

Chapter 7 The Mental Physics of Social Compacting

§ 1. The Empirical Scientist Within the Humanist and the Romanticist

One of the most pronounced social characteristics of the community of scientists is the general and centuries-long habit of presupposing there is a fundamental dichotomy between science and what is called humanism and romanticism. The practicing scientist, trained to precise and exacting methodology and habituated to regard all things objectively, tends to see in the poet, the artist and the novelist *undiscipline* and habituated impracticality or even irrationality. This leads to the habit of ignoring the opinions of non-scientists and even to a contempt for that which is not already reduced to recognized putative standards that are called the scientific form. This walks hand in hand with the scientist's suspicion and distrust of emotion and metaphor to produce a prejudicial divide between that which we call science and that which we call the humanities, poetries, and romantics.

There is some justification for this in those arenas where the scientific vocation is devoted to dead-matter topics. A falling rock falls, and no entreaty or appeal to ideals can stay its trajectory or reduce the shock of its eventual impact. Here the humane and the romantic and the poetic simply have no contextual bearing upon the topic and their principles are contextually non-real. It can even be argued – and it has been argued – that this is enough on its own to justify the specialized devotion of scientific education to the pure technical and mathematical arts, with literature and the fine arts mere luxuries that might be indulged in at one's leisurely whim but which contribute nothing useful or practical to the education of a scientist. I do not agree with this argument, but if a person wishes to devote himself exclusively to a tradesman's practice with a purely vocational training, I will not say this must not be allowed. I will only say that the dead-matter vocationalist forfeits all license to claim to speak as an expert on topics where living matter is concerned. If he has any opinion to offer in that realm, let him offer it as a layman and without claim to possessing any sort of special wisdom or authority.

But where the nature of live-matter is concerned, as it is in every social-natural science, these traditional prejudices and presuppositions are wholly without merit or objective validity. Exclusion – of the voices of poets, artists, writers of romantic fiction, and authors of humanist essays – is not objectively valid even when those voices belong to people with no training and habituation to mental schemes of disciplined scientific methodological thinking. *Empiricists of people science* they are, and so what they think, what they say, what they do cannot be ignored by social-natural scientists because such ignorance is ignorance of the social science atom.

This is to say there is important knowledge in the works and expressions of romanticists and humanists, however raw and unrefined its state might be and often is, that social-natural science cannot ignore any more than a physicist can ignore the manifestations of dead-matter objects. These expressions are expressions of mental physics in action, phenomena of human Nature, *data* of precisely that sort of experience a social-natural science must seek to comprehend in its theories. There is *no* deontological divide between sciences, humanities, poetics, and art. To presume such a divide exists is as much an ontology-centered error and prejudice as it was an error to believe in a luminiferous aether or a brick-wall-in-the-sky sound barrier.

The topic of this chapter is the mental physics underlying the phenomenon of social compacting. Sound practice of science mandates that we begin with a brief survey of relevant phenomena standing under the general Object, and we shall take our data from where it is found. Like the raw appearances in physical nature with which physics is topically concerned, most of the raw appearances of human Nature are unrefined when originally apprehended and recognized. Mathematics and logic can and do inform our understandings of their relationships of Quantity and Relation. However, the richest evidence for relationships of Quality and Modality spring

from precisely those sources that science has traditionally discounted. It is with these sources – essays and expressions that have traditionally been the concern of the humanities – that we will begin our examination.

§ 2. Socializing and Antisocializing *Triebfedern* I: Prudence

Social association in Communities is in some ways a natural outcome of human character and in other ways an unnatural one. That forming associations is a natural act is clear because if it were wholly alien to human Nature civil associations would never be formed in the first place. In chapter 2 we looked at some of the positive practical mainsprings favoring association when we examined Hobbes, Locke, and Paine. Those spoke in the main directly to self-preservation and mutual advantage as immediate products of civil association. These types of mainsprings pertain to obvious pragmatic and prudential considerations. Emerson wrote,

Prudence is the virtue of the senses. It is the science of appearances. It is the outmost action of the inward life. . . . It moves matter after the laws of matter. It is content to seek health of the body by complying with physical conditions, and health of mind by the laws of the intellect.

The world of the senses is a world of shows; it does not exist for itself, but has a symbolic character; and a true prudence or law of shows recognizes the co-presence of other laws, and knows that its own office is subaltern, knows that it is surface and not center where it works. Prudence is false when detached. It is legitimate when it is the Natural History of the soul incarnate; when it unfolds the beauty of laws within the narrow scope of the senses.

There are all degrees of proficiency in knowledge of the world. It is sufficient to our present purpose to indicate three. One class live to the utility of the symbol; esteeming health and wealth a final good. Another class live above this mark, to the beauty of the symbol; as the poet, and artist, and the naturalist, and man of science. A third class live above the beauty of the symbol, to the beauty of the thing signified; these are the wise men. The first class have common sense, the second, taste; and the third spiritual perception. . . .

Prudence does not go behind nature, and ask, whence it is. It takes the laws of the world, whereby man's being is conditioned, as they are, and keeps these laws, that it may enjoy their proper good. . . . On the other hand, nature punishes any neglect of prudence. [Emerson (1841a), pp. 108-111]

Our earlier authors – Hobbes, Locke and Paine – spoke in specifics. Here Emerson, the poet, essayist and sometimes minister, speaks in the more general (as the poet, the essayist, and the common philosopher often do) of prudence as the wisdom of weighing ends vs. means, actions vs. consequences. The ideas he expresses here are hardly profound. Every person who has left the house of his parents and made his own way into the world has encountered circumstances where prudence is provoked into action, and even little schoolchildren encounter in their child's world lessons of experience from which the rudiments of prudential maxims arise. Insofar as this goes, there might seem to be no context with ideas of socialization or morality.

Yet there is a specific moral profundity in the essayist's words when he says, "Prudence is the *virtue* of the senses." A virtue in what context? None, perhaps, in traditional, ontology-centered pronouncements on ethics. But considered deontologically, that of which Emerson writes pertains to the hypothetical Relation in *officium*, namely, the causality of freedom with regard to the situation of the person. Emerson goes on to say,

We must not try to write the laws of any one virtue, looking at that only. Human nature loves no contradictions, but is symmetrical. The prudence which secures an outward well-

being is not to be studied by one set of men, whilst heroism and holiness are studied by another, but they are reconcilable. Prudence concerns the present time, persons, property, and existing forms. But as every fact hath its roots in the soul, and if the soul were changed would cease to be, or would become some other thing, therefore the proper administration of outward things will always rest on a just apprehension of their cause and origin; that is, the good man will be the wise man, and the single-hearted the politic man. Every violation of truth is not only a sort of suicide in the liar, but is a stab at the health of human society. On the most profitable lie the course of events presently lays a destructive tax; whilst frankness proves to be the best tactics, for it invites frankness, puts the parties on a convenient footing, and makes their business a friendship. Trust men, and they will be true to you; treat them greatly and they will show themselves great, though make an exception in your favor to all their rules of trade. . . .

In the occurrence of unpleasant things among neighbors, fear comes readily to heart, and magnifies the consequence of the other party; but it is a bad counselor. Every man is actually weak and apparently strong. To himself, he seems weak; to others, formidable. You are afraid of Grim; but Grim also is afraid of you¹. You are solicitous of the good will of the meanest person, uneasy at his ill will. But the sturdiest offender of your peace and of the neighborhood, if you rip up *his* claims, is as thin and timid as any; and the peace of society is often kept because, as children say, one is afraid and the other dares not. Far off, men swell, bully, and threaten: bring them hand to hand, and they are a feeble folk. . . .

Wisdom will never let us stand with any man or men on an unfriendly footing. We refuse sympathy and intimacy with people as if we waited for some better sympathy and intimacy to come. But whence and when? Tomorrow will be like today. Life wastes itself whilst we are preparing to live. . . . Let us suck the sweetness of those affections and consuetudes that grow near us. Undoubtedly, we can easily pick faults in our company, can easily whisper names prouder, and that tickle the fancy more. Every man's imagination hath its friends; and pleasant would life be with such companions. But if you cannot have them on good mutual terms, you cannot have them. . . .

Thus truth, frankness, courage, love, humility, and all the virtues, range themselves on the side of prudence, or the art of securing a present well-being. I do not know if all matter will be found to be made of one element, as oxygen or hydrogen, at last; but the world of manners and actions is wrought of one stuff, and begin where we will, we are pretty sure in a short space to be mumbling our ten commandments. [*ibid.*, pp. 115-118]

Emerson contends: that maxims and precepts originating in hypothetical Duties to oneself, according to one's own situation, seed and inevitably lead, through further such maxims, to the phenomenon of social Community. Must this always be so? Of course not. Perhaps it is true that Grim fears you, but this does not mean he will not strike you down if he thinks he sees his chance to do so with impunity. Yet, while Emerson's maxim is not always found to be true, it is also not found to always be false and many people, myself included, find Emerson's maxim to be true more often than it is false. This is to say nothing more or less than that in behaviors following maxims of prudence there subsists some partial but not sufficient cause of Community.

To posit the *Dasein* of a cause, even a partial cause, from actualities of experience is one thing. It is something else altogether to discover the *Existenz* of the posited Object. Because we are dealing here with an Object of *social* experience, Critical metaphysics tells us we must seek for this Object nowhere else than within the particular human being and his powers of Self-determination through judgmentation. The empirical question here is evidently a psychological one but one that an impartial survey of social psychology and personality psychology must find, in honest assessment, to be unanswered so far by any theory that can epistemologically claim objective validity. An empirical investigation of the *Existenz* of such a putative cause, if the

¹ A scholar of English literature tells me Grim was a 19th century slang term for an angry neighbor.

investigation is to be scientifically sound, must begin with observables. Because all *mental* Objects are unobservable *per se*, this means that the observer must begin with observations of behaviors and with self-reporting by the subjects of his observations. Emerson says much – too much, in fact – when he says "truth, frankness, courage, love, humility and all the virtues range themselves on the side of prudence." The statement is a generalization that has subjective validity for at least some people (clearly, Emerson himself being among them), but subjective validity is not sufficient for concluding to objective validity. It suffices for no more than personal conviction. We must look for more specific examples and not leap ahead to what Bacon called "remote and most general axioms" [Bacon (1620), I. §104]. As we examine them, we must look for their relationships in general observable schemes of behavior and for relationships that at least putatively tie these to the processes of judgmentation and appetite in the Organized Being.

