

## Chapter 4

**Empirical Factors in Self-Determination II: Psychology****§ 1. Preliminary Remarks**

The entry for leadership in Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology* sums up what a practical, fair, and impartial judge would have to call psychology's lack of success in studying leadership. It begins with a cogent observation:

**leadership** The only really proper use for this term is to characterize the exercise of authority and influence within a social group; that is, to function as a leader is to manifest leadership. It is often used, however, as if it were a personality trait, as if it were a collection of specific skills that reflect leadership capability. Although there is a certain intuitive truth here, this use leads to hopeless confusion because it neglects the role of a situation itself in determining leadership behavior. – Reber's *Dictionary*

Historically the approaches to studying the phenomenon of leadership can be classified using two broad categories, namely the trait approach and the behavioral approach. Neither are successful. Blum and Naylor described the trait approach in the following words:

Most of the early leadership research has been of the trait approach type. The philosophy of the trait approach is quite simple and would seem, at least initially, quite logical. *Successful leaders are assumed to possess more (or less) of certain traits than are unsuccessful leaders.* This is the notion of the ideal leader, or the ideal leader profile which describes which traits a good leader should possess a lot of and which traits he should possess only in minimum amounts. The emphasis in this approach is on the personal characteristics of good and bad leaders. It says that the best way to investigate leadership is to look at good and bad leaders and see how they differ in terms of their traits. – Blum and Naylor, *Industrial Psychology*

It is easy to note the ontology-centeredness in this philosophy of leadership research. It presumes that "leadership traits" are "something the leader has" that the non-leader or the poor leader does not. But the proper term to use here should be "leader traits" since the idea is entirely vested in the individual who is the leader. *Leadership* phenomena are only exhibited in situations involving at least two people and there is nothing we can understand by "leader" unless the experience also includes a follower. There are several serious criticisms that can be and are leveled at the trait approach. The two most significant ones are: (1) the problem of defining and agreeing upon leadership traits has proven utterly refractory because the number of such traits that have been proposed is tremendously large; and (2) it proves to be effectively impossible to measure the traits that have been proposed. For these reasons the trait approach no longer enjoys very much favor among practicing psychologists.

Blum and Naylor described the behavioral approach in the following words:

More psychologists recognize that looking for specific traits even as measured in psycho-

logical tests does not enhance the understanding of leadership qualities. From widely different sources, work and enthusiasm seem to be centered around a more broad and meaningful concept of leadership. This view regards leadership as behavioral, situational, or related to the interaction of the leader and the group. . .

The behavioral approach is also quite simple in its philosophy. It states that the best way to study and to define leadership is in terms of *what leaders do* rather than in terms of what leaders are. Thus one is concerned with leader "behaviors" rather than leader traits. In outline form, the behavior approach:

1. Collects critical incidents of good and bad leadership behavior, usually by interview procedures.
2. Scales each incident to determine, in the eyes of experts, how "good" or how "bad" each behavior is judged to be.
3. Develops a check-list type questionnaire that can then be used to check off which of these behaviors have been exhibited by each leader or supervisor. A leadership "score" can be computed by using the median scale value of the behaviors which have been checked. – [*ibid.*]

This might seem to be nice and scientific, and also better organized or more logical than the trait approach. It does at least recognize that followers are involved and that interactions take place. If, however, we look at the three-step study process outlined above it is again rather evident that this philosophy is likewise ontology-centered and makes some questionable presumptions. First, it posits a *something* called "behavior" – or, more accurately, "behavior of the leader" – as the efficient cause of what one then must call "leader's outcomes." Second, it presumes that "leadership behavior" can be clearly distinguished from other kinds of behaviors and, moreover, that this distinction can be drawn out of interviews. Third, it presupposes there are judges who are capable of judging the goodness or badness of these putative behaviors, and one is then led to ask who judges the qualifications of the judges to be good judges. Fourth, it presumes that these behaviors, which have to be judged *qualitatively* according to good-bad norms, can be *quantitatively* scored in a relative ranking. It uses a neat cut-and-dried mechanical procedure that more or less amounts to counting how many "behaviors" an individual has exhibited in "leadership situations" with perhaps additional weighting of different "behaviors" according to some weighting criterion. Finally, it presumes that the original data sources, e.g. those who are interviewed, are themselves adequate judges of what particular experiences make up the appropriate overall set of experiences that should be pre-labeled as "leadership examples." That the entire paradigm rests on many unnamed *subjective* factors ought to be clearly recognized because, and this is important to note, the paradigm implicitly *presumes* that these subjective factors need not themselves be considered in the analysis procedure that follows.

If one examines a variety of case studies examples of the behavioral approach, one thing that soon becomes apparent is that there are about as many different lists of leadership behaviors

appearing in these studies as there are different teams of psychologists carrying out the studies. If nothing else this serves to underscore the fundamental element of subjectivity in what scientists would prefer to be an objective process. To the extent that by "philosophy" Blum and Naylor (and others) mean "a way of looking at the world," it is correct to say that psychology approaches the topic philosophically; however, it should also be clear that such "philosophies" are nothing other than pseudo-metaphysical prejudices about the way one "ought to look at the world" or about "the best or proper or most scientific way to look at the world." Lacking a common and scientific system of metaphysics, it is not a wonder that, as Blum and Naylor put it,

Actually it is probably not appropriate to talk about "theories" of leadership behavior since there is little in the literature on leadership that is really of sufficient elegance to qualify for the title. However, it is convenient to stretch a point and to consider some of the different conceptual positions regarding leadership in our modern day society.

Historically, the concept of supervision has had two rather distinct "phases" which differ considerably in their philosophy. The first phase might be called the *scientific management* phase, and the second is probably best labeled the *human relations* phase. Scientific management in the early 1900s was really established and exemplified by Frederick W. Taylor. The leader or manager in this system was perceived exclusively as an individual whose sole purpose was to expedite the goals of the organization. Management was completely impersonal in that the interaction of the leader and his subordinates was ignored and the notion that subordinate attitudes or goals might have some relevance to the work situation was not considered. . .

The Hawthorne Studies marked the beginning of the end of scientific management. Indeed, the acceptance of the human relations notion of leadership has sometimes been carried to the opposite extreme of Taylorism. That is, if Taylorism implied organizations without considering the human element, then the extreme human relations notion has tended to consider people as if they existed free of organizational constraints. Both positions are quite unrealistic – [*ibid.*]

The psychological study of leadership has not advanced significantly since Blum and Naylor wrote these words in 1968. As a field of study, it was then and is today an example of what Kant called a merely historical doctrine of nature. By itself this is not a condemnation because *every* science begins in this way. What does have to be regarded as important is that, in a century of effort, psychology (as well as management theory) has not succeeded in moving beyond being a merely historical doctrine. What one can observe readily enough in reviewing twentieth century trends in management is that, despite different labels given to variations on the two themes named above (which in more technical terms would be called "dimensions of management"), on the whole actual practices in at least American businesses and government is tending to slowly oscillate between the extremes marked by Taylorism and the human relations approaches. It is a cultural behavior consistent with the old Greek presupposition that "if X is good then more X is better." Hence reactions to excesses in the practice of the human relations model currently seem to be leading practicing managers in business and government back towards the extremes of

Taylorism. Thus personnel departments are now called "human resources departments" and have been since the 1980s. A less Platonic and more Aristotelian attitude would favor something like the same conclusion Aristotle came to in regard to ethics, viz.,

There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices involving excess and deficiency and one an excellence, viz. the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other; and the intermediate to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relative to the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent . . . That moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle – Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II

If asked, many people will report they think or feel "good leadership" goes hand in hand with ethics and lack of ethics brings with it "bad leadership" – or, at least, they will often so self-report when they are questioned in a hypothetical context or when they are not themselves named to some nominal leader's position. Many of us who have had experience with being in some nominal leader's position are familiar with encountering people who are quite self-convinced that they know more about "how to be a good manager" than their manager does – despite the fact that they have never themselves managed or supervised anyone or been in a position in which they are held responsible for the success or failure of a group of people in accomplishing some objective. If nothing else, that phenomenon illustrates that leadership is beheld by more than a single pair of eyes. If one subjects the evaluation of ability-to-lead to a criterion based on some set of measurable sustained outcomes achieved over a defined interval of time – as most managers of managers do – then one can appreciate an observation made by former Avis president and chief executive officer Robert Townsend:

How do you spot a leader? They come in all ages, shapes, sizes, and conditions. Some are poor administrators, some are not overly bright. One clue: since most people per se are mediocre, the true leader can be recognized because, somehow or other, his people consistently turn in superior performances. – Robert Townsend, *Up the Organization*, 80

One can safely regard Townsend as an experienced manager regardless of whether or not one regards him as an expert on leadership – the latter open to being disputed by some in reaction to his use of the phrase "since most people per se are mediocre." (Today one is expected to say instead, "The average person is a medium performer"). If it is practical to recognize what constitutes "superior performance" then what Townsend argues might be a means of getting to

some objective signpost of whether or not the quality of ability-to-lead is demonstrated. Again, though, who is to judge: (1) whether "consistent superior performances" are achieved? and (2) "superior" relative to what standard? When Townsend says "you" he doesn't mean *you* per se; he means "you-acting-from-the-position-of-being-a-manager-of-employees-or-subordinates-within-some-corporate-organization." That is the context of *Up the Organization*.

We must not mistake understanding the phenomenon of leadership for understanding the reason for one's *desire* to understand leadership. To merely be coronated "the leader" of a group is not the same thing as actually being the leader unless you were elected leader by your followers; and even then they must agree to follow and to continue to follow you. This is why no unilateral criterion of leadership has practical objective validity. Suppose a workgroup under some nominal leader consistently turns in superior performances (by whatever norms of judgment one uses). That does *not* necessarily mean the leader and the nominal leader are one and the same person. Perhaps the actual leader is one of the underlings and the Pooh-Bah leads the group the same way a carved wooden figurehead at its bow once led a ship. Or perhaps the actual practical role of the nominal leader is as representative *of* or ambassador *from* the group to others in the organization. There is no objectively valid way to understand the phenomenon of leadership outside the *context* of a reciprocal relationship between leader and followers. Step out of this context and at once you fail to reach the objective.

## § 2. The Affective Dimension of the Leadership Phenomenon

It is not uncommon in a team of engineers nominally led by an engineer for the manager of the group to regard the affective dimension of management somewhat distastefully. One of your author's industrial colleagues once remarked to him after a meeting, "I hate the touchy-feely stuff." It is not overly difficult to apprehend this attitude. An engineer is trained to view all problems objectively, to parcel up complex problems into less complex sub-problems to be solved piece by piece, and then to re-integrate them into a whole. Many engineers receive no training in psychology in college (taking a psychology course is optional in most engineering curricula), and by the point in an engineer's career where he is considered ready to take on the role of manager, he has usually accumulated many habits of thinking and behaving opposed to treating affectivity as a legitimate part of problem solving. In some cases these habits are so engrained that the new manager is unwilling to "buy into" the "touchy-feely stuff" often presented as part of corporate first-level management training (in those organizations that see fit to provide such training). This situation is not unique to groups of engineers; it merely tends to be more highly pronounced in such groups. It is not a situation cured by some expedient such as getting an

MBA degree or enrolling in one of the new "Professional Science Master's" programs just now coming into vogue. Civil Air Patrol cadets learn more about leadership than Harvard MBAs do.

Like it or not (and note that this is itself an affective reaction), the affectivity dimension cannot be ignored in understanding the phenomenon of leadership. Within psychology this dimension is the working business of the specialties concerned with the topics of emotion and motivation. Unfortunately, neither subdiscipline is in much better shape than was described above for leadership scholarship. Reber's *Dictionary* says of the topic of emotion,

**emotion** Historically this term has proven utterly refractory to definitional efforts; probably no other term in psychology shares its combination of nondefinability and frequency of use. . . Contemporary usage is of two general kinds: **1.** An umbrella term for any of a number of subjectively experienced, affect-laden states, the ontological status of each being established by a label the meaning of which is arrived at by simple consensus. This is the primary use of the term in both the technical and common language. . . **2.** A label for a field of scientific investigation that explores the various environmental, physiological, and cognitive factors that underlie these subjective experiences.

There is little dispute over 1, other than a prevailing sense that it is unfortunate that a term of such importance is used in such loose subjective fashion. The confusing array of usages that confronts the psychologist comes from 2, where the 'definitions' that abound are really mini-theories about the underpinnings of emotions – Reber's *Dictionary*

Similarly, Reber calls "motivation" a "definitionally elusive term." In mental physics emotion labels such as anger, joy, etc. are seen as merely nominal because it finds that emotions are not primitives but are instead particular *sequences* of conscious states of affectivity resulting from reflective judgments of affective perceptions. It tells us there are 13,122 distinct *species* of states of affective perceptions ( $2 \times 6,561$ ) arranged in pairs of affective opposites. Any one such state is called a **feeling of Lust** (pronounced "loost") or **Unlust** ("un-loost").

Like *Gestalt*, the German word *Lust* (as well as its opposite, *Unlust*) does not travel very well into English; there is no exact English equivalent for the word *Lust*<sup>1</sup>. It has been traditional to translate *Lust* and *Unlust* as "pleasure" and "pain," respectively, but these renderings are scientifically incorrect and wholly misleading. The "flavor" of the feeling of *Lust* is describable using the American colloquialism, "I'm up for that!" The feeling of *Unlust* is similarly describable as "That's a downer." That to which the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* refers (*Lust per se*) is understood in terms of the functions of the logical division of *psyche* in the human being (which deals with mind-body reciprocity), whereas the *feeling* of *Lust* or *Unlust* belongs to the logical division of *nous* and, in particular, to the process of reflective judgment.

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<sup>1</sup> The English word "lust" is a direct Anglo-Saxon word. Although Anglo-Saxon derived from the West Germanic branch in the Indo-European family of languages, the Anglo-Saxon word *lust* does not mean the same thing as the German word *Lust*. Anglo-Saxon, Old Saxon, Low German, and High German all branched from the West Germanic at the same point in the Indo-European "languages tree" and German (as well as Yiddish) derived from High German.

