Chapter 7

Reflective Judgment and Affectivity

§ 1. The Affective Function in Judgmentation

The study of affectivity is a relative newcomer in the centuries-long history of science. It is fair to say the majority of the great Western philosophers and scientists long regarded it as a nuisance, an impediment, and something no self-respecting scientist would waste his time with. There is evidence to suggest that even Kant, who was one of the most renowned figures in the great German Aufklärung (Enlightenment) of the eighteenth century, did not regard affectivity as a proper scientific topic. His treatment of affectivity is, as Palmquist has observed, generally unsystematic. His Critical analysis of it lacks the same penetrating, hair-splitting detail as the rest of his metaphysics, even though ideas of affectivity recur in key places throughout the Kantian corpus of writings, and his correspondence strongly suggests he thought metaphysics could do quite well without a thorough-going Critique of affectivity. The work he did publish on the topic, Critique of Judgment, differs markedly in layout and depth of analysis from his two earlier Critiques and is in many ways his most disappointing work.

It was not until the end of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth centuries that science began to develop serious and more or less systematic theories of affectivity under the labels of "emotion" and "motivation." Probably the most important of the pioneering theorists in this arena were William James, Carl Lange, Walter Cannon, and Sigmund Freud. The last few decades of the twentieth century saw an upsurge in research activities in this field, quite probably due to a wealth of new information being delivered up by neuroscience and eagerly received by psychology. Yet, for all this, there is today no "theory of emotion" or "theory of motivation" that is generally agreed upon by the research community and what we have is an unsystematic aggregate of "mini-theories" and speculations. The field even lacks common definitions for its fundamental terminology, and while current work being done is clearly scientific the product of all this labor thus far would have to be called, by any impartial outsider, something less than a science. No doubt there are veins of truth to be found within the corpus of work and, also doubtlessly, veins of falsehood as well. Identifying which is which is a significant problem at present because we lack even a common paradigm for affectivity.

One way to cope with the situation, a way that tends to be favored by physicists, is to deny the reality of any such thing as emotion, motivation, or affectivity and say of these phenomena that they are merely "epiphenomena" (surface phenomena), the complicated result of an enormous number of physical factors that eventually bring on behaviors we merely "label" with these terms.
"Every thing is made of atoms," the physicists tell us, and therefore everything can and must be explainable by explaining what atoms do. The undeniable success physics has demonstrated in dealing with dead matter brings enormous prestige to this science – the self-proclaimed "queen of the sciences" – and it is fair to say the majority of neuroscientists and psychologists have gone along with physics' mantra. Physics is certainly the science with the most comprehensive and well-developed mathematical expressions of its theories, and one who finds mathematics intimidating can be prone to overlook the fact that physics owes this mathematical elegance to its fortunate situation of having the simplest and easiest of the science topics as the object of its study. Almost every other science or topic of study that could become a science – including but not limited to biology, chemistry, psychology, linguistics, economics, sociology, civics, teaching, and most branches of engineering – is a more difficult science than physics. History and computer science, perhaps and as they are presently practiced, are easier. Mathematics is a language for saying things very, very precisely; the simpler what one has to say is, the easier it is to say it. As awe inspiring as physics' dead matter successes are, 

ex pede Herculem is hardly a ground for its self-coronation. There are no happy electrons, no pontifical cells, no knowledge organs, there is no mind dust, and there is nothing whatsoever anywhere within physics' dead matter models from which such a phantasma as any of these could arise.

The fundamental error, of course, is the post-Cartesian one: One mistakes a merely logical division for a real division between mind and body and then throws away the mental dimension. The object of study that remains is then merely a projection onto a plane of dead matter, less than an Organized Being and thus not a human being. In two quick steps, the only actual phenomenal object of the science is removed from our sight by an ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysical prejudice. There will be physiological signals in soma that stand in reciprocal relationship to affective representations; that is a theorem of mental physics (the principle of emergent properties). Conventional physics does have a role in helping to explain the Nature of these signals, and it seems both reasonable and likely that these explanations will help in understanding affectivity and its manifestations called emotion and motivation (again because of the principle of emergent properties). But to think dead matter physics will or can provide causal explanations of the Nature of affectivity itself is baseless. Physics lacks the competency to deduce mental phenomena because mental phenomena do not fall under the first principles of this science.

By this point we are in a position to see and understand the fundamental role affectivity has in objective perception. The process of reflective judgment performs a crucial function in the making of intuitions, a role neither Reason nor determining judgment has the competency to fill. Affectivity drives learning and, as we shall see, motoregulatory actions as well. It is now our task

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to examine this function in detail and understand its principles.

In the previous chapters we were able to obtain an adequate representation of the process of determining judgment using a 2LAR structure. What might not have been easily apparent is that its product, the determinant judgment, is not adequately represented at the second analytical level and for it we must minimally employ a 3LAR structure, namely Figure 7.1.1 above. Determinant judgments are objective perceptions when re-introduced into the synthesis of apprehension (and are always objective representations in the manifold of concepts). As such, each has a scope in composition (the entirety of all the objects mediately represented or representable by concepts through intuition) and a sphere in nexus (the structure of understanding in the manifold of concepts). The 2LAR of scope is provided by the categories of understanding, while that of the sphere is provided by the logical momenta of judgments. One can call the scope of a determinant judgment its *exterior aim* and the sphere its *interior aim* as labels for the formal expedience of the representations of determining judgment. External aim and internal aim are ideas of determining judgment from the judicial Standpoint of Critical epistemology.

Now, affective perceptions are those conscious representations in sensibility that never become part of the representation of any object. It is not difficult, therefore, to see that the aims of reflective judgment and its acts (the reflective judgments) are of a different kind and are in a manner of speaking contrary to those of determining judgment. In the 2LAR of the faculty of pure consciousness determining judgment is internal Relation in consciousness while reflective judgment is external Relation. The former is reflected in our commonsense acknowledgement that our thoughts belong to us, as individuals, and are something apart from the external environment of the Organized Being. The primary Standpoint in viewing determining judgment is
thus the theoretical Standpoint. Critical theory adds to this commonsense acknowledgement the further acknowledgement that our thoughts and understanding are also something apart from the physical dimension of soma in the Organized Being model.

In the case of the latter, the Relation of reflective judgment in consciousness is an idea of relationship that takes its primitive underpinning in one's understanding from the category of causality & dependency. This idea is an idea understanding what is traditionally called the agent-patient relationship and is of a twofold character: the relationship of environment acting as agent to produce effects in the Organized Being as patient; and the relationship of the Organized Being acting as agent to produce effects in the environment as patient. Acts of reflective judgment according to the first of these (i.e., the Organized Being as patient) are the affective dimension of interior aim from the judicial Standpoint, while those of acts according to the second (i.e., the Organized Being as agent) are the affective dimension of exterior aim. The first is Self-determining in regard to the capacity for composition of the sensory state of the Organized Being (patientia\(^1\)); the latter is Self-determining in regard to the nexus of the organized motoregulatory responsiveness of the Organized Being (agency).

To these twin poles of this two-fold character of reflective judgment we give the names aesthetical reflective judgment and teleological reflective judgment, respectively. Aesthetical reflective judgment "faces" sensibility and acts in the making of perceptions. Teleological reflective judgment "faces" the process of pure practical Reason and acts in the determination of spontaneous actions undertaken by the Organized Being. Both poles of reflective judgment have their explanations in terms of 2LARs of momenta, and thus reflective judgment is understood in

\(^{1}\) liability or susceptibility to some influence, esp. in regard to feelings, passibility.
terms of a 3LAR structure. This is illustrated by Figure 7.1.2.

Because of the unsystematic manner in which Kant treated reflective judgment, the Critical deduction of its overall structure is quite lengthy and takes up three full chapters in CPPM (chapters 14, 16, and 18). Our treatment in this book will, perforce, need to be more brief, leaving the detailed metaphysical analysis to the pages of CPPM. This, at least, has the advantage of providing the reader with the picture of the final outcome, whereas in CPPM the task and concern is not unlike hacking a trail through a thick jungle. Here we will see the forest, there the trees.

One primary reason why reflective judgment cannot be adequately represented by anything less than a 3LAR structure arises from the fact that the division of Organized Being into nous, soma, and psyche is objectively valid only as a logical and never as a real division. The idea of external Relation in the faculty of pure consciousness mates reflective judgment with receptivity in psyche on the one side and motoregulatory expression in psyche on the other. It is a transcendental necessity under the acroam of transcendental consciousness that there be no real seam at the boundary between nous and psyche. This is the idea of judicial continuity and dictates as a requirement a true synthesis between reflective judgment and the adaptive psyche. In

![Figure 7.1.3: The synthesis of continuity between reflective judgment and the adaptive psyche.](image)

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2 Bits and pieces of it are scattered throughout Kant's Critique of Judgment, the Opus Postumum, in isolated passages in Critique of Pure Reason, and his book and lectures on anthropology. Other pieces of it are even found in his logic lectures and his works on ethics, moral theory, and religion.
other words, the real unity of the Organized Being is a fundamental and primary condition placed on the real objective validity of every aspect of the Organized Being model. Every synthesis requires three terms and this synthesis in continuity, illustrated in Figure 7.1.3, requires the division of each of the four endpoints of reflective Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality into two poles of synthesis, with the corresponding titles of the adaptive psyche providing the third term. The resulting four synthetic ideas are called, respectively, the synthesis in continuity of objectivity, the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea, the synthesis in continuity of the judicial Idea, and the synthesis in continuity of Meaning. We will discuss each of these in this Chapter as well.

§ 2. Affectivity and the Manifold of Desires

Affective perceptions are the materia of reflective judgment and we must now explain this type of representation more clearly and distinctly. It was introduced as that in perception which never becomes part of the representation of an object. As a species of perception, affective perception clearly must have a tie-in with the faculty of pure consciousness. This tie-in is the subcontrary idea of Quality in pure consciousness, which we call the feeling of Lust or Unlust. We recall that Lust per se belongs to the logical division of psyche (and that Lust – pronounced "loost" – does not mean the same thing as the English word "lust"). Lust per se is the fundamental property of adaptive psyche for determining adaptation to a state of equilibrium. The feeling of Lust per se is the conscious representation of the effect in sensibility corresponding to the determination of the Kraft of adaptive psyche. It is the perception of a psychic innovation as a disturbance incompatible with the condition of equilibrium, and therefore it represents a state of inexpediency for the pure purpose of practical Reason, namely, the formula of the categorical imperative: Achieve Existenz in a state of perfect equilibrium.

Now, a feeling is matter in a sensuous representation – a sensation – with the additional condition that this matter is not made part of the representation of an object in intuition. But to have a complete representation we also require a form for this sensuous representation. We call this form a value. A value is defined as the represented nexus of affectivity by which a non-objective sensuous representation is referenced to the somatic Kraft of psyche by means of the synthesis of objectivity (Figure 7.1.3). A feeling, on the other hand, is referenced to the noetic Kraft of psyche by means of the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea. Somatic Kraft is the power of soma to produce or suffer effects in the reciprocal co-determination of nous and soma; noetic Kraft is the power of nous to produce or suffer effects in this co-determination. The determining act on the side of nous is that which we call an act of aesthetical reflective judgment.
We will call affective perception in the context of aesthetical reflective judgment by the name matter of desire. The reason for doing so is the following. Whenever one makes a theory of Nature, one is attempting to explain a set of phenomena in Nature. To do so, one must introduce concepts of objects-in-Nature because any theory is a representation and every representation must have an object to which it refers. Indeed, ontology is defined in the Critical theory as the system of all principles and concepts related to understanding objects in general. If ontology is to be science rather than poetry, we must be able to treat the object of a representation as a "real thing" in Nature. But this means one has a concept of the object and this concept is combined with other concepts (in the manifold of concepts) that give it a context and meanings. The sine qua non for this is that the concept of the object must have objective validity.

As non-objective representation, the concept of an affective perception at first presents a fairly obvious problem in this regard. The real reference for affective perception lies entirely with the transcendental Subject (the I of transcendental apperception) as one of the factors in its consciousness of its own Existenz. (This is to say affective perception is a character of the Self). In Critical metaphysics, this means that affective perception as affective perception per se is a transcendental object (an object whose Dasein is necessary for the possibility of experience). Our understanding of affective perception can only be an understanding in terms of the effects it has on the state-of-being of the Self. Our knowledge of this can only be knowledge that regards this transcendental object as an appearance (not as a thing-in-itself) and so the objective validity of the concept of affective perception can never be other than practical objective validity.

The only objective appearances that we can associate with non-objective affective perception are effects it is credited with having on the Organized Being's empirical consciousness of its own Self-Existenz. There is not too much poetry in saying that the objective validity of affective perception is in what it does to us. It is in order to make clear these objective and practical contexts of the idea of affective perception that we give affective-perception-in-context its own special technical term by naming it matter of desire. In this context, matter of desire stands as phenomenon to which affective perception stands as the conditioning noumenon. From the theoretical Standpoint affective perception is a mathematical object for which matter of desire is a facet A phenomenon that can only be treated from the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. Such are the deep ontological bulrushes one encounters in seeking to understand the affective character of human life.

This brings us to the question of what is meant by the term "desire." More precisely, we must ask for a Critical explanation of this term. As a technical term, this word translates Kant's word Begehren, which is one of a trio of peculiar (to a native English speaker) German words with
meanings that travel over into English with some amount of difficulty.\textsuperscript{3} Through the pen of one of his students\textsuperscript{4}, Kant tells us,

One expresses the feeling of Lust or Unlust through delight and aversion. Both however are merely sensible: according to Mr. Kant it can be determined more generally by means of complacentia et displicentia\textsuperscript{5} and on this the idea of desire can be grounded, namely as the state of satisfaction with respect to the actuality of the Object, i.e. the representation of the Object which is in its actuality connected to the satisfaction and which is the ground for producing it.

