, Aquinas held that "the contemplative life" (i.e., the life of a philosopher) was superior to "the active life" although he does stop short of declaring "the active life" to be without value. He tells us this himself:

Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves which nonetheless are surpassed by another in some respects. Accordingly, we must reply that the contemplative life absolutely is more excellent than the active; and [Aristotle] proves this by eight reasons. The first is because the contemplative life befits man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect . . . The active life however is occupied with externals. . . . The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous . . . Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the

<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to note that Aristotle's development of the idea of life in *On the Soul* mirrors precisely the same stages of a child's understanding of "life" documented in Piaget (1929).

active . . . Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient since he needs fewer things for that purpose . . . Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake while the active life is directed to something else. . . . Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest . . . Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, while active life is according to human things . . . Eighthly, because the contemplative life is the most proper to man, namely, his intellect; in the works of the active life, however, the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part [Aquinas (1267-1273), "Treatise on Active and Contemplative Life," Question CLXXXII, Art. 1]

The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of externals works; and then it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and putting in order the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the lack of order of the internal passions. [*ibid.*, Art. 3]

But are "the internal passions" really discordant with "Divine things"? A sizable portion of chapter 16 was devoted to arguing exactly the opposite, that supernature was to be regarded as *essentially* affective and only secondarily "intellective" in the context of ontological things. Aquinas' doctrine implicitly takes the position of a person semi-disconnected with other persons. But if divine purpose finds its expression in divine Community (11th article of Critical faith), this disconnection is *at the least* contrary to that article and carries characteristics of egocentrism.

The useful dialectic characterization we seek, therefore, must in some way involve not a twofold *analysis* – such as Aquinas' dialectic does – but instead a threefold *synthesis* of some sort. I said earlier in this section that there must be something active in it (Aquinas' "active life"); it also seems obvious that there must be something of "the contemplative life" in it as well (else what use would there be for an *apprenticeship* for afterlife?). But what is the synthetic (third) aspect?

Aquinas provided us with the clue to answering this question when he wrote, "the contemplative life befits man according to that which is best in him . . . The active life however is occupied with externals." The adjectives "contemplative" and "active" denote general concepts of Relation in regard to the idea of "life." Contemplative life is an idea of *internal Relation*, i.e., the form of connection in a representation in which the connections have no reference to anything other than the object which is being represented in the connection. Active life is an idea of *external Relation*, i.e., the form of connection among objects in which is represented something not contained in the representation of any of these objects by themselves. The synthesis of these two forms of connection is called the *transitive Relation*, i.e., the form of connection in which the concept of the connection is simultaneously the concept of an internal Relation *and* an external Relation [Wells (2006), chap. 3, pp. 170-171].

Aquinas' "active life" is obviously an idea grounded in the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology because it pertains to actions a person carries out as an agent. His "contemplative life" is clearly an idea grounded in the theoretical Standpoint because, as Aquinas says, it pertains "to the contemplation of truth," i.e., the capacity for understanding. The Standpoint for the idea of the transitive form of Relation then follows immediately from the synthesis of these other two Standpoints. The synthesis of the theoretical and the practical Standpoints is the judicial Standpoint, the Standpoint which evaluates with regard to the power of judgmentation in general and the feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust*.<sup>3</sup> It is the Standpoint for a human being's power of self-organization in harmonizing objective and subjective knowledge. The feeling of *Lust* and *Unlust* is an affective perception and therefore the transitive Relation *pertains to affectivity*. It thus "fills in" the piece left out of Aquinas' twofold analytic division.

<sup>3</sup> I remind you that the German word *Lust* ("loost") does not mean the same thing as the English word "lust." *Lust* is the fundamental property of adaptive *psyche* for determining adaptation to a state of equilibrium [Wells (2006), chap. 15].

Transitive Relation provides congruence with the idea from chapter 16 that supernatural is to be regarded as essentially affective. In Kantian terminology, reflexion (regarded from the judicial Standpoint) is an act of coalition by which a person brings about a harmony in his thinking, reasoning, and activity. As Kant put it,

Reflexion does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is consciousness of the relationship of given representations to our various sources of knowledge, through which alone their relationships among themselves can be correctly determined. [Kant (1787) B: 316]

Aquinas applied the adjectives "contemplative" and "active" to his two notions of life. What adjective is appropriate for this third (transitive) notion of (after) life? For this answer we turn to dialectic deduction.

## 2. The Context and Ground of the Dialectic

Because of the context of the transitive Relation applied to afterlife, we must not seek this answer in the form of "things." By this I mean the answer cannot come in the form of "will I be a gardener?" or "will I sing in a divine choir?" or other *occupationally* concrete things. The context of the Relation is aesthetical and therefore so must be the form of possible answers being examined.

The context also implies that answers are not to be sought in objective terms of some *ontology*-centered cosmology-of-supernature such as "heaven-and-hell" or any such other. In Critical metaphysics the transcendental Idea of Rational Cosmology is the regulative principle of absolute completeness in the series of conditions by which a human being organizes his knowledge of Nature (and, by dialectic extension, his speculations about supernatural) [Wells (2006), chap. 4, pp. 242-253]. A dialectic on afterlife activity can take as its grounding conditions only those articles of Critical faith which *epistemically* pertain to conditioning of afterlife. These are:

2. God created human beings and the temporal universe, and did so for some divine purpose;
3. Human beings are a reflection or image of God;
6. God values never-ending striving for perfection;
8. God values freedom;
10. No human being can thwart a divine purpose; if his actions are in opposition to a divine purpose, they serve it mediately by serving as provocations for actions by others who do agree with it;
11. Divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall, not by individuals, and finds its expression in divine Community;
12. Every person unchosen for membership in divine Community has unchosen himself;
13. Every person makes himself the person he has chosen to become;
14. Life is an apprenticeship for afterlife; its lessons of virtue and morality are necessary preparations for afterlife *Existenz* by a being possessing free will.