Sigmund Freud captured a better scientific description of the functional character of *Lust* and *Unlust* with his famous *Lustprinzip*<sup>2</sup>:

In the psycho-analytic theory of mind, we take it for granted that the course of mental activities is automatically regulated by the *Lustprinzip*: that is to say we believe that any given activity originates in an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon determines for itself such a path that its ultimate issue coincides with a relaxation of this tension, i.e., by means of an evasion from *Unlust* or a generation from *Lust* . . .

We are not interested in examining how far in our assertion of the *Lustprinzip* we have approached to or adopted any given philosophical system historically established . . . We cannot, however, profess the like indifference when we find that an investigator of such penetration as G. Th. Fechner has advocated a conception of *Lust* and *Unlust* which in its essentials coincides with that forced upon us by psycho-analytic work. Fechner's pronouncement . . . reads as follows: "In so far as conscious impulsions always bear a reference to *Lust* or *Unlust*, *Lust* or *Unlust* may be thought of in psycho-analytic regard to relationships of stability and instability, and upon this may be based the hypothesis I intend to develop elsewhere: viz. that every psycho-physical movement rising above the threshold of consciousness is charged with *Lust* in proportion as it draws near an outer boundary to complete equilibrium, and with *Unlust* in proportion as it digresses from it beyond a certain limit; while between the two limits which may be described as the qualitative thresholds of *Unlust* or *Lust*, there is an area of aesthetical indifference. . ."

The facts that have led us to believe in the supremacy of the *Lustprinzip* in psychic life also find expression in the hypothesis that there is an attempt on the part of the psychic apparatus to keep the quantity of excitation present as low as possible, or, at least, constant. This is the same supposition only put into another form, for, if the psychic apparatus operates in the direction of keeping down the quantity of excitation, all that tends to increase it must be felt to be contrary to function . . . On more detailed discussion we shall find further that this tendency on the part of the psychic apparatus postulated by us may be classified as a special case of Fechner's principle of this *tendency towards stability* – Freud, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1921)

The principles of mental physics tell us the feeling of *Lust* attracts and that of *Unlust* repels. Both are "energizing feelings" and organic equilibrium is achieved when the opposition of the feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* negate each other's effects. This is ***the condition of equilibrium*** for a human being, and acting to achieve this condition is what is mandated by the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. The Arons' finding that "happiness is the neutral gear of the nervous system" (cited earlier) is consistent with mental physics. Mental physics also implies that an approach to the study of emotion more like the script theory of James Russell (see references) is a potentially more fecund research paradigm for emotion psychology.

Many psychologists have attempted to treat emotions as if they were atoms of affectivity. A number of emotion mini-theories have postulated that some set of specific emotions are primitive and, in essence, "prime elements" of affectivity. Ross Buck's "primes" theory of motivation does much the same thing in motivation theory. Mental physics says this is wrong and is just another illusion of ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysical prejudice. The phenomenon we label

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<sup>2</sup> misleadingly translated as "the pleasure-principle," a Victorian influence corrupting renditions of Freud.

"emotion" is a sequence of affective states (which is why Russell's script theory approach is appealing). Kant was getting at this when he described emotion in terms of "sensation in which pleasantness or unpleasantness is produced by means of a momentary inhibition of actions *followed by* stronger motoregulatory expression<sup>3</sup>."

Freud's idea of "tension" has practical objective validity provided we regard tension in the Critical context of an imbalance (lack of negation) between the feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust*. To use Piaget's terminology, it acts as an "energetic" for some actions and a "terminator" for others. This means that if one wishes to effect a change of behavior by another person one must either stimulate some particular psychological state of tension through that person's process of reflective judgment or stimulate some different state of tension that counteracts an existing state of tension. Something very much like this has long been recognized by managerial psychologists. While we must make allowance for his imprecise and non-Critical use of the word "motivation," Leavitt made a fundamentally important and objectively mostly-valid point when he wrote,

[One] can say that behavior is an attempt to get rid of tension. Tension then equals motivation; and the objective of behavior is to eliminate the necessity for behaving . . . Behavior is thus seen as an effort to eliminate tensions by seeking goals that neutralize the cause of tensions.

Thinking about motivation in terms of tension and discomfort inside the person is useful in another way. It puts the emphasis on the *push* from inside the person rather than on the *pull* from outside. . . But no matter how one views these concepts, they suggest that the ultimate condition of man can be thought of as an equilibrium condition in which he need not behave. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 1

Every deliberate leader's action can be seen as nothing more and nothing less than an occasion in which a leader attempts to stimulate some vaguely specific behavior by a follower. Thus in a real sense the leader is a mediate and partial causer of feelings of tension in the follower for the purpose of getting the follower to act in a manner that accords with what the leader seeks to accomplish. Here it is important to understand both that the leader is only a *mediate* causer (because the immediate cause is an act of self-determination by the follower) and that he is only a *partial* causer (because factors other than the leader's actions are also mediate causers of feelings of tension in the follower). As Margenau pointed out in *The Nature of Physical Reality*, it is the syncretic entirety of all the partial causes that constitutes a unit cause.

In this Critical context we can then say that a *successful leader action* is one that achieves a state of tension in the follower for which the follower's self-determination produces behavior

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<sup>3</sup> This is the modern wording. Bearing in mind that psychology as a science did not exist in Kant's day and that biology was still lumped inside "medicine" (the word "biology" had not even been coined yet), Kant's term for motoregulatory expression was *Lebenskraft* (power of life). Kant provided this description in his third Critique (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*).



(actions) congruent with the leader's intent. An *unsuccessful leader action* is one that results in behavior opposed to the leader's intent, and a *non-successful leader action* is one that results in behavior contrary to (but not contradictory to) the leader's intent. In all cases the leader's action (including at times judicious inaction) involves the synthesizing (by the follower) of a state of tension. A state of tension is an affective condition of affective perception, and all affective perceptions are non-objective (they are inherently subjective). This means affective perceptions *as such* are *autistic* (incommunicable by one person to another). The only reason human beings succeed to the degree they do succeed in communicating "how I feel" to each other is because all human beings are on the whole more alike than they are different and therefore a second person is often able to apprehend "how the other person feels" by analogy with his own subjective experiences. This ability to apprehend affectivity by analogy is called *empathy*.

This very basic observation tells us that *every leader action affects the follower through his process of reflective judgment* and, therefore, exclusively through the affectivity dimension. This is the case even when the overt actions are those we call rational reasoning and discussion, i.e., when the actions involve objective logical reasoning and consensus building. Here the actions of the leader are mediately aiming at the follower's manifold of concepts, process of determining judgment, judgmentation, and ratio-expression. However, and this is a key point, self-determination is the *immediate* outcome of determination of a person's *appetitive power* and this determination is *always* conditioned by *subjective* reflective judgment. "Reaching a common understanding" between leader and follower is, viewed from mental physics, stimulation of affectivity by means of conditioning brought about through stimulation of thinking and the process of judgmentation. It is a more complex process than the relatively simpler process of immediately stimulating tension.

This is why coercion, when it actually works, is easier (for the leader) than is consensus building. It is correct to say a coercive leader is a lazy and unwise leader. The effect in reflective judgment is more direct, appeals in a more primal way to raw affectivity and thus more directly to the determination of appetitive power. This, however, in no way implies that coercion is better than other tactics because one possible way for the follower to reduce his state of tension is *to remove the leader as a source of tension*. Quitting one's job or murdering one's Pooh-Bah are examples of actions falling into this category. A rather more sophisticated version of this is to *indirectly* remove the leader by, e.g., causing him to fail in the verdict of *his* governor. Sabotage, wildcat strikes, and most forms of so-called passive aggression are examples in this category.

Thus, all leader actions are actions taken with the intent of stimulating tension in the follower in such a way as to bring about a desired behavior by the follower. Tension may be produced

either by appeal to feelings of *Lust*, to feelings of *Unlust*, or, frequently, to both in such a way that these feelings jointly reinforce the same action. Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* provides numerous examples through its recounts of orations to armies or to assemblies. One of the shorter ones was delivered by an Athenian general named Hippocrates:

"Men of Athens, my exhortation will not be long, but to brave men it will mean as much, and will be a reminder rather than an appeal. Let none of you think that because we are on foreign soil it is without cause that we are hazarding this great danger. For though the contest is on Boeotian soil, it will be in defense of our own; and, if we win, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade your territory, and in one battle you not only win this land but make sure the freedom of your own. Advance to meet them, therefore, in a spirit worthy both of that state, the foremost in Hellas, which every one of you is proud to claim as his fatherland, and of the fathers who under Myronides vanquished these men at Oenophyta and became at one time masters of Boeotia." – Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, IV, xcvi

Unfortunately for Hippocrates, his speech was better than his generalship; his army was outmaneuvered and routed in the subsequent battle. Caesar had much better luck at Pharsalus:

When, according to the custom of war, he was exhorting his army to battle, and setting forth his unbroken record of kindness to his men, he particularly reminded them that he could call his troops to witness with what zeal he had sought peace, what negotiations he had conducted through Vatinius in conferences and through Aulus Clodius with Scipio, how at Oricum he had urged Libo about the sending of envoys. He had never, he said, wished to squander the blood of his soldiers or to deprive the republic of either of its armies. After delivering this speech, the soldiers clamoring for action and burning with zeal for the fight, he gave the signal with a trumpet.

There was in Caesar's army a reservist, G. Crastinus, who in the previous year had served under him as first centurion in the Tenth Legion, a man of remarkable valor. On the signal being given, "Follow me," said he, "you who have been my comrades, and give your commander your wonted loyal service. This one battle alone remains; when it is over he will recover his dignity and we our liberty." At the same time, looking at Caesar, he says, "Today, General, I will give you occasion to thank me alive or dead." Having said this, he ran forward first from the right wing, and about one hundred and twenty picked men of the same cohort, serving as volunteers, followed him. – Caesar, *The Civil Wars*, III, 90-91

Caesar won at Pharsalus and later had himself declared Dictator for Life by the Roman Senate.<sup>4</sup>

Because leader action is never more than a partial causer of tension, all leader actions involve risk for the leader insofar as it is possible that the actual state of tension produced can result in unsuccessful (rather than merely non-successful) behavior consequences. The leader's actions are partial causers of tension, but the follower's reactions are likewise partial causers of tension felt by the leader. Leadership always occurs as a *reciprocal* dynamical relationship. It is therefore important for us to look at the data of emotion and attitude phenomena. We may call this sort of observation data *personality data*.

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<sup>4</sup> A leader's action that led to his assassination – an unsuccessful outcome for Caesar.

### § 3. First Sources of Personality Data and Methodological Discipline

Observation of human behavior has been going on longer than philosophy and science have been in existence. The more or less common understanding of personality data goes by many labels such as a person's "character," a person's "temperament," and various others. Quite often emotion labels are conveniently attached to these attributes and used for speculating about why a person behaved the way he did or committed the deeds he committed. Although the vast majority of such observations and characterizations are non-scientific, frequently incomplete or even mistaken, and not highly reliable in one-on-one situations, they nonetheless can be regarded as *sociological* characterizations because the very popularity of their expressions tells us something about the extent to which the characterization resonates with the experiences of many people.

Put another way, they provide loose sets of subjective norms used to methodically aid general attempts to understand, through classification, various characteristics of affectivity-driven behaviors. A social-natural scientist who ignores this sort of data of observation, especially on the excuse that it is not formally obtained in a controlled setting, is acting with foolish narrow-mindedness. Cautious restraint from theoretical overgeneralization of this data is needed, but a policy of deliberately ignoring it is a maxim for the bias of institutionalized contextual blindness.

Let us put this less in the abstract by means of an example. In *Discourses on Davila* John Adams – who is *practically* qualified to be seen as a scholar of human political nature – wrote,

Men, in their primitive conditions, however savage, were undoubtedly gregarious; and they continue to be social, not only in every stage of civilization but in every possible situation in which they can be placed. As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections. There is none among them more essential or remarkable than the *passion for distinction*. A desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows is one of the earliest as well as keenest dispositions discovered in the heart of man. If any one should doubt the existence of this propensity, let him go and attentively observe the journeymen and apprentices in the first workshop, or the oarsmen in a cockboat, a family or a neighborhood, the inhabitants of a house or the crew of a ship, a school or a college, a city or a village, a savage or civilized people, a hospital or a church, the bar or the exchange, a camp or a court. Wherever men, women, or children are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected, by the people about him, and within his knowledge. – John Adams, *Discourses on Davila*, II

Adams' "passion for distinction" can be regarded as a label for a broad category of human appetites. As such it is a category reflective of *Lust*. Considering the social circles in which Adams lived his life, it is perhaps unsurprising that he did not speak of its corollary in *Unlust*. If the experiences a person has had in pursuit of his "passion for distinction" have had unpleasant or

harmful outcomes, that person might develop what we could call a "passion for anonymity," an appetite for, as the American phrase puts it, avoiding the limelight. In Japan "the upright nail is hammered down." There are similar broad categories of appetites recognized in the management arts by the aphorism, "Some men pursue the carrot, others flee the stick."

Broad categorizations like these are a starting point and a logical means for beginning to bring some order to efforts in understanding the nature of the affective gateway by which one person influences the behavior of another. These categorizations quite clearly do not stand as first principles. Again, as Aristotle put it,

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not think we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature . . . Hence, in advancing to that which is intrinsically more luminous and by its nature accessible to deeper knowledge, we must start from what is more immediately within our knowledge though in its own nature less fully accessible to understanding. – Aristotle, *Physics*, I

By "clearer and more knowable by nature" Aristotle means comprehensible by deduction from principles; by "more knowable and clear to us" he means apprehensible from direct observation. A broad category, such as Adams' "passion for distinction," is like the outer skin of an onion. It is a starting point for organized investigation efforts to, so to speak, peel off the surface layers to find the core of the matter. Indeed, *this*, more than any other practice, is what characterizes a *scientific* approach to a research topic. To the Greeks *every* natural science was a *physikē*.

