

Chapter 13

The Agriculture of Republican Leadership**§ 1. Baconian Idols**

Without on-going investment of human effort, care, attention, and education to the civics of republican Enterprise, the Enterprise will fall to satisficing behavior and growing ignorance of its essential ailments in the relentless march of years and toil. There is no racial memory of history, and lessons of the past not taught are soon forgotten and pass from the knowledge of humankind. Progress gives way to an evolution of groping for petty responses to current interests and tensions similar in kind to what has been called "the English tradition of muddling through change." How many today know the establishment of the British Raj in India was the product of a series of accidental events rather than of imperial planning? The Raj was a *response*, not an *intent*.

Conceptualization in human understanding is no less subject to satisficing acts than is any other type of human act. The most common manifestation of this is the evolution of folkways and prejudices – attitudes that "are taken for granted" or "go without saying." There are very, very few things a republican community can take for granted and almost nothing that goes without saying and without saying repeatedly. Inattention to this leads, by a quite natural motivational dynamic of mental physics, to prejudices and folkways of thinking that Francis Bacon once called "idols of human understanding":

38. The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it, not only so beset men's minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access is obtained will again meet and trouble us at the instauration of the sciences, unless mankind when forewarned guard themselves with all possible care against them.

39. Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for the sake of distinction) we have assigned names, calling the first idols of the tribe, the second idols of the den, the third idols of the market, the fourth idols of the theater. . . .

41. The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and the very tribe or race of man; for man's sense is falsely asserted to be the standard of things; on the contrary, all the perceptions of both the senses and the mind bear reference to man and not to the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects¹

42. The idols of the den are those of each individual; for everybody (in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature, either from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and the authority acquired by those he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like; so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions) is variable,

¹ by another name, Bacon's idol of the tribe can be called naive realism.

confused, and, as it were, actuated by chance; and Heraclitus said well that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds and not in the greater or common world.²

43. There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from the commerce and association of men with each other; for men converse by means of language, but words are formed at the will of the generality, and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy; words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.³

44. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men's minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theater; for we regard all systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined as so many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present systems, or of the philosophies and sects of the ancients, since numerous other plays of a similar nature can still be composed and made to agree with each other, the causes of the most opposite of errors being generally the same. Nor, again, do we allude merely to general systems, but also to many elements and axioms of sciences which have become inveterate by tradition, implicit credence, and neglect. – Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book 1

It can be instructive to compare Bacon's idols to the four titles of the power of a person, i.e., physical power (tribe), intellectual power (den), persuasive power (market), and tangible power (theater). The presuppositions and prejudices of the individual that affect the course of his reasoning are well-called "idols" because they become such deeply ingrained habits of thinking that one might well say they are in some sense worshipped – an attachment that is demonstrated by the virulence with which some people respond to ideas that run counter to their prejudicial presuppositions. Bacon wrote of the idols of the tribe,

45. Human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order of equality in things than it really finds; and although many things in nature be *sui generis* and most irregular, will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives where no such thing is. . . .

46. Human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. . . .

47. Human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind . . .

48. Human understanding is active and cannot halt or rest, but even, though without effect, still presses forward. . . .

² there are interesting similarities between Bacon's idol of the den and Plato's famous myth of the cave in *Republic*.

³ a property of language Cicero stressed in fine detail in *De Oratore* and which propagandists exploit.

49. Human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits a tincture of will and passions, which generate their own system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers. . . .

51. Human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better to dissect than to abstract nature . . .

52. Such are the idols of the tribe, which arise either from the uniformity or the constitution of man's spirit, or its prejudices, or its limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference of the passions – [*ibid.*]

Bacon's idols of the tribe speak to the *homo noumenon* aspect of being human. In this context we have the counterpart in human mental nature to the physical characteristics of the *homo phaenomenon* aspect of being human. Regardless of how unflattering one feels Bacon's depiction of human nature just quoted is, the outcomes of the process of judgmentation he catalogs as idols of the tribe are no more and no less than manifestations of the groping for equilibrium that is the observable central regulating process of ratio-expression. Thus it is that your author compares the idols of the tribe to physical power – not as an example of it but as a homologue to it.

It might seem the parallels between the idols of the den and intellectual power are obvious enough to pass over without further comment. But, because it is precisely in that which seems most obvious and least in need of reflection where idols inhere, some additional explanation is a precautious wisdom. Bacon wrote,

53. The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature of each individual's mind and body, and also from education, habit, and accident . . .

54. Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become most habituated to them. If men of this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of a universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived fancies . . .

56. Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just medium, so as to neither tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns. But this is very prejudicial to science and philosophy . . .

58. Let such, therefore, be our precautions in contemplations, that we may ward off and expel the idols of the den, which mostly owe their birth either to some predominant pursuit, or, secondly, to an excess of analysis and synthesis, or, thirdly, to party zeal in favor of certain ages, or, fourthly, to the extent or narrowness of the subject – [*ibid.*]

It is perhaps a doleful reflection upon the deficiencies of education that the majority of scientists today are unaware of the central role Bacon played in the founding of the practices of modern science. Yet his role in pulling and prodding Western civilization from the doldrums of dogma that came out of medieval scholasticism was foundational (indeed, the founding of the Royal Society was inspired by Bacon's *New Atlantis*). Philosophers and scientists today dismiss Bacon as a man with pretensions of science who himself was no scientist, and if by this it is only

meant he was no physicist or chemist that is correct. But Bacon was, in great contrast, a political scientist in days when it was not dignified with the label of science and, as the quotations here intimate, he was a social-natural political scientist. It has not been to America's benefit that no American Bacon appeared on the scene between 1880 and 1910 when the modern conceptions of the American university and the American public school system were taking on the hodgepodge that is their modern form and spirit today. Some venerate the education system as if it were a statue of Athena robed in samite incorruptible, while others revile it as a Stonehenge of druids. There is no elitism in or merit to be found for ignorant idolatry of the den regardless of who the idol worshipper might be. Idols of the den produce poverty of intellectual power.

We might be able to pass even more swiftly over the parallels between persuasive power and the idols of the market were it not for the numbing constancy with which each of us is subjected to a ceaseless barrage of propaganda and sophism from every direction every day. In state of nature relationships most leader's actions are not aimed at the benefit of the follower but rather to benefit the self-interests of the leader. It is a testimony to the pervasiveness of propaganda and demagoguery that most people are not stimulated to anger from being lied to by others, and by ceaseless efforts to mislead them into acting in contradiction to their personal remote interests. Yet idols of language and oratory can as easily be used to deliberately deceive as to produce unintended misunderstandings among people. Bacon wrote,

59. The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all, those namely which have entwined themselves round the understanding from their associations of words and names. For men imagine that their reason governs words, whilst, in fact, words react upon understanding; and this has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive. Words are generally formed in a popular sense, and define things by those broad lines which are most obvious . . . but when a more acute understanding or more diligent observation is anxious to vary those lines, and to adapt them more accurately to nature, words oppose it. Hence the great and solemn disputes of learned men often terminate in controversies about words and names, in regard to which it would be better . . . to bring such disputes to a regular issue by definitions. Such definitions, however, cannot remedy the evil . . . because they consist themselves of words, and those words produce others; so that we must have recourse to particular instances and their regular series and arrangement . . .

