

## Chapter 6

### Rational Factors of Self-Determination: Duty

#### § 1. The Manifolds of Knowledge *A Posteriori*

Knowledge obtained or derived from experience is called knowledge *a posteriori*. All human knowledge of objects is knowledge *a posteriori*. So too is all knowledge of arts, crafts, and learned skills including practical skills in using one's own body (which we can call gymnastic knowledge). In the human being all knowledge *a posteriori* is represented by structured forms in the manifold of concepts and the manifold of rules. The know-how to *build* these structures is innate and, as that know-how knowledge is necessary for the possibility of experience, it belongs to the class of knowledge called pure knowledge *a priori* and is the functional knowledge of the processes of judgment. In a context not entirely poetic, pure knowledge *a priori* could be called the innate instincts of learning.

Everything we think and everything we choose to do in interacting with the world is based on knowledge *a posteriori*. Again, knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) is any conscious representation or capacity for making such a representation by or through which meanings are determined. The two manifolds of knowledge *a posteriori* are the constructed structures that constitute the source of all rational factors of self-determination, and so we begin this chapter with them.




Figure 6.1: Schematic illustration of the manifold of concepts and the horizon of possible experience.

### § 1.1. The Manifold of Concepts

Because it is the easier idea to grasp, we begin with the manifold of concepts. Figure 6.1 provides a schematic illustration of the structure of this manifold. A *concept* is a rule for the reproduction, or used in an original creative production, of an intuition. The circles depicted in figure 6.1 denote concepts. However, and this is important to comprehend, aggregates of concepts placed in connection with each other by determining judgment *are also concepts* because the connected aggregate can be taken back into the synthesis in sensibility (through reproductive imagination) and used *en masse* in synthesizing an intuition. Put another way, a connected sub-manifold of concepts is still a rule for the reproduction of an intuition.

It is also important to comprehend that the synthesis of apprehension does not merely re-copy a concept or "re-draw" it as an intuition. The synthesis in sensibility *is* a synthesis. It can and does "dissolve" the *materia* it receives from the manifold of concepts during its operation in synthesizing an intuition. Concepts are rules, not "atoms of knowledge," and they *stimulate* but do not *determine* the production of an intuition by the synthesis of apprehension. The synthesis in sensibility is *not* a process of judgment. A representation in sensibility is *judged* to be an intuition *by the process of reflective judgment*. Were it otherwise, the possibility of human understanding would necessarily require us to possess some innate "copy of reality" mechanism of mind. That hypothesis can be put to the scientific test, it has been, and the hypothesis is refuted. All intuitions are *subjective* representations and belong to *aesthetic* rather than to objective *logic*. Practically speaking, "an intuition *is* an intuition because it *feels like* an intuition." Were this not so there would be no possible *objectively valid* explanation for how raw data of receptivity, without contributions from imagination and determining judgment, could produce the first intuitions upon which the earliest acts of determining judgment operate *unless* a copy-of-reality mechanism is invoked.

To visualize this it is helpful to refer again to figure 5.4, reproduced for convenience as figure 6.2 below. A transformed concept re-introduced into sensibility by the process of reproductive imagination affects both the *materia* of sensibility entering into a three-step synthesis (denoted in the figure by the operations *Comparison, reflexion, and abstraction*) as well as the *form* given to an intuition by the process denoted *the synthesis of pure intuition*. The "dissolving" (analytic division) of the transformed concept is necessary for the logical possibility of being able to combine the knowledge of a concept with new data of receptivity as well as with representation by other concepts to combine mere knowledge of appearances to produce objective knowledge of phenomena. The synthesis of apprehension *coalesces* conceptual and receptive data to produce a new intuition. This accretion-like process metaphor is illustrated by figure 6.3.




Figure 6.2: The synthesis in sensibility.




Figure 6.3: Accretion process metaphor of the synthesis of an intuition.

*Comparison* and *reflexion* are both processes of comparison. However, this is not comparison of sensible *materia* with other sensible *materia* but, rather, is comparison in terms of the formal expedience of the representation being formed. Among other things this is how reflective judgment judges some representations to be affective perceptions while others are *made* objective intuitions. In mathematical terminology, the synthesis process is a synthesis of equivalence structures (*Comparison*) and congruence structures (*reflexion*).<sup>1</sup> Abstraction, on the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> Equivalence and congruence are used here in a technical mathematical context as explained in *Principles of Mental Physics*. The mathematically-minded reader can refer to that work for the technical details.

is a function that removes from the representation sensuous *materia* not compatible with its formal expedience according to the first principle of the process of reflective judgment. A new concept abstracted from two other concepts retains only that representational data common to both and is for that reason called a *higher concept* in the manifold of concepts and a *mark* of the others. Referring to figure 6.1, the lower concepts are said to be *contained under* the higher concept and to *stand under* the higher concept. The higher concept is said to be *contained in* the lower concepts and to *under-stand* ("stand them under itself") these lower concepts. This, by the way, is a practical *Realerklärung* of what "understanding" *means*. In *Logik* Kant called the processes in this three-step synthesis the "acts of understanding" or *Verstandes-Actus*.

These acts of understanding process the sensuous *materia* of sensibility (its matter) but not the form of the representation of an intuition (in Kant's terminology, the pure intuition). Because the act of abstraction removes sensuous *materia* in representing an intuition that will be transformed into the higher concept, as we "climb higher" in the manifold of concepts, the sensational content of concepts becomes less and less. At the point where a higher concept first comes to be made with no sensuous content (lacks any sensuous *materia*) it can no longer be directly experienced. It is at that point a concept made entirely from concept forms and is called an *idea*. The object represented by the idea is said to lie *at the horizon of possible experience* and is a *noumenon* instead of a phenomenon. The idea is an *ultimate* representation of a-thing-as-we-can-know-it.

Past this horizon, even higher ideas are isolated from all possibility of being experienced in phenomena and therefore *lack all real objective validity for ontology*.<sup>2</sup> They are *notions* and their objects as entities are mathematical but no part of the phenomenal world. The object of an idea past the horizon of possible experience is a-thing-as-we-cannot-know-it and its ontological standing is merely Platonic and a transcendent illusion. The idea is a notion of a-thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich selbst*) and is only a phantom of the process of speculative Reason and acts of ratio-expression. The *Dasein* of a thing-as-we-can-know-it is grounded by determinant judgment in a Relation of causality & dependency but such a judgment establishes nothing concerning the *Existenz* of a thing-as-we-can-know-it. It is at the end of the line for human empirical knowledge. Beyond this point lies nothing but pure speculation. In the language of the mathematicians, the ontological validity of any notion of any thing-in-itself is *formally undecidable*. All supersensible objects are entities of pure mathematics. Their objectively valid relationships in Nature are bound by Slepian's principle and Margenau's law.

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the purpose of all scientific instruments is to extend the reach of our senses. This means the horizon of possible experience is not some fixed firmament of knowledge. Bacteria were not objects of possible experience in the days of Hippocrates and Aristotle, but are today. One lesson this holds for us is that the design of scientific instruments is also bound to the theory of Critical metaphysics.




Figure 6.4: Functional organization of practical Reason

### § 1.2. The Manifold of Practical Rules

In its graphical form the manifold of practical rules has the same structure as the manifold of concepts. For that reason the nodes in its graph can be called *practical concepts*, although these representations are not rules for the reproduction of intuitions. Where the two manifolds differ is in their functional characters. A *practical concept* is an unconscious representation of a practical rule or tenet for the production of actions. It is called that merely by analogy to concepts in the manifold of concepts. A practical concept is *a rule for the synthesis of appetites* and because it is never brought into conscious presentation a practical concept is never a perception.

Unlike concepts in the manifold of concepts, practical concepts do not require the existence of any practical analog of the process of imagination within practical Reason for either the synthesis of appetites or the presentation of practical concepts (because neither an appetite nor a practical concept is ever made conscious). However, appetitive power can be regarded as a homologue of imagination. Figure 6.4 illustrates the general functional organization of practical Reason in its connections with motoregulatory expression and the manifold of Desires in reflective judgment. The representation of a Desire has for its matter the product of an act of aesthetical reflective judgment, which is called a desire (*Begehren*), and for its form the product of an act of teleological reflective judgment, which is called a desiration (*Begehrung*). A *Desire* is the unity in

affective perception by which it is possible for subjective affects to be transformed into the representation of an appetite (*Begierde*). The matter of a desire is a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* and the form of a desire is a value. Desiration is the form of the unity (regarded as a *nexus* of desires) of affective perception in relationship to the capacities of the human being, and it is regarded from the practical Standpoint as the determinable in motoregulatory expression. Hence it is the representation of a *possible* appetite as judged to be expedient by the act of teleological reflective judgment.

But this act of judgment is impetuous and whether or not a desiration is transformed into an appetite is subject to conditioning by the constructed manifold of rules during the synthesis of appetition. The manifold of rules provides what can be termed the experience-based *policies* of practical Reason. It is the value structure of the human being. Appetition is the act of determining a practical purpose. Seen in this way, the manifold of rules is the structure of a human being's system of practical purposes. A ***practical purpose*** is the object of a practical concept insofar as that practical concept is taken as the real ground for the possibility of the object of an act of expression (either a motoregulatory- or a ratio- expression).

The hierarchical structure of the manifold of rules contains practical rules *per se*, practical maxims, and practical hypothetical imperatives. A ***practical rule per se*** is the know-how knowledge for determining some specific action. A ***practical maxim*** is a constructed practical rule of actions containing multiple practical rules under it, including both lesser maxims and practical rules *per se*. Maxims are conditioned under practical hypothetical imperatives. A ***practical hypothetical imperative*** is a rule standing under no higher rule in the manifold and can best be regarded as a maxim about maxims. It is practically conditioned *only* by the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason and constitutes a ***practical law*** the human being makes for himself.

Such a law is no mere "ought to" inclination. It is an imperative in the full sense of being a *command of Reason*. When stimulated by desiration *it will be enacted*. That later experience can lead to a hypothetical imperative becoming conditioned and placed under a new higher law by an act of practical judgment does not change the force this type of practical concept has when it is still unconditioned in the manifold. Practical judgment does not choose actions; it constructs the manifold of rules under the dictate of the categorical imperative. Combinations of rules in the manifold of rules are judgments of the process of practical judgment and these combinations determine the conduct of the human being. Practical ***conduct*** is the determined actuality of non-autonomic actions taken by a human being. In the context that morality is the *logic* of actions, *the manifold of rules is the self-constructed moral code of the human being*.




Figure 6.5: 2LAR structure of appetitive power in practical Reason

## § 2. Appetitive Power and the Synthesis of Appetition

Kant tells us,

All representations refer to the object as Object of knowledge, but they can also be regarded as acts, and then the ground of the production of the same Object lies in the representation. Herewith then corresponds the *capacity of the soul to become, through the representation of an object itself, the cause of the actuality of the object*, = and this is the appetitive power, which one can just as validly determine as *causality of the representation in regard to its Object*. – Kant, *Metaphysik K 3*, 29:1012-1013

Figure 6.5 illustrates the 2LAR structure of appetitive power in practical Reason. Its matter is the power (*Kraft*) to compose activity (the union of act and action<sup>3</sup>), and its form is the organized ability (faculty) to determine the connection between representations (desiration and rules) and the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. It can be regarded as the bridgework between the manifold of Desires and the manifold of practical rules (as suggested by figure 6.4). It exercises the executive power of practical Reason: (1) over reflective judgment through the veto power of practical Reason in motoregulatory expression; (2) in ratio-expression to speculative Reason; and (3) in adaptation of the manifold of rules. The *synthesis of appetition is reasoning insofar as reasoning pertains to the regulation of actions*.

Quantity in appetitive power pertains to the form of rules validated in the determination of an appetite and its context is the rule structure of practical Reason. The practical rule of validation is either a practical rule *per se* (the know-how for determining some specific, singular action), a practical maxim (a conditioned rule in the manifold of rules that stands under some higher rule),

<sup>3</sup> Act is the determination of a *Kraft* as a cause of accidents. Action is change in the appearance of accidents.

or a practical law (a practical hypothetical imperative the human being has bound himself to obey – again, until such occasion as an adaptation in the manifold of rules demotes this representation to the status of a maxim by placing it under a new and higher rule).