Adams provides us with an example of this in connection with his "passion for distinction":

A regard to the sentiments of mankind concerning him, and to their dispositions towards him, every man feels within himself; and if he has reflected, and tried experiments, he has found that no exertion of his reason, no effort of his will, can wholly divest him of it. In proportion to our affection for the notice of others is our aversion to their neglect; the stronger the desire of the esteem of the public, the more powerful the aversion to their disapprobation; the more exalted the wish for admiration, the more invincible the abhorrence of contempt. Every man not only desires the considerations of others, but he frequently compares himself with others, his friends or his enemies; and in proportion as he exults when he perceives that he has more of it than they, he feels a keener affliction when he sees that one or more of them are more respected than himself.

This passion, while it is simply a desire to excel another, by fair industry in the search of truth and the practice of virtue, is properly called *Emulation*. When it aims at power, as a means of distinction, it is *Ambition*. When it is in a situation to suggest the sentiments of fear and apprehension that another, who is now inferior, will become superior, it is denominated *Jealousy*. When it is in a state of mortification, at the superiority of another, and desires to bring him down to our level, or to depress him below us, it is properly called *Envy*. When it deceives a man into a belief of false profession of esteem or

admiration, or into a false opinion of his importance in the judgment of the world, it is *Vanity*. These observations alone would be sufficient to show that this propensity, in all its branches, is a principal source of the virtues and vices, the happiness and misery of human life; and the history of mankind is little more than a simple narration of its operation and effects. – Adams, *Discourses on Davila*, II

The present day social science disciplines, perhaps hypnotized by the success physics achieved by rolling balls down inclined planes, tend to regard the writings of Adams and others like him as "not science" and pay no heed to these observations in the push to accomplish something. Indeed, it is instructive to note that should a social scientist of today cite Adams, as your author has done here, he is likely to be excoriated by the editors, referees, and readers of his professional journal – a form of disapprobation the typical social scientist will go to nearly any length to avoid.

In point of fact this is a form of *natural human impatience* and this behavior is grounded securely in the mental physics of judgmentation. Self-regulation by pure practical Reason tolerates no affective inexpedience in reflective judgment, and practical judgment accommodates the manifold of rules *as directly as the person can find a way to do it* in order to cancel the inexpedience. It is instructive to note at this point Piaget's confirmation that *practical* knowledge *a posteriori* (which mental physics tells us is represented in the manifold of rules) precedes *theoretical* knowledge (which is represented in the manifold of concepts):

In general, when a psychologist speaks of a subject being conscious of a situation, he means that the subject is fully aware of it. The fact that he has become aware of it neither modifies nor adds anything to the situation – all that has changed is that light has now been thrown on a hitherto, for him, obscure situation. . . [No] one has contributed more than Freud to make us consider the "unconscious" a continually active dynamic system. The findings in this book lead us to claim analogous powers for consciousness itself. In fact, and precisely insofar as it is desired to mark and conserve the differences between the unconscious and the conscious, the passage from one to the other must require reconstructions and cannot be reduced to simply a process of illumination. Each chapter has shown that cognizance (or the act of becoming conscious) of an action scheme transforms it into a concept and therefore that cognizance consists basically in a conceptualization. . .

. . . As has been shown in this book, cognizance is always triggered by the fact that automatic regulations . . . are no longer sufficient. New means must therefore be sought through a more active adjustment; this constitutes the source of thought-out choices . . .

Moreover, the very fact that the regulations have this role shows that it would be quite wrong to think that cognizance resulted only from such lack of adaptation. Effective cognizance can occur very late as, for example, in walking on all fours or the use of a sling, without there being any lack of adaptation in these actions. . .

. . . [The] general law that seems to emerge from our findings is that cognizance proceeds from the periphery to the center – these terms being defined as a function of the path of a given behavior. This behavior begins with the pursuit of a goal, hence the first two observable features, which can be termed peripheral because they are linked to the triggering of the action and to the point of its application: consciousness of what the goal is – in other words, awareness of the general direction of the action needed to attain it (intention) – and cognizance of its result, either failure or success. . . These two aspects of

the immediate action are conscious in every deliberate activity, while the fact that the scheme that assigns a goal to the action immediately triggers off the means of effecting it . . . may remain unconscious, as is shown by the multiple situations studied in this book where the child achieves his goal without knowing how he did so. – Piaget, *The Grasp of Consciousness*, 16

Present day habits of discourse in psychology tend to favor calling Adams' labels – Emulation, Ambition, Jealousy, Envy, Vanity – "emotion labels." Indeed, psychologists who subscribe to one of the mini-theories based on prime (that is, "atomic") emotions are almost paradigmatically necessitated to call them such. But look again at what Adams wrote. He is not crediting the associated actions to the labels, which an ontology-centered prejudice would incline one to do; instead he is labeling the class of actions and this is equivalent to setting down the beginnings of *operational or functional descriptions for the labels*. We cannot observe "hate *per se*" or "joy *per se*" or any other emotion "X *per se*"; these are psychological, not physical, objects. An objectively valid *Realerklärung* of "emotion" is, by Critical requirement, going to be a *practical* explanation, and Adams is starting off on precisely this path. He is behaving as a scientist should behave.

Present day science has picked up the habit of thinking valid scientific methodology is defined by the overly narrow and overly specialized laboratory methods of physics and chemistry. A number of eminent leaders in science have sanctioned this dogma in print and denigrated other approaches (usually illustrated by examples culled from the social sciences) as contrary to the methods of modern science born in the time of Newton. In point of fact, this dogma tends to push social sciences away from the correct practice of natural science by rewarding a natural human propensity to leap towards what I will call methodology-disciplinary axioms, in contradiction to Aristotle's dictum. It is nothing more and nothing less than an *historical fact* that the paradigm for scientific practice which led to the most basic methodical principles in physics and chemistry was first enunciated by Francis Bacon in *Novum Organum*. He wrote,

Nor can we suffer the understanding to jump and fly from particulars to remote and most general axioms . . . and thus prove and make out their intermediate axioms according to the supposed unshaken truth of the former. This, however, has always been done to the present time from the natural bent of the understanding, educated too, and accustomed to this very method, by the syllogistic mode of demonstration. But we can then only augur well for the sciences when the ascent shall proceed by a true scale and successive steps, without interruption or breach, from particulars to the lesser axioms, thence to the intermediate (rising one above the other), and, lastly, to the most general. For the lowest axioms differ but little from bare experiments; the highest and most general (as they are esteemed at present), are notional, abstract, and of no real weight. The intermediate are true, solid, full of life, and upon them depend the business and fortune of mankind; beyond these are the really general, but not abstract, axioms, which are truly limited by the intermediate.

We must not then add wings, but rather lead and ballast to the understanding, to prevent its jumping or flying, which has not yet been done; but whenever this takes place, we may entertain greater hopes of the sciences. – Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I. 104

Social-natural science cannot follow this disciplined approach to knowledge if it begins by summarily ruling out the observations and "lowest axioms" such as are found in Adams' example. Indeed, in Bacon's polemic against the method of the schoolmen of his day in *Novum Organum* we encounter page after page of vivid observations, by Bacon, of human intellectual habits that serve as splendid exemplars of the consequences of *the natural impatience of judgmentation* in practical reasoning alluded to above. If we say, as we did in chapter 2, reflective judgment is *impetuous*, it is likewise truly said that the overall process of judgmentation is *impatient*. This is a *theorem* of mental physics. Maxims of *discipline* serve to counteract this natural impatience.

Discipline in natural science is found when one makes it a maxim of his scientific reasoning to heed the sequence outlined above by Bacon and not give in to the powerful inclination to transfer what has worked for some other topical arena of science directly over into one's methodology of research. This means paying attention *first* to "what is clearer to us" and only afterwards advancing step by step "to the intermediate axioms" (as Bacon put it) and beyond. As engineers often put it, one must "peel the onion." To do so, one has to start with the whole onion. Psychology, sociology, economics, political science, &etc. are simply not physics or chemistry or biology. Their onions neither fit into test tubes nor are usefully processed using Bunsen burners. Yet the *fundamental* methodology of science is the same for all sciences and it follows Bacon's prescription. In the Adams illustration we have not the example of a lawyer or a politician or a revolutionary (although he was all of these), but the example of a social-natural scientist holding his onion in his hand. Bacon's *Novum Organum* prescribes the discipline.

#### § 4. Tension and Behavior I: Dependency and Need

The proactive actions of the leader aim at the general objective of stimulating tension in the follower in order to produce some desired behavior. As aesthetically unpleasant as this sounds, it is nothing more and nothing less than a cold fact of the leader-follower relationship. For the leader every such action is risky, and that is a practical incentive for better understanding the nature of tension and the possible effects of tension stimulation on the person tensioned by it.

In Critical epistemology the process of reflective judgment is determined according to what is called the *principle of formal expedience*: All acts of reflective judgment legislate for formal unity in Nature according to the expedience mental representations have for the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Critical **expedience** (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) is a property of a mental representation regarded as possible only with respect to some purpose from the practical Standpoint. The expedience of something is the congruence of a thing with that property of things that is possible only in accordance with purposes. Now, in the interplay between reflective

judgment and appetitive power, the final "say" on whether reflective judgment's legislation really is congruent with practical purpose under the categorical imperative belongs to practical judgment. This, we recall, is an affectively cold and cognitively dark mental capacity and its fundamental standard for judgment is a negative one; this is to say practical judgment judges *lack* of congruence between a reflective judgment and the self-constructed practical manifold of rules.

One important consequence of this property for judgmentation is that to effect change in behavior requires the *first* reaction sanctioned by reflective judgment to be *thwarted* (either by a determination of ratio-expression by appetitive power or by affective dissatisfaction with the sensible outcome of the action). This is a theorem of mental physics and one that finds evidentiary support in independent empirical findings from developmental psychology:

Every response, whether it be an act directed towards the outside world or an act internalized as thought, takes the form of an adaptation or, better, of a re-adaptation. The individual acts only if he experiences a need, i.e., if the equilibrium between the environment and the organism is momentarily upset, and action tends to re-establish the equilibrium . . . Behavior, thus conceived in terms of functional interaction, presupposes two essential and closely interdependent aspects: an affective aspect and a cognitive aspect. – Jean Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence*

The experimental and observational evidence leading to this stated finding are distributed widely across the corpus of Piaget's works and one could not accuse Piaget and his collaborators of going out of their way to bring these many pieces together under one dedicated roof where the student of psychology can view them panoramically. Nonetheless, the conclusion holds and, furthermore, finds additional support from clinical results in the treatment of severe autism in children. Here the work of Stanley Greenspan is particularly notable.

Nor is the evidence confined to developmental and clinical studies. That behavior responds to needs is widely documented throughout psychology. The Critical *Realerklärung* of *need* is this: a need (*Bedürfnis*) is anything subjectively necessary for satisfaction of some purpose. However, *practical* necessity (necessitation) is here an idea that *presupposes* thwarted satisfaction (that is, an actual dissatisfaction in the outcome of an action) and loses its real meaning outside of the practical context provided by this presupposition. Leavitt tells us,

While people are alike, they are also different. They are alike in that their behavior is caused, motivated, and goal-directed and their physical equipment is roughly similar. They are different to the extent that they are subject to different kinds of stimulation, that they vary in kinds and degrees of motivation, that they behave in many different ways to achieve many different goals, and that they have different sizes and powers in their physical equipment. . .

Looking back over the list of motives, one can classify them into at least two major groups. Some arise from needs that are essentially physical and "basic": needs for food, for water, for warmth. One could add others . . . These are clear-cut, unambiguous needs; they are physiological; they are universal; they are present in infants as well as adults . . .



The second class of needs, however, is less easily definable. Needs for achievement, status, and "belongingness" are much more "psychological," more clearly limited to human beings, and for the most part not immediately observable in the newborn. They also seem highly individualistic . . . They seem to be present to an extreme degree in some people and almost nonexistent in others. We do not ordinarily characterize one another as "food seekers," but we do often characterize a person as a "power seeker" or a "prestige seeker." In fact, our judgment of the intensities of psychological needs in other people make up a large part of our judgment of their personalities. . .

These acquired sets of feelings can now be thought of as two new classes of learned needs. One set is of essentially social needs, for dependency, for affiliation with other people (because people satisfy needs), for affection, and the like. The other set is egoistic, i.e., concerned with the self in relation to other people rather than with other people per se. In this class belong the emerging needs for independence, for power (over other people), for prestige (as one kind of power over other people), for knowledge (another kind of power), and the like. . .

One outstanding exponent of growth motivation has pointed out that certain needs take operational precedence over others if both are unsatisfied at the same time. The ambitious man who is lost in the desert pays attention to his thirst, not his ambition. In general, the ordering of needs seems to be from the physical needs, which take first place when unsatisfied, to the social needs, to the egoistic needs, and perhaps beyond what we have called the egoistic group, to needs for self-actualization – that is, to needs for fulfilling one's self in one's own way. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 2

Most of these psychological needs are acquired or developed needs and arise from personal experience (acknowledging that one's experience depends on one's "physical equipment" as well as on the accidents of living). That has been long recognized in experimental psychology and is also a natural mental physics by-product of the construction process undertaken by the individual in structuring his manifold of rules and his manifold of concepts. The hierarchy Leavitt lays out in the final paragraph quoted above is one particular layout of Maslow's famous needs hierarchy:

1. physiological needs
2. safety needs
3. belongingness and love needs
4. esteem needs
5. cognitive needs
6. aesthetic needs
7. need for self-actualization.


Leavitt emphasizes the "dependency" aspect of social needs and sets these in opposition to egoistic needs. By "dependency" he means the reliance a person must have on other people for attainment of satisfactions. This rests in large measure on causality & dependency Relations insofar as a person views another person as a provider or "causer" of whatever it is that is used to satisfy his need. Leavitt hypothesizes that to the degree the other person provides for or is needed for the achievement of satisfaction, a person's feeling of dependency grows likewise in degree. In affectivity terms, one can call this a positive dependency because, to the extent the other person fails to provide for the achievement of satisfaction, the dependent person will come to feel a

negative dependency (e.g., "He's no help!") that Leavitt associates with egoistic needs.