60. The idols imposed upon understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either the names of things which have no existence (for as some objects are from inattention left without a name, so names are formed by fanciful imagination which are without an object), or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things. – [*ibid.*]

Most people presume that their words are heard by others in precisely the same context as these words symbolize meanings in their own minds, and they do not take the trouble to examine if a disagreement that issues thereafter is due to nothing more than different conceptual contexts between the speaker and the hearer. It is a *carelessness* that is nothing else than lingering habit of

what Piaget called the egocentrism of the child – for it is easily observed that small children always presume that meanings are the same for everyone and that everyone understands precisely what and as the child himself understands. The idols of the market are the by-product of adult childishness. That these idols can be easily exploited – and methods for doing so taught – is one of the important lessons Cicero bequeathed to humankind.

Finally we come to the parallels between idols of the theater and the tangible power of a person (which subsists in the stock of goods, both tangible and intangible, the person has acquired and has available for tangible *employment* in carrying out his life's enterprises and enjoyments). Beyond material possessions, a person's acquired vocational skills, social skills, and skills of discipline in reasoning all play vital roles in his commerce of life. These things are not innate in human nature; they are *bought* through experience and acquisitive work. Similarly, Bacon wrote:

61. The idols of the theater are not innate, nor do they intrude themselves secretly into understanding, but they are manifestly instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules of demonstration. . . .

62. The idols of the theater, or of theories, are numerous, and may, and perhaps will, be still more so. For unless men's minds had been now occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, and civil governments (especially monarchies) had been averse to novelties of that nature even in theory (so that men must apply to them with some risk and injury to their own fortunes, and not only without reward, but subject to contumely and envy), there is no doubt that many other sects of philosophers and theorists would have been introduced, like those which formerly flourished in such diverse abundance amongst the Greeks. For as many imaginary theories of the heavens can be deduced from the phenomena of the sky, so it is even more easy to found many dogmas upon the phenomena of philosophy; and the plot of this our theater resembles those of the poetical, where the plots which are invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasurable than those taken from real history.

In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either too much from a few topics, or too little from many; in either case their philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and natural history, and decides on too scanty grounds. . . .

64. The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school; not being founded in the light of common notions (which however poor and superstitious, is yet in a manner universal and of a general tendency), but in the confined obscurity of a few experiments. Hence this species of philosophy appears probable, and almost certain to those who are daily practiced in such experiments, and have thus corrupted their imagination, but incredible and futile to others. . . .

65. The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with superstition and theology is of a much wider extent, and is most injurious to it both as a whole and in parts. For human understanding is no less exposed to the impressions of fancy than to those of vulgar notions. . . .

67. Understanding must also be cautioned against the intemperance of systems, so far as regards its giving or withholding its assent; for such intemperance appears to fix and perpetuate idols, so as to leave no means of removing them.

These excesses are of two kinds. The first is seen in those who decide hastily, and render the sciences positive and dictatorial. The other in those who have introduced skepticism, and vague unbounded inquiry. The former subdues, the latter enervates understanding. –

[*ibid.*]

Ideas and theories are idea-products of ratio-expression and are bought either cheaply, on the one hand, through little effort or dearly, on the other, through much effort. In either case, once an idea or a theory has been cultivated in the manifold of concepts, the overriding regulation for total and universal equilibrium under the formula of the practical categorical imperative of pure practical Reason tends to conserve them. Judgmentation attempts to force-fit new ideas and new theories into accommodation to the old, rather than to re-fit the old in accommodation with new experience. But *no* idea is so universally certain and complete as to claim immunity to change for all time and over the long march of accumulating human experiences. Every idea has a life cycle of its own, and even an idea of great benefit at the time of its origination will, as it calcifies into dogma, reach a decrepit old age when it is no longer great.

No person need ever fear an *idea* – because an idea is an insubstantial thing – even if there might be reason to fear the person presenting the idea. The idols of the theater are men's weapons against self- and community-improvement, against the betterment of general welfare, and against utilities that benefit a larger portion of humankind. The idols of the theater are like a *tax* that takes from a person liberty to employ his tangible power. If advances in the general betterment of society are ever to keep pace with advances in material science, the taxing effects of dogmatic idols must be recognized and dogmatism itself eliminated in favor of the sober *refinement* of ideas. A new idea is like an unprocessed ore just mined; in it will be not only benefit but also disbenefit and harm. The refinement of ideas is the name given here to the cooperative process of extracting the good and discarding the bad in bringing new ideas into *practical realization*.

§ 2. The Agriculture of Enterprise

The Baconian idols can be taken for similes and likened to climate and soil conditions in an agricultural metaphor for the governance of leadership. It has been the foolish practice of the industrial age to use similes of manufacturing and the processing of dead matter as guidelines applied to the governance of leadership. A less efficacious species of idol can hardly be imagined. If any business-based metaphor be used at all, the most fit one is agriculture. The farmer does not grow the corn; the corn grows itself. The farmer *provides* conditions and aliments that best enable the corn to do so, and *that* is his context for "growing the corn." A leader cannot determine the follower; all he does is guide and stimulate a follower's *self*-determinations. *That* is the active governance of leadership. Herein lies the wisdom of what Lao Tzu said twenty-six centuries ago:

Why is the sea the king of a hundred streams?
Because it lies below them.
Therefore it is the king of a hundred streams.

If the sage ruler would guide the people, he must serve with humility.
To lead the people he walks behind them. – Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, 66

If a team of able executives in an entity should decide to re-make their organization into a republican Enterprise, they should not rush in haste to do so. Rather, they must first understand and gauge the formidable obstacles that the idols of the tribe, den, market, and theater will place in the way to this goal, and then they must carefully plan the campaign by which the enslaving effects of these idols might be overcome. *Every human organization is a political institution.* To alter an existing one, he who would alter it will be wise to employ the favorite maxim of Caesar Augustus; he should *festina lente* – make haste slowly. Again, as Mill correctly noted:

Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions . . . are the work of men; owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble trees which, once planted, "are aye growing" while men "are sleeping."⁴ In every stage of their existence they are made what they are by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are made by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skill may have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these. And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure have not had it in their power, to give themselves a constitution by the tentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as the sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of political progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it does not prove that what has been found good for others would not have been good also for them, and will not be so still when they think they are fit to adopt it.

On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available. This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfill its purposes. The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation.

The failure of any of these conditions renders a form of government, whatever favorable promise it may otherwise hold out, unsuitable to the particular case. – John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, ch. 1

A fool might plant potatoes in a swamp, but only he will be surprised when they do not grow. In whatever place on whatever day with whichever group, the idols of the tribe, den, market, and theater will be as present as soil and weather on a farm; they set growing conditions in which the agriculture of leadership will either flourish or fail. Without full and active citizenship in the participation of the members of the community, no republic can succeed or survive. Once again,

⁴ Mill paraphrases Sir Walter Scott: "Jock, when ye hae naething else to do, ye may ay sticking in a tree; it will be growing, Jock, while ye're sleeping" – *The Heart of Midlothian* (1818), ch. 8.

citizenship is the actuality of individual actions congruent with conventional standards of expectation for civic actions. Citizenship is more than a mere attitude and it is *never* an entitlement. A person can be nominally labeled a citizen, but if his actions do not conform to the term of the social contract (the *condition* of citizenship) the label is meaningless. Arguing otherwise is making, as Lincoln once put it regarding another matter, "a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a man can prove a horse chestnut to be a chestnut horse."⁵ When, in any community calling itself republican, those people who are called citizens claim to keep the title but then neglect the duties of citizenship, there is no surer sign republicanism is extinguished and that, whatever else it may have devolved into, that community is no longer a republic.