Whatever speculations about supernatural cosmology you might make are going to be ideas containing contexts of your experience because **context** is the sphere of concepts, combined by judgment with the concept said to have the context, which delimits the *applicable scope* involving that concept in Reality. Every object is real in some contexts, unreal in others, and non-real in still others. The idea that there might be stages and levels of afterlife *Existenz* is not-incongruent with the articles of faith above; indeed this idea is wholly congruent with the 6th article of faith. The idea that a person might be consigned to a hellish afterlife for eternity is incongruent with the 8th article of faith because it implies God is intolerant of *some* uses people might make of their freedom. But the 8th article of faith is categorical: it doesn't say "God values some freedoms but not others"; it says "God values freedom," *period*. The practical concept of humanity is mutual sympathetic participation by a Community of people subsisting in unselfish active commitment to a social compact. If a person, by his construction of his manifold of practical rules, makes

himself irretrievably unsuited for humanity then it is sufficient to satisfy divine purpose if death ends his *Existenz* as a person. It is not up to you or me to decide when some person is *irretrievably* "lost to humanity" because of the choices he has made which determine the person he has chosen to become. To presume to so decide is to deny the possibility such a person might yet choose – as a result of whatever trauma or travail he might experience – to *redeem* himself and *reconcile* himself with humanity by turning away from acting on grounds of selfish interests<sup>4</sup> and committing himself to acting from grounds in reciprocal Duty and Obligation. Clearly *you* can *wish* for anything you think *he* deserves in afterlife, but freedom to wish does not grant you *natural liberty* to make it so. It only presents *you* with a decision about what kind of person *you* will choose to become.

Consequently, the dialectic must base its context on the aesthetical character of human judgmentation. Kant tells us,

All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:

1. *What can I know?*
2. *What should I do?*
3. *What might I hope?*

The first question is merely speculative. . . . The second question is merely practical. . . . The third question, namely, "If I do what I should, what may I then hope?" is simultaneously practical and theoretical . . . For all *hope* concerns happiness, and with respect to practical and moral law it is the very same as what Knowledge<sup>5</sup> and natural law is with regard to theoretical knowledge<sup>6</sup> of things. . . . Happiness is the gratification of all our inclinations[.] [Kant (1787) B: 832-834]

What we must examine dialectically, then, are the aesthetical foundations of hope and happiness. Further, this examination must be pertinent to the question asked in this chapter: what does one *do* in afterlife?

I suspect you might be wondering how *both* of these could possibly be addressed in *one* dialectic. Hope and happiness are ideas rooted in subjectivity and are *non-objective* representations. But "what does one do?" is clearly a practical question pertaining to *objective* undertakings. Isn't this a very fundamental problem for what we seek to do here?

The answer is: yes, of course it is; specifically, it is a *metaphysical problem* and has to be initially addressed by metaphysics. To get any communicable answer we must be able to express that answer in cognitive terms – and that means we must have Objects of cognition with which to describe it. Getting them is the job of Kant's Critical metaphysics proper:

Metaphysics, or the system of pure cognitions of reason, divides into two main objectives: I) Transcendental metaphysics, or that part of metaphysics which presents elementary notions in order to recognize Objects which can be given *a priori*: this system of metaphysical knowledge is called *ontology* and rests on dissection of reason according to all elementary notions contained in it . . . II) Metaphysics proper, as metaphysics is called when it is applied to Objects themselves: these objects are [either]


a) *sensuous* and then

- 1) the system concerns either Objects of inner sense or soul, therefore rational psychology;
- 2) or Objects of outer sense, therefore doctrine of body, rational physics;

<sup>4</sup> A selfish interest is an interest-object for which the concept is *immediately* conditioned by a concept of Duty-to-Self. There is no moral merit in selfish interests that conflict with terms or conditions of a social contract.

<sup>5</sup> *Wissen*: systematic and inalterable assertion of truth with consciousness that holding-to-be-true is grounded in judgments that have apodictic Modality with both objectively and subjectively sufficient grounds of understanding.

<sup>6</sup> *Erkenntnis*: any conscious representation or capacity for making such a representation by or through which meanings are determined.



**Figure 1:** 2LAR organization of Critical ontology in Kantian metaphysics proper and their Objects.

b) or Objects of mere reason, i.e., Ideas or ideas of mere reason = cognitions whose Objects cannot be given by the Objects. These are the objects of supersensible cognition, and such present

- 1) rational cosmology, or cosmology of pure reason; and
- 2) rational . . . theology of pure reason. [Kant (1794-95) 29: 956]

Figure 1 illustrates in 2LAR form this organization of metaphysics proper along with the Objects of each of the four branches and the metaphysical reflective perspective (what he above called the 'objective' of transcendental metaphysics) which governs the Ideas of each branch of metaphysics proper.

In some ways Kant's terms "rational cosmology" and "rational theology" are a little inconvenient for our day because when someone today speaks of "cosmology" and "theology" he doesn't mean quite the same thing as what the philosophical terminology of Kant's day meant [Mautner (1997)]. What *Kant* means by "rational cosmology" is the metaphysics of Nature (the objective representation of all-that-exists). What he means by "rational theology" is the metaphysics of Reality (the transcendently necessary universal context in which all ideas of real objects cohere as limitations) [Wells (2006), chap. 4].

A *perspective* is a philosophical viewpoint for systematically evaluating philosophical concepts and emphasizes a particular aspect of these concepts in relationship to metaphysics proper and in relationship to the capacities of the phenomenon of mind. Kant's four headings in figure 1 are the perspectives of general Critical ontology. Critical ontology is a constituted *system* of all concepts and principles related to understanding objects in general. The four perspectives are called the logical, transcendental, hypothetical, and empirical reflective perspectives, respectively (figure 1).

Perspectives are *understood* in a threefold manner according to the Critical Standpoints (the three *subjective* perspectives for evaluating philosophical concepts with regard to the three higher capacities of the phenomenon of mind by which these concepts are judged): theoretically by means of the process of determining judgment; judicially by means of the process of reflective judgment; and practically by means of the process of practical judgment. With this understanding of how Kantian metaphysics is arranged and structured, we are in a position to identify the perspective and the Standpoint that must be used in our dialectic. Because an "ontology of supernature" is regarded subjectively and aesthetically, the Standpoint is judicial. Because the context of its Objects is supernatural, and because Critical theology

takes its starting point from what we know about how the phenomenon of mind judges Reality, the perspective is that of rational theology. Combined, this is called the empirical-judicial perspective<sup>7</sup> and its Ideas (regulative principles of Reason) are those of rational theology.

### 3. The Empirical-Judicial Perspective in Critical Metaphysics: Rational Theology

Aquinas thought theology was a science because Aristotle told him it was [Aristotle (date uncertain), BK.VI, pp. 296-297]. Indeed, Aristotle stated that "if gods exist" then theology was *the* proto-science and it dealt with "things which are separable [from "the stuff a thing is made of" (ὕλη)] and immutable." The stuff a forest is made of are trees but a tree is not a forest. The forest itself is "separable" from the trees. Aristotle held: gods were first causes of everything else (if they existed); they existed as entities separable from the things they caused; and they themselves never changed (they were immutable). Modern scholars of Aristotle criticize Aristotle's metaphysics of theology [Barnes (1995), pp. 101-108] but to a theologian like Aquinas there is nothing controversial about the idea theology is not only a science but the *primary* science. Aquinas' challenge was to make the ideas of Aristotle (who was a pagan) safe for Christianity.