Satisfaction in the intuition of the Object differs from desire for it in that the latter concerns the relationship of the representation to the Object so far as it can be the cause of its actuality. [KANT (29: 1013)]

This is obviously an explanation for what we are to understand by the word "desire" rather than a definition of desire. It is, however, a rather brief explanation within a rather broad context and we must break it down a bit. The first sentence presents us with no intellectual problem since most of us would probably be inclined to describe the feeling in similar terms. It is the second sentence, where Kant dropped into Latin in his lecture\textsuperscript{6}, where the technical discussion begins and where some rather subtle fine points of Critical epistemology come into play. He is telling us that the general idea of desire is grounded in something causing a state of satisfaction (feeling of Lust) or dissatisfaction (feeling of Unlust). This something is what is meant by the Object.

Here it is important not to jump to the conclusion that this Object is an object of intuition because this is not what Kant means. The epistemological context is in the judicial Standpoint and

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\end{center}

\textbf{Figure 7.2.1:} The Object vs. object distinction regarded from the judicial Standpoint.

\textsuperscript{3} The other two are Begehrung (which I translate as "desiration") and Begehr (which I translate as "demand" in the sense of "brisk demand"). Modern German has drifted a bit from these contexts, but Kant was an eighteenth century German and so the English context must fit the older German context. There are numerous challenges like this in translating the Kantian corpus. As another example, the word translated as "appearance" is Erscheinung, the meaning of which might be better translated as "appear-ation." However, I try to err a bit on the conservative side when it comes to inventing new English words.

\textsuperscript{4} Johann Friedrich Vigilantius (1757-1823). Vigilantius, a lawyer, was one of Kant's close friends, legal advisor, and an informal student who apparently sat in on all Kant's lectures.

\textsuperscript{5} the state of causing satisfaction or dissatisfaction

\textsuperscript{6} Kant held that basic technical vocabulary should be expressed "in a dead language" because in a living language the meanings of words drift and change over time. Whenever he shifts over into Latin, it is a clue that the discussion is getting more precise and technical.
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this means we must look at the terms Object and object with respect to the process of reflective judgment rather than from the theoretical Standpoint of determining judgment. In the judicial Standpoint Object, object, and representation stand in the relationship depicted by Figure 7.2.1. The object is always "that which the representation represents" and in this case what is being represented is affective. The object of an affective representation can be called the judicial subject of the representation. In the context of desire in an Organized Being, this judicial subject takes its empirical link to theory through the determinable in the sensorimotor idea; i.e., we regard the judicial subject as a state of satisfaction-dissatisfaction. The feeling of a state of satisfaction is a feeling of "this is not-bad" (Wohlgefallen) while the feeling of a state of dissatisfaction is a feeling of "this is not-good" (Mißfallen). "Not-bad" aligns with the feeling of Lust and implicates possible expedience for the purpose of pure practical Reason, whereas "not-good" implicates the contrary and aligns with the feeling of Unlust. Kant writes,

Now one calls the capability to have Lust or Unlust during a representation feeling for this reason: because both contain the merely subjective in the relationship of our representation and contain absolutely no reference to an Object for the possible cognition of the same (not even the cognition of our state) . . . Indeed, because of this very reason Lust and Unlust will not be able to be clearly explained for themselves and rather one can, if need be, only cite what consequences they have in certain relationships to make them recognizable in practice. [KANT (6: 211-212)]

Metaphorically speaking, the feeling of a state of satisfaction is the carrot, the feeling of a state of dissatisfaction is the stick; the Organized Being pursues the one and flees the other under the dictate of the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. This dictate demands actions directed to the objective of achieving a state of equilibrium (the negation of Lust per se). The degree of success in doing so defines "quality of life." Elsewhere Kant tells us,

Feeling subsists in the relationship not to an Object but to the entire Subject. Lust and Unlust are not at all cognitions. The capacity of discrimination of representations so far as they modify the Subject is the capacity of Lust and Unlust. . . The feeling of the promotion of life is Lust, and the feeling of the hindrance of life is Unlust. Lust is when a representation contains a ground to be determined to produce again the same representation or to continue it when it is there. [KANT (28: 586)]

Similarly, Unlust contains a ground to be determined to prevent the representation or to abolish it when it is there. Lust is when the adaptive psyche impels attractively along a particular trajectory of adaptation, Unlust when it impels repulsively. As Kant put it, Unlust is a "negative Lust."

This is what is meant where Vigilantius wrote, "the representation of the Object which is in its actuality connected to the satisfaction and which is the ground for producing it." The Object is made actual (the judicial subject is realized = made real) when the actions of the Organized Being (either mental alone or both mental and physical together) produce equilibrium. In the overall

7 i.e., the empirical Self; feeling is "Self-centered."
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The determination that the Object is actualized falls to reflective judgment. It matters not one whit to reflective judgment, or to pure Reason either, whether or not a cognition accompanies this realization. And thus we have our Realerklärung: desire is the judicial subject of the representation of the feeling of Lust per se.

As it is for intuitions, so also the materia in qua of affective perceptions coalesces from the materia ex qua of sensibility. Unlike intuitions, the materia circa quam for this coalescence is not that of the pure intuition of space. Rather, this materia circa quam subsists in the actions of aesthetical reflective judgment. This is why affective perception is "spread across the timescape" in Figure 3.3.3; affective perception is "space-less." However, this is not all there is to affectivity. Human beings do not, loosely speaking, "experience affective perceptions" as a set or collection of differentiated "atomic" feelings. On this point all the major "mini-theories" of emotion that have had significant numbers of followers do seem to be in agreement. Whether we are talking about what a mathematician might call "point set" emotion theories (e.g., Plutchik's circumplex model with its "primitive emotions" and "color wheel" metaphor or Buck's "primes" theory) or with "distributed" emotion theories (e.g., Russell's fuzzy logic "script" theory), the general quality of affective perception is most often described using words like "diffuse" or "non-specific" or "shadings" or "flux." As William James put it,

The internal shadings of emotional feeling, moreover, merge endlessly into one another. Language has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, animosity, dislike, aversion, malice, spite, vengeance, abhorrence, etc., etc.; but in the dictionaries of synonyms we find these feelings distinguished more by their severally appropriate objective stimuli than by their conscious or subjective tone. [JAME1b: 448]

Moment by moment in subjective time, the affective state is a unity, a singular nexus of Existenz. The discussion just concluded above speaks to affective composition. We must also consider the subjective nexus and this takes us from the context of aesthetical reflective judgment to that of teleological reflective judgment.

If the effects of affective perception on the Organized Being were not expressed in observable appearances of somatic actions, we would have no cognitive knowledge of affectivity whatsoever. Affective perceptions are not concepts nor are they intuitions. In their essence they are the content of empirical consciousness that is essentially incommunicable by language. This is not to say "affective perception causes somatic changes" nor is it to say "somatic changes cause affective..."
perceptions." To say either is to forget that somatic signals and noetic representations are two sides of one and the same coin and that soma and nous are co-determining. It is to say that our ability to communicate affectivity to others and to describe it to ourselves rests upon observable phenomena that can be recognized and understood ex post facto. Soma is that characteristic of being human that occupies precisely this observable position.

In this consideration, something Santayana wrote is both prescient and illuminating in appreciation of the Nature of the affective nexus:

Why any form of feeling should be delightful is not to be explained transcendentally; a physiological law may, after the fact, render every instance predictable; but no logical affinity between the formal quality of an experience and the impulse to welcome it will thereby be disclosed. We find, however, that pleasure suffuses certain states of mind and pain others; which is another way of saying that, for no reason, we love the first and detest the second. . .

Pleasures differ sensibly in intensity; but the intensest pleasures are often the blindest, and it is hard to recall or estimate a feeling with which no definite and complex object is conjoined. The first step in making pleasure intelligible and capable of being pursued is to make it pleasure in something. The object it suffuses acquires a value and gives the pleasure itself a place in rational life. The pleasure can now be named, its variations studied in reference to changes in the object, and its comings and goings foreseen in the order of events. The more articulate the world that produces emotion the more controllable and recoverable is the emotion itself. . .

The step by which pleasure and pain are attached to ideas, so as to be predictable and to become factors in action, is therefore by no means irrevocable. It is a step, however, in the direction of reason; and though reason's path is only one of innumerable courses perhaps open to existence, it is the only one that we are traveling here; the only one, obviously, which human discourse is competent to trace.

When consciousness begins to add diversity to its intensity, its value is no longer absolute and inexpressible. The felt variations in its tone are attached to the observed movement of its objects; in these objects its values are imbedded. A world loaded with dramatic values may thus arise in imagination; terrible and delightful presences may chase one another across the void; life will be a kind of music made by all the senses together. . .

. . . When consciousness awakes the body has, as we long afterward discover, a definite organization. Without guidance from reflection bodily processes have been going on, and most precise affinities and reactions have been set up between its organs and the surrounding objects.

On these affinities and reactions sense and intellect are grafted. The plants are of different nature, yet growing together they bear excellent fruit. It is as the organs receive appropriate stimulations that attention is riveted on definite sensations. It is as the system exercises its natural activities that passion, will, and meditation possess the mind. No syllogism is needed to persuade us to eat, no prophecy of happiness to teach us to love. On the contrary, the living organism, caught in the act, informs us how to reason and what to enjoy. The soul adopts the body's aims; from the body and from its instincts she draws a first hint of the right means to those accepted purposes. Thus reason enters into partnership with the world and begins to be respected there; which it would never be if it were not expressive of the same mechanical forces that are to preside over events and render them fortunate or unfortunate for human interests. Reason is significant only because it has begun by taking, so to speak, the body's side; that sympathetic bias enables
The affective nexus is not a connection among individual "perceptrons" of affectivity but rather between the representing act and the psychophysical expression of the act in motoregulatory expression and also, indirectly through practical Reason, ratio-expression in the orientation of thinking. Kant used the word *Begehrung* to name this connection. In eighteenth century German, this word denotes not merely "desire" but rather desire made specific and actively *demanded*. To keep this context distinct, I translate *Begehrung* as "desiriation." *Desiriation* is the form of the unity of affective perception in relationship to the capacities of the Subject and is the determinable in motoregulatory expression. As *nexus*, desiriation is the connection made in the process of reflective judgment between the non-cognitive representations of sensibility and the capacities of the Organized Being to act in response to these representations (the Organized Being as patient) or to determine to change them (the Organized Being as agent). It is in this latter capacity that the name "teleological judgment" appropriately fits the act of reflective judgment.

The *combination* of the composition-of-desire and the *nexus*-of-desiriation is what Kant called the *Mannigfaltige Begehrungen*. Linguistic consistency would favor translating this as the "manifold of desires," but so as not to lose sight of the composition we will instead translate this as the **manifold of Desires** and, when the context is clear enough, more briefly as Desires.

We obtain a succinct representation of the practical act of affective perception by gathering up the points discussed in this section and cataloging them under the titles and general ideas of our general 2LAR structure. This is done under the application of the judicial-psychological Idea of Quality in Rational Psychology. The result is illustrated in Figure 7.2.2.

**Figure 7.2.2**: 2LAR structure of the act of affective perception. See also § 3.4 below.
§ 3. The Rational Psychology of Affectivity

The discussion just concluded treated the Realerklä runung of affective perception as an object of inner sense and was, for this reason, a treatment of affectivity under the transcendental Idea of Quality in Rational Psychology from the judicial Standpoint: Unconditioned unity in compatibility (i.e., the division between objective and affective perception is a merely logical division; affective and objective perception in combination make up the complete state of conscious representation). As soon as we recognize this acroamatic underpinning for desire, desiration, and Desires, we also at once realize that our Realerklä runung of affectivity is incomplete until we likewise treat it in terms of the remaining three psychological Ideas of Quantity, Relation, and Modality. Each adds something to this applied metaphysic of affectivity, viz. the natural schema of judgmentation (Quantity), the synthesis in continuity (Relation), and the presentment of Reality (Modality). The general Idea of Rational Psychology is the Idea of the absolute unity of the thinking Subject, and these three titles, along with the title of act of affective perception from the previous section, rounds out the practical Realerklä runung. Figure 7.3.1 illustrates the structure of the applied metaphysic of affectivity.

§ 3.1 The Natural Schema of Judgmentation

Deduction of the natural schema of judgmentation is carried out in Chapter 18 of CPPM. This title falls under the transcendental Idea of Quantity in Rational Psychology from the judicial Standpoint: Unconditioned functional unity of affective and objective perception in sensibility. The overall process of judgmentation involves the acts of all three processes of judgment: determining judgment for concepts; reflective judgment for affective perception; and practical judgment for practical rules of action. All three operate on and with functionally different types of
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Figure 7.3.2: 2LAR structure of the natural schema of judgmentation.

representations, governing acroams, and objects of representation. The representation of objective knowledge falls to the process of determining judgment under the principle of conformity to law. In contrast, the process of practical judgment is entirely unconcerned with objects of appearances or sensible phenomena, knows no affective perceptions, and is entirely concerned with enforcing the dictates of the master formula of the categorical imperative by means of practical laws of action. The gap between these two processes could scarcely be wider and it falls to the reflective judgment of affectivity to bridge this gap. In Critique of Judgment Kant tells us,

The determining power of judgment by itself has no principles that ground concepts of Objects. It is no autonomy, for it merely subsumes under given laws or concepts as principles. . .