Quality in appetitive power pertains to the relationship between an action and practical purpose. If expression of a presentation in the manifold of Desires serves a purpose of pure Reason the rule in force is a *rule of commission*, e.g., "if  $x$  then validate  $z$ ". If expression of a presentation in the manifold of Desires conflicts with practical purpose whereas its *non-expression* does serve the purpose, the rule in force is a *rule of omission*, e.g., "if  $x$  then invalidate  $z$ " (and Reason thereby exercises its veto). If a presentation in the manifold of Desires sometimes serves practical purpose and sometimes is in conflict with it then the function is the *rule of exception*: validation of expression of a presentation in the manifold of Desires is contingent upon and conditioned by the practical manifold of rules. Here it is important to take note that: (1) the *manifold* of Desires contains many presentations of desiration; (2) that these presentations serve as conditions for the assertion of rules; and so (3) the relationship dealt with by the function of the rule of exception pertains to the state of the *entire* manifold of Desires with respect to the entire manifold of rules rather than with the relationship of particular presentations with particular rules. The rule of exception as a function is functional subcontrarity, e.g., "if  $x$  and also not- $y$  then validate  $z$ , but if  $x$  and also  $y$  then invalidate  $z$ ."

Relation in appetitive power is the determination of the ground for an appetite with respect to practical expedience, i.e., what *sort* of appetite is determined: (1) appetite from the expedience of motives, which is *intellectual* appetite; (2) appetite from the expedience of sensuous representations in sensibility, which is physical appetite; or (3) appetite from the expedience produced through judgmentation by which what originally was merely physical appetite is transformed through ratio-expression into the reasoned judgment of an *idea* of expedience for happiness. The first two *momenta* are called appetite *per motiva* and appetite *per stimulus*, respectively. The third *momentum* recognizes that while sensuous stimuli affect the human being, the human being is not *bound* to determination by stimuli, that his self-determination can be liberated from the causality of sensuality. Therefore the third *momentum* is called appetite *per liberum*. It is the practical ground for the exercise of what is commonly called human free will. Among a great many things, it is how *bravery* – the commission of an action with consciousness of a feeling of fear of doing so when *not* taking the action is also possible – is possible<sup>4</sup>.

Modality in appetitive power is the idea of the metaphysical *nexus* of practical Reason as an

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<sup>4</sup> Mental physics produces the interesting finding that, like social moral conventions, bravery is learned through experience (usually in childhood). Neither courage nor cowardice is an innate character trait.



organized mental ability (mental faculty). As Modality in judgment is a judgment of a judgment, Modality in appetitive power is a determination of a determination. The first *momentum* in the Modality of appetite is the problematic function called *wish*: the act of appetitive power responds to a need (*Bedürfnis*) of Reason without prior practical knowledge of what will satisfy this need. The second momentum is the assertoric function called *choice*: the determination of an appetite of action with consciousness of belief (through reflective judgment) that the act will satisfy Reason by making actual the Object of the action. The third *momentum* in Modality of appetite is a function both logically apodictic and transcendently necessitated (i.e., *made necessary*) and is called *will*: the determined appetite is not merely asserted but, furthermore, *required by* a practical tenet of Reason. A practical tenet is a higher level practical rule that contains multiple other rules standing under it. Will is a capacity to beget objects according to the Organized Being's representations and to determine appetitive power for acting accordingly. These are the practical real explanations of wish, choice, and will.

Like the synthesis of an intuition in sensibility, the synthesis of an appetite in appetitive power follows a three-step process: *practical Comparison*, *practical reflexion*, and *practical abstraction*. These are, mathematically, the same functions as found in the synthesis of apprehension except for the *materia* going into the synthesis process and the reference for comparison. In appetitive power this *materia* is originally sourced from desiration (rather than receptivity) and the manifold of rules (rather than the manifold of concepts). The reference for comparison in the acts of understanding in sensibility is the principle of formal expedience in the making of reflective judgments; in appetite it is the formula of the categorical imperative in the making of practical judgments. Otherwise the three functions deal with synthesis of equivalence structures (*Comparison*), congruence structures (*reflexion*), and the removal of *materia* from the representation not compatible with the formula of the categorical imperative (abstraction).

### § 3. Obligation and Duty

It is not difficult to appreciate that the structure of the manifold of rules becomes complicated in the march of experience. The specific matter in an individual's manifold of rules is as diverse as particular experiences in the lives of individual people. What is common from person to person is the generic structural form of the manifold. This form is a hierarchy of practical concepts in which successively higher practical concepts become progressively more general and abstract in their contents. It is a straightforward proposition to note that the manifold of rules is less complex and diverse for young children than for adolescents and adults owing to the fewer actual experiences of the former compared to the latter. Indeed, this difference underlies the remarks

about the naivety of children that adults frequently make. Practically speaking, the adult has had more time to make himself the person he is than a young child has had, and his self-construction yields a more subtle, detailed, and distinct personality.

Contrariwise, younger children are more malleable than adults, by which I mean their acts of self-determination are more easily influenced by others because they have a far less developed manifold of practical rules. This is the practical basis for the also commonly heard remark that children are impressionable. It is as the Jesuits were once fond of saying, "Give us the boy and the man is ours for life." A society that deems itself to possess cultural values and mores that it wishes to preserve intact over the passage of years from generation to generation can do so only through some system of general education designed and tasked specifically to serve this purpose. Western civilization calls such a system a liberal education, although this sort of education has largely disappeared from the West today and has given way to an amalgam of vocational training and conflicting sectarian education programs<sup>5</sup>. In the United States general liberal education is extinct and has been for at least half a century.

The complexity of the individual's manifold of rules renders it quite impractical to suppose a leader could hope to reliably and consistently manipulate followers through stimulation of the great majority of the followers' specific and individualistic practical concepts. However, it is practically possible to influence a follower's general orientation and self-direction at the higher levels in the manifold of rules. This is because the higher rules are highly abstracted, the most general, and, for these reasons, much easier for the leader to empirically gauge and understand. Indeed, a review of familiar leaders' maxims, e.g.,

Regard your soldiers as your children and they will follow you into the deepest valleys;  
look on them as your own beloved sons and they will stand by you even unto death. –  
Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, X.25

reveals that these maxims all pertain to stimulation of higher and more general practical concepts in the manifold of rules.

The practical challenge in applying maxims such as these is that the manifold of rules at this level contains precisely those practical rules that are the highest conditions of the individual's personal moral code (again, in the context that morality is the logic of actions), the top level of which is comprised by the individual's practical hypothetical imperatives. Unless the group of

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<sup>5</sup> This, by the way, is a quite reliable recipe for eventual societal disintegration as well as for the fall of republics to despotic political systems. That is a sociology theorem deducible from mental physics. If you wish to bring about the fall of a free republican society, deny it a general system of liberal education (or abolish it if the society already has one) and time alone will then bring about your aim in a few generations. Dark ages are not caused by the sword. And, as Charlemagne demonstrated, once brought on they are not easy to bring to an end or to end before a great deal of human slaughter occurs.

people involved is socially homogenized, there will be a great deal of diversity from one person to the next regarding the specific *causata* of practical concepts conditioned by individual hypothetical imperatives and tenets of practical maxims. Yet the practical possibility of effective leader actions hinges precisely on the leader's ability to stimulate individuals' high tenets. The diversity in these from one person to another makes ontology-centered moral presuppositions quite unreliable. This accounts for the well known lack of broad success achieved by most leadership training programs because these programs are invariably ontology-centered. The remedy is fairly obvious: *adopt deontological principles and use them to create a culture.* Deontological ethics is epistemology-centered and is grounded in Critical metaphysics.

It is here where we encounter two ideas of central significance for leadership. These are the ideas of *obligation* and of *duty*. Both are fundamentally ethical ideas, and systems of ontological ethics tend to vest both terms in objects as if they were primal properties of those objects. Thus we use phrases such as "fulfilling an obligation" and "answering the call of duty." Despots tend to think that obligations and duties can be imposed by one person on another person, e.g., "*I oblige you to pay taxes, serve in my army, be on this jury, clean your room, stop smoking,*" &etc. Many of us have also had experiences – often disappointing or unpleasant ones – in which some other person has refused to honor an agreement, fulfill a pledge, or done (or not done) something else that we thought was that person's obligation or duty.

Systems of social mores (societal moral conventions) are predicted on ideas of obligation and duty. Where these ideas are not such as to be consented to by all members of that society, therein lie the seeds of a great many troubles. As all leadership situations are social dynamics, the importance of these ideas for the topic of this treatise is probably quite evident. Unfortunately, all ontological systems of ethics suffer from the fundamental flaw that no universal consent to what obligation or duty are has ever been reached in the long history of our species. This is because the presumptive ground for these ideas is displaced from our social atom and vested elsewhere, typically in something either mystical or supernatural. This is true of both consequentialist ethics and virtue ethics, the two most popular classes of ethical systems. The only proper grounding for any sort of societal moral code is our social atom, the individual human being. The objective validity of such a ground cannot be based on ontology but rather must be based upon the mental physics of human nature, and the fundamental principles of this nature are *deontological*. What, then, are obligation and duty and what other consequences follow from these?

### § 3.1 Obligation, Duty, and duty

Kant tells us,

*Obligation* is the necessity of a free act under a [theoretically] categorical imperative of reason.

[A theoretical] imperative is a practical rule through which an act, in itself contingent, is *made* necessary. It differs from a practical law in that [a practical law] represents, to be sure, an act as necessary but takes no regard of whether this is peculiar to an inner necessity of the acting Subject . . . or is contingent to him (as in a human being); for the first is the case where there is no [theoretical] imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule for which its representation makes necessary a subjectively contingent act and hence represents the Subject as one who must be beholden (necessitated) to that in conformity with this rule . . . The ground of the possibility of [theoretically] categorical imperatives lies only in this: that they refer to no other condition of choice . . . than simply to its freedom. – Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, 6: 222

A theoretically categorical imperative is an idea, the source of which is a practical hypothetical imperative of Reason in the manifold of rules. The theoretically categorical imperative is not part of the manifold of rules but, instead, is part of the manifold of concepts. It is a rational self-understanding from one's introspection of the grounds of his own actions. It is, invariably, an idea of right-or-wrong, or good-or-bad, or sometimes both at once. As such, this type of concept is constructed with very intimate meanings relationships to formal expedience in reflective judgment and is a potent factor in judgmentation. However, because it is not part of the manifold of rules, it does not carry the primal force of a practical hypothetical imperative; it is an "I ought to" concept and not an "I will" law. It is a "law" only and in precisely the same way that "an automobile driver ought to stop at a stop sign" is a "law." Because it is theoretically categorical, it occupies the highest level of the structure in the manifold of concepts. But because it is only a concept of understanding, its efficacy is subject to *non-objective* judgments of formal expedience in subjective reflective judgment, and because of this it can be overturned in actual experience through ratio-expression in the process of judgmentation.

An obligation is that which is merely *formal* in a human *self-determination* of an action made necessary (necessitated). By itself an abstraction, it presents no *specific* point of application for an action but *all* human actions are actions *taken in the specific*. A human being does not merely "do." A human being "does *this*." A 1LAR division of the idea of a *necessitated action* divides this idea into a matter of the action and a form of the action. **Obligation** is the *form* of a necessitated action. We can view it as a formula for acting-rightly.

What, then, is the matter of a necessitated action? The answer to this is, in one word, **Duty**:

*Duty* is that act to which someone is bound. It is therefore the matter of an obligation, and there can be one and the same duty (in conformity with the act) although we can be bound to it in different ways. – [*ibid.*]

A duty is a specific action regarded by the individual as necessary because he represents it as a *necessitated* action under a formula of obligation. We have here a fine and rather hair-splitting

distinction between "duty" as an *act* and "a duty" as an *action*. This is a distinction for which we have no specific words in English, so let us refer to the former as "Duty" and the latter as "duty." The idea of Duty is logical and mathematical; it refers to representation in a concept and its object is a *noumenon*. The Object of a duty is real and phenomenal; the action is the object. A multiplicity of duties sharing the same common logical *formula* constitute *examples* of an Object of obligation. Thus the concept of "an" obligation is the idea of an object that is a *noumenon*.