Rational theology occupies a less lofty position. In the 2LAR of Critical ontology applied to Objects, it is the matter of the form (Modality) of this ontology and its regulative principle is what Kant called the theological Idea [Wells (2006), chap. 4, pp. 277-290]. Its general Object is Reality (the transcendently necessary universal *context* in which all ideas of real objects cohere as limitations), and its special object Kant calls *the transcendental Ideal*. The general Idea of rational theology, its "principle of operation," is absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thinking in general [Wells (2006), chap. 14, pg. 1270]. We cannot say *anything* "is real" unless we necessarily presuppose there is some substratum, some all-of-reality (Reality), to give meaning to the word "real." The Idea of Reality is therefore the supreme necessary condition for thinking *anything* is "real." What-is-real about any object is a limitation of this Idea of all-of-reality. When we objectify this Idea of all-of-reality, that object is called the transcendental Ideal, i.e., the practical object of the regulation by Reason of thinking which, in regard to a *nexus* in Reality, serves as the practical *a priori* standard for the perfection of knowledge (theoretical Standpoint) and of happiness (judicial Standpoint).

The word "reality" has always been one of philosophy's most troubling words. Blackburn (1996) offers to "define" it as "that which there is," but this isn't all that helpful if you're wondering about "what is there?" Mautner (1997) doesn't offer to define it at all. "Reality" is and always has been a pretty major problem for ontology-centered philosophy. "Everybody knows what reality is" until they try to *explain* what it is, i.e., what the word means. The main dictionary "definition" of "reality" is "the quality or state of being real; the totality of real things and events." We have here nothing but a *diallelon*. An atheist will tell you "God is not real"; the Pope will tell you "God is real and real in the sense of the highest and most perfect reality." Which of them do you think is correct? Why should you not think *both* of them are correct? Why should you not think both of them are *incorrect*? Do you see the problem here? To understand any meaning of the word we need to have some better and more meaningful form of representation of the Idea, and this is what the Idea of rational theology in Critical metaphysics provides. Represented in 2LAR form, Kant called the headings for the general Idea:

In Quantity, the Idea of *entis realissimi* ("most real of being");  
 In Quality, the Idea of *ens originarium* ("original being");  
 In Relation, the Idea of *ens summum* ("highest being"); and  
 In Modality, the Idea of *ens entium* ("the essence of all being").

<sup>7</sup> In the Critical philosophy an object of representation is said to be empirical when the representation of the object in understanding is so constructed that its concept is signified as thinglike and its marks are characterized by thinghood. The possibility of making such a representation rests on the regulation of judgmentation by the theological Ideas, and for this reason the metaphysic proper of Rational Theology is the metaphysic of the empirical reflective perspective.

These are the names of these four Ideas but what do *they* mean? Like other things in Critical metaphysics the explanations are threefold according to the three Standpoints [Wells (2006), pp. 2352-2353]. For the purposes of this treatise, the pertinent Standpoint is the judicial Standpoint, and here the explanations are:

- for *entis realissimi*, synthesis of all possible aesthetic predicates of expedience for happiness;
- for *ens originarium*, happiness is the original Quality in the affective state of being from which all desires are derivative as limitations;
- for *ens summum*, aesthetic context in the presentation of Reality is connection of desire in a manifold of Desires; and
- for *ens entium*, perfection of the judicial Ideal of happiness is the coherence of satisfaction, expedience, desire, and the binding of these in the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded under the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason.

I ask you to consider: do these four headings, taken together, remind you of the paradisiacal notions of afterlife that were reviewed in chapter 16?

Still, there is no denying that what is said above is awesomely abstract. As I sometimes put it, this is "deep weeds philosophy." Its relevance to this chapter's question is still very opaque. The work of this treatise is not done until the connection is made much more clear and *practically applicable*. Therefore, let us press on and peel this onion down another layer.

#### 4. The Primitive Functions of Aesthetical Reflective Judgment

The transcendental Ideas are regulative principles of the process of pure Reason but understanding of their implications, and therefore of their practical applicability for the question at hand in this treatise, is found through examination of the acts of aesthetical reflective judgment. The primitive functions (*momenta*) of the process of aesthetical reflective judgment were deduced from the regulative principles of Kant's transcendental Ideas in Wells (2006), chap. 14, pp. 1221-1304. This citation is the detailed source for in-depth explanations of them and, as you can surmise from the 84 page length of the citation, the discussion in this treatise must of necessity be merely summary. Figure 2 presents the twelve primitive functions in 2LAR form. Affective perceptions *as objects of inner sense* are understood from the transcendental perspective of Rational Psychology and the labels naming the functions are taken from that perspective. But *as presentments in Reality* they come under the regulation of the theological Idea.




Figure 2: The primitive functions of aesthetical reflective judgment.



As figure 2 indicates, the synthesis carried out in the process of aesthetical reflective judgment is a synthesis of *desires*. A desire (*Begehren*) consists of a combination of affective perceptions. Its *form* is called a **value**; its *matter* is called a **feeling** of *Lust* or *Unlust* (see footnote 3 above).

This technical understanding of a desire is not alien to the connotation of the noun "desire" one finds in dictionary definitions, e.g., "conscious impulse toward an object or experience that promises enjoyment or satisfaction in its attainment"; but neither is it synonymous with dictionary usages. I find it interesting to note that psychologists do not use the word "desire" as a technical term and try to avoid using it altogether. Reber & Reber (2001) does not even offer to define it. As for "feeling," they tell us,

It is particularly difficult to isolate precise usages of this term [feeling] since even the most technical are contaminated by popular connotations. . . . The difficulty with the term is that its use is nearly always metaphoric and somehow we all seem quite convinced that we know what we mean when we use it. [Reber & Reber (2001), "feeling"]

They do offer an ontological description of the noun "value":

The quality or property of a thing that makes it useful, desired or esteemed. Note the pragmatic aspect implied by this definition: the value of a thing is given by its role in a (social) transaction; the thing itself does not possess value. [*ibid.*, "value"]

They also offer four additional "definitions," describing how the term is used in anthropology, economics, mathematics, and color classification, as well as two verb usages ("to assess the worth of a thing"; "to hold something in esteem based upon one's evaluation of it").

