

Chapter 3

Empirical Factors in Self-Determination I: Political Science**§ 1. Sources of Leadership Data**

Every special science has a topic that stands as the Object of that science. There can be no development of any special science prior to some amount of work directed at identifying and classifying some set of particular facts and observations of the natural world that establish a preliminary description of the topic. Especially in the beginning stages, these facts will come from observations made on various experiences that subjectively seem to go together in some way in the judgment of the fact-gatherers. Here the word observation is not used in its typical everyday usage but rather in the more technical connotation explained earlier by Bernard. While specific observations are themselves of historical facts, the scientific observer will also distill several similar observations to obtain mild generalizations of traits common in these observations so as to more clearly delineate what are to be regarded as the pertinent phenomenal facts. From the viewpoint of epistemology these are actually simple working premises and very early concepts made in the effort to clarify the distinctive characteristics of the scientific topic.

Often it will not be very self-evident why these facts seem to go together. Verisimilitude is then the determining factor in the initial sorting of the data of experience into (1) what will be regarded as relevant or preliminary data for the purposes of the science-to-be and (2) what will be regarded as irrelevant or uninteresting for these purposes. This initial gathering and sorting out of facts of experience constitutes the first step in the development of what Kant called an historical doctrine of knowledge. These initial efforts are subject to later revision as more experience is gained and as scientific ideas become more distinctive, but still never lose their anchoring importance for the science. Physicist Henry Margenau wrote,

One often thinks of data as kinds of experiences which point beyond themselves. By virtue of this transcendent linkage, it is supposed, data enjoy a unique position in the scheme of reality, with a stability and significance all of their own. This view has very naturally created the illusion of a marked cleavage within experience, between sense data as parts of the immediately given on the one hand, and representation, abstraction, thought on the other. Accordingly, data are easily distinguished from concepts.

On our view, which encourages experience to walk on its own feet and denies it the use of ontological crutches . . . the difference between sensory fact and thought is not so apparent. We shall argue that sensation as part of the process of knowledge is not wholly *sui generis* and that a passage from the qualities that signify an act of clear perception to those characterizing pure thought may well be gradual. . . On the one hand, many *concepts* have sensory-empirical aspects because of their reference to the immediately given . . . and it is quite clear on the other hand that *sensory data* require concepts for their interpretation. Torn out of its context in experience, the immediately given becomes as grotesque as its counterpart, the rational, has often been when nourished in seclusion.

Unless one is careful not to disturb the natural setting of data and thought, one's philosophy is artificial and certainly unrepresentative of science. – Margenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality*

The topic of leadership has been at this stage of fact-sorting for a very long time. This is not to say little effort has been put into attempting to understand leadership; quite the opposite is the case. It is to say that these efforts have yielded relatively little beyond either historical doctrines or the barest speculative mini-theories embedded in one or another wider topic. Let us take a fresh look at this. Much as the science of metallurgy grew out of observations of pre-scientific activities, such as the craft of metal workers, leadership data is obtained from observations gathered up from divers arts, crafts, and social sciences. There are three delimiting characteristics inherent in the Critical *Realerklärung* of leadership. The first is that relevant data will come from experiences of human behaviors. This is because the human being is the social atom of every humane science and we intend for the study of leadership to become a social-natural science. The second characteristic is that the data will involve, immediately or mediately, factors that emerge from relationships among an aggregate of different individuals. This is because the *Realerklärung* of leadership has the leader for its direct object and leading is something manifested by the existence of followers. All leader-follower phenomena are phenomena of relationships between and among individuals through which one or some of these individuals (the leader or leaders) *purposively* influence the actions of the others (the followers). The third is that the base facts will be those that bear upon the character of self-determination. This is because self-determination is the most fundamental empirical characteristic separating the phenomenon of being a human being from the phenomena of dead matter.

Although our earlier discussions were put in a way that might lead one to conclude that in any leadership situation there is one leader plus one or more followers, such a conclusion is a hasty overgeneralization. It is more common in the commerce of living to encounter experiences where we would have to say the presence of more than one leader is manifested, or that who is the leader at any particular moment can change, or that leadership outcomes emerge from collective efforts of several individuals without any one of them being identifiable as the chief or primary leader. Who, for example, was *the* leader at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia? A perusal of the *Convention Records* will show that some individuals (e.g., Dickinson, King, Madison, Morris, Pinckney, Randolph, Sherman, Wilson) had more overall influence than other delegates (e.g., Bassett, Clymer, Few, Franklin, Hamilton, Washington) in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, but no one single man stood out as *the* leader of the Convention.

In view of these considerations, it should not be surprising that data pertaining to leadership phenomena is found in a great many sources. Every person encounters leadership phenomena in

some forms or others during the commerce of life. The helplessness and utter dependency of the new-born infant upon the presence of caregivers for his survival is sufficient to ensure this. Everyone has some degree of experiential knowledge of the phenomenon of leadership, many have some speculative knowledge or opinion of leadership through their own experience in followership roles, and a smaller number have practiced knowledge of acting as a leader from experience of many instances of deliberately influencing other people's actions and behaviors, with follow-up of these occasions by reflecting upon their experience.

Without claiming the list to be exhaustive, here are major intellectual dimensions where data pertaining to the phenomenon of leadership are found: (1) pre-modern political science; (2) twentieth century psychology; (3) sociology; (4) military science; (5) management studies; and (6) imaginative literature. In this chapter we explore the political science dimension.

§ 1.1 Pre-modern Political Science

History teaches us that the first social-natural science was political science and points to the 4th century BC¹ for the earliest preserved doctrines of politics-science. The relevance of this to the purpose of our treatise is: Observations from which we draw an initial understanding of empirical characteristics marking the phenomenon of leadership include observations made by scholars and statesmen of pre-twentieth century political science. These are chiefly preserved in their works concerning government, law, and oratory. Also of relevance is the historical fact that the roots of other major scholarly disciplines wearing the label "social science" today (especially psychology, economics², and sociology) were first planted in political science. The relevance here is that leadership, which we strive to give emergence as a scientific discipline in its own right, is a topic entangled with all of these.

Politics as a human activity is far older than science. However there is a vast difference between an activity as an art or craft and an activity as a science because a science requires not just a topic but also an organized methodology. The oldest disciplined efforts in the historical record to produce such a methodology are found in the works of Plato (*Republic*³, *Statesman*, *Laws*) and Aristotle (*Politics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, *Rhetoric*). For Plato and

¹ History as a disciplined craft requiring careful research is older than the social-natural science of political science and is usually credited to Herodotus in the 5th century BC. However, serious efforts to move history from a craft to a science did not begin until well into the 18th century AD at the earliest. Some argue that we should regard nothing prior to the 19th century as scientific history.

² One who has studied and contemplated Adam Smith's *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* can hardly help but be struck by the manner in which ethics, political science, and sociological considerations work in harmony to establish the practical context of his economic theory.

³ Plato's actual title for this work is *Politeía*, literally "body politic." Later scholars made it a scholastic tradition in philosophy to render the title of this work *Republic*. There is very little in *Politeía* that bears much resemblance to the modern definitions of "republic."

Aristotle political science is an application of practical philosophy, viz. moral theory and ethics. It is this common ground (moral philosophy) that provides political science with its immediate connection to our social science atom, the human being. It is by this connection, and by this connection alone, that pre-modern political science earns the title of social-*natural* science. This connection to human nature was maintained for centuries by later theoreticians, most notably Cicero (*The Republic, Laws, The Orator*), Locke (*An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*), Montesquieu (*The Spirit of Laws*), Rousseau (*The Social Contract*), various works of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, *The Federalist* (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton), and John Stuart Mill (*On Liberty, Representative Government*).

Political science maintained this connection to the social atom until the 20th century. During the course of that century it changed under the twin misguidances of positivism and a baseless pseudo-ontology centered on the presupposition that applying the methods of physics to political science would produce a more exacting and fruitful social science discipline. Political science became divorced at that point from its grounding in human nature and placed itself in a silo, within which the modern university either treats the topic as a rather Platonic and impractical pastime or else reduces it to vocational training in the art of being a politician or a political operative. This morphing of the topic of political science, under the banner of an ill-conceived experiment in higher education called "the open inquiry model" that began early in the 20th century, not only produced a discipline (or, more accurately, an aggregate of mini-disciplines) that cannot be called a natural science but also boxed in its practitioners in a manner that correctly can be called academic autism. It is for this reason that we will primarily examine the pre-modern period of political science, rather than present day political science, in this treatise for gathering some of our topical facts concerning leadership.

§ 1.2 Psychology and Sociology

In regard to the topic of leadership, and with some other topics as well, there is a fuzzy overlap between psychology and sociology. Today this region of joint custody is often called behavioral science and it includes contributions from the field of anthropology. Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology* defines sociology as

A discipline that focuses on the study of human behavior from the perspective of the social dimension. Sociology concentrates relatively less upon the individual as a separate entity than does social psychology, tending to view behavior as it occurs in social interactions, in groups, etc.

Our concern with sociology as an arena of study is confined to that blurry region where it overlaps with psychology. Reber's *Dictionary* defines social psychology as

That branch of psychology that concentrates on any and all aspects of human behavior that involves persons and their relationships with other persons, groups, social institutions and society as a whole. . . . Social psychology freely exchanges ideas, models, and methods with other social sciences, particularly sociology. In fact this exchange is so rich and ubiquitous that it is often difficult to distinguish the two fields.

Because a social-natural science cannot lose touch with its social atom (the individual human being), in this treatise your author will abbreviate this partnership between psychology and sociology as simply psychology – intending by this no belittling of sociology but only to keep emphasis on the human being as our basic ontological object of interest.

Psychology and sociology, as social sciences, were both born in the 19th century under the sway of the pseudo-metaphysical attitude called positivism (which originated then as well; in fact, the founder of sociology – Auguste Comte – was also one of the principal authors and leaders of the positivism movement). Both disciplines have suffered greatly from the confusions that came out of the positivists' refusal to deal with metaphysical issues, in apparent ignorance of the fact that they were merely substituting unscientific pseudo-metaphysics in its place. Again, in a broad context, metaphysics is "the way one looks at the world" and positivism was a disorganized and often capricious way of looking at the world. This disorganization shows itself in the splintering of the social science scholarships. Again, critic Allan Bloom wrote,

To look at social science first, it might seem that it at least has a general outline of its field and a possible systematic ordering of its parts Unfortunately there is nothing to this appearance. . . . Within most of the specialties, about half of the practitioners usually do not believe the other half even belong among them, and something of the same situation prevails throughout the discipline as a whole. . . . It is as though there were a dispute among the various natural sciences about which is primary. Actually each of the social sciences can, and does, make a claim to be the beginning point in relation to which the others can be understood The issue is what is the social science atom, and each specialty can argue that the others are properly parts of the whole that it represents. Moreover, each can accuse the other of representing an abstraction, or a construct, or a figment of the imagination. Is there ever a pure market, one not part of a society or a culture that forms it? What is a culture or a society? Are they ever more than aspects of some kind of political order? The social sciences actually represent a series of different perspectives on the human world we see all around us, a series that is not harmonious because there is not even agreement as to what belongs to that world, let alone as to what kinds of causes would account for its phenomena. – Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*

Psychology has probably suffered less from its positivist heritage than has sociology, primarily because of the work of major contributors such as William James and Jean Piaget. It has also benefited from its practical ability to conduct laboratory experiments, which is something sociology has difficulty accomplishing. In addition, psychology has benefited to a degree through the practice by some of its major contributors (such as Sigmund Freud) of disregarding some of the more crippling dogmas of positivism even as these contributors held to the claim that they

were positivists. In this treatise we will pay much attention to the observations and experimental results of psychology but we will interpret and analyze these observations and results from a scientific grounding in Critical epistemology and mental physics.