But the reflecting power of judgment has to subsume under a law that is not yet given, and which is in fact only a principle for reflexion on objects for which objectively it is entirely lacking a law or a concept of an Object that would be adequate as a principle for the cases occurring. Now since no use of the faculty of knowledge can be permitted without principles, in such cases the reflecting power of judgment must itself serve as a principle which, since it is not objective and cannot underlay a sufficient ground of knowledge of the intention of the Object, can serve as a merely subjective principle for the expedient use of the faculty of knowledge – namely, for reflecting on one class of objects. In reference to such cases, the reflecting power of judgment therefore has its maxims, and indeed necessary ones, for the sake of the cognition of natural laws in experience in order to arrive by their means at concepts, even if these are ideas of reason, if it needs these merely in order to come to know nature according to empirical laws. [KANT (5: 385-386)]

Nature is the world model the Organized Being constructs for itself. Under the acroam of the transcendental Idea of Quantity, this model must be unified and for this task there must be what Kant has called the "maxims of the reflecting power of judgment." Such maxims constitute a practical framework for the possibility of cognitions of objects in Nature and thoroughly suffuse an applied metaphysic for the role of affectivity in constructing the world model. The 2LAR
structure of this applied metaphysic is illustrated in Figure 7.3.2 above. Kant writes,

If the word nature is taken simply in its formal meaning, where it means the first inner principle of all that belongs to the Dasein of a thing, then there can be given as many different natural sciences as there are specifically different things, each of which must contain its own peculiar inner principle of the determinations belonging to its Dasein. But nature is also taken in its material meaning, not as a constitution but as the embodiment of all things insofar as they can be objects of our senses, and thus also of experience, under which is therefore understood the whole of all appearances, i.e. the sensible world with the exclusion of all non-sensuous Objects. Nature taken in this meaning of the word has two principal parts, in accordance with the principal division of our senses, where the one contains the objects of outer sense, the other the objects of inner sense; hence is possible a twofold doctrine of nature, the doctrine of body and the doctrine of soul, where the first takes into consideration extended nature, the second thinking nature. [KANT (4: 467)]

By "doctrine of body" Kant means the applied metaphysic for physical objects, i.e. the objects studied by the so-called "hard" sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology. This applied metaphysic is a system of ontological laws for objects of outer sense that must ground empirical laws in these sciences. Kant published this doctrine under the title *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* in 1786. The work was largely ignored by scientists at that time, most likely because its most key conclusion was that Newtonian physics was fundamentally flawed. In its place Kant proposed a theory in which the key ideas foretold the necessity for theoretical constructs that would in fact later be discovered and come to be known under the name "field theory." Under Kant's metaphysic, the most vexing paradoxes of today's quantum physics cease to be paradoxes and what we today call "wave-particle duality" appears as an ontological necessity in a proper Critical understanding of physical Nature.\(^\text{10}\)

Kant obtained this applied metaphysic by applying the transcendental Ideas of Rational Physics under the theoretical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics proper. When we turn to the doctrine of objects of inner sense (which is what Kant means by his use of the word "soul"), the ontological laws of the applied metaphysic – because this metaphysic must apply to psychological objects – is still a rational physic but one that must be understood in terms of the judicial Standpoint of Rational Physics. Here we are dealing with the phonomy, mechanics, dynamics, and phenomenology of judicial outcomes of the overall process of judgmentation. This is nothing else than the schema employed in judgmentation for the representation of experience and knowledge. Unfortunately, Kant himself never got around to producing a metaphysical

\(^{10}\) Even today the revolutionary nature of Kant's metaphysic is not generally understood or appreciated by philosophers. Among other things, English translations of Kant's theory tend to be distorted by the incorrect presupposition that Kant had to be tailoring his metaphysic to provide a metaphysical framework for Newton's theory. This produces subtle yet crucial errors in the translating of the technical terminology, and physicists have long taken philosophers at their word that Kant's system is a system of "Newtonian" theory. Because Newton's theory is now known to be incorrect, this is all scientists need to ignore Kant's system.
doctrine of thinking Nature and left this as a task for some younger metaphysician to carry out. This "homework assignment" lay untouched for another two centuries until the deduction of the applied metaphysic was developed in Chapter 18 of CPPM. What is provided here in this book is a synopsis of the outcome of that development. The ontological laws of the schema of judgmentation are laws of the subjective regulation of the Organized Being's thinking and reasoning processes in the representation of knowledge.

The title of Quantity is called judicial phoronomy and concerns forms of schemata of kinesis (change in general)\(^{11}\) in the Self-determinations of the Organized Being. The momenta of Quantity are the general ideas of identification, differentiation, and integration subsumed under the psychological Idea of Quantity according to the judicial transcendental Ideas of Rational Physics (which act as specifying principles). Identification specifies to the idea of composition of a motoregulatory act: in the synthesis of apprehension the determination of the representation of every appearance requires the co-determination of an act of motoregulatory expression by which the materia circa quam for synthesis of the pure intuition of subjective space is givable through kinaesthetic feedback. The act of co-determination of motoregulatory expression is an act of teleological reflective judgment. The idea of differentiation specifies to the idea of generation of topological neighborhood: the apprehension of change necessarily requires the on-going construction of not merely a topological point in subjective space but of an aggregation of points in time that produces topological neighborhoods from the extensive magnitude of change in the representation of kinaesthetic feedback data. As we discussed earlier in this book, the pure intuition of space is a representation of topological structure in sensibility. This structure is not given a priori but rather is givable and a product of the synthesis of apprehension. The idea of integration specifies to the idea of presentation of syncretic Obs.OS: representation in empirical intuition cannot distinguish between the representation of object-in-space and sensuous matter of the representation of that space and thus every intuition is a syncretic representation of object-and-space in which the materia in qua of sensation of outer sense and the kinaesthetic materia circa quam of the empirical intuition of space are fused in the representation of a single Object called Obs.OS. The term Obs.OS denotes "observable object-and-scheme" and is a term introduced by Piaget to describe the infant's inability to distinguish between what is observable about an external object of outer sense and what is observable in his own schemes of sensorimotor actions. There is no "foreground-background" distinction nor an "it-me" distinction in a singular intuition. All such distinctions come later in representation through concepts of phenomena and acts of thinking (cognition through concepts) and not through receptivity.

\(^{11}\) Phoronomy is the metaphysic for what in physics is known as kinematics.
Quality in the natural schema is called **judicial dynamics** and concerns the idea of moving powers. From the theoretical Standpoint of Rational Physics **moving power** is the power to be a cause of a change in an object's external relationships. In the applied metaphysic for physics moving power has three qualitative characteristics. It can be: a power of attraction (e.g., gravity); a power of repulsion (e.g., electric charges of the same sign); or it can take the form of an oscillating equilibrium (e.g., the ground state dynamics of a quantum mechanical "particle in a box"). Considered judicially, **Lust per se** is the moving power of the adaptive psyche whereas the feeling of **Lust per se** is merely its presentation in nous. In and of themselves, feelings of **Lust per se** can be regarded as energetics but are not themselves efficient causes of actions. For this an act of judgment is required, the Quality of which can pertain to nothing else than a relationship to the practical capacity for judgmentation, i.e. a relationship of formal expedience between the manifold of Desires and the appetitive power of practical Reason. However, to present such a relationship in judgment requires **laws** of the synthesis, and this is what is provided by the **momenta** of Quality in the natural schema. Regarded as a cause of **kinesis** in motoregulatory actions of the Organized Being, this relationship is determined under either a law of **well-being** (attraction; **Lust**), **ill-being** (repulsion; **Unlust**), or **happiness** (equilibrium; balancing the opposition – Entgegensetzung – of **Lust** and **Unlust**). These **momenta** reflect the general ideas of agreement, opposition (Widerstreit) and subcontrarity in our general 2LAR subsumed under the judicial Standpoint of the transcendental Idea of Quality in Rational Physics (the feeling of closure in the structure of sensibility).

Relation in the natural schema is called **judicial mechanics**. In physics "mechanics" is defined as the study of the interactions between matter and the forces acting on it. Ultimately, mechanical laws of physics come down to determinations of the form "given a particular physical circumstance, the circumstance that will follow is such-and-such." In the simplest cases these laws are expressed in differential equation form (e.g., the time rate of change of momentum = force), but in more complex and general cases physics casts its laws in integral forms (e.g. Hamiltonians) expressing a more or less teleologically-flavored law (e.g., "of all the ways such-and-such could happen, what will happen is the system will minimize the total action"). When we turn our attention to objects of inner sense, we also find that the judicial ontological laws of judgmentation likewise follow this sort of "end result" conditioning. In the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant wrote,

> All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the whole possible state of self-consciousness. But from this, as a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable and certain *a priori*, because nothing can come into cognition except by means of this original apperception. Now since this identity must necessarily enter into
the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances so far as they are to become empirical cognition, appearances are thus subject to a priori conditions with which their synthesis (of apprehension) must be in thoroughgoing accord. Now, however, the representation of a general condition in accordance with which a certain manifold (of whatever kind) can be set up is called a rule, and if it must be so set up, a law. All appearances, therefore, stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity of which the empirical affinity is the mere consequence.

That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, indeed even depend on this in regard to its lawfulness, may well sound preposterous and strange. But if one considers that nature is nothing in itself but an embodiment of appearances, hence no thing in itself but merely a multitude of representations of mind, then one will not be astonished to see that unity, on claim of which alone it can be called an Object of all possible experience, i.e. nature, solely in the radical capacity of all our cognition, namely transcendental apperception, and for that very reason we can know this unity a priori, hence also as necessary, which we would certainly have to abandon if it were given in itself independently of the primary sources of our thinking. [KANT (4: A113-114)]

Judgmentation has the singular peculiarity that general concepts are formed from acts of non-objective reflective judgment and that such acts in marking intuitions in time carry over via the synthesis of re-cognition in imagination into the manifold of concepts as assertions of the Dasein of Objects. Depending on the Relation of the transcendental schema and the determining judgment that follows, these cognitive by-products stand as inferences of objects (ideation), of order-in-Nature (induction), or of co-determination (analogy)12. The natural schema of Relation, as ontological laws in the judicial Standpoint, must therefore speak to the "mechanics" of how these sorts of outcomes are possible. The law of inference of ideation is schematization according to the first analogy of experience in the judicial Standpoint (motoregulatory expression persists through a determination of appetitive power). The law of inference of induction is schematization according to the second judicial analogy of experience (all actions of an Organized Being follow a principle of acting to extinguish the intensive magnitude of Lust per se). The law of inference of analogy is schematization according to the third judicial analogy of experience (motivation13 is cause of an effect in appetite14, and appetite is at the same time cause of an effect in motivation). Here we should recall (Chapter 1) that appetitive power belongs to practical Reason; an appetite (Begierde) is a representation constructed by practical Reason. The ontological laws of Relation provide the subjective bridge between objective thinking and the power of pure practical Reason.

Modality in the natural schema is called judicial phenomenology and it concerns the assimilation of appearances into experience. The first law deals with the determinable idea of our general 2LAR subsumed under the first transcendental Idea of Modality in Rational Physics

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12 Regarded from the viewpoint of logic, the inference of analogy is induction with respect to the predicate.
13 Motivation is the accommodation of perceptions.
14 Appetite is the representation of a determined practical purpose.
judicially conditioned by formal expedience in reflective judgment. This is the law of indifference: any joining of desiratio
n with the motor faculties of the Organized Being that satisfies the principle of formal expedience in reflective judgment is a possible subjective ground for the marking of an intuition in sensibility. This law reflects the ontological character of the process of judgmentation in general, i.e. that the process of judgmentation is a priori indifferent to the form of appearances represented in intuition so long as that form has practical expedience.

The second law concerns the general idea of determination subsumed under the second transcendental Idea of Modality. This is the law of attentiveness: the perception of a change in kinesis draws the attention of an Organized Being to a particular content of presentation in sensibility and away from other content of the presentation. This is a law for the orientation of psyche through perception and is a "focusing" law for determination. Consciousness is the representation that a representation is present and is to be attended to; attention is the representation that this representation, and not some other, is the representation to be presented.

Finally, the ontological law for the determining factor (subsumed under the third transcendental Idea of Modality in Rational Physics) is the law of coherence in context: no presentation of an object of attention can be determined except this determination also include a mutual determination of other objects of experience which provide context for the first object and present this context in sensibility. Coherence in a context means the opposition of Lust and Unlust in balance (equilibrium). The second ontological law of Modality is an orientation of attention via motoregulatory expression of the Organized Being's capacity to focus its powers of sense; the third law is the principle for the orientation of speculative Reason through ratio-expression. The third law is the principle for the summoning of representations in the manifold of concepts back into the synthesis of apprehension.

§ 3.2 The Synthesis in Continuity

The natural schema of judgmentation is the most physics-like title of the applied metaphysic of affectivity in the sense that it deals directly with the role of affectivity in producing cognitions of objects in Nature. Its twelve judicial-ontological laws are laws of form of composition or, more accurately, of the form of composing (since affectivity itself is not immediately concerned with objects). The synthesis in continuity, on the other hand, deals with the form of Nature overall and the role of affectivity in constructing the necessary unity of connection that is the defining hallmark of Nature. The natural schema deals with Nature locally, i.e. with the composing of knowledge, opinion, and belief in the immediate spotlight of attention. The synthesis in continuity deals with the overall forming of Nature globally as this world model is developed through the
organic unity of *psyche* and reflective judgment. Thus, it too is a rational physic, but one that takes its specification from considerations of Rational Cosmology from the judicial Standpoint and, again, in service to the judicial acroam of Relation in Rational Psychology: unconditioned unity of all relationships is grounded in the *a priori* anticipation of the form of connection of perceptions in time according to the *modi* of persistence, succession, and coexistence.

Deduction of the synthesis in continuity was carried out in Chapter 16 of *CPPM*. This deduction proceeds by taking as its starting point four classical negative principles of continuity, which were already well known in Kant's day, and applying Kant's Copernican hypothesis to make these principles epistemology-centered rather than, as they were then, ontology-centered. These four principles are:

1. *in mundo non datur saltus* (a leap is not given in the [sensible] world);
2. *in mundo non datur hiatus* (a gap is not given in the [sensible] world);
3. *in mundo non datur casus* (chance is not given in the [sensible] world);
4. *in mundo non datur fatum* (fate is not given in the [sensible] world).