Egoistic needs implicate the learned development of maxims of duty to oneself, particularly the Relation of duty with respect to one's own personality, whereas social needs tend to implicate learned development of maxims of duty to oneself in Relation to one's situation. Reciprocal need, which Leavitt does not explicitly discuss but implicitly invokes in some of his examples, is a synthesis of these two (hence Leavitt's two-part classification is Critically incomplete) and could be called *co-dependency* insofar as the person's egoistic needs result in behaviors that at the same time affect needs of another person and influence that person's behaviors. Leader-follower relationships are co-dependency need relationships (seen from the rather trivial observation that if the leader did not need something from the follower he would have no reason to lead, and if the follower did not need something from the leader he would have no reason to follow). This opposition of social vs. egoistic need, and their synthesis in reciprocal need, is an important subjective factor in the phenomenon of leadership.

**§ 5. Tension and Behavior II: Frustration, Deprivation, and Anticipation**

The interplay between reflective judgment's impetuosity (for acting on the basis of affective mental presentations of expedience) and appetitive power's impatience with inexpedience (when the presentation made by reflective judgment is contrary to practical conditions set in the manifold of rules) is a source of psychological tension. Although mental representations of pure practical Reason (in the manifold of rules) are unconscious representations, the process of Reason nonetheless exerts a regulating control function over cognition, by means of ratio-expression, that *orients and biases* objective presentations by the process of determining judgment in thinking.



**Figure 4.1:** The functional structure of the phenomenon of mind in mental physics (from chapter 2).

To appreciate this let us reference the illustration of mental functional structure from chapter 2, which for convenience is repeated as figure 4.1 above. In mental physics **perception** is the making of a conscious mental representation. Perceptions (the products of this process) are outcomes of the syntheses of apprehension and apperception (see figure 4.1). The processes of reflective and determining judgment interact with each other, as illustrated in the figure, and so human perception is the joint work of both cognitive (determining judgment and imagination) and affective (reflective judgment) processes. The cognitive, however, is directly *regulated* by the affectively cold and cognitively dark processes of pure Reason through ratio-expression. This expression orients the employment of determining judgment. A perception is not a direct impress of the outer world upon what British empiricists called the "*tabula rasa*"<sup>5</sup> of the mind." Mind is not a camera and perceptions are *synthesized products* of these interacting mental processes. Every cognition is objective and always accompanied by subjective (non-objective) perceptions, which we denote *affective perceptions*. Tension is an affective function of overall perception.

Here it must be noted that present day psychology *misuses* the term "perception" in technical contexts. Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology* provides six separate usages of the term, these usages are homonymous, and some of them contradict others of them. All bear the marks of ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysics. Reber correctly notes that,

Not surprisingly, the full range of connotations of this term [perception] envelops nearly every aspect of psychology, and existing theories of perception are far-reaching indeed. In essence, the study of perception always begins with recognition of the fact that what is perceived is not uniquely determined by physical stimulation but, rather, is an organized complex dependent upon a host of other factors. While there is no doubt that the incoming stimulus is an essential feature of what is ultimately perceived, the old structuralist argument<sup>6</sup> that perceptions are built up entirely out of sensations is accepted by virtually no one today. – Reber's *Dictionary*

The psychologist's two principal windows through which the process of perception is studied by observation and experiment are (a) behaviors of and (b) interviews with test subjects. Some very broad findings of impressive consistency have resulted. Leavitt summarizes the meat of these findings in non-technical language in the following way:

[A common observation is] that people see things differently, that the world is what we make it, that everyone wears his own rose-colored glasses. But consider some additional questions: Whence the rose-colored glasses? Are the glasses always rose-colored? That is, does one always see what he wants to see, or does he see what he is afraid he will see, or both?

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<sup>5</sup> "blank tablet"

<sup>6</sup> Structuralism and functionalism are the names given to two pseudo-metaphysical approaches that have been used in psychology research. Neither approach has proven very successful. Mental physics can be regarded from one particular and narrow point of view as an epistemology-centered re-synthesis of the structuralist and functionalist paradigms into the unity of a *Logic of Meanings*.

These questions are important because the primary issue of "human relations" is to consider ways in which individuals can affect the behavior of other individuals. If it is true that people behave on the basis of the perceived world, then changing behavior in a predetermined direction can be made easier by understanding the individual's present perception of the world. For if there is any common human-relations mistake made by industrial superiors in their relations with subordinates, it is the mistake of assuming that the "real" world is all that counts, that everyone works for the same goals, that the facts speak for themselves. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 3

That "the world is what we make it" is true according to Critical epistemology *if* we re-phrase this aphorism as "*my* world is what *I* make it." Nature is the "world model" a human being makes for himself, and no other conclusion is objectively valid because "the world" does not stamp its impress on the human mind. If you feel and think your boss is a greedy, manipulative scoundrel then *for you* that is what he is. If you think your subordinate is a lazy, dishonest parasite feeding at the company trough then *for you* that is what he is. But for the person standing right beside you the same boss might be a kindly and wise friend, and the same subordinate might be a hero whose finger in the company dike is all that is holding back a flood. To ask "Which one of these two contradictory perceptions is true?" is a *meaningless* question because it is asked from a false ontology-centered premise (a "copy of reality" hypothesis that goes back to Aristotle) and it is asked without first establishing a universal objective norm for comparative judgments. Here we have one of those rare cases where, scientifically, Plato was less incorrect with his famous "myth of the cave" (*Republic*, VII) than was Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*.

Put in a slightly different way, it is not the perceptions of individuals that really matter in leadership; it is the *common understanding* of the situation along with the *misunderstandings* (lack of objective agreements among individuals) that really matters. Individual understanding of a situation is *driven* by reflective judgment, and this is the source of the differences between what Kant, in his *Logik*, called a person's *persuasions* of opinion, his *convictions* of belief, and the *shared comprehension* of objective experience between two (or more) people. The third of these is the basis of *common* understanding, the first two are sources of misunderstandings between people when persuasions or convictions differ between them.

Piaget and his collaborators were able to identify three forms of behaviors indicative of what he termed "cognitive compensations." These compensation behaviors provide observable data indicative of characteristics of the judgmentation loop depicted in figure 4.1. Piaget wrote,

Let us now study the characteristics common to these various regulating compensations. The first has been described above. We repeat: all compensation works in an opposite or reciprocal direction to that of the disturbance . . . which means it either cancels (inversion) or neutralizes the disturbance (reciprocity) . . . The second general characteristic of cognitive compensations is that they include a terminal evaluation of their success or insufficiency which is linked to the source of the regulation itself. Since this source consists of a nonbalance of the assimilation and the accommodation, the final

evaluation involves a judgment dealing with success (whole, partial, or missing). . . The third characteristic common to every compensation is the tendency to conservations through transformations, i.e., conservation of a state or of a progression, of a scheme or of a subsystem, etc. . . . A final remark is necessary. Although the regulations and the compensations which they create use the equilibration method, it is important to emphasize the fact that these formative processes are both constructive and preservative.  
– Piaget, *The Development of Thought*

In less technical and more accessible language, Leavitt called the outcomes of compensation regulations "selective perception" (he would have better called it "selective cognizance"). He ascribed to this a "defensive" character (which, Critically, is too restrictive) described thusly:

So two of our rules of selective perception become: (1) see what promises to help satisfy needs, and (2) ignore mildly disturbing things. . . At those points when the unpleasantness becomes intense and dangerous, people stop defending and begin attacking. They stop ignoring the irritation and start directing all their attention to it. This reversal seems to happen suddenly, at some specific threshold. . .

This is the third rule: Pay attention to things that are really dangerous. The whole picture now begins to look like this: *People perceive what they think will help satisfy needs; ignore what is disturbing; and again perceive disturbances that persist and increase.* – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 3

We must note that where Leavitt refers to "things that are really dangerous" this isn't strictly correct. To be objectively valid the statement should be "things a person *believes* are actually dangerous." But "dangerous" in what context? "Disturbing" in what context? The objectively valid context in both cases is found in the relationships between the object perceived and the affective representation of feelings of *Unlust* – in other words, a subjective relationship between affective perceptions and a cognitive representation of need-objects. This reduces to a subjective evaluation of whether a disturbing factor is *contrary* to satisfaction of a need that can nonetheless be satisfied despite the disturbing factor (in which case the disturbance is simply ignored or is readily cancelled) vs. an evaluation that the disturbing factor *contradicts* the ability to satisfy the need (in which case the disturbance is a *real threat*). The former is a type of tension Leavitt calls a *deprivation*. The latter is a type of tension Leavitt calls a *frustration*. He writes,

Frustration is a "feeling" rather than a "fact." It is a feeling that arises when one encounters certain kinds of blocks on paths to certain kinds of goals. These feelings arise when the block seems insurmountable and when failure to surmount it threatens one's personal well-being – when the goal involves the self.

When people encounter such obstacles they react with aggression; aggression mostly toward the obstacle when the person is sure of his own ability and aggression mostly toward oneself when the person is pessimistic about his ability, i.e., when he has had a history of failure.

Many obstacle situations are depriving rather than frustrating because the obstacles do not seem insurmountable or the goals are not central to the self. Some people may therefore meet fewer frustrations than others because they have more ways around more obstacles or because they are self-confident enough so that their self-esteem does not

have to be proved again by every new problem they encounter. – [*ibid.*, 4]

What Leavitt describes here is technically known as the *frustration-aggression hypothesis*. Reber calls this hypothesis a "circular and an unsatisfying account of behavior. . . what is needed to rescue the hypothesis is independent evaluations of frustration and aggression." Note, too, the hypothesis is only partial (deals with *Unlust* but not with *Lust*). Reber defines its key terms as:

**frustration** . . . 2. The emotional state assumed to result from the act [of blocking, interfering with or disrupting behavior that is directed towards some goal]. It is typically assumed that this emotional state has motivational properties that produce behavior designed to bypass or surmount the block.

**aggression** An extremely general term used for a wide variety of acts that involve attack, hostility, etc. Typically, it is used for such acts as can be assumed to be motivated by any of the following: (a) fear or frustration; (b) a desire to produce fear or flight in others; or (c) a tendency to push forward one's own ideas or interests. While this will do as a loose but acceptable definition, it barely touches on the nuances of usage in the psychological literature. Patterns of usage typically reflect some theoretical bias on the part of the writer. . . The point to be emphasized here is that different concepts of aggression play a central role in many theoretical conceptions and, as is so often the case in the social sciences, usage follows theory and no mutually accepted definition can be found. – Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology*

Note that this deals with the "stick" (*Unlust*) but ignores the "carrot" (*Lust*). As for deprivation,

**deprivation** Strictly speaking the term refers to the loss of some desired object or person and is used to mean either the act of removing the object or person or the state of the loss itself – [*ibid.*]

Leavitt does not use "deprivation" with this technical connotation but, rather, in the context of a tension that produces no "emotional upset."

One rather obvious implication of all this is that we require a more precise (Critical) *Realerklärung* for each of these terms "tension," "frustration," "aggression," and "deprivation" if we are to make real use of Leavitt's (and others') observations of leadership factors. This will take us rather deeply into the mental physics of something called *the motivational dynamic of judgmentation*. Empirical psychology, in its observations and speculations, serves to illustrate the sort of empirical factors involved with the individual human being's power of self-determination. But a social-natural theory requires much more than the speculative collage of current competing mini-theories presented in the present corpus of psychology literature.

One factor that lies implicit in Leavitt's view (and in many others as well) and is important for us to explicitly recognize is the factor of *anticipation*. Leavitt speaks of such things as a person's "confidence" in overcoming whatever "block" is triggering frustration or deprivation. And indeed, his main discrimination between the two terms (and a third we have not yet addressed, namely "conflict") is predicated upon such intrapersonal factors. Loosely understood, anticipation carries

the connotation of being able to "look ahead" and "predict" action outcomes in terms of potential success (satisfaction) or failure (dissatisfaction). At this descriptive level we encounter yet another mental physics factor in self-determination. The *Critical Realerklärung* of **anticipation** is *knowledge through which the person can recognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition*. In mental physics *a priori* means "prior to actual experience." Note well that the real meaning of anticipation stated here is not in a context of outcomes but, instead, is in the context of how the person can/will produce an objective perception (and is thus *epistemological*).

In the still narrower context of a *predictive* cognition of an outcome linked to an action, such a cognition is one in a causality & dependency Relation – in less technical terminology, an ends-means assessment. What we will later see is that the practical possibility of this directly involves self-determination of appetitive power and, therefore, depends upon: prior experiences; the person's self-constructed manifold of rules; and his tenets and maxims of action self-constructed in his manifold of concepts on the basis of the rules by means of *regulated* determining judgment.

## § 6. The Deontological Implication of Factors of Self-Determination

Although at this stage of the treatise it is not expected to be very obvious, what this ultimately is going to lead us to is this: *Self-determination is going to ultimately be a function of the individual's own personal "moral code"* (in the context that "morality is the logic of actions"). The corollary to this is: *The effect of every action by which the leader attempts to influence the behavior of the follower is going to involve, at root, a moral reference* of some sort. There is no way for us to avoid plunging into the issue of **deontological morality** because we must have an objectively valid understanding of this to understand, again with objective validity, the leadership relationship. Such an understanding *only* an epistemology-centered moral theory can provide. The more commonly encountered tenets of consequentialist or of virtue ethics will be of utterly no scientific use to us because both of these are ontology-centered and lack universal practical objective validity. "Deontological" means "not ontology-centered."

This is something that runs so contrary to a centuries-old tradition in science that you, my dear reader, cannot at all be blamed if it "leaves an unsavory taste in your mouth." The undeniable lack of historical success for moral and ethical theories formulated out of ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysical prejudices and religious traditions could scarcely have any other impact for a scientist. At this moment all your author can do is ask you to exercise patience – if necessary by reminding yourself that later, if you deem the case not-sufficiently-made, you are free to reject the entire business (compensation by ignoring the disturbance) – and he asks you to *not* reject it out of hand right *now* on the ground that if you do it will be because of precisely the sort of

*subjective* factors in self-determination found in the "interior layers of the onion" we have set out to peel. He asks of you no more than to be *skeptically open-minded* for now.