§ 1.3 Military Science and Management Theory

Because military science and management theory are both vitally concerned with issues of leadership, they share a conjunction (much as psychology and sociology do). Their relationship to the traditional social science disciplines can be regarded in a way similar to the way scholars in physics, chemistry, and biology often look at engineering. They are fundamentally practical intellectual endeavors inasmuch as they devote much more attention to documenting "what seems to work well and what seems to not work" than they do to "why it works or why it doesn't work." Both the armed forces and business enterprises can and do tinker and experiment with the mini-societies each represents. Viewed in this way, they can in an important way be regarded as a laboratory arm of sociology, albeit a rather restricted arm. Both are fundamentally pragmatic in their outlook and tend to discourse on specific phenomena of experience rather than attempt to formulate a grand rationalism for their topics. Indeed, both tend to be somewhat openly pessimistic when it comes to opining about the possibility of coming up with any grand unified theory. Both would like one; they just tend to be conservative about the prospects of getting one and tend to criticize the social sciences for not having already provided one.

§ 1.4 Imaginative Literature

Your author will not be surprised if you are surprised to see this category included in our list. After all, what could be farther from science than creative literature? Certainly no one would be inclined or even willing to call what storytellers, authors of fiction, and poets do "science."

And yet let us not lose sight of our social atom. If a novelist wishes to have his work read he must represent the thoughts, attitudes, feelings, and prejudices of at least one human character (the protagonist)⁴ and what he presents must ring true enough to engage the interest and credibility of his readers. There are limitations to the extent a successful author can engage in outright fantasy and if he forays beyond these limitations his work will not get an audience and often will not even be published. It has been said that every work of imaginative literature is at least partly autobiographical; whether this is true or not isn't very relevant, but what is relevant is that it must to some extent be *biographical*. The social situations he presents must either be plausible enough or else be ironically appreciable through contrast with human associations and

⁴ This is true even if the protagonist and other characters are represented as non-humans, as, e.g., in Orwell's *Animal Farm*.

social situations. The case in point for imaginative literature has points in common with history. For example, military historian and activist Gwynne Dyer wrote,

Actually, Troy was destroyed after a long siege – the excavated ruins show evidence of huge fires and destruction among the great stone buildings of the city and the refugee hovels packed tightly between them – but Homer did not write his account of the siege until four centuries later.⁵ It was about eight centuries after that when Virgil wrote his vivid account of the sack of Troy, in a personalized style that would never have been used by those who lived through the event. What he writes is almost all fiction, but it is also as true to the essence of the disaster as if he had been there himself. He lived in a world where some unfortunate city met its end like this every few years for as long as memory ran, and he had no more freedom to distort the events and emotions of such a siege than a modern European writer would have to misrepresent the experience of an air raid: too many people knew what it was really like. – Dyer, *War*

Although imaginative literature cannot be regarded as science, it can be regarded as presenting insight into the *nature* of human experience. Somewhat tongue in cheek, one might call what we can get from imaginative literature "non-true data" in the context that, while it is not specifically factual insofar as its content goes, it is still *reflective* of the nature of real human experience. It conveys what we might call the *taste* and *flavor* of what it is to be human. It often is one of our very few available gateways from the uncommunicative, autistic dimension of human affectivity. Introspect, if you please will, upon the following words of poet Matthew Arnold:

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And here we are as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. – Matthew Arnold, *Dover Beach*, 1867.

Does this do nothing to you? Or do you perceive to some degree some inexpressible primordial stirring within yourself? We are well advised to not overlook what we can learn about being human from our imaginative sources. To be human is to be aesthetically alive.

§ 2. Data from the Greek Roots of Political Science

§ 2.1 Modern Interest in Leadership as Leadership

A scholarly as well as a practical interest in leadership *as* leadership in a broad context is a relatively recent development even though the leadership phenomenon has been noted *en passant* for millennia. For most of history leadership was looked at in the context of *political* leadership. Its role in business, the sciences, the arts, and in other arenas of life only very slowly came to be

⁵ Technically, Homer did not "write" about Troy at all; *The Iliad* was written down much, much later.

appreciated to the point where a broader context for understanding it gained a firm footing in the twentieth century. The seeds for this broader perspective were planted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the soil of representative government and democracy, but the plant itself did not begin to flower until interest in industrial social psychology did.

Many modern readers might find this statement surprising, especially given the amount of ink and effort that has gone into the topic of leadership in our own present day. Yet history bears this out. Prior to the Industrial Revolution the craftsman, shopkeeper, and tradesman had little need to grapple with organizational or administrative issues. The typical white American city boy of 1760 became an apprentice at age 15, usually living in the home of his "master" as almost a part of the family while he learned his trade. This followed an older tradition dating back centuries and exemplified by the structure of the European guilds of medieval times. When the Industrial Revolution began changing this social structure in Great Britain, the business model adopted by the new manufactories was a monarchy-based model Adam Smith described using class partitioning into "the master of the business" and "servants and workmen." It is worth noting that the practices of corporate organization formed and were already in place prior to the beginnings of the populist and democracy movements of the eighteenth century.

The great majority of people accommodate themselves to the folkways and traditions of their country and culture at a very young age, and many people remain habitually rooted in these folkways and traditions unless they should happen to live during a period of great social upheaval. Sociologists define culture as "the ways of thinking, the ways of acting, and the material objects that together form a people's way of life." They define society as "the people who interact in a defined territory and share a culture." Cultural accommodation tends to lead to specific developed mental habits underlying a person's behavior patterns, maxims of thinking, and cognition-associated feelings. People tend to take their folkways for granted, rarely question them except in extraordinary circumstances, and cultural norms usually change slowly and by an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. From the sociologist's perspective it is not a surprise that leadership in a broader context should have remained unrecognized for such a long period of time, nor that it should have been more or less equated with political leadership and authority for so many centuries.

Your author earlier called management theory a laboratory arm of sociology. One of the major empirical surprises that awakened interest in the broader context of leadership came out of what had been expected to be a more or less routine experiment begun in 1927 at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant. Peters and Waterman wrote,

The stream that today's researchers are tapping is an old one, started in the late 1930s

by Elton Mayo and Chester Bernard, both at Harvard. In various ways, both challenged ideas put forward by Max Weber, who defined the bureaucratic form of organization, and Frederick Taylor, who implied that management really can be made into an exact science. Weber had pooh-poohed charismatic leadership and doted on bureaucracy; its rule-driven, impersonal form, he said, was the only way to assure long-term survival. Taylor, of course, is the source of the time and motion approach to efficiency: if only you can divide work up into enough discrete, wholly programmed pieces and then put the pieces back together in a truly optimum way, why then you'll have a truly top-performing unit.

Mayo started out four-square in the mainstream of the rationalist school and ended up challenging, *de facto*, a good bit of it. On the shop floors of Western Electric's Hawthorne plant, he tried to demonstrate that better work place hygiene would have a direct and positive effect on worker productivity. So he turned up the lights. Productivity went up, as predicted. Then, as he prepared to turn his attention to another factor, he routinely turned the lights back down. Productivity went up again! – Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*

Subsequent efforts to understand the Hawthorne effect eventually led to the discovery of many other human factors that, in time, gave rise to scientific recognition that leadership really does have to do with more than just political leadership. That this scientific awakening almost certainly lagged anecdotal and common sense awareness of it on the part of lay people by centuries is a general, historical, and rather easily documented if underappreciated curiosity characteristic of the sociology of modern science and its practitioners. Science culture has a well earned reputation for being, if not exactly stiff-necked, at least starched-collared and frequently dogmatic.⁶

Nonetheless, cultural change (including the culture produced in science by scientific practice) normally comes very slowly. Despite the restriction of attention to leadership phenomena in the species of leadership we are calling political, pre-modern political science did succeed in noting some human factors of widespread importance for the entire genus of leadership phenomenon. We cannot reasonably expect to catalog all of them here, but we can and should examine the most enduring and consistent of them.

§ 2.2 Plato's Theory

Neither Plato nor Aristotle make much reference to the leader or to leadership in their political works. Rather, they each make frequent references to the ruler (archon), the legislator/lawgiver, and the statesman⁷ as well as to kings and tyrants. The idea of the military leader – that is, the army general – had a quite different and lesser connotation; the Greek word is *strategos* –

⁶ So that academicians and scholars in the humanities should not feel too left out, I will comment in passing that the humanities disciplines have their own habitual starch-collared traditions as well. One place this shows up is in the practice of mechanical and traditional translation of classic old works of science and technical philosophy (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Kant). Every good idea becomes a practically bad idea when it settles into the comfort of traditional dogma and we cease to ask why we practice the way we do.

⁷ The Greek word for "statesman" would carry over phonetically as "politico" in modern American English slang but wholly without the generally negative connotation the American word carries today.

strategist. Military leadership, as we would phrase it today, was regarded by both men as a lesser albeit important art. The topic was better treated by Sun Tsu in *The Art of War*.

Both men focused large parts of their theories on the questions of why there should be rulers at all, what the desirable qualities of a ruler should be, and what undesirable qualities bad rulers display. Their theories each have at their roots moral as well as pragmatic themes. In *Republic* Plato has his "Socrates" character tell us

Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself – but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantages of that, the weaker, and not the advantage of the stronger? That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in the form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.

What do you mean by that, Socrates? said Glaucon. The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don't understand.

Then, said I, you don't understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach? . . . Well, then, said I, that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for the service of their rule and be styled hirelings, nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. . . For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men only, immunity from office holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now, and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled, so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. – Plato, *Republic*, I.

It is obvious that the good ruler Plato describes here is a rare find in the real world, whether in politics or in business. In social experience many people holding nominal leader positions often appear to covet money, honor, power over other people, or all of these together. Plato is describing an *ideal* ruler from the viewpoint of followers' informed and rational expectations, from which they *consent to be led* by him. He is, therefore, describing only one half of the mutual relationship between the leader and the followers and not even all that is found in this half. Furthermore, even this half of the relationship presupposes the power of the followers to depose a bad ruler or to remove themselves from his power over them.

But if the good ruler is to be regarded as, in effect, the servant of those he rules, why should the latter consent to be *ruled* rather than merely advised or persuaded by the leader? Plato argues that this consent is, to use a modern phrase, motivated by enlightened self interest. He illustrates

this by means of a parable of sailors and the shipmaster:

For so cruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to the state that there is no single thing like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defense for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix . . . Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one. Picture a shipmaster in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all . . . and meanwhile they are always clustered about the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out of the ship, and then, after binding and stupefying the worthy shipmaster . . . they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage of it as is to be expected from such; and, as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule, while the man who lacks this craft they censure as useless. They have no suspicion that the true pilot must give his attention to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship. . .

. . . For it is not the natural course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him . . . But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything. But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we were just describing. – Plato, *Republic*, VI

Like many men of his time and aristocratic class (and, for that matter, of today as well), Plato did not hold a very high opinion of the intelligence and ability of the majority of the people who make up a political entity. Plato despised democracy and held that the best of all possible rulers was the "philosopher king." Like all the classical Greek thinkers, he accepted the presupposition that if bigger is better then biggest is best, that if more is better then most is best, that if expertise is good then deeper and more specialized expertise is better. The classical Greek thinkers were champions of specialization, holding that excellence follows when every man is a deep specialist, and one of the specialties was the art of coordinating and controlling all the other specialists. This was the art of the statesman. If one buys into this set of presuppositions then Plato's idea of the best form of government (or any other enterprise) follows from rigorous logic. In *Statesman* Plato has "young Socrates" instructed in this lesson by a wise stranger from Elea:

We decided, did we not, that the art of rule is one of the sciences? . . . Furthermore, we agreed that it is a particular kind of science. Out of the whole class of sciences we selected the judging class and more particularly the directive class. . . We divided the directive into direction of lifeless things and direction of living things, and by this process of subdivision we arrived by regular stages to where we are now, never losing sight of the fact that statesmanship is a form of knowledge but unable as yet to say precisely what

form of knowledge it is. . .