Now, merely because an action is a duty does not mean the action will always be regarded as "moral" in a context that either consequentialist or virtue ethics understands by that term. It might be merely technical or pragmatic, as in "this is how-it-is-correctly-or-best-done." Many Kant scholars mistakenly think deontological ethics is, to quote the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, "ethics based on the notion of a duty, or what is right, or rights, as opposed to ethical systems based on the idea of achieving some good state of affairs (consequentialism) or the qualities of character necessary to live well (virtue ethics)." This is not correct. Deontological ethics properly regarded epistemologically is *grounded in* and based on the idea of obligation, not Duty. As Kant put it,

All obligation rests on the form of maxims; its matter cannot be made into a general rule, for it is arbitrary. Even the idea of perfection, if this is to mean a reality or even merely *consensus* of the many in one, presupposes a coincidence of feeling of satisfaction. Will as free, however, must be determined consequently only so far as it can serve as a rule for all willing. – Kant, *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie*, note 7229, 19: 290 <sup>6</sup>

A *system* of ethics is a theory. If it is to be a *scientific* theory – and to become a social-natural science – it has to be grounded in real human nature. We do not currently have such a science, and it is not the objective of *this* treatise to provide one. However, the human nature upon which such a science rests is also the human nature upon which leadership rests and so it *is* part of the objective of this treatise to examine that nature.

Now, all obligations are *self-determined*, as are all Duties. Nothing whatsoever is *my* obligation *unless I make it my obligation* through a self-determination that the idea is one to which I bind myself (hold-to-be-binding) by an act of judgmentation. The corollary to this is obvious: *No person can impose an obligation on another person*. The same is true of Duty and

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<sup>6</sup> That deontological ethics is almost universally regarded as an ethics of duty can be imputed to Kant himself. His published writings focus on the topic of Duty to an extent that could fairly be called lop-sided. However, there are two important points to consider here. First, these works were Kant's effort to produce an *applied* metaphysic of morals, and Duty *is* the point of application for this. Second, Kant did commit a fundamental error by equating, or at least appearing to equate, the categorical imperative of practical Reason with something he called "the moral law," and he failed to make clear the crucial distinction between a *theoretically* categorical imperative and a *practical* hypothetical imperative. There is only one practical categorical imperative, and while it *is* the ground for the possibility of moral laws, its scope goes far beyond this one application. It is the first law of human nature in his aspect as *homo noumenon*.

duty. Obligations are only and can only be assumed from within by a person *taking it upon himself to make* an act his obligation. Nothing else is compatible with the human being's power of self-determination, and since the power of self-determination cannot be taken away from any person by any means short of killing him, this power of self-determination can be called *the one innate natural right* a human being possesses *a priori* simply by *being* a human being. All other ideas of "rights" and "justice" derive from this one. Kant wrote,

Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), so far as it can coexist with the freedom of every other according to a universal law, is the only primordial right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. – Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, 6: 237

If, then, any community of persons is to exist in any mutual relationship in which the members rely upon the usual notions of rights and responsibilities expected of the membership, all of these must be established by mutually-agreed-to convention. The questions this raises for leadership are the following: Are such conventions possible? and, if so, under what conditions or by what means can they be brought about?

### § 3.2 Rational Factors of Self-Determination Pertaining to Leadership

To answer these questions we must examine rational factors at work in an individual's making of his personal *theoretical* imperatives. More specifically, we must examine the *practical* bases in the manifold of rules that make such theoretical constructs possible for a human being. Now, all such factors are understood in the context of the appetitive power of a human being and his process of practical judgment. Are there *general empirical principles* that follow from the Critical epistemology of practical Reason? If so, what are they? What, in other words, are the Critical implications for psychology that arise from the mental physics of judgmentation?

Here Kant's efforts to produce an applied metaphysic of morals did succeed to an important degree. Your author stops short of saying they "bore fruit" but he is willing to say they "bore potatoes." We just have to do a little digging to find them.

Theoretical imperatives and conceptualized maxims, unlike their practical counterparts, are open to introspection and analysis. Tenets of choices in regard to actions always carry in them some meaning implication of a right/wrong, good/bad, or better/worse thing-to-do. Thus, they always have a reference to appetitive power that considers Critical good or evil on some level. The Critical *Realerklärung* of good is: **good** is the *Object of practical Reason by which an object is represented as a necessary object of appetitive power*. It is a practical representation of the power of pure Reason and refers to a choice to either effect or maintain the actuality of an object represented in judgment. The Critical notion of good subsists in the act of practical determination

of appetitive power according to a practical maxim and is *not* vested in either the outcome of the action or in the action itself. Its mirror in *psyche* is *Lust*.

The Critical *Realerklärung* of evil is the psychic opposite of this. *Evil is the Object of practical Reason by which an object is represented as a negative-necessary object of appetitive power* (a necessarily detested object). It is likewise a practical representation and refers to a choice to effect or maintain the *non*-actuality of the object. Like good, the notion of evil subsists in the determination of appetitive power according to a maxim and is not vested in either the outcome of the action (action's object) or in the action itself (action-as-object). Its mirror in *psyche* is *Unlust*. We see here that the deontological *Realerklärung* of good (or evil) is neither the object of consequentialist ethics (good vested in the action's object) nor of virtue ethics (good vested in the action-as-object). Kant wrote,

It is not possible to think of anything at all in the world – yes, or beyond it as well – that could be held good without any restriction except a **good will**. – Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 4: 393

In *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant analyzed the transcendental logic of tenets in 2LAR form to produce what he called "the categories of freedom in consideration of the ideas of good and evil." This analysis did not and was not meant to set out primitive *a priori* functions of mind. The *momenta* of this 2LAR can probably best be called *Kant's moral categories* and they have to do with understanding the relationships of maxims and tenets to the process of practical Reason and the determination of appetitive power. Kant's moral categories 2LAR is:

**Quantity –**

Subjective according to maxims (*opinions of the will* of the individual);  
Objective according to principles (*precepts*);  
*A priori* objective as well as subjective principles of freedom (*laws*);

**Quality –**

Practical rules of *commission*;  
Practical rules of *omission*;  
Practical rules of *exceptions*;

**Relation –**

To *personality*;  
To the *situation* of the person;  
*Reciprocally*, of one person to the situation of another;

**Modality –**

The *permitted* and the *un-permitted*;  
*Duty* and what is *contrary to duty*;  
*Perfect* and *imperfect* duty.

These categories describe the causality of *conceptualized* tenets for the self-determination of

actions by a human being. They do not describe the practical manifold of rules; this is set by the *momenta* of appetitive power and those of practical judgment. They describe how one can *understand the reasoning* behind action choices and how these choices stand in relationship to Critical good and evil. Reason's act is *subjective* if it merely concurs with an immediate reflective judgment of the manifold of Desires. It is *objective* if the determining factor of choice is a maxim in the manifold of rules but does not involve a condition set by a practical hypothetical imperative. Choices of this sort are merely technical or pragmatic. It is *both* if the determining factor is a practical hypothetical imperative and in this case the choice carries *moral force* in the determination. In terms of Quality, Reason's executive act can be one of commission, omission, or exception. The meanings of these are more or less clear: to *do*, to *do-not*, or to-do-or-not subject to qualifying factors of Desire. Reasoning's composition (Quantity and Quality) have to do with the specific matter of action-choice.

The factors of deep importance for leadership are those of reasoning's *connections* (Relation and Modality) as these pertain to the underlying "because" of Reason's free act. The composition is expressively directed but the connection pertains to the person's *mind set*. The Relation to personality is *categorical* and refers to what is probably best called the individual's *moral personality*. This is the Relation by which a person *respects himself as an individual* and sets terms by which he is willing to accept obligations and bind himself to duties. Kant wrote,

A *person* is a subject who is accountable for his acts. *Moral* personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws. . . . From this it follows that a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others). – Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, 6: 223

Nothing any other person can do can make an individual forsake those obligations and duties he makes *to himself for himself*. If as the leader you try to coerce a person into going against one of these, you are well advised to listen for the sound of a pistol being cocked and to start checking under your car before starting the engine. There is nothing more futile or dangerous than to attack a person's inner imperatives of self-respect. With great caution you can try to stimulate tensions of deprivation (move the person to doubt his own tenet) with the aim of getting him to effect an accommodation in his manifold of rules – i.e. try to get the person himself to "demote" one of his practical hypothetical imperatives. (The armed forces succeed in this almost all the time; soldiers are brought to accept that killing an enemy in battle is not *murder* but *duty*). But if you attack one directly, you will find yourself in a war and create for yourself an implacable enemy. Any leader who deliberately brings about such an internecine situation is a fool. A wise leader *exploits* these tenets to stimulate change in behavior. Skill in doing so is a sort of social jujitsu.

The Relation to one's situation is the *hypothetical* Relation and pertains to maxims of well-



being. Like the categorical Relation, these tenets involve duties one makes to himself for himself and are *essentially* non-social. Specifically understood tenets of obligation and duty here are sourced from maxims, not practical hypothetical imperatives, although they are still answerable to conditioning by the person's practical hypothetical imperatives. Most such tenets have little or no connection to what adults commonly understand as "moral" tenets<sup>7</sup>, but in the context that morality is the logic of actions they have what we might describe as "selfish-moral" force. Kant wrote,

Now the human being as a reasonable *natural being* (*homo phaenomenon*) can be determined by his reason, as a *cause*, to deeds in the sensible world, and hereby the idea of obligation does not come into consideration. But the same [human being] thought according to his *personality*, that is, as a being endowed with *inner freedom* (*homo noumenon*) is regarded as a being liable to obligation and, indeed, obligation for himself (to the humanity in his own person); so the human being (regarded in these two different senses) can acknowledge a duty to himself without falling into contradiction (because the idea of a human being is not thought in one and the same sense). . .

. . . The first fundamental principle of duty to oneself lies in the saying "live in conformity with nature" . . ., that is, *preserve* yourself in the perfection of your nature; the second, in the tenet "*make yourself more perfect* than mere nature has made you" (perfect yourself as an end, perfect yourself as a means). . . There are impulses of nature concerning man's **animality**. Through them [his] nature aims at: (a) his self-preservation, (b) preservation of the species, and (c) preservation of his capacity to enjoy life, though still on an animal level only. . .

But a human being's duty to himself as a moral being *only* (without his animality on exhibition) subsists in what is formal in the congruence of the maxims of his will with the *dignity* of humanity in his person, thus in the prohibition against depriving himself of the *prerogative* of a moral being, namely that of acting according to principles, i.e., inner freedom. – [*ibid.*, 6: 418]

The hypothetical duties are selfishly pragmatic in regard to how he responds to circumstances outside himself in dealing with them. All else being equal, he seeks rewards, avoids injuries, and generally looks after his own well-being. His maxims will give way to the categorical duties he makes to himself but not to any others *unless* these maxims are self-brought under conditioning by other maxims. And this brings us to the third Relation, that of the *reciprocal* duties.

Obligations freely assumed and duties freely made in this Relation are *social*. However, there is always a pragmatic interest at work in their construction. These tenets are correctly regarded as the outcome of a synthesis of the other two types of Relations, and duties to oneself always lie behind them. These maxims presuppose and require a kind of social compact between the person and other people. Rousseau's idea of the *social contract* quite aptly describes the nature of these maxims of obligation and duties. The person will "take a knock for the team" but he *expects and*

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<sup>7</sup> The case is quite different for young children, for who the manifold of rules is far less developed. Here Piaget's numerous observations in *The Moral Judgment of the Child* are very illuminating.

*requires* the team to reciprocate in some tangible appreciation of his actions *that serves the duty to self standing behind the social obligation*. Reciprocal duties include the sort most people view as matters of ethics and morality but the fulfillment of duty is expected to be rewarded, either by an inner satisfaction or by something more tangible and external. If I oblige myself to not steal from you, I expect you to oblige yourself not to steal from me. If I choose to associate myself in a political community I *accept the obligation* to behave as a citizen *in return for the benefit I expect to derive as a consequence of my citizenship*. If I choose to accept employment with your company over another *because* you claim the company has a virtuous commitment to behave as a good citizen of our community, I *expect nothing less* from *our* company.

This Relation always *essentially* involves expectation of a social contract. However, in the majority of real cases in people's experiences, the compact is implied and unspoken rather than made specific. Almost inevitably this means members of the group will *not* share the same set of expectations and values, and such *subjectivity* invites eventual conflicts. We will have much more to say about this point later because the great majority of leadership situations involve people's tenets structured with this form of Relation. Herein lies the practical benefit of *creating a culture*.