It may perhaps be of some comfort to know that we will not be exploring morality *per se* later on but, rather, the Critical bases of the *phenomenon of moral judgment* – and all of us make judgments of this sort. Regardless of what each of us chooses to call it, all of us from time to time feel very strong convictions about "right and wrong" and "good and evil" and make at least some of our decisions and choices out of these convictions. My convictions might (and will) differ from yours, but I do have mine just as you do have yours. These are *nothing else* than moral judgments, regardless of whatever one chooses to call it or name one's private "moral code." We will not be trying to answer the question "what *ought* everyone to do?" but, rather, "what determines what a person *will* do?" in particular circumstances. What kind of rules will he make for himself? How and why will he change them from time to time? What kinds of rules does he bind himself to most passionately? What exceptions to them will he permit himself and when?

To ask these and related questions of this sort is not unscientific in the least. These have to do with what is often called the social nature of being human. They are questions that can be put in manners accessible to observation and experiment, as Piaget did so insightfully and in such an often entertaining way in *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. We will not and indeed *cannot* invest these considerations with the ontology-centered Hegelianism encountered in Vygotsky's *Mind in Society* nor with dogmatic tenets of any religious theology of whatsoever creed. The individual's private moral code is the by-product of the *self-developed* structure of his manifold of rules.

None of this is to say that all leadership is "moral leadership" in the conventional sense. It is likely true that most people beyond the age of majority will have encountered in their own personal experiences examples of leaders whose actions can hardly be dignified as examples of "moral leadership" as that term is usually used. It is, however, to say that every leadership situation involves the interaction of at least two personal and subjective moral codes, viz. that of the leader and that of the follower. This moral interaction will *essentially* play out in the affective dimensions of each person. But here and in this regard, as Shakespeare wrote,

There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. – *Hamlet*, II, ii

## § 7. Internal Balance and the Role of Rhetoric and Oratory

### § 7.1 Values, Attitudes, and Internal Balance

This chapter has so far emphasized the fundamental importance of affectivity in personal decision making and choice. However, this is far from saying cognition and thinking are of minor or secondary importance. Reflective judgment, which deals with affectivity, and determining



judgment, which deals with thinking and understanding, are interactively coupled in the syntheses of apprehension and apperception. Among the products of this interaction we find two hard-to-easily-define characteristics of being human recognized by most people as somehow being central to the self-determination of actions. We call these *values* and *attitudes*. The difficulty encountered in being able to crisply state what these are stems from the fact that they are joint products of the two judgment processes and, additionally, are conditioned by the practical manifold of rules.

A keen understanding of values and attitudes must call upon mental physics for elucidation. Yet before embarking upon such an elucidation it is good to first view them in their broader relationship to self-determination, i.e. to heed Aristotle's dictum of beginning with "that which is clearer to us" before plunging into the depths of "that which is clearer by nature." Leavitt writes,

People not only develop needs and styles of problem-solving. They also develop beliefs and opinions and values and attitudes. . . This collection of "stuff" in people properly belongs neither in the realm of emotionality nor in the realm of cognitive problem-solving. This realm of beliefs and values seems rather to constitute some mixture of the reasoning and non-reasoning parts of people. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 8

Although what Leavitt precisely means by "values and attitudes" remains rather vague in his book, Critical analysis does in fact support what he says here, and his remarks are congruent with the Critical *Realerklärung* of values and of value *per se* we will later discuss. He goes on to describe them in the following way:

Attitudes and values . . . are orientations toward things in the world. Generally, values are considered to be more basic, more fundamental. Attitudes are a little more direct: propensities to look at more or less specific things in particular ways. . . An attitude is a readiness to respond, an overall framework within which to cast particular beliefs or opinions. Attitudes are usually pretty conscious. People can express them, although in many cases they may choose not to. We tend to call the same kind of things values when they are a little broader, a little more deep-seated, and include more unconscious elements. – [*ibid.*]

Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology* provides seven usages of the term "value" and five usages of the term "attitude." Leavitt's description and his usages of these terms are a bit broader than but still consistent with the following contexts from Reber's *Dictionary*:

**value** 2 n. An abstract and general principle concerning the patterns of behavior within a particular culture or society which, through the process of socialization, the members of the culture or society hold in high regard. These social *values*, as they are often called, form central principles around which individual and societal goals can become integrated. Classic examples are freedom, justice and education. – Reber's *Dictionary*

**attitude** 4. Some internal affective orientation that would explain the actions of a person. This meaning is basically an extension of the idea of *intention* . . . but contemporary usage generally entails several components, namely: *cognitive* (consciously held belief or opinion); *affective* (emotional tone or feeling); *evaluative* (positive or negative); and *conative* (disposition for action). – Reber's *Dictionary*

It is important to note that the "abstract and general principle" referred to here is a self-formed principle – i.e., it is an idea formulated by the individual and represented in his manifold of concepts. It does not refer to a natural law or a principle of mental physics. For this reason the individual's specific concepts of, e.g., social values differ to some degree from one person to the next although many people in a society hold to principles similar enough to each other that one can find in this verisimilitude of common agreement sufficient enough reason to say "the society has such-and-such a value." But because these "abstract and general principles" are self-formed and, at root, individualistic, this means that the possibility of the in-forming of ideas of "values" must rest on something more fundamental, namely a natural law of mental physics. It is this natural law that your author meant when earlier he spoke of examining value in the sphere of "that which is clearer by nature."

That mental physics finds value to be intricately linked to the self-formation of an individual's personal moral code perhaps is suggestively evident enough at this point in the treatise for the reader's first apprehension. If not, perhaps he will find an insight provided by Santayana helpful:

We may . . . assert this axiom, . . . that there is no value apart from some appreciation of it . . . In appreciation, in preference, lies the root and essence of all excellence. Or, as Spinoza clearly expresses it, we desire nothing because it is good, but it is good only because we desire it.

It is true that in the absence of an instinctive reaction we can still apply these epithets by an appeal to usage. We may agree that an action is bad, or a building good, because we recognize in them a character which we have learned to designate by that adjective; but unless there is in us some trace of passionate reprobation or of sensible delight, there is no moral or æsthetic judgment. . . If we appealed more often to actual feeling our judgments would be more diverse, but they would be more legitimate and instructive. Verbal judgments are often useful instruments of thought, but it is not by them that worth can ultimately be determined.

Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature. The rational part is by its essence relative; it leads us from data to conclusions, or from parts to wholes; it never furnishes the data with which it works. . . In spite of the verbal propriety of saying that reason demands rationality, what really demands rationality, what makes it a good and indispensable thing and gives it all its authority, is not its own nature, but our need of it both in safe and economical action and in the pleasures of comprehension. . .

Æsthetic and moral judgments are accordingly to be classed together in contrast to judgments intellectual; they are both judgments of value, while intellectual judgments are judgments of fact. If the latter have any value, it is only derivative, and our whole intellectual life has its only justification in its connection with our pleasures and pains. – Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, I, 2

The *regulations of thinking* pathway, illustrated in figure 4.1 as running from speculative Reason to the process of determining judgment, is correctly regarded as providing an orientation for the employment of determining judgment and, by this, an orientation to thinking. Thus it is both appropriate and significant that "attitude" is described by Leavitt and by Reber as an

orientation. Ideas of values, the affectivity that accompanies the apperception of these in thinking, and the regulating role of practical Reason through ratio-expression set the empirical idea of values squarely within the judgmentation loop in self-determination. This leads to the idea that the mental system seeks for a state of equilibrium – which Leavitt calls *balance* – in the process of self-determination. This was likewise the conclusion Piaget drew from his experimental work summarized in *The Development of Thought*. It is also a *law* of mental physics. The significance of this was well-described by Leavitt when he wrote:

The balance idea is simply that human beings try to maintain *internal* consistency and balance among their attitudes, values, and decisions. Hence, any of us is apt to stay stubbornly with a position long after it is seen by others as either rationally wrong or inconsistent with other positions we have held. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 8

It is probably a safe bet to make that each of us has encountered from time to time other people who hold to ideas utterly contrary to the facts of nature as we understand them or who refuse to admit to having been wrong about something long after events have rather conclusively demonstrated an error in their conclusion or tenet. Not infrequently people will say in this case that the other person's reasoning or rationalization is "irrational." Because values and attitudes enter in to the individual's behavior and decision-making actions, this idea of balance has a direct implication for the phenomenon of leadership. Leavitt wrote,

If one wants to change attitudes or values, it is useful to think of the human being as a "cognitive balancer," who tries to keep his attitudes and values grossly consistent with one another. Hence, we find more or less clear attitude and value patterns in most people. But that isn't a perfectly safe bet, because most of us can do balancing tricks that allow us to feel comfortable with patterns that look inconsistent to outsiders.

The important thing is that people try to reduce internal dissonance, to get things into internal balance. If we look at the internal behavior process, rather than the rational facts, we can often better understand and predict attitudes and, moreover, change them much more effectively than by logical argument.

While we can often change behavior by first changing attitudes, the reverse is also true: to change a man's attitudes, change his relevant behavior. – [*ibid.*]

In broad strokes what Leavitt tells us here is consistent with mental physics. The manifold of concepts and the manifold of rules are both constructed as *structures* – systems of self-regulating transformations such that no new element engendered by their operation breaks the boundaries of the system and such that the transformations of the system do not involve elements outside it. The most fundamental property of a structure is that its overall self-regulation is holistic, and this means structural regulation is *conservative*: the structure can change to *accommodate* differences in the aliments that feed into it, but this accommodation does not abolish any prior capacity the structure had for *assimilating* its old aliments. The manifold of Desires, on the other hand, is not

constituted as a structure and it is not self-conserving. To the extent that one sees semi-robust patterns of affectivity, this is because reflective judgment and determining judgment are co-determining, the latter operates on and with the structure of the manifold of concepts, and is oriented according to the structure of the practical manifold of rules.

This, mental physics teaches us, is why it is more easily accomplished in practice to sway or change people's behaviors by playing on their values and attitudes *affectively* so that the leader can often accomplish through affectivity what he cannot accomplish solely by appeal to rational argument and "cold, clear logic." This has long been recognized by management theorists. In 1957 Philip Selznick wrote,

The in-building of purpose [in an organization] is a challenge to creativity because it involves transforming men and groups from neutral, technical units into participants who have a particular stamp, sensitivity, and commitment. This is ultimately an educational process. It has been well said that the effective leader must know the meaning and master the technique of the educator. . . . The art of the creative leader is the art of institution building, the reworking of human and technological materials to fashion an organism that embodies new and enduring values. . . . To institutionalize is to *infuse with value* beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand. The prizing of social machinery beyond its technical role is largely a reflection of the unique way it fulfills personal or group needs. Whenever individuals become attached to an organization or a way of doing things as persons rather than as technicians, the result is a prizing of the device for its own sake. From the standpoint of the committed person, the organization is changed from an expendable tool into a valued source of personal satisfaction. . . . The institutional leader, then, is primarily an expert in the promotion and protection of values. – Philip Selznick, *Leadership and Administration*

In the United States there are not many institutions that are able to demonstrate much of a track record of success in educating individuals for the role Selznick describes. Probably the most notable of those that do exist are the military academies and the moral leadership education program of the Civil Air Patrol. The incentive for the military academies is almost self-evident when one considers the absolutely fundamental importance the concept of duty has in the armed forces. The Civil Air Patrol is a civilian auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force and inherits the commitment of its parent institution in its cadet education program.

Elsewhere, business leaders most often lack the background in psychology or in any sort of formal moral philosophy to understand the notion of value in its fundamental nature, and as little possess the education necessary to practice institutionalizing it within their organizations. For too many U.S. business or government managers and administrators "value" is little else than a word in their vocabulary; the typical manager or administrator has no better understanding of its nature and role in real leadership *on a practicable level* than a chimpanzee has of opera.

If, however, the idea and import of value is poorly understood or even largely *misunderstood* in management practice, the same is not true for awareness of the practical efficacy of "pushing

the follower's values-and-attitudes button." This efficacy has long been evident to politicians, lawyers, and cult leaders. These, history shows, have cultivated the ability to push this affective button for centuries. The ability, when regarded with a positive attitude, has long gone by the distinguished names rhetoric and oratory. Viewed with a negative attitude it goes by the names demagoguery and propaganda. This brings us to our next factor.

## § 7.2 Rhetoric: Plato's and Aristotle's Views

Webster's Dictionary provides five definitions for the word rhetoric:

**rhetoric**, n. [OFr. *rhetorique*; L. *rhetorica*; Gr. *rhētorikē*, the rhetorical art.]

1. the art or science of using words effectively in speaking or writing, so as to influence or persuade; especially now, the art or science of literary composition, especially in prose, including the use of figures of speech.
2. a treatise or book on this.
3. the art of oratory; the rules that govern the art of speaking with propriety, elegance, and force, or that regulate argumentative prose composition.
4. artificial eloquence; showiness and elaboration in language and literary style.
5. the power of influencing or persuading; as, the *rhetoric* of the heart or eyes.

Some might find it surprising to learn that these definitions have been controversial in history, with the controversy swirling about some of the inherent presuppositions contained in them. For instance, that rhetoric is either an art or a science has been disputed. That there are or can be rules governing speaking or writing as an art has been disputed. That rhetoric is a synonym for influencing or persuading has been disputed. It is therefore instructive to take a brief look at what a few of history's more influential thinkers had to say about it.

Plato had very low esteem for it, denying it was an art at all and casting it in a villainous light. Considering his skill at it, this is a bit ironic. If "propaganda" had been a word in his language, he might have applied it to rhetoric. In *Gorgias* he has his "Socrates" character tell us,

It seems to me then, Gorgias, [rhetoric is] a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name *flattery*. This practice, as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery. . . I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry – four branches of [flattery] for four kinds of affairs. . . Rhetoric, by my account, is a semblance of a branch of politics. . . I call it [a base thing] for all that is bad I call base . . .