Man has been called a social animal, and those so labeling our species usually presume, from the fact that most people live in socialized environments, that there is something innate within human Nature called man's social instinct. This presumption is false; *man has no social instinct* and needs none, as I will prove later. But it is nonetheless true that community living is by far the most common situation for the great majority of people. It is also true that mere technical pragmatism such as Paine used in his argument regarding the origin of government is not the only factor that is prevalent in socialized environments. There is no doubt that powerful affective factors enter into the balance as well. It is wrong to assume, however, that a premise of "love for one's fellow man" plays a dominant role in this. John Adams, who was a leading practitioner of political science in an era when this was a social-natural science, subscribed to the presupposition of an innate social Nature in man and further held with some other common but ungrounded and ontology-centered presuppositions. Nonetheless, he was not blind to the role of affective factors of self-love in man's social behavior. He made the following lengthy comment, in which the first two sentences exhibit his ontology-centered prejudices. He followed this, however, with a keen reflection upon an important socio-psychological phenomenon:

Men, in their primitive conditions, however savage, were undoubtedly gregarious; and they continue to be social, not only in every stage of civilization, but in every possible situation in which they can be placed. As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections. There is none among them more essential or remarkable than the *passion for distinction*. A desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows, is one of the earliest, as well as keenest, dispositions discovered in the heart of man. If anyone should doubt the existence of this propensity, let him go and attentively observe the journeymen and apprentices in the first workshop, or the oarsmen in a cockboat, a family or a neighborhood, the inhabitants of a house or the crew of a ship, a school or a college, a city or a village, a savage or a civilized people, a hospital or a church, the bar or the exchange, a camp or a court. Wherever men, women, or children are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected, by the people about him, and within his knowledge. [Adams (1790), pp. 338-339]

We will let pass the errors in his first two statements here, namely, that not every person is fond of the company of others (gregarious) and that nature is not a *thing* that *does* something to us, i.e. "furnish us" with various attributes. It is enough to note that his following remarks are congruent with what is usually observed in human exhibitions within a social environment in the cases of most people in most circumstances. Adams' thesis is that the behavior of socialized people can be recognized to be behaviors that seek an affective reward (a satisfaction) as a return for his socialized actions. The reward to which he attends here is what he called the passion for

distinction. He goes on to add:

A regard to the sentiments of mankind concerning him, and to their dispositions towards him, every man feels within himself; and if he has reflected, and tried experiments, he has found that no exertion of his reason, no effort of his will, can wholly divest him of it. In proportion to our affection for the notice of others is our aversion to their neglect; the stronger the desire of the esteem of the public, the more powerful the aversion to their disapprobation; the more exalted the wish for admiration, the more invincible the abhorrence of contempt. Every man not only desires the consideration of others, but he frequently compares himself with others, his friends or his enemies; and in proportion as he exults when he perceives he has more of it than they, he feels a keener affliction when he sees that one or more of them are more respected than himself. [*ibid.*, pg. 340]

This is true in some cases, even likely, perhaps, in most. It is an overgeneralization to say it is a universal human trait. You might wonder what sort of friend is a friend who envies you or how much reliance you can prudently invest in him. Is it your esteem that a sociopath or a tyrant seeks from you, or does he rather seek his affective reward from your expression of fear of him and from the illusion of power he pretends to hold if he thinks you are helpless to express your disapprobation and contempt of him? Perhaps it could be called a passion for distinction in the tyrant, but it seems inappropriate to call it that in the sociopath. There is an objectively valid general concept in Adams' thesis, but he overgeneralizes his conclusion from a too-narrow basis. Adams' overgeneralization reflects what Bacon called the idol of the theater:

45. The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds; and although many things in nature be *sui generis*² and most irregular, will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives where no such thing is. Hence the fiction that all celestial bodies move in perfect circles . . . Nor is this folly confined to theories, but it is to be met with even in simple notions.

46. The human understanding, when any proposition has once been laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. . . . Besides, even in the absence of that eagerness and want of thought (which we have mentioned), it is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than negatives, whereas it ought duly and regularly to be impartial; nay, in establishing the true axiom the negative instance is the most powerful.

47. The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind, whilst it is very slow and unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances by which axioms are tried by fire, unless the office be imposed upon it by severe regulations and a powerful authority. [Bacon (1620), I. 45-47]

Bacon's assessment is supported by mental physics. I wish I could say that scientists are less prone to these symptoms of impatient ratio-expression in judgmentation, but historically scientists have been among the worst offenders in worshipping Bacon's idol of the theater. A call for open mindedness is nothing else than a call to come out of this idol's temple. Bearing this caution in mind, and recognizing that over-hasty generalization toward the contrary is equally idolatrous, let

² of its own kind; peculiar; unique.

us return now to Adams and see the rest of what he had to say in regard to the "passion for distinction."

This passion, while it is simply a desire to excel another by fair industry in the search of truth, and the practice of virtue, is properly called *Emulation*. When it aims at power, as a means of distinction, it is *Ambition*. When it is in a situation to suggest the sentiments of fear and apprehension that another, who is now inferior, will become superior, it is denominated *Jealousy*. When it is in a state of mortification at the superiority of another, and desires to bring him down to our level, or to depress him below us, it is properly called *Envy*. When it deceives man into a belief of false professions of esteem or admiration, or into a false opinion of his importance in the judgment of the world, it is *Vanity*. These observations alone would be sufficient to show that this propensity, in all its branches, is a principle source of virtues and vices, the happiness and misery of man life; and the history of mankind is little more than a simple narration of its operation and effects.

There is in human nature, it is true, simple *Benevolence*, or an affection for the good of others; but alone it is not a balance for the selfish affections. Nature then has kindly added to benevolence the desire for reputation, in order to make us good members of society³. *Spectemur agendo*⁴ expresses this great principle of activity for the good of others. Nature has sanctioned the law of self-preservation by rewards and punishments. The rewards of selfish activity are life and health; the punishments of negligence and indolence are want, disease, and death. Each individual, it is true, should consider that nature has enjoined the same law on his neighbor, and therefore a respect for the authority of nature would oblige him to respect the rights of others as much as his own. But reasoning as abstruse, though as simple as this, would not occur to all men. The same nature, therefore, has imposed another law, that of promoting the good, as well as respecting the rights of mankind, and has sanctioned it by rewards and punishments. The rewards in this case, in this life, are *esteem* and *admiration* of others; the punishments are *neglect* and *contempt*; nor may anyone imagine that these are not as real as the others. The desire for the esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger; and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as the gout or [kidney] stone. It sooner and oftener produces despair, and a detestation of existence . . . Every personal quality, and every blessing of fortune, is cherished in proportion to its capacity for gratifying this universal affection for the esteem, the sympathy, admiration and congratulations of the public. [Adams (1790), pp. 340-341]

Again, we must dismiss the *phantasia* of crediting some external power as the original source of the affections Adams describes. To the extent that we take this "nature" as human Nature, Adams' thesis is put on a firmer foundation. However, even here we must bear in mind that there is great difference between the innate and acquired human *behavioral habit*. That the affective *Triebfedern* he capably describes are teleological – goal seeking – in character is obvious enough. But this is also the precise evidence that the source lies in the process of judgmentation and not in some specious external agency. Understanding the manifested behaviors Adams described means understanding the mental physics of social compacting.

When it is objectively valid to say of a particular individual that he is gregarious – fond of the company of others and sociable – the behavioral objective validity of Adams' thesis follows from this trait and subsists in Self-determined practical maxims and tenets in the manifold of rules. Indeed, it is his exhibition of such rule structuring that leads us to characterize him as gregarious in the first place. Gregariousness is, in other words, the Object in which all of these manifestations of what Adams called a passion for distinction are united. Is gregariousness an innate human factor or an acquired habit of a person's mental schemes of judgmentation? Some

³ The specious teleology, as well as the ontology-centered illusion, is evident enough in this sentence that I think further comment on it is unneeded at this point.

⁴ noteworthy or remarkable doings attracting or drawing the attention and admiration of on-lookers.

sociologists and psychologists hold with the first hypothesis, others with the second. The verdict of mental physics on this point is unequivocal. Neither hypothesis is correct. Both, however, contain particular objectively valid concepts and the correct answer is a synthesis of these two.

This is a topic – the Nature of human gregariousness – to which we will return in chapter 8. It is a "deeper layer" in the scientific "onion" that we are peeling in this treatise, and we have not yet finished with the present layer. The empirical fact is that most people are gregarious to some degree. Adams' "passion for distinction" is one of the factors, although not the only one, that is exhibited in gregarious behaviors. It is a factor in Emerson's view of prudence we saw earlier. Regarded from the deontological viewpoint of Critical analysis, Kant explains prudence as:

All [theoretical] imperatives are: (1) hypothetical, i.e., the necessity of the act as a means to an end; (2) categorical, i.e., the straightforward practical necessity of the act without the motivating ground being contained in any other end. The latter has unconditioned, the former only conditioned practical necessity. The hypothetical imperative commands something either *problematically*, i.e., it enjoins something under the condition of a merely possible end, or *assertorically* if it enjoins something under the condition of an actual end. The categorical imperative enjoins without any end. The problematic imperative occurs in all practical sciences; for example, in geometry when I say: If you wish to measure a tower you must do thus and so. Those who have no wish to measure the tower have no need to do this. The imperative under *problematical* condition is the imperative of skill. When we instruct him in youth, we show the schoolboy all possible means to all possible ends with the intention that, if he knows everything that is needed, it may be useful to him. He who knows the imperatives to very many possible ends has a great deal of skill.

The imperative where I presuppose an assertoric end is the imperative of happiness, and this I can presuppose in everybody because we all wish to be happy. The imperatives which teach us how to reach happiness are the imperatives of prudence. *Skill* is dexterity in knowing the means to any desired ends. The influence of men is always directed here to the particular skill, so that to use a man for one's own arbitrary purpose is prudence; for example, the clockmaker is skilled if he makes a good clock, but prudent if he knows how to dispose of it effectively; proper prudence is the use of means to promote or look after one's own happiness.⁵ That is the pragmatismal imperative. Pragmatic is that which makes us prudent, and practical that which makes us skilled; or, pragmatic is that which I can make use of for my freedom. [Kant (1785a), 29: 606-607]

It is instructive to compare and contrast these deontological explanations with the standard dictionary definitions of these words pragmatic, pragmatismal, prudence and prudent. Webster's Dictionary (1962) defines these as follows.

pragmatic, *a.* [L. *pragmaticus*; Gr. *pragmatikos*, from *pragma*, business; *prassein*, to do.]

1. (a) busy; active; (b) practical.
2. pragmatismal; meddlesome; officious; conceited, etc.
3. having to do with the affairs of a state or community.
4. dealing with historical facts in their interrelations.
5. of or belonging to philosophical pragmatism.

pragmatic, *n.* 1. a pragmatic sanction. 2. a pragmatismal person.

pragmatismal, *a.*

1. active; diligent; busy. [Obs.]

⁵ E.g., when a clockmaker knows how to get someone to buy a clock at the best price he can get for it. If he contracts with someone to make a clock for him, the clockmaker is being prudent; if he makes a clock for no one in particular but with the knowledge that he can get someone to buy it, he is skilled and prudent.

2. pertaining to business or ordinary affairs; hence, material; commonplace; practical. [Obs.]
3. officious; meddling.
4. dogmatic; opinionated; conceited.
5. in philosophy, pragmatic.

prudence, n.

1. the state or quality of being prudent; the habit of acting with deliberation and discretion; wisdom applied to practice.
2. an instance of this.
3. careful management; economy.

Syn. – forecast, providence, considerateness, judiciousness, discretion, caution, circumspection, judgment.

prudent, a. [Fr., from L. *prudens*, for *providens*, provident.]

1. capable of exercising sound judgment in practical matters.
2. cautious or discrete in conduct; circumspect; not rash.
3. characterized, dictated, or directed by prudence.

Syn. – circumspect, discreet, cautious, judicious, careful, considerate, sagacious, thoughtful, provident, frugal, economical.

Note here how the Latin roots and obsolete definitions of these words remain somewhat close to the deontological explanation, but the modern English usages have drifted away in connotation until the words have become little more than contextual synonyms for other words. They have, in short, become more pronouncedly ontology-centered and have lost much of their connection to *actions*. Writers like Emerson, on the other hand, still retain the older flavoring of these words. The deontological explanation keeps the word centered in the individual person and how *he* assesses his specific means to his specific ends and goals.

