Leadership

Richard B. Wells

© 2010

© 2010

Table of Contents

Preface ..... **vi**

Chapter 1 A Science of Leadership **1**

1. Defining leadership: The issues 1
2. The real conditions of leader and leadership guidance 7
3. Purposes for understanding a doctrine of leadership 11
4. Critical method for a science of leadership 14
5. References 22

Chapter 2 Basic Ideas for a Critical Applied Metaphysic of Leadership **23**

1. Epistemology-centered metaphysics 23
2. Leadership is a social-dynamical phenomenon 27
3. Organized Human Being: The "atom" of social-natural science 31
4. Affectivity, practical choice and cognitive decision-making 34
5. The practical rule structure 40
6. Critical bases of choice 44
7. Obligation and duty 46
8. References 53

Chapter 3 Empirical Factors in Self-Determination I: Political Science **54**

1. Sources of leadership data 54
   - 1.1 Pre-modern political science 56
   - 1.2 Psychology and sociology 57
   - 1.3 Military science and management theory 59
   - 1.4 Imaginative literature 59
2. Data from the Greek roots of political science 60
   - 2.1 Modern interest in leadership as leadership 60
   - 2.2 Plato's theory 62
   - 2.3 Aristotle's theory, part I: Political science as a moral science 69
   - 2.4 Aristotle's theory, part II: Political science as a practical science 77
3. Locke, Rousseau, and the social contract 81
   - 3.1 Locke's essays 84
   - 3.2 Rousseau and the social contract 89
4. Despotic and pragmatic associations 95
5. Summary 98
6. References 98

Chapter 4 Empirical Factors in Self-Determination II: Psychology **100**

1. Preliminary remarks 100
2. The affective dimension of the leadership phenomenon 104
3. First sources of personality data and methodological discipline 110
4. Tension and behavior I: Dependency and need 114
5. Tension and behavior II: Frustration, deprivation, and anticipation 117
6. The deontological implication of factors of self-determination 122
7. Internal balance and the role of rhetoric and oratory 123
   - 7.1 Values, attitudes, and internal balance 123
   - 7.2 Rhetoric: Plato's and Aristotle's views 128
   - 7.3 Cicero and oratory 133
   - 7.4 Excellence in leadership and knowledge of the affair 141
   - 7.5 Propaganda 143
8. Remarks 146
9. References 147

Chapter 5 Rational Factors in Self-Determination: Mind Function 149

1. The logical division of mind and body 149
2. Standpoints and judgmentation 155
3. The judgmentation cycle I: The empirical context of actions 161
4. The judgmentation cycle II: Rational context 167
5. The scientific issues of causation and the existence of objects 170
6. The synthesis in continuity 174
   - 6.1 Analytic representation of objects and the representation of *psyche* 174
   - 6.2 The continuity of *nous* and *psyche* 179
     - 6.2.1 The synthesis of objectivity 180
     - 6.2.2 The synthesis of the aesthetic Idea 182
     - 6.2.3 The synthesis of the judicial Idea 183
     - 6.2.4 The synthesis of Meaning 184
7. The motivational dynamic 187
   - 7.1 Critical valuation, validation, and reevaluation 188
   - 7.2 Want 189
   - 7.3 Drive 191
   - 7.4 Drive state 192
   - 7.5 Type-of-motive 193
8. Practical perfection 194
9. Judgmentation 197
10. References 199

Chapter 6 Rational Factors of Self-Determination: Duty 200

1. The manifolds of knowledge *a posteriori* 200
   - 1.1 The manifold of concepts 201
   - 1.2 The manifold of practical rules 204
2. Appetitive power and the synthesis of appetition 206
3. Obligation and Duty 208
   - 3.1 Obligation, Duty, and duty 210
   - 3.2 Rational factors of self-determination pertaining to leadership 213
   - 3.3 The power of social imperatives of duty 218
4. Leadership and social contracts 224
   - 4.1 Fluid leadership 224
   - 4.2 Authority and organized leadership 227
     - 4.2.1 Authority and the distinction between authority-position and the leader 228
     - 4.2.2 Compulsion, obligation, and the state of being-obligated 231
5. The practical efficacy of social contracts 235
6. Tension 238
7. References 242