The difficulty psychology has with the word "value" arises out of its being embedded in the technically vague notion of "emotion." Reber & Reber remark,

Historically, this term [emotion] has proven utterly refractory to definitional efforts; probably no other term in psychology shares its combination of nondefinability and frequency of use. Many textbook authors wisely employ it as the title of a chapter and let the material in the chapter substitute for a concept definition. [*ibid.*, "emotion"]

Psychology runs headlong into these difficulties because psychologists, like nearly everyone else, adopt an ontology-centered "way of looking at the world." Kant's *practical* explanation of "emotion" is

a sensation in which pleasantness [or unpleasantness] is produced only by means of a momentary inhibition followed by a stronger outpouring of the power of life [Kant (1790) 5: 226].

"Power of life" (*Lebenskraft*) means the power (as in "vitality") to Self-determine your own actions. *Lebenskraft* is closely connected to another idea we will soon be looking at, namely, *Personfähigkeit* or the "power of a person." But before this we must examine the *Realdefinition*<sup>8</sup> of each of the primitive functions of aesthetical reflective judgment in figure 2 from Kant's empirical-judicial perspective. These are summarized as follows.

sense of culmination: private satisfaction or dissatisfaction in mere sensation;  
 sense of continuity: the presentation of a particular satisfaction or dissatisfaction combined with an object of desire;  
 sense of belief: the presentation of a general satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one's state of *Existenz*;  
 feeling of pleasure: presentation of a transcendental affirmation of expedience for happiness;  
 feeling of sublimity: presentation of a transcendental denial of expedience of happiness;

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<sup>8</sup> A ***Realdefinition*** is a practical definition that contains a clear mark by which the object can always be recognized and makes the concept to be explained usable in application.

feeling of beauty: presentation of a feeling of real satisfaction through the negation of *Lust per se*;  
 sense of immanent interest: a *Sache*-desire symbolized by anticipation of the *Existenz* of a substantial *Sache*-thing<sup>9</sup>;  
 sense of transeunt interest: an *Unsache*-desire<sup>10</sup> symbolized by an action anticipated to realize a satisfaction in an aesthetic context;  
 sense of reciprocal interest: Ideal-desire as a state-of-being expedient to a general state of happiness symbolized in an idea of a tenet of Reason;  
 feeling of tendency: a feeling of hope or hopelessness symbolized by an object of desire judged possibly expedient for the aesthetical perfection of happiness;  
 feeling of presentment: a feeling of liking or disliking for a symbolized object of desire judged actually expedient for happiness;  
 feeling of accord: a feeling of rightness or wrongness for a symbolized object of desire judged necessarily expedient for the aesthetical perfection of happiness.

An object of desire is that for which the presentation of its actual *Existenz* is a condition of satisfaction (or, in the case of the feeling of *Unlust*, dissatisfaction). An object of desire is not necessarily an objective appearance; it can equally well subsist in an affective perception. In this case it is an 'object' only in the sense that every Object has an implied object to go with the representation. One could call an affective object of desire a subjective object or a non-cognitive object or a psychological object. When an object of desire is represented in *cognition* it is an objective end or means.

The form of a desire (its value) is that in affective perception that can be connected to externalized motoregulatory expression (body actions) and to appetites of practical Reason by means of the process of *teleological* reflective judgment (the other half of the process of reflective judgment in which connections are established in the manifold of Desires). In Critical epistemology, a value has nothing to do with any particular object of external nature but rather is to be regarded as a subjective orientation for how a person determines his actions, i.e., the expression of a person's *Lebenskraft*. We *act* upon our values. Santayana put it rather well and almost correctly when he wrote,

Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reactions of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature. The rational part is by its essence relative; it leads us from data to conclusions, or from parts to wholes; it never furnishes the data with which it works. If any preference or precept were declared to be ultimate and primitive, it would thereby be declared to be irrational, since mediation, inference, and synthesis are the essence of rationality. [Santayana (1896), pg. 14]

The only thing I would quibble about with this is that he did get it a little backward: values do not "spring from the immediate and inexplicable reactions of vital impulse," but, rather, the latter spring from values. Santayana would be completely correct only if "values" were ontological things – which they are not.

What Critical epistemology uncovers about human nature here again buttresses what has been said earlier in this treatise: that understanding of supernature and afterlife must proceed from grounds of subjectivity and affectivity in human nature. We would be in error to think (other than by metaphor) the question "what will I do in afterlife?" can have ontological answers like "I will tend gardens" or "I will sing in a heavenly choir" or "I will sit and contemplate God's divine awesomeness" or other such activities. Rather, we will explore the "what will I do?" question in terms of the disposition or modification of things by human skill to answer intended purposes, and in Critical epistemology this is called **art**. What we seek to connect is how activities serve as *preparations* for life after life in the context of divine purpose.

<sup>9</sup> A *Sache*-thing is an object regarded from the empirical reflective perspective as a thing-in-the-world. A *Sache*-desire is the feeling and value anticipated by realization of that thing.

<sup>10</sup> An *Unsache*-thing is a change-in-Nature, i.e., an event or "happening." An *Unsache*-desire is the feeling and value anticipated by realization of this change-in-Nature.

## 5. The Ideal of Afterlife *Existenz*

Critical theology holds that life is a preparation for afterlife. Metaphorically, this is akin to the idea of a person's schooling. *Meriting* afterlife *Existenz* implies a divine expectation that a person will make satisfactory progress in his Self-creation of the person he chooses to become by means of how he constructs his private and personal moral code defined by his manifold of rules (13th article of faith). Divine purpose is fulfilled by humanity overall and expressed in divine Community (11th article), and so a person who fails to prepare himself to participate in this expression fails to merit continuing *Existenz* as a person in afterlife and thereby *unchooses* himself for membership in humanity (12th article of faith).

There are obvious follow-up questions consequential to this. *What* prepares a person? *How much* progress is "satisfactory"? Lacking a "social instinct" and innate inclinations toward reciprocal Obligations and Duties, and being given the power of free will (8th article of Critical faith), meritorious Self-creation is a *laborious* act of Self-disposition. This is, I think, reasonably obvious. A **disposition** (*Gessinnung*) is a first *subjective* ground for the adoption of a practical rule or maxim [Kant (1797) 6: 25], and so here, too, we find the human nature of affectivity at the center of our dialectic speculations. Kant famously wrote,

It is not possible to think of anything at all in the world – yes, or beyond it as well – that could be held-to-be good without restriction except a *good will*. Understanding, wit, power of judgment, and the like, whatever such *talents* of mind may be called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one's plans, as qualities of *temperament*, are undoubtedly good and desirable for many ends; but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which is to make use of these natural gifts, and whose distinctive constitution is therefore called *character*, is not good. [Kant (1785) 4: 393]

What does a person do to *perfect* his own willpower to give himself a *good will*?