Deontological prudence pertains to maxims for dealing with the person's situation. These all ultimately stand under theoretical hypothetical imperatives that are themselves mediately connected (by the process of making reflective judgments) to practical maxims and imperatives in the person's manifold of rules. This context in regard to actions in general is an amoral context. But there is also an inner and less obvious context that pertains immediately to the phenomenon of an individual committing himself to particular and specific matters of obligation. Prudence is deontologically linked to the individual's satisfaction of his own happiness. Deontologically, happiness itself is: (1) from the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics, the consciousness of the person of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole *Dasein*; (2) from the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics, *the expedience of the disposition* the person has to act on the basis of the matter of desire.

The *judgment of this expedience*, which is a judgment rendered by the process of reflective judgment, refers to the person's own *self-regard*. It is because of this linkage that acceptance of social obligation becomes indissolvably linked to the person's maxims of Self-respect – the basis of his categorical Relation of Duty to himself with regard to his personality. **Socializing *Triebfedern*** are motives that incline the individual to accept limitations of his personal liberty of action on the grounds that by doing so he benefits, by consequential conditions dependent upon his acceptance of these limitations, in ways that serve his categorical Relations of Self-respect.

Earlier I said that the reciprocal Relation of Duty and Obligation can be regarded as a synthesis of the first two Relations of Duties to oneself. We here see the positive aspect of this synthesis. The individual must first *act* – that is, he must first choose to accept an obligation – in order to establish such a reciprocal and mutual Relation with another person. This act refers to the adaptation of *Lust* in *psyche*.

There is, however, a contrary synthesis as well, which we next take up. The positive aspect of prudence is the means by which the individual comes to accept a socialized condition. The negative aspect has to do with his rejection of social conditions.

§ 3. Socializing and Antisocializing *Triebfedern* II: Self-love

Self-regard is a type of satisfaction related to the feeling of *Lust*. *Consciousness* of Self-respect, on the other hand, is related to the feeling of *Unlust*. Perhaps at first encounter this seems a strange thing for me to say. However, Self-respect is the notion of the first pure and *a priori* interest of practical Reason; this interest is to act for the practical perfecting of the structure of rules in the manifold of practical rules. The perception of Self-respect is an affective perception arising from the spontaneity of the human being (as *homo noumenon*) and never through his power of receptivity in *psyche*. It therefore originates from ratio-expression in judgmentation. It is an affective perception prejudicial to *self-love*, which is the determination of a choice subjectively grounded in happiness. *Ratio-expression is stimulated by violation of the categorical imperative.*

Provided you are not a child, it is likely that you have had the experience of carrying out some duty that, things being otherwise, you would have preferred to not do but did anyway *because* failure to carry out the action would have "made you feel guilty" about not doing it. Not all duties have this negative affective character, but it cannot be denied that some do at least sometimes. The reluctance you felt was an affective perception of self-love, but the stronger *Triebfeder* that motivated you to carry out that duty despite your reluctance originated either from Self-respect (if you felt your action was a moral duty) or from self-regard (if you acted from prudence, e.g. to avoid some unpleasant consequence that would have attended a failure to act on your part). A feeling of Self-respect pertains to *Unlust* because *consciousness of Self-respect has only a negative criterion*. In other words, one becomes conscious only of *lack* in Self-respect. This affective perception arises out of an act of ratio-expression originating in practical Reason when this regulative power of mind is responding to a condition of lack of equilibrium.

Human beings maintain a precarious balance between acts of self-love and acts of Self-respect insofar as theoretical maxims and tenets of *reciprocal* duty and obligation are concerned. The theoretical concepts of maxims and tenets in the manifold of concepts do not carry the human-natural *force* of practical hypothetical imperatives in practical Reason's manifold of rules. Other concepts, brought into association with those of the theoretical maxim or tenet during the synthesis of apprehension, can be contrary to the straightforward original conception of the tenet. This is a form of what psychologists call *cognitive dissonance* and why theoretical imperatives have only the character of an "ought to" and not of a human-natural *law*.

Mathematically, cognitive dissonance is the name given to a condition where free play of imagination and understanding is failing to bring the process of apprehension into a state judged (by reflective judgment) to be expedient *for equilibrium* in congruence with the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason⁶. The judgment marks a feeling of *Unlust* and the resulting manifold of Desires stimulates an act of ratio-expression in the synthesis of appetition (and keeps stimulating it until the inexpedience is resolved by judgmentation). Now, once again, Reason is the executive process of *nous* and is cognitively dark and affectively cold. It knows nothing of sensible objects and it feels no feelings. It dictates that the inexpedience be removed and it does not "care" how that it done. (To "care" about it would be a feeling, and Reason has

⁶ It is instructive to compare this *Realerklärung* of cognitive dissonance with the usage psychologists make of this term. Reber's *Dictionary of Psychology* tells us that "cognitive dissonance" is an emotional state set up when two simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions are inconsistent or when there is a conflict between belief and behavior. The resolution of the conflict is assumed to serve as a basis for attitude change, in that belief patterns are modified so as to be consistent with behavior.

none). Self-love is said to "clash" with Self-respect when the meaning implication of an intuition implicates an action contradictory to *practical* maxims in the manifold of rules. This contradiction must be *transformed*, through judgmentation, into a contrary relationship so that accommodation of the action scheme becomes practically possible.

Let us be very clear about something. Duties to oneself in Relation to personality are *logically categorical*. This means *no* accommodating transformation that is judged by the person to be inexpedient to *any* practical hypothetical imperative in the manifold of rules is ever realized (made actual) through ratio-expression and judgmentation. The cycle of judgmentation will carry on until *some* accommodation is found that satisfies this dictate of the pure categorical imperative. The "character" of practical Reason is *impatient* and the process will "settle" for the first realizable accommodation that is found. Psychologists call behavior that results from this accommodation *satisficing behavior*. Stanford psychology professor Harold J. Leavitt tells us,

[We] have been talking about problem solving as a two-stage process. Usually when we think of solving a problem we are apt to think only in terms of finding the right answer from among the possibilities. . . . [But] it is very seldom indeed that the world supplies us with free road maps fully describing all possible routes, all possible choices. Before we can solve a problem we must search for paths, routes, ideas, tools. This search involves an expenditure of time and energy, and often the expenditure of money or other resources. So part of the problem of deciding which car to buy is the search problem of deciding which cars to look at and how much to shop around. . . .

But notice that in most cases, whether selecting a wife or a used car, deciding which of several package designs to adopt, or trying to choose among several applicants for a job, we follow what some authors have recently called a *satisficing* model. We usually indulge in a limited amount of search, until we reach a *satisfactory* rather than an optimal alternative.

This model of man as a satisficing problem-solver – as an individual using both his head and his guts with a limited degree of rationality and with large elements of strategic guesswork – this is quite a different model from others that have existed in the past. Some earlier conceptions of problem-solving laid almost exclusive emphasis on the impulsive and emotional aspects of behavior. . . .

But these emotional ideas are not negated by the satisficing model; they are simply placed in a different setting. When one talks about the "cost" of a search, one must take into account the *psychological* cost. And the locus of search . . . may be very much a function of [the buyer's] unconscious (or conscious) need for status and prestige. Some buyers may look only at used Lincolns and Cadillacs; others, only at used sports cars. And their selection of these areas to search are quite likely to be related to their personalities.

The satisficing model is also very different from still a third model that many of us carry around with us. The third is a rational model of problem-solving behavior.

The rational model began as a description of how people *ought* to solve problems rather than how they do solve them. Somewhere along the line, this distinction became blurred; researchers and even industrial problem-solvers now sometimes treat the rational model as though it were a description of the way people actually behave in problem situations. The rational model, of course, assumes that people . . . will first perform a complete and rational search and that they will then select the optimal alternative from among the alternatives evoked by the search.

To borrow an apt analogy, the distinction between the rational and the satisficing model is made clear when one thinks of a man looking for a needle in a haystack. The "rational" man searches all through the haystack collecting all the needles he can find there. He then measures the sharpness of each needle and selects the one which is the sharpest. The satisficing man searches through the haystack until he finds a needle; then he tries it and if

it is sharp enough to sew with he gets on with his sewing; and that's the end of it. If not, he searches some more until he finds one that is satisfactory.

It seems quite clear that most of us do behave more like the second man than the first, whether we ought to or not. [Leavitt (1972), pp. 62-64]

Well, no. Except for people with certain brain injuries, we *all* behave like the second man *every time*. The difference is what each of us holds to be the concept of a "satisfactory solution." Mental physics tells us that the satisficing model of behavior is the objectively valid one. ***To be rational means the exercise of ratio-expression and judgmentation.*** To be a satisficing problem solver and to be a rational problem solver are one and the same thing. The classic rational problem solver model is a Platonic fantasy. Its real context is a *pseudo-moral maxim* of prudence.

When we look at examples of satisficing accommodations pertaining to ethical and moral relationships, what sort of characteristics and marks do we find? Emerson's "Prudence" essay presents us with an interesting juxtaposition of Epicurean consequentialism and Stoic themes of virtue ethics. For example, in one place he writes,

The application of means to ends ensures victory and the songs of victory not less in a farm or a shop than in the tactics of party or of war. The good husband finds method as efficient in the packing of firewood in a shed, or in the harvesting of fruits in the cellar, as in Peninsular campaigns or the files of the Department of State. In the rainy day he builds a workbench, or gets a toolbox set in the corner of the barn chamber, and stored with nails, gimlets, pincers, screwdriver, and chisel. Herein he tastes an old joy of youth and childhood, the cat-like love of garrets, presses, and corn chambers, and of the conveniences of long housekeeping. His garden or his poultry yard – very paltry place it may be – tell him many pleasant anecdotes. One might find argument for optimism in the abundant flow of this saccharine element of pleasure in every suburb and extremity of the good world. Let a man keep the law – any law – and his way will be strewn with satisfactions. There is more difference in the quality of our pleasure than in the amount. [Emerson (1841a), pg. 111]

And yet he also writes, only a few paragraphs later,

We have found out fine names to cover our sensuality withal, but no gifts can raise intemperance. The man of talent affects to call his transgressions of the laws of the senses trivial, and to count them nothing considered with his devotion to his art. His art rebukes him. That never taught him lewdness, nor the love of wine, nor the wish to reap where he had not sowed. His art is less for every deduction of his holiness, and far less for every defect of common sense. On him who scorned the world, as he said, the scorned world wreaks its revenge. He that despiseth small things will perish little by little. . . . The scholar shames us by his bifold life. Whilst something higher than prudence is active, he is admirable; when common sense is wanted, he is an encumbrance. Yesterday Caesar was not so great; today Job is not so miserable. Yesterday radiant with the light of an ideal world, in which he lives the first of men, and now oppressed by wants and by sickness, . . . none is so poor to do him reverence. . . . Is it not better that a man should accept the first pains and mortifications of this sort, which nature is not slack in sending him, as hints that he must expect no other good than the just fruit of his own labor and self-denial? [*ibid.*, pp. 113-114]

A Stoic theme, this. In "Prudence" Emerson does try to reconcile these two opposing views and admonishes all to "not try to write the laws of any one virtue, looking only at that." Thus he ranks and stands "truth, frankness, courage, love, humility, and all the virtues" on the side of a true 'art of prudence' and, thereby, tells us that by practicing this 'true prudence' we "are pretty sure in a short space to be mumbling our ten commandments." On the whole, the Prudence essay makes its ultimate stand on the side of the Stoics and virtue ethics with due heed paid to material

prudence. This is the path to the good society, he implies, and what prudence ought to be.