Chapter 7 Leadership in Civic and Uncivic Relationships 244

1. Practical necessitation 244
2. Social compacts 250
3. The judicial Object of all duties 253
4. Social compacts and the power of a person 259
   - 4.1 The power of a person and transitive Relation 260
   - 4.2 The determination of a social compact 267
5. References 274

Chapter 8 The Governance of Leadership I: Enterprise 275

1. The concepts of governance and management 275
   - 1.1 Governance 275
   - 1.2 Management 277
2. Authority and the leader 280

3. The early industrial revolution and plutocratic tradition 285
4. Republican management and moral leadership 298
4.1 The Enterprise as a community of enterprises 299
4.2 The social-natural economic environment of Enterprise 305
4.3 The aims of the employer and the employee in republican Enterprise 312
5. References 315

Chapter 9 The Governance of Leadership II: Analysis 317

1. The Enterprise context 317
1.1 The Enterprise of enterprises 317
1.2 The effect of the *Existenz* of a social contract on the Nature of Enterprise 318
1.3 The concept of the entrepreneur 323
2. Judicial factors in expectations of entrepreneurs in an Enterprise 325
3. Deontological expectations of entrepreneurs in an Enterprise 328
4. The civil organization of Enterprise 333
4.1 Suppression of factious predisposition within the Enterprise 334
4.2 Objectives and goals: the form and matter of civil organization of Enterprise 337
4.3 Three examples of Enterprise strategic objectives 340
5. Conditions for effective governance of leadership 343
5.1 The civil character of participation in Enterprise 344
5.1.1 The Enterprise as a political institution 344
5.1.2 Liberty of enterprise and militancy 348
5.2 Reconciliation: Carnegie's tenet 352
6. Ownership 358
7. References 368

Chapter 10 The Rise and Fall of Enterprises 369

1. Metaphysical issue I: The real Meaning of "successful Enterprise" 369
2. Metaphysical issue II: The ontological problem of corporate identity 373
3. The Toynbee society 377
4. The Toynbee classes 381
4.1 Toynbee's classes of societies 381
4.2 Toynbee's classes of individuals 384
4.3 The creative minority and the dominant minority 389
5. Breakdown and disintegration of Enterprises 397
5.1 The universal state 397
5.2 Breakdown of successful governance of leadership: Historical basis 400
5.3 Breakdown of successful governance of leadership: Mental physics analysis 406
6. Social-natural Enterprise success and identity 414
7. References 421

Chapter 11 Plutocratic Leadership 423

1. The plutocracy 423
2. The source of social breakdown in plutocracies 429
3. Plutocratic breakdown in civics 436
3.1 Andrew Carnegie 436
3.1.1 Carnegie's business and financial success 436
3.1.2 Gamesman and union breaker 439
3.2 Centralization of power 444
3.3 Institutionalized bias 450
4. The semblance of longevity in plutocratic entities 454
5. References 461

Chapter 12 Republican Governance of Leadership..... 462

1. The idea of a republic 462

2. The idea of the general will 468
3. The republican justice system 474
4. Checks and balances in the governance of leadership 481
5. The republican legislative institution of governance 490
6. The republican executive institution of governance 500
7. The call to service 510
8. Segue to chapter 13 516
9. References 516

Chapter 13 The Agriculture of Republican Leadership 518

1. Baconian idols 518
2. The agriculture of Enterprise 523
3. The necessity of the education institution in governance 530
4. Growing republican educators 537
5. References 544

Chapter 14 The Prime Objectives of Republican Leadership 546

1. State of nature outlaw free enterprise 546
2. The six objectives of republican leadership governance 550
3. The objective to form a more perfect union 554
4. The objective to promote the general welfare 557
   - 4.1 Economic welfare, property, and deontological possession 561
   - 4.2 Health and safety welfare 569
   - 4.3 Public education welfare 574
   - 4.4 Political welfare 577
5. The objective to secure the blessings of liberty 580
   - 5.1 Checks and balances in a community of mini-republics 588
   - 5.2 The cultivation of merit in agents of governance 592
6. References 596