The second dialectic theorem deduced earlier states that afterlife is seriated with grades of Community. I think it would be a very rare human being who can so thoroughly perfect humanity in his own person during his earthly *Existenz* that his Self-perfection could merit him being judged an *ideal* person of good will. If mundane life is an apprenticeship for afterlife, then stages of afterlife would be likened to a journeyman's continuation of perfection of humanity in his own person. These stages can be regarded as ongoing acts of Self-creation and re-creation. Metaphorically, they could be called "days," not unlike Augustine's metaphors for the six "days" of creation in Genesis. It seems to me poetically fitting to think that if one "day" wasn't enough for God to create the universe, then one "day" (lifetime) is unlikely to be enough for a human being to create himself. For Augustine, these "days" of creation are not reckoned to be *temporal* days; rather, they are steps in a logical series of *acts* of creation. For example,

The sky above us, this great work of wonder, you made on the second day, after you created light on the first. [Augustine (c. 397-400), Bk. XII, pg. 285]

These acts, he concludes, lead to and culminate in an ultimate perfection, the Augustinian "Sabbath day":

But the seventh day is without evening and the sun shall not set upon it, for you [God] have sanctified it and willed that it shall last forever. Although your eternal repose was unbroken by the act of creation, nevertheless, after all your works were done and you had seen that they were very good, you rested on the seventh day. And in your Book we read this as a presage that when our work in this life is done, we too shall rest in you in the Sabbath of eternal life, though our works are very good only because you have given us the grace to perform them.

In that eternal Sabbath you will rest in us, just as you now work in us. The rest that we shall enjoy will be yours, just as the work that we now do is your work done through us. But you, O Lord, are eternally at work and eternally at rest. It is not in time that you see or in time that you rest: yet you

make what we see in time; you make time itself and the repose which comes when time ceases.  
[Augustine (c. 397-400), Bk. XIII, pg. 346]

Augustine's metaphor of Sabbath *Existenz* is a metaphor of *non-temporal* supernature, the *desire* for which is judged in the *transcendental-judicial* perspective by the aesthetical function of *beauty*: the matter of composition in a reflective judgment presenting a feeling of a state of equilibrium [Wells (2006), chap. 14, pp. 1218-1260]. An inference of analogy can be made between Augustine's "Sabbath Day" and the aesthetical reflective judgment of beauty, and in this analogy *there is an immediate correspondence to be found with something Kant said about the Ideal of humanity in one's own person*:

Only that which has the purpose of its *Existenz* in itself, the *human being* – who determines his purposes himself through reason, or, where he must draw them from external perception, can nevertheless compare them to essential and universal purposes and, in that case, also aesthetically pass judgment on their harmony with them – this *human being* alone is capable of an Ideal of *beauty*, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone among all the objects in world capable of the Ideal of *perfection*. [Kant (1790) 5: 233]

Equilibrium is the aesthetical correspondent of Augustine's "rest." We have in this the orientation we need for an *empirical-judicial* dialectic on life after life.

From the empirical-judicial perspective of Reality, beauty is presentation of a *feeling* of real satisfaction through the negation of *Lust per se*. In the threefold logical division of being-a-human-being, *Lust per se* is the fundamental property of adaptive *psyche* for determining adaptation to a state of equilibrium [Wells (2009), chap. 4, pp. 141-163]. The logical division of *psyche* is the organized structure of animating principles for reciprocal co-determination of body phenomena and mind phenomena. Adaptation is the equilibrating of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is incorporation of a representation or scheme into a general structure. Accommodation is modification of an existing structure to permit incorporation of a new representation or scheme. Assimilation "absorbs" a representation or action scheme into the already-existing structure; accommodation modifies that structure. When these two are in perfect equilibrium there is neither any more change in the structure nor is there any remaining disturbance introducing a need to change it. In this state, feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* cancel each other out in their balance and one feels neither *Lust* nor *Unlust*. The aesthetic Quality of beauty is the perception of this condition. Kant wrote,

We *linger* over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) that lingering when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly awakens attention in which the mind is passive. [Kant (1790) 5: 222]

Tranquility is a state of mind that results from being sufficiently satisfied in relationship to one's general state of life and desiring nothing more or different in this relationship. One *lingers* in this state. Feeling tranquil is marked by the Quality of beauty in aesthetical reflective judgment, and this is the aesthetically defining character of "rest" in Augustine's connotation of "Sabbath Day." A thing is perfect if it is entirely complete, and ideal tranquility is therefore a state of aesthetical perfection.

In terms of the functions of aesthetical reflective judgment outlined earlier, a state of tranquility is a representation of judgment as {sense of belief; feeling of beauty; sense of reciprocal interest; feeling of accord}. The aesthetical *momentum* of beauty can be called a "terminating function" because it brings a specific activity to a conclusion. I think I am fairly safe in saying all people at one time or another have had an experience of such a state. In contrast, the other two *momenta* of Quality in aesthetical reflective judgment (pleasure/displeasure and sublimity) can be called "activating functions" because these feelings move you to take action [Wells (2009), chap. 8, pp. 302-307]. In a manner of speaking, satisfactions of pleasure can be called "small" or "selfish" because they seem very localized and quite specific to special

objects of desire. In contrast, satisfactions of sublimity can be called "great" or "sublime" because they denote inexpedience for happiness without objective knowledge of what would make up for the lack of something that one feels. The feeling is "infinite" (is not-finite). Kant said of the sublime,

We call *sublime* that which is *absolutely great*. However, to be great and to be a magnitude are quite different concepts (*magnitudo* and *quantitas*). Likewise, *simply to say* that something is great is also something entirely different from saying it is *absolutely great* (*absolute, non comparative magnum*<sup>11</sup>). The latter is that *which is great beyond all comparison*. [Kant (1790) 5: 248]

An idea of God is an idea of a sublime Object. Let us consider these two feelings in the context of a process of perfecting humanity in one's own person. The feeling of sublimity is an activating function that orients and moves you to relieve the dissatisfaction felt when you are conscious of *lacking* something. In religion, this is a motivation for seeking what Augustine called "resting in God in the Sabbath of eternal life." Here is what philosophers call a "final cause," i.e., a teleological end or "that for the sake of which a result is produced" [Blackburn (1996), "causes: material, formal, efficient, final"]. To reach such a teleological end is a step-by-step process of attaining intermediate "results." These results – specific, limited, and identifiable – are objects corresponding to the feeling of pleasure. Completion of this process corresponds to the feeling of beauty, and thus beauty can be regarded as a synthesis of the feeling of pleasure and the feeling of sublimity, i.e.,

pleasure + sublimity → beauty.