Yet this is at best an unstable mixture, sometimes subsuming self-regard under self-love and at other times subsuming self-love under self-regard. When is the one Self-respect and when the other? When would a Stoic call an Epicurean "virtuous"? When would an Epicurean call a Stoic "wise"? These are issues "Prudence" leaves dangling. We find Emerson exhibiting a quite different side to things in another essay, also published in 1841 and in the same collection of essays as "Prudence." This essay, "Self-Reliance," exhibits an outlaw side to his character. It also provides an interesting illustration of the re-staging process discussed in chapter 5:

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart, is true for all men – that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for always the inmost becomes the outmost . . . A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses his thought because it is his own. . . . Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the divine Providence has found for you; the society of your contemporaries, the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the Eternal was stirring at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. . . .

What pretty oracles nature yields us on this text in the face and behavior of children, babes, and even brutes! That divided and rebel mind, that distrust of a sentiment because our arithmetic has computed the strength and means opposed to our purposes, these have not. Their mind being whole, their eye is as yet unconquered; and when we look in their faces, we are disconcerted. Infancy conforms to nobody: all conform to it, so that one babe commonly makes four or five out of the adults who prattle and play to it. . . . Bashful or bold, then, he will know how to make us seniors very unnecessary.

The nonchalance of boys who are sure of a dinner, and would disdain as much as a lord to do or say aught to conciliate one, is the healthy attitude of human nature. How is a boy the master of society! Independent, irresponsible, looking out from his corner on such people and facts as pass by, he tries and sentences them on their merits, in the swift summary way of boys, as good, bad, interesting, silly, eloquent, troublesome. He cumbers himself never about consequences, about interests; he gives an independent, genuine verdict. You must court him, he does not court you. But a man is, as it were, clapped in jail by his consciousness. . . . Ah, that he could pass again into his neutral, godlike independence! Who can thus lose all pledge, and having observed, observe again from the same unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, unafrighted innocence, must always be formidable,




Figure 7.1: Stages of moral development.

must always engage the poet's and the man's regards. Of such an immortal youth the force would be felt. He would utter opinions on all passing affairs, which being seen to be not private, but necessary, would sink like darts into the ear of men, and put them in fear. [Emerson (1841b), pp. 23-25]

Figure 7.1 illustrates again the documented stages of development in the moral judgment of the child. In chapter 5, it was pointed out that this same sequence is re-staged in different situations by human beings throughout life. Emerson sings a paean here to individualism, moral realism, and the egocentric stage of rule practices. When he counsels us to "accept the place the divine Providence has found for you," he does not mean acquiesce to that place with Stoic apathy. Rather, he means, "Here you are, and here you'll be – so seize it and make it yours!"

Against this he directs a cold sneer at he who would not be "independent, irresponsible" but would instead be contented to be "clapped into jail by his consciousness. As soon as he has once acted or spoken with *éclat*, he is a committed person, watched by the sympathy or the hatred of hundreds, whose affections must now enter into his account" [*ibid.*, pg. 25] despite the counsels of those inner convictions Emerson does not doubt all men have. He abjures conformity:

These are the voices which we hear in solitude, but they grow faint and inaudible as we enter into the world. Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It [society] loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.

Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world. . . . No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names, very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. . . . Expect me not to show cause why I seek or why I exclude company. Then, again, do not tell me, as a good man did today, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations. Are they *my* poor? I tell thee, thou foolish philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent I give to such men as do not belong to me, and to whom I do not belong. There is a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am bought and sold; for them I will go to prison, if need be; but your miscellaneous popular charities; the education at college of fools; the building of meeting-houses to the vain end to which many are now staged; alms to sots; and the thousand-fold Relief Societies; – though I confess with shame I sometimes succumb and give a dollar, it is a wicked dollar which by and by I shall have the manhood to withhold.

Virtues are, in the popular estimate, rather the exception than the rule. There is the man *and* his virtues. Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of courage or charity, much as they would pay a fine in expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their living in the world . . . Their virtues are penances. I do not wish to expiate, but to live. My life is not an apology, but a life. It is for itself, and not for a spectacle. . . . I wish it to be sound and sweet, and not to need diet and bleeding. My life should be unique; it should be an alms, a battle, a conquest, a medicine. I ask primary evidence that you are a man, and refuse this appeal from the man to his actions. . . .

What I must do is all that concerns me; not what the people think. This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder, because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude. [*ibid.*,

pp. 25-28]

These are lone wolf, antisocial words written by the very same man who also wrote,

In an age of fops and toys,
 Wanting wisdom, void of right,
 Who shall nerve heroic boys
 To hazard all in Freedom's fight, –
 Break sharply off their jolly games,
 Forsake their comrades gay
 And quit proud homes and youthful dames
 For famine, toil and fray?
 Yet on the nimble air benign
 Speed nimbler messages,
 That waft the breath of grace divine
 To hearts in sloth and ease.
 So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
 So near is God to man,
 When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*,
 The youth replies, *I can*. – [Emerson (1863), III]

Surely there is no purer exhibition of commitment to social Duty and fulfillment of Obligation than that a person willingly hazards his own life for his Country or for a Great Cause. Here are cooperation and moral cognizance exhibited in the most unambiguous of terms. No one regards becoming personally dead as either prudence or virtue. No one regards being shot through the head with a musket ball, or dying miserably from infection a few weeks after having a leg amputated in a filthy Gettysburg field hospital, as a benefit. If you had never heard a single word of Emerson and someone were to read "Prudence," "Self-Reliance" and "Voluntaries" to you without telling you their authors' names, you might easily think they had been written by entirely different individuals. Yet Emerson is not called a madman, nor is it said that he had a multiple personality disorder. What is this complex thesis? woven by the same man who *also* wrote,

In dealing with the State, we ought to remember that its institutions are not aboriginal, though they existed before we were born: that they are not superior to the citizen: that every one of them was once the act of a single man: every law and usage was a man's expedient to meet a particular case: that they are all imitable, all alterable; we may make as good: we may make better. Society is an illusion to the young citizen. It lies before him in rigid repose, rooted like oak trees to the center, round which all arrange themselves the best they can. But the old statesman knows that society is fluid; there are no such roots and centers; but any particle may suddenly become the center of the movement, and compel the system to gyrate round it . . . But politics rest on necessary foundations, and cannot be treated with levity. Republics abound in young civilians, who believe that the laws make the city; that grave modifications of the policy and modes of living, and the employments of the population; that commerce, education, and religion, may be voted in or out; and that any measure, though it were absurd, may be imposed on a people, if only you can get sufficient voices to make it a law. But the wise know that foolish legislation is a rope of sand, which perishes in the twisting; that the State must follow, and not lead the character and progress of the citizen; the strongest usurper is quickly got rid of; and they only who build on Ideas build for eternity: and that the form of government that prevails is the expression of what cultivation exists in the population which permits it. The law is only a memorandum. . . . Meantime the education of the general mind never stops. The reveries of the true and simple are prophetic. What the tender poetic youth dreams, and prays, and paints today, but shuns the ridicule of saying aloud, shall presently be the resolution of public bodies, then shall be carried as grievance and bill of rights through conflict and war, and then shall be triumphant law and establishment for a hundred years, until it gives place,

in turn, to new prayers and pictures. The history of the State sketches in coarse outline the progress of thought, and follows at a distance the delicacy of culture and of aspiration. [Emerson (1844), pp. 275-276]

A great poet uses his words to paint a great portrait, employing often the extreme metaphor, according to his purpose, for its simplicity of comprehension and power either to portray the *reductio ad absurdum* or stir the chill of sublimity by the grandeur of his vision. Mental physics teaches us that we each learn the new and abstract general concept from the synthesis of more concrete examples, and a great poet exploits this human Nature with skill and artistry. It is an error of satisficing to take out of context a single piece of his work and declare, "*Here* is this man's conviction." Human beings do not have just one conviction, and each of us must reconcile for ourselves contradictions between them. We do so by converting contradictions to contraries and imposing rules of exception upon the divers cases of their invocation.

So it is with Emerson. I know a number of people who greet his statement, "The law is only a memorandum," with aversion and shock. Yet Emerson is not the only man to have ever put his tongue to these words or their like, nor was he even the first. Montesquieu wrote,

We have said that the laws were the particular and precise institutions of a legislator, and manners and customs the institutions of a nation in general. Hence it follows that when these manners and customs are to be changed, it ought not to be done by laws; this would have too much the air of tyranny: it would be better to change them by introducing other manners and customs.

Thus when a prince would make great alterations in his kingdom, he should reform by law what is established by law, and change by custom what is settled by custom; for it is very bad policy to change by law what ought to be changed by custom. . . .

Manners and customs are those habits which are not established by legislators, either because they were not able or were not willing to establish them.

There is this difference between laws and manners, that the laws are most adapted to regulate the actions of the subject, and manners to regulate the actions of the man. There is this difference between manners and customs, that the former principally relate to the interior conduct, the latter to the exterior. These things have sometimes been confounded. [Montesquieu (1748), pp. 298-300]

These are facts of human social-Nature. Officials of the justice system in the United States today seem to have forgotten this. Partisans of political parties act in total ignorance of it. Their consequential actions produce an arresting tyranny and social disintegration. Theirs is the mental illness of a transcendent, idiot, satisficing Platonism of mediocrity and despotism.

The civil rights war in the United States, waged from the late 1950s into the 1970s, was not decided, settled or won by laws, no matter how much self-styled liberals might think it so. At best civil rights legislation acted to pry the oppressor's boot from the neck of the oppressed so that he had the chance to rise to his feet and be seen. The reformation of manners and customs, effected by making plainly visible to many eyes the actual despotisms of segregation and racial prejudice, gave what victories were gained in the civil rights revolution. These came not from reformation of laws. Laws never change manners or customs. They either build up or destroy a Community, a state or a nation according to whether they accord or discord with manners and customs and with such terms and conditions as each citizen requires and gives consent in his individual making of Obligation to a social compact. Martin Luther King, Jr. knew this:

But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vault of opportunity in this nation. And so we've

come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice. . . . Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood. Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of God's children.

It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end but a beginning. . . . There will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges. . . .

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal."

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. . .

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. . . .

This will be the day, this will be the day when all God's children will be able to sing with new meaning "My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrim's pride, from every mountainside let freedom ring!"

And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true. And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire. Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York. Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California. . . .

Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi – from every mountainside.

Let freedom ring. And when this happens, and when we allow freedom to ring – when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when *all* of God's children – black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics – will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual: "Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"
[King (1963)]

In his speech, King used the words "justice" and "freedom" many times, and the word "law" not once. *Laws are meant to serve liberty with justice for all*, and never the other way around. It is in this context that any law *is* a mere memorandum of experience and prudence.

Emerson knew this too:

Whilst I do what is fit for me, and abstain from what is unfit, my neighbor and I shall often agree in our means, and work together for a time to one end. But whenever I find my dominion over myself not sufficient for me, and undertake the direction of him also, I overstep the truth, and come into false relations to him. I may have so much more skill or strength than he, that he cannot express adequately his sense of wrong, but it is a lie, and hurts like a lie both him and me. Love and nature cannot maintain the assumption: it must be executed by a practical lie, namely, by force. This undertaking for another is the blunder which stands in colossal ugliness in the governments of the world. It is the same thing in numbers, as in a pair, only not quite so intelligible. . . . Therefore all public ends look vague and quixotic beside private ones. For, any laws but those which men make for themselves are laughable. If I put myself in the place of my child, and we stand in one thought, and see what things are thus or thus, that perception is law for him and me. We are both there, both act. But if, without carrying him into the thought, I look over into his plot, and guessing how it is with him, ordain this or that, he will never obey me. This is the history of governments – one man does something which is to bind another. A man who cannot be

acquainted with me taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that part of my labor shall go to this or that whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy. Behold the consequence. [Emerson (1844), pg. 283]

Emerson's "Politics" essay unveils the Object in which the apparent opposites of his divers views are united. It is grounded in the basic human-Nature of social compacting. It is in the notion of liberty with justice for all members of the Community: as much civil liberty as the terms of the compact *demand*, and as much justice as the conditions of the compact *require*. It is precisely Rousseau's fundamental thesis. The day of which Dr. King dreamed is not yet dawned although many no longer clearly see the urgency. In economics, in politics, in sociology and education, in Community and liberty there are yet villages and hamlets, mountains and molehills, where liberty with justice for all has yet to ring. The civil war is not over. It merely respites.