Citations 598

Glossary of Technical Terms 604

Index 615

© 2010

Preface

The importance of that elusive and intangible thing we call leadership has been widely acknowledged by humankind for centuries. Yet, in all that time, it has resisted objective scientific definition. There are many people who glibly talk about it, apparently under the presupposition that everyone understands what they mean by the word. Almost all organizations try, in one way or another, to achieve "good leadership" within the organization. When they fail to do so, the two most common reactions to this failure are: (1) to bemoan the scarcity of good leadership; or (2) attempt to produce it through management training and personnel recruitment. It is commonplace to see "leadership ability" listed on job requisitions as a personal qualification of candidates for manager or supervisor jobs.

If leadership were a precious gem, it would have to be said that throughout history most people and organizations have looked for it as if expecting it to be found lying on the ground rather than seriously attempting to mine for it. This is not hard to understand. If one doesn't know what leadership is, one neither knows exactly what he is looking for nor how to mine for it. There is no shortage of literature, consulting services, books, or opinions on the topic. Yet, when one scrutinizes these, what one finds is that in all cases either the term "leadership" is used as if it were a primitive concept that the reader or listener is expected to already understand, or else some nominal and quite superficial description of it is provided – usually either in terms of personality traits or behaviors or demonstrated past results that are supposed to provide markers for recognizing the presence or absence of leadership.

The kindest remark I can make about these efforts is that they are earnest essays in a not-quite-a-craft hoping to become a technical art. The lack of success displayed in these endeavors over the centuries has prompted some people to attribute aspects of mysticism to the idea, to assume or conclude that "leaders are born, not made," and, more or less, surrender themselves to attitudes known to philosophers as skepticism. What cannot be asserted with real objective validity is that any of these efforts constitute a *science* of leadership. At best they can be called attempts to midwife the birth of such a science. Some endeavors, such as some found in psychology, are more science-like than others, but all fall short of actually being a science.

The root of the problem is the metaphysics employed in these efforts. Here it must be pointed out that many people will deny that their, or others', efforts to produce such a science are in the least "metaphysical" and, by implication, metaphysics therefore cannot be the problem. There is some truth in the assertion and utter falsehood in the implication. The truth in the assertion is that no *scientific system* of metaphysics has been used. What has been used is some hodgepodge of presuppositions and speculations that this treatise terms a *pseudo-metaphysic*. Any metaphysic, including a pseudo-metaphysic, is nothing else than "the way one looks at and understands the world." Everyone has such a personal system through which he or she filters the data of the senses and strives to "make sense" out of personal experience. A personal pseudo-metaphysic is one of the earliest mental developments occurring in childhood. The newborn infant utterly lacks one; the two-year-old has already begun to form one. This constructed set of mental speculative maxims utterly colors the way a human being "makes sense of his world" from the moment that his most deep-lying concepts of objects, space, time, and causality first develop.

Furthermore, this earliest primitive system is, in every case, a system constructed as a naive realism with ontological speculative beliefs. For most people, this system remains in force throughout their lives. Most philosophers' efforts to formulate science-like systems of metaphysics are unconsciously chained to this prison-house of presuppositions and beliefs, and this has historically resulted in almost all philosophical systems of metaphysics being made ontology-centered. In the final analysis, the outcome has always been the same: eventually all systems of ontology-centered metaphysics are confronted with unanswerable paradoxes, antinomies, deductions logically arrived at that find themselves utterly refuted in actual experience, and – eventually – a retreat to mysticism in some form. This mysticism invariably finds itself having to invoke the agency of some sort of deity – either the sort invoked in religion, or of some mathematical "god of probability," or in a preposterous and empty premise that nature *per se* (or, almost as often, reality *per se*) is some *thing* that *acts* on us by *impressing itself* upon us. As soon as one makes "nature" or "reality" a thing that does something to us, one makes this concept the concept of an agent. Because this agent's essence is mysterious, this is the same thing as invoking some sort of deity. When it finally becomes clear that a retreat into mysticism is presented by a system of metaphysics, and that there remain paradoxes and antinomies it cannot deal with, the usual reaction other people have is to dismiss it as

"nothing but speculation" and to rightly regard it as untrustworthy.