Do we realize, then, that the real criterion judging constitutions must not be whether few or many rule, whether rule is by violence or consent, or whether the rulers are poor or rich? If we are going to abide by our previous conclusions, the criterion must be the presence or absence of an art directing the ruling. . . Then we are forced to look at the issue in this light. In which, if any, of these constitutions do we find the art of ruling being practiced in the actual government of men? What art is more difficult to learn? But what art is more important to us? We must see it for what it is so as to be able to decide which are the other public figures we must remove from the true king's company, those personages who claim to be statesmen, who win over the mass of men to believe them to be statesmen, but are in actual fact nothing of the kind. . .

. . . I think it follows that if the art of government is to be found in this world at all in its pure form, it will be found in the possession of one or two, or at most, of a select few. . . On this principle it is the men who possess the art of ruling and these only whom we are to regard as rulers, whatever constitutional form their rule may take. It makes no difference whether their subjects be willing or unwilling; they may rule with or without a code of laws; they may be poor or wealthy. It is the same with doctors. We do not assess the medical qualifications of a doctor by the degree of willingness on our part to submit to his knife or cautery or other painful treatment. . . The one essential condition is that they act for the good of our bodies to make them better instead of worse, and treat men's ailments in every case as healers acting to preserve life. We must insist that in this disinterested scientific ability we see the distinguishing mark of true authority in medicine – and of true authority everywhere else as well. . .

Then the constitution par excellence, the only constitution worthy of the name, must be the one in which the rulers are not men making a show of political cleverness but men really possessed of scientific understanding of the art of government. Then we must not take into consideration on any sound principle of judgment whether their rule be by laws or without them over willing or unwilling subjects or whether they themselves be rich men or poor men. . . They may purge the city for its better health by putting some of the citizens to death or banishing others. They may lessen the citizen body by sending off colonies like bees swarming off from a hive, or they may bring people in from other cities and naturalize them so as to increase the number of citizens. So long as they work on a reasoned scientific principle following essential justice and act to preserve and improve the life of the state so far as may be, we must call them real statesmen according to our standards of judgment and say that the state they rule alone enjoys good government and has a real constitution – Plato, *Statesman*, 292^b-293^c.

At this point we are bound to ask, "Justice for who?" and "What does 'the good of the state' mean?" From our vantage point twenty-five centuries after Plato, his ideas of the ideal state and the ideal statesman are repugnant to many cultured to the ways of representative government and democracy. On the other hand, Plato's "ideal constitution" is quite alive and well in the prevailing attitudes taken by many managers of private sector companies and by political party bosses. We still find practices of so-called "scientific management" (Taylorism), of banishing citizens (layoffs), of "sending off colonies" (spin offs), and of bringing people in and naturalizing them (mergers). Plato's idea of the ideal state is alive in the political arena. It is, for example, his same set of compounded ontological presuppositions and logical dialectic, repackaged by Hegel, that underlies the theory of Communism. It is not without reason that a twentieth century commentator once damned Plato's *Politeía* (*Republic*) as "ant-like Communism." The still-living

influence of Plato's doctrine is present all around us to this day. Indeed, that is why he is accounted by most philosophers to be the greatest philosopher who has ever lived (which proves one can be great without being right). Plato was an effective leader.

However, Plato's theory is seen to lack objective validity when we view it from a basis in Critical epistemology. Plato's theory is in essence formulaic, which is to say it is "mathematical" in the basic sense of that word. If one accepts his presuppositions ("axioms") and does not too deeply inquire into the real meanings of his ideas of such things as justice ("primitives"), Plato's conclusions and principles follow with the rigidity of a geometry proof. This mathematical character can be hard to clearly see in Plato's own words, but it is seen more clearly in Hegel's work. One of Hegel's more interesting if immodest conclusions, presented in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, essentially amounts to saying that if Plato had just developed "the genuine dialectic" more it would have been Hegel's and Plato himself would have *been* Hegel:

The fully worked out and genuine dialectic is, however, contained in the *Parmenides* – that most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic. . . These are the principal points in Plato's peculiar dialectic. The fact that the Idea of the divine, eternal, beautiful, is absolute existence is the beginning of the elevation of consciousness into the spiritual and into the consciousness that the universe is true. . . This constitutes the only truth, and the only interest for knowledge in what is called Platonic philosophy[.] – G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, Plato and the Platonists

Plato's dialectic formulae all pursue the same course of continued abstraction, sailing on into ever more remote and ideal constructs until, at last, all possible connection with real human experience is lost. His subsequent conclusions thereby lose all objective validity in natural science. It is perfectly correct for Plato to call his theory a science, as he does in *The Statesman* and elsewhere, because it does fit the Critical definition of what a science is. What Plato's doctrine is not, however, is a *natural* science for the simple reason that it loses contact with real Nature. This does not, unfortunately, prevent human beings from using his objectively non-valid maxims as rationalizations for their actions, especially when organization theory and management theory are concerned. A key point from this that your author wishes to stress is this: wherever we find Platonism embedded in any natural science, there we also find false doctrine. It is for this reason very beneficial for us to not ignore Plato because he is a fairly reliable signpost marking various speculative paths by which ontological prejudices carry us away from our goal.

Let us mine what we have here from Plato's theory and extract the observational data it contains. In doing so, it is important for us to bear in mind that, for an epistemology-centered metaphysic of leadership, the data we can expect to obtain from Plato *is not* observed human behavior but rather what sort of rational *maxims* (behaviors in thinking and rationalizing) we should expect to find *manifested* in the dynamical relationships between human beings that

pertain to the ideas of leader and leadership. Plato *exhibits* these maxims through the dialectic arguments he presents. *In social-natural science the maxim a theorist uses in his theorizing is a relevant datum because it exhibits something about his **thinking nature** in his role as a social atom.* His maxim is mediately *observable* through his presuppositions and arguments.

First of all with Plato we find a three-part maxim, viz. that the ruler (leader) consents to rule (lead), that the follower consents to be led (ruled), and that the relationship between them must call upon some ideas of good expected to come out of this arrangement or some ideas of evil that will be avoided or abolished due to this arrangement. *Ideally*, according to Plato, these ideas would be commonly held by both leader(s) and follower(s). However, we must also note that this ideal situation is speculative. Put another way, this idealism presupposes a political counterpart to the so-called "rational man" model used in economics theory. It is, to use Bloom's phrase, "an abstraction, or a construct, or a figment of the imagination."

Should a science of leadership make the speculative presupposition that every person involved in a situation where leadership dynamics are present will share a common and enlightened understanding of mutual self-interests? Of course not. Each person might, and often will, *presume* such an enlightened common understanding of the situation is held by all involved. Belief – which Critical metaphysics defines as *unquestioned* holding-to-be-true-and-binding – underlies all generalizations in every individual's self-constructed manifold of concepts. Furthermore, concepts-of-belief are grounded in the effects of *affective* perception and reflective judgment. In other words, beliefs are subjective and make up the foundations for other concepts a human being practically *takes for granted* in deciding upon his actions.

The Critical foundation for his *subjective* premise – viz. that an ideal common understanding such as Plato deems necessary for the ideal ruler (leader) is practical and "ought to be" understood by all concerned – stems from the naive realism characteristic of early learning in childhood. Something that bears pointing out is that *all* the classical Greek philosophers (perhaps with the possible exception of Protagoras) – regardless of whether they adhered to what we would today call a rational disposition, an empirical disposition, or a skeptical disposition – were ontology-centered realists. The mental physics involved here leads to observable traits in childish thinking Piaget termed the "egocentric thought" of the child. This learning trait in child development is observable by the psychologist and it is humanely universal. Piaget wrote,

In short, thought in all realms starts from a surface contact with the external realities, that is, by a simple accommodation to immediate experience. Why, then, does this accommodation remain, in the true sense of the word, superficial, and why does it not lead at once to correcting the sensory impression by rational truth? Because, and this is what we are leading up to, primitive accommodation of thought . . . is undifferentiated from a distorting assimilation of reality to the self and is at the same time oriented in the

opposite direction.

During this phase of superficial accommodation to physical and social experience, we observe a continuous assimilation of the universe not only to the impersonal structure of the mind . . . but also and primarily to the personal point of view, to individual experience, and even to the desires and affectivity of the subject. Considered in its social aspect, this distorting assimilation consists, as we have seen, in a sort of egocentrism of thought so that thought, still unsubmitive to the norms of intellectual reciprocity and logic, seeks satisfaction rather than truth and transforms reality into a function of personal affectivity. – Jean Piaget, *The Construction of Reality in the Child*

This is a theoretical finding that came out of Piaget's empirical studies of children from birth to age twelve years; it is also a consequence of a *theorem* deducible from fundamental principles of mental physics. Thus we have full scientific closure for an objectively valid Critical theory.⁸

Secondly, although Plato tells us the followers ought to be willing to submit to the rule of a good ruler, imperfect human society is such that oftentimes those in rulership positions are not Platonic "true rulers" (i.e., they lack the "art" to be "fit" to rule). This is hardly a profound revelation. Not even Plato held that the ideal society is to be found anywhere in the world. He merely held it ought to be possible to make one *and that to do so* was the duty of the statesman. This is, so to speak, Plato's "Father knows best" maxim used to justify submission to authority by the followers, even if it is sometimes necessary to obtain submission by force and coercion.

But this leads us directly to our third piece of observation data. It is in an important sense the counterpart to the premise of the enlightened Platonic follower, namely, the premise that ideal Platonic statesmen, while rare among human beings, nonetheless can and do exist and realize their native-born potential to be true rulers through adequate study and contemplation of the "art of statesmanship." Indeed, the idea that there is such an art of true statesmanship is another maxim of Platonic dialectic. Plato would tell us this art belongs to the philosopher alone, hence the true ruler would be a philosopher king. That we should expect to encounter people who hold to such a maxim is an important observational datum.

Today those of us who live in countries governed according to precepts of republicanism and democracy would be largely inclined to dismiss Plato's premise as nonsense. We should not, however, be so quick to dismiss this *datum* because it is easy enough to find manifestations of it in the behaviors and attitudes of managers in many private sector businesses. The Platonic premise might have lost currency insofar as Western governments are concerned, but its manifestations are alive and well in other spheres of social life, especially in the business world,

⁸ A note to the reader: Your author does not quote findings of empirical science in the context of their being *facts* of observation and/or experiment unless these findings stand in conformity with and are expected from the principles of mental physics and Critical epistemology. This method of treating empirical findings is a method congruent with what we earlier saw Bernard put forth in regard to observation and experiment.

in many bureaucracies and other agencies of government, in labor unions, in education, and in the core ideologies of political parties. The important *superficial* point this raises is: Who is fit to be identified as a "Platonic statesman" in any particular human enterprise?

The deeper and Critical question, though, is: Is Plato's "statesman premise" objectively valid? Or is it, like the "rational follower," nothing but one of Bloom's "abstractions, constructs, or figments of the imagination"? Put yet another way, is there any objective validity in the idea that *any person naturally* does *unilaterally* know what is best for the enterprise (whether it be a political state or any other organized human enterprise whatsoever)? That some people do hold to the Platonic premise in at least some relative form ("I might not *perfectly* know what is best, but I know better than *they* do") is nothing else than a rather common facet of human experience, and so the maxim must be examined in a doctrine of leadership social-natural science. Managers of companies do downsize the workforce, pursue mergers with other companies, and enact workplace policies to which employees are required to adhere as a condition of employment or face banishment (that is, get fired). Political parties do occasionally conduct pogroms against "ideologically impure" members (e.g., the anti-RINO⁹ pogrom within the Republican Party in the U.S. and the on-going strife between "the liberal" and "the blue dog" factions within the Democratic Party). What we will see later is that the premise – the actuality of *naturally unilateral* best judgment in leadership situations – lacks objective validity and a proper Critical premise must take its place in scientific precepts of leadership.

§ 2.3 Aristotle's Theory, Part I: Political Science as a Moral Science

Plato's greatest student, Aristotle, also grounded the starting point of his political theory in a moral theory. Like Plato, Aristotle did not often question the "if big is good then bigger is better" prejudice of the classical Greek thinkers.¹⁰ He tells us,

Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. – Aristotle, *Politics*, I.