A republican community is a community whose members practice *civic* morality. But here it must always be remembered that no convention of morality can command universal respect and practical adherence to its standards unless that convention is grounded in *deontological* ethics. It is, of course, possible for a small *and homogeneous* community to substitute, for a time, other ethical premises such as those of a common religion, a common consequentialist convention, or a common convention of virtue ethics. The early history of America displays precisely this. But it must also and always be remembered that the early American communities were small and were made up in preponderance by, as John Jay put it, "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion . . . , very attached to the same manners and customs".⁶ For a time such an homogeneous community can be a moral community but the conditions are unstable. Growth and the infusion of new members with other backgrounds will "alter the mix in the melting pot" of the community. The result will be that the special conditions that supported the original non-universal moral standards will cease to hold and the old moral order will disintegrate because it cannot assimilate its new population *by their consent*. It was for this reason that ancient Sparta *utterly* forbade immigration *and* discouraged travel by Spartans.

A great many people – perhaps even a great majority of people – *practice* deontological ethics while *misconceptualizing* their moral tenets as religious, consequentialist, or virtuous tenets of ethics. This is not mysterious. The ground of all ethics is the personal, experience-driven and accidental *construction* of the manifold of rules in human practical Reason. But Reason is a cognitively dark and affectively cold capacity of mind. The rules in the manifold of rules are utterly practical, utterly non-objective, and utterly non-affective. The process of practical judgment is regulated *only* by the pure categorical imperative of practical Reason, and this imperative mandates nothing but a *formula*: universal practicality *for equilibrium*.

⁵ Abraham Lincoln, *First Lincoln-Douglas Debate*, Ottawa, IL, August 21, 1858.

⁶ John Jay, *The Federalist*, no. 2.

And yet this process of practical judgment does not operate independently of the acts of its organic partner processes of determining and reflective judgment. Practical judgment cannot recognize universal law, but it can and does judge *lack of practical* universality. This is why we encounter the peculiar phenomenon of experience that most conceptualized statements of moral tenets are framed in the negative – as, e.g., in the case of the ten Mosaic commandments in *Exodus*, eight of which begin with *You shall not*, another contains *you shall not* in its explicit instruction, and only one of which ("Honor your father and your mother") is stated in the positive terminology of a *you shall*. *Conceptualized* moral tenets, which belong to the manifold of concepts rather than the manifold of rules, are but objective reflections, produced in the general synthesis of the overall process of judgmentation, by which the human being seeks and finds an *expedient* satisfaction for regulation by the pure practical categorical imperative.

This is demonstrated by a psychological phenomenon Piaget observed in small children, and which he dubbed *the moral realism* of the child. Piaget reported,

We have had occasion to see during our analysis of the rules of a game that the child begins by regarding these rules not only as obligatory, but also as inviolable and requiring to be kept literally. We also showed that this attitude was the result of the constraint exercised by older children and of the pressure of adults themselves, rules being thus identified with duties properly so called. . . .

We shall speak of *moral realism* to designate on the plane of judgments of value what corresponds to "nominal realism" and even verbalism or conceptual realism on the plane of theoretical reasoning. Not only this, but just as realism in general . . . results both from a confusion between subjective and objective (hence from egocentrism) and from the intellectual constraint of the adult, so also does moral realism result from the intersection of these two kinds of causes.

We shall therefore call moral realism the tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself.

Moral realism thus possesses at least three features. In the first place, duty, as viewed by moral realism, is essentially heteronomous. Any act that shows obedience to a rule or even to an adult, regardless of what he may command, is good; any act that does not conform to rules is bad. A rule is therefore not in any way something elaborated, or even judged and interpreted by the mind; it is given as such, ready made and external to the mind. . . . The good, therefore, is rigidly defined by obedience.

In the second place, moral realism demands that the letter rather than the spirit of the law shall be observed. This feature derives from the first. . . .

In the third place, moral realism induces an objective conception of responsibility. We can even use this as a criterion of realism, for such an attitude towards responsibility is easier to detect than the two that precede it. For since he takes rules literally and thinks of good only in terms of obedience, the child will at first evaluate acts not in accordance with the motive that has prompted them but in terms of their exact conformity with established rules. Hence this objective responsibility of which we shall see the clearest manifestations in the moral judgment of the child. – Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, ch. 2

Yet, perhaps surprisingly, this literal attitude towards rules is also accompanied, in younger

children, by a general lack of understanding of and even by a lack of attention to what the rule itself is. The child frequently forms his moral judgment *ex post facto* when a specific outcome of a specific action produces a cognitive disagreement between this outcome and the child's concept of the rule. The young child evidences in his behavior simultaneously a *reverence* of rules, amounting to a *religious zeal*, side by side with the most flagrant *inattention* to those same rules. Piaget tells us,

The case of Geo [one of the boys in Piaget's study] comes as a beautiful confirmation of what we said in connection with Fal [another boy in the study], viz., that for little children inventing a game comes to the same thing as finding in one's head a game that has already been anticipated and classified by the most competent authorities. Geo attributes the game he has invented to divine inspiration, and supposes it to be already known to the "Gentlemen of the Commune."⁷ . . .

With regard to the practical application of rules all these children . . . belong to the stage of egocentrism. The result is clearly paradoxical. Here are children playing more or less as they choose; they are influenced, it is true, by a few examples that have been set before them and observe roughly the general schema of the game; but they do so without troubling to obey in detail the rules they know or could know with a little attention, and without attributing the least importance to the most serious infringements of which they may be guilty. Besides all this, each child plays for himself, he pays no attention to his neighbor, does not seek to control him and is not controlled by him . . . And yet these same children harbor an almost mystical respect for rules: rules are eternal, due to the authority of parents, of the Gentlemen of the Commune, and even of an almighty God. It is forbidden to change them, and even if the whole of general opinion supported such a change, general opinion would be in the wrong: the unanimous consent of all the children would be powerless against the truth of Tradition. As to any apparent changes, these are only complementary additions to the initial Revelation: thus Geo . . . believes the rules invented by him to be directly due to a divine inspiration analogous to the inspiration of which the Gentlemen of the Commune were the first recipients.

In reality, however, this paradox is general in child behavior and constitutes, as we shall show towards the end of the book, the most significant feature of the morality belonging to the egocentric stage. . . . With regard to moral rules, the child submits more or less completely in intention to the rules laid down before him, but these, remaining, as it were, external to the subject's conscience, do not really transform his conduct. This is why the child looks upon rules as sacred though he does not put them into practice. – [*ibid.* ch. 1]

It is as amusing as it is instructive to look in detail at Piaget's report of little Geo's reaction when he is told that a rule he has just made up (and has attributed to divine revelation by God) is "not known to the Gentlemen of the Commune"; he is completely taken aback, utters a little cry of astonishment and alarm – "Oh!" – and immediately repudiates the rule variation he invented. He is discomforted and humbled, presumably because he has already played his rule variation and thus, in a manner of speaking, has committed a sin. In a twinkling he transforms his rule-concept into a *you shall not* **theoretical** categorical imperative as rigid as the laws of *Deuteronomy*.

⁷ that is, the town council. Little Geo (age six years) thinks the rules of the game of marbles were set down by the town council, acting under instruction from God, at the beginning of the world.