Yet without some sort of metaphysic, no science is possible. Every science needs and uses ideas to unify its discourse and "make sense" of its doctrine. Ultimately, the ground of all such ideas is metaphysical. Every science stakes out for itself some topic "of" or "in nature" that it attempts to explain, and in almost every instance the idea of nature it presumes is *essentially* ontological. But if one takes a closer look at what the *practice* of science accomplishes *when it is fruitful and beneficial*, what one will discover is that science never attempts to explain nature (or reality) *per se*; rather, it attempts to explain and understand *phenomena of human experience*. The community of physicists at the beginning of the twentieth century was the first science community to begin to grasp this. Sir James Jeans, who was in his day one of the acknowledged "top men" in physics, wrote, in 1942 and with obvious reluctance,

> We know now that there is no danger of even one perfect model [of nature or reality] appearing – at least of a kind which is intelligible to our minds. For a model or picture will only be intelligible to us if it is made up of ideas which are already in our minds. Of such ideas some, as for instance the abstract ideas of mathematics, have no special relation to our particular world; all those which have must, as we have seen, have entered our minds through the gateways of the senses. These are restricted by our having only five senses of which only two are at all important for our present purpose. . . . Thus an understanding of the ultimate processes of nature is forever beyond our reach; we shall never be able – even in imagination – to open the case of our watch and see how the wheels go round. The true object of scientific study can never be the realities of nature, but only our own observations of nature. – Sir James Jeans, *Physics and Philosophy*

Jeans was right about this, but he was also wrong. He was right about our inability to study "the realities of nature" *if* we make the ontological presupposition – and Jeans made precisely this presupposition. But the resolution of the problem hides within his last sentence above, snuggled securely out of sight under the ontological leaves littering the forest floor of ontology-centered metaphysics. To continue Jeans' metaphor, it is a question of opening the right watchcase. We can bring it out into the open by asking, "What do you mean when you say, 'the realities of nature,' Dr. Jeans?" Reality is itself one of our human ideas but the objectively valid idea of "reality" is no empirical concept. It is, instead, a *practical* concept *applied to experience*. The idea becomes reified – and, really, "deified" is the more accurate word – when we speak of "the" realities of nature because "these" are Platonic speculations about things. What turn-of-the-century physics found itself having to face was the fact that the objects of these Platonic speculations lie forever beyond the horizon of possible human experience. They must forever remain occult quantities, neither verifiable nor refutable and scarcely imaginable.

If the root meaning of "reality" (and, likewise, "nature") subsists in a non-empirical concept, this means that concept is one a human being does not use for speculation but, rather, *for determining his actions*. It is, quite literally, a concept he uses in practice. The ground of every such concept is not ontological; it is practical. To *understand* such a concept is to understand the character of human knowledge and understanding. This means to sort out what sort of mental capabilities and processes are *necessary for the possibility of human experience* as human beings come to know experience and come to empirically "know things" by means of experience. In metaphysics this approach and anchoring is called *epistemology*. A *system* of metaphysics that takes its ground from epistemology and pays attention to the epistemological limitations inherent in our situation, viz. that what we know about "the world" we know only as an outcome of experience, is called an *epistemology-centered* metaphysic. The uncompromising standard for judging all concepts, theories, and doctrines for such a *science* of metaphysics is simply this: *all root concepts it employs must be those necessary for the possibility of experience as human beings come to know experience*. There is one such system of metaphysics that has been developed in the long history of philosophy and speculation. It is called Critical metaphysics, and the founder of its doctrine was the eighteenth century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant.