Aristotle's premise, "everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good," is objectively valid and true according to mental physics provided we also include "preventing or abolishing an evil" in our understanding of what "obtaining that which they think good" means. The ontological prejudice that is part of Aristotle's maxims of thinking and rationalizing is

⁹ The acronym RINO stands for "Republican in name only."

¹⁰ Evidence of this maxim of thinking shows up in childhood. Many a nine-year-old will say he is "almost ten" (closer to being a grown-up) and will urgently protest, "I'm not a little boy! I'm a *big* boy!"

exhibited in his premise that "every community is established with *a* view to some good." A community is, by definition, comprised of more than one person. It is a metaphysical premise – the same one Plato used – to say that the community of individuals has *one* common "view to some good." At some abstract level this can be true (although it is not necessarily true) once we refine it by abstracting from the concept all individual differences pertaining to "what is good." But to say the community is of one mind about the good to be realized is to transfer the idea of "what is good" out of the minds of human beings, reify it, and place it in a reified corporate body (the community as a substantial thing-in-itself). Aristotle goes on a bit later to say

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is in its end. For what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. – [*ibid.*]

There is a germ of objectively valid truth in this collection of premises and a good deal of objective falsity as well. We can, without running into later problems, take the uniting of several villages into a self-sufficing community as one nominal definition of a "state." It is also true that each human being associating with the others in this arrangement can be individually regarded as acting to satisfy "the bare needs of [his personal] life" (at the least). This individual action merely serves an individual's self-determined duties to himself (as we discussed in chapter 2). This analysis of the *cause* of the formation of political states is Critically valid and appears in some form or another in the writings of every major Western thinker discoursing upon pre-modern political science. For example, Thomas Paine wrote,

In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest; they will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto, the strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same. Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of the wilderness, but *one* man might labor out the common period of life without accomplishing anything; when he felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even misfortune would be death, for though neither might be mortal, yet either would disable him from living and reduce him to a state in which he might rather be said to perish than to die.

Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants into a society, the reciprocal blessings of which would supercede and render the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen

that in proportion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, they will begin to relax in the duty and attachment to each other; and this remissness will point out the necessity of establishing some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue. – Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*.

The suppositions Paine uses here regarding the individuals' motives in forming a society are objectively valid under Critical epistemology and correctly implicate their grounding in duties one makes and necessitates to himself. Where Aristotle errs is in overgeneralization; it is possible a political community could come to a common agreement for holding some specific *social ends* as the "common cause" of their association. If they do so, this is called a *social compact* and the mutually agreed-to social ends are the basis for concepts of necessitated reciprocal duties, i.e. tenets of duties one determines oneself to assume in Relation to the situation of others and expects other to do in Relation to his.

But it is also possible the community of individuals does not bother to identify and formalize common ends for their association; and in this case there would be no common idea of what "a good life" might be. Aristotle repeats here in a slightly different formula the same maxim we saw Plato employ.

Aristotle also errs in overgeneralizing and reifying his end-as-a-final-cause. The idea of final causes in Nature has objective validity only within strict limits, namely as *psychological* causality in the individual's self-determination of his own actions. The ground of objective validity here is found in spontaneous actions of a human being that defy every effort to attribute determination of the action solely to some external stimulus. Furthermore, any mathematical formulation of any representation of psychological causality is itself strictly bound by the fact that *experience* of every human action is bound to *physical* causality and dependency. This means that a formula of psychological causality when expressed mathematically (which, it turns out, will be in the form of an integral equation) *must* have a mathematical form that is capable of being re-expressed in a differential equation form of the type that describes the physical cause-and-effect relationship. In mental physics this is called *Margenau's law*. The part of mathematics that deals with this is called the calculus of variations.¹¹

But this idea of psychological causality has objective validity only in the context of the individual human being and utterly lacks objective validity for anything else. Aristotle takes the objectively valid principle of psychological causality and abstracts it beyond the horizon of possible experience in coming to his famous idea of the entelechy of Aristotelian substances.

¹¹ Your author recognizes that this is going to be contentiously received by most scientists and many non-scientists as well. It would take us too far afield to repeat here the deductions and principles of Margenau's law in this treatise, and so the reader is referred to *Principles of Mental Physics* for this discussion.

Thus the maxim stated in the last sentence of the quote from *Politics* above is a false maxim and a creature of ontology-centered metaphysics. It helped set the stage for Hume and his devastating attack that razed to the ground the metaphysics of both empiricism and rationalism alike.

Modern science is correct to dismiss this principle insofar as physical Nature is concerned; but it does err (in psychology and in neuroscience) when it dismisses psychological causality and banishes it as a principle for understanding human *thinking-Nature*. Indeed, the *concept* of physical causality as a scientific principle is *grounded* in psychological causality. The progression of experience eventually leads the child to *formulate* the physical causality principle and is the very same progression that produces the child's conception of *himself* as one thing among other things in Nature. At the risk of stating the principle too simply here, "that which physically responds to the efficacy of my will is part of me; that which does not is not-me." This is the *practical* real basis of the "me vs. not-me" division every one of us comes to draw early in our understanding of Nature. *This metaphysical division is not initially present in the infantile mind at birth*, as Piaget's research has amply demonstrated empirically in the collective findings published in *The Construction of Reality in the Child*, *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality*, and *The Child's Conception of the World*. The principles of mental physics predict its genesis as a *theorem*, the conclusions of empirical psychology are congruent with the prediction, and we again have scientific closure on the question.

Getting back now to Aristotle: We can accept as being objectively valid the maxim that each member of any sort of voluntary human association joins it to further the realization of some personal benefit he expects to obtain using the association as a means. We further see that this is appetized from duties he makes to himself in the categorical and hypothetical Relations of duty to Critical good and evil. What premises and maxims, though, underlie the idea that it is possible for the community as a whole to share some one (or few) benefit(s) as common cause of reciprocal social duties (under the reciprocal Relation of duty to Critical good and evil)? Upon this question, we will later see, hinges the distinctions between moral leadership, amoral leadership, and immoral leadership.

Aristotle approaches the question by asking what is meant by the idea of "good." He tells us,

Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good¹² is That at which all things aim. . . . But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows that their ends are correspondingly numerous Now in cases where several such pursuits are subordinate to some single capacity the ends of the master arts are things more to

¹² There are two different Greek words that translate into English as "good." One of them carries the connotation of "a good" as a possession, and this is the word translated here as "good." The other carries the connotation of "good" as a *thing* – an ontological prejudice – and this is translated here as "Good."

be desired than all those of the arts subordinate to them . . .

If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we wish for its own sake, while we wish the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else . . . clearly this one must be a good, and indeed the best. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I

Longstanding tradition in philosophy and theology calls this ultimate "best good" by the names "the supreme good" and "the *summum bonum*." It is a terminology we inherit directly from the medieval schoolmen (the European Scholastics) whose faith necessitated that this supreme good be identified as God. It is a tradition that tends to color (and sometimes distort) the translations of Aristotle's work. Aristotle was not remotely so overtly theological in his theorizing.

Nonetheless, there are two important observable maxims of reasoning inherent in the premises of the second paragraph. The first is in the hypothetical proposition that there is always some end for the sake of which one ultimately chooses some course of action. Aristotle argues this must be the case or else it would "result in an endless process so that all appetite would be futile." Aristotle held as a metaphysical principle that there are no endless processes (nothing is actually infinite) and clearly rejected the idea that all appetite is futile. This is an ontology-centered premise for understanding most of Aristotle's metaphysics and is an inherent ground in Aristotle's teleological physics of Nature.

Second, we have the hypothesis that there is only one ultimate end having, therefore, an all-encompassing scope. This second premise he treats *as* an hypothesis and undertakes to find out if there is some one good to which all other goods are subordinated. If there is such a singular good,

It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include most of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more divine to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry, being concerned with politics, aims. – [*ibid.*]

Here Aristotle is very much his teacher's pupil¹³. Politics is to be seen, first and fundamentally, as a *moral* science. Aristotle did not agree with Plato in all particulars set out in *Republic*, but both men agreed with the maxim that the state is more important than any one individual. This maxim is still current today in our attitudes. We see it expressed in sayings like, "the group comes before

¹³ Plato was the teacher of Aristotle, but Aristotle was Plato's *student* and not just his *pupil*. A pupil accepts his lessons as authoritative; a student masters his lessons in such a way that he can then go beyond them.

any one person," "there is no 'me' in 'team'," in every claim of the right of the state to punish criminals, and it is a pillar in most ideas of government-and-society.

Given the history of governments and politics, the idea that the science of politics is a moral science might strike some modern readers as either humorously quaint or egregiously false. However, in America at least, that is a relatively recent attitude of the latter half of the twentieth century. It is by no means shared by everyone (even if the political science departments in many universities seem to have lost sight of it and teach politics as if it is nothing more than a vocation or as if the part of Nature it studies is no different from what physics studies). Plato and Aristotle would both be quick to point out that *malpractice* in politics does not change the social *aim* of politics or the reason most people submit themselves to the authority of a government in a free country. Bloom wrote,

Political science has always been the least attractive and the least impressive of the social sciences, spanning as it does the old and new views of man and the human sciences. It has a polyglot character. Part of it has joined joyfully in the effort to dismantle the political order seen as a comprehensive order and to understand it as a result of subpolitical causes. Economics, psychology, and sociology as well as all kinds of methodological diagnosticians have been welcome guests. But there are irrepressible, putatively unscientific parts of political science. The practitioners of these parts of the discipline are unable to overcome their unexplained and unexplainable political instincts – and their awareness that politics is the authoritative arena of effective good and evil. – Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*

Your author does not agree with Bloom's characterization of what he calls political instincts as "unexplainable," although he does agree they are "unexplained" in American universities today. He is also willing to go along with Bloom's indictment of "putatively unscientific parts of political science" insofar as the current practice of political science is concerned. However, a central theme of this treatise is that *every* social science must be re-made a *social-natural* science and that such sciences are possible. For Plato and Aristotle political science was precisely this and the shortcomings in their doctrines were and are metaphysical shortcomings, i.e., shortcomings in taken-for-granted premises and ontology-centered presuppositions.

All this, however, does not establish the validity of Aristotle's hypothesis of the real existence of "one ultimate good." In the quote above he merely points out that *if* the hypothesis is correct then political science will necessarily be an arena of human activity and experience where it is made manifest and so here is a sphere of human life where one can look for evidence of it. One thing we should note right away is the relative nature of the idea of "good" inherent in the Greek premise that "political good" is "higher" or "better" than "individual good." If a society were to consist of two individuals only (let us say a husband and wife with no children), what meaning would there be in saying "good for the two is better than good for either one alone" if the two of

them do not agree on what constitutes "good"? In asking this question we also question the Greek prejudice that more *quantity of* something equates to more *quality in* that something. If this presupposition should fail to hold for the case of two individuals, adding more individuals to the aggregate does not *ipso facto* make the proposition begin to take hold. It follows that if the premise is to hold then whatever it is that is said to become "more divine" as quantity goes up must be something found in common among all the individuals involved and which the act of aggregation in no way diminishes for the individual case.

Aristotle understands this:

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and choice aims at some good, what is it that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is in some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another – and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor . . . Now some thought that apart from these many goods, there is another which is good in itself and causes the goodness of all these as well. . .