Turning lastly to Modality, a *permitted* maxim is merely one not contrary to obligation. An *un-permitted* maxim is the same except that it is a "negative" maxim, i.e. a "better not do that" type of maxim. Permitted and un-permitted maxims are problematical. Many executives wear ties in meetings – not because wearing one is a duty but because not wearing one might work against his effectiveness in accomplishing his aims and objectives for that meeting. What it means for a tenet to be regarded as a duty has already been explained: the action is a matter of an obligation to which the person has bound himself and its logical Modality is assertoric. Contrary to duty is the same except it is an "I will-not" type of tenet. As for the Modality of necessity, Kant tells us,

Perfect duty is that conformable to the principle of will so far as the opposite cannot become a universal law; imperfect duties, however, are those which come to pass from the principle that we be able to will that the maxim of our act should become a universal law. All perfect and imperfect duties are inner and outer compared with ourselves. With perfect duties I ask whether their maxims can stand as universal law. But with imperfect ones I ask whether I could also will that such a maxim should become a universal law. – Kant, *Moral Mrogonovius II*, 29: 609

These are the tenets the person does hold to constitute *ethics* in the strictest sense. He expects *everyone* to conform to these tenets and views transgressors of *his* tenet as "acting immorally."

Again, these moral categories are not primitives of mind nor do they describe the structure of the manifold of rules except indirectly and theoretically. Kant's moral categories deal with the nature of how the individual binds himself to his practical tenets *as he understands them*. Because this does describe how he binds himself in his own moral code, it is not enough for the leader to

merely understand *statements* of the person's principles but, further, to also *apprehend the manners by which he has bound himself to them*. They are the "leadership buttons" he pushes.

### § 3.3 The Power of Social Imperatives of Duty

It was explained earlier that the process of practical Reason is affectively cold and cognitively dark. Its practical rules are *absolutely* conditioned by nothing else than the categorical imperative of pure Reason and this is a regulating formula dictating complete equilibrium as the practical end-purpose of all non-autonomic acts of the human being. The equilibrium state itself is the complete extinguishing of the intensive magnitude of *Lust per se*, which is achieved by perfecting the opposition of *Lust* and *Unlust* in *psyche* through producing an opposition of *feelings* of *Lust* and *Unlust* in reflective judgment by which the intensity of these feelings balance and cancel each other's effects.

There is in this *nothing specific* required of concepts in the manifold of concepts except the formal expedience of their *subjective* meaning implications. *Cognizance* in the *understanding* of objects has no *immediate* bearing on the pure purpose of Reason. This is to say that the regulation and employment of the process of determining judgment through ratio-expression is such that *objective understanding is made to serve* the principle of formal expedience in *teleological* reflective judgment, which in its turn is *made to serve* the categorical imperative by the process of practical judgment. In this subsists the essence of the motivational dynamic and the character of the cycle of judgmentation. All this is to say that understanding necessarily lags the construction of the manifold of practical rules. This structure *neither knows nor cares about* objects of experience *as* objects. The human being *first* learns the practical and *afterwards* learns his understanding of objects. This is the *Realerklärung* of Piaget's finding he expressed by saying "cognizance moves from the periphery to the center" in *The Grasp of Consciousness*:

In addition to enabling us to analyze how a child gains cognizance as such, this research has shown us that action in itself constitutes autonomous and already powerful knowledge. Even if this knowledge (just knowing how to do something) is not conscious in the sense of a conceptualized understanding, it nevertheless constitutes the latter's source, since on almost every point cognizance lags, and often markedly so, behind this initial knowledge, which is thus of remarkable efficacy despite the lack of understanding.

How then does the action evolve in its links with the conceptualization that characterizes cognizance? If the latter proceeds from the periphery to the center, development of the action must represent a sequence of transformations of the center itself . . .

Clearly, at the action level, initial reactions consist in proceeding through isolated assimilation schemes; there is an attempt to link these to their object, but the reactions remain at the stage of temporary accommodations . . . Progress consists in coordinations that first involve reciprocal assimilations of the schemes in use and then become increasingly general and independent of the specific content . . . Certainly, this is also a process leading from the periphery to the center, although in appearance rather different

from the one relevant to the conceptualization characteristic of cognizance. The distinct common element is the peripheral point of departure where the subject's activity, in its most external or accommodating form, encounters the surface of the object. . . Conceptualization is far from constituting a simple reading: it is a reconstruction, which introduces new characteristics in the form of logical links, providing a connection with understanding and extensions, and so on. . .

It is therefore not exaggerated to talk of a gradual passage, even at the level of action alone, from the periphery to the center, with the periphery situated in the initial zone of interaction and objects and the central regions situated in the organic sources of behavior and the operatory structures themselves. In both cases, the action as well as its conceptualization, the forming mechanism is simultaneously retrospective, in that it extracts its elements from earlier sources, and constructive, in that it creates new links. – Piaget, *The Grasp of Consciousness*, 16

The consequences of this are manifested everywhere in people's daily experiences. "Seeing what one expects to see" and ignoring or rationalizing away perturbing facts (ignorance<sup>8</sup>) both happen so frequently that this facet of human behavior has become proverbial: "None so blind as those who will not see," as it says in Henry's *Commentaries, Jeremiah 20*. Because some process of socialization every child undergoes while growing up is a primary source of early practical experiences that go into the construction of his manifold of concepts, it is not to be marveled at that different societies and cultures develop widespread common maxims of folkways and imperatives of mores that differ radically from those developed in other societies and cultures. This is something modern anthropology has long recognized:

Ultimately, a society is no more than a union of individuals, all of whom have their own special needs and interests. To survive, it must succeed in balancing the immediate self-interest of its individual members against the needs and demands of the collective well-being of society as a whole. To accomplish this, a society offers rewards for adherence to its culturally prescribed standards. In most cases, these rewards assume the form of social approval. For example, in contemporary North American society a person who holds a good job, takes care of family, pays taxes, and does volunteer work in the neighborhood may be spoken of as a "model citizen" in the community. To ensure the survival of the group, each person must learn to postpone certain immediate personal satisfactions. Yet the needs of the individual cannot be suppressed too far or the result may be a degree of emotional stress and growing resentment that results in protest, disruption, and sometimes even violence. . .

[In] all life issues, cultures must strike a balance between the needs and desires of individuals and those of society as a whole. When those of society take precedence, people experience excessive stress. Symptomatic of this are increased levels of mental illness and behavior regarded as antisocial: violence, crime, abuse of alcohol and other drugs, depression, suicide, or simply alienation. If not corrected, the situation can result in cultural breakdown. But just as problems develop if the needs of society take precedence over those of the individual, so too do they develop if the balance is upset in the other direction.

We have knowledge of numerous highly diverse cultural solutions to the challenges of human existence. The question often arises, Which is best? Anthropologists have been intrigued to find that all cultures tend to see themselves as the best of all possible worlds. This is reflected in the way individual societies refer to themselves: Typically, a society's

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<sup>8</sup> pronounced ig-NOR-ance; the act of deliberately ignoring something.

traditional name for itself translates roughly into "true human beings." In contrast, their names for outsiders commonly translate into various versions of "subhumans," including "monkeys," "dogs," "weird-looking people," "funny talkers," and so forth. We now know that any adequately functioning culture regards its own ways as the only proper ones, a view known as **ethnocentrism**. – Haviland *et al.*, *Anthropology*, 14

In the context of Critical epistemology, the anthropological question, "Which culture's solutions to the challenge of human existence is best?" is scientifically meaningless. "Cultural relativism," often promoted by anthropologists, is likewise scientifically meaningless. To make any sort of comparison a standard for comparison is necessary, and for a scientific comparison such a standard must be universal and firmly grounded in principles (specifically, Critical principles). Well, there is no such standard. Our social-natural science's atom is the individual human being, such a standard must ultimately reference a human moral code, and all human beings make their own moral codes according to individual accidents of experience. None but a nominal (conventional) standard is therefore possible, and this is not adequate for basing a *proper* social-natural science. Different cultures aren't comparatively *relative*; they're just *different*.

What we can say with objective validity is that any culture will, through the interactions among its members, form at least a pseudo social contract. (I call it a pseudo contract because usually its terms are not explicit; in the common way of speaking, the actions of its members follow the aphorism "to get along, go along"). Nor are "culture" or "society" synonyms for "nation." For example, in the United States many people speak of "Midwest values" and contrast this with, say, "California values" or "New York values." This is as much as to say the mores and folkways of Iowans are not the same as those of, say, Californians. Nor is the distinction invalid. Your author grew up in Iowa and worked for a few years in the San Francisco Bay area. The "natives" there often described his "Midwest values" as "quaint"; he often saw theirs as "rude and feckless." (Your author was a young man just starting his professional career at that time).

The important point I wish to make here is this: any group of people living in on-going close association with each other over a period of time is in a general sense a "culture" or a "society." This applies to a Little League baseball team, an international corporation, or the regular patrons of a farmer's market as much as to a state, province, or country. Every human society above the most primitive (e.g. a band of Kalahari Bushmen) is loosely organized as a community of mini-communities and individuals usually belong to several such mini-communities at the same time. The implication this holds for leadership phenomena is likely rather obvious. The leader of a group of people does not have just one unspoken pseudo social contract to consider; he has as many as the divers backgrounds of the members' formative experiences bring together in the group aggregate. Underlying all ethnocentric presuppositions are the egocentric presuppositions

at work in the individual moral codes of each member of a mini-community.

What Haviland *et al.* observe "in the large" in the quote above with regard to the need for balancing the self interests of the individual and the needs of the society also holds true "in the small" of a mini-community. *Reciprocal* Relation in self-assumed obligations and duties answers to the satisfaction of categorical and hypothetical Relations in obligations and duties made to one's self *prior* to the individual agreeing to ally himself with any group of other people. Again, leadership is a phenomenon of social-dynamic relationship. Greater diversity in the membership of a mini-community does bring real benefits to its membership, but along with this come significantly greater challenges for the leader. Diversity in and of itself is neither good nor bad. It is the nature of the leadership that determines whether diversity is beneficial or unbeneficial.

To illustrate the power of mores and folkways in any setting, it is helpful to look for a specific example of a successful society most of us would regard as representing an uttermost fringe of cultural behavior. For this purpose a very homogeneous society serves as a good model. In Western civilization there has probably been no more-homogeneous society than the example provided by ancient Sparta. Sparta has been described as "an army that owned a state." Everything about Spartan life after the *circa*-9th century BC reforms of Lycurgus (Sparta's legendary lawgiver) was aimed at ensuring Spartan military power would be insurmountable in the environment of a political state of nature lethally hostile to the approximately thirty thousand people who were the Spartans. The historian Plutarch tells us,

Lycurgus was much missed at Sparta, and often sent for, "for kings indeed we have," they said, "who wear the marks and assume the titles of royalty, but as for the qualities of their minds, they have nothing by which they are to be distinguished from their subjects"; adding, that in him alone was the true foundation of sovereignty to be seen, a nature made to rule, and a genius to gain obedience. Nor were the kings themselves averse to see him back, for they looked upon his presence as a bulwark against the insolence of the people.