Pleasure is a sensuous satisfaction, and that which pleases in sensation Kant calls "the pleasant" (*Angenehmen*) [Kant (1790) 5: 205]. It pertains to inclinations, i.e., habitual sensuous appetites. This is what Kant referred to as *appetitio per stimulos* [Kant (1783) 29: 895]. Aquinas' "active life" roughly corresponds to occupational activities of this sort inasmuch as he described it as pertaining to *external* actions. By "occupational" I mean "how one occupies oneself."

The feeling of beauty, on the other hand, is the mark of a judgment of taste [Kant (1790) 5: 211] and one lingers over it. This is not precisely the same thing Aquinas meant by "the contemplative life." Aquinas was speaking of occupational activities concerned with intellectual appetites (*appetitio per motiva*) which arise out of understanding rather than sensibility [Kant (1783) 29: 895]. Aquinas' "contemplative life" describes *pursuit* of something ("truth"), but the feeling of beauty is not a state of mind in pursuit of anything because, in a manner of speaking, the thing that *was* being pursued has been caught (at least momentarily). A mathematician or a scientist labors in pursuit of truth, a theologian in pursuit of understanding of faith, a poet in pursuit of what Kant called *aesthetical* truth (congruence of a cognition with the Subject and the laws of sense-semblance) [Kant (1800) 9: 39].

We are now in a position to see that Aquinas' twofold division of "human life" is not so much a division of "life" as it is a division of appetites (*per stimulos* and *per motiva*). Both appetites are objective in the sense that there is an object being pursued and an interest of reason involved. But human appetitive power is not bound or constrained to either of these. Rather, its *autonomy* is autonomy of transcendental freedom and can be called a free determination of practical purpose or *appetitio per liberum* in relationship to expedience for happiness. This *modus* of Relation in appetitive power is the one most congruent with the 8th article of faith (God values freedom). But all appetites are determinations to undertake activity of some kind. Kant tells us the feeling of sublimity is that in aesthetical perception the moves the mind through feelings of *Unlust* [Kant (1790) 5: 257-258]. In the beginning of this chapter, it was asked what the third Relation (the transitive) of the notion of life might be. We now have an answer for this. Along with Aquinas' notions of the contemplative life and the active life, we can now add the notion of *the sublime life*, by which I mean the person is occupied with activities in pursuit of something *unlimited* in

<sup>11</sup> "absolutely, not comparatively great"

scope while not knowing in advance how the *Existenz* of its *Object* might turn out to be. If we recall to mind the 3rd article of Critical faith (human beings are reflections or images of God), that article presages what this Object might be. All the major genera of religion regard their divine archetype as being in some way sublime. For a human being to *make himself* a truer reflection of God implies the person strives to extend the limitations of his *Existenz* into some greater scope of life-*Kraft*. When we add to all this the idea of perfection of humanity in one's person then we find the metaphorical Objects of afterlife activity: the *power of a person* and the *power of humanity*.

## 6. The Power of a Person and the Power of Humanity

The idea of leading a sublime life in afterlife *Existenz* calls to mind somewhat an easily and commonly observable character of small children. In a normal household, a little boy *wants to grow up* to be just like his daddy; a little girl wants to grow up to be just like her mommy. A little child's parents are his or her first and most important role models, and a little child's estimations of them are *sublime* stereotypes. If the parents are at least minimally fit caretakers, to the child Daddy is the strongest, wisest, most courageous daddy in the whole world; Mommy is the most loving, wisest, most caring mommy in the whole world. It is an expectation of authority parents can never hope to meet – something a child eventually comes to understand when he or she is older. Does it then seem odd or strange that the idea of the sublime life should be one in which a person seeks to emulate God? It doesn't seem odd to me. Let us examine the ideas of the power of a person and the power of humanity with this in mind.

Hobbes introduced a vague concept of "a man's power to do what he would" [Hobbes (1651), pp. 79-80] and this notion is the general context of the idea of the power of a person (*Personfähigkeit*). Kant made a number of *en passant* remarks about the power of a person, although he stopped well short of actually giving the idea a full and proper development. He wrote,

Cultivation (*cultura*) of his natural powers (powers of intellect, powers of mind, powers of body) as a means to all possible ends is man's Duty to himself. Man is culpable to himself (as a natural being) not to leave his natural gifts and capacity unused and rusting, as it were, of which his reason might someday make use . . .


*Powers of intellect* are those whose exercise is possible only through reason. They are creative so far as their use is not drawn from experience but rather derived *a priori* from principles. Such things are mathematics, logic, and the metaphysics of nature, of which the latter two are also included in philosophy, namely in the theoretical, which then does not mean wisdom, as the word itself would suggest, but only science, although the former can be conducive to [science's] purpose.

*Powers of mind* are those which stand at the disposal of the needs of understanding and the rule it uses to satisfy its arbitrary aims, and because of this experience is their guide. They include memory, the power of imagination, and the like, on which can be built learning, taste (internal and external embellishment), and so forth, which furnish instruments for a variety of intentions.

Finally, cultivating the *power of body* (gymnastics, strictly) is looking after what makes the equipment (the matter) in men, without which the purposes of men could not be fulfilled; hence the continuing and deliberate invigoration of the animal side of man is Duty of man to himself. [Kant (1797) 6: 444-445]

His remarks are found sprinkled in various places in the Kantian *corpus* including: Kant (1793-4) 27: 593-602; Kant (1797) 6: 444-445; and Kant (1803) 9: 447-489. However, his treatment of the topic was unsystematic and generally unsatisfactory. It remained in this condition until attention was given to it in its own right in Wells (2010), chap. 7, pp. 259-267, and Wells (2012), chap. 10, pp. 333-336, chap. 11, pp. 360-366, and chap. 13, pp. 467-476.

The four general headings of the power of a person are illustrated in figure 3. In this treatise there are two contexts in which to view it: perfection of humanity in oneself and perfection of humanity overall.



**Figure 3:** 2LAR structure of the power of a person.

In the first context, the idea of *Personfähigkeit* concerns the power of an individual to pursue his aims and satisfy his purposes. In the second, the idea concerns the power of a *Community* of people to act in concert in pursuing their common interests. The latter can be called the power of a *corporate* person.

I begin with the first context. When referenced to an individual person, *Personfähigkeit* means *the organization of the capacities of a person for realizing or attempting to realize (make actual) the objects of his appetites*. This is the prime meaning of the term; references to a corporate person are extensions of analogy with this. Its four headings of Quantity, Quality, &etc. have the following explanations [Wells (2010), chap. 7, pp. 259-267]:

in Quantity, a person's *physical power*, which subsists in the physical capacities of his body;  
 in Quality, a person's *intellectual power*, which subsists in his knowledge, intelligence, and judgment;  
 in Relation, a person's *tangible power*, which subsists in his personal possessions (stock of acquired tangible goods), these being implements useful to him as means for accomplishing his ends; and  
 in Modality, a person's *persuasive power*, which subsists in his ability to sufficiently communicate his thoughts and ideas to other persons.