It is not the purpose of this treatise to explain or teach this system. That purpose is addressed in another treatise entitled *Principles of Mental Physics*. The purpose of this treatise is to bring forth an objectively valid *social-natural science* of leadership. In doing so, we will have to call upon a great many findings that issue out of the Critical metaphysics and the transitioning bridge between Kant's system and its objectively valid application to science. That bridge your author calls *mental physics*. Mental physics is the science of

human mental nature, and hopefully the reader will find it more or less obvious that a science of leadership can be based upon nothing else than human nature. The individual human being is our true "social atom" in every field of study outside the dead-matter natural sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and their derivatives and progeny. The currently existing social sciences have, during the twentieth century, abandoned this "social atom" as their foundation, turning instead to ontological prejudices and presuppositions and trying to mimic the methods of dead-matter science (particularly physics). We will not make that mistake in this treatise. The science of leadership presented here is a human science, i.e., it is what your author calls a *social-natural* science.

Critical metaphysics is not widely studied and even among those who have studied it the science is far more misunderstood than understood. Kant, unfortunately, was not an excellent expositor of his theory, essential parts of it are scattered across the landscape of his life's works, and his centerpiece book, *Critique of Pure Reason*, has very aptly been nicknamed by some "Kant's Opaque Masterpiece." Penetrating this opacity and better organizing it as a scientific system occupied your author for many years. The immediate fruit of this effort was the theory of mental physics – the fundamental science of the phenomenon of mind.

Mental physics is still such a new science that very few people have had any chance to become familiar with it. This is a disadvantage for this present treatise, but it is dealt with by introducing and explaining, hopefully to an adequate level of detail, its principles and theorems as they are needed. The reader not satisfied with this level of explanation has recourse to take up the more in-depth study of mental physics provided in *Principles of Mental Physics*. The reader of this treatise will encounter Critical metaphysics – there really is no way to avoid this – but your author asks you to keep in mind that the central objective of this treatise is not metaphysics but, rather, a science of leadership. It is to this topic that we always return. The treatise's metaphysical road-stops are, metaphorically speaking, stops to pick up the needed supplies and implements we require on the next stretch of the road to understanding leadership.

This treatise treats leadership as what it is: a social-natural phenomenon and a human social dynamic. Chapter 1 opens the work with a discussion and exploration of what the scientific issues are in understanding the basic topic of leadership and the intimately connected topics of the leader and the follower. Chapter 2 treats the limitations and constraints under which an objectively valid science of leadership must operate. The chapter is largely metaphysical and makes heavy use the principles of mental physics because the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to "the nature of human nature" insofar as every objectively valid concept of leadership is grounded in the actions and acts of human beings.

Every real science seeks to understand its topic through empirically-applicable concepts. Without this grounding, what one has is not science but romanticism. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the empirical bases out of which we get those data of human experiences any theory of the phenomenon of leadership must deal with. But mere empirical concepts are not scientifically understood until they are structured and connected by ideas. That is the rational character of proper science, and chapter 5 turns to the topic of understanding the rational underpinnings of the science of leadership.

All proper sciences require some set of fundamental theoretical principles that serve to ground deductions and predictions in the *application* of the science. These principles are what give a science its structure and its predictive power. Without them one does not have a proper science; one has the metaphorical equivalent of a butterfly collection. Chapter 6 deals with the key principles and ideas that provide this structure for a social-natural science of leadership.

The idea of leadership is devoid of apprehensible meaning outside of the context of human social groups and associations. It is here that the doctrine of leadership finds its only real application. Beginning with chapter 7, the treatise turns to this context and treats the application of the theory of leadership. This is the starting point for *reduction to practice* of the doctrine developed in the first six chapters. A doctrine that cannot be reduced to practice is correctly called a *useless* doctrine. The remainder of the treatise from chapter 7 through 14 is devoted to the practice of leadership science. A key and fundamental principle that runs throughout these chapters is the principle of *a social contract*. Whether made explicit or not, every association of cooperating human beings operates under at least a *presupposition*, made by every member, of some sort of social compact he expects the association as a whole to honor and which grounds his own decision to join in that association. If the organization has no commonly understood convention of a social contract, what one finds is that it rapidly becomes a semi-organized anarchy of individual actions that more

closely resembles a cattle drive than it does a soccer team. Chapters 8 and 9 introduce the key principles of governing the phenomenon of leadership within human organizations.