If shortcoming is to be found in Emerson's essay, it is in the relative lack of attention he pays to social manners and customs *not* written into the legislation of the Community. This issue, raised in the waning days of political science as a social-natural science, was more closely addressed by another political essayist, John Stuart Mill:

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant – society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it – its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by means other than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. [Mill (1859), pg. 4]

It is this tendency of the mob to tyrannize the individual through overly-intrusive customs and manners – mores and folkways held to be proper by the numerical majority of people in the society – that Emerson rebels against in "Self-Reliance." The "reflecting persons" to whom Mill refers above were the framers of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. James Madison wrote,

It is of the greatest importance in a republic, not only to guard society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. . . . In a society, under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger [Hamilton *et al.* (1787-88), No. 51, pp. 290-291].

It is true, as Mill wrote, that communities and societies leave fewer avenues of escape from the tyranny of arbitrary social manners and customs. Madison obliquely points out the avenue that is *always* available to every individual. He can repudiate his previous commitment of Obligation to that society and turn outlaw in his relationships with its members. He can do this while continuing to live among them, concealing the fact that he and they now coexist in the state

of nature. Historian Arnold Toynbee called the outlaw residents within a society its "proletariat" [Toynbee (1946)]. I prefer to use the term *Toynbee proletariat* to distinguish Toynbee's specific definition from the more widely used term "proletariat" employed by Communist propagandists. Toynbee grimly documented the findings from the record of history revealing that *civilizations always fall from within*, and that when they do it is because oppressions have brought into being a large-scale Toynbee proletariat, holding no allegiance to the old order but holding ample enmity.

Emerson raises a banner of rebellion against such social oppression to heights that amount to a vision of holy orders:

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself, for better, for worse, as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact makes much impression on him, and another none. . . . Bravely let him speak the utmost syllable of his confession. We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. It needs a divine man to exhibit anything divine. [Emerson (1841b), pg. 24]

Even so, Emerson's "Self-Reliance" does not speak quite as plainly as did his friend and fellow-traveler in conscience, David Henry Thoreau:

After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. . . . Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first and subjects afterward. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. . . . Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made agents of injustice. . . . All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. [Thoreau (1849), pp. 2-3]

In any community or nation where it is alleged that government is "of the people, by the people, for the people," revolution against the government by that association's Toynbee proletariat is also and always revolution against the social order and a civil war between neighbors in which no one can long remain neutral. In the state of nature, all men are simultaneously predators and prey.

This unstable character of societies, which satisficing habits and lack of civics education tends to promote and produce, is not due to any specious external force or power. It arises immediately as a consequence of human Nature. Mill wrote,

The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human

conduct is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety which are not written in his religious creed, and his chief guide in the interpretation of even that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason – at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires and fears for themselves – their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. [Mill (1859), pg. 5]

There are many people, while acknowledging these men's points quoted here, either reply that the diversity in human opinion over such matters is too great to be dealt with rationally or scientifically, or who think that there is no practical way possible to deal with this social situation even if the matter were to be understood down to its last particle of reason. Such attitudes are satisficing in regard to the choice to do nothing, but are these presuppositions factual? If they are factual, no better argument could be offered in excuse of despotism and perpetual civil war. But as the consequence of presumption here is so unpalatable to the desire for life in the civil state, this amply justifies the most strenuous efforts to ascertain when the presupposition is factual, un-factual and non-factual. To make this effort, we must turn to ascertainable facts of human Nature and the mental physics of Self-determination.

§ 4. Judgmentation and Self-Determination

To do so, we must bring views such as those expressed in the preceding sections under the analysis of mental physics. It is true that every individual human being is a unique person in regard to his or her Self-constructed manifold of rules, manifold of concepts, and in the transitory organization of affective Desires. However, and in spite of this diversity, the human-natural fact remains that the *processes* of these constructions are governed by noetic and psychic capacities that are innate, *a priori*, and common to all human beings who have not suffered extensive major medical pathologies in the structure of *soma*⁷. This common structural-functional character of being a human being is what opens the door to the possibility of empirical human-natural science. In addition to this inherent human commonality, there are also the facts that: (1) the manifolds of rules and of concepts are *experientially* constructed; and (2) this experience most often takes place in some sort of communal social-environment.

⁷ For example, some particular kinds of strokes. *Soma* and *nous* are reciprocally determining (through the logical division of *psyche*), and so major disabilities in brain function reciprocally co-imply major disabilities in the noetic capacities of the person. A coma, for example, is most often produced by bilateral damage to the brain stem from the upper half of the brain stem tegmentum at the high pontine or midbrain level extending upward towards the hypothalamus. In other cases, it is caused by damage to intralaminar nuclei in the thalamus. The symptoms of coma indicate that these brain structures are reciprocal with, at least, the process of reflective judgment and so impairment of these somatic structures implicates impairment of the process of reflective judgment as well. It has been said that "the mind is embodied," but it is equally true that "the body is minded." The relationship is reciprocity, not causality and dependency. Neurological pathologies are important sources of empirical data for empirical psychology and the study of social-natural anthropology.




Figure 7.2: Processes involved in the cycles of judgmentation, thinking, and conceptualization.

Sociologist Peter Berger once described studying sociology as a perspective from which one sees the general in the particular. All that the social science of sociology has lacked is the Critical metaphysics and the mathematics of mental physics needed to turn it from a mere social science into a social-natural science. These provide the *context in Nature* that specific theoretical (abstract) concepts require to gain and maintain real objective validity. Figure 7.2 is a panoramic illustration of the common functionals and organization ("faculty") of the noetic processes of judgmentation, thinking and conceptualization. It also depicts the logical interactions between the logical division of *nous* and the logical division of *psyche* (the faculty of animating principles of *nous-soma* reciprocity). You might recognize this figure as an expanded version of an earlier one that was presented in chapter 4 (figure 4.5).

Those wishing to acquire detailed comprehension of the blocks depicted in figure 7.2 must turn to *The Principles of Mental Physics* [Wells (2009)] to obtain this background. Following Aristotle's dictum of advancing from that which is more accessible in experience to that which is comprehended according to principles of natural laws, it will be sufficient for the purposes of *this* treatise to treat the over-arching mental physics factors involved in social-natural behaviors. This, I think, can be accomplished from a more general exposition of the noetic processes and their relationships to the adaptive faculty⁸ of *psyche*. This tactic does not speak immediately in terms of fundamental principles of mental physics but it does speak in terms of mental-physical consequences. In this, the tactic used here has a sympathetic forefather in a maxim of skill belonging to what William James called "radical empiricism." James said,

The pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no difference of truth that doesn't make a difference of fact somewhere; and it seeks to determine the meaning of all

⁸ Recall that adaptation is the equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. Its fundamental condition is the negation of feelings of *Lust per se* (a state of affective perception judged in the process of reflective judgment). *Lust per se* is the fundamental property of adaptive *psyche* for determining adaptation to a state of equilibrium through *nous-soma* co-determination.

differences of opinion by making the discussion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or particular issue. The principle of pure experience is also a methodological postulate. Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says, except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experiment; and for every feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system of reality. In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real. [James (1905)]

What I try to accomplish in these pages is to explicate the "definite place in reality" where the theses of Emerson, Adams, Montesquieu, etc. cited earlier have their human-natural grounds of origination. I am, in other words, using these examples of particulars in experience as the "particular or practical issue" James' maxim advises be used to "hinge" theoretical generalization.

The central focus of our attention is the judgmentation loop figure 7.2 depicts. The other more localized loops (thinking and conceptualization) are oriented and directed by the acts of judgmentation occurring in the main loop of appetition, ratio-expression and judgments. The cycle of judgmentation is a closed-loop cycle and, mathematically, an analyst might pick any point within it to begin a systematic analysis. However, in terms of experienceable context, we can hardly improve upon starting with reflective judgment. Figure 7.3 illustrates the 3LAR structure of the process of reflective judgment and its synthetic relationship with adaptive *psyche*. In this chapter I outline its functions; chapter 8 shows how we put them to use for analysis.




Figure 7.3: Mathematical presentation of the process of reflective judgment and its relationship to adaptive *psyche*. The depiction of reflective judgment provided here is called a 3LAR structure and is logically divided into a process of aesthetical reflective judgment (as its matter) and a process of teleological reflective judgment (as its form). Standing under each of its eight headings (anticipation of value, etc.) are three functional *momenta* explained in Wells (2009), chapter 8. When the synthetic union of reflective judgment and adaptive *psyche* is considered, this structure results in 13,122 distinct species of reflective judgments of affective perception (6,561 judgments of the feeling of *Lust* and an equal number for the feeling of *Unlust*). A state of equilibrium is marked by mutual cancellation of these affective perceptions.

§ 4.1 Aesthetical Reflective Judgment

The phenomenon of reflective judgment logically divides into a matter of desire in aesthetical reflective judgment and a form of desiration in teleological reflective judgment. Mathematically represented at the 2LAR level of explanation, aesthetical reflective judgment judges the *parástases* of the synthesis of apprehension by means of primitive functionals⁹ of sense of satisfaction (Quantity), transcendental affirmation and denial (Quality), anticipation of value (Relation), and feelings of expedience for happiness (Modality). The first principle of this process is the principle of formal expedience, the governing acroam of reflective judgment in general. Expedience in apprehensive *parástase* is marked as a feeling of *Lust* or *Unlust*. This feeling never becomes part of any objective *parástase*. Kant wrote,

[The] subjective in a representation *which cannot become part of the cognition at all* is the *Lust* or *Unlust* combined with it; for through this I know nothing about the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition. Now, the expedience of a thing, so far as it is represented in a perception, is not also characteristic of the Object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be deduced from a cognition of things. Thus the expedience that precedes the cognition of an Object – which moreover is immediately combined with it – is the subjective that cannot become part of cognition at all. The object is therefore called expedient in this case only because its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of *Lust*; and this representation is an aesthetic representation of expedience. [Kant (1790), 5: 189]

The primitive functions of Quantity constitute the sense of satisfaction in reflective judgment because

The subjective representation of the collective power of life to receive or to exclude objects is the relationship of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Thus the feeling is not the relationship of the object to the representation but rather to the collective power of mind, either to most intimately receive or to exclude the same. [Kant (c. 1777-80), 28: 247]

Lust that springs from the play of the power of imagination without a determined concept to combine immediately with it is satisfaction. [Kant (1792-93), 28: 676]

The *momenta* of Quantity pertain to an act of association by aesthetical reflective judgment. The *momenta* of Quality, on the other hand, pertains to functions of compatibility in *parástases* of apprehension. The judgment of compatibility is either an act of transcendental affirmation, denial, or not-affirmation (that is, the affirming of the representation of "something else" – an act that affirms a *parástase* but places its representation outside of the current *parástase*). The judgments of Quantity and Quality jointly compose *feelings* of desire (when referenced to *Lust*) or un-desire (when referenced to *Unlust*).