Things being in this posture at his return, he applied himself, without loss of time, to a thorough reformation, and resolved to change the whole face of the commonwealth; for what could a few particular laws and a partial alteration avail? He must act as wise physicians do, in the case of one who labors under a complication of diseases, by force of medicines reduce and exhaust him, change his whole temperament, and then set him upon a totally new regimen of diet. – Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*

If even a fraction of the accomplishments credited to Lycurgus are true, he would have to be ranked as one of the most extraordinary leaders in history. Before his reign the Spartans were a typically individualistic Hellenic society and not particularly remarkable. Afterwards they were a rigidly homogeneous society holding to a common ethics every Spartan bound himself to so rigidly that he would literally rather die than transgress it. Lycurgus implemented his immediate reforms by stint of coercion and reasoning. He insured their longevity by means of a system of

universal education that for its youngest citizens has been aptly described by one modern historian as "the Cub Scouts from Hell" and for which there is no adequate word in any language to describe it except "Spartan." Every modern Western society finds nearly every aspect of Spartan life utterly repugnant and many aspects of it horrifying. For example,

The boys in Sparta were lashed with whips during the entire day at the altar of Artemis Orthia, frequently to the point of death, and they bravely endured this, cheerful and proud, vying with one another for the supremacy as to which of them could endure being beaten for the longer time and the greater number of blows. And the one who was victorious was held in especial repute. This competition is called 'The Flagellation' and it takes place every year. – Plutarch, *Ancient Customs of the Spartans*, 239: 40

And some American mothers worry about their sons playing football. We have more than just Plutarch's word that this festival really happened (and it was a festival; the parents attended and cheered on their sons). Cicero, who died before Plutarch was born, records it too:

The laws of Crete, for instance . . . and also the laws of Lycurgus educate youth by hardships, hunting and running, hunger and thirst, exposure to heat and cold; moreover, at the altar Spartan boys are submitted to such a shower of stripes

"That from the flesh the blood comes forth in streams,"

sometimes even, as I heard on the occasion of a visit, resulting in death; not one of them ever uttered a cry nor even so much as a groan. What then? Can boys do this and shall men prove unable? Has custom the power and shall reason not have the power? – Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, II. xiv. 34

It would be hard to even imagine another illustration that so conclusively demonstrates the power of self-determined social obligation and duty. This Spartan example is so contrary to the experiences of modern life that, if it were not documented by numerous historians, it would defy credibility. One should not, of course, assume that Spartan education "took" with everyone who was subjected to it. Some did "fail to measure up" and for them the Spartan solution was brutally simple: death or exile. Spartan eugenics was ruthless but no more ruthless than Sparta's enemies. One crucial factor, not to be overlooked, was that it was applied to *every* Spartan male without exception from the least distinguished family to the sons of the Spartan kings. No less rigorous and explicit form of social contract would have prevented what Haviland *et al.* called "a degree of emotional stress and growing resentment that results in protest" against Spartan educational practices. Sparta adhered to and flourished under Lycurgus' system for about six centuries (until *circa* 188 BC) if, as many historians think, Lycurgus' reforms began in the 9th century BC.

One might think Sparta and the Spartans would have been utterly despised by the other city-states of Hellenic Greece. One might think this, but one would be wrong. Every other city-state in Hellenic Greece greatly admired the Spartans for their *moral* virtues and, at the same time, thanked their gods that they themselves were *not* born Spartans. Plutarch tells us,

While the games were being held at Olympia, an old man was desirous of seeing them, but could find no seat. As he went from place after place, he met with insults and jeers, and nobody made room for him. But when he came opposite the Spartans, all the boys and many of the men arose and yielded their places. Whereupon the assembled multitude of Greeks expressed their approbation of the custom by applause, and commended the action beyond measure; but the old man, shaking

"His head grey-haired and grey-bearded,"

and with tears in his eyes, said, "Alas for the evil days! Because all the Greeks know what is right and fair, but the Spartans alone practice it."

Some say the same thing happened at Athens also. It was at the time of the Panathenaic festival, and the people of Attica were teasing an old man in an unseemly manner, calling him to them as if they were intending to make room for him, and not making room if he came to them. When he had passed through almost all the spectators and came opposite to the delegates of the Spartans, they all arose from where they were sitting and gave him place. The crowd, delighted, applauded the action with great approval, and one of the Spartans said, "Egad, the Athenians know what is right and fair, but do not do it." – Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartans*, 235: 55

The Spartans were the premier example of a closed, homogeneous society. They discouraged outsiders from visiting Sparta, fearing that foreigners' contemptible ways would corrupt their society, and they even more strongly discouraged Spartans from traveling to other places except as soldiers in the army on the march, official delegates on some diplomatic mission, or to attend the Olympic Games. Spartans did enjoy more personal leisure than perhaps any other non-primitive society in history: a Spartan man's only job was soldier and a Spartan woman's only job was to bear children and bring them up as Spartans. But Spartan leisure was simple, rustic, unrefined, and more or less brutish: hunting, sports, martial arts, and horseplay. Wealth and Athenian refinements in art, theater, and philosophy were held in contempt. Writing of Cleomenes, a Spartan king *circa* 517-488 BC, Plutarch tells us,

When someone, wishing to introduce a musician to him, said, in addition to other commendations, that the man was the best musician among the Greeks, Cleomenes pointed to one of the persons near and said, "Yonder man, I swear, ranks with me as the best soup-maker."

Macandrius, the despot of Samos, because of the inroads of the Persians, fled to Sparta, and exhibited all the gold and silver vessels which he had brought with him, and offered to favor Cleomenes with as many as he wished; but he would have none, and, taking good care that the man should not distribute any among the rest of the citizens, he went to the Ephors and said that it was better for Sparta that his own friend and guest from Samos should be withdrawn from the Peloponnesus, so that he should not persuade anyone of the Spartans to become a bad man. And they listened to his advice and proclaimed the expulsion of Macandrius that very day. – Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartans*, 223:15 - 224:16

Probably no other groups of people in recorded history can begin to be compared to the Spartans in terms of simplicity of life, devotion to discipline and morality, and commitment to duty except for the monks of Medieval Europe or the samurai class of feudal Japan. Sparta still stands as the purest example of the power of social obligation in Western history. Plutarch wrote,



One of the noble and blessed privileges which Lycurgus appears to have secured for his fellow-citizens was abundance of leisure. In fact it was not permitted them to take up any menial trade at all; and there was no need whatever of making money, which involves a toilsome accumulation, nor of busy activity, because of his having made wealth wholly unenvied and unhonored. – Plutarch, *Ancient Customs of the Spartans*, 239: 41

As long as the Spartan State adhered to the laws of Lycurgus and remained true to its oaths, it held first place in Greece for good government and good repute over a period of five hundred years. But, little by little, as these laws and oaths were transgressed, and greed and love of wealth crept in, the elements of their strength began to dwindle also, and their allies on this account were ill-disposed towards them. But although they were in this plight, yet after the victory of Philip of Macedon at Chaeroneia, when all the Greeks proclaimed him commander both on land and sea, and likewise, in the interval following, proclaimed Alexander, his son, after the subjugation of the Thebans, the Spartans only, although they dwelt in an unwallled city, and were few in number because of their continual wars, and had become much weaker and an easy prey, still keeping alive some feeble sparks of the laws of Lycurgus, did not take any part in the campaigns of these or of the other kings of Macedon who ruled in the interval following, nor did they ever enter the general congress or even pay tribute. So it was until they ceased altogether to observe the laws of Lycurgus and came to be ruled despotically by their own citizens, preserving nothing of their ancestral discipline any longer, and so they became much like the rest, and put from them their former glory and freedom of speech, and were reduced to a state of subjection; and now they, like the rest of the Greeks, have come under Roman sway. – [*ibid.*, 239-240]

## § 4. Leadership and Social Contracts

### § 4.1 Fluid Leadership

Every cooperative human activity, however well-organized or disorganized it may appear, involves the phenomenon of leadership and involves more than one person. Leadership is a social dynamic. In the greater number of instances of cooperative activity encountered in life we do not even find explicit designation of who is leading and who is following and, indeed, these roles can and do constantly switch from one person to another. The leader-of-the-moment is whoever the others follow and the follower-of-the-moment is whoever is self-determining his action from the partial cause of a leader's actions. The purest and least visible form of leadership occurs in cases where decisions and actions are reached through a process of finding consensus.

Suppose three young bachelors have decided to have dinner together and have to choose where to go for dinner. One suggests restaurant A; another vetoes the suggestion; the third suggests restaurant B; the first vetoes that suggestion and suggests restaurant C; they talk until at last all three agree to go to restaurant E. Who was "the leader" in this case? It usually *won't* be the person who suggested restaurant E (even if restaurant E was his only suggestion). The social dynamic here is, obviously, a negotiation, but the fact remains that each of our bachelor's self-determinations is being influenced and swayed by the actions of the others and this is the essence of the leadership phenomenon. We would have to say that the leader role was passed around among these three friends during their negotiation until at last all three jointly satisfied their

individual aims to have dinner and to share the others' company during it. Had one of them said, "Well, let's just forget it," and the group had broken up and gone their separate ways, this would have been failed leadership so far as the original aim is concerned. As it was, we would have to say that they ended up following each other. The only thing lacking in this social dynamic is explicit recognition of any *designated* leader. Such is the character of consensus-building in its most cooperative form.

More formal situations, such as those encountered in business, organized sports, or military or governmental undertakings, tend to more visibly display or exhibit some one or few persons who have clearly demonstrated that their actions were leader's actions. This, however, does not change the character of the dynamic all that much even in those cases where the determining factor in the followers' self-determinations is coercion. If we look for the difference in this case, we do not find it anywhere else than in the Relation to duty underlying the choices each follower makes. Under coercion this Relation would have at its root some duty-to-self of the hypothetical type. In the case of our three bachelors, this would not have been utterly absent but the *determining ground* for their eventual consensus would be found in some reciprocal duty, the peculiar form of self-obligation in this case being what we call *friendship*.

Suppose one of our three hypothetical friends had a few restaurants in mind where he did not wish to eat, was largely indifferent as to several others, and knew from past experience that his two companions usually found it difficult to agree with each other as to what to eat and where. He might under these circumstances have deliberately instigated a minor squabble between the two of them – knowing there would be one anyway – and then skillfully and unobtrusively merely acted to moderate and give direction to their squabbling with the aim of keeping it as brief as possible before consensus was reached. If his gentle manipulations went unnoticed by the other two, he would have been the real leader of the group without the others even knowing it. Lao Tzu would hold this to be the best type of leader action. Some call such leader skill "being a glue." It is far more common than most people realize because this sort of "three-friends" leadership dynamic is by far the most commonly encountered in the commerce of day to day living.

To those like Townsend who ask, "Where have our leaders gone?" your author answers, "Most of them have gone underground." To the extent where "lack of leadership" is held to be a problem for modern society, your authors responds, "The problem isn't lack of leadership; it is lack of cohesion among the mini-communities that comprise a larger community." Social cohesion is the basic characteristic of those societies we say are "governed by laws, not men." It is said of Charillus, one of the early kings of Sparta,

When someone asked him what he thought to be the best form of government, he said,

"That in which the greatest number of citizens are willing, without civil strife, to vie with one another in virtue." – Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartans*, 232: 4

The moment-to-moment fluidity in who is acting in the role of leader is also far more common than most people appear to be aware. It tends to be most easily observable in small groups of people whose relationships with the larger population around them are of a more pronouncedly state-of-nature character. Psychologists Ruch and Zimbardo wrote,

One of the marks of an effective leader is his accurate appraisal of his assets as they relate to the group goals. Where he falls short, others must be chosen to supply the necessary resources. Authority must often be delegated and the leader's role separated according to functions required by the group and talents possessed by certain members.

After studying the patterns of interpersonal communication in a great many small groups, Bales (1958, 1970) concluded that one leader can rarely be all things to all group members, even when dealing with groups much smaller than that which Moses had to contend. Bales found a tendency for leadership to be differentiated into two general types of leaders: one in charge of the group's task and one responsible for handling social-emotional problems. Sometimes the same person may serve both the expertise and the human relations functions but often secondary leaders take over certain functions.