Now let me see if I can explain my meaning to you more clearly. There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine. Under politics I set legislation in the place of gymnastic, and justice to match medicine. In each of these pairs, of course – medicine and gymnastic, justice and legislation – there is some intercommunication, as both deal

with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences. Now these four, which always bestow their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which . . . divides herself into four parts and then, insinuating herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which she has crept, and cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value. Thus cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body . . . Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace . . . because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art but a habitude, since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is irrational . . . and in just the same manner self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men . . . so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. . . [As] self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. – Plato, *Gorgias*, 462-466

This leaves little room to doubt where Plato stood on the topic. He sharply distinguished between rhetoric and dialectic. Aristotle did not entirely disagree with his teacher about rhetoric, but he is also far from agreeing with him. In particular, he recognized the practical importance of rhetoric in human affairs and set out to deal with the subject on that basis. He tells us,

Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and everyone will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art. – Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I

We most often think of rhetoric and oratory in connection with politicians and trial lawyers. In classical times these two sorts of people were assuredly the most visible and accessible sources for methodical observations of the practice of persuasion, and most classical authors of rhetoric and oratory confined their examples to political and legal proceedings. But if rhetoric is, as Aristotle defined it to be, *the technical study of modes of persuasion* then his remark above that it is the concern of *all* human beings is important. A twelve year old boy at my doorstep who successfully persuades me to subscribe to the newspaper he delivers has not only persuaded me to do something I probably wasn't even considering doing before he showed up on my doorstep; he has, by virtue of the fact that I signed up for the subscription he was selling, *exercised leadership* from the standpoint that he influenced *me* to do something *he* wanted me to do. Salesmanship, like statesmanship, is a species of leadership. Aristotle goes on to say,

It is clear, then, that the technical study of rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Now persuasion is a sort of demonstration (since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated); the orator's demonstration is an

enthymeme and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion; the enthymeme is a sort of deduction (the consideration of deductions of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches): clearly, then, he who is best able to see how and from elements a deduction is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from inference from premises. For the true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty . . . Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at what is reputable. – [ibid.]

By "enthymeme" Aristotle means "an argument from probabilities." Because it is easy to assume an overly narrow context for what Aristotle says above, what has just been quoted needs a somewhat more Critical evaluation. The most immediate context presupposed for Aristotle's statement is that it is the orator who provides the demonstration and this is often true. However, if the argument is *persuasive* it can only be so because the listener *determines himself to accept the argument* as really being demonstrative. We can say without mistake that *the persuaded listener has made the deduction his own* even if he did not think of the argument first. This, in the broader context, is how we should Critically understand Aristotle's remark about "what is reputable." This becomes more clear when one considers that people who are held by others to demonstrate the best qualities of leader ability are often skilled at getting their followers to come up with the idea or argument for themselves and, by doing so, bring themselves to the conclusion the leader intends for them to reach *and* with a stronger personal commitment to it. As Lao Tsu said,

When the best leader's work is done the people say, "We did it ourselves!" – Lao Tsu,  
*Tao Te Ching*, 17

What art or means, then, does one person exercise in successful leader action that another person lacks or fails to effect in unsuccessful leader action? This is the question, Aristotle tells us, with which rhetoric deals.

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter . . . But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects. . .

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided in the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. . . Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained or hostile. . . Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in

command of them must, it is clear, be able to reason logically, to understand human characters and excellences, and to understand the emotions – that is, to know what they are, their nature, their causes, and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science . . . As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. – Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I

All three of these modes of persuasion – character, influencing the listener's state of mind, and convincing argument – are inseparable parts of this technical art of persuasion and go into the actions the leader takes *and* how the follower is affected by these actions. Character goes to how the follower feels *about the leader* as a result of their past associations and the sort of personal tensions their interactions stimulate in the mind of the follower. Influencing state of mind goes to the influence the leader has in stimulating an intended state of affectivity in the follower. The first is personal, the second situational. What works effectively to influence me is very different in the case of the paperboy than it is, e.g., in my interactions with my university's provost. The third, namely the argument itself, goes to the cognitive effect it has on the follower. To persuade is to influence the listener to *do* something. Obviously what he *will* do is determined by the listener's own cognitive appraisal of the situation and the appropriately satisfying actions this appraisal implicates in his judgmentation. Thus it is this appraisal the leader is attempting to influence.

That some techniques of persuasion work better and more often, from the leader's viewpoint, than do others is no more and no less than a fact of experience. That the same techniques do not work with the same effect on every follower is likewise a fact of experience. That the personal relationship set up in leader-follower interactions is most often non-transitory (that is, past interaction experiences influence present actions) is another fact of experience. For example, if the newspaper company fires my paperboy, my reaction might be to cancel my subscription to the newspaper. If my *past* appraisals of my provost were more often disagreeable to me than agreeable, my reaction to a disagreement *this* time might be to go find a smarter boss somewhere else *or* it might be to stay put and make his life as miserable as I can through passive aggression. As noted earlier, every action the leader undertakes is fraught with risk for the leader.

Unlike the idealistic Plato, Aristotle treats these facts of experience in a pragmatic and often hard-nosed way. He writes,

Thus every action must be due to one or the other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous to distinguish actions according to the doers' age, states or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite . . . Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite kinds of actions associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if



he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky. – [*ibid.*]

It "comes with the territory" (as the American saying puts it) that some of these considerations involve deliberate attempts on the part of the leader to sway the emotional response of the follower. Aristotle is coldly pragmatic about this point:

The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or delight. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in anyone. The same is true of the other emotions. – Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II

Let us not sugarcoat this. Aristotle *is* saying that sometimes the persuader (leader) *deliberately* tries to make people angry (or fearful, or ashamed, or some other emotional reaction). There are people who will feel indignant, offended, or even repulsed by this doctrine. "He advocates being manipulative," they might say. "This is propaganda, not leadership," they might protest. If this is *your* reaction, you are both correct and incorrect. It *is* manipulative; the leader seeks to influence the behavior of the follower and strictly speaking that is *always* a manipulation. Although it is not necessarily so, the doctrine *can* be a doctrine to which propaganda tactics belong. But even when it is, if it works (in the view of the leader) it is still a leadership relationship. It is merely *wise* followership skill for you to coolly recognize when and how another is trying to manipulate you.

It is also wise to understand that manipulation can be *either* benign or malignant in the intent of the leader. Indeed, learning how to recognize manipulation is both part of learning how to be an effective leader *and* learning how to be a *liberated* follower. The more skilled one is able to make oneself at the latter, the more often tension will be a feeling of deprivation rather than one of frustration. At a sufficient skill level one can even effect a switching of roles and *become* the leader while letting the other person think *he* is doing the leading. Lao Tsu would say that such is characteristic of the best kind of leader. *Leadership subsists in mutual relationship.*

It is not improper to say that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (accompanied by his related treatises, e.g. *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations*) was history's first training manual on the *technical art* of persuasive leader action. Properly interpreted by Critical epistemology, almost everything he has to say is as relevant today as it was in the 4th century B.C. when he was the teacher of Alexander the Great. It is, however, best to regard him as saying the "first word" on a technical art rather than having the "last word." Classical antiquity had much more to say about the subject.

### § 7.3 Cicero and Oratory

As learned as he was, Aristotle was neither statesman nor lawyer. He was first and foremost a scientist and a philosopher. Refinement of skill in a technical art comes from practice and experience. While a number of schools and philosophies followed Aristotle into the pages of history, probably the most important collection of works in classical antiquity to build upon the beginning Aristotle made (and which, with Critical interpretation, remains relevant today) is the oratorical corpus of Cicero in the first century BC: *Rhetorici Libri Duo qui Vocantur de Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, De Oratore, and De Partitione Oratoria*. Lawyer, senator, and Roman consul, Cicero was the Roman republic's orator *par excellence*. He was heavily influenced by Aristotle but also by other later great practicing orators. If one takes Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for the introductory training manual on the technical art of persuasion, Cicero provided the manuals for the advanced course.

Cicero wrote his first manual on oratory, *de Inventione*, when he was still very young. Scholars estimate he wrote it when he was between fifteen and nineteen years old. While his later works, especially *de Oratore*, are significantly more important than this first work, all still carry the mark of Cicero's first youthful tenet regarding oratory's proper social role and import:

I have often seriously debated with myself whether men and communities have received more good or evil from oratory and a consuming devotion to eloquence. For when I ponder the troubles in our republic, and run over in my mind the ancient misfortunes of mighty cities, I see no little part of the disasters was brought about by men of eloquence. When, on the other hand, I begin to search in the records of literature for events which occurred before the period which our generation can remember, I find that many cities have been founded, that the flames of a multitude of wars have been extinguished, and that the strongest alliances and most sacred friendships have been formed not only by the use of reason but also more easily by the help of eloquence. For my own part, after long thought, I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and foremost: that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful. Therefore if anyone neglects the study of philosophy and moral conduct, which is the highest and most honorable of pursuits, and devotes his whole energy to the practice of oratory, his civic life is nurtured into something useless to himself and harmful to his country; but the man who equips himself with the weapons of eloquence, not to be able to attack the welfare of his country but to defend it, he, I think, will be a citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his own interests and those of his community. – Cicero, *de Inventione*, I, i

Impressively high-principled and mature thinking for a teenager, is this not?

While Cicero never lost his moral compass in his works on oratory, he was nonetheless as pragmatic and hard-nosed about the art as was Aristotle. This is not surprising. Both men lived in times where one bad oratorical mistake or one serious political blunder could get the orator killed or the city sacked. Indeed, it was an injudicious oratorical flourish by Cicero, at the expense of

Caesar Octavianus, that ended up getting him killed by henchmen of Mark Antony. While the specific contexts in Cicero's treatises and dialogues are usually set in terms of the litigator or the politician, the persuasive character of oratory in general he describes is pervasive in its applications. Cicero tells us through the mouth of Crassus, one of his dialogue characters,

[There] is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes. In every free nation, and most of all in communities which have attained the enjoyment of peace and tranquility, this one art has always flourished above the rest and ever reigned supreme. For what is so marvelous as that, out of the innumerable company of mankind, a single being should arise, who either alone or with a few others, can make effective a faculty bestowed by nature upon every man? – Cicero, *De Oratore*, I, viii. 30-31

Cicero can hardly make it much clearer that who he extols here is the *leader* since the "faculty bestowed by nature upon every man" is nothing else than a human being's personal power of persuasion. He goes on to extol the virtue of fine speech-making, and this is the preeminent characteristic we customarily use in bestowing upon a person the title "orator" and which is most frequently exhibited in occasions involving political or litigation matters. However, it is not the elegance of a person's expression but the persuasive power of this expression that marks the ability of the leader to influence the follower in the desired way. Need one be an orator in order to accomplish this? Clearly experience tells us the answer to this is no. But is it a potent factor and often the determining factor? Here we can only conclude, with Cicero, that it is:

Or what is so pleasing to the understanding and the ear as a speech adorned and polished with wise reflections and dignified language? Or what achievement so mighty and glorious as that the impulses of the crowd, the consciences of the judges, the austerity of the Senate, should suffer transformation through the eloquence of one man? What function again is so kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those who are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights? What too is so indispensable as to have always in your grasp weapons wherewith you can defend yourself, or challenge the wicked man, or when provoked take your revenge?

Nay more (not to have you forever contemplating public affairs, the bench, the platform, and the Senate-house), what in hours of ease can be a pleasanter thing or one more characteristic of culture, than discourse that is graceful and nowhere uninstructed? For the one point in which we have our very greatest advantage over the brute creation is that we hold converse one with another, and can reproduce our thought in word. Who therefore would not rightly admire this faculty, and deem it his duty to exert himself to the utmost in this field, that by doing so he may surpass men themselves in that particular respect wherein chiefly men are superior to animals? To come, however, at length to the highest achievements of eloquence, what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights? And not to pursue any further instances – well-nigh countless as they are – I will conclude the whole matter in a few words, for my assertion is this: that the wise control of the complete orator is that which chiefly upholds not only his own dignity, but the

safety of countless individuals and of the entire State. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, I, viii. 31-34

It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves at this point that our context takes in only a partial set of actions that stand under the genus of leadership. Specifically, we are discussing leadership through the influence of speech and discussion and not that part of the phenomenon of leadership that relies on coercion by threats of force or sanctions. Consider the context of a committee meeting where a group of people is gathered to decide upon something. One does not have to wear a toga or use grandiloquent words to be recognized as practicing the art of rhetoric and the skill of oratory in such a setting. Consider a business meeting where a manager and a team of people are met to decide upon actions to take in response to some situation. While in most organizations the manager is the *nominal* leader of the group and is responsible to his superiors for the outcome of the actions decided upon, the people whose voices and views are heeded in determining the final action decisions are the people who were the *actual* leaders and whose persuasion through discussion (of at least the judgment of the decision-maker) can be called successful oratory. It is worth pointing out that the Latin root of the word "oration" (*oratio*) derives from the verb *orare*, to speak. It is a mistake when considering the phenomenon of leadership to over-specialize what we are to understand by the word "oratory."

And yet Cicero is not saying that to be effective as an orator necessarily implies the orator is non-manipulative, fair-minded, noble, or non-deceitful. He tells us,

Who indeed does not know that the orator's virtue is preeminently manifested either in rousing men's hearts to anger, hatred, or indignation, or in recalling them from these same passions to mildness and mercy? Wherefore the speaker will not be able to achieve what he wants by his words unless he has gained profound insight into the characters of men, and the whole range of human nature, and those motives whereby our souls are spurred on or turned back. And all this is considered to be the special province of philosophers, nor will the orator, if he take my advice, resist their claim; but when he has granted their knowledge of these things . . . still he will assert his own claim to the oratorical treatment of them, which without that knowledge is nothing at all. For this is the essential concern of the orator, as I have often said before – a style that is dignified and graceful and in conformity with the general modes of thought and judgment. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, I, xii. 53-54

Again, the essence of oratory is *to persuade*. Book II of Cicero's *de Oratore* can function quite well as a training manual for propagandists and, just as well, as a self-defense manual for avoiding the snares of propaganda by recognizing it. In it we find, among other things,

Now nothing in oratory . . . is more important than to win for the orator the favor of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion rather than by judgment or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, xlii. 278-279

Cicero was very pragmatic about oratory and the orator. The orator targets men's *values*. If a school board election can turn on a demagogue's cry, "Down with the godless evolutionist!" then, Cicero would tell us, that is what we could expect to hear him say even were the evolutionist to be none other than St. Augustine himself, whose doctrine taught *creation* in a non-temporal plane with *earthly* matters being in a temporal plane and occurring by changes that enter into the world of living men according to a divinely appointed plan, i.e. "evolution by divine design":

Behold, the heavens and the earth are; they proclaim that they were created: for they change and vary. Whereas whatever has not been made, and yet is, has nothing new in it now which it had not before; and that it is, to change and vary. They proclaim also that they made not themselves; "therefore we are because we have been made; we were not therefore, before our time was to be, so as to make ourselves." Now the evidence of a thing is the voice of the speakers. You, therefore, Lord, made them. – St. Augustine, *Confessions*, XI, iv.