Adults, having been socialized, are not so strict moral realists as young children (although it does seem that this never entirely disappears), nor do they take rules so literally as children do. Even so, the phenomenon lingers on in more diluted form – because the *scheme* of judgmentation is set by mental physics – and is manifested in the Baconian idols. The cycle of judgmentation involves all three processes of judgment (practical, reflective, and determining); in consequence of this, there is a much more intimate linkage between aesthetics and morality than many people appear to suspect. This was noted by American philosopher George Santayana:

The relation between æsthetic and moral judgments, between the spheres of the beautiful and the good, is close, but the distinction between them is important. One factor of this distinction is that while æsthetic judgments are mainly positive, that is, perceptions of the good, moral judgments are mainly and fundamentally negative, or perceptions of evil. Another factor of the distinction is that whereas, in the perception of beauty, our judgment is necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of the immediate experience, and never consciously on the idea of an eventual utility in the object, judgments about moral worth, on the contrary, are always based, when they are positive, upon the consciousness of benefits probably involved⁸.

Hedonistic ethics have always had to struggle against the moral sense of mankind. Earnest minds, that feel the weight and dignity of life, rebel against the assertion that the aim of right conduct is enjoyment. . . . The truth is that morality is not mainly concerned with the attainment of pleasure; it is rather concerned, in all its deeper and more authoritative maxims, with the prevention of suffering. There is something artificial in the deliberate pursuit of pleasure . . . We feel no duty in that direction; we take to enjoyment naturally enough after the work of life is done, and the freedom and spontaneity of our pleasures is what is most essential to them.

The sad business of life is rather to escape certain dreadful evils to which our nature exposes us – death, hunger, disease, weariness, isolation, and contempt. By the awful authority of these things, which stand like specters behind every moral injunction, conscience in reality speaks, and a mind which they have duly impressed cannot but feel, by contrast, the hopeless triviality of the search for pleasure. It cannot but feel that a life abandoned to amusement and to changing impulses must run unawares into fatal dangers. The moment, however, that society emerges from the early pressure of the environment and is tolerably secure against primary evils, morality grows lax. The forms that life will farther assume are not to be imposed by moral authority, but are determined by the genius of the race, and opportunities of the moment, and the tastes and resources of individual minds. The reign of duty gives place to the reign of freedom, and the law and covenant to the disposition of grace. – George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, § 3

The prevention of suffering is a common aim and, as it were, substrate of the first five general objectives of republican governance: (1) to form a more perfect union; (2) establish justice; (3) insure civil tranquility; (4) provide for the common defense; and (5) promote the general welfare. Systems and mechanisms of governance exist to satisfy these objectives for *every* citizen in the community. The remaining objective – to secure the blessings of civil liberty – is to fulfill completion of the condition of the social contract. But the systems of governance must be staffed

⁸ as an example, "Honor your father and your mother, *that your days may be long in the land which your Lord God gives you.*" *Exodus* 20: 12

by ordinary people and the mechanisms of governance operated by them. The deontological backdrop for these objectives – insofar as the prevention of suffering is the underlying real factor – is a deontological *moral* backdrop. Agents of governance are always expected by the citizenry to be *moral agents*; this alone constitutes *merit* in republican governance. To be a republican community and to be a deontologically moral community are inseparable. Moral leadership is not a mere *desideratum* of republicanism; it is a *mandate*. This, and the deontological nature of social-natural morality, are two aspects that recent books and articles published on the topic of moral leadership in business seem to miss substantially.

But all systems of civic morality are civil conventions of morality. If the community now has no shared common convention of this, the institution of republican governance is proportionally limited in the scope of what it can be practically expected to achieve in the short run. This is why it was said above that would-be founders of republican civil Enterprise should heed the *festina lente* of Caesar Augustus. In the agriculture of Enterprise, before the first tilling of the soil is attempted must come an ascertainment of what current factors of a common deontological moral compact are present – what soil nutrients are already present – and a careful assessment of what additional terms of such a compact are most immediately pressing – i.e., what fertilizer is going to be immediately most efficacious.

The latter cannot be dictated by fiat. The principal practical problem republicans must face in establishing a republican Enterprise is the individuality of each person's practical moral code – his individual manifold of rules as he has built it prior to republican association. Again, it is this individuality of moral codes that necessitates the moral convention of the community be made a deontological convention. It must further be kept in mind that of the three Relations of duty (categorical, hypothetical, and reciprocal), the first two pertain to duties to oneself and for these the other community members are locked out of having a say. Only reciprocal duties, founded upon a pact of mutual obligation, are open to and belong to the fair province of community life. If a particular individual's self-determined duties to himself do not permit him to take onto himself the reciprocal duties of a citizen, *and if these community duties of citizenship are indeed deontologically sound*, no social union between that individual and the other members is possible and the community has no option but to exclude that person from its membership.

Growing a republican Enterprise is a step-by-step process of incremental perfections (actions to make the union more perfect than it was). For this reason, leaders' actions taken to found republican community are *acts of civic education and civil persuasion*. Again, *every* leader's action is fraught with risk *for the leader*. This is nowhere more the case than in the case of leader's actions aimed at growing the synergy of agreement a civil moral convention embodies.

Remember that moral realism is not completely extinguished and understand that this moral realism will be at its most potent in regard to duties a person makes to himself. Be aware that the principal risk here is grounded in a zealous – almost religious – character of affectivity when such duties are involved, and that the motivational dynamic will bring this character to the fore if the leader tries to get too far ahead of where the civic education of the followers enables them to go. The civil moral convention cannot be dictated, and attempting to do so destroys the authority expectation the founder-agent must be granted by the citizens if he is to succeed as their leader.

Yet the task, while difficult to a degree not to be underestimated, is neither impractical nor is it a hopeless task. Socialization of the individual – by his experiences in the larger social community if by no other source – does provide, by its social-natural character, some seeding of common grounds. Mill wrote,

When an institution, or a set of institutions, has the way prepared for it by the opinions, tastes, and habits of the people, they are not only more easily induced to accept it, but will more easily learn, and will be, from the beginning, better disposed, to do what is required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into such action as enables them to produce their best results. It would be a great mistake in any legislator not to shape his measures so as to take advantage of such pre-existing habits and feelings when available. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to elevate these mere aids and facilities into necessary conditions. People are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to; but people also learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first. There are abundant instances in which a whole people have been eager for untried things. The amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances, is itself one of the elements of this question. . . . The capability of any given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of government cannot be pronounced on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity, must be the guides. – John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, ch. 1

§ 3. The Necessity of the Education Institution for Republican Enterprise

The first maxim of Enterprise growth is: Do not take for granted that a common understanding of civil convention is already in place, or that if one is in place it is congruent to republican governance of Enterprise leadership. The individuality of personal moral codes and the variations of accidents of experience among the membership both work to make this unlikely. The real social-natural environment must be explored with the penetrating impartiality of a practical scientist at work. The next step is to plan and initiate the process of civil education found necessary to induce the community to move towards a minimal conventional agreement. This, and subsequent actions for making this civil convention more perfect, is the task of the republican *institution of education*. It is an institution serving the first general objective – to form a more perfect union – and its neglect is a practical guarantor of plutocratic breakdown.

The need for this institution arises from the fact that while republican leadership governance is *in principle* the most effective means for marshalling the energy, commitment, and competence of the entrepreneurs within the Enterprise, *in practice* it is both difficult to achieve and difficult to maintain. It cannot be maintained among a people uneducated to republicanism or uneducated in the ways by which the social contract works to each individual's *general* benefit.