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, "are we on the way from or to the first principles?" . . . Presumably, then, *we* must begin with things familiar to *us*. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I

Aristotle proceeds to tick through various sorts of opinions held by different people as to how what we here might call "the quality of being good" is manifested in life. This diversity of viewpoints admits to a two-fold general classification, with species of schools under each:

1. *Pleasure is good.* This is in essence the viewpoint taken by the Epicureans, who defined "pleasure" as "the absence of pain." Centuries later Cicero would summarize the Epicurean thesis in *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* ("About the Ends of Goods and Evils") in the following words: "Besides this, pleasure and pain function as the initial origination of desire and of avoidance. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the *telos*, the greatest or ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the chief Good is to live agreeably." Plato especially almost violently disagreed with this and Aristotle eventually rejects it as well. In modern times the Epicurean thesis is somewhat adopted by the so-called "objectivist" followers of Ayn Rand, who more or less merely rediscovered various elements of the old arguments. Of more interest is the compatibility of the Epicurean thesis, when we bear in mind that this school defined pleasure as absence of pain, with findings published by psychologists Elaine and Arthur Aron, who reported that, psychologically, happiness is "the normal human condition" and the "neutral gear" of the nervous system. Of more significance is the fact that the Arons' finding admits to an objectively valid Critical interpretation. We will discuss this point later when we take on the thorny issue of how "happiness" is to be

understood from Critical epistemology.¹⁴

2. *Virtue is good.* This is effectively the conclusion both Plato and Aristotle drew, although their specific ideas of what "virtue" is are significantly different. For Plato, "virtue" more or less means "justice" and the ideal just man is one who does not doubt the rightness of his moral principles and who is not even tempted to transgress them. Plato reifies the idea of justice and later theologians had no difficulty objectifying the Platonic Idea of justice in the person of God. Aristotle makes a rather different argument. He undertakes to analyze what he calls "the function of man" as a rational being (and he presumes there is such a "function of man"). He concludes that "virtue" means "moral excellence" and for him virtue is a necessary condition of happiness but is not itself the chief or highest Good. That role remains filled by "happiness," which we still have to discuss in more detail. Aristotle's theory was the precursor of a more elaborate system, called virtue ethics, erected later by the Stoics. The Stoics were almost fanatical devotees of logical argument and were notorious hair-splitters who agreed with one another in the abstract but disagreed with each another on a great many of the finer details. In *de Finibus* Cicero summarized the Stoic position as follows: "Eliminating therefore the views [of other philosophical systems] just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the greatest Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the greatest Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature." For the Stoics everything in nature is materialistic, events are deterministic, predestined and fixed by fate, there is no human free will in regard to being able to in any way alter "what is to be," and human free will is limited to merely deciding whether one will accept his fate calmly (*apatheia*, apathy) or will torment himself by futile resistance to his fate. The Stoics had an interesting motto: "The Fates guide the man who wishes to be guided; the man who does not wish to be guided they drag along." Like Aristotle, the Stoics held that virtue leads to happiness but, unlike Aristotle, held that virtue, not happiness, is what a man should make his ultimate aim, i.e., "virtue is its own reward." For Aristotle virtue is a means; for the Stoics it is an end in itself. The difference arises because Aristotle held that a man has free will and is a determining agent of events, while the Stoics held that events controlled the man through inevitable determinism in "nature itself."

There are numerous variations on the two basic themes of "pleasure" and "virtue" as "the" highest good, and a number of ethical systems derived (or are derivable as variations on a theme) from these two themes. Consequentialist ethics, for example, is one logical endpoint that can be reached from the Epicurean basis, while virtue ethics in its various modern forms descends more or less linearly from the Stoic position. What both general camps share in common is ontology-centered metaphysical presupposition and the eventual reification of "the good" in some object *outside* the individual human being. Both, in other words, lose contact with our social atom. This is not particularly surprising since the roots of both consequentialist and virtue ethics predate Kant's epistemology-centered system by many centuries.

Neo-Platonism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and later non-Critical systems developed along one

¹⁴ Aron, E.N. & Aron, A. (1987), "The influence of inner state on self-reported long term happiness," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 27, 248-270.

or another of these lines and adopted absolute positions that in effect make ethics subordinate to an ontology-centered foundation. By doing so they all end up with systems of ethics incapable of getting everyone's agreement. Some people become consequentialists, some virtue ethicists, some simple hedonists. Failure to gain universal free agreement in a moral code means societies then resort to sanctions, force, and scolding (a form of social coercion) to impose one as a *legal system*.¹⁵ It also dooms any prospect of making a social-natural science for an ontology-centered ethical system. To his credit as a scientist, Aristotle stopped short of taking on the untenable absolutist position and recognized the significance of subjectivity for ethics:

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuations, so that they may be thought to exist by convention and not by nature. And goods also exhibit a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people: for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. . .

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject and the man who has received an all-around education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living and pursuing each successive object as passion directs. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I

Aristotle was and remained a prisoner of ontology-centered prejudices that arise as a natural matter of course from the naive realism that characterizes childhood and the development of human intelligence over the long apprenticeship of childhood. This prevented him from reaching any one fundamental principle grounding the idea of happiness. Instead, he chose to do what he could do, which was to examine the problem pragmatically to seek for good *practices* for living one's life. Aristotle's ethics theory, and his political theory, are, at root, *pragmatic*.

§ 2.4 Aristotle's Theory, Part II: Political Science as a Practical Science

Having concluded that he could not offer a definition of happiness as any kind of substantial thing, Aristotle turned his attention to what he could do, which was to try to identify its calling card, i.e. what sort of general properties seemed to attend when someone professed to be happy. These he wedded to some logical considerations that seem to be called for if one is to posit

¹⁵ Consent is not the same as agreement. One can consent to obey a law by coercion without agreeing to it.

perfect happiness as the endpoint of everything said to in some way be a reflection of happiness. He found three such logical considerations:

Happiness, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given if we could first ascertain the function of man. . . Now if the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle, and if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind . . . human good turns out to be an activity of soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with the best and most complete.

But we must add "in a complete life." For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. . . And we must also remember what has been said before and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter and so much of it as is appropriate to the inquiry. – [*ibid.*]

Aristotle is not resorting to spiritualism by his use of the phrase translated as "soul" (*psyche enérgeia*, which for Aristotle more or less means the power a human being has to determine and carry out his own actions based on rational decision-making). What makes humankind distinct from all other forms of life is the human capacity for abstract reasoning; man is "the rational animal" and so the special *function* of man, he tells us, is marked by this ability. Put another way, this is what we *do* that makes us *distinctive* among all living things. It follows from this that actions based upon wise principles (wisdom) are those that work for the perfection of happiness, and excellence is the signpost of good action. Excellence, he tells us, has a twofold character:

Excellence, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral excellence comes about as a result of custom, whence also its name is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word for custom.¹⁶ From this it is also plain that none of the moral excellences arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II

These claims by Aristotle, controversial as they may be in the eyes of adherents to different schools of psychology and ethics, turn out to be congruent with the Critical theory after Kant's Copernican turn is applied and ontology is made subordinate to epistemology. We will discuss this in more detail in a later chapter when we discuss *deontological ethics* as the foundation for the possibility of a system of universal and objectively valid social-natural ethics. The reason Aristotle is able to reach this point of congruence with Critical theory is because, in his deductive

¹⁶ Aristotle is, naturally, referring to the Greek language, in which "moral excellence" = "ethics" (*ἠθικῆ, ēthikē*) is a variation of the word for custom (*ἔθος, ēthos*).

process leading him to these conclusions, he had to let go of ontology (which in this particular subject-matter sold him short) and turn to epistemology in his reasoning:

Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we must act according to right reason is a common principle and must be assumed . . . Matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity . . . [and] the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion[.] – [*ibid.*]

This last little observation, easily overlooked in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by ontology-centered thinkers, turns out to be a key leadership principle. Aristotle may have considered this to be an embarrassment and a shortcoming, but in the Critical system it is a *theorem*.

Aristotle's other observation, namely that "nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature," is also important. It was previously stated in this treatise that the Critical theory tells us moral laws, while all originating as a consequence of the fundamental practical formula of the categorical imperative in mental physics, are nonetheless individual and personal tenets the individual makes out of his experience. This is another important point of congruence where Aristotle's reasoning manages to come up with the objectively valid finding. The reader might perhaps be beginning to appreciate why Aristotle is receiving such a large amount of coverage in this chapter. If humans had some moral law pre-fixed in our mental nature, immoral behavior would simply be impossible in real experience. The fact that it is not (and that what is immoral in one person's eyes is not immoral in another's) is another empirical fact easily observable from typical human experience. On this point Aristotle was more correct than Kant.

Step by plodding step, Aristotle slowly brings us to the next important observation we wish to bring out in this chapter:

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in appetite¹⁷, so that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate appetite, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the appetite right if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical or productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity . . . while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right

¹⁷ It is a longstanding, if nontechnical, tradition to translate Aristotle's *ὀρέξει* as "desire" rather than appetite. This shows up in all the major English translations of *Nicomachean Ethics*. In English the idea of "appetite" is usually regarded as a species of desire, but we owe this to the Romans rather than the Greeks. In mental physics "desire" belongs to reflective judgment but "appetite" belongs to practical Reason. Aristotle is talking about action and choice here, thus the *context* is that of practical Reason and it forestalls later confusion if we translate him as your author has done here. *Critical appetite* is practical self-determination to undertake an action that will find its terminal satisfaction from the effect it has; we use the term *appetition* to refer to the process of making this self-determination.

appetition.

The origin of rational action – its efficient, not its final cause – is choice, and that of choice is appetite and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without thought and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only that intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only relative to something, i.e. of something) – only that which is *done* is that; for good action is an end, and appetite aims at this. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI

We should note that there is nothing objective (that is, universally applicable in experience to all human beings) in this *except* the idea of a *process* of choice-determination. So far as "good" action and "moral" choice is concerned, *every human being always acts according to the self-determination of his appetitive power of practical Reason, and this determination always stands in a relationship to Critical good and evil* (as discussed in chapter 2). The motto of this principle is, "*good* is whatever I decide it is." For the possibility of two people jointly *agreeing* that some particular concrete end or some particular concrete means to an end is "good" we must look to mutual relationships between them. If these two people can reach no agreement of this sort then socially beneficial leadership will not be forthcoming. Now, the quote above pertains to personal choice and action but the contexts of both politics and leadership are social contexts. This brings us to the last observation we will extract from the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to have come together originally and to endure, for this is what legislators aim at, and they call 'just' that which is to the common advantage. Now the other communities aim at some particular advantage, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to making money or something of the kind, fellow soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly. Some communities seem to arise for the sake of pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship. But all of these seem to fall under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole. . . All communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community; and particular kinds of friendship will correspond to particular kinds of community. – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII

Here we have a particularly important linkage among all kinds of human associations. It is perhaps not difficult to see that the topic of leadership spans all of these communities, or to see that there must be some points of commonality between leadership in the context of politics and all other communal contexts. Note that Aristotle has not said every member of the community seeks exactly the same advantage as everyone else within it. What the members have in common is that each seeks *something* advantageous for the purposes of his life.

Few of us would normally say that a confidence man is "exercising leadership" when he dupes his victim into thinking or presuming he will realize some advantage by doing what the con man is trying to get him to do (even though the con man is attempting to get the victim to take the action he wants). Nonetheless, we would have to say that this is still a form of leadership – one we will call *antisocial leadership* and assign the quality of *malignant manipulation*. But this is not what Aristotle or most other political theorists have in mind for the context of social-natural political science and we will stick to their context. The key observation we take from the quote is that social community of whatever sort hinges upon the common idea of advantageousness-sought-by-its-members. And this brings us to our next topic for this chapter.

§ 3. Locke, Rousseau, and the Social Contract

Scholars of Aristotle's works might be quick to pounce on the next to last statement above by pointing out that the contention it makes both is and is-not supported in Aristotle's *Politics*. A well organized exploration of what strikes many scholars as a fundamental inconsistency within that work has been presented by C.C.W. Taylor (see reference below). He writes,

Aristotle's account of the *polis* is firmly rooted in his philosophy of nature. The connection is expressed in two fundamental theses: 1) that the *polis* exists by nature, and 2) that a human being is a being of a kind naturally adapted to live in a *polis*. While his enunciation of both theses in a single sentence indicates their intimate interconnection, the precise nature of his view of the logical relation between the two is not entirely clear.