But the earth was invisible and without form, and darkness was upon the deep. In which words is the formlessness conveyed unto us (that such capacities as are not able to conceive an utter privation of all form may hereby be drawn on by degrees, without yet coming to nothing<sup>7</sup>) out of which another heaven might be created together with a visible and well formed earth, and the waters diversely ordered, and whatsoever further is in the formation of the world recorded to have been, not without days, created: and that, as being of such a nature, the successive changes of times may take place in them, as being subject to appointed alterations of motions<sup>8</sup> and of forms. – St. Augustine, *Confessions*, XII, xii.

Cicero presents oratory and the great orator in two lights, which he personifies by two of his characters in *de Oratore*. The noble and statesmanlike orator is personified by Lucinius Crassus, who was the most illustrious Roman orator prior to Cicero himself and who is the mouthpiece for Cicero's own opinions in *de Oratore*. The darker, intimidating face of oratory is personified by Marcus Antonius, grandfather of the Mark Antony who was immortalized by Shakespeare and would order the murder of Cicero. Cicero put the words quoted above in the mouth of Antonius. The Antonius figure is the epitome of the "shyster lawyer" figure most people denounce publicly and seek to hire when they need the services of a trial attorney. These two personalities are not presented as contesting opponents by Cicero but, rather, are used to present the genteel and the harsh realities of effective oratory. (Indeed, the historical Crassus and Antonius were political partners in the days of Cicero's boyhood). Crassus is presented as urbane and refined, Antonius as shrewd and calculating. But these characters are two sides of the same common coin.

The maxims Cicero presents as belonging to Antonius are interesting to us as examples of observations on human nature that today would be called psychological in character. To begin

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<sup>7</sup> Augustine is saying that human beings cannot comprehend anything that is utterly formless except for absolute nothingness itself and so *Genesis* is worded the way it is in order for men to understand it.

<sup>8</sup> Augustine uses "motion" in the Greek connotation of *kinesis*, which is change of any kind.

with, it is instructive to look at how the Antonius figure sees himself and his own role since it is from this starting point that Cicero's Antonius self-justifies his actions:

It is the part of the orator, when advising on affairs of supreme importance, to unfold his opinions as a man having authority: his duty too it is to arouse a listless nation, and to curb its unbridled impetuosity. By one and the same power of eloquence the deceitful among mankind are brought to destruction, and the righteous to deliverance. Who more passionately than the orator can encourage to virtuous conduct, or more zealously than he reclaim from vicious courses? Who can more austere censure the wicked, or more gracefully praise men of worth? Whose invective can more forcibly subdue the power of lawless desire? Whose comfortable words can soothe grief more tenderly? – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, ix. 35

Worthy aims indeed. In moralist terms, Antonius would be called a consequentialist today since his ends justify his means. And what are his principles for achieving them? "Antonius" tells us,

Under my whole oratorical system and that very readiness in speaking which Crassus just now lauded to the skies, lie three principles . . . first the winning of men's favor, secondly their enlightenment, thirdly their excitement. Of these three the first calls for gentleness of style, the second for acuteness, the third for energy. For, of necessity, the arbitrator who is decide in our favor must either lean to our side by natural inclination, or be won over by the arguments for the defense, or constrained by stirring his feelings. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, xxix. 128-129

Those readers who have personal experience with productive leadership might perhaps recognize Antonius' general principles to be as applicable to business management as to politics, to educating as to practicing law, or to parenting as to organizing community actions for meeting an important civil need. It is in realizing the goals of these principles that the aesthetically chilling side of Antonius' maxims becomes evident. With regard to his first maxim,

A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, conduct and course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned; and for the feelings of the tribunal to be won over, as far as possible, to goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate's client as well. Now feelings are won over by a man's merit, achievements or reputable life, qualifications easier to embellish, if only they are real, than to fabricate where non-existent. But attributes useful to an advocate are a mild tone, a countenance expressive of modesty, gentle language, and the faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly and under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove. It is very helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the qualities belonging to men who are upright, unassuming and not given to haste, stubbornness, strife or harshness, are powerful in winning goodwill, while the want of them estranges it from such as do not possess them; accordingly the very opposites of these qualities must be ascribed to our opponents. But all this kind of advocacy will be best in those cases wherein the arbitrator's feelings are not likely to be kindled by what I may call the ardent and impassioned onset. For vigorous language is not always wanted, but often such as is calm, gentle, mild: this is the kind that most commends the parties. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, xliii. 182-183

Note that Antonius is not saying the advocate (or the leader) must really possess these fine qualities of character, but merely must present a convincing semblance of them in himself (and in

his client if plausibly possible). If this is a false front and is seen through the effect will be, to paraphrase Cicero's words, 'powerful in winning the ill-will' of the arbitrator (and the potential follower). Thus, as Antonius tells us later, it is better for the advocate (or leader) to present only either what he himself believes in, or can convince himself enough that he believes it, so that he can then convince others it is true by stirring conviction in them.

But, in either case, Antonius is blunt in stating the aim of the tactic: to win the favor of the decider. To do so the advocate must prepare by studying the persons he seeks to convince:

Another desirable thing for the advocate is that the members of the tribunal, of their own accord, should carry within them to Court some mental emotion that is in harmony with what the advocate's interest will suggest. For, as the saying goes, it is easier to spur the willing horse than to start the lazy one. But if no such emotion be present, or recognizable, he will be like a careful physician who, before he attempts to administer a remedy to his patient, must investigate not only the malady of the man he wishes to cure, but also his habits when in health, and his physical constitution.

This indeed is the reason why, when setting about a hazardous and important case, in order to explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness, their thoughts, judgments, anticipations, and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence. If they surrender to me, and as I said before, of their own accord lean towards and are prone to take the course in which I am urging them on, I accept their bounty and set sail for that quarter which promises something of a breeze. If however an arbitrator is neutral and free from predisposition, my task is harder, since everything has to be called forth by my speech with no help from the listener's character. But so potent is that Eloquence that . . . she can . . . even make prisoner a resisting antagonist. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, xlv. 185-187

Within today's American cultural habits, Antonius' bluntness is something many people react to with repugnance. We soften our rhetoric, put a different "spin" on the situation, and generally try to suppress recognition that all effective leadership involves effective manipulation. In spite of this, however, and despite the fact that Antonius' words might seem to cast him in a role more like a Mr. Hyde than a Dr. Jekyll, modern management psychology adheres to his same principles and merely puts a different face to the front. What Antonius calls "scenting out" the modern day managerial psychologist calls "diagnosis of the follower." In regard to the relationship between leader ("A" or "the changer") and follower ("B" or "the changee") Leavitt writes,

As who use force as a prime device to effect change usually do not worry much about diagnosis. The effects of a whip, after all, are fairly predictable even if one doesn't know much about the psyche of the particular person being whipped. But at the other extreme one can find As . . . devoting a large portion of their effort to finding out a great deal about the changee – about his background, his childhood, and his personality down to the finest detail. . . .

A great deal can be said . . . in favor of gathering information about a problem before trying to solve it. But three easily overlooked points are worth considering. First, who needs the information thus gathered, A or B? Second, what kind of information does A (or B) need? Third, how much information is worth chasing after, especially if the

chasing process costs time and effort?

Behavior-change problems may be somewhat different from some other problems in this regard. Often it is more important for **B** to understand the problem than for **A** to understand it. If the ultimate control for change lies with **B**, and if it is for **B** to fit **A**'s efforts into the larger framework of **B**'s own perceptions, then **B** can best make a reasonable change decision when he, not **A**, understands what is going on<sup>9</sup>. . . Somewhere along the line **B** has to line up the facts in a form *he* can understand and utilize. . .

The second problem involves two kinds of information that are available to both **A** and **B** – information about facts and feelings. Facts in the usual sense of observable phenomena are likely to be much less important than feelings in change situations. Fears, doubts, feelings of confidence, inadequacy, ambition – these are much more likely to be significant information for behavior changers than the cold facts of duties or salary bracket. Moreover, these feelings may be hard for **A** to get at, even if he needs them. This is partly because our language and our culture makes verbal communication of feelings so difficult and partly because feelings often touch on people's psychological defenses. . .

One of the best of many good things to be said for a serious effort by **A** to understand **B**'s feelings is that those **As** who undertake such diagnosis often end up changing their own objectives. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 12

This is really nothing other than Antonius' principle dressed in a cotton shirt and blue jeans rather than in a tunic and cuirass. It is not out of place here to mention that, in regard to the second problem Leavitt speaks to, there is an often overlooked corollary to your author's earlier (and perhaps at this point contentious) statement that effective leadership always involves effective manipulation. It is this: The most effective followership involves dispassionate and conscious anticipation *by the follower* that the leader will attempt to manipulate him. This is not merely a good means of self defense against being exploited, but also a means for the follower to help himself experience feelings of psychological tension as feelings of deprivation rather than frustration. If one knows he is being manipulated one gains the power to *rationaly* self-determine the manner in which he will *choose to let himself* be manipulated and, in addition, *to manipulate the manipulation* if he deems it appropriate to do so. Leadership, again, belongs neither to the leader nor the follower but subsists in the reciprocal relationship between them. This is a corollary that, Critically viewed, brings to mind Bacon's famous aphorism, "nature is only to be commanded by obeying her." Enlightened followership and jujitsu have much in common.

As regards deliberately "stirring the feelings of the arbitrator," Antonius advocates for, in his somewhat cold-blooded way, emotional sincerity of expression on the part of the orator:

Moreover, it is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill-will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, unless all these emotions, which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator, are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself. Now if some feigned indignation had to be depicted, and that same kind of oratory afforded only what was counterfeit and produced by mimicry, some loftier art would perhaps be called for. As things stand . . . in my own case there is no

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<sup>9</sup> This speaks to Antonius' second principle above.



reason why I should lie to men of consummate experience who are also my best friends: I give you my word that I have never tried, by means of a speech, to arouse either indignation or compassion, either ill-will or hatred, in the minds of a tribunal without being really stirred myself, as I worked upon their minds, by the very feelings to which I was seeking to prompt them. For it is not easy to succeed in making an arbitrator angry with the right party if you yourself seem to treat the affair with indifference; or in making him hate the right party unless he first sees you on fire with hatred yourself; nor will he be prompted to compassion unless you have shown him the tokens of your own grief by word, sentiment, tone of voice, look, and even by loud lamentation. For . . . there is no mind so ready to absorb an orator's influence, as to be inflammable when the assailing speaker is not himself aglow with passion.

Again, lest haply it should seem a mighty miracle, for a man so often to be roused to wrath, indignation and every inward emotion – and that too about other people's business – the power of those reflections and commonplaces . . . is great enough to dispense with all make-believe and trickery: for the very quality of the diction, employed to stir the feelings of others, stirs the speaker himself even more deeply than any of his hearers. – Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, xlv-xlvi. 189-192

The more homespun version of this would be, "If as leader you would not be taken for a posturing faker, don't be one." In the much more poetic words of Shakespeare it is,

This above all: to thine own self be true,  
And it must follow, as the night the day,  
Thou canst not then be false to any man. – *Hamlet*, I, iii

For the orator, then, it remains only for him to ask himself, "Who am I and who do I wish to make myself become?" The sincerity urged by Antonius is Cicero himself speaking to us. We will later consider the situation when the advocate (leader) is of less scrupulous character.

Those who dislike the "touchy-feely" dimension of leadership – and there are many who do – might be inclined to regard Antonius' doctrine as unnecessary and see in it, in some vague way, a harsh and contemptuous attitude toward the follower on the part of the leader. One often hears the opinion that "cold, clear logic" and "the simple call of duty" ought to be enough in any leadership situation, with deliberate emotional appeal having no justifiable place in it. It would then follow that *de Oratore* belongs on the shelf next to Machiavelli and is to be morally denounced. In a Platonic world this would be true. But we do not live in a Platonic world and such opinion overlooks an important psychological factor. Leavitt put it thusly:

No matter how much power a changer may possess, no matter how "superior" he may be, it is the changee who controls the final change decision. It is the employee, even the lowest paid one, who ultimately decides whether to show up for work or not. It is the changee who changes. . . Moreover, it is **A** [the changer] who feels the tension, whose needs are unsatisfied. So it is **A** who is dependent on **B** [the changee].

**B**, after all, is a whole person; and **A**'s activities in trying to get **B** to change constitute just one set of forces in the multitude of forces that affect **B**'s behavior. **B**, in effect, sits behind the solid fortifications of his own history and his own personality, integrating **A**'s activities into all the other forces that act upon him and coming up with a new behavioral pattern that may or may not constitute what **A** wants. . .

Still another thing that commonly happens during the process of behavior change is that changees get disturbed. . . In fact . . . some disturbance seems to be a necessary accompaniment of change. . .

Signs of upset in the process of change are visible in many situations. . . The explanation of these upsets takes us back to [frustration and conflict]. . . People change when their present behavior begins to appear inadequate, either because they have been frustrated – something in the world has thrown a block across a previously open path – or because some new path has become visible and looks as if it *might* . . . be a better one. In either case a kind of behavior that had in the past been adequate has now become less adequate. If the present path is now inadequate, but no alternatives are immediately available, we have a classic frustration situation . . . If one's present tack does not look as good as it did because another has begun to look better, we have conflict between the safety and security of the old path and the risk of an uncertain new one. Once again we should expect some emotional disturbance, the particular nature of which should be grossly predictable from our knowledge of the individual. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 12

*Some* affective arousal must be anticipated in *every* leadership situation because all leadership situations call for change of some kind. If everything is already "going in the right direction" there is no need for the leader to act (other than for him to stay out of the way of progress). The affective arousal need not always be so extreme as Antonius' discourse above might seem to imply (and elsewhere in *de Oratore* he points this out, too). But some affective arousal is always involved and it is the leader who tries to effect this arousal in a desired way and in an appropriate degree. This is, in a manner of speaking, a kind of psychological Newton's First Law. In every leadership exchange producing an outcome, leader and follower *will* touch each other affectively.