A people who are uneducated in either of these regards are, bluntly but truthfully, *unfit* to be governed and *unable* or *unwilling* to work the mechanisms of governance as their reciprocal duties require. It is an unfortunate and grim fact of history that ignorant people cannot enjoy both liberty *and* security. If they are free it is because they live in a state of nature wherein they have, so far, been more successful predators than their neighbors. But this is liberty without security. If they are secure, it is because they are subjugated to masters whose own self-interests motivate them to maintain subjugated people to serve them. The price of this security is slavery, and should a serf become a hindrance to his master rather than an asset, the master has the power to remove the hindrance by removing the serf. It is thus a security bought at the price of selling oneself, and a slave is deprived of civil freedom.

The serf cannot defend himself by himself, and his ignorance hinders him from joining with others to successfully throw off his enslavement. A subjugated group might, it is true, temporarily throw off one tyrant or small group of tyrants, but their ignorance of the nature of their own temporary social compact inevitably leads them to merely replace of one set of tyrants with another. In the modern era there has been no better illustration of this than the Russian Revolution of 1917; the people of Russia could overthrow their czar, but they merely replaced him with the tyranny of Lenin's Bolsheviks. It remains to be seen if the current Russian Federation will endure or if it, too, will fall under some new set of despots calling themselves by some new name.

It is the same in commercial entities. Again, as Adam Smith wrote,

It is not . . . difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. . . . A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, a merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate. – Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 1, VIII

Andrew Carnegie wrote much the same thing:

Labor is usually helpless against capital. The employer, perhaps, decides to shut up the shops; he ceases to make profits for a short time. There is no change in his habits, food, clothing, pleasures – no agonizing fear of want. Contrast this with his workman whose

lessening means of subsistence torment him. He has few comforts, scarcely the necessities for his wife and children in health, and for the sick little ones no proper treatment. – Andrew Carnegie, *The Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie*, 18

Suppose that some great fraction of the employees of a particular business were to rebel against an iron-handed owner and say to themselves, "We don't need *him*. We can go into business for ourselves," and then were to do so. If they are ignorant men then, even disregarding the obvious disadvantages they would face from loss of access to the tangible capital assets of the first entity, they will likewise lack the intangible assets of personal power to cooperate successfully and manage their own concern. Carnegie was equally blunt about this question of employee ownership:

[Unequal] management produces unequal results. It will be precisely the same if one of these manufactories belongs to the workmen themselves; but in this case, in the present stage of development of the workmen, the chances of failure will be enormously increased. It is, indeed, greatly to be doubted whether any body of working-men in the world today could organize and successfully carry on a mining or manufacturing or commercial business in competition with concerns owned by men trained to affairs. – Andrew Carnegie, "An Employer's View of the Labor Question" (1886), in *The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays*

Carnegie was right about the ill-effects that lack of proper *vocational* education has on the success of an entity of enterprises, but – Gamesman that he was and relishing the quasi-state-of-nature business world he succeeded in so amazingly – he overlooked a more important factor, namely the ill-effects a lack of proper *civics* education wreaks upon human cooperation. This is by far the more important and fundamental issue; vocational training is not so difficult to provide, but civics education is another matter altogether. One could almost say that civics is, in a peculiar and very specific context, *non-natural* because it requires people to alienate some of their natural liberties in exchange for civil liberties. But this always and only is possible by means of *mutual* obligation and *reciprocal* duties. John Stuart Mill wrote,

We have recognized in representative government the ideal type of the most perfect polity, for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them . . . Let us examine at what point in the descending series representative government ceases altogether to be admissible, either through its own unfitness, or the superior fitness of some other regimen.

First, then, representative, like any other government, must be unsuitable in any case in which it cannot permanently subsist – i.e., in which it does not fulfill the three fundamental conditions enumerated in the first chapter. These were – 1. That the people should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation. 3. That they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them. . . .

In any case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at all likely to

be made, indifference to it, and inability to understand its processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition, are the obstacles to be expected. These, however, are as fatal, and may be as hard to be got rid of, as actual aversion . . . When a people have no sufficient value for, and attachment to, a representative constitution, they have next to no chance of retaining it. . . .

Representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be overthrown, as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader who can muster force for a *coup de main*, is willing to run some small risk for absolute power.

These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a representative government. The third is, when the people want either the will or the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in a representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small fraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the State necessary to the formation of public opinion, the electors will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of someone with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the representative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of seeking their fortune. – John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, 4

Civilizations, Toynbee wrote, fall from within. A republic falls from within – assuming it succeeded in arising in the first place – primarily from the apathies of ignorance, out of which eventually flow not merely dereliction of duty but ignorance of what necessitated duties to the republic one even has. When the citizens take their republic for granted, they lose it. Republican community is not a self-evident thing nor a trivial idea; if it were, then the dawn of history would have cast its first light upon a Mesopotamia of republics rather than a Mesopotamia of harsh and brutal tyrant-kings. The spirit of republicanism is not absorbed by the young through osmosis merely because they might have chanced to grow up living in one. Quite to the contrary: that in which one is immersed one soon stops noticing, stops pondering, stops regarding, and stops valuing until after it is gone. The life-giving aliment of a republic is civic education, for this alone feeds the intellectual, tangible, and persuasive powers of a person to sustain his civil liberties and maintain his civil rights. The authority vested in agents of governance by republican citizens includes as a most basic ingredient the expectation that the republican mind will be nourished. It is necessary for the possibility of sustaining a union – let alone forming a more perfect one. Thus, the institution of civic education is made a necessary branch of republican governance of leadership. We call the agents of this institution *educators*.

If democratic nations have been too careless historically to insure adequate merit be demonstrated by their legislators, executives, and judges, they have been even more careless and remiss regarding their education institution. In America, civic education was once, and briefly, called liberal education. It was a brief flower that bloomed for a short time at the beginning of the American republic and has been as extinct as the dinosaurs for the past half century. If there is

even one person in American history who earned the honor of being called a champion of republican civic education, that person would be Thomas Jefferson. He wrote, regarding the institution of public schools for the children of Virginia,

The objects of this primary education would be,

To give to every citizen the information he needs for the transaction of his own business;

To enable him to calculate for himself, and to express and preserve his ideas, his contracts, his accounts, in writing;

To improve, by reading, his morals and his faculties;

To understand his duties to his neighbors and country, and to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by either;

To know his rights; to exercise with order and justice those he retains; to choose with discretion the fiduciary of those he delegates; and to notice their conduct with diligence, with candor, and judgment;

And, in general, to observe with intelligence and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.

– Thomas Jefferson, "Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia," (1818), in *The Portable Thomas Jefferson*

Understanding "morals" to mean precisely *deontological ethics*, "rights" to mean *civil rights*, "duties" to mean *civic duties*, "justice" to mean *the negating of that which is unjust* under the social contract, and "faithfulness" to mean *true allegiance to the republic*, these six objectives are none other than ***the prime objectives of the institution of public education***. That there are investment costs to be borne in realizing these objectives is obvious. But, in the language of commerce and business, these costs are nothing more and nothing less than investments in the *intellectual capital* of the community. The mission and task of civic education, being *vital* to sustaining Enterprise, can no more be outsourced than a nation can outsource its armed forces and hire others to defend its citizens. The Western Roman Empire, in its last stages of disintegration, tried such an outsourcing scheme; it paid for it with its own *Existenz*, falling to the barbarians they regarded as their hirelings. With its fall came Europe's long Dark Age.

One who would lead his fellows and his entity to republican Enterprise must undertake leader's actions productive for the establishment of the education institution of governance. Then he, and his later successors, must undertake leader's actions necessary to sustain it. It is possible – indeed, it is often economic – to outsource mere vocational education or vocational training. But ***practical civic education***, firmly grounded in the mental physics of human nature, cannot be outsourced to others – outlaw barbarians – whose special interests are not those of the Enterprise. It is practical civic education – and practical civic education alone – that it is the *civic duty* of the citizens of republican Enterprise to provide for their union.