Critical *value* is a *nexus* of desires. The act of judgment in Relation makes a connection between representations and something the Organized Being will invest with a value. To put this another way, the anticipation of value is an affective perception of the individual's sense of interest in realizing (making actual in some way) the *Existenz* of some Object. This does not mean the aesthetical judgment is a cognition; it is not. Kant put it this way:

By the designation "an aesthetic judgment about an Object" it is therefore forthwith indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an Object but that what would be understood in the judgment is not the determination of an Object but of the Subject and its

⁹ A functional is a function that has a set of functions for its domain and a range belonging to another set of functions. The domain functions of a functional are called its *momenta*.

feeling. For in the power of judgment, understanding and imagination are considered in relationship to one another and this can, to be sure, first be considered objectively, as belonging to cognition . . . but one can also regard this relationship of two faculties of knowledge merely subjectively, as far as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the *state of mind*, and so as a relationship which is *sensitive* . . . Now although this sensation is no sensuous representation of an Object, still, because it is subjectively combined with the sensualization of the notions of understanding through the power of judgment, it can be reckoned to sensibility, as sensuous representation of the state of the Subject who is affected by an act of that capacity, and a judgment can be called aesthetic, i.e. sensuous. [Kant (c. 1789), 20: 223]

Piaget called affectivity an *energetic* of mind [Piaget (1953-54)]. Concepts in the manifold of concepts are "cold cognitions" indeed because they are only latent representations of appearances – "memory matter" – and do not affect the actions of the Subject until they are brought back (through imagination) into the synthesis of apprehension and apperception to make an intuition. *Intuitions* are "warm" cognitions because they are symbolic of and linked to actual sensorimotor expression *by* representations of reflective judgment. Consider figure 7.2. The *parástases* of sensibility are not immediately joined to either motoregulatory expression (impetuous emotivity) or to the synthesis of appetite (the process that gives final "consent" to carrying out a practical action). Therefore, unless something actually *connects* sensibility to the capacities for determined actions, cognition would play no role whatsoever in human behavior. The "sense of interest" developed by an anticipation of value is what makes it possible for merely sensuous representation to provide for the matter of an action. Kant wrote,

Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e. becomes a cause determining will . . . Reason takes an immediate interest in an act only when the universal validity of the maxim of the same is a sufficient ground of determination of will. Only such an interest is pure. But if it can determine will only by means of another Object of desire or under the presupposition of a special feeling of the Subject, reason then takes only a mediate interest in the act, and . . . this latter interest would be only empirical and not pure interest of reason. The logical interest of reason (to further its insights) is never immediate but rather presupposes set aims of its employment. [Kant (1785b) 4: 459-60 fn]

These first three functionals of aesthetical reflective judgment attend to composing desires in affectivity as affective perceptions of sensuous *materia* in sensibility. However, a human being could never become conscious of desire (thus desire could never be perceived) unless what was represented in the affective perception was somehow judged to be expedient for meeting the unrelenting demand of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Anticipation of value, transcendental affirmation and denial, and sense of satisfaction all pertain to what an affective perception contains. The Modality functional, feelings of expedience for happiness, pertain to the judgment of the judgment, i.e., to apperception rather than apprehension. Its transcendental principle is called the ***principle of happiness***: *A human being's disposition to act on the basis of a matter of desire is a pure purpose of practical Reason.*

In Critical epistemology, happiness is: (1) from the practical Standpoint, the expedience of the disposition of the Organized Being to act on the basis of the matter of desire; (2) from the judicial Standpoint, the consciousness of the Organized Being of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole *Dasein*. Kant remarked,

The idea of happiness is not one such as man has abstracted by chance from his instincts and so derived from the animality in himself; on the contrary, it is a mere Idea of a state to which he would make the latter [his animality] adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible). He sorts this out himself and indeed in different ways through his complicated understanding by imagination and the senses; yet, and what is more, he

amends these so often that this nature, even if it were to be totally subjugated to his choice, nevertheless could by no means undertake to determine a general and firm law with this unstable concept, and so harmonize with the purpose that each arbitrarily intends for himself. But even if we either reduce this to the genuine urge of nature in which our species generally agrees, or, on the other hand, raise our skill so high as to provide for such an imagined purpose, yet even so what man understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own proper natural purpose (not purpose of reason), would never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the type to stop anywhere in possession and enjoyment and to be gratified. [Kant (1790), 5: 430]

The feeling-of-expedience-for-happiness functional does not judge a *parástase* of sensibility in apprehension, as the other three functionals do, but instead judges the progress of the synthesis of the free play of imagination and understanding, its focal points, and how this synthesis is becoming oriented according to *Lust* or *Unlust* in *psyche*. Its *momenta* are accordingly called the *feeling of tendency* (a subjectively problematic *modus* of judgment), the *feeling of presentment* (an assertoric *modus*), and the *feeling of accord or discord* (an apodictic *modus*). These *modi* pertain, respectively, to apperception of what might-be, is, or must-be expedient for happiness (in regard to the feeling of *Lust*) and, of course, their logical opposites of might-be-not, is-not, or must-be-not expedient for happiness (in regard to the feeling of *Unlust*).

§ 4.2 Teleological Reflective Judgment

If we look at the idea of desire as an idea with the character of a "longing for," the idea of desiration is an idea with the character of an "active demanding" of that which is longed for. The distinction is a somewhat subtle one that was reflected in 18th-century German by two words: *Begehren* (desire) and *Begehrung* (desiration). This is a distinction that has become rather blurry in modern German. Both words took their root from *Begehr* (wish; demand; request; appetency). Teleological reflective judgment is the affective judgment of desiration, i.e., of the form of unity in affectivity in relationship to the capacities of the Organized Being. If we use the simile that desire is like gasoline (the energetic that "makes the motor run"), then desiration is like the carbureting process that gives gasoline its explosive flammability¹⁰.

The union of desire and desiration is called Desire. The process of teleological judgment subsists in the organizing of desires and the expressive capacities of *nous* to form a *manifold of Desires*. Its functionals are the "how-to-express" functions of the phenomenon of affectivity. As a process, teleological reflective judgment is essentially proactive, impetuous, is tied to moto-regulatory expression in *soma*, and its acts serve a final purpose (equilibration under the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason). In this last context, we can say that the Object of teleological judgment is *expression of practical law*. Its four functionals are extensive implication (Quantity), intensive implication (Quality), persuasions of judgment (Relation) and preferences of judgment (Modality) [Wells (2009), chapter 8].

The extensive functions of implication pertain to: sensorimotor scheme implications (these schemes being regulations in a process of constituting empirical meanings); differentiating divers *parástases* of sensibility into particular implications of *context* (expressed by divers schemes); and integrating all these divers schemes into an overall syncretic organization of meanings that is exhibited by observable actions in union with objects upon which these schemes act. *Locomotion* is the name we give the phenomena of appearances we understand by such phrases as "voluntary motion" (when our bodies move because we "will" them to) or when we associate physiological reactions (sweating, trembling, flushing, etc.) with "emotional" states of mind. This has historically led to the famous problem of mind-body *commercium*, and the quest to try to explain

¹⁰ Continuing the simile, appetite is then like the spark from the spark plug that sets it off.

it from some underlying (usually mechanical) principle is one of the longest (and, scientifically, most utterly barren) quests in ontology-centered philosophy. The traditional question is itself misposed from the start because it is based on the objectively invalid presupposition of a real mind-body division, in which body is regarded as an ontological substance distinct from soul or mind as a second and different ontological substance. Kant flatly tells us that *every* system for attempting to explain mind-body *commercium* from this starting point is fruitless and in vain. The phenomenon of locomotion is no more and no less than a basic fact of the Nature of being a human being and, as he tells us, "One has already philosophized enough if one only comes *up to the basic power*" of locomotion, i.e., recognizes it as no more and no less than a *Kraft* the living person is able to put on display in the world of phenomena [Kant (1777-80), 28: 280]. The exhibited ability is, by itself, an objectively sufficient ground to posit the *Dasein* of the *Kraft*. Further pursuit of the question, in terms of the *Existenz* of this *Kraft*, carries us past the horizon of possible experience and is attended by the loss of all objective validity in speculation. *Science* must limit itself to the accurate description of the phenomena without the invocation of superstitious miracles¹¹. The extensive functions of implication are *mathematical* functions for the *systematic* characteristics of scheme expression, no more and no less. The ground for their objective validity, like everywhere else in Critical metaphysics, is the criterion of *necessity for the possibility of experience* as human beings actually know experience.

The functional of intensive implication pertains to elementary compensation behaviors that are found to be expressed in complex sensorimotor schemes. These compensations, denoted types α , β and γ , can be regarded as actions serving the person's internal demand for happiness in his state of *Existenz* and, in this context, as expressions of meanings at the sensorimotor level [Wells (2009), chapter 8, §4.2.2]. The first *momentum* of Quality, which is connected to type β compensation behavior, is a synthesis of desiration as an ***implication of real tendency***, with tendency understood as the behavioral character of inclining or contributing an influence towards something. The compensating action is one that is judged expedient for the satisfaction of *Lust* and has the logical character of affirmation. The second *momentum*, which is connected to type α compensation behavior, is the logical opposite of the first and is called an ***implication of real repugnancy***. This compensation is aimed at actions judged to be expedient for the abolition of the feeling of *Unlust* and the action is either one of simply *ignoring* disturbing factors (an act that mental physics terms *ignorance*) or one that acts to remove or otherwise dispose of some hindering object. The third *momentum*, which is connected to type γ behavior, is best regarded as a synthesis of the first two and is called an ***implication of real significance*** because it leads to a coalescing of empirical presentations in sensibility to formulate the intuition of an Object with a *symbolized* meaning. It is noteworthy that Piaget and his coworkers have documented the existence of types α , β and γ compensation behaviors in children, shown that these three modes of compensation are found in all children, and are apparently-innate instinctual forms of compensation in seeking reequilibration after disturbances [Piaget (1975), pp. 64-77].

The functional of Relation in teleological judgment pertains to acts of *Self-reconciliation*, in regard to which we understand "reconcile" in the contexts of making consistent, compatible, etc. (in other words, bringing into harmony) and making oneself content with or acquiescing to something. In particular, these acts of Self-reconciliation are aimed at bringing harmony to what I have previously called the free play of imagination and understanding. This is because the act of making an intuition symbolic is a keystone act of equilibrating the cycle of judgmentation. For this reason, the functions of teleological Relation are called ***persuasions of judgment*** because the

¹¹including those miracles ascribed to improperly reified secondary quantities of pure mathematics such as vacuum energy, quantum fluctuations or any other specious invocation of a god of probability. Probability is an idea and not an ontological *thing*, regardless of how much the pseudo-metaphysics of some physicists would like it to be otherwise (e.g. Bjorken and Drell (1965), pp. 91-93).

cognitions that are its by-products are objective representations the person has persuaded himself to believe. More specifically still, the three functions: (1) mark inferences of ideation in intuition and categorically set the Organized Being's focus of attention; (2) mark inferences of induction in intuition and hypothetically anticipate phenomenal causality as a rule of expectation; or (3) mark inferences of analogy in intuition and determine the orientation of imagination as a rule of psychological causality.