Nature, as representation, falls to *nous* but the reference to its object (the sensible world) contained in these principles tells us that the synthesis in continuity is an applied metaphysic of *nous-soma* reciprocity, i.e. the synthesis deals with the *nexus* of *nous* and *psyche*.

The transcendental place of this synthesis rather obviously puts us into the realm of knowledge where our understanding of the mental physics is necessarily mathematical since neither *nous* nor *psyche* are objects of sensible appearance. Kant defined mathematics in general as knowledge through the construction of concepts and we therefore require a mathematical *Realerklärung* of the idea of continuity. Kant provided us with one:

> Continuity is thus the absolute indeterminability of the number of parts in a whole. Thus where no smallest part is possible, there is continuity; e.g. space and time are *qua* *nta continua* . . . All moments are positions in time, just as all points are positions in space . . . Further, no thing comes from one state to another immediately, i.e. *per saltum*, but rather the transition from one state to the other happens so that the thing must go through all intermediate states; thus we may say generally: All *mutatio*\(^{15}\) is *continua*\(^{16}\) . . . The cause of the law of continuity is time. [KANT (28: 200-201)]

The general law of continuity is a law for what Kant called "the dynamic synthesis in appearances." The titles of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality in the applied metaphysic of the synthesis in continuity are called, respectively, objectivity, the aesthetic Idea, the judicial Idea, and Meaning (see Figure 7.1.3). Because the *practical* significance of the synthesis in continuity lies in the *nexus* it forms between *nous* and *psyche*, each title requires a full 2LAR.

\(^{15}\) the action of making or the process of becoming different; change, alteration.

\(^{16}\) uninterrupted, unbroken (in space or time).
§ 3.2.1 The Synthesis of Objectivity

Human beings are born into the world with no copy-of-reality mechanism and no innate ideas of objects, including any innate idea of "object" *per se*. Yet all healthy human beings come to construct objective representations and to regard the objects of these representations as real and actual. All children are born naive realists and most adults likewise cling to a realist ontology in the way they view the world. For us it is as impossible to comprehend Nature without objects as it is to represent objects without representing them in space and time. How is this possible? The only objectively valid answer to this question is that our knowledge of objects arises as a product of the process of judgmentation and this, in turn, means that a transcendental *function of practical objectivity* is necessary for the possibility of this fact.

From the hypothetical-judicial reflective perspective (the judicial-cosmological Idea of Quantity: *absolutely complete equilibrium in judgmentation through the suppression or equilibration of innovations*) objectivity addresses the Quantity of continuity as *Nature structured through the homogeneous composition of the extensive magnitude in every appearance in empirical consciousness*. The objectivity function expresses Nature as the persistent in all appearances, i.e., **objectivity is the function of continuity in Nature**. In terms of logical *momenta* we express its *judicial* character as **objectivity = {universal, affirmative, categorical, apodictic}**. This character of the objectivity function accounts for the strong hold naive realism maintains on the thinking of the Organized Being. We know Nature as objects and relationships among objects.

These logical titles make the deduction of the synthetic functioning of objectivity more or less straightforward. Under the title of Quantity, the universal character of objectivity provides the synthesizing idea for specializing the three general ideas of identification, differentiation, and integration. Identification specializes to the idea of **structure** (a system of self-regulating
transformations). Differentiation specializes to the idea of sub-structure (structures within an overall structure, which can contain their own specific and additional self-regulating transformations, all of which are nonetheless constrained to conserve the overall structure). The idea of integration specializes to that of closure: provisional completion and stability in adaptation to equilibrium. Closure is always merely provisional because later experienced events are always potentially innovative in the Lust-Kraft of psyche (upsetting to the established system in equilibrium). Piaget writes,

In the first place, the production of the structure appears in two forms, the second being the end-result of the first: a formation and transformations. Consequently, the organism, the thinking being, or the social group, builders of structures, are only centers of functioning (or structuration) and not completed structures containing all possible structures by a sort of 'pre-formation'. In other words, a distinction should be drawn in this formative process between the function as a 'structuring' activity and the structure as a structured result.

In the second place, in the case of structures in the formative stage, the self-regulating system can no longer be reduced to a set of rules or norms characterizing the completed structure: it consists of a system of regulations or self-regulation, with correction of errors after the event, and not the 'pre-correction' to be found in the final system . . .

Lastly, in the case of structures in the process of constitution or continual re-constitution (as with biological structures), exchange is no longer limited to internal reciprocities . . . but involves a considerable exchange with the outside, to enable these structures to obtain the supplies necessary for their functioning. This is so with structures in the formative stage, as regards the development of intelligence, when the subject must constantly have recourse to trial and error . . . This is especially so with biological structures . . .

A living structure . . . constitutes an 'open' system in the sense that it is preserved through a continual flow of exchanges with the outside world. Nevertheless, the system does have a cycle closing in on itself in that its components are maintained by interaction while being fed from the outside. Such a structure can be described statically since it is preserved despite its perpetual activity, but as a rule it is dynamic since it constitutes the more or less stable forms of continual transformations. [PIAG11: 16]

The logically affirmative character of objectivity provides the context for specializing the general ideas of agreement, opposition, and subcontrariety. We define disposition as a first subjective ground for the adoption of a practical rule or maxim [KANT (6: 25)]. The specifying acroam is the judicial-cosmological Idea of Quality: absolute completeness in a common ground of belief in all reflective judgments. Here we must note that belief is unquestioned holding-to-be-true (in cognition) and unquestioned holding-to-be-binding (in the expression of actions).

Bearing in mind that the synthesis of objectivity ties Quantity in reflective judgment to the somatic Kraft of adaptive psyche, it is clear that the idea of disposition provides the context for the momenta of Quality in objectivity. Expedience in disposition is the positive ground for adaptation to closure and takes its reference from the feeling of Lust; inexpediency in disposition is the negative ground for adaptation, involves the rupture of a cycle of activity (which must then
be replaced by another), and takes its reference from the feeling of *Unlust; conservation*, as the subcontrary function, is the synthesis of the other two, i.e. conservation is the condition by which feelings that otherwise impress inexpedience are transformed into positive dispositions through the internal self-regulations of the structuring of judgments and actions. Note that without the function of conservation the rupture of one cycle of activity could not be merged seamlessly into the establishment of a second cycle as continuity in Nature requires (*in mundo non datur saltus*). Quality in objectivity is the matter of initiating, terminating, and closing cycles in noetic-psychosomatic activity expression.

The *Dasein* of Objects of direct sensuous experience are declared categorically in thinking; this is one of the more pronounced characteristics of the realism by which human beings view the world. Even though the *Existenz* of an Object is subject to frequent re-structuring in representation, there remains a categorical unity of the Object as object. Relation in the synthesis of objectivity pertains to the subjective "inner mechanics" by which this is effected. Here the specifying cosmological acroam is the transcendental cosmological Idea of Relation from the judicial Standpoint: the causality of freedom is the absolute beginning of all appearances. We will discuss in depth the practical idea of "freedom" and what its Critical meaning is when we turn to practical Reason in a later chapter. Here let it suffice to say that freedom is the ability of the Organized Being to initiate and regulate its own actions through spontaneity, under the master regulation of the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason, without being necessarily bound by specific sensuous impressions of receptivity. It is the idea that speaks directly to what psychologists and neuroscientists usually call "the motivational system of the brain" – to which the Critical theory adds "and mind."

This provides the context for specialization of the general ideas of internal, external, and transitive Relation. Internal Relation specializes to constancy of purpose: every representation of the *Dasein* of an Object serves equilibrium under the formula of the categorical imperative. External Relation specializes to the idea of *elater animi* ("driver of mind"): every noetic-psychosomatic activity springs from the logically-hypothetical expression of a subjective regulation of practical Reason as its ground. The transitive Relation in the context of the synthesis of objectivity specializes to the idea of affinity of purpose: the synthesis of objectivity proceeds according to the *a priori* rule that Objects and the expression of purpose are co-determining.

Modality in the synthesis of objectivity pertains to judgments of formulations of the representation of Objects. Appearances, as objects of outer sense, carry no mark in receptivity that dictates the specific representation of any object of appearances. It is the Organized Being who formulates these representations (no copy-of-reality mechanism) under the acroam of the
judicial cosmological Idea of Modality: the I of transcendental apperception is the unconditioned condition for thinking the Dasein of any object. The context supplied hereby to the apodictic Modality of the synthesis of objectivity leads to the specialization of the general ideas of the determinable, the determination, and the determining factor in the synthesis. For the determinable the function is possible Gestaltung: the synthesis of any form of representation in which both intuition and affective perception satisfy the condition of formal expedience in reflective judgment is a possible ground of objectivity in consciousness. The determination function is actual Gestaltung: the synthesis of any form of sensuous representation in apprehension for which the concurrent noetic-psychic-somatic activity is neither vetoed nor results in an act of ratio-expression by practical Reason is a ground of objectivity. The determining factor specializes to necessitated Gestaltung: an equilibrium in the synthesis of perception in apprehension that follows from a ratio-expression of practical Reason is made objective necessarily.

Objectivity and objects are such central characteristics of human understanding that it is not at all difficult to appreciate the extraordinary hold the copy-of-reality hypothesis has on scientists and laypersons alike. It is therefore quite easy to overlook or fail to appreciate the role affectivity and non-cognitive Reason play in one's most basic understandings of Nature. Better appreciation of the judicially aesthetic character of objectivity can often be gained from the study of those unfortunate individuals who have been victims of some severe psychological trauma. Here the younger the subject is when the trauma occurs, the clearer the appreciation can be since children do not yet possess the same overall magnitude of structure in the manifold of concepts as adults have constructed. Let us therefore digress for a moment to consider an example case reported by Nyman and Svensson of the Boys' Clinic in Sweden [NYMA].

Patrik was a ten year old boy for whom the world was a good place, where grownups were trusted, and where a little boy could be bold and inquisitive in complete safety. On his way home from school one day he met a man posing as a policeman who lured him from the street and into the flat where Patrik lived with his parents. Once they were alone, the friendly, helpful policeman suddenly turned into a terrifying stranger who sexually molested him and threatened to come back and get revenge if Patrik told anyone what had happened. The little boy was scared to death that the man was going to kill him and, after the man let him go, he ran home in hysterics. Patrik was left severely traumatized. His world became one populated by omnipotent monsters in the guise of strange men. He suffered nightmares in which he was abducted, imprisoned, and murdered. The presence of strange men often triggered olfactory hallucinations in which Patrik believed he once again smelled the odor of his attacker. Even though he knew the man who had molested him had been arrested and was in prison, the boy was tormented by thoughts that the
man was hiding behind the shower curtain or under his bed. He would wake up at night in terror that the man was climbing through the bedroom window of his fourth-floor apartment. The boy told his therapists that even if the man were killed, he would always come back to life again.

These are brutally objective symptoms of how this little boy's world was changed by the shock and overwhelming terror of what he had experienced. The experience was in such horrifying contradiction to the ten-year-old's prior conception of his world that synthesizing closure in Nature resulted in debilitating neuroses and only the most fragile successes in re-equilibration. A world stalked by monsters in the guise of adult male strangers became for him a fearsome and persistent reality. Nyman and Svensson make mention of some other objective factors they think are related to the specific manifestations of the trauma, factors that might explain the course some characteristics of the neurosis took. They do not say what eventually became of Patrik but they do say his therapy took eight months just to bring under some control the most debilitating aspects of the trauma. The point I wish to make in relating this case is this: objectivity is a function of mind and a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of empirical objectivity obtainable from understanding the root character of the synthesis of objectivity ought to be expected to one day produce more effective therapeutic methods for treating severe psychological trauma.

§ 3.2.2 The Synthesis of the Aesthetic Idea

The function of continuity in perception, as Quality in the synthesis in continuity, is called the aesthetic Idea. The aesthetic Idea binds the reflective Quality of judgment to the noetic Kraft of adaptive psyche (the power of nous to produce or suffer effects) and by doing so animates thinking. Figure 7.3.4 illustrates the 2LAR structure of the function of the aesthetic Idea. In terms of the subjective sources of knowledge, it belongs to sense but is not itself a perception.

![Figure 7.3.4: 2LAR structure of the aesthetic Idea.](image-url)
Thought, as William James pointed out in *Principles of Psychology*, presents the character within one's personal empirical consciousness of being sensibly continuous. Between what I am thinking now and what I was thinking a moment ago there are no blanks or gaps such that the character of thought *now* vs. *then* reveals any breach or crack. Thus we find in apperception and apprehension an exhibition of the principle *in mundo non datur hiatus*. James wrote,

The proposition that within each personal consciousness thought feels continuous means two things:

1. That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same self;

2. That the changes from one moment to another in the quality of the consciousness are never absolutely abrupt.

The case of the time-gaps, as the simplest, shall be taken first. And first of all, a word about time-gaps of which the consciousness may not be itself aware.

[We] saw that such time-gaps existed, and that they might be more numerous than is usually supposed. If the consciousness is not aware of them, it cannot feel them as interruptions. In the unconsciousness produced by nitrous oxide and other anaesthetics, in that of epilepsy and fainting, the broken edges of sentient life may meet and merge over the gap, much as the feelings of space of the opposite margins of the 'blind spot' meet and merge over that objective interruption to the sensitiveness of the eye. Such consciousness as this, whatever it may be for the onlooking psychologist, is for itself unbroken. . . To expect the consciousness to feel the interruptions of its objective continuity as gaps would be like expecting the eye to feel a gap of silence because it does not hear, or the ear to feel a gap of darkness because it does not see. So much for the gaps that are unfelt.