. . . We must note in passing that the notion of "natural" in play here is not entirely unproblematic. If "natural" is understood as "such as will inevitably come about unless prevented by external interference," then Aristotle is surely unjustified in claiming that the household and the village, as he understands them, are natural in that sense. Plainly, the basic human needs of reproduction and survival may be satisfied in numerous kinds of organizations (e.g. the nomadic tribe) . . . Again, it is unclear to what extent "natural" (or, equivalently, "by nature") is opposed to "conventional" or "artificial." – C.C.W. Taylor, "Politics" (1995)

What does one do when the ambiguity of apparently contradictory statements is encountered in a work such as Aristotle's *Politics*? One option, of course, is to conclude the work's author isn't very bright; it wouldn't be very bright of us to take that tack with Aristotle since if he was such a boob we wouldn't be talking about what he had to say more than twenty-four centuries after he said it. Another is to presume his "true view" is contained in one or the other of the contradictory positions, present that presupposition as if it were *known* to be true, and then – depending on whether you agree or disagree with the presumed thesis – either conveniently ignore troublesome parts contradicting it or else bring them up to "prove" the author didn't really know what he was talking about. An example of this is provided by another Aristotle scholar, A.E. Taylor:

Man is by nature a political animal, a being who can only develop his capacities by

sharing in the life of a community. Hence Aristotle definitely rejects the view that the State or Society is a mere creature of convention or agreement, an institution made by compact between individuals for certain special ends, not growing naturally out of the universal demands and aspirations of humanity. Mankind, he urges, have never existed at all as isolated individuals. Some rudimentary form of social organization is to be found wherever men are to be found. – A.E. Taylor, *Aristotle* (1919)

Or one can recognize that there is a third way of looking at the problem. Kant's Critical method teaches us that where we seem to encounter contradictory propositions ("X both *is* and *is-not Y*") we should always ask *if the question itself was wrongly posed* and if we are encountering an issue that must be looked at in subcontrary terms ("X *is* not-Y"). Two merely contrary predications can be made together, whereas a contradictory pair of predications can never be made of the same object at the same time. Kant's doctrine in this is not what we call "logic" in the usual school context but, rather, what he called *transcendental* logic – a *real* logic (a logic of *meanings*) that does not abstract out the material premises of predications but, instead, deals with them from a foundation in epistemology.

Aristotle's *Politics* appears to be a work where Kant's doctrine of analysis must be applied. Two comments are pertinent here for the purposes of our present treatise. The first is we should remind ourselves of what Aristotle said in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely that we should treat a subject only "with as much clearness as the subject-matter will admit to." This is a warning to resist the temptation to over-analyze an ill-posed question (a temptation mental physics shows us is characteristic of the process of judgmentation). The second comment is that we must always be on guard against allowing ontology-centered habits of thinking to slip in and subtly divorce our objective understanding of a question of nature from its foundation in experience. Is Aristotle's *polis* the same thing, in his mind, as the genus under which is contained the actual human political communities encountered in experience? Or is his *polis* an ideal political state, such as Plato's *Republic* is unambiguously addressed to? Or does Aristotle employ homonymous uses of the word *polis* and assume we will be skillful enough to recognize its two (or more) usages from the context of his discussions? Your author's opinion is that Aristotle is trying to do two things at once in *Politics* and that he is not doing a very clear job of keeping his two objectives delineated.

If so, straightening out the mess would be a labor worthy of a chapter in its own right and such a chapter is really quite tangential to the purposes of *this* treatise. Our interest in political science in this treatise is the interest we have in using its observations to build up our empirical understanding of leadership. Understanding what Aristotle was doing in *Politics* is quite another matter altogether. For this reason we now leave Aristotle and move ahead two millennia to the point where we encounter the next significant advances made in pre-modern political science.

C.C.W. Taylor sagely noted,

Given the identification of human good achieved by [a political society], political theory narrowly conceived seeks to identify which forms of society are more and which less conducive to the achievement of that good, to explain the defects of the imperfect forms, and to suggest how those defects might be remedied. The question of political authority, central to most modern political philosophy, is, then, absent from Aristotle's agenda. That question, which may be phrased as "What are the grounds, and what are the limits, of the individual's obligation to obey the state?" presupposes a background of thought in which the central concept is that of obligation and in which the state is seen as something external to the individual, a coercive agency whose power to interfere and to limit stands in need of justification. Aristotle's presuppositions are quite different. His fundamental concept is not that of obligation, but of human good, while in his view the role of the state, so far from limiting the individual's freedom of action with the aim of securing a common good, is precisely that of enabling the individual to realize his or her potential to achieve his or her individual good, an achievement impossible unless in the context of the state. . . For the modern theorist the central problem is why the individual should accept the authority of the state; Aristotle has rather to make good the claim that the individual good is unattainable except to an active participant in a political community. – C.C.W. Taylor, "Politics" (1995)

Our objective in this treatise is related to but still different from either of the above. It is not "why the individual should accept the authority of the state," nor is it to ask "is it true that individual human good is unattainable except to an active participant in a political community?" Our interest could be expressed by asking, "Why, how and when *do* individuals allow themselves, to whatever degree they do, to be led by agents of a government of whatever kind?" We seek not a social science in the modern context but, rather, a social-*natural* science.

We had a taste of observations of the sort pertinent to this earlier in the quote from Thomas Paine. It is a fact that human beings, with the exception of the occasional hermit, join together in organized social structures and that such organizations generally feature some form of governing body, whether it is a council of elders, a staff of managers, or some more despotic form of government. Now, the most fundamental empirical characteristic of a human being is that he is self-determining in all his actions. This includes his self-determined action to join or to not join in an association with other people. We can easily enough spot at least two discernible poles in how such a determination actually comes about: the voluntary determination and the coerced determination. The former involves *self-made obligation*, the latter merely pragmatic *self-interest* with no obligation to the association. Both involve leadership phenomena but in different forms. Paine illustrated the first sort with these words:

Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under the branches of which the whole colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more probable that their first laws will have the title only of Regulations and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every man, by natural right, will have a seat.

But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their

consenting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were they present. – Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*

The other pole is illustrated where a large fraction of the population is subjugated under the rule of a warlord. In describing and denouncing the characteristics of monarchies, Paine wrote,

This is supposing the present race of kings in the world have had an honorable origin; whereas it is more than probable, that could we take off the dark covering of antiquity and trace them to their first rise, that we should find the first of them nothing better than the principal ruffian of some restless gang, whose savage manners or pre-eminence in subtlety obtained for him the title of chief among plunderers; and who by increasing in power and extending his depredations, over-awed the quiet and defenseless to purchase their safety by frequent contributions. . . . Yet I should be glad to ask how they suppose kings came at first? The question admits but of three answers, viz. either by lot, by election, or by usurpation. – [*ibid.*]

§ 3.1 Locke's Essays

From the fall of the Roman republic at the hands of Julius Caesar in the 1st century BC until the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1776, Western civilization was ruled exclusively by monarchies, oligarchies, and military dictatorships combining characteristics of both. With the arrival of what some historians have called "the Age of Reason" beginning at the end of the 16th century, scholars began to re-ask the by-then-heretical question, "Is this how government must or should be?" By the early 17th century the dawn of populism and the re-discovery of the ideas of republicanism and democracy had come. By 1690 John Locke could write,

All these premises, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power . . . so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion . . . [and he] must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designating and knowing the persons that have it – John Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*

Locke was a practicing politician as well as a political scholar, which is to say he was a political scientist in his day¹⁸ coming at his topic as an ontology-centered empiricist¹⁹. He begins his essay by examining the character of complete anarchy, which was and is correctly named *the state of nature*. He wrote,

¹⁸ Locke was not a physical scientist, although the chemist Robert Boyle was one of his close personal friends and he edited Boyle's *General History of the Air* for publication after Boyle's death.

¹⁹ Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, published in 1689, is a work of metaphysics and is usually credited with starting that interesting philosophical movement called British Empiricism.

To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection[.] – [*ibid.*]

Here Locke introduces into the political context an idea of natural equality quite missing from (and even antagonistic to) the premises of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom saw natural inequality as a self-evident character of human association. In ancient Athens men were supposed naturally superior to women, slaves naturally inferior to free men, etc. Nor was the gender differentiation absent from the England of Locke's day. If we take Locke literally his equality pronouncement is rather obvious nonsense. A person born with a physical abnormality such as clubfoot rather clearly does not have precisely the same physical "advantages of Nature" as a person born free of such a condition. A person who is born with or develops²⁰ one of the syndromes given the label infantile autism and who does not receive effective treatment does not have precisely the same mental "advantages of Nature" as someone who does not have the syndrome. Locke knew such things happen. So what does he mean by "equality"?

His contextual meaning becomes clear in the next paragraphs of his essay. Locke is talking about *moral* equality (and, specifically, in a context of religious morality). His arguments utterly lack objective validity and exhibit the societal/cultural prejudices of his time and place²¹, but we will see later that there is an objectively valid grounding in deontological ethics for the idea of equality in the state of nature. For now we can "taste the flavor" of this idea by saying "equality means no person has any natural right that every other person does not also have." This, of course, just transfers the question from "what does 'equality' mean?" to "what does 'natural right' mean?" but this will be explained later. What we will learn is that the idea of natural right derives in a direct way from the self-determining Nature of being a human being. This means that the idea of equality properly understood under Critical metaphysics has *practical* objective validity in social-natural science.

Locke next tries to set up a foundation for establishing just powers of government. His line of argumentation is wholly specious and basically Platonic but it nonetheless serves to bring out an

²⁰ At present we do not know what causes infantile autism and so we cannot say if it is a birth condition or something that develops from some cause inside the first 30 months of age.

²¹ The lack of objective validity comes from Locke's ontology-centered metaphysical prejudices, and his societal/cultural prejudices are attributable to the consequences of ethnocentric *habits of thinking*.

observation we should note for what it tells us about human rationalization. He writes,

But although this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state has an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person and possessions, yet he has not the liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into this world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. . .

And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing harm to one another, and the law of Nature to be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has the right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. – [*ibid.*]

Locke's argument regarding a divine origin of moral law is not uncommon. It or others akin to it have been and still are frequently invoked by moral theorists as well as by legislators and jurists. But if Locke's so-called "law of Nature" were actually a natural law it would not *cajole* obedience like man-made legislation (such as the one telling us automobile drivers *ought to* stop at a stop sign); it would *compel* obedience imperatively and it would be held universally valid and true by *all* human beings. (And, by a specious and transcendent continuation of Locke's argument, which he in fact makes, those who did violate this "law" would, *ipso facto*, not be men but rather merely beasts). That this specious "moral law of Nature" is not *objectively* valid is proven by the mere fact that many people hold it to be false. Contrast Locke's "law" with a remark once made by Alexander Hamilton:

In all general questions which become the subjects of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. . . Take mankind in general, they are vicious – their passions may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British government without duly reflecting how far it was necessary to support a good government. We have taken up many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. . . Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of those passions in order to make them subservient to the public good – for these ever induce us to action. – Hamilton, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, vol. I, June 22, 1787

Locke's argument, and Hamilton's remarks as well, serve to provide us with empirical data illuminating the sorts of rationalizations and reliances upon subjective suppositions characteristic of human reasoning. A social-natural science must take these into account while recognizing that such rationalizations and suppositions are not natural laws but human-behavioral factors.