An aggregate of people unaccustomed to and uneducated in republican community are unfit to receive immediate imposition of republican governance of leadership. Strangers to its principles, they will not know how to work its mechanisms, will not know what duties are merely those they owe to themselves as individuals vs. those which are reciprocal, will not understand the necessity to answer the call to service when their fellows call upon them. More acclimated to the state of nature than to the social contract, their satisficing behavior is enough to insure the failure of a too abrupt transition to republican governance of leadership. The republican governance of leadership requires *republican* leaders, not just any person who happens to possess the persuasive power for successful leader's actions. Republican leaders are quite rare because one *learns* to be a republican leader. *Growing* republican leaders is the agriculture of republican leadership.

When the republic that was Hewlett-Packard fell and transformed into an ordinary business plutocracy, it was because it was too much presumed that merely growing up in America, or merely working at the company, sufficed to provide the civics education necessary to sustain the Enterprise. What the example of Hewlett-Packard exemplifies is nothing else than the necessity for deliberately and actively sustaining the civic education institution of Enterprise. David Packard tried to convey this lesson, as he understood it, but, as superbly talented as he was in his other endeavors, he was not equally talented in the role of educator.

It appears to likewise be so in the case of IBM. Watson wrote,

There are two things an organization must increase far out of proportion to its growth rate if that organization is to overcome the problems of change. The first of these is communication, upward and downward. The second is education and retraining. . . . Everyone – particularly in a company such as IBM – must place company interest above that of a division or a department. In an interdependent organization, a community of effort is imperative. Co-operation must outrank self-interest, and an understanding of the company's particular approach to things is more important than technical ability. – T.J. Watson, Jr., *A Business and Its Beliefs*, 5

Watson wrote and spoke with pride and confidence – even with a degree of arrogance – of the way in which IBMers put the company first and understood the importance of its community. But the lesson must not have been taught as well in IBM's two internal management schools as Watson apparently thought. Just a little over a decade after his retirement many thousands of these very same people still worked there, but the stagnation and breakdown of IBM was apparent to any attentive gypsy capitalist. Your author made money from IBM in the 1970s and early 1980s – by making investments that profited from the *decline* of IBM's stock price. The hyena and the buzzard, too, are denizens of the state of nature.

Political government and commercial management alike generally fail to recognize that an education duty is as central and essential for the governance of leadership as the executive, the

legislator or the judiciary. At no time in America has the general government or the state governments regarded education as *part of the process* of republican governance. Nor have the education institutions themselves realized or understood this. Today there are many so-called conservatives who regard education as a *private* good rather than the universal and necessary *public* good that it in fact is. If it were true that the duty of education went no further than vocational education and training, these so-called conservatives would be correct. It would also follow from this same conservative principle that *all* vocational education and training should be *privately* funded by individuals and by commercial entities needing a well-trained workforce procurable by indentured servitude. But to neglect *civic* education is antithetical to republicanism and a dereliction of duty in governance. Mill wrote,

What, for example, are the qualities in the citizens individually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in a society? Everybody will agree that those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence. But are not these, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in the community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence conduce alike to permanence and to progression; only there is needed more of those qualities to make the society decidedly progressive than merely to keep it permanent.

What, again, are the particular attributes in human beings which seem to have a more especial reference to Progress, and do not so directly suggest the ideas of Order and Preservation? They are chiefly the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. But are not all these qualities fully as much required for preserving the good we have as for adding to it? If there is anything certain in human affairs, it is that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success induces to relax their habits of care and thoughtfulness, and their willingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good fortune at its height. The mental attribute which seems exclusively dedicated to Progress, and is the culmination of the tendencies to it, is Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less necessary for Permanence since, in the inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences and dangers continually grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances in order to keep things going on even only as well as they did before. Whatever qualities, therefore, in a government tend to encourage activity, energy, courage, originality are requisites of Permanence as well as of Progress; only a somewhat less degree of them will on the average suffice for the former purpose than the latter. – John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, 2

It is in this context that one is better able to apprehend the significance of what this treatise earlier quoted from Mill, namely,

The first element of good government, therefore, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual; or rather . . . moral, intellectual, and active. The government which does this best has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities,

so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of government depends. – [*ibid.*]

Civic education has been practically extinct in American public education at all levels since at least the latter half of the 1960s, and some argue it has been practically extinct for longer than that. The person who would lead his community to republican governance of leadership must understand and recognize the intangible human capital of the powers of a person he has available to work with, and he must face the challenge that this failure and moral fault in public education has produced: near bankruptcy of civic intellectual capital in the community. For over forty years the great majority of all people have been educated to plutocracy and conditioned to state of nature expectations. Growing the *civic* education foundation of the community must be the object of his first and most essential leader's actions. There is no other pathway leading to moral leadership governance and no other antidote to the poisonings that lead to the fall of Enterprise.

§ 4. Growing Republican Educators

The republican educator is a no less vital agent of republican governance of leadership than is the republican judge, legislator, or executive. Contrary to urban legend, the print, radio, and television media do not constitute the so-called fourth estate of a republic. A republic's true fourth estate is civic education, and across the world today it is an estate in receivership. The so-called conservatives⁹ in American politics today are not entirely wrong in their harsh criticisms of public education and public educators – although the fact they are not entirely wrong does not imply in the least that they are more than barely correct or correct on more than just one tiny point.

Few Americans know that in the closing days of the 1787 Convention, on September 14, a motion to amend the almost-finished Constitution was proposed granting Congress the power to establish a national university. The motion failed by a vote of 4 to 6 with the Connecticut delegation being divided over the question. The business of the Convention being then very near to its conclusion, the motion received very little debate:

Mr. Madison and Mr. Pinkney then moved to insert in the list of powers vested in Congress a power – "to establish a University, in which no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of religion."

⁹ It is an irony that would be ridiculous, if the threat they pose to the republic were not so serious, that the so-called conservatives in the Republican Party in America have chosen to castigate those in their own party who do not fall in line with their views as RINO (Republicans-in-name-only). That they have sought with success to drive their opponents out of the party is also ironic because the views of these so-called conservatives are *anticonservative* in regard to true republican government; these so-called conservatives are themselves RINO. But the so-called liberals in the Democratic Party are no improvement; they are in *deed* illiberal, hypnotized by false Platonic ideals, and no less plutocratic in their political philosophy. Still, this is not to say these mobs are venal as individuals; the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Mr. Wilson supported the motion.

Mr. Govr. Morris: It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the Seat of Government will reach the object. – Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, vol. II

Some might find it curious Madison thought that making the providing of university education an explicit power of Congress was an important idea. Here it is important to understand that in 1787 there were *no* American universities – merely a handful of small private colleges that were primarily established by different churches. In the years that followed Congress never saw fit to, in Morris' words, "reach the object" and establish a national university. The task of providing for public higher education was left in the hands of the states, the churches, and private persons. The national government took no important part in establishing public education in America until the Morrill Act of 1862, which established land grants to be used for universities promoting what were at that time called *the useful arts*. Historian John Thelin tells us,

What was distinctive about the Morrill Act was that the land grants were not literal gifts of land on which a state government would build a college. Rather, the act established a complex partnership in which the federal government provided incentives for each state to sell distant Western lands, with the states being obliged to use the proceeds to fund advanced instructional programs. . . . The state government was then required to dedicate land sale proceeds to establishing collegiate programs in such "useful arts" as agriculture, mechanics, mining, and military instruction – hence the "A&M" in the name of many land-grant colleges. . . . [The Morrill Act's] institutional legacy was the accessible state college and university, characterized by a curriculum that was broad and utilitarian. – John Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 3

That federal and state governments took a hand in higher education at that time – when the nation was engaged in a civil war – was due in part to what American colleges had become by then. They were little more than preparatory schools for ministers. The curriculum of study had degenerated into autocratic, useless, and uninteresting drills and recitations. They had become so remote from meeting any public needs that they faced the looming prospect of going out of existence. The great majority of Americans saw no benefit whatsoever in obtaining a college education. Opportunities were much richer in the booming new industries that were then taking shape. Over the next thirty years, that economic powerhouse lobbied with increasing vigor to have more utility – that is, more vocational training – provided by higher education.