With the felt gap the case is different. On waking from sleep, we usually know that we have been unconscious, and we often have an accurate judgment of how long. The judgment here is certainly an inference from sensible signs, and its ease is due to long practice in the particular field. The result of it, however, is that the consciousness is, *for itself*, not what it was in the former case, but interrupted and continuous, in the mere time-sense of the words. [JAME1a: 237-238]

What James describes here is the empirical experience of "time-gaps" such as those we say exist while one is asleep, unconscious due to suffering a blow to the head, etc. Indeed, this character of continuity in perception is one of the factors of personal experience that, from these corner cases in experience, goes into one's conceptualization of one's own empirical Self. Sensible continuity in the midst of waking experience is, on the other hand, so complete that we typically never appreciate how remarkable it is that such continuity in perception persists in the *Existenz* of the Self. This continuity can hardly be laid to receptivity alone or to the synthesis of imagination alone. Rather, we must view it as a *function* of the process of perception. The Nature of this function also is revealed in other characteristics of perception and cognition. Kant wrote,

Now if to a concept were imputed a representation of imagination that appertains to its presentation, but which by itself gives rise to so much to think that it can never be concentrated in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically enlarges the concept
itself in an unbounded way, then here imagination is creative and brings the capacity for intellectual Ideas (reason) into motion, to wit: at the instigation of a representation it gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be sure, appertain to the concept of the object).

We call those forms which do not make up the presentation of a given concept itself, but only express, as supporting representations of imagination, the consequences connected with it and the affinity of it with others, (aesthetic) attributes of an object whose Idea, as an Idea of reason, cannot be adequately presented . . . They . . . give occasion for imagination to spread itself over a multitude of kindred representations . . . and give an aesthetic Idea, which serves that Idea of reason in place of logical presentation, although really only to animate the mind by opening up for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of kindred representations. [KANT (5: 314-315)]

What Kant describes here is the ground of the possibility of creative ideation. Indeed, we can give a Critical explanation of the phenomenon of creativity, i.e., creativity is the power of the aesthetic Idea to stimulate the process of thinking through the summoning of concepts from the manifold of concepts into the synthesis of reproductive imagination in such a way that these concepts become partial representations and materia ex qua for the synthesis of productive imagination. The aesthetic Idea is that which stands in the affectivity of sense as the aesthetic counterpart to the objectivity of cognition. We can describe the logical judicial character of the aesthetic Idea as {particular, negative, disjunctive, problematic} and contrast this with our earlier logical description of objectivity as {universal, affirmative, categorical, apodictic}. The aesthetic Idea is particular because it is an aggregating function, i.e. it "gives rise to so much to think that it can never be concentrated" in one determinate concept. It appertains to the materia ex qua of sensibility and not merely the materia in qua of a single intuition and, hence, falls under the general idea of differentiation in representation rather than to identification (the singular) or integration (the universal). It is negative because the aesthetic Idea is not itself a perception. It is disjunctive because its role is that of transitive Relation in apprehension and apperception. It is problematic because it falls under the determinable idea of general Modality and not determination or determining factor.

Sense in terms of the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea has for Quantity an act of analytic aggregation. Its function provides the causatum\(^\text{17}\) for summoning representations from the manifold of concepts. The momenta of Quantity for such a rule serve the aesthetical perfection of perception and this perfecting is reflected in: (1) clarity in appearance, i.e. the making of a clear representation; (2) distinction in an object, i.e. the clear representing of a characteristic of a clear representation; and (3) comprehension of Object, i.e. the representing of an object through reasoning such that the Object is sufficient for a particular intention.

\(^{17}\) Recall that causatum is a rule for the determination of a change under the condition of a cause (as its ground).
The title of Quality in the aesthetic Idea is the **act of quickening**. Sense is the capacity to present sensations and **quickening** in the aesthetic Idea is the catalyzing function for this presentation through the synthesis in continuity between reflective judgment and noetic **Kraft**. This synthesis ties the aesthetic Idea to the *Lust per se of psyche* and its three **momenta** follow from this as: (1) **quickening in materially sensuous Lust**; (2) **quickening in materially intellectual Lust**; and (3) **quickening in the pure equilibrium of Lust**. The first speaks to receptivity, the second to the synthesis of re-productive imagination, and the third to the coalescence of sense in acts of judgmentation. The aesthetic Idea does not directly contribute to the perception but, rather, to the **animation** of the cycle of thought.

In Relation the aesthetic Idea is the **act of harmonization** of the faculty of perception, i.e., making diverse representations homogeneous and compatible with each other such that they can be combined in composition. Bearing in mind that the function of the aesthetic Idea joins the matter of composition in reflective judgment (aesthetical Quantity and Quality) with noetic **Kraft**, homogeneity and compatibility in this context refer to **feelings**. This context sets up the proper understanding of the three **momenta** of Relation as: (1) **harmonization in the pleasant**, i.e., harmonization merely in a sensuous satisfaction through sensation alone; (2) **harmonization in the good**, i.e., harmonization in a satisfaction through ratio-expression in reasoning; and (3) **harmonization in the beautiful**, i.e., harmonization through equilibrium of the free play of imagination and understanding. This terminology is phrased in terms of the feeling of **Lust**, but we should recognize that harmonization in terms of the feeling of **Unlust** refers merely to the opposite, or **negative**, intensive magnitude of the feeling and the satisfaction, i.e., dissatisfaction (*Wohlgefallen* and *Mißfallen*). The first **momentum** speaks to satisfaction grounded in receptivity in apprehension, the second to satisfaction grounded in spontaneity in apprehension, and the third to what Kant called the judgment of **taste**:

The judgment of taste differs from the logical [judgment] in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the Object, but the former does not subsume under a concept at all, because otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. All the same, however, it is similar to the latter in that it professes a universality and necessity, though not according to concepts of the Object and hence a merely subjective one. Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (that which pertains to the cognition of the Object), but the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts, it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general . . . This, employed with respect to a representation through which an object is given, requires the harmonization of two powers of representation: namely of imagination (for the intuition and composition of its manifold), and of understanding (for the concept as representation of the unity of this composition). Now since no concept of the Object is here the ground of the judgment, it can subsist only in the subsumption of imagination itself (in the case of a representation through which an object is given) under the condition that understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts. I.e., because the freedom of imagination subsists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a
concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating power of imagination in its freedom and understanding with its conformity to law, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged according to the expedience of the representation (through which an object is given) for the promotion of the faculty of knowledge in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts but rather of the power of imagination or presentations (i.e. of imagination) under the capacity for concepts (i.e. understanding) so far as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its conformity to law. [KANT (5: 286-287)]

Modality in general always denotes the manner of connection with apperception, and so the title of Modality in the aesthetic Idea is the act of modal awareness, i.e. representing the manner of conscious comparison (Comparation and reflexion) for expedience in determining the direction of judgmentation. This is the determinable function for which the sole expedience in the act is in serving to bring forth determinables possibly suitable for the formal expedience of the representing of sensible Nature overall through continuity in perception. Hence, the momenta of Modality are merely manners of direction-setting in animating perception insofar as this pertains to the manner in which the Organized Being holds-to-be-binding that which is presented. This is either: (1) problematic direction, i.e. a possibly expedient animation; (2) assertoric direction, i.e., animation held-to-be-actually-expedient; or (3) apodictic direction, i.e. a manner of animating the faculty of sense made necessary by pure practical Reason for the sake of equilibrating the overall unity in apperception of the Organized Being.

§ 3.2.3 The Synthesis of the Judicial Idea

In Principles of Psychology William James took the bother to point out a universal fact so elementary and self evident in the naive realism with which every healthy human being enters into post-infantile life that the fact itself can seem utterly trivial.

[In] my mind and your mind the rejected portions and the selected portions of the original world-stuff are to a great extent the same. The human race as a whole largely agrees as to what it shall notice and name, and what not. And among the noticed portions we select in much the same way for accentuation and preference or subordination and dislike. There is, however, one entirely extraordinary case in which no two men ever are known to choose alike. One great splitting of the whole universe into two halves is made by each of us; and for each of us almost all the interest attaches to one of the two halves; but we all draw the line of division between them in a different place. When I say that we all call the two halves by the same names, and that those names are "me" and "not-me" respectively, it will be seen at once what I mean. The altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels in those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact. [JAME1a: 289]

Once we have rejected the copy-of-reality hypothesis and adopted the epistemology-centered system of metaphysics, such a "self evident" and "fundamental" psychological fact ceases to be trivial. Indeed, the more fundamental and self evident such a fact is, the greater is its significance.
The near-universal character\(^\text{18}\) of this fact points to the epistemological requirement for an underlying and necessary acroam grounding its possibility. One cannot ascribe the fact to an "accident of nature" because of the negative principle of Relation, *in mundo non datur casus*. However, a negative principle alone does not suffice to explain the fact. The positive acroam in this case is the acroam of unity in apperception. This principle does not stop short of the *entirety* of the perception-giving processes of the Organized Being. (If we said it did we would be ignoring the role of what Freud named 'the unconscious' in mental life).

The synthesis in continuity in Relation is the synthesis joining Relation in reflective judgment to somatic organization in *psyche*. Somatic organization, we recall, is the somatic structure of adaptation in *nous-soma* reciprocity. The animating principle of somatic organization is: motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation. Now, when we tie this principle to that of the acroam of unity in apperception, the context we set is continuity in regard to subsuming the phenomenon of adaptation (the equilibrium of assimilation and accommodation) as somatic structure under unity in apperception. We thus are subsuming a *thing in empirical Nature (soma)* under a principle of the *intelligible* Nature of the Organized Being. The ground for thinking of any object as a *thing* rests on the practical causality in the real division between the Self and the not-Self, but this idea is nonsensical unless this empirical "me" is thought as continuous in *Existenz*. The judicial *Idea* in the synthesis of continuity follows from this as the *function of continuity in Self-Existenz*. Figure 7.3.5 illustrates its 2LAR structure. The judicial Idea is a grounding function by which the negative principle of

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\(^{18}\) Near-universal because infants have not yet made this me vs. not-me distinction and children afflicted with the most severe forms of autism due to brain pathology have great difficulty in forming it. In our discussion here we are speaking of healthy human beings whose mental development has progressed beyond the sensorimotor stage.
Relation in continuity is satisfied in a positive principle of the thorough-going reciprocity in the structures of *nous* and *soma*, namely by focusing the effects of affectivity on psycho-noetic factors that concentrate the attention of the Organized Being on sensuous factors that eventually form core concepts of the Self and make possible the practical distinction between those factors and those that form core conditions of the not-Self.

In terms of the logical understanding of the judicial Idea, the logical *momenta* of this understanding easily follow both from the principles named above (transcendentally) as well as from the mere logical synthesis of objectivity with the aesthetic Idea, i.e. as {singular, infinite, hypothetical, assertoric}. At this point in the exposition of our theory, the alignment of these logical *momenta* with the context of the general ideas of {identification, subcontrarit y, external Relation, determination} is, hopefully, quite clear. The judicial Idea is singular because "there is only one me in apperception." It is logically infinite (subcontrarity) because *Existenz* involves limitation in the empirical representation of the Self. Just as we regard the objects in Nature as limitations of Nature *per se*, *Self-Existenz* is limitation in appearances referred to the transcendental *Dasein* of the *I* of original apperception.\(^\text{19}\) The judicial Idea is hypothetical because the synthesis in continuity of *Self-Existenz* makes connection between the state of *Existenz* at one moment in time and the state of *Existenz* at another moment in time by the *expression of a condition* for continuity in *Self-Existenz*. Finally, the judicial Idea is assertoric in the determination of this continuity; there is in consciousness no problematical "maybe this is still me" and, likewise, no *a priori* necessity for "this is how I must be" anteceding the Organized Being's empirical experience of the Self\(^\text{20}\).

Deduction of the *momenta* of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality for the judicial Idea is covered in Chapter 18 of *CPPM*. For Quantity the synthesizing functions of continuity in *Self-Existenz* are: (1) *sensorimotor unity*: for every noetic representation of perception there is a corresponding somatic representation (biological signaling) that conveys the same information as the former; sensorimotor unity is the identification of sensible affectivity with practical activity; (2) *sensorimotor acts*: limitations of judgmentation of *Self-Existenz* are made possible through specific acts of motoregulatory expression; and (3) *Self-experience*: integration of the aggregate of perceptions accompanying sensorimotor acts composes the boundary limitations of the perception of the Self.

For Quality the synthesizing functions of continuity are: (1) *affirmation of Self-Dasein*: in

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\(^{19}\) Recall that this original apperception is awareness of *Dasein* without any awareness of *Existenz*.

\(^{20}\) For example, Piaget's studies have documented that in the first few months of life the human infant has no inkling that her hands belong to her. C.f. [PIAG7, observation 70].
every act of perception sensibility contains materia judgmentation subsumes under a reference to the Organized Being's awareness of its own Dasein; (2) negation of Self-contradiction: that which in reflexion is in opposition (Widerstreit) to the materia subsumed under the reference to the Dasein of the Organized Being cannot be presented in any intuition of the appearance of the Self; and (3) Self-Existenz: that in perception which remains after abstraction of the materia of Self-contradiction composes the limitations in judgmentation that define the appearances of the Self. The Existenz of the Self inheres in the Dasein of transcendental apperception.

The synthesizing functions of Relation in the judicial Idea are: (1) generalized locomotion: the function of inner Relation in the judicial Idea connecting an act of reflective judgment with a corresponding action in soma such that there is a necessary connection between the power of pure Reason (which contains the appetitive power of the Organized Being) and Lust per se in the psychic dimension of organization; (2) impression-expression: the function of external Relation in the judicial Idea requiring that noetic representations in reflective judgment be reflected in a specific somatic structure of appearance, i.e., every impression of sense is connected with an expression of somatic actions in individuo that constitute somatic appearances in the representation of sensibility; this function mandates that the expression of objective expedience is a condition of continuity in the Existenz of the Self; (3) emergency in experience: the law of community in the judicial Idea (transitive Relation) requiring that reflective judgment and somatic organization be united through a process of reciprocal co-determination of the physical nexus of soma and the form of logical expedience in reflective judgment.