All acts of teleological reflective judgment *immediately* concern nothing else than synthesis of non-cognitive desiration determining only a connection between perception and action, expressed either immediately through motoregulatory expression in *psyche* or mediately through ratio-expression in pure Reason. Cognition is produced as a by-product of these acts. *Belief*, at its very root, is a *practical* act manifested in actions. Objective (that is, speculative) beliefs serve as *constituted* functions of judgmentation of expedience. However, the possibility of formulating constituted functions necessarily must presume *a priori* functions that are *constitutive* for this. Such functions *bias* judgmentation in order to serve the practical final purpose of equilibration. In teleological reflective judgment, these functions are the functions of Modality and are called the *preferences of judgment*. Kant tells us,

Belief is no special source of knowledge. It is a type of incomplete holding-to-be-true with consciousness, and when it is regarded as restricted to a special class of Objects . . . distinguishes itself from opinion not through degree but through relationship it has to knowledge for acting . . . Now we have theoretical knowledge (of the sensuous) in that we can bring it to certainty, and in consideration of all that which we can call human knowledge, the latter must be possible. We have just such certain knowledge, and indeed completely *a priori*, in practical laws, although these are grounded in a supersensible principle (freedom) and indeed in *ourselves* as a principle of practical reason . . . Nonetheless, nature as an Object of our theoretical reason must agree with it, for in the sensible world the consequences or the effect of this Idea shall be met with . . .

Between the obtainment of a cognition through experience (*a posteriori*) and through reason (*a priori*) there is no mediator. But between cognition of an Object and the mere presupposition of its possibility there is a mediator, namely an empirical ground or a ground of reason to accept the latter in regard to a necessary expansion of the field of possible Objects above those whose cognition is possible for us. This necessity takes place only in respect of that in which the Object is known as practical and practically necessary through reason, for to accept something on behalf of merely expanding theoretical knowledge is always contingent . . . This is a subjective necessity, to accept the reality of the Object for the sake of the necessary determination of will. This is the *casus extraordinarius*¹², without which practical reason cannot support itself in regard to its necessary purpose, and here a *favor necessitatis*¹³ proves useful to it in its own judgment. It can acquire no Object logically, but only set itself against that which hinders in the use of this Idea which practically belongs to it. [Kant (1800), 9: 67-69fn]

The Modality functions of teleological judgment constitutive of the formulation of beliefs are: (1) the *presupposing judgment*, which is a phronomic preference of desiration by means of repetitive acts when teleological judgment is in free play with the synthesis of apprehension; (2) the *demanding judgment* when the preference of desiration demands a specific action scheme by means of an identifying coordination when teleological judgment is in free play with the synthesis of imagination; and (3) the *requiring judgment*, which is an apodictic desiration for generalizing assimilation by means of coordinating action substitutes (so-called "mobile schemes" of action) when teleological judgment is in free play with the full powers of judgmentation in general. It is

¹² supplementary (or additional) circumstance

¹³ necessitated bias

again noteworthy that Piaget *et al.* have demonstrated the empirical existence of constitutive functions of coordination of precisely the sorts characteristic of the Modality functional in teleological reflective judgment [Piaget *et al.* (1968), pp. 30-34, 167-175]. It is more than mere metaphor to say teleological reflective judgment makes presuppositions, levies demands, and sets down requirements in the synthesis of judgmentation. In these characteristics of reflective judgment we see the preconditions and preparations for satisficing behavior, habituation to maxims, and *strict judicial adherence to the legislations of practical laws* composed in the manifold of rules as this legislation is expressed through the ratio-expression of pure Reason.

§ 4.3 The Synthesis in Continuity

The division between *nous* and *psyche* in the Organized Being model is only a logical division (which is to say it is a mathematical distinction). It is quite wrong to regard the *nous-psyche* connection in terms of some sort of information flowing from reflective judgment into *psyche* or to regard the operation of *psyche* as the continuation of a sequence of information processing steps or as a stage of computation. *Nous* and *psyche* are merely logically distinct functionals of organized being. *Psyche* is the faculty of animating principles of *nous-soma* reciprocity and, as such, "belongs" neither to *nous* nor *soma*. The theory of *psyche* is called **Critical psychophysics** and is the foundation for a science of objectively valid empirical psychophysics in psychology as well as for neuropsychology in empirical neuroscience [Wells (2011a)].

A good way to explain the relationship of *psyche* and *nous* is by way of an analogy with what a physicist must do in order to make any explicit scientific statement of physics. In every such pronouncement we always find a combination of two things. First, there is some composition of dead-matter objects to which the statement is applied. Second, there is always some contextual connection of these objects in some empirical law of physics. "Two particles exert an attractive force upon each other proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them" is an example of this (specifically, Newton's law of universal gravitation). There is, however, always a *third factor* involved in the *making* of any such objectively valid statement. It is this: There is some principle or "meta-law" that says *this combination of dead-matter objects and physical law is objectively valid*. For example, the law of conservation of matter does not apply to those mathematical objects physicists call "bosons." The object physicists call a "photon" (a "particle of light") is an example of a boson. It is held-to-be-true in physics that atoms do not contain a "boson bag" from which their "supply" of photons is drawn or into which their received "revenue" of photons is deposited like some metaphorical bank transaction. An electron cannot run out of photons and "go bankrupt" in its capacity to give off radiation or exert an electromagnetic force field. Similarly, calculations involving bosons are *required* to use what are called Bose-Einstein statistics and are *not allowed* to use what are called Fermi-Dirac statistics. These are *laws about laws* in theoretical physics.

Similarly, there is a law-about-laws governing the relationship between *psyche* and *nous*. It is called **the synthesis in continuity** and it is depicted by the yellow triangles in figure 7.3. Synthesis in continuity is the organic unity of reflective judgment and adaptive *psyche*. The synthesis in continuity is represented by four functionals: (1) objectivity (Quantity); (2) aesthetic Idea (Quality); (3) judicial Idea (Relation); and (4) Meaning (Modality). The fundamental principle governing the synthesis in continuity is **the general law of continuity: a leap, a gap, chance, and fate are not given in the sensible world**¹⁴.

Adaptation in general is an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. Adaptive *psyche* is the 2LAR depiction of *psyche* in terms of animating principles of: (1) somatic *Kraft*, the

¹⁴ *In mundo non datur saltus, hiatus, casus, et fatum.*

power of *soma* to produce or suffer effects (Quantity); (2) noetic *Kraft*, the power of *nous* to produce or suffer effects (Quality); (3) somatic organization, the somatic context of the structure of adaptation in *nous-soma* reciprocity (Relation); and (4) noetic organization, the noetic context of the structure of adaptation in *nous-soma* reciprocity (Modality).

The detailed theory of the synthesis in continuity is provided in Wells (2009), chapter 7. Objectivity is the function of ***continuity in Nature***. Continuity in Nature (one's "world model") is established through the formal composition of the extensive magnitude in every appearance. The possibility of this establishment requires reciprocal actions in both *soma* and *nous* because sensorimotor actions in *soma* (e.g., eye saccades) are necessary for the possibility of the synthesis of intuitions in *nous* and (aesthetical) reflective judgments in *nous* are likewise necessary to direct and orient the somatic actions required to carry out the composition. The principle of objectivity is *in mundo non datur saltus* (a leap is not given in the sensible world). Scientists and philosophers alike are habituated to speaking of "objects" and "objectivity" rather casually, apparently in the belief that everyone understands these words in the same way. (This is, for those who are keeping track, an exhibition of the egocentric stage of the practice of rules in figure 7.1). Yet neither "object" nor "objectivity" are primitive *a priori* notions of understanding. There is no "object function" in determining judgment. If we understand Nature in terms of objects (and we do; that is what we *use* the mental *construct* of an object to do), then the *capacity* to produce *parástases* of the mathematical Nature we call "objects" is a capacity necessary *a priori* for the possibility of human knowledge. This, however, is not a task *nous* can accomplish all by itself. *Nous* has no direct contact with the sensible world and requires the cooperation of an instrumental factor in being-a-human-being, namely *soma*, to produce knowledge of physical Nature in the manner in which human beings actually come to know and understand the sensible world. The synthesis in objectivity is the function of unity for this capacity. The animating principle of *psyche* that this function serves is **the animating principle of somatic *Kraft*: reciprocity through somatic *Kraft* is determination of a condition, called an elater animi¹⁵, through which the structuring of somatic actions expresses acts of aesthetical judgment of the form of a system of values, desires, and interests.** Knowledge of *physical* objects is grounded in the aesthetic *nexus*.

The aesthetic Idea is the Quality function of the synthesis of ***continuity in perception***. The mathematical concept of the aesthetic Idea belongs to the idea of sense-in-general. Representation *through* the aesthetic Idea in sensibility belongs to the power of imagination and is the seat of human creativity. The aesthetic Idea is a catalyst for summoning concepts from the manifold of concepts into the synthesis of reproductive imagination (figure 7.4). It joins Quality in reflective judgment (matter of the matter of reflective judgment in figure 7.2 at the 2LAR level; aesthetical Quantity and Quality at the 3LAR level) to *psyche's* Quality of noetic *Kraft*. The governing principle of the aesthetic Idea is *in mundo non datur hiatus* (a gap is not given in the sensible world). The animating principle of *psyche* served by the aesthetic Idea is the **animating principle of noetic *Kraft*: the co-determinations of somatic signals and the affective perceptions of Quality in reflective judgment are energetics for understanding and reasoning in the structuring of a value system and for the orienting of activity.**

The aesthetic Idea was introduced by Kant [Kant (1790), 5: 314-315]. The judicial Idea, on the other hand, was a recognizable "hole" left in Kant's system, discovered by applying Kant's own prescription of how to use the mathematical structure of his metaphysical system to discover missing pieces (much as the blanks in Mendeleev's periodic table would later drive the discovery of new chemical elements). The judicial Idea is the function of ***continuity in Existenz***. It is the capacity (know-how) to gauge the formal expedience of sensuous conditions for a pure purpose of practical Reason. It joins Relation (form of the form) in reflective judgment (teleological *nexus*

¹⁵ "driver of mind"




Figure 7.4: The free play of determining judgment, imagination and apprehension in the synthesis of intuitions, concepts, and affective perceptions. (A) creative summoning of concepts by means of the aesthetic Idea into a spontaneous synthesis of sensuous apprehension; (B) the synthesis of re-cognition of intuitions to form combinations of concepts in the manifold of concepts by determining judgments.

in teleological reflective judgment) to Relation in adaptive *psyche*, forming the objective unity of these according to the **animating principle of somatic organization**: *motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation*. The governing principle of continuity in the judicial Idea is *in mundo non datur casus* (chance is not given in the sensible world). Probability functions are *never* causes. Continuity functions *are causata* (rules).

Meaning is the Modality function of continuity: **coherence in the context of life**. Specifically, Meaning is the continuity function of judgmentation in general. It is an organizing function for activities serving the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Its governing principle of continuity is *in mundo non datur fatum* (fate is not given in the sensible world). The Meaning function serves the **animating principle of noetic organization**: *equilibration is the activity leading to the closure of the cycle of affective interaction in a state of equilibrium*.

Figure 7.5 re-illustrates the cycle of affective interaction. A sensible cycle is a recurring succession of accidents of *Existenz* that can be represented in sensibility. The affective interaction




Figure 7.5: The cycle of affective interactions. The cycle depicts the free play of sensibility, reflective judgment, motoregulatory expression to *soma*, and somatic impression via receptivity to *nous*.

cycle pertains to the mutually co-determining co-syntheses of somatic and noetic capabilities that jointly produce and make possible the representation of empirical knowledge in a human being. But the operation of any such capacity requires a transcendental ground for its principle. Meaning is this ground. If the experience of life were nothing but a flux of chaotic and incoherent momentary impressions, the experience of human life as we know it would be utterly impossible. The function of Meaning is what brings coherence in life, i.e., defeats the chaos of the immediate and grounds the substratum for systematic understanding and rational appreciation.