A person's individual pursuit of happiness is made possible by the power of his person alone because it is the source of his *natural* liberties and his means of fulfilling Duties to himself. The more a person develops and perfects the power of his person: (i) the more at liberty he is to make actual those things he thinks will make him happier; and (ii) the fewer frustrations he encounters in life. Psychology tells us,

Frustration is a "feeling" rather than a "fact." It is a feeling that arises when one encounters certain kinds of blocks on paths to certain kinds of goals. These feelings arise when the block seems insurmountable and when failure to surmount it threatens one's personal well-being – when the goal involves the self.

When people encounter such obstacles, they react with aggression: aggression mostly toward the obstacle when the person is sure of his own ability and aggression mostly toward oneself when the person is pessimistic about his ability, i.e., when he has had a history of failures.

Many obstacle situations are depriving rather than frustrating because the obstacles do not seem insurmountable or the goals are not central to the self. Some people may therefore meet fewer frustrations than others because they have more ways around obstacles or because they are self-confident enough so that their self-esteem does not have to be proved again by every new problem they encounter. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 38]

Frustration and deprivation are both sources of disturbance to a person's equilibrium. For this reason, a person tends to develop dispositions for maxims by which he uses and tries to increase the power of his person. If he uses *only* maxims of natural liberty then his relationships with other people are relationships

in a state of nature and his relationships with others remain mutually outlaw. If he lives among others, he is part of their community but not part of a *civil* Community. It is a fundamental theorem of human Society that *a human being makes a reciprocal self-commitment to join in a civil Community with others if and only if he judges that doing so is beneficial to his personal liberty in exercising, maintaining, and improving the power of his person* [Wells (2012), chap. 11, pg. 360].

Not every person makes such a judgment nor is led by his experience to an understanding of the benefits of civil Community and the exchange of natural liberties for civil liberties. Santayana remarked,

The moment . . . that society emerges from the early pressure of the environment and is tolerably secure against primary evils, morality grows lax. The forms that life will farther assume are not to be imposed by moral authority, but are determined by the genius of the race, the opportunities of the moment, and the tastes and resources of individual minds. The reign of duty gives place to the reign of freedom, and the law and the covenant to the dispensation of grace. [Santayana (1896), pg. 17]

It can be said with much truth that people born into a civil Community and accustomed throughout their lives to the security and benefits it provides can take these for granted and therefore never develop those judgments and maxims by which they commit themselves to reciprocal obligations or exchange any of their natural liberties for civil liberties. If there is nothing to make them aware of the benefit to themselves civil Community provides then one can and should expect a slow and inevitable breakdown and collapse of that civil Community. Indeed, the *prime* objective of *public* education is to make people aware of these benefits-to-self that *only* civil Community provides [Wells (2012b), chap. 3, pp. 67-79]. This prime objective aims to protect nothing less than the **Society's Existenz** and continuation so its citizens can continue to enjoy the protections and benefits civil Society provides [*ibid.*, pg. 75].

A person who uses only maxims of natural liberty and neglects to limit himself to exercising only civil liberties can, *perhaps*, obtain for himself some tolerable degree of mundane happiness. He might even regard himself as successful in life. But by doing so he does *nothing* to perfect the humanity in his own person. If he remains anesthetic to reciprocal Duty and Obligation, then by his own choice he renders himself unfit for even mundane civil Community, much less for divine Community. As Mill wrote,

When we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an individual man, as a general principle determining their actions, the question what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge observes, the man makes the motive, not the motive the man. What it is the man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward circumstances than upon what sort of man he is.

If you wish to know what is practically a man's interest, you must know the cast of his habitual feelings and thoughts. Everybody has two kinds of interests: interests which he cares for, and interests which he does not care for. Everybody has selfish and unselfish interests, and a selfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former and not caring for the latter. Everyone has present and distant interests, and the improvident man is he who cares for the present interests and does not care for the distant. It matters little that on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former.

It would be vain to attempt to persuade a man who beats his wife and ill-treats his children that he would be happier if he lived in love and kindness with them. He would be happier if he were the kind of person who could so live; but he is not, and it is probably too late for him to become that kind of person. Being what he is, the gratification of his love of domineering and the indulgence of his ferocious temper are his perceptions of a greater good to himself than he would be capable of deriving from the pleasure and affection of those dependent on him. He has no pleasure in their pleasure and does not care for their affection. His neighbor, who does, is probably a happier man than he; but he could not be persuaded of this; the persuasion would, most likely, only still further exasperate his malignity or his irritability. On the average, a person who cares for other people, for his country, or for mankind, is a happier man than one who does not; but of what use is it to preach this doctrine to a



man who cares for nothing but his own ease or his own pocket? He cannot care for other people if he would. It is like preaching to a worm who crawls on the ground how much better it would be for him if he were an eagle. [Mill (1861), pp. 71-72]

Every person makes himself the person he chooses to become. If he chooses to make himself a licentious person, a denizen of the state of nature, and an outlaw to other people then he merits no afterlife *Existenz*. He makes himself an improvident man because, as it says in the New Testament,

What does it benefit a man to gain the whole world yet lose his life? [Mark 8:36]

His selfishness and egocentrism detracts only from himself. He cannot touch, much less hinder, divine purpose because divine purpose is not served by individuals but instead by humanity overall.

Perfecting the power of your person is not to be regarded in *only* this narrow focus. Others in a civil Community *accept* a person into their Community because by doing so they think that as a citizen he will be, or could potentially be, beneficial to their corporate *Personfähigkeit*. For this, a person must possess some skills or talents or abilities that add to and strengthen the common force of the Community. Skills are not ends; they are means to ends both for an individual and for a Community. Kant wrote,

Culture . . . is the procurement of skills. This is possession of a capacity which is sufficient for any arbitrary purpose. It determines no ends at all, but leaves this to the later circumstances. Some skills are good in all cases . . . others only for some purpose . . . Because of the multitude of purposes, skill becomes, as it were, infinite. [Kant (1803) 9: 449-450]

What Kant tells us is the polar opposite of a mistaken opinion held by most of the prominent ancient Greek philosophers. Plato, Aristotle, and others thought that excellence in life and community came from cultivating extremely fine overspecializations. If you were a wheel maker, that should be your sole skill and vocation; if you were a soldier, that should be your sole skill and vocation; if you were a ruler, that should be your sole skill and vocation. Kant does not agree. But skills must also not be shallow:

As concerns *skill*, one must see that it is thorough and not superficial. One must not take on the appearance of knowing things that later one cannot bring about. In skill there must be thoroughness, which must gradually become a habit in the way of thinking. It is the essential thing for the character of a man. Skill appertains to talent. [Kant (1803) 9: 486]

Many people to this day are swayed by the Greek extravagance in reasoning. But this organization of a Society exacerbates its fragmentation into mini-Communities when carried out to its logical conclusion. It renders one ultra-specialist unable to communicate with another whose specialty is different. It promotes stratification into castes based on peculiar skills. The primordial advantage of the human species in prehistory was not specialization but, rather, generalization *to the extent* that there were enough overlapping skill sets to cover unanticipated and unpredictable exigencies of life. Complete generalization of skills is, of course, an extravagance of reasoning in the opposite direction. As an old wisecrack goes: "A specialist is a person who knows more and more about less and less until eventually he knows everything about nothing; a generalist is a person who knows less and less about more and more until eventually he knows nothing about everything." A person at either extreme in this specialist-generalist spectrum is of no use to and has nothing to contribute to the power of a Community. The proper balance between specialization and generalization lies somewhere in the middle between these extremes. Let your maxim be: ***Learn as much as you can about as many things as you can*** according to your judgments of taste. Make living be what Eva Timothy called "a creative, exhilarating adventure filled with unknowns and great 'Aha!' moments along the way" [Timothy (2010), pg. 7].

Perfecting the power of one's person makes a person better suited for civil Community *if* his maxims also serve to perfect humanity in his own person. One might question this in regard to a person's physical

power in the context of afterlife; but, if so, recall the 4th dialectic theorem of afterlife: afterlife requires bodily resurrection. One might likewise question this in regard to tangible power, but is this really questionable when one properly regards objects of tangible power as *implements* used as means for fulfilling purposes – both for Duties to oneself and also for meeting obligations with regard to other people? *Personfähigkeit* is power applicable to serving the general welfare of a Community [Wells (2010), chap. 14, pp. 558+].

It follows from the above that preparation and merit for divine Community is fundamentally reliant upon perfecting the power of one's person *as this perfecting serves, at the same time, perfecting humanity in one's person* insofar as Obligations to oneself are made to include precepts of commitment to civil Community and alienation of particular natural liberties in favor of civil liberties. This is tantamount to saying one makes it a Duty to oneself *to commit to being a loyal citizen* of his civil Community.

An individual's power of his person derives from human nature. This is not so in the case of a corporate person because a corporate person is a mathematical noumenon. Nonetheless, the idea of *Personfähigkeit* extends more or less directly to animating principles of the idea of corporate *Personfähigkeit* [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 467+]. With some slight rewording of these principles as stated in Wells (2012), (in order to make their technical-mathematical terminology less opaque for a general audience without altering the essence of their meanings), these are:

1. Each person accepts and attends to specific civic Duties, for the performance of which he can be justly held accountable by the Community;
2. The Community provides an institution of means for the civic education of every member, by which each member can further develop humanity in his own person and participate in perfecting humanity in the Community; participation in this educational Self-development is held to be a civic Duty;
3. Each person has a Duty to refrain from uncivic social interactions and misuse of his tangible power within the Community; and
4. In both leader's actions and follower's actions, each person's activities are to be directed toward the generation of bonding relationships and elimination of antibonding relationships with other people within the Community.

These four animating principles lead directly to the first four maxims of civic conduct presented previously in this treatise on page 310 of chapter 14.

While this does not preclude enjoyment of leisurely and pleasant activities and fellowship, corporate *Personfähigkeit* also requires each individual to participate in the leadership dynamic of Community life. It follows that cultivation of one's skills for acting as a leader on some occasions and for acting as a follower on other occasions is part of an individual's on-going efforts to perfect humanity in both his own person and for humanity in general. As a supreme and supremely sublime benevolent leader, we can expect God's actions to stimulate, and when appropriate even *provoke*, followers' actions by which the on-going striving for perfection of afterlife is maintained. Lazy or hedonistic expectations for afterlife *Existenz* are misplaced expectations. As Santayana said,

Hedonistic ethics have always had to struggle against the moral sense of mankind. Earnest minds, that feel the weight and dignity of life, rebel against the assertion that the aim of right conduct is enjoyment. . . . There is something artificial in the deliberate pursuit of pleasure; there is something absurd in the obligation to enjoy oneself. We feel no duty in that direction; we take to enjoyment naturally enough after the work of life is done, and the freedom and spontaneity of our pleasures is what is most essential to them. [Santayana (1896), pp. 16-17]

Even though all this emphasis on civic Duty and continuous striving for Self-perfection might make it seem to some that afterlife is like a grim and not very attractive labor camp where many of the travails of mundane *Existenz* are merely continued, this is a misplaced concern. Santayana might just as well have

been speaking about divine Community when he wrote,

Work and play here take on a different meaning, and become equivalent to servitude and freedom. The change consists in the subjective point of view from which the distinction is now made. We no longer mean by work all that is done usefully, but only what is done unwillingly and by the spur of necessity. By play we are designating no longer what is done fruitlessly, but whatever is done spontaneously and for its own sake, whether it have or not an ulterior utility. Play, in this sense, may be our most useful occupation. So far would a gradual adaptation to the environment be from making this play obsolete that it would tend to abolish work and to make play universal. For with the elimination of all the conflicts and errors of instinct, the race would do spontaneously whatever conduced to its welfare and we should live safely and prosperously without external stimulus or restraints. [*ibid.*, pg. 19]

If one carefully reflects upon Santayana's re-designation of the word "play," it is not difficult to see that, in a sense more real than poetic, Critical theology brings us in a full circle. From childhood, during which imagination and play are not only the easiest observable characteristics of childish life but also the most important formative means of mental and physical perfection, we go on to adulthood where the trials and challenges of life bring about unpleasant necessities (and thus "work" and "play" come to be seen not just as different but as opposing activities). But then, in the stages of afterlife, one approaches and finally enters an *Existenz* in which duties are no longer felt to be onerous burdens but, rather, felt as vocations to be undertaken for their own sakes and for the sake of the perfection of humanity, and where doing one's duty and employing one's skills becomes an enjoyment and leisure of play. In this subsists living in peace and harmony with others. If you call to mind the New Testament lesson,

unless you change and become like the children, you will never enter the realm of heaven [Matthew 18:3],

does this dialectic conclusion not sound very much like this lesson in Matthew?

It matters not at all what one's actions *in concreto* might be *objectively*. The essence and the hope of afterlife subsists in its aesthetic sublimity and final beauty.

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