Matters came to a head in the thirty years from 1880 to around 1910 and were marked by a great schism in the university between the sciences and what today we call the humanities. But the schism ran even deeper than this suggests. "The scientists" were, practically without exception, educated in Europe and had embraced an attitude and view of science that was the mutant product of a European Hegelianism that had turned to positivism. "The humanitarians," on the other hand, were by and large the conservative old-guard committed to a moralism founded

upon Protestant religious dogma and utterly divorced from human nature. The scientists tried to reduce human being to dead matter, the humanists sought to turn young men into ministers. Nor was the revolution in American higher education the product of anything that could be called a cohesive planning process; some street riots have been better organized and led. In the end, the "universality" of the university disappeared as a smorgasbord of various disciplines set themselves off in isolated specialties – giving us the uncoordinated aggregate of silo disciplines we have today. Expelling political despotism in the American Revolution, America imported intellectual despotism in the form of European educational idols of the theater. In all of this, the first victims were civic education and the American ideal of republic.

Thomas Jefferson wrote,

To instruct the mass of our citizens in these, their rights, interests and duties, as men and citizens, being then the objects of education in the primary schools, whether private or public, in them should be taught reading, writing and numerical arithmetic, the elements of mensuration (useful in so many callings), and the outlines of geography and history. And this brings us to the point at which to commence the higher branches of education, of which the [Virginia] Legislature require the development; those, for example, which are,

To form the statesmen, legislators and judges, on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so much to depend;

To expound the principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which, banishing all arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another;

To harmonize and promote the interests of agriculture, manufactures and commerce, and by well informed views of political economy to give a free scope to the public industry;

To develop the reasoning faculty of our youth, enlarge their minds, cultivate their morals, and instill into them the precepts of virtue and order;

To enlighten them with mathematical and physical sciences, which advance the arts, and administer to the health, the subsistence, and comforts of human life;

And, generally, to form them to habits of reflection and correct action, rendering them examples of virtue to others, and of happiness within themselves.

These are the objects of that higher grade of education, the benefits and blessings of which the Legislature now propose to provide for the good and ornament of their country, the gratification and happiness of their fellow-citizens, of the parent especially, and his progeny, on which all his affections are concentrated. – Thomas Jefferson, "Report of the Commissioners" (1818), in *The Portable Thomas Jefferson*

One must not fall victim to the bias and idols of our own time in reading these words. In 1818 the typical American boy finished with his schooling at age 15 when he became an apprentice. What in Jefferson's day was called "higher" education today takes in high school education as much as college education. It doesn't take a very deep reflection upon Jefferson's list of specific objectives above, accompanied by an only slightly more than superficial inspection of American education today, to see that these objectives – *the civic objectives of public education* – have been mislaid

and lost in the unrefined march of accidental events since 1818.

When the education system is smashed and broken the damage lasts for generations. Today's cadre of teachers at all levels, being themselves deprived of a civic education, have received no formal preparation for teaching it. They have been left to rely upon their own personal initiative, accidents of experience and affective reflections to form individual ideas of what the role and proper mission of education is to be. Education today has few republicans in the ranks of its agents, and fewer who have acquired adequate preparation to be effective *leaders* of their young followers. Few, indeed, understand that *the most essential part of teaching is the taking of leader's actions* to stimulate the pupil or student to make civic *republican* self-determinations. It has become popular dogma today to say that America's most urgent education needs are those for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics – the so-called STEM disciplines. There is a national need, true enough, but it is far from the most urgent need. For a republic, the most urgent immediate public need is to educate and produce civil agents of education – the republican educators – upon whom we rely in growing republican citizenship in the community.

The practical consequence this has for he who would lead his community to republican Enterprise is this: You have no marketplace where you can go to purchase the service you need to establish and develop the citizens of the Enterprise you desire. Education is sinking – and being driven by politicians, parents, and commerce – into plutocracy and is being forced to revert back to a state-of-nature survival mode. In many ways the situation we face is like that faced by Charlemagne – and here we must take a warning from history. Historian Olaf Pedersen tells us,

The formidable military and political success of the Carolingians after only three generations had brought them a kingdom whose extent far exceeded that of all previous Germanic states. [Charlemagne's] coronation in Rome¹⁰ was the symbolic expression of the view of Charles himself: that his kingdom was nothing less than a resurrection of the old Roman empire of the west following the chaos of the age of migrations, and that he himself was the legitimate heir of the western emperors. In reality the situation was rather more complicated. . . .

[The] emperor's chief difficulty was this: while his kingdom in its extent could nearly measure itself by the old Roman empire of the west, in the beginning at least it completely lacked the administrative structure that had determined the existence of Rome. The Roman balance between centralized and decentralized control was gone, and the primary task of the new central power was to create an expedient administration. . . .

The central administration itself – which presumably only functioned through the emperor's constant journeys around the kingdom – presupposed the existence of a special class of officials capable of drawing up in the royal chancellery the steady stream of decrees that went out to all corners of the empire. It was surely Charles' need for such civil servants as much as for local administrators which led to that concern for education which became one of the most interesting features of Charles' personality. . . .

¹⁰ In 800 AD; Charles (Charlemagne, i.e., "Charles the Great") was crowned emperor of "the Holy Roman Empire" by Pope Leo III.

Charles' repeated initiatives in the area of schooling are interesting as the first attempt in Europe . . . to carry out Plato's old idea of the responsibility of the state towards education. Already in 788 Charles ordered Bishop Bangulf of Fulda . . . to pursue studies in his diocese . . . [In] 789 he issued [a general admonition] to all the clergy of his kingdom. There it is decreed that regular instruction shall be organized in all monasteries and cathedrals, for both monks and canons should order their existence in such a way that 'many by their good conduct of life shall be drawn to God's service, so that not only children of unfree status but also the sons of freeborn men may meet and join in, so that schools of reading may be set up for children.' . . .

Such a comprehensive program presupposed a staff of qualified teachers who had to be brought in from abroad, given the state of learning in Charles' realm. . . .

It was Charlemagne's wish to involve the monasteries in the enlightenment of his people, by linking public education to the already existing training of monks. . . . It is obvious that the lay school was meant to be kept sharply separate from the novices and that different teaching methods were to be used there. How far this sketch was really followed . . . is hard to say. . . . [The] Carolingian school system [impresses] . . . On the other hand, it cannot be denied that these schools never came to fulfill their original aims, that is, to shape a system of general popular education supplemented with higher training of such character that the new empire was provided with enough administrators to keep its coherence, and with teachers in sufficient numbers to create a somewhat uniform culture for the ironing out of tensions between individual elements in the population. . . .