This division of power is typically seen in analyses of the structure of street gangs. In one New York City gang, the Pirates, four leaders were required to orchestrate the varied needs of the gang. – Ruch and Zimbardo, *Psychology and Life*, 8

They quote from a 1958 study of the Pirate gang by Block and Niederhoffer:

*Paulie* was the man with "the final say in all important decisions." He was older than the others, held himself aloof, but masterminded the gang's burglaries and robberies. He established contact with older neighborhood gangs and with fences to sell the stolen goods. Like generals in battle, he directed but never jeopardized himself by taking part physically in the "hits." *Lulu* was second in command, and was the tactician and burglary expert. He would plan the details of the burglaries, and "had a tremendous talent for anything connected with tools or electricity." *Solly* was the diplomat who dealt with the frequent police "interference." "Solly played the part of the decent fellow commiserating with the police over the bad habits of the other Pirates." He had a talent for listening quietly to a long harangue from a cop and then pacifying him with an earnest but noncommittal answer. *Blacky* occupied a very unusual position: "most of the time he played the clown, the butt of all the gang's earthy humor, which often took a brutal turn. . . ." But *Blacky* was supreme in the domain of sex, the field where the others were sadly lacking, and they looked to *Blacky* for leadership in matters relating to the opposite sex. He made available his personal "stable" of three or four girls to special friends in the gang. In this way "the division of power allowed completely different personality types to function efficiently." – Block & Niederhoffer, *The Gang*, quoted in Ruch & Zimbardo, *Psychology and Life*, 8

This foursome constituted the recognizable command structure of the Pirate gang. In addition to them the gang included numerous rank and file members as well as a cadre of "corner boys" at its periphery, mainly younger boys who were not yet officially members of the gang. *Lulu* was the "efficiency expert" and the instructor of the gang's rookie members, and *Solly* was the "referee" for disputes and the "director of communication" within the gang. It is not particularly difficult to apprehend the underlying social compact holding the Pirate gang, or other youth gangs, together:

to provide protection, social status, emulation, a "sense of belonging and family," and group-enhanced empowerment the individual gang members did not have from the broader society in which their lives were embedded. That a violent street gang is an antisocial element within broader society does not mean it is not a mini-community operating in a state of nature outlaw relationship with that broader society. It is precisely this. To gain these benefits the individual gang members were willing to obligate themselves to "citizenship" in the gang, to take orders from others, to commit crimes, and to place loyalty to the gang above all other loyalties. The gang had a leader-hierarchy but the correct way to regard Paulie is not gang-leader but rather chief authority figure in the gang. In this regard it is useful to note that the root of the word authority is the same as that of the word author, namely the Latin verb *augere*, "to cause to grow."

## § 4.2 Authority and Organized Leadership

### § 4.2.1 Authority and the Distinction Between Authority-position and the Leader

This brings us to the more familiar and easily recognized situation of the organized group with a designated authority structure. This has been the traditional form of the organized human cooperative we usually call "civilization" since before the days of Kish (*circa* 4500 BC) and the myth of Gilgamesh. It is through tradition developed over the long march of history that the authority figure has gradually come to be called "the leader" and the two roles often mistakenly equated. There is no doubt that sometimes authority figure and leader are one and the same person, as in the case of Sargon the Great, who is credited with establishing the Western world's first military empire in ancient Sumeria. There is also no doubt sometimes they are not.

All Western history's earliest recorded kings were absolute despots whose power over those they ruled came from the real threat of deadly force carried out by the armies they commanded. Although the historical records do not support a clear conclusion, it seems very likely that these earliest *rulerships* were little else than larger versions of the Pirate gang and the obedience of the subjugated came out of nothing else than coercion. Here society of the subjugated is held together by individuals who act from duties to *themselves*, specifically those of self-preservation. For the despot to remain the ruler he had to win the *loyalty* of his army (gang) but only the *obedience* of those he subjected to his rule. History's verdict on these kingdoms is also clear: they lasted only so long as the ruler maintained the power to coerce his subjects and fend off the predations of other despots with armies of their own. There is certainly no "nationalism" under despotism. The greater majority of the subjugated will not lift one finger to save the despot from conquest by another, although they will act in their own defense if they think an invader threatens to bring worse conditions upon them, e.g. by sacking their city and murdering or enslaving its populace:

The populace stood by and watched the combatants; and, as though it had been a mimic conflict, encouraged first one party and then the other by their shouts and plaudits. Whenever either side gave way, they cried out that those who concealed themselves in the shops, or took refuge in any private house, should be dragged out and butchered, and they secured the larger share of the booty; for, while the soldiers were busy with bloodshed and massacre, the spoils fell to the crowd. It was a terrible and hideous sight that presented itself throughout the city. Here raged battle and death; there the bath and the tavern were crowded. In one spot were pools of blood and heaps of corpses, and close by prostitutes and men of character as infamous; there were all the debaucheries of luxurious peace, all the horrors of a city most cruelly sacked, till one was ready to believe the Country to be mad at once with rage and lust. – Tacitus, *The Histories*, III. 83

Political science has long wrestled with the question of authority. Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Mill all took their swings at the issue, although a reader of their various treatises can easily come away more with the impression that they were trying harder to justify a social phenomenon than to understand it. That in any formally organized association there must be "authorities" of some sort is taken utterly for granted. It is when we ask "*What sort?*" that the issues are encountered. As loosely and commonly understood, "the authority" is whoever "is authorized" to exercise some sort of power. But what does this really mean and, if it does mean something, who is authorized to do the authorizing? And who authorizes those who are authorized to do the authorizing, &etc.? We have here the mirror image of another political problem recognized by the Romans and lampooned by Juvenal, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* ("Who will watch those who watch?" i.e., who will guard us from our guardians?). These are the sorts of innocent questions for which blind presumption leads us to step into the hole of a bottomless regression.

What is the *Realerklärung* of "authority"? In political and leadership contexts most people equate it with the power to compel obedience, and, as this power is also usually presumed to be backed up by or based upon some power to apply sanctions, modern political and leadership contexts of authority usually lead straightaway to issues of the *right* for someone to compel the obedience of another. Since the 18th century most theorists have tried to link the overall issue to some sort of basis in social morality. Rousseau, for example, wrote,

The strongest is never strong enough to always be the master unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will – at most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be called a duty?

Suppose for a moment that this so-called "right" exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest always being in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do

so. Clearly, the word "*right*" adds nothing to force: in this connection it means absolutely nothing. – Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, 3

If, as most people now accept, might does not make right then authority, taken in the sense it is most often used, must originate elsewhere and this is how it comes to be entangled with moral issues. Most theorists have brought forth very refined and complicated arguments that in the end really amount to nothing but nominal definitions of authority. In the end, though, a nominal definition is an ontology-centered definition and this is revealed by the fact that the arguments eventually end up calling upon some sort of divine or mystic grounds. Locke and Rousseau were explicit about this divine ground being God.

In the case of Kant, he could not resort to this expedient and his mystic ground<sup>9</sup> was that ontological thing he called "the moral law within me." This, of course, is precisely the point where Kant made his own ontology-centered error in his moral theory and he paid the price in the form of various antinomies that scholars have ever since been only too delighted to point out. Kant, who by and large took Rousseau's social contract as his starting point, spent his effort in trying to make Rousseau's position practical. He did not offer a definition of "authority." The word he used that is conventionally translated into English as "the authorities" (*Gewalten*) isn't actually equivalent to the conventional English idea of "an authority" (that would be *Autorität*) and is better translated as "those in power." Kant called the *Gewalten* "dignities" but did not explain what he meant by that. The flavor of his remarks is rather like that found when the British call their king or queen "majesty," a mere honorific with no real practical relationship to whether or not the person in question is actually regarded by others as "majestic."

A *Realerklärung* of authority must be epistemologically-centered if it is to have objective validity and keep that context with the social atom necessary for the possibility of any social-natural science. Because the Object of "authority" is a *noumenon*, the *only* objective validity the idea can have must be a *practical objective validity*, and this *must* be defined in the context of any *effects* attributed to the *Dasein* of the "authority." To explain who or what authority is, we must go back to the active etymological root of the word and this is the Latin verb *augere*: to make greater, increase, strengthen, or reinforce. Something therefore *has authority* if it (or he or she) exhibits a *Kraft* of causing something to grow, i.e., become greater, increase, be strengthened, or be reinforced in some way. To say that this something exhibiting the *Kraft* is "the authority" is at

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<sup>9</sup> Throughout his long life, Kant never entirely gave up a quest to somehow establish or prove the objective *Existenz* of God – a preoccupation of all philosophers of his age. He hoped to find some segue from "the moral law" to God but never did accomplish this even as his efforts were making him enemies among the churchmen of his time and place because of his criticisms of their doctrines. Yet the fact remains that he never gave up the attempt. His last gasp at this – quite literally – came in his unfinished *Opus Postumum*, but even there he did not solve the problem. Clearly Kant did not lack the virtue of stubbornness.

most a mere nominal convention, like that of calling a Pooh-Bah "the leader." **Authority is possession of the Kraft** and not the substance or thing-like entity said to possess it. Its *Dasein* is grounded in and only in *phenomenal* effects attributed to it.

This is not to say nominalism in *designating* someone as "the authority" or "the leader" does not also have an effect. Ruch and Zimbardo wrote, in regard to the nominal designation of someone as the leader, that "to lead one need only be labeled 'the leader'." What they mean by this is that other members of a group will tend to channel their suggestions through the designated leader, not interrupt him when he is talking as much as before he was designated or as they do to each other, to be less openly critical of his suggestions, and to be more affected by his evaluation of their suggestions than by others' evaluations. Initially, at least, this is likely to be so, especially if the members of the group do not know the designated leader-figure very well.

However, it must also be noted that this newly minted Pooh-Bah *is on probation* with his group inasmuch as he cannot count on this accorded respect *for his position* to be transferred to respect *for his person* by the group if he doesn't demonstrate meeting *their* expectations of *him*. A group of people in an organized relationship will usually recognize *the authority of a position* in the sense of acknowledging that position as a source of decisions and directions for the group and for individuals in the group, but this is not the same thing as recognizing the *occupier* of that position *as a leader*. The individual members of an organized group will usually each make it at least a maxim to acknowledge duties of followership to the authority of a position but at the same time not bind this duty to the individual named to that position. This is to say that for them to regard the authority of the position to be actual rather than problematic, they must judge the person holding that position as *fit to exercise* the *potential* authority of the position. This is to say the nominal leader must be judged to *demonstrate* the *Kraft* of authority *in his own person*.

In this way a person can make his maxim of followership duty to the authority of a position subject to exceptions that apply to its occupier *without experiencing* a dissonance or conflict in his own manifolds of rules and theoretical imperatives. Indeed, the individual's self-determined duty to the authority of the position can even allow him, by virtue of this distinction, *to conclude that this same duty requires the overthrow* of a Pooh-Bah named to that position. As noted before, all leader actions are fraught with risk *for the leader*.

This is why the real explanation of authority given above is an important factor. The followers' judgments of the fitness of a person occupying a position of authority will seek the formal expedience for this judgment as much in whether or not the person judged is meeting the criterion of increasing, strengthening, reinforcing, etc. the group (organization) as a whole as it will on whether or not the follower is satisfying his own conditions for joining himself to the

organization in the first place. This is especially the case when the people involved were not *founders* of the organization. This is to say that behind every person's decision to join himself with others in a common community (an organization in this case) is an *expectation* of a social compact of some sort and he *requires* every other member to be faithful to that compact *as he understands it*. He acknowledges authority *only* insofar as it benefits that social compact. He acknowledges authority-positions *only* insofar as he judges the position to be necessary for *realizing* the phenomenal effect of authority, *viz.* beneficial growth of some sort.

This is the *personality* ground for those manifestations in experience we usually call "loyalty" and "devotion." It underlies that immensely satisfying feeling being expressed by a person when he speaks of "belonging to something bigger than any one of us." It is also what understands the nature of the motivational dynamic captured by the old limerick,

Here's to me and here's to you  
And here's to love and laughter.  
I'll be true as long as you,  
And not one second after!

To understand this aspect of the motivational dynamic in more detail, we must next take up a closer examination of the ideas of compulsion and obligation.

#### § 4.2.2 Compulsion, Obligations, and the State of Being-obligated

Although the ideas of compulsion and coercion often tend to be regarded as synonyms or near-synonyms, there is in fact a Critical distinction between them we must apprehend. We begin by examining the Critical distinction between obligations and the *self-determined* state of being-obligated. Kant used two distinct technical terms in his German writings to distinguish these: (1) *Obligation* for the former; and (2) *Verbindlichkeit* for the latter. We will distinguish these in English by using "obligation" for the first and "Obligation" for the second.