One thing, though, worth catching our attention is Locke's assertion that "everyone has the right to punish transgressors." His context for "transgressor" is just as subjective as the rest of his argument inasmuch as "transgression" is in the mind of the person who thinks another's actions constitute transgression of a speculative rule or moral law the former has made for himself. What is pertinent to the idea of the state of nature is not the rationalization put up to support one's own subjective set of "ought to" rules but, rather, the easily observable fact of experience that any person can determine himself to perpetrate any sort of assault on another person. This is nothing more than a lineal consequence of the true *natural law* of human self-determination. A political state of nature is governed by jungle law. If you have a strong conviction that a man must not kill another man, but you can convince yourself that your enemy is a beast, then you can kill the beast while remaining true to your conviction. History is rich with examples of precisely this. It is even indirectly excused in Martin Luther's specious "slave will" dictum,

The human will is like a beast of burden. If God mounts it, it wishes and goes as God wills; if Satan mounts it, it wishes and goes as Satan wills. Nor can it choose its rider. – Martin Luther, *De servo arbitrio* (1525)

Under Luther's dictum it is not a man but rather Satan who *God* attacks. If Locke's so-called "law of Nature" were an actual natural law, rather than being, as he put it, the product of "consulting one's reason," it would be apt to say the world would be more utopian than Utopia itself. Why, then, would any person submit himself to the authority of a government? Locke has made a homonymous usage of the phrase "law of Nature" and, furthermore, he knows it:

If man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name – property.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting. – Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government* (1690)

Here, despite his factitious foundations, Locke has managed to arrive at the practical and objectively valid *pragmatic* motive for those human alliances we call political communities. It is an individual decision – and contains nothing at this point that speaks to an objectively valid idea

of obligation, duty, or even any form of communal ethics. Nor does it speak to any specific form the government of such a community will assume, nor to specific legislative codes such a community might adopt. The act of association is a self-determination freely reached by each individual consenting to join with others in forming such a community. It does not yet speak directly to the phenomenon of leadership but it does hint at an important pragmatic motive for followership. This motive we will examine in more detail in the next subsection. To properly appreciate Locke's argument, we must have a clearer idea of what he means by "free" and "liberty." For this, we must turn to Locke's metaphysics:

Every one, I think, finds in *himself* a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which everyone finds in himself, arises the *ideas* of *liberty* and *necessity*.

All the actions that we have any idea of [reduce] . . . to these two, viz. thinking and motion²²; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference of his own mind, so far is a man *free*. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition where there is no liberty. – John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II (1689)

Locke is drawing a rather fine distinction between "being free" vs. "being at liberty" to do something, and he ends up having to expend quite a lot of effort in his essay to draw out this distinction. Eventually he tells us that "being free" (*freedom*) is the ability to act or to not act as one chooses; *liberty*, he tells us, means freedom *plus the ability to realize* what is willed. This is a muddy looking distinction, but he illustrates what he is trying to say with examples. I am at liberty to jump down twenty feet from the edge of a cliff but I am not at liberty to jump twenty feet straight up into the air, although I have the freedom to *try* to do so. The distinction, then, is the distinction between being able to attempt vs. being able to accomplish. One is not at liberty to do what one cannot accomplish, but one is free to attempt the accomplishment. One is free to try the impossible but is not at liberty to accomplish the impossible.

In Locke's terminology, then, what one man is not at liberty to do by himself he might be at liberty to do with the assistance of other men. Liberty, then, involves constraint while freedom

²² Locke is saying that all human actions can be classified either as an action of thinking or an action of physical movement.

involves only self-determination. It is the nature of the sorts of constraints involved, then, that distinguishes the idea of *natural* liberty from that of *civil* liberty. Civil liberty involves self-imposed (voluntary) constraints, whereas natural liberty involves only external constraints.

Locke's metaphysics suffers from a number of deeply inlaid defects (brought on by the fact that his theory is ontology-centered), and it ultimately fails. Berkeley later exposed a number of these defects and Hume completed its wholesale demolition. For the purposes of this treatise, it is enough to bring out the *observation* that there is a difference between natural liberty and civil liberty, that the latter involves self-imposed constraints and, therefore, civil liberties *differ in kind* from natural liberties.

§ 3.2 Rousseau and the Social Contract

Philosophy as a field of organized intellectual endeavor has, from its origin to the present day, exhibited a rather Toynbee-like history of cyclic behavior. Some founder (usually there is only one) brings forth a new system of metaphysics that attracts disciples and establishes a school. Over time the schoolmen analyze and dissect the issues and questions that arise in much the same way as post-17th century scientists do; reductionism is not uniquely the methodology of the physical and social sciences. In time disagreements over how to resolve the issues and questions lead to a splintering of the school into a multiplicity of derivative movements, each of which then vies against the others and, often, against at least some of the premises of the original school. To use the terminology of mathematicians, they adopt different axiom systems and discover that different axioms lead to different conclusions. As there is a commonly shared presupposition that there can be only one true system, doctrinal disagreements among the multiplicity of schools lead to what amounts to scholastic warfare waged with polemics that often devolve into internecine propaganda misrepresenting the doctrines of the other schools. Noted English philosopher C.E.M. Joad did no more than point this out when he wrote that the reader of a general book on the subject of philosophy

is warned that philosophers frequently do not even discuss the same questions and that, when they do, it is only to give diametrically opposite answers; and he is informed that he will be asked to take part not in a steady and ordered advance from speculation to knowledge but in a series of marches and countermarches, in the course of which he will traverse and re-traverse the same territory in the company of travelers whose concern seems less to arrive at a goal than to obliterate the footsteps of their predecessors. – Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad, *Guide to Philosophy* (1936)

As the school sinks deeper into reductionism, it carves up its original Object (usually at the price of replacing it with one of Bloom's "constructs"), its terminology and arguments become increasingly esoteric until the schoolmen can speak meaningfully only to their fellow schoolmen,

and its doctrinal opacity, added to the plethora of equally opaque opposing claims of truth by the other schools, becomes repugnant to the wider audience of humankind. At this point there is a revolt by the non-philosophers through some countermovement (such as romanticism) and philosophical inquiry enters into a dark age period, during which almost no one takes it seriously. It then tends to remain there for so long as the wider world finds itself able to get by on pseudo-metaphysical prejudices as it builds on the beneficial practical outcomes of the previous epoch. During this period it is usually the case that philosophers do not disappear altogether but their endeavors tend to be stoic and come to lack coherence, drive, passion, and urgency. Looking over university philosophy departments near the close of the 20th century, Bloom caustically wrote,

Most interesting of all, lost amidst this collection of [humanities] disciplines, modestly sits philosophy. It has been dethroned by political and theoretical democracy, bereft of the passion or the capacity to rule. . . . Philosophy once proudly proclaimed that it was the best way of life, and it dared to survey the whole, to seek the first causes of all things, and not only dictated its rules to the special sciences but constituted and ordered them. The classic philosophic books are philosophy in action, doing precisely these things. But this was all impossible, *hybris*, say their impoverished heirs. Real science did not need them, and the rest is ideology or myth. Now they are just books on a shelf. Democracy took away philosophy's privileges, and philosophy could not decide whether to fade away or to take a job. Philosophy was architectonic, had the plans for the whole building, and the carpenters, masons and plumbers were its subordinates and had no meaning without its plan. Philosophy founded the university, but it could no longer do so. We live off its legacy. – Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*

Eventually society's pseudo-metaphysical prejudices produce enough problems of a serious enough nature that the countermovement exhausts itself. After some interlude a new founder makes an appearance on the stage and the cycle begins again. This has happened several times in the history of philosophy – most recently with positivism in the 19th century and its subsequent exhaustion in the 20th, introducing a current interlude passage. Sometimes the countermovement itself might serve to inspire or trigger the work of some new philosophical founder. Even if it were nothing else, the history of philosophy makes grand epic theater.

In an oddly ironic way philosophy seems to need the anti-philosophy rebel. Theoretical and speculative reductionism tends to splinter and disintegrate philosophy as a science; the rebel tends to bring the Object back into focus and attention. Reductionism dissects and juxtaposes; the rebel brings back syncretism of outlook. Reductionism tends towards the anatomical; the rebel tends towards the organic. Philosophy tends to forget its own value; rebellion eventually recalls it.

Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the great rebels. He was a romantic before romanticism began. He was a happy and precocious boy who became a passed-around foster child as an adolescent and a homeless wanderer as a young man. He was a Calvinist who turned Catholic who turned Calvinist again before ending up as a deist. He was a match to the tinder that blazed

into the French Revolution. He was a social outsider who the social insiders of his day were unable to ignore. He was a sentimental reactionary against the chilly rationalism of 18th century continental Europe who helped seed the Critical Philosophy. He was a non-scientist who made return to naturalism in science respectable. He was an anti-philosopher whose works were studied by philosophers as different as Schopenhauer and Kant, who influenced the plays of Schiller, the novels of Goethe, the poems of Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley, the socialism of Marx, and the ethics of Tolstoy. He was an impractical man whose work had the widest practical consequences. No other writer of his day was more widely criticized and denounced, yet his work stands acclaimed today as among the Western world's most precious literary accomplishments. He held no important post in government yet changed the political landscape of Europe. Such a man was the leadership riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma who is Rousseau.

Locke, as we have seen, stated the motive for human beings to band together in organized political communities. He did not, however, state the condition for this action. For that we turn to Rousseau and his thesis that human associations are all based on a mutual agreement among the parties involved he calls a *social contract*. In the introduction to his book, *The Social Contract*, he tells us the purpose of his treatise:

I mean to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall endeavor always to unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest in order that justice and utility may in no case be divided. – Rousseau, *The Social Contract*

It becomes evident in the body of *The Social Contract* that Rousseau means the phrase "rule of administration" to pertain reciprocally among all the members; it takes in not merely "how to act as an administrator" but also "how to act as one who is administrated" so that "justice and utility may in no case be divided." We can observe here that "utility" (the benefits produced by the association) and "justice" (which we still need to define) must go hand in hand if the purposes of the association are to be realized. Neither is to be sacrificed for the sake of the other if the administration of "the civil order" is to be "sure and legitimate."

Thus, the most fundamental common interest jointly shared by the members of the association is the association itself as the vehicle each member has chosen to use for the sake of his own purposes. But what is the *common* purpose and why is the vehicle of association the means to achieve it? Rousseau sets the context for this:

I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. – [*ibid.*, 1.6]

Rousseau thus begins from a state of nature premise quite similar to Locke's premise, the principal difference being that Rousseau is not so sanguine as Locke about a divine origin of moral equality in the every-man-for-himself free environment of the state of nature:

This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself and consequently becomes his own master. – [*ibid.*, I.2]

This "law," and not Locke's unscientific "law of Nature," is to be presumed as the fundamental *natural* law at work in the state of nature according to Rousseau. Locke's version leads directly to a necessary logical corollary that, because not all men follow it, some men are inherently "good" and others inherently "bestial" or "evil." But such a judgment is always relative, and between any two men, opposing one another's interests, neither possesses an objectively valid license to judge who is the beast and who is the righteous man. Indeed, mental physics tells us each man will always hold himself to be the good actor and the other, therefore, the bad actor. (And this is why Locke must call upon God to be the impartial judge adjudicating the matter).

Rousseau, on the other hand, presupposes that each person responds first to what Kant will later call his duties to himself. Rousseau's "law" is objectively valid and congruent with the principles of mental physics. In understanding it, however, one must not too narrowly understand the scope of the "cares" a person "owes to himself." Material cares, of course, make up a part of this. But *affective* cares also contribute significantly as part of the overall package. The "cares" of a person are the "cares" he has for his *whole* person. Rousseau spoke of "the nature of man"; the most primitive of these "cares" are equivalent to what William James would, slightly more than a century later, call *instincts*:

Why do men always lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on hard floors? Why do they sit round the stove on a cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, with their faces towards its middle rather than to the wall? Why do they prefer saddle mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? . . . Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that every creature *likes* its own ways, and takes to the following them as a matter of course. . . But it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following them we feel that is the only appropriate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. . . If you ask him *why* he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at you for a fool. This connection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him absolute and *selbstverständlich*²³, an '*a priori* synthesis' of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own evidence. – William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, XXIV (1890)

What, then, induces men to form associations? Rousseau's answer, put into the convention of

²³ "self-understandable"

modern language, is *enlightened self-interest*. He writes,

But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome their resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause this to act in concert. – Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, I.6

However, such an act of association always comes at a price. In a *civil* association – that is, one where the agreement of the members to associate with each other is not compelled by force – that price is an obligation to respect the other members and understand what each member's self-interest is truly grounded upon:

This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms:

"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." – [*ibid.*]

We will call this statement of purpose *the civil convention* and the *condition* of the social contract. It is the necessitated (made necessary) ground for the possibility of what Rousseau called the "sure and legitimate rule of administration." An association grounded upon the civil convention can maintain itself in such a way "that justice and utility may in no case be divided" if and only if the ways and means of associating are such that the *common* purpose stated in the civil convention is satisfied for each and every member of the association. This leads to what Rousseau called the *terms of the social compact*:

If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:

"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." – [*ibid.*]

We will need a clearer and objectively valid understanding of what the idea of *the general will* means before we can conclude whether or not Rousseau's contract terms are possible for actual human associations. This is not a trivial question and *The Social Contract* does *not* in fact present a satisfactory *Realerklärung*²⁴ of Rousseau's idea of the general will, as critics of social contract theory have very capably demonstrated over the years. Rousseau does, however, leave us with an important clue for a proper Critical deduction of what "the general will" must mean:

²⁴ "real explanation"; this is a technical term in Critical metaphysics.