Chapter 10 pauses briefly to examine the crucial question of why organizations fail. Most organizations eventually do. This phenomenon is found across the spectrum of human endeavors from the small business shop to entire nations and even whole civilizations. The common factor in this vast panorama is just this: *failure of leadership*. Competent leadership is the survival *sine qua non* of every human joint enterprise.

The genus of leadership can be logically divided into two main species of social dynamics. Your author designates these *plutocratic* leadership and *republican* leadership. Plutocratic governance of leadership is dealt with in chapter 11. It is, historically, the most common case of organization leadership, the simplest to establish – indeed, it is challenge to prevent its establishment from taking hold – and its practices can be executed by the most ignorant and incompetent people, for a while, because it requires no special training or skill or talent to erect. The sobering conclusion from its analysis is this: plutocratic governance of leadership inevitably brings about the breakdown and disintegration of the organization.

The other species is republican leadership – the social dynamic governed through the convention of a social contract. Unlike plutocratic leadership, republican leadership enables an organization to be successful in its endeavors, to grow, to remain integrated, and to endure. The problem with republican leadership is that it is easy for the people in the association to take it for granted, to fail to do what it requires of them to sustain it, and to slowly slip into folkways that march the organization down the path to plutocracy. Organizations with republican leadership do not fail, but they do tend to decay over time by losing their republican character and degenerating into plutocracy. Once they have done so, they share the fate of all plutocratic organizations. Chapters 12 through 14 address the requirements and objectives that must be met for the republican governance of leadership.

In the course of this treatise, it is necessary to discuss in detail what is known as social contract theory. This theory has many detractors and their objections to it are sound *when social contract theory is based on the ontology-centered metaphysical prejudices* it contained in its first erection. This is a failing and a shortcoming of social contract theory that this treatise is obliged to correct. It does so by reframing the theory to be epistemology-centered. In the course of doing this, we will provide the objectively correct explanation for one of the historically-most-contentious theoretical ideas it contains: the idea of *the general will*. Thus, the social contract theory the reader encounters in this treatise is not the inadequate traditional one; it is the Critical and *social-natural* theory of the social contract and it is firmly anchored in human nature.

Although it is not a central or essential aspect of this treatise, your author confesses to having a second agenda he hopes this treatise will promote. There has long been a strong distinction drawn between the so-called natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, and their offspring) and the so-called social sciences. In the community of science, the so-called social sciences have always been the second-class citizens even though their topics are of far more immediate and of far more wide-ranging impact for people's lives than are those of the so-called natural sciences. It is a fact long-bemoaned that the social sciences have not kept pace with the accomplishments of physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, etc.

Your author has always been greatly bothered by this dichotomy of classification. What, he has always wondered, could be *unnatural* about the social sciences – for that is the implication inherent in calling the one family of sciences "natural" and the other "social." The conclusion that is deduced from the Critical system is a very simple one: the only things "unnatural" about the social sciences are their ontological prejudices and the methodologies that have developed out of these prejudices. Put simply, the social sciences have long neglected (but have not always neglected, in the past) their real "social atom" – the individual human being. A social science re-made according to epistemology-centered principles and firmly grounded in the mental physics of human nature *is* a natural science – i.e., a *social-natural* science. Your author's other agenda is in his intent that this treatise serve as a concrete example for how history, political science, economics, psychology, sociology, and all the other intellectual pursuits we call the social studies can be re-made, and by this re-making achieve levels of success at least as great and impressive as the dead-matter sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, and their offspring.

– ***Richard B. Wells***
Dec. 22, 2010