The fundamental distinction is that between an Object ("Obligation") and the *representation* with necessity for an act in the manifold of rules and its conceptualization in an object-form in the manifold of concepts ("obligation"). An Obligation refers to an overall *orientation of judgmentation* in a person's self-determination of his appetites; we might very well call this a "mind set" of the human being. An obligation is a specific and concrete formal representation of this as an *example* object under this *general* Object. Kant tells us,

All Obligations to generous acts are active pledgings. I am bound to the act, although it is a service. Deeds whereby we can bind others if we perform them are services. We are bound to the act towards a person without being bound to the other [person]. *Obligati sumus ad actionem ita ut et illi non oobligati simus.*<sup>10</sup> We are bound to the act, not to the person. If I

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<sup>10</sup> "We are pledged to the action as such, and not pledged to the person."



am bound to help the unfortunate, and thus to the act but not the man, that would be active pledging. But if I owe a debt to someone, I am bound not only to the act of payment but also to the creditor, and that is passive<sup>11</sup> pledging. It seems, however, that all pledging is passive for if I am bound then I am obliged. Yet with an active pledging there is a constraint of reason, and I am constrained by my own considerations, so there is nothing passive about it; and passive pledging must come about through another, whereas if a man is necessitated by reason, he rules himself. The distinction of Obligation is therefore right. *Obligatio passiva est obligatio obligati erga obligantem, obligatio activa est obligatio erga non obligantem.*<sup>12</sup> – Kant, *Moralphilosophie Collins*, 27: 260

The effect of a maxim of obligation on judgmentation is that of a compulsory *inner* force. This brings us to the idea of *compulsion*. Kant tells us,

We begin by noting of compulsion in general that the necessitation is of two kinds, objective and subjective. Subjective necessitation is the representation of the necessity of acts *per stimulos* [by sensuous stimulation], or through the impelling causes of the subject. Objective compulsion is constraint of a person through that which has the greatest constraining and moving power in his subject. Compulsion is therefore not a necessity, but a constraint to act. But the being who is constrained must be one who would not do this act without constraint, and would, indeed, have objections against it. . . . Compulsion is thus a constraint of an act reluctantly done.

This constraint can be objective and subjective. Thus we forego a thing reluctantly from one inclination, though we do it according to another; as a miser, for example, forgoes a small advantage if he thereby secures a greater; but reluctantly because he would sooner have both. All compulsion is either pathological<sup>13</sup> or practical. Pathological compulsion is the making necessary of an act *per stimulos*; practical is the making necessary of an act reluctantly done *per motiva* [from motives]. No man can be pathologically forced because of free will. Human choice is an *arbitrium liberum*<sup>14</sup>, in that it is not necessitated *per stimulos*. Brutish choice is an *arbitrium brutum*<sup>15</sup> and not *liberum* because it can be necessitated through *stimulos*; if a man, for example, is pressed into an act by numerous and cruel tortures, he still cannot be forced to do the acts if he does not will it; he can, after all, withstand the torture. Comparatively speaking, he can be forced, indeed, but not strictly; it is still possible to refrain from the act regardless of all sensuous impulses. That is the nature of *arbitrium liberum*. . . Hence a man can be pathologically forced but only comparatively speaking, e.g. by torture.

An act is necessary if one cannot resist it; grounds are necessitating if human powers are not adequate to resist them. But a man can be practically forced *per motiva*, and then is not forced but moved. The compulsion, then, is not, however, subjective, for otherwise it would not, of course, be practical, and it is done *per motiva* and not *per stimulos*, for stimuli are subjective self-moving activities of the senses<sup>16</sup>. – [*ibid.*, 27: 266-267]

Boiled down to its essentials, then, **compulsion** is an effect wherein a person determines himself to do something that he would not otherwise do in the absence of some external circumstance. In every case this determination is still a self-determination and the act is not necessary but, rather, is made necessary (necessitated) by the person's self-determination.

<sup>11</sup> subject to passion or emotion

<sup>12</sup> "Passive pledging is pledging owed to an obliger, active pledging is not pledged to an obliger."

<sup>13</sup> Kant does not use "pathological" in any medical sense; he uses it to mean sensuously based in *soma*.

<sup>14</sup> free choice, choice that is determined or determinable independently of sensuous stimuli.

<sup>15</sup> choice that is determined through sensuous stimuli.

<sup>16</sup> "*motiva subjective moventes*"; Kant's Latin here must be translated as a full phrase to get his meaning.

Compulsion is necessarily occasioned by and in a relationship to some external circumstance because of the reluctance aspect of the choice made, and Kant takes pains to point out that there are two classes of compulsion (subjective and objective).

With subjective compulsion the person is concerned primarily or exclusively with inclinations towards his own well-being. His determined appetite is either grounded in some duty *to himself* or else is the result of a maxim standing under a hypothetical duty connected with the external circumstance. It manifests that concern for oneself Kant calls *self-love*. In state of nature relationships with other people this is the only kind of compulsion encountered. An investment banker bullying a company's board of directors is attempting to effect this sort of compulsion in the board members. A schoolyard bully intimidating a weaker child into handing over his lunch money is attempting to effect a compulsion of this sort. Both instances are correctly called *coercion*. A district attorney offering a deal to one of two criminal suspects, in order to get him to confess to the crime and implicate the other, is playing on the self-love of the person being interrogated, and this, too, is an attempt to effect subjective compulsion (in this case it is anti-social coercion if the suspect is actually innocent and is being frightened into making a false confession; coercion is a subjective compulsion grounded in non-reciprocal duty).

Attempts to effect subjective compulsion are frequently risky actions for the person attempting to stimulate compulsion. A schoolyard bully who picks the wrong victim runs a pretty high risk of getting nothing more than a pair of black eyes for his efforts. This is because the actions of the compeller might stimulate a *causatum* that brings a categorical duty to self<sup>17</sup> into effect, and some such duties are grounds for maxims of violence or retribution (fight rather than flight reaction). Compeller action triggering a practical hypothetical imperative in determination can have the compeller's desired effect only if the imperative involved belongs to the class of hypothetical duties to oneself (which have to do with Relation to the person's *situation*), and even then the practical *causatum* can be an action rule contrary to the compeller's intent.

The leader actions of an autocratic leader most often reach only maxims standing under practical imperatives of duties to self. He might be able to get what he wants but there will be utterly no loyalty to him granted by his followers. His relationships with them will be state-of-nature relationships. In Lao Tzu's hierarchy of leaders, the two poorest are those the people fear and those the people hate. Robert Louis Stevenson's Long John Silver was this sort of leader for his pirate crew but slightly better in Lao Tzu's ranking in regard to his relationship with young Jim Hawkins (whose fear of him was mingled with begrudged admiration).

Objective compulsion is correctly called *self-compulsion* because here the ground for self-

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<sup>17</sup> Recall that categorical duties are duties to one's own personality, i.e. pertain to *self-respect*.

determination is or stands under a practical hypothetical imperative of reciprocal Relation and a social contract. As Kant put it, in this case the person is not *forced* to act but, rather, *moved* to act. The distinction is one of the *attitude of reluctance*. The person still reluctantly acts, but in the case of objective compulsion the ground of self-determination involves or stands under *social* duties and obligations. Actions of this sort are those that are *deontologically ethical*. The most powerful of these are those where the self-determination to act is grounded in reciprocal duty while *at the same time* a self-determination *not* to do this act is contrary to a categorical duty of self-respect. The person is in this case doubly self-constrained and *no constraint has a more powerful practical effect than a categorical duty of self-respect*.

Here it is worth recalling that Rousseau's essential social contract is of a *twofold* character, involving a *condition* for an obligation self-assumed and a consequential *term* for the obligation. The condition relates to a duty to oneself and the term only to a reciprocal duty. He stated the condition as

The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before. – Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, 6

Rousseau stated the term as

Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole. – [*ibid.*]

There are well-known issues with this statement as Rousseau set it down, not the least of which is the central question of "What does 'the general will' mean?" Another important question not well addressed by Rousseau is "What does 'the power of the person' mean?" We will deal with both of these questions in the next chapter. Right now there are two things that call for our attention.

One of these is the concept of a relationship between the idea of authority and Rousseau's "general will." Authority is a *Kraft* for causing something to become greater, to increase, to be strengthened, or to be reinforced in some way. In the context of a social contract for a group of people (an organization) this something must stand in a relationship *with the condition of the contract* and can be described as *the commonwealth of the group*. The idea of the commonwealth of the group is this. Each member has his own specific interests and personal objectives to be gained from membership in the association. The *commonwealth* is the entirety of such personal interests and objectives *not in conflict with each other* (i.e., satisfaction of person X's objective does not necessarily imply frustration of person Y's objective). By another name this is known as *the general welfare*. A social contract is possibly only when commonwealth is possible.

It is because of the benefits of commonwealth that the members of the association regard their association – which is, after all, an *immaterial* entity properly called an *incorporation* (i.e., "bringing together as one body") – as an Object *founded upon a common purpose* of increasing and reinforcing the benefits to its members insofar as these benefits are congruent with the condition of commonwealth. This can be predicated on nothing else than *an expectation of authority vested in the incorporation*. The expectation of authority is never vested by any individual member in the *person* of another member. The context of authority is the association itself. People placed in positions of authority are those *expected by the members to make it an obligation* to see that the authority of the association is upheld. Authority figures, in other words, are *means* chosen for the association to *realize* (make actual) the authority of the incorporation.

Roughly, then, the *general will of the association* is the *objective* of establishing authority in the incorporation in service of the condition for the social contract. A tyrant or despot is not an authority; he is, socially, a threat or an enemy to an association, in a state of nature relationship with the members, and its members will deal with him from bases in duties to self.

The other thing that calls for our attention at this point is Rousseau's enthusiastic exaggeration that each member in an association puts *all* his power in common with the other members. This simply isn't true. Specifically, any member called upon to do something contrary to the condition for his self-imposed assumption of obligation in a social contract will not do it. He will, rather, regard the contract as breached if others attempt to force him to act in such a manner. In other words, no member ever assumes duties to the association unilaterally and without expectation that the association will reciprocate by assuming obligations to him. If, in his determination, this obligation is breached by the association it will stimulate reactions grounded in duties to self. As we will see later, this is the context for the *Realerklärung* of the idea of something being *unjust*, and that idea provides the context for the deontological *Realerklärung* of *justice*.

## § 5. The Practical Efficacy of Social Contracts

It can seem strange indeed that an organization made up of individuals who each act from a practical structure of maxims, *all* of which are *grounded* in deontologically moral imperatives, can nonetheless function as an entirely amoral association. Yet in the great majority of cases, especially in the U.S. business world, this is what happens. But there is no great mystery here. The association is made up of deontologically ethical people but their individual value structures and ethical codes are independent of each other's – other than for what commonality is found in them from the greater society of which they are each a part – and the typical organization does little or nothing to purposively build for itself an organizational culture capable of unifying these

individual value structures and theoretical imperatives. What typically happens instead is that this either is taken for granted (in which case most members simply presume that most or all of the others share the same one) or dismissed as unimportant, or as irrelevant, or as impossible to practically achieve because of differences in creeds, backgrounds, or other factors. Indeed, to tell many an American that he is a conformist is as likely to be taken as an insult as it is to be taken as a compliment in the business setting.

And yet the individual's deontological ethical-moral imperatives are the strongest factors in behavior self-determination. A few management theorists have recognized this, although they usually avoid using words like "moral" and "ethical" in their works. Thomas Watson, Jr., IBM's legendary president, CEO, and chairman of the board, wrote,

One may speculate at length as to the cause of the decline or fall of a corporation. Technology, changing tastes, changing fashions, all play a part. . . . No one can dispute their importance. But I question whether they in themselves are decisive.

I believe the real difference between success and failure in a corporation can very often be traced to the question of how well the organization brings out the great energies and talents of its people. What does it do to help these people find common cause with each other? . . . And how can it sustain this common cause and a sense of direction through the many changes which take place from one generation to another? . . .

Consider any great organization – one that has lasted over the years – and I think you will find that it owes its resiliency, not to its form of organization or administrative skills, but to the power of what we call *beliefs* and the appeal these beliefs have for its people.

This then is my thesis: I firmly believe that any organization, in order to survive and achieve success, must have a sound set of beliefs on which it premises all its policies and actions.

Next, I believe that the most important single factor in corporate success is faithful adherence to those beliefs.

And, finally, I believe if an organization is to meet the challenge of a changing world, it must be prepared to change everything about itself except those beliefs as it moves through corporate life.

In other words, the basic philosophy, spirit, and drive of an organization have far more to do with its relative achievements than do technological or economic resources, organizational structure, innovation, and timing. All these things weigh heavily in success. But they are, I think, transcended by how strongly the people in the organization believe in its basic precepts and how faithfully they carry them out. – Thomas J. Watson, Jr., *A Business and Its Beliefs*, 1

What Watson called "beliefs" other writers call "shared values." Peters and Waterman wrote,

Every excellent company we studied is clear on what it stands for, and takes the process of value shaping seriously. In fact, we wonder whether it is possible to be an excellent company without clarity on values and without having the right sorts of values.