Firstly, the lack of teachers worked against the successful conclusion of the project. . . . Added to this, the Benedictine monasteries did not seem to be as willing to cooperate on this task as has been claimed. . . . In this connection it can be understood that in 817, only three years after the emperor's death, a synod in Aachen, his own capital, was able quite consciously to disregard his decisions with an unequivocal decree that 'no school may be kept in the monasteries unless for [pupils belonging to the order].' – Olaf Pedersen, *The First Universities*, 3

If Charlemagne's attempt to re-establish education in Europe had succeeded, the Dark Age might have ended three centuries earlier than it did. The challenges faced in establishing republican Enterprise today include a scarcity of qualified *republican* educators that rivals the problems of Charlemagne, and no less opposition to growing republican civic education should be expected from our own non-sectarian Benedictines and their idols of the theater in education.

Even so, this agricultural situation is neither hopeless nor hopelessly impractical. We have no already-planted fields, but we do have seeds. The tasks are to plant them in fertile soil and keep the Vikings away from the crop. The seeds are contained in a broad collection of works called by some discriminating scholars *the Great Books*. The acquisition of knowledge of the ideas set out in these works was and is what was once known as a liberal education. By this term your author does not mean the sort of smorgasbord potpourri that is palmed off as "a liberal education" in American universities today. An adequate actual and practical liberal education has never been available through the American school system, nor has even an inadequate one been formally available for at least half a century. Yet the books themselves still exist and place within the reach of anyone with ordinary intelligence the civic education required for republican citizenship. Many

of the citations made in this treatise, such as *The Social Contract* and *Representative Government*, are books belonging to the Great Books collection. Furthermore, there still exist old study guides and study plans to help design and establish a program of study.

Educator Robert M. Hutchins, who was a champion of the Great Books movement in the 1950s, wrote,

What is a liberal education? It is easy to say what it is not. It is not specialized education, not vocational, avocational, professional, or preprofessional. It is not an education that teaches a man how to do any specific thing.

I am tempted to say it is the education that no American gets in an educational institution nowadays. We are all specialists now. Even early in high school we are told that we must begin to think how we are going to earn a living, and the prerequisites that are supposed to prepare us for that activity become more and more the ingredients of our educational diet. . . . What is missing is education to be human beings, education to make the most of our human powers, education for our responsibilities as members of a democratic society, education for freedom.

This is what a liberal education is. It is the education that prepares men to be free. You have to have this education if you are going to be happy, for happiness consists in making the most of yourself. You have to have this education if you are going to be a member of a community; for membership in the community implies the ability to communicate with others. You have to have this education if you are going to be an effective citizen of a democracy; for citizenship requires that you understand the world in which you live and that you do not leave your duties to be performed by others, living vicariously and vacuously on their virtue and intelligence. A free society is a society of free men. To be free you have to be educated for freedom. This means you have to think; for the free man is one who thinks for himself. It means that you have to think, for example, about the aims of life and of organized society. – Robert M. Hutchins, preface to *An Introduction to the Great Books* (1959)

At present and for the past few years, various accreditation agencies and boards who oversee higher education in America have been trying to call for academic programs to provide the *content* of the liberal education of which Hutchins wrote to all undergraduate students. Their well-meaning efforts have been thwarted by four things: (1) they do not themselves know what it is they are asking for; at best they have only a dim vision of what its product would look like; (2) the members of these boards are themselves transfixed by various Baconian idols and mistake these idols for solutions; (3) neither they themselves nor the educators they seek to influence have ever received the education they are calling to have provided; and (4) their tactics are premised on a failed pseudo-science once called scientific management (Taylorism). The inspectors sent out from these organizations neither know what to inspect for, nor are they able to communicate effectively what deficits in education they do think they perceive, nor are they able to offer productive ideas for recommendations or remedies. Colleges and universities have become quite skilled in outflanking them – which is the natural result one should expect to find in a relationship that stands with both feet in the state of nature, and demonstrates their lack of authority.

One great myth that has been an idol of the theater in Academia for a very long time now is the myth that citizenship education – true liberal education – is beyond the grasp of most people. This is nothing but a product of academic hubris and Baconian idolatry. With proper pedagogy – that is, teaching methods and teaching materials developed consistent with the mental physics of human nature – this education is within the grasp of every typical high school student and it might even be within the grasp of many junior high school students at the ages from twelve to fourteen years. A twelve-year-old will not have the acquired patience to plough attentively through the often-long-winded prose of Mill, the paragraph-long sentences of Kant, or the ponderously glacial movements of Dickens, but he can read *Animal Farm*. Proper material properly developed for his level of experience and *written to be interesting* can make the ideas of the Great Books accessible to those who are still quite young. Children are not and cannot be regarded as short adults, but they are human beings and the mental physics of their minds is the same as it is for yours. They are as self-determining as you. As you did, they begin life as naive realists and societal outlaws. The baggage they carry merely weighs less than yours and their relative lack of experience makes the outcomes of their judgmentation more malleable.

In the same way, proper material, including shorter context-providing *interesting* introductory material, makes the ideas that built Western civilization accessible to any adult of ordinary intelligence. Indeed, the less burdened a person is by academic idolatry, the more apprehensible the ideas are. Regarding the accessibility of liberal education, Hutchins wrote,

Can you do it¹¹ by yourself? . . . You will see that the problems [the Great Books] deal with are current today. You will observe that the language is not nearly so difficult as you may have been told it is. The ideas are important; but they are not ideas that you have never heard of or have never thought about. These books were not written for specialists in philosophy or political science or literature; they were written for ordinary people, and read by them until it became fashionable to say, as it has lately [1959], that they are too difficult for ordinary people.

These books are teachers. They demand attention, but if the attention is given, they reward it. As you read on¹², you will find the reading easier, for one book leads to another.

These books are, I believe, the finest written creations of the human mind. Our educational system largely disregards them. Even the names of some of the authors contained in this set are never mentioned in the presence of college students today. Yet these are the books that have made the world in which we live, and it is impossible to understand that world without understanding the principal positions taken in them. – [*ibid.*]

Hutchins was too sanguine in some ways about the learning task involved. There are some difficulties – important ones – that attend a books-only program of study. Lack of personal context for the ideas, owing to inexperience, is one factor. Poor or misleading translations (for

¹¹ give yourself a liberal education

¹² as you read more of these books

those books originally written in another language) is another factor. Probably the most important difficulty is what your author terms "temporal-ethnocentricity," by which term he means a habit and inclination to read or interpret an old author from the perspectives of contemporary idols of the market and of the theater. It would be expecting too much of the members of the community if one were to merely say, "Read these books" – and too naive by far to expect successful outcomes to emerge. The republican educator *does* have a vital role to fill; it is that of a guide who knows the trail being taken and is experienced with its landmarks, signposts, and meanings.

The broader education mission cannot be a random lunge into the pages of what are, in point of fact, long works that are frequently written in dry and plodding styles. If re-making a mere geographical aggregate into a republican community were so easy as Hutchins sometimes suggests, it is a re-making that would have occurred naturally and long ago. The very fact it has not, and that many well-intentioned modern educators are among the most vigorous opponents, are two of the surest signs that republican agents of education are necessary for republican governance of leadership, that today they are rare, and that we must grow more of them. We must not forget or ignore the lesson of Charlemagne.

If you would lead your community to republican Enterprise, you must see to the growing of that important first generation of republican educators who demonstrate deontological merit by their actions. You must do so by whatever *civil* means you can find. The agent-educator is the first farmer for leadership agriculture. He is a necessary agent in the institution of republican leadership governance.

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