Finally, the synthesizing functions of Modality in the judicial Idea are: (1) unity of motivation: the accommodation of perceptions in reflective judgment is the noetic counterpart to the reciprocal co-determination of somatic action in the nous-soma reciprocity of psyche; (2) motive: judgments held-to-be-binding under the principle of formal expedience by reflective judgment are binding determinations of the motoregulatory expression of somatic actions; this Modality in the judicial Idea is a connection held-to-be-binding in the practical orientation of the activities of an Organized Being for the judicial Ideal of happiness; (3) the Ideal of happiness: the process of judgmentation in general realizes a disposition to act on the basis of the matter of desire with an a priori aim of achieving a robust state of satisfaction by means of the equilibration of the feelings of Lust and Unlust; such a state constitutes the judicial meaning of happiness and the activities of the Organized Being are oriented to the achievement of total perfection (logical, aesthetical, and practical) in Existenz in this state.

Although all reflective judgments are subjective and non-objective, the principle of formal expedience in reflective judgment does produce an objective by-product: It tasks teleological
reflective judgment with structuring judgmentation to produce an overall cognitive unity in Nature. The synthesis in continuity in the judicial Idea is continuity in Relation joining noetic representation with somatic organization in the thorough-going reciprocity of nous and soma according to the general acroam of Rational Cosmology, namely the Idea of absolute completeness in the origin of an appearance in general. Now, all changes in appearances in sensible Nature imply a cause as their condition (category of causality & dependency), and sensible causes are themselves conditioned by other conditions in a series. However, the Idea of absolute completeness in the series of conditions leads to an unconditioned cause. Such a cause is a noumenon and its objective validity can never be other than practical objective validity. Concurrently, this Idea forbids the objectively valid invocation of "chance" as a cause in Nature. If we then try to "get behind" this speculative noumenal cause we step over the horizon of possible experience and into the baseless speculative fog of transcendent ideas with one exception. For every human being awareness of his/her own Dasein is knowledge held-to-be absolute, true, and certain. All other ideas of existence and reality eventually are adjudicated on the basis of this one a priori standard gauge. Protagoras was right when he said, "Man is the measure of all things."

The key event in the development of objective empirical knowledge comes when the Organized Being has advanced its manifold of concepts sufficiently to make the primary division of Nature into the representation of the Self Object and the concurrent representation of the not-Self Object. The original ground for this division lies in the practical causality of the Organized Being, and this is why the child's earliest conceptions of the world are decorated with animism, participation, and magical beliefs. In this development of empirical intelligence, the synthesis in continuity in Self-Existenz performs a vital functional task and one necessary for the possibility of human experience as human beings come to acquire experience.

§ 3.2.4 The Synthesis of Meaning

Let us begin this section with a difficult question: What does "meaning" mean? The very form of this question is enough to warn us of the risk our answer might be nothing other than a circular diallelon that in the end tells us nothing. A recourse to the dictionary soon enough reveals that the English word "meaning" is used in many contexts but is provided with no real definition, e.g., meaning is that which has significance and significance is that which has meaning.

The form of this question also warns us that we are approaching an object of this idea that is likely to be a noumenon and perhaps might even be a primitive. We will shortly see that meaning

21 Those who know something of modern physics might protest at this point that the quantum theory has shown this to be false. However, this is not-true. A discussion of this is provided in CPPM in Chapter 16.
admits to a practical Realerklärung (and is therefore not primitive) but that it is indeed a 
noumenon situated at the edge of the horizon of possible experience. Its practical explanation is 
found through an analytic division of the idea of meaning into a manifold of matters, called 
meanings, and a nexus of form called the meaning implication.

Epistemology-centered metaphysics denies us the option of holding the view that objects have 
meaning a priori in and of themselves as things. Such a view is ontology-centered and has no 
ultimate recourse but to invoke the failed copy-of-reality hypothesis. Rather, objects are given 
meanings in their conceptions by the Organized Being. Indeed, understanding presupposes 
meanings since we do not say we understand something unless we can first say we know what it 
means. The Organized Being does not discover the meaning in an object but rather endows an 
Object with meanings in the acts of representing the Object through concepts. This places the idea 
of meaning where its root explanation is necessarily bound up with the earliest capacities of the 
Organized Being for forming concepts and thus the real explanation of meaning must apply to the 
earliest phases of sensorimotor intelligence in the infant. At this phase, it becomes possible to 
study the formulation of empirical meanings as a phenomenon. Piaget and Garcia have reported 
on precisely such studies [PIAG1] and their principal findings are as follows.

First, in sensorimotor intelligence the meanings of an object amount to what can be done with 
the object. A rattle is something to grasp, something to shake, something to suck, something to 
throw, etc. This is a thorough-going practical understanding of the object that Piaget called a 
logic of actions and a logic of meanings. He saw this as a kind of "primitive proto-logic" upon 
which, among other things, "logics" are later constructed and refined as the growth of the 
manifold of concepts permits. Indeed, cognizance of the object, as a thing independent of the 
sensorimotor schemes for which it is an aliment, is made possible by the fact that the appearances 
of the object are the common point of intersect for the various sensorimotor schemes in which the 
object is involved [PIAG6].

These empirical meanings, bound up as they are with sensorimotor schemes in the earliest 
phases of life, constitute the matters of meaning. However, we also require for this matter a form 
of nexus, and this is where the meaning implication comes into the picture. Nexus is connection of 
non-homogeneous representations that are, nonetheless, regarded as necessarily belonging to one 
another a priori. It is this connection that Piaget and Garcia called a meaning implication: p 
implies q (written \[ p \rightarrow q \]) if one meaning m of q is embedded in the meanings of p and if this 
meaning m is transitive [PIAG1].

Now, as important as these findings are, they nonetheless belong to the empirical science of 
psychology and our overriding concern in this book is with the grounding principles from which a
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Figure 7.3.6: 2LAR structure of the synthesis of Meaning.

Theoretical interpretation such as the Piaget-Garcia finding obtains its objective validity. Put another way, meanings and meaning implication are empirical ideas and, as ideas, they must be grounded in a transcendental principle or risk passing beyond the horizon of possible experience and becoming mere speculations of a transcendent dialectic. This transcendental ground in the applied metaphysic of affectivity is provided by the synthesis of Meaning.

Figure 7.3.6 illustrates the 2LAR structure of the synthesis of Meaning. The practical Real-erklärung of this term is: **Meaning is coherence in the context of life.** The structuring of the form of this coherence is the Modality function of the synthesis in continuity; it is continuity in the synthesis of Meaning. The negative principle of continuity for this is *in mundo non datur fatum*, but we again require a positive statement to go with it if the metaphysic is to be useful in application. Now, speculative teleology – i.e., fate as blind necessity operating without the governance of any law – is utterly lacking in objective validity. Spontaneity of *nous*, on the other hand, does not belong to sensible Nature but, rather, to the intelligible Nature of mind. Here teleological thinking, as a characteristic of human intellect, has objective validity as a phenomenon. Nonetheless, we still require a law and for noetic spontaneity this law must be one of transformation grounding spontaneity with practical objective validity. This law is the first acroam of reflective judgment, i.e. the acroam of formal expedience in Nature, which regulates for noetic organization in the mere form of experience. For each of us the order in Nature is what one thinks it to be, for order in Nature is but one's personal representation of an empirical nexus providing coherence in the context of mental life. Seen in this light, noetic organization is the nexus of meanings expressed in the reciprocity of the representations of *nous* and *soma*. The synthesis of Meaning is objectively the synthesis of a system of beliefs while, subjectively, it is the function that brings coherence in the context of life – life here being understood as the
capacity for an Organized Being to act according to laws of its appetitive power. (For a metaphysical discussion of "What is life in general?" refer to Chapter 12 of CPPM and Chapter 10 of this book. This Realerklärung is the root practical explanation, epistemology-centered, from which all other usages of the term "life" are derivative in the understanding of Nature).

§ 3.2.4.1 Quantity in the Synthesis of Meaning

Deduction of the momenta of the synthesis of Meaning is found in Chapter 16 of CPPM. As the Modality function of the synthesis in continuity, the momenta of Modality in the synthesis of Meaning are, for the context of Meaning, in some sense to be regarded as basic for the proper understanding of the other three titles in our 2LAR, yet these others are not derived from the Modal momenta but rather are functions recognized as making up the necessary context for the idea of the synthesis overall. Quantity in the synthesis of Meaning refers to the form of composition in sensibility as composing acts from which judgmentation then proceeds. Two of the three acts of synthesis we have already discussed previously. The identification function is the synthesis of reflexion; the differentiation function is the synthesis of abstraction. We have briefly discussed both in Chapter 3, but there it was said that we would require a more fundamental Realerklärung for these terms, and this is the point at which we have now arrived.

The synthesis of reflexion in sensibility is the act of constructing a congruence structure with respect to the formal expedience in intuition. Congruence is general and global agreement and suitability without contradiction or real opposition (Widerstreit) and a congruence structure is a structure that satisfies the conditions of a mathematical congruence relation. Without delving too deeply into the formal mathematics of congruence relations – a topic better suited for a treatise on Critical mathematics – let it suffice for our purposes here to say that this construct of mathematics does, with particular restrictions required by Critical epistemology, occupy facet B as a principal quantity and can be applied to facet A with real objective validity (again subject to the same epistemological conditions). Let S be an aggregate of representations, let γ be some action (an associative binary operation), and let * be a closed associative operation on S. A congruence relation is written aryb, where a and b belong to S. aryb denotes an ordered pair <a, b> that belongs to a subset R of the set of all ordered pairs of the members of S. R represents the outcomes of applying the operation γ. γ is a congruence relation if all the following conditions hold:

1. \( aγa \) is a member of R for every \( a \) in S; (this says \( a \) is congruent with itself);
2. if \( aryb \) is a member of R then \( bγa \) is also a member of R; (congruence is commutative);
3. if \( aryb \) is a member of R and \( bγc \) is also a member of R then \( aγc \) is a member of R;
4. for every \( aryb \) and \( cγd \) belonging to R, \((a*c)γ(b*d)\) also belongs to R (substitution).
We may note that this is a practical and operational definition of a congruence relation. Coupled with the definition of a structure, we have our formal Realerklärung for the act of reflexion.

The Verstandes-Actus of reflexion makes an empirical meaning implication that binds an intuition to an action. Abstraction is a segregation of comparates in sensibility, and the synthesis of abstraction bases its segregation on the empirical meaning implication made by reflexion. Perceptions in sensibility that are segregated from intuitions are affective perceptions (because there is nothing else left for them to be). The synthesis of abstraction is the act of marking off a manifold in sensibility on the basis of the character of the formal expedience in the representations. Reflexion and assimilation are tied to each other in the synthesis of apprehension; likewise abstraction and accommodation are tied to each other in this same synthesis. We see in these pairings the specialization of the general ideas of identification and differentiation in the context of the synthesis of Meaning. Reflective judgments of Relation are tied to the motoregulatory expression of actions, yet an action considered in isolation contains within its idea nothing that can rightly be called a meaning. An expression of meaning is not an idea of the form of a nexus but, rather, of its matter (Modality of the synthesis in continuity). An object is vested with a meaning by its assimilation into an action scheme (reflexion) and the object is distinguished from accompanying affective perceptions by an accommodation of representation (abstraction).

The idea of integration completing the threesome for the momenta of Quantity is the synthesis of orientation. To orient is: (1) in thinking, to determine judgmentation according to a subjective principle (the principle of formal expedience) with insufficiency in objective principles of Reason for the holding-to-be-true of concepts; (2) in acting, to determine an action judged expedient for the negation of the intensive magnitude of Lust per se; and (3) in general, to determine according to a subjective principle of holding-to-be-binding under the categorical imperative of pure Reason. We find empirical meaning in actions through the synthesis of Meaning. Orientation in thinking is an outcome of this synthesis, while that which binds an intuition to a deed (a scheme of activity) is the affective perception that accompanies the intuition in the synthesis of apprehension. The meaning vested in an intuition is that which gives orientation in thinking but the meaning vested in the affective perception gives orientation in acting. The synthesis of orientation is the integrating function in the continuity of reflective judgment and noetic organization that forms a union in the co-determination of thinking and acting.

It is not out of place at this point to take another look at the logical organization of nous (Figure 7.3.7). There we see orientations in the direction of thinking illustrated in the projection from speculative Reason to determining judgment and, similarly, empirical meaning implications.
in the projection from reflective judgment to motoregulatory expression. Orientation in acting is inherent in the appetitions of practical Reason in expressing Reason's veto power over the acts of impetuous reflective judgment. This emphasizes that the synthesis of continuity in Meaning takes its context from judgmentation overall (general *Beurtheilung*) and not merely from one or the other of the three specific processes of judgment (determining, reflective, and practical).

§ 3.2.4.2 **Quality in the Synthesis of Meaning**

The matter of composition (Quality) in the synthesis of Meaning adds to the general ideas of agreement, opposition, and subcontrariness a notion of *necessitation*. **Necessitation** is to make necessary by the rule of a practical *causatum* rather than by the conditions of a possible experience and, therefore, necessitation takes its context from the regulation of non-autonomic actions by pure practical Reason. Just as determining judgment operates on the manifold of concepts and reflective judgment operates with a manifold of Desires, practical judgment operates on a manifold of rules (practical rules of action) by which acts of reflective judgment are conditioned by experience, under the formula of the categorical imperative, in the determination of the appetitive power of practical Reason. To properly understand this *rational context* for actions (and, therefore, for empirical meanings), we must discuss two characteristics of judgmentation, namely holding-to-be-true and holding-to-be-binding.

**Holding-to-be-true** is the conscious reference of a determinant judgment to the state of
understanding in general concerning the manner in which the judgment is regarded as being true. It belongs to the logical perfection of understanding (thus to the overall regulation of reasoning).