[We] did an analysis of ["shared values"] about three years ago. . . . The study preceded the excellent companies survey, but the result was consistent with what we subsequently observed. Virtually all of the better performing companies we looked at in the first study had a well-defined set of guiding beliefs. The less well performing institutions, on the other

hand, were marked by one of two characteristics. Many had no set of coherent beliefs. The others had distinctive and widely discussed objectives, but the only ones that they got animated about were the ones that could be quantified – the financial objectives, such as earnings per share and growth measures. Ironically, the companies that seemed the most focused – those with the most quantified statements of mission, with the most precise financial targets – had done less well financially than those with broader, less precise, more qualitative statements of corporate purpose. (The companies without values fared less well, too.) – Peters & Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*

What the "excellent companies" of Peters and Waterman and the "successful organizations" of Watson had in common can be (and is) called many things, but at its root essence it was a *social contract* accepted by all (or, at least, the greatest majority) of its people. The "beliefs" spoken of by Watson and the "shared values" of Peters & Waterman were nothing else than a common understanding by the organizations' memberships of "who *we* are." Not surprisingly, these "beliefs" or "value systems" paid close attention to the factors that attracted people into these organizations in the first place and kept them there with enthusiasm year after year. They also, of course, paid similar attention to the factors that win the loyalty of customers, the confidence of investors, and other such factors – all parts of broader mini-communities that define a publicly held stock corporation – since, after all, the organizations themselves were business enterprises. What made Sparta the most formidable military power in Hellenic Greece is the same thing as what made the "excellent companies" excellent: unity of purpose among those joined together in the incorporation.

In every voluntary association of human beings brought together for some common purpose – even if that purpose is nothing more than to merely "make a living" – there is at the minimum an *expectation* of a social contract. No one, for example, accepts employment with a company with an expectation that sometimes the owner, chief executive officer, or anyone else can simply refuse to hand over his paycheck when payday rolls around, or that the check can bounce at the bank. The purpose for the existence of the organization sets the nature of the *common* social compact among its members. A car dealership achieves no common benefit to any of its stakeholders from the Spartan ceremony of beating the sons of its people bloody with whips once a year. If it did, someone would have tried it by now. What helped (or was thought to help) make a Spartan soldier a good soldier doesn't necessarily make a car salesman a good car salesman or a professional football player a good football player.

What does help determine "how well the organization brings out the great energies and talents of its people" is a commonly agreed to set of obligations and duties *to the association* (which, in the final analysis, means *to all its members*), and as all obligations and duties are self-determined and, furthermore, those that benefit an organization are obligations of *mutual* Relation, this common set comes from nowhere else than a social contract.

Again, leadership is not a personal characteristic; it is a social dynamic. The extent to which all the members in an association share a common understanding of a social contract determines the character of that organization's social dynamic. Also again, who the real leader is at any given moment is fluid; who is *granted custody of responsibility for authority* at a given time or in a given circumstance *is determined by those who choose to follow*. Each individual's manifold of rules constitutes his or her personal value structure; a social contract determines that of an association. It follows that the most cohesive association enjoying the greatest personal commitment by its members is that which has the most appropriate social contract as the basis for the reciprocal relationships among the members. And, *deontologically*, such an association is nothing else than *a moral society in miniature*. It is also what Rousseau called *a republic*.

## § 6. Tension

From the outer perspective of behaviors under practical maxims and imperatives, we now move to consideration of inner factors involved in the motivational dynamic. To effect a change in another person's behavior the leader's action must stimulate tension in the follower. Now we must look at the real nature of tension in a human being.

Although we commonly speak of feeling tense or feelings of tension, such a perception is only a particular perception of the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. Tension is the object to which this description refers and, ontologically, tension subsists in the motivational dynamic. It is not too difficult to deduce its 2LAR functional structure within the motivational dynamic by examination of observable behaviors we say manifest tension in a person. This requires one *momentum* from each of the four heads

{want, drive, drive state, type-of-motive}

in the 2LAR of the motivational dynamic. For tension this is

tension = {expression of interest, affirmation of reevaluation, enforcement of law, groping for equilibration}.

This is, of course, a mathematical representation of its *Existenz*-context since tension as an object is a *noumenon* at the horizon of possible experience. Expression of interest is the want-function. The term means expression by means of ratio-expression regulated according to standards of practical perfection. This says immediately that the cycle of judgmentation is being altered by ratio-expression through an orientation and regulation of the process of determining judgment. From this comes the cognitive character in the behaviors of a person one says is experiencing a state of tension. The human being *wants* to employ his power of thinking to understand what to do about the feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust* he is perceiving.

Affirmation of reevaluation is the drive-function. The term means affirming a *reactive* act of

ratio-expression due to *material* inexpedience in the manifold of Desires. Recall that conscious representations in the manifold of Desires are affective perceptions. Material inexpedience in the manifold means an aesthetical inexpedience and thus refers to the process of aesthetical reflective judgment and to the affective representation of desire. The teleological form of the reflective judgment (the desiration) will be one that has been not-incongruent with the manifold of rules in previous experiences but this time an aesthetical sense of dissatisfaction is consciously presented and the judgment of Desire has been produced with a feeling of *Unlust* that drives determination of the appetite away from what it was in the past. There are many possible sources of such a dissatisfaction. The actual experience might have been contrary to a cognitive-based expectation. An action in progress, previously successful, might have been externally thwarted, which would be an affective incongruence between anticipation and actuality. Whatever the inner logical cause is, the inexpedience produced in a reflective judgment has signaled failure to suit the formula of the categorical imperative and has the effect of acting as a "motivational trigger."

Enforcement of law is the drive state function. It is a categorical Relation bringing motivation (the accommodation of perceptions) under regulation by the manifold of rules. It is important to take note that the Relation is *categorical*. Whatever someone else might think of the situation and circumstances, to the person it *feels* wrong and it *is* practically imperfect. The person *is going to react*, and the reaction will seek a resolution congruent with the formula of the categorical imperative. *Anything* that *removes* the judicial imperfection through the accommodating acts of motivation will suit the purpose of practical Reason. Recall that a human being cannot judge perfection. He can only judge imperfection and can be said to react in order to produce *lack of imperfection*.

Groping for equilibration is the type-of-motive function. It is a problematical Modality for acting to find *any* resolution for the judicial imbalance by accommodating the manifold of *rules*. This is, for the human being, the most serious and earnest type of accommodation action he can undertake because it strikes at the very center of Reason's regulation of non-autonomic actions. Tension is an affirmation of *reevaluation*, which means that the psychic *Unlust* attending the circumstance is being produced by a discovery that the manifold of rules is not a *universal* structure of practical laws and maxims. It is an immediate failure *by the structure* of the manifold of rules to conform to the dictates of the formula of the categorical imperative. Practical conditions on maxims in the manifold of rules are going to be changed. It might be the case that the circumstance challenges a practical hypothetical imperative, in which case the imperative will be demoted by accommodation and some new imperative will be placed above it. Whatever the person finds that serves to restore practical equilibrium (a state that is judged by the negation of



the feeling of *Lust per se*) is going to be set up as the new "code" in the manifold of rules. If it is a practical imperative that has been challenged and undergoes acts of accommodation, the difficulty the human being experiences in his acts of reequilibration will be the greatest because standing under a practical hypothetical imperative is an entire large subnetwork of lesser maxims and practical rules, and practical congruence with this *entire* sub-network is what the person seeks to restore. Whatever accommodation accomplishes this will be accepted as "the new law" and the accompanying behaviors will be what was referred to earlier in this treatise as "satisficing" behaviors.

Furthermore, the Nature of practical Reason is *impatient*. The acts of accommodation are necessitated under the categorical imperative, and here the "blind and heartless" character of the process of Reason is important. Reason knows no objects and feels no feelings. Its regulative acts serve achievement of equilibrium *and nothing else*. If you will permit your author a bit of poetic license and allow me to anthropomorphize the mathematical process of pure practical Reason, it is the essence of the Freudian superego, the repository of value structure, the seat of moral attitude, and the champion of Critical good over evil. Tension is the clarion call for the regulation of pure practical Reason to take action and *set direction*.

If you are a younger person still yearning for your chance to "be the leader" and this picture scares you a bit, I will call you wise. Bear in mind that the actual behavior reaction evoked in tension will have the degree of its severity modulated by how high into the manifold of rules the *accommodation* being made penetrates. The higher is the placement in the manifold of the accommodated practical concepts, the greater is the scope of accommodation effects and the more unpredictable the reaction will be. A Pooh-Bah so unobservant as to be frequently in ignorance of how much practical accommodation his leader action is likely to provoke (and, really, "provoke" *is* the correct word to use) is a most practically unfit person for the role of leader.

A new cycle of judgmentation logically begins with a reflective judgment of inexpedience and innovates until equilibrium is achieved and signed by a reflective judgment of satisfaction. Motivation is transformation in a self-regulating law of compliance for judgmentation in general. The longer the effort required to reach equilibrium takes for the human being, the higher up into the manifold of rules the impact of tension will be. What Leavitt called *frustration* and mistook for a feeling is really *a rupture in the cycle of judgmentation* with the initiation of a new cycle in an entirely different direction. *This* is the direction a leader should dread events taking because, due to the diversity of individual moral codes, the behavioral outcome gets very unpredictable once frustration is established. The first victims of frustration are the maxims regulating interpersonal relationships and reciprocity of Obligation. Once relationships of reciprocity cease

to be in play in the cycle of judgmentation, the actions of the individual will revert to roots anchored by duties to himself and the commanding imperatives in the motivational dynamic become the imperatives that condition these.

Tensions not initially involving imperatives of duties to oneself and resolved in judgmentation before such imperatives are stimulated correspond to what Leavitt called *deprivations*. As all leader actions aim at the production of tension, it is important to keep practical hypothetical imperatives regulating reciprocal duties from coming to be co-involved with those regulating the hypothetical Relation class of duties to oneself in a manner directly leading to their accommodation in the manifold of rules. Co-involvement is a recipe for mere deprivation giving way to frustration. In more common terms, "the leader must make things such that the follower does not come to regard *him* as 'the problem'." In Kant's terminology, which we take up in chapter 7, the leader's aim should be necessitation (by the follower) via *motiva objective moventia*<sup>18</sup> and not *motiva subjective moventia*<sup>19</sup>.

If the leader's manipulations must, in his view, lead to the accommodation of such imperatives (or highly placed maxims near them), the manipulation must be such that the reciprocity relationships between the follower *and himself* first be divorced from participation in the motivational dynamic. This is what Leavitt referred to as "internal conflict." He wrote,

Much supervision is an attempt to control others through the use of conflict. . . Such control, through conflict, cannot be classed glibly either as good or bad. For the most part such measures do not introduce dangerous conflicts because they do not set up situations that involve feelings of guilt or threaten people's feelings of self-esteem. They are largely external to the personality. But insofar as some people may see rules as a challenge to their basic autonomy, the reaction may be intense.

Other uses of conflict as devices for controlling behavior can get more serious. Suppose, instead of the threat of discipline, we choose to try to develop "positive" feelings of loyalty and duty to the company – suppose we try to build a "company conscience" into our employees as we do into our children. If we succeed, we are setting up *internal* conflicts this time. Now it is not the boss the employee must worry about, but his own feelings of guilt. People who thus begin to feel honor-bound can get themselves into a tense emotional tizzy. And the probabilities of an irrational emotional blowoff are consequently greater. Paternalism is that kind of problem. – Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology*, 3

Leavitt is slightly off the mark in the last paragraph. The question is not whether or not the employee is "honor bound"; *ideally* this is what the leader *should want*. The question is *to what object he makes himself* honor bound. If you are his supervisor, you do not want this object to be *opposition to you*. You want it to be "*our* joint obligation to the company"<sup>20</sup>. This is in the essence of the difference between Kant's *motiva subjective moventia* and *motiva objective*

<sup>18</sup> "motives that objectively stir the senses"

<sup>19</sup> "motives that subjectively stir the senses"

<sup>20</sup> bearing in mind that "the company" means "all of us; all the members," and nothing else

*moventia*.

Leader actions could be called, with only mild romanticism, "tension management." How to practically accomplish this is, of course, one of those many things we say are "easier said than done." *Can* it be done, and, if so, *how*? Let us move on to chapter 7 and see what we can learn about this question.

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