At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will. – [*ibid.*]

Rousseau phrased this as if it were a statement of fact – i.e. something that comes automatically from the act of association. This, however, is not the case. The correct Critical interpretation is: we know the terms of the contract are met if the association on the whole produces the "moral and collective body" Rousseau called *the body politic*. Only then will we be able to understand in an objectively valid way what the "general will" of such a "body" means.

We must also note that there is another obvious question inherent in Rousseau's statement: In what context are we to understand what is meant by the term "moral"? Looking ahead, what we will find is that the context for "moral" cannot be subjective (because then it is not the same for every member of the association). It must instead be an objective context. The consequence this will have is that a *civil* moral code cannot be based on tenets of either consequentialist ethics, virtue ethics, or religious ethics. It must be a code applicable to objects (that is, be objectively valid) such that all members of the association are capable of understanding their *corporate* moral code in exactly the same way. Critical metaphysics teaches us that this is possible if and only if our moral presuppositions are epistemology-centered rather than ontology-centered. Such a system of ethics is called *deontological ethics*. It is necessary for the possibility of meeting the terms of the social contract that the association be a deontologically moral association. If it is not then the terms cannot be met and the civil convention is not realized (i.e., made actual).

It is from this basis that a Critical *Realerklärung* can be obtained for the idea of justice. Justice is an idea notorious in the history of philosophy for its difficulty. Plato and many other ontology-centered theorists have historically tended to make this idea more and more abstract until the notion of justice passes far beyond the horizon of any possible human experience. No objectively valid *science* of justice is possible in this case. This is probably the major factor behind the modern myth, popular with lawyers and jurists, that "the justice system is about the law, not about justice." If one does not understand what "justice" means with objective validity, then it is indeed an empty concept and only a legal system – and not a justice system – can result. However, if we approach the question from epistemology-centered premises and a system of deontological ethics, then an objectively valid *Realerklärung* of justice is forthcoming. Its context is the context of the civil convention and it is this: ***That which is contrary to realizing the condition of the social contract is unjust; justice is the negating of anything that is unjust.*** Understanding this then shows us that "legal" is not the same thing as "just" and that *the real purpose* of any legal system is to *serve* the justice system as a means for which justice is the end.

The fact it is possible for humans to associate in such a way that a civil convention is not realized means that a science of leadership must also take into account two other situations. The first is where no pretense is made of having the mutual relationship serve the common *natural* purpose stated above; we call this the *uncivil convention*. The second is where the *intent* exists in the members of the association to have the association serve as a means for each to satisfy his self-interested purposes for joining, but the condition of a social contract is not satisfied. We call this the *non-civil convention*. We name association under an uncivil convention *despotism*; we name association under a non-civil convention *pragmatic association*.

§ 4. Despotic and Pragmatic Associations

Subjection by military conquest and slavery are history's two premier examples of despotic association. There is no social contract, except between the despot and his lieutenants, underlying despotism and, therefore, the idea of justice is an empty idea in this form of association. This is because, as we will later see, every social contract requires of each member that he take upon himself an *obligation* and, in order to meet this obligation, willingly accept certain particular types of actions to be *duties* he owes *to the situation of others*. These terms – obligation and duty – are ideas of deontological ethics (when they are objectively valid), and so we must treat them later in this treatise when we treat the general topic of deontological ethics. For right now, let it suffice to say that duty is the matter of an obligation and that all obligations are *self-imposed* (no one can impose an obligation on anyone else). Both of these explanations are direct consequences of the self-determining nature of being a human being and so both obligation and duty are Objects of man's *thinking* Nature. They are not at all the contentless things that ontology-centered philosophy makes of them but are, instead, psychological phenomena in human *social* Nature.

Slavery can be regarded within a specific limited context as being one species of subjugation by force; subjugation by military force or its threat is merely a broader instance insofar as its relationship to slavery is concerned. Despotism is a genus under which we find both as particular cases. Let us draw a specific example of military subjugation from the pages of historical literature. The time is 49 BC and the place is the town of Massilia (modern day Marseilles):

Dismayed at this sudden calamity, the townsmen bring forward with cranes the largest possible stones, and roll them headlong from the wall on to the gallery. The strength of the timber bears the blow, and everything that falls on it slips off owing to the sloping roof of the gallery. . . . Meanwhile some soldiers under the gallery prize out with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's tower which served to hold the foundations together. . . . When now a number of stones had been withdrawn from the tower next to the gallery, a part of it suddenly collapsed and fell. The rest was beginning to follow it and fall forward when the enemy, terrified at the sacking of their city, without their arms and wearing fillets, stretch out their hands as suppliants to the legates and the army. . . . When the enemy reach the legates and the army they fling themselves in a body at their feet, and

beseech them to wait for Caesar's arrival: they say they behold their city captured, the works of investment completed, their tower undermined, and so they desist from their defense. Nothing can now arise to prevent their being plundered forthwith on his arrival if they do not carry out orders at his beck. . . . These and many such words, as might be expected from men of intelligence, are uttered with much pathetic appeal and weeping. – Caesar, *Civil Wars*, II

The enlightened self-interests of the people of Massilia is clear with little doubt: they did not want to be slaughtered by Caesar's legions and hoped that by surrender they would benefit from Caesar's reputation for being merciful to those who surrendered:

For Caesar in his dispatch had strongly urged Trebonius not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the troops, deeply moved by hatred of the revolt, by the contempt shown for themselves, and by their continuous labor, should slay all the youths; which in fact they were constantly threatening to do, and were now with difficulty restrained from breaking into the town, and resented the fact because it appeared to be the fault of Trebonius that they did not get possession of the town. – [*ibid.*]

That no social contract resulted from the surrender of Massilia is perhaps obvious to you, dear reader, or perhaps not. That the Massilians put themselves under no obligation to Caesar is made clearly evident by the fact that several days later they took advantage of the fact that Caesar's troops were not allowed (by their commander) to enter the town and they revolted once again. They succeeded in burning down the siege equipment and were able to resume their defense for another few days before

the enemy saw . . . there was now no opportunity for treachery or sortie, and that no possible chance was left for any injury to be done either to the men by weapons or to the works by fire; and . . . that there was no chance for themselves of standing their ground on their own defense . . . then they recur to the same terms of surrender. – [*ibid.*]

Fortunately for the Massilians,

When all this was done, Caesar, sparing them more on account of the name and antiquity of their state than for anything they had deserved of him, leaves two legions there as a garrison, sends the rest to Italy, and himself sets out for Rome. – [*ibid.*]

They would not have been so fortunate had it been Genghis Khan at their gates rather than Caesar. The uncivil association is a unilateral power relationship with the subjugated doing only what they determine they must do to avoid undesired consequences and obtain whatever desired consequences as they find possible under the circumstances. We can, however, note that the leader-follower relationship is still reciprocal; in this case, the leader's method is coercive and menacing, but the followers do manipulate the despot as best they can to minimize harm to themselves and maximize whatever well-being he permits them to achieve. The association, though, lasts only so long as the despot has the physical power to enforce his *rulership*. Let the subjugated think they see the opportunity to get rid of him, and they will act on it. There is no

such thing as loyalty in a despotic association; there is only an aggregate of people who acknowledge no duties other than duties they make individually to themselves for themselves. When Alexander the Great died in Persia and

When the news of [Alexander's] death reached Greece, revolts against the Macedonian authority broke out everywhere. Theban exiles in Athens organized a force of patriots and besieged the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmeia. In Athens itself, where many had prayed for an end to Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party . . . crowned themselves with garlands and feasted over the death of him whom they had courted as a god . . .

The same tragic year saw the end of Aristotle. He had long been unpopular in Athens: the Academy and the school of Isocrates disliked him as a critic and a rival, while the patriots looked upon him as a leader of the pro-Macedonian party. Advantage was taken of Alexander's death to bring an accusation of impiety against Aristotle . . . Aristotle quietly left the city, saying that he would not give Athens a chance to sin a second time against philosophy . . . The Athenians passed sentence of death upon him, but had neither opportunity nor need to execute it. . . Aristotle died a few months after leaving Athens, in the sixty-third year of his age. – Will Durant, *The Life of Greece*

There is, Rousseau tells us, an important difference between what he calls "giving oneself" to an association (the case for a civil convention) and "selling oneself" to an association (the case for each of the other two conventions):

Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men. . . To alienate is to give or to sell. Now, a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at least for his subsistence. . . I maintain that a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so. . . So far then is [the master] from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance. – Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, I.4

The pragmatic association is correctly understood as the synthesis of the other two types of associations. Its premier practical exemplar in experience is the typical business organization in which the members see themselves in employer-employee or superior-subordinate relationships. While the association in despotism rests entirely on power through naked force and terror, that of the pragmatic association rests in part on coercion and in part on non-coerced reciprocal relationship in which both parties see their own interests and objectives as capable of being satisfied through liberty of cooperative actions not immediately based upon coercion (with liberty understood in the Lockean context discussed above).

There is here, as was said earlier, a limited social contract in force. The practical problem is that it is based on a narrow context of mutual interests and no party in the association can ever be sufficiently sure when the relationships are reciprocal or when one or the other person is acting

through manipulation to serve no interest but his own. Effective leadership is far more difficult to achieve in the pragmatic association because of this fundamentally foggy set of understandings on the part of the membership. Here, to a much greater degree than is required by either civil association or despotism, understanding the psychological nature of self-determination is necessary for any "sure and legitimate administration" to be practically realized.

Because the pragmatic association does contain in its constitution some factors of a social contract, there will be likewise some *expectations of justice* held by its members. We see this reflected in such things as fair labor practices and labor laws in democratic societies. But because the elements of social contract are largely ill-defined or even undefined in typical pragmatic associations, so too is the matter of what is an unjust event or situation. Such an association cannot have what could properly be called a justice system constituted for it and would instead be guided by and large by folkways, precedents, and policies. Frustration, dispute, and conflict are therefore to be expected and are regularly produced in pragmatic associations.

The pragmatic association is by far the most commonly encountered form of human association (even at the level of association known as the family). Understanding its empirical basis relies much more on understanding the empirical data of psychology and sociology, which is the topic of our next chapter.

§ 5. Summary

This chapter has illustrated examples of the sort of empirical data we can glean from a study of pre-modern political science. We have seen that presuppositions and lines of argumentation, whether objectively valid or not, reveal appearances of common types of presuppositions and common lines of rationalization characteristic of the mental physics of self-determination. These are among the important characteristics of human beings involved in the reciprocal relationships in which the phenomenon of leadership subsists. This chapter illustrates the empirical use social-natural science can and should make of political doctrines because what we can observe from the theories and arguments of these doctrines point directly at the character of self-determination that underpins leadership success or failure. The chapter has also furnished us with a few objectively valid principles and real explanations, congruent with our foundational mental physics, that must be part of a social-natural science.

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