**Holding-to-be-binding** is the act of necessitating an action under the regulation of the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. An action held-to-be-binding is practically unconditioned, i.e., in the manifold of rules there has been made no higher rule of acting that stands as a condition to a rule held-to-be-binding. The act of holding-to-be-binding makes an implication of practical expedience in an activity and serves to orient judgmentation.

The idea of agreement in this context for the synthesis of Meaning is belief. **Belief** is unquestioned holding-to-be-true-and-binding on the basis of a merely subjective sufficient reason and without consciousness of doubt. In the narrower sense of cognitive belief, it is a subjectively inalterable assertion of truth. In logical terms, the concept of a belief is a highest concept in the manifold of concepts, i.e. no other concept has yet been determined that stands as a condition to a concept of belief. All the earliest concepts determined by an Organized Being (i.e., infantile concepts) are concepts of belief. However, as we have seen, highest concepts are subject to being made subordinate to new concepts in the march of experience (the manifold of concepts is an open system) and when this occurs one is said to question a belief. The questioning of belief is an act of aesthetical reflective judgment. In practical terms, a highest rule in the manifold of rules is a practical belief (holding-to-be-binding on the actions of the Organized Being) and remains so until it becomes conditioned (by an act of practical judgment) through the occurrence of an actual outcome of the action that violates the formula of the categorical imperative. (The manifold of rules is also an open system).

The idea of opposition in the synthesis of Meaning is unbelief. **Unbelief** is unquestioned holding-to-be-false-and-binding-in-the-opposite based on a merely subjective sufficient reason and without consciousness of doubt. In the narrower (cognitive) sense, unbelief is a subjectively inalterable assertion of falsity. An action of unbelief in the practical sense is the veto (by practical Reason) of the expression of an action judged in reflective judgment. Such an act can be called an act of omission, whereas in the case of belief the act is called an act of commission.

Finally, the idea of subcontrariety in the synthesis of Meaning is non-belief. **Non-belief** is unquestioned holding-to-be-contingently-true-and-binding on the basis of a subjectively sufficient reason with consciousness of limitation by an objectively sufficient reason. The rule of an action of non-belief is called a rule of exception.

We can without difficulty see that composition (Quantity and Quality) in the synthesis of Meaning speaks to the practical and intelligible Nature of the Organized Being in noetic organization and judgmentation. Pure Reason knows neither objects nor feelings and is, in its
practical character, concerned only with the regulation of non-autonomic actions under the formula of its categorical imperative. Kant tells us,

The theoretical employment of reason occupied itself with objects of the faculty of knowledge only, and a critique of the same in view to this use properly concerns only the pure faculty of knowledge . . . With the practical use of reason it is quite different. In this reason is concerned with grounds of determination of the will, which is a capacity either to beget objects according to representations or just to determine itself to the production of the same . . . i.e., with its causality. [KANT (5: 15)]

He later goes on to say,

If one assumes that pure reason can contain in itself a practical ground, i.e. suffice for the determination of will, then it gives practical laws; but if not, then all practical fundamental principles will be merely maxims. In a pathologically-affected will22 of a rational being there can be found a conflict of maxims known to it by practical laws . . . In practical knowledge, i.e. that which has to do only with grounds of determination of will, those tenets one makes for himself are therefore not yet laws under which we may unfailingly stand because reason in the practical has to do with the subject, namely with appetitive power according to its special property to be able to put in order various rules. The practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes act, as means, to action, as end. [KANT (5: 19-20)]

In the earliest stages of life the Organized Being has not yet made for itself the structure of a manifold of rules and, consequently, its actions are pathologically-necessitated (by impetuous reflective judgment). Simply put, any action judged expedient is expedient and lawful simply because there has not yet been formed any practical laws the action could violate. The innate sensorimotor reflexes of a new-born infant are a phenomenal example of this. They are actions "taken for their own sake" and judged to be "good in themselves" by virtue of the fact that they evoke no veto from practical Reason. The determination of appetitive power in this case has the character of what Kant called *arbitrium brutum* (brutish choice).

With the growing acquisition of experience and the construction of the manifold of rules, actions become more and more constrained by this manifold and the determination of appetitive power becomes increasingly grounded in this non-objective/non-perceptual manifold. Actions are liberated from being determined strictly by immediate sensuous conditions. In the limit where all such actions would be so-liberated, we arrive at the character of appetite Kant called *arbitrium liberum* (free choice), i.e. the determination of action is *not necessitated* by sensuous stimuli but rather is necessitated by the manifold of rules alone. Short of this limit, which is the lifetime situation of the Organized Being, the determination of action follows what Kant sometimes called a *natural choice* and sometimes called an *arbitrium sensitivum* (sensitive choice). By this he

22 Kant does not use the word "pathological" in any medical connotation. In Greek *pathos* means "passion". Kant is referring to the influence of feelings on our reasoning.
means choice according to a reconciliation (we would say an adaptation) by which an equilibrium is established in which the determination of the action is affected by but not necessitated by sensibility. An Organized Being's power of choice in regard to freedom of choice (that is, freedom from sensuous conditions) is thus a potential capability (a Vermögen rather than a Kraft) and would be called a Willkürvermögen rather than a Willkürskraft. Put simply, the Organized Being has the capacity to make of its Self rogue or renown (or both) through its construction of a system of empirical meanings. Each of us, as intelligible being, is the person we make our Self to be and it is in this capacity where we find the foundation of those human behavioral phenomena we collectively call by the name ethics. In Piaget's words, "morality is the logic of action."

§ 3.2.4.3 Relation in the Synthesis of Meaning

Transcendental Meaning as the Object of an Idea is a noumenon, the object of which is beyond the possibility of any actual experience yet the Dasein of which is a necessary condition for the possibility of the unity in empirical meanings required by the general Idea of Rational Psychology. As an Object, Meaning can have none but a practical objective validity as a regulative principle of actions. Its representation is therefore a practical Idea, i.e., a robust rule structure for determination of appetitive power characterized by a scope of applicability held-to-be-universal under the condition of the rule. We are therefore led to understand the practical Idea of Meaning in terms of "what it does" for the actions of the Organized Being. The title of Relation for the synthesis of Meaning is the form of the form of the practical Idea of Meaning and so we are led to consider the general ideas of the internal, external, and transitive Relations in the context of a nexus of meanings. The psychological Idea of Relation from the judicial Standpoint is: unconditioned unity of all relationships is grounded in the a priori anticipation of the form of connection of perceptions in time according to the modi of persistence, succession, and coexistence.

An ideal is the object that exhibits in its representation in concreto the most perfect instantiation of an idea. As transcendental object, then, the ideal corresponds to the modi of persistence in time and thus to the internal Relation in the nexus of meanings. To appreciate this, let us first recall that noetic organization is the metaphysical nexus of the Self and expresses the nexus of meanings in the reciprocity between nous and soma. The actions by which this expression is made always involve a cycle of affective interaction, illustrated in Figure 7.3.8.

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23 Held-to-be-universal because the formula of the categorical imperative regulates for the construction of universal practical law in the manifold of rules. We say of the rule that it is held-to-be-universal rather than that the rule is universal because the manifold is an open system in which a currently highest rule (that is, a rule practically unconditioned by any higher rule in the existing manifold) is always subject to being subordinated to a new rule as a consequence of actual experience.
The animating principle of noetic organization is: equilibration is the activity leading to the closure of the cycle of affective interaction in a state of equilibrium. This is a structure-enforcing law of psyche. The on-going (persistent) maintenance of structure is therefore the ideal of the synthesis in continuity in Meaning so far as the internal Relation is concerned. We call this the nexus of an ideal in the 2LAR of Meaning.

The idea of transitive Relation is the idea of that which coexists in both psyche and judgmentation for the synthesis in continuity of Meaning. A purpose is the Idea of a relationship between teleological reflective judgment and acting on Desires. A purpose as object is the object of a concept so far as the concept has been taken as the real ground of the possibility of the object [KANT (5: 219-220)]. Put another way, a purpose is regarded as a cause by which the Dasein of the object is made possible by the acts and actions of the Organized Being. The notion of a cause belongs to the title of Quality, but the determination of a purpose falls under the notion of causality and thus belongs to Relation. Causality is the notion of the determination of a change by which the change is established according to general rules, and in our present context the changes we are considering are those exhibited in the actions of the Organized Being and effected by the accommodation of the structure of the manifolds of representation in nous. Here something Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason has important relevance for our discussion:

The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensuous, i.e. is nothing but receptiveness, and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our capacity of representation without being anything other than the way in which the subject is affected. Yet the combination (conjectio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition; for it is an act of spontaneity of the power of representation and, since one must call this understanding in distinction from sensibility, all combination is an act of understanding, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts (and in the first case can be either of sensuous or non-sensuous intuition), which we would designate with the general title of synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as joined in an Object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is the only one that is not given through Objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its own self-activity. One can here easily see that this act must initially reach agreement and be equally valid for all combinations. [KANT1 (B:129-130)]
Now, combination as a synthesis must necessarily be a synthesis according to rules a priori because no action of the Organized Being can be held to occur as a result of the specious idea of some final and predestined cause. Fate is necessity in Nature without a cause but in mundo non datur fatum. All spontaneous actions of an Organized Being therefore must be regarded as actions grounded in a purpose (of pure Reason) and thus nexus of purpose is the transitive Relation in the synthesis of Meaning.

We obtain our idea for the external Relation as a synthesis of the other two in the context of succession in time. Because neither reflective judgment nor psyche belong to sensibility, neither of these objects as objects come under the condition of the synthesis of the pure intuition of time, and this means that succession in the present context is logical succession, i.e. logical connection of conditioned to condition in a prosylogism. The objective validity of a purpose (an Idea of relationship) is found only in the regard of a purpose as a regulating principle. The ideal, on the other hand, is what the Organized Being's actions partially exhibit in concreto as an instantiation of a structure-enforcing law. This, however, necessarily must presuppose a condition under which it is possible for this enforcement to be accomplished. An aim is a condition for closure in the cycle of affective interaction in the equilibrating activities of the Organized Being. Nexus of an aim is therefore the external Relation in the synthesis of Meaning.

§ 3.2.4.4 Modality in the Synthesis of Meaning

The synthesis of Meaning is an activity in nous-soma reciprocity, the matter counterpart of the synthesis of form in Self-continuity of the judicial Idea. It takes for its first principle the psychological Idea of Modality from the judicial Standpoint: unconditioned unity in the apperception of all perceptions in the interrelationships of meanings. The judicial Idea provides us with what we may well call the ways and means of uniting reflective judgment and somatic organization by the synthesis in continuity; when we consider the Modality of Meaning we turn to the aspect of nexus in connecting reflective judgment and noetic organization. Our understanding of this is the understanding of an Ideal and, more specifically, a practical Ideal. An Ideal is an Object by which the Organized Being understands an Idea not merely in concreto but rather as an individual thing determinable through the Idea alone. A practical Ideal is an Ideal for a practical Idea. Now, any Ideal is an Object of Reason and the principles of its possibility belong to the metaphysics proper of Rational Cosmology. However, in our present context we seek to understand the activities of the Organized Being in terms of the ground of observable phenomena (because the practical Nature of this Ideal vests its objective validity in actual behavioral phenomena). Thus, the context of the explanation has reference to the Ideas of
Modality in Rational Physics from the judicial Standpoint.

For the determinable, the principle is the first judicial postulate of empirical thinking in general: the representations in sensibility and the motor faculties of the Organized Being are such that the former can be joined to specific capacities for actions in the latter. All empirical meanings are determinable from the possibility stated by this acroam and, indeed, the acroam defines what we may take as the materia in qua of conjunction in Meaning. This materia acts as a "reflexive predicate" of a possible meaning implication as an action. The action, regarded as a functioning in nous-soma reciprocity, is itself the determinable for the synthesis of Meaning and in this context we call it the idea of sensorimotor possibility.

The idea of the determination calls upon the second postulate of empirical thinking, again from the judicial Standpoint: that which coheres with the material conditions of meanings (somatic motoregulatory expression) is actual. In the context of the synthesis in continuity, this idea of determination can be stated explicitly as an action that we name a Meaning implication: co-determination of a somatic action and a reflective judgment viewed as a specific act.

Finally we come to the idea of the determining factor. Now, in everything we have discussed for the synthesis of Meaning, the overarching acroam has been the complete psychological unity of the Subject. This fundamental acroam touches every aspect of judgmentation and, indeed, thorough-going unity in the process of judgmentation constitutes the Realdefinition of coherence in Reality as continuity of nexus in general Beurtheilung (judgmentation). Inasmuch as kinaesthetic sensibility arises from motoregulatory expression, this coherence is determined through the activity of the Subject, hence is lodged in the psychological Realerklärung of empirical meanings that we discussed earlier. Thus we are led to conclude that the possibility of empirical meanings necessarily presupposes acts of teleological reflective judgment combined with practical judgments of appetition by which mere representations can be the cause of an object. Regulation of actions is oriented by the Lust principle of psyche but the equilibrium mandated by the categorical imperative of practical Reason must be regarded in terms of a sensible cycle in which no further innovations are perceived. An ideal of equilibrium is Existenz in a cyclic state that is absolutely robust. Coherence in Reality is a condition of sensible equilibrium and so we find that the determining factor in the synthesis of Meaning is enforcement of coherence by pure Reason.

§ 3.3 The Presentment of Reality

Now we turn at last to the second "matter title" in our applied metaphysic of affectivity. This we call the presentment of Reality. Figure 7.3.9 illustrates the 2LAR structure for this title.
No thing is real to an Organized Being unless it has a concept of the object and this concept is combined with other concepts that give it a coherent context and a connection with sensation. The first corollary to this is: any thing is real to the Organized Being in its context if this affirmative condition is met. The second corollary is: a thing is not-real outside this affirmative coherent context and is unreal in contexts that stand in opposition to the context that defines the reality of the thing. Unreal means objective invalidity or lacking congruence between the object and its concept in some particular context. A ghost is real as a make-believe character in a ghost story but ghosts are unreal as disembodied spirits that haunt actual houses. All things are both real (in some context) and unreal (in other contexts).