#### § 7.4 Excellence in Leadership and Knowledge of the Affair

Hippocrates the Athenian succeeded in rousing his men to follow him into battle, rout and defeat. Caesar succeeded in rousing his men to follow him into battle and total victory. Both men were leaders, but it is obvious which one was the better leader. By the mid 1970s a myth had settled in on the landscape of American management theory. It is summarized in the aphorism, "A manager only needs to know how to manage; he does not need to know the details of the business he manages." This is, so to speak, a one-size-fits-all paradigm of off-the-rack management. While it is clearly easier to stay willfully ignorant than to become knowledgeable enough to exercise sound judgment in making decisions, it is no part of anyone's intent in hiring a manager to set that job up to be a mere sinecure. There is no more absurd yet widely accepted proposition in American business today than the myth of the one-size-fits-all manager. This buffoonery services only the facade of a search committee that merely appears to fulfill its fiduciary responsibility instead of actually fulfilling it.

It is true that in almost every case it is not necessary for a CEO to have worked his way to the top from some humble beginning in the company mailroom. It is also true that this non-

requirement is totally irrelevant insofar as the phenomenon of successful leadership is concerned. It is true that an auto factory manager need not himself know *how* to install an engine block, but it is also true that he does need to know engine blocks have to be installed, that in order to do so the installer needs specific parts, that to obtain these someone has to buy them, etc. He does not need a specialist's knowledge of every craft but he does need to know enough about the crafts that are needed, and the working conditions required for them to be successfully carried out, to know how to assess his organizational needs, to evaluate its success (or lack thereof) in meeting them, and to determine what changes he must stimulate in order for his organization to succeed. There are *no* policies or tactics that work the same way all the time in every situation for every enterprise.

David Packard, co-founder of the Hewlett-Packard Company, wrote

No operating policy has contributed more to Hewlett-Packard's success than the policy of "management by objective." Although this term is relatively new to the lexicon of business, management by objective has been a fundamental part of HP's operating philosophy since the very early days of the company. . .

I should point out that the successful practice of management by objective is a two-way street. Managers at all levels must be sure that their people clearly understand the overall objectives and goals of the company, as well as the specific goals of their particular division or department. Thus managers have a strong obligation to foster good communication and mutual understanding. Conversely, their people must take sufficient interest in their work to want to plan it, to propose new solutions to old problems, and to jump in when they have something to contribute. . .

Managers must be sure that their people clearly understand the objectives and specific goals of their division or department, as I have said. It is also essential that the manager have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the work of his or her group. This brings up the debate that has been carried on by business people for many years. Some say good managers can manage anything; they can manage well without really knowing what they are trying to manage. It's the management skill that counts.

I don't argue that the job can't be done that way, but I do argue strongly that the *best* job can be done when the manager has a genuine and thorough understanding of the work. I don't see how managers can even understand what standards to observe, what performance to require, and how to measure results unless they understand in some detail the specific nature of the work they are trying to supervise. – David Packard, *The HP Way*, 11

Cicero said essentially the same thing two millennia earlier in the specific context of the orator. Here he speaks to us directly and in his own person:

To begin with, a knowledge of very many matters must be grasped, without which oratory is but an empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage: and the distinctive style has to be formed, not only by the choice of words but also by the arrangement of the same; and all the mental emotions, with which nature has endowed the human race, are to be intimately understood, because it is in calming or kindling the feelings of the audience that the full power and science of oratory are to be brought into play. To this there should be added a certain humor, flashes of wit, the culture befitting a gentleman, and readiness and terseness alike in repelling and in delivering the attack, the whole being combined with a delicate charm and urbanity. Further, the complete history of the past and a store

of precedents must be retained in the memory, nor may a knowledge of statute law and our national law in general be omitted. . .

And indeed in my opinion, no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. For it is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and fullness, and unless there is such knowledge, well-grasped and comprehended by the speaker, there must be something empty and almost childish in the utterance. – Cicero, *de Oratore*, I, v. 16-21

Effective action on the part of the leader, like the orator and the litigator, does not require the depth of a specialist's knowledge in every craft, but it does require sufficient detail of knowledge for the leader not to be perceived by the followers as a posturing faker mouthing slogans he does not understand or believe. Moreover, he *will* be so perceived if he actually is one. Ignorance cannot be hidden. Detailed and specialized knowledge, which he can use to augment and improve his own, *can* be provided to him by competent counselors, advisers, and staff members. Cicero had "Antonius" illustrate this point for the case of the litigator:

This is why those most accomplished speakers, for all their own profound skill, have with them in Court assistants learned in the law, and these, as you said a little while ago, are called attorneys. – Cicero, *de Oratore*, I, lix. 253

A leader's staff does him no good if he has not sufficient knowledge, in sufficient detail to separate good advice from bad and distinguish sage counsel from hasty, to win their loyalty. The slogan, "a good manager can manage anything without really knowing what he is managing," is just plain hogwash. Like the Platonic idol of the leader who excels all his followers in everything, the one-size-fits-all manager who can lead anything is pulp fiction. He who denies this will excel in nothing but ignorance. An ignorant Pooh-Bah will win and retain no loyal counselors, but he will draw manipulative sycophants who play him like a fiddle to the ruination of everyone else.

## § 7.5 Propaganda

Aristotle and Cicero are both clear in stating that deliberately inciting an emotional and irrational response is one of the orator's (and the leader's) most potent tactics. Furthermore, in many instances there is an opponent – someone or something opposing the aims of the leader – to overcome. We have a word for this tactic: propaganda. In Western society today we are all bombarded by propaganda from all directions every day and much of it is very effective. Furthermore, propaganda is not at all a recent phenomenon. What is propaganda? Can it be recognized? Can one guard against being manipulated by it? What are its downsides? What kind of leadership results from it? Is its use contrary to moral leadership?

Ever since World War II the word propaganda has acquired a more or less entirely negative connotation. Most Western societies regard the use of propaganda in much the same way that

they regard spying – an unsavory but unfortunately sometimes necessary means justified by the end it serves. Historically, automatic association of the word "propaganda" with the word "deceit" can be laid at the doorstep of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda established in Nazi Germany on March 13, 1933, under the direction of Joseph Goebbels. If in modern retrospect it seems strange that the Nazis deliberately gave this ministry this name (no government since the Nazis has done so), it may help to know that the word "propaganda" originally meant nothing more than "propagating ideas, doctrines, and practices." Today in both government and business this activity is called "getting the message out." Today we do not have "propaganda agencies"; we have "advertising agencies," "press releases," and "spokesmen."

In the post-Nazi era what has the word "propaganda" come to mean? Merrill and Lowenstein tell us,

Regardless of which of the many definitions one is examining, he finds certain core ideas about propaganda: "manipulation," "purposeful management," "preconceived plan," "creation of desires," "reinforcement of biases," "irrational appeal," "specific objective," "arousal to action," "predetermined end," "suggestion," and "creation of dispositions."

Out of all these terms one may gather a certain impression about propaganda. It seems that propaganda is related to an attempt (implies *intent*) on the part of somebody to manipulate somebody else. By manipulation we mean *to control* – to control not only the attitudes of others but also their actions. Somebody (or some group) – the *propagandist* – is predisposed to cause others to think in a certain way, so that they may, in some cases, take a certain action. Propaganda, then, is the effort or the activity by which an initiating communicator intends to manage the attitudes and actions of others through playing on their preexisting biases with messages designed largely to appeal to their emotions and/or irrationality.

The propagandist does not want his audience to analyze or to think seriously about his message. He does not want to be questioned about his remarks. He does not want to be forced to deal in specifics or to present evidence. He has what Harold Lasswell has referred to as a non-educational orientation; by this he meant that the ends or solutions had already been determined before the search for truth began. Contrasted to this is what in Lasswellian terms may be the "deliberative" attitude, the non-propagandistic orientation that implies an unprejudiced and open search for the truth. Lasswell uses the term "deliberative attitude" to refer to education as distinct from propaganda. Propaganda is not an invitation to the audience to deliberate, to contemplate, to analyze, to think, to question. It is an invitation to come to rather quick conclusions or to reinforce existing conclusions. It is an invitation to change or strengthen one's attitude and to involve oneself in an action of some type. . .

[Perhaps] it would be well to make these points about the propagandist: 1. He is *not* disinterested, 2. he is *not* neutral, 3. he *has* a plan, a purpose, a goal, 4. he *wants* to influence, to persuade, to affect attitudes and action, and 5. he is not interested in his audience members making up their own minds on the basis of a fair and balanced presentation of information. – Merrill and Lowenstein, *Media, Messages and Men*, 14

The majority of business managers, administrators, boy scout troop leaders, teachers, and others whose role is at least nominally that of a leader would be distressed and offended if someone were to label them as "a propagandist." Yet it is clear that if there is any dividing line between

what a leader does and what a propagandist does, it must be a fine line indeed. At the same time, that there *is* a dividing line, a distinction of some sort, is intuitively clear. Otherwise we would not have the two words "leader" and "propagandist." From both Aristotle and Cicero it is plain that the actions of a leader, which *always* in some sense involve manipulating the follower, are at least very similar to the manipulation of people effected by a propagandist.

What, then, is the distinction? Is it what Lasswell is cited above as saying? We should not be so quick to adopt his view unless we are prepared to explain very precisely what sort of attitude is a "propagandist's attitude" and what sort is not.

Does "propaganda" necessarily imply deception? This is where Aristotle's term, enthymeme, becomes important. An enthymeme is "an argument based on probabilities." Truth is not so easy to recognize, and where disagreement is present ambiguity in "what is true" also is present. The final *empirical* arbitrator of material truth is experience of the entirety of outcomes of an action already taken. We use the word "deceit" in the context of one who knows, or *thinks* he knows, that the truth is really different from what he presents or that the true agenda is not the agenda being presented. This warns us that an *ontology*-centered distinction between the actions of a leader and the actions of a propagandist is going to eventually flounder on the rocks of experience for lack of real objective validity.

To see one aspect of this, consider the question: Is deception necessarily bad, wrong, or evil? One who adopts the viewpoint of consequentialist ethics is bound to answer this question, "no," because the ends justify the means and if the end is just then deception is justifiable. In 482 B.C. an Athenian general named Themistocles foresaw the coming war between Hellenic Greece and the Persian Empire, and foresaw defeat unless Athens built a powerful navy. The citizens of Athens, overconfident from their previous victory at Marathon, would not fund the building of Themistocles' fleet for that purpose, and so he argued they should build one for the purpose of a different war against a people called the Eginetans. Without Themistocles' navy all of Greece would have fallen to Xerxes shortly after the battle of Thermopylae and Athens itself would have taken its place alongside Troy in the role call of vanished cities in human history. To the consequentialist, Themistocles was a wise and good leader who saved Athens.

On the other hand, one who adopts the viewpoint of virtue ethics holds that ends are only justifiable if the means to achieve them are virtuous. Lying is not a virtue, so he must conclude Themistocles acted wrongly. He was a deceiver, a scoundrel, a propagandist.

What mental physics teaches us is that the distinction between leader and propagandist can only be based, with practical objective validity, on deontological considerations (that is, the distinction must be epistemology-centered). "The moral leader" is distinguished from "the amoral

or immoral propagandist" by a *practical* grounding in reciprocal duty – which is to say the distinction is a *deontological* ethical distinction and the moral difference lies in a social contract.

Why does this matter? The answer here comes back, once more, to the fact that leadership is a relationship. A person who feels he was or is being manipulated by propaganda is likely to feel tension as a frustration and become aggressive towards the person he judges to be a deceitful manipulator. A person who thinks himself "led" rather than "manipulated" is likely to feel tension as a deprivation and to be more open to persuasion by the leader. Future leadership interactions are conditioned by the experience of past ones, and so what is at issue is the sustainability of the relationship. It is said of Philip of Macedonia (father of Alexander the Great),

After his victory over the Greeks, when some were advising him to hold the Greek cities in subjection by means of garrisons, he said that he preferred to be called a good man for a long time rather than a master for a short time. – Plutarch, *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*

Pejorative propaganda is the tool of a leader's action aimed at realizing antisocial benefits.

## § 8. Remarks

There is a pronounced tendency for many management training courses, intended to teach leaders' skills to managers, to present platitudes or grand general pronouncements in generous quantity, but to do this so Platonically that they convey nothing practical to the trainees. This is what has taken place when the trainee afterwards refers to the course as "a lot of Mom and apple pie." Even worse, courses sometimes present matters in a way open to such a broad range of personal interpretation that what some of the trainees learn are practices the sponsors of the course actually want the trainees to learn to avoid.

For example, your author once attended a management training course that did not lack for entertainment value because of the instructor's style of using amusing hyperbole and exaggeration to drive home the point he wished to make. One of his homespun one-liners, intended to teach people the affective benefit of "cutting your boss some slack," was what he called "the Golden Rule of Management: He who has the gold makes the rules." Although many attendees, including your author, understood his point and chuckled at the witticism, many others took him literally at his word. Upon returning to their workplaces they were so indiscrete as to quote this "Golden Rule" to their own subordinates entirely out of context. The predictable result was an immediate upsurge in friction and interpersonal tensions between the manager and his team. The antagonism eventually became so widespread the company discontinued this particular training course. Here is an example of a practical downside to what some call "commonsense management training."

There is a teaching maxim that emerges from mental physics with the force of a doctrine. It is:

If you would teach the general principle, you must first teach it in particulars because the general principle is always understood by abstracting from particular cases. Only in this way can the general principle *and the limitations of its contextual validity* be effectively taught. Cicero's oratory manuals and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* can be made to serve the purpose of providing very explicit examples that can then be generalized.

Even so, what we have discussed in this chapter speaks only to empirical factors in self-determination as this pertains to the leadership situation. This is not enough for a proper science of leadership. What is yet missing is an understanding of why and how these factors are effective when they are effective, ineffective when they are ineffective, and counterproductive when they are counterproductive (for the very same action by the leader can be any of these in different situations). For this we must return to our social atom and look more closely at the nature of Critical self-determination. We take this up in the next chapter.

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