The delimitation of the reality of a thing is made through transcendental affirmations and transcendental negations in judgmentation. However, this necessarily presupposes the Idea of an All-of-Reality (a term we abbreviate to simply "Reality") as a substratum for such affirming and negating judgments. The fundamental ground of this Idea is the Organized Being's "sense of aliveness" we call the I of transcendental apperception. Each one of us takes our own Dasein absolutely for granted, but recall that this transcendental apperception is a priori knowledge of Dasein with utterly no a priori knowledge of Existen. The idea of a "larger Reality," in which the Self is an object among objects, is not present at birth but develops later after the infant first comes to make a judgment of a real division between the Self and the not-Self. However, the possibility of conceptualizing this idea necessarily presupposes a regulative principle of pure Reason and it is this regulative principle we call the Idea of Reality. The Critical metaphysics proper of this regulative principle is what Kant called Rational Theology, the title of metaphysics proper having Reality as its Object of Reason.

Reality is not the-sum-total-of-all-real-things, i.e., Reality is not an Idea of an aggregate. To
use a metaphor, Reality is a cornucopia from which individual things-in-Reality are brought out. The Existenz of one real and individual thing implicates for human understanding the Dasein of other real and individual things, and the possibility of this character of understanding can only be laid to the Nature of human understanding and judgmentation (i.e., to the Organized Being's thinking nature). As regulative principles of pure Reason, the transcendental Ideas all aim for perfection (logical, aesthetical, and practical). This is to say they set an orientation and a direction for judgment and understanding. The transcendental end-point for this direction – the norm of perfection – is what we call an Ideal of pure Reason. In regard to the things-in-Reality, this Ideal is the theological Ideal for understanding:

- in Quantity, entis realissimi – a real object has one-ness (unity);
- in Quality, ens originarium – the Existenz of an object is predicated from grounds;
- in Relation, ens summum – all real things have a context within All-of-Reality;
- in Modality, ens entium – all real things are necessarily coherent in Reality.

In regard to the regulation of understanding and judgmentation, the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded and required by the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason is called the summum bonum. This Ideal is the empirical goal of Reason. In the Critical philosophy an object of representation is said to be empirical when the representation of the object in understanding is so constructed that its concept is signified as thinglike and its marks are characterized by thinghood. The possibility of making such a representation rests on the regulation of judgmentation by the theological Ideas.

The presentment of Reality is the title of the applied metaphysic of affectivity taking for its topic the metaphysical empiricism of how Existenz in Reality is subjectively synthesized in apperception through judgmentation. Its Standpoint is the judicial Standpoint and its reflective perspective is the empirical-judicial perspective. Now, the three subjective sources of knowledge are sense, imagination, and apperception. The synthesis of apperception through aesthetical reflective judgment and the synthesis of imagination are quite separate processes when viewed from the perspective of logical divisions of the mental physiology of the Organized Being. But because this division is merely logical, we still require real relationships between them.

When we examined the logical functions of understanding in judgment in Chapter 6, we viewed these functions from the theoretical Standpoint. We must also examine understanding from the judicial Standpoint and in terms of subjective unity in the cycle of thought (Figure 3.4.1, reproduced below as Figure 7.3.10). While the logical functions of understanding in judgment are logical momenta of the structure of the manifold of concepts, the subjective functions of unity in judgmentation are functions of structuring the unity in sense, imagination, and apperception. Consciousness is the representation that a representation is present and is to be attended to. What,
though, is meant by saying a representation is "present"?

**Presentment** is that in the synthesis of apprehension and comprehension which is made conscious as a merely subjective factor in the synthesis. Because the outcome of presentment is consciousness of something, presentment itself is understood as merely the power (*Kraft*) of apperception. Here we must remind ourselves that apperception and perception are necessarily conjoined, i.e., in every cognition *x* or affective perception *y* the complete representation is *I think x* or *I feel y*. The *I think* and the *I feel* exemplify presentment.

**Presenting** is the **act** of presentment. **Presentation** is the **action** of making a representation of sensibility conscious by the process of reflective judgment through a representation of the Dasein of the representation being presented. Here we are reminded that an act is the determination of a *Kraft* as a cause of accidents; act is the form in a 1LAR division of *Kraft*. An action is change in appearance of accidents (and, thus, a change of state); action is the matter term in the 1LAR division of *Kraft*. Thus, to say a representation is present is to say nothing more than the representation stands as transcendental object to the power of apperception.

The 2LAR division of the presentment of Reality is the representation of the subjective functions of unity in apperception speaking to how presentment is made as a structural unity of the three subjective sources of knowledge. In Quantity the identification function is **presentation of a synthetic aggregation** in imagination, i.e. the presentation of a manifold of comparates in sensibility through the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. The differentiation function is
presentation of an analytic aggregation, i.e. the presentation of a rule of re-collection by the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea. The integration function is presentation of an anasynthetic aggregation, i.e., the synthesis of sense through summoning the materia ex qua of sensibility (through reproductive imagination) and recombining it in a synthetic judgment (an aesthetical reflective judgment in particular).

In Quality, the agreement function is presentation of a coalition in apperception, i.e., presentation of an agreement of a coalition of sensible materia with the condition of subjective expedience in aesthetical reflective judgment. The opposition function is the quickening catalyst, i.e. a presentation animating the cycle of thought through the synthesis in continuity of the aesthetic Idea. The subcontrary function is presentation of a coalition in thinghood, i.e., the presentation of a coalition of materia in qua of intuition through the synthesis of apprehension in imagination.

Quantity and Quality in the presentment of Reality are actions composing apperception. They are mathematical momenta in the sense of the Greek root of the word mathematics, i.e. mathema (µαθηµα) – "what is learned." Relation and Modality in the presentment of Reality are acts of presentment. The momenta here are dynamical in character. In Relation the internal Relation is presenting as objective perception through the synthesis of imaginative apprehension. This presenting is internal Relation because the act of imagination is subjectively categorical, i.e. its representation declares the Existenz of an appearance. The external Relation is presenting as affective perception through an act of aesthetical reflective judgment. This is the external Relation function because the representation presented is not connected to the represented appearance but, rather, merely to desire in the feeling of Lust or Unlust, hence is a hypothetical connection. The transitive function of Relation is presenting as a harmonizing Relation, i.e., presenting a state of harmonization in the faculty of perception through the synthesis of the aesthetic Idea.

In Modality the determinable function is presenting an awareness without an Object of awareness, i.e., presenting as a subjectively problematical sense of expedience through the synthesis of the aesthetic Idea. Such an awareness is exemplified in experience by such things as that which we call "gut feel" or "tension." The determination function is presenting an awareness of an Object, i.e., presenting the subjective assertion of an Object of appearance through the synthesis of apprehension in imagination. Finally, the function of the determining factor is presenting an awareness of Reality, i.e., presenting a general apperception of the subjective state through aesthetical reflective judgment. Such a presentation is subjectively apodictic because this presenting is a necessary real awareness of the I feel y of affectivity.
All conscious representations are centered upon sensibility and, in this context, it is not improper to say that the *materia* of metaphysical *nexus* in affectivity is comprised of sense, imagination, and apperception. Of these, apperception stands as outcome of the synthesis of sense and imagination with: sense in the role of the determinable (through the aesthetic Idea); imagination in the role of the determination; and aesthetical reflective judgment occupying the role of the determining factor in the synthesis. Apperception connects representation to the organic whole of the Organized Being. Just as the idea of representation is meaningless without that-which-is-represented, so too it is meaningless without that-to-which-the-representation-is-presented. Realism, both in its naive character as well as its erudite character, is a thorough mark of the intellectual nature of human beings. The metaphysic of the presentment of Reality merely illuminates the transcendental character of human realism. The deep mental mechanisms belong to the synthetic processes while realism is the empirical surface structure of consciousness.

This situation is not altogether unlike Chomsky's theory of transformational generative grammar [CHOM]. In this theory, a sentence is held to possess both a "deep structure" consisting of semantic and grammatical relationships which underlie the "surface structure" in the form of spoken sentences. The spoken sentence supplies the *materia* of experience; the deep structure is held to determine the form of the experience. In an analogous fashion, we experience through the surface appearances and perceptions of the presentment of Reality but what/how we come to have this experience is determined through the processes that comprise the faculty of knowledge.

§ 3.4 The Act of Affective Perception

Let us now return to the 2LAR structure of the act of affective perception that was earlier depicted in Figure 7.2.2 and summarize the *momenta* of this structure. An act is the making of a *nexus* in a manifold of organization and the other three titles of our applied metaphysic of affectivity have presented the functional and organizational roles of affectivity. We are now in a position to appreciate the title of Quality in this metaphysic, i.e. what the coalition of the *materia ex qua* of sensibility in an affective perception brings to the absolute unity of the thinking Subject.

Quantity in the act of affective perception is the form of an affective perception of desire insofar as perception affects the determination of the appetitive power of the Organized Being. **Valuation** is the practical validation of actions as being in formal compliance with the condition of the categorical imperative of pure Reason. **Validation** is a determination of appetitive power permitting motoregulatory expression of all or part of the manifold of Desires. Both of these must presuppose a determinable matter upon which a valuation can be based, i.e. the desires contained
in the manifold of Desires. The form of a desire is called its value. Now, the objective validity of this idea can only be practical and, therefore, Quantity in the act of affective perception must find its metaphysical explanation in terms that relate the act of affective perception to effects of sensuous perception. The subjectively singular idea of identification in this Quantity is the **value in attending** to specific materia ex qua of sensibility, i.e., the identification of a manifold of sense data as an object of inner sense. The subjectively particular idea of differentiation is the **value in understanding**, i.e., the association of a part of the manifold of sense data with objectivity and the power of determining judgmentation in thinking. The subjectively universal idea of integration is the **value in reasoning**, i.e., the overall integration of sensibility into the cycle of thought for the Self-regulation of the overall process of judgmentation.

Quality in the act of affective perception is the determination of empirical consciousness with respect to Lust per se. The idea of agreement here is determination of feeling as a feeling of Lust, i.e., a **life promoting feeling** as an energetic for a determination of appetitive power to produce (through appetitive power) a desired state-of-being. The idea of opposition is determination of feeling as a feeling of Unlust, i.e., a **life hindering feeling** as an energetic for a determination of appetitive power to prevent or abolish a particular state-of-being. The idea of subcontrariness is the synthesis of these two **momenta**, i.e., a **life preserving feeling** as an energetic for a determination of appetitive power to maintain the Organized Being's current state-of-being.

Relation in the act of affective perception is merely the structuring act itself and is the central context for the act itself. We previously discussed this and it suffices here to merely repeat the three ideas of Relation. These are the affective Relations of desire, desiration, and the manifold of Desires.

Finally, the three ideas of Modality merely connect the act of affective perception to the specific transformative processes within the overall structure of nous. The determinable is the connection in sensibility itself; the determination is the immediate connection of perception in judgment; the determining factor is the mediate connection of perception with Reason in its relationship to the grounds of determination for appetitive power in the modi of arbitrium brutum, liberum, or sensitivum.

§ 4. Remarks on the Centrality of Affectivity

Present day empirical psychology, especially in regard to the phenomena of emotion and motivation, is far from being a unified discipline operating under a commonly agreed-to paradigm. It is a science insofar as it has an identified topic but, as science writer Morton Hunt remarked, "it is not a coherent science with a coherent and comprehensive theory; it is an
intellectual and scientific jumble sale." Psychology was born and spent its formative years under
the influence of the nineteenth century attitude of positivism and, even though positivism is dead
in modern science, its dead hand still lies heavy on the shoulder of psychology. The core reason
for this state of affairs is that psychology lacks the unifying direction of a central paradigm and,
instead, its many mini-theories and unstable ideas are the product of and guided by the influences
of various pseudo-ontologies, including the undue influence of the paradigm of dead-matter
physics.

This chapter has presented the applied metaphysic of affectivity. The role and purpose of any
applied metaphysic is to tie together the foundational laws of metaphysics proper (in particular,
our epistemology-centered system) and the reasonings by which rational theories are produced in
the empirical practice of science. A fundamental outcome of the theory of affectivity, as we have
seen in this chapter, is the centrality of affectivity for all else determined by the phenomenon of
mind. This includes the very notion of objectivity. In an important way, the terms "emotion
psychology" and "motivational psychology" are far too narrow terms for grasping the
epistemological context of affectivity (and this is why we use the term "affectivity" rather than
the quite vague term "emotion" in this book).

Human beings are born with no copy-of-reality mechanism and no objective innate ideas. Yet
human beings come to possess objective concepts, make objective cognitions, and to grow
beyond the limited automatism of the innate reflexes to acquire and develop the capacity for
acquired habits and intellective intelligence. How is this possible in the absence of a copy-of-
reality mechanism and the absence of innate objective concepts? We have seen the answer in this
chapter. Affectivity, itself wholly non-cognitive and non-objective, grounds and drives objective
learning and cognition. The a priori in human knowledge is not an apriority in concepts but rather
in the functional structure of mental capacities, by which alone we come to know Nature and to
exercise the capacity for Self-determination in empirical knowledge and spontaneity of actions.
Affectivity is the bridge between the Organized Being as patient to the agency of its environment
and as agent for producing effects in this environment and in its Self.

Narrowing our focus further to within the confines of the logical division of nous, the bridge
between objective knowledge and practical actions (exhibited in behavior and in reasoning) is the
process of reflective judgment. We have seen in this chapter the direct involvement of reflective
judgment in both motoregulatory expression, cognition, and the capacity of Self-regulation of
non-autonomic actions. What we must next do is slice into the structure of reflective judgment as
a judicial capacity of mind and to exhibit the momenta of its 3LAR structure. This we will do in
our next chapter.