This last point in particular, **appreciation** (*Würdigung*), has especial pertinence for Meaning. The verb *appreciate* and the noun *appreciation* both come from the Latin verb *appreciare*, to value or estimate. The proper Critical contexts of the verb are: *to value; to esteem; to be conscious of the significance, desirability, or worth of; to estimate justly*, as, "we seldom sufficiently *appreciate* the advantages we enjoy." Critical appreciation is *appreciating* in one or more of these contexts. Critical Meaning is the substratum for all specific meanings, and every meaning is *at its roots* practical. The synthesis of practical judgment, in constructing the manifold of rules, can be understood as the act of synthesizing a **value system**, i.e., *legislating appreciation*. The synthesis in continuity of Meaning is essential to who one is and who one chooses to make himself become.

§ 4.4 The Synthesis of Appetition

The next stop in our tour of the cycle of judgmentation is the synthesis of appetition in practical Reason (figure 7.2 again). The synthesis of appetition and its place in pure practical Reason was previously discussed in chapter 3 and illustrated in figure 3.6. Appetite is the Self-determination of the power of the Subject to be cause of something in the future through an act of practical representation. The *parástase* of this act is also called an appetite. The capacity to *make* this representation is called the **appetitive power** of the Organized Being. Figure 7.6 illustrates the 2LAR structure of appetitive power. For detailed explanation of its twelve primitive functions of appetite, I again refer the reader to Wells (2009), this time to chapter 9.

The first thing we can note about appetitive power is the similarity in name of the three functions of Quantity of the act and Quality of the action to the non-primitive functions of Quantity and Quality discussed earlier in Kant's moral categories. However, despite the similarity there is a fundamental distinction between them and it is this: In Kant's moral categories reference




Figure 7.6: 2LAR structure of appetitive power (*Begehrungsvermögen*).




Figure 7.7: The processes of synthesizing appetitions and practical rules and of expressing appetites.

is made to constructs in the manifold of concepts; in appetitive power the functions of Quantity and Quality refer to the relationship between the expression of desiration (form of emotivity) and the structure of practical rules in the manifold of rules. For convenience of reference, figure 7.7 repeats the earlier illustration of figure 3.6, showing the structured linkages among the mental processes in play during Self-determination and the synthesis of appetition. The synthesis of appetitive power has direct linkage only with the manifold of Desires and the manifold of rules.

Note that its linkage with the manifold of Desires extends only to linkage with the *form* of Desire, i.e. desiration judged by teleological reflective judgment, and not with the matter of Desire (desire) judged by aesthetical reflective judgment. Appetitive power quite literally "lacks a sense of aesthetics" and knows no concepts of objects. Practical Reason is, as was said earlier, a cognitively dark and affectively cold process. Its Object is equilibrium under the condition of the practical categorical imperative and nothing else. In this there is no reference at all to any notion of good or evil, thus to any concept of morality, although it is proper to say that there is reference to right and wrong in the limited context of "right for the condition of the categorical imperative" or "wrong for the condition of the categorical imperative." Yet the categorical imperative is only a logical formula that categorically decrees *all activities of the Organized Being are directed to seek and maintain the condition of equilibrium and abolish anything antagonistic to this state of Existenz*. From the Nature of this decree comes the earlier *Realerklärung* of Critical good and evil. The closest objective description of the essence of the practical categorical imperative as expressed by Kant was

Act so that the maxim of your will always can hold good at the same time as a principle of universal legislation. [Kant (1788), 5: 30]

How does practical Reason know any of this *a priori* of any particular act? The answer to this

is so simple as to almost be disappointing: *It doesn't*. Practical Reason in the beginning doesn't have a single rule placed *a priori* in its manifold of rules, and determining judgment in the beginning doesn't have a single concept placed *a priori* in its manifold of concepts. What is present *a priori* is a set of innate sensorimotor reflexes and affective preferences, and these belong to impetuous reflective judgment. Practical Reason *learns how to satisfy the categorical imperative* by doing things and then judging the outcomes of those actions in terms of their effect on the feeling of *Lust per se*. The condition of equilibrium is marked by the negation (loss of consciousness) of the feeling of *Lust per se* and departure or incomplete equilibrium is marked by consciousness of any residual feeling of either *Lust* or *Unlust*.

One can see in this that there was an impressive bit of prescience in Emerson's remark that "none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried." Could one ask for a better illustration that a poet might sometimes be more cognizant of human Nature than a psychologist who is mired in a pseudo-metaphysic of physics-inspired psychology-as-social-science? One might well wonder if our education system grievously errs when it drives the poetry out of the scientist or extinguishes the *Lust* for scientific discovery in the poet. The man will still cherish what the boy learned to love. Paul the Apostle fell a bit short of being correct when he wrote, "when I became a man I put away childish things," even if the man should come by stint of experience to "see through a glass, darkly" as he looks upon the world. On his natal day the child is both scientist and poet. Should we not make it possible for him to remain both?

Appetite is a cause immediately determined by appetitive power. Kant tells us,

Causality is the determination of a cause through which it becomes a cause, or a determination of the Relation of a thing as cause to a determined effect. Thus cause is always to be distinguished from causality . . . The capacity to produce Objects through one's representations is the appetitive power. The appetitive power rests on the first principle: *nihil appeto nisi quod placet, nihil avertō nisi quod displicet*¹⁶. [Kant (1783), 29: 893-894]

The functions of Quantity in appetitive power are functions for the form of rules validated in the determination of an appetite. These forms are the logically singular (rule), particular (maxim) or universal (law). These refer, respectively, to a specific rule scheme in the manifold of rules, a plurality of rules organized under a generalizing rule (the practical maxim) or a practical imperative (practical hypothetical imperative, unconditioned as of yet in the manifold of rules).

Quality in composition of appetitive power is, metaphysically, the matter of rule expression by appetite. Logically, the functions of Quality are practically affirmative (rule of commission), negative (rule of omission) or logically infinite, i.e. subcontrary (rule of exception). The first is a validation of the expression of the manifold of Desires, the second a validation of its non-expression, and the third a validation conditioned by the manifold of practical rules.

The functions of Relation connect the represented appetite to expedience for practical Reason. This expedience may be *intellectual* (expedience *per motiva*), *sensuous* (*per stimulos*) or the organic synthesis of the two (*per liberum*). Kant explained the first two in the following terms:

That which is the cause of appetite is *causa impulsiva*¹⁷ or *elater animi*¹⁸. Now, if they arose from sensibility then they are called *stimuli* and their effect [is called] *appetitio per stimulos*¹⁹ or sensuous appetite. Otherwise they spring from understanding; consequently

¹⁶ "I seek nothing but what seems good, turn away from nothing but what displeases."

¹⁷ impulsive cause

¹⁸ driver of the mind

¹⁹ stimulated appetition

they are called *motiva*²⁰, their action *appetitus per motiva*²¹ or intellectual appetite. [*ibid.*]

Expedience *per liberum* (by freedom) denotes the capacity of the Organized Being to elevate mere sensuous expedience to the status of a maxim for acting on a reasoned judgment of an *idea* as a *principle* of objective happiness.

Lastly, we come to the functions of Modality in appetitive power. *Wish* is the problematic function; it refers to an act of appetitive power responding to a need of Reason without prior knowledge of what will satisfy this need. We could call this the *groping* action of practical Reason. *Choice* is the assertoric function; the action is asserted as a specific realization (making actual) of Reason's regulation of all non-autonomic behavior of the human being. *Will* is the necessitating function, i.e., the Modality of an activity that is not merely asserted but, rather, *made necessary* under a practical tenet in the manifold of rules that the Organized Being has *made for itself* by means of practical judgment.

The process of practical judgment is the harness mate of appetitive power in practical Reason. I earlier remarked that Kant called his moral categories "categories of freedom" but because these are not epistemological primitives they are not *a priori* functions of *nous*. However, the possibility of *thinking* in terms of moral categories *necessarily presupposes* the existence of primitive and *a priori* notions of rule-making. These alone epistemologically merit being called categories of freedom. They are, of course, the primitive functions of practical judgment. Figure 7.8 illustrates the 2LAR structure of practical judgment.

The detailed technical explanation of the categories of freedom occupies a full chapter (chapter 11) in Wells (2009). We need not go into this level of detail to satisfy the purposes of the present treatise for the same reason that it is not necessary to go into the fine technical details of the categories of understanding in determining judgment. It is enough to explain the Nature of the four functionals depicted in the figure.

The manifold of rules is the experience-driven and constructed *value structure* erected by the individual over the course of living his life. One way of looking at the manifold is that it records a history of the sorts of rules the person has found to be *practically expedient* in his past for satisfying the demand for equilibrium dictated by the categorical imperative. This is a very personal, and intimately private, construct specific to each individual. It is even *autistic* inasmuch




Figure 7.8: 2LAR structure of the process of practical judgment.

²⁰ motives

²¹ appetition by motives

the person cannot *communicate* it exactly to another person. This is because practical rules are never made conscious by being presented in sensibility. All that the person can communicate to another person is his speculative *understanding* of the "rules he lives by" as this understanding is constructed in his manifold of concepts by means of *examples* through determining judgment.

The categories of freedom in regard to Quantity specify the forms of composition of rules in the manifold. Every category of freedom has its *Realdefinition* explained from four metaphysical perspectives of epistemology. These have to do with four acroamatic *regulative principles* that govern the functioning of the process of pure Reason. Collectively, these acroams are known as the transcendental Ideas. There is one perspective for each of them, and they are denoted the logical-practical perspective (acroam of Rational Physics), the transcendental-practical perspective (acroam of Rational Psychology), the hypothetical-practical perspective (acroam of Rational Cosmology), and the empirical-practical perspective (acroam of Rational Theology). The *Realdefinitions* of the categories of freedom in regard to Quantity are as follows:

Instinct –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a practical end-in-itself;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the notion of somatic disequilibrium as a trigger for appetite with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of a singular practical rule;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of a problematic congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law;

Appetite of inclination –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of appetite through *stimuli*;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of both somatic and noetic grounds of satisfaction with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of the structure of a maxim;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of assertoric congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law;

Intellectual appetite –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of appetite through motives;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of solely noetic grounds of satisfaction with respect to *Lust per se*;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of the structure of a practical hypothetical imperative;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of apodictic congruence of an action with the Ideal of universal law.

It is easy to observe from these real definitions that the categories of freedom in regard to Quantity are logico-practically linked to the functions of Quantity in appetitive power. Appetites and practical rules are not independent of one another. The form of composition of rules (Quantity) can be properly regarded as constructed *policies of pure Reason*.

The matter of rule composition (Quality) pertains to judging the validity or invalidity of action expressions, i.e. functions for *value assessment*. The *Realdefinitions* of the categories of Quality are as follows:

Validation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, identification of a presentation of reflective judgment as a value;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, a transcendental affirmation of value;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the justification of an act;

- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion that an act is a good choice in serving the categorical imperative;

Invalidation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, differentiating a presentation of reflective judgment by marking part of it as *disvalued* in a particular circumstance;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the transcendental affirmation of a disvalue (= transcendental negation of value);
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, negation of an action through the veto power of pure practical Reason;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion that an act is in opposition to good choice (= an evil choice) in serving the categorical imperative;

Reevaluation –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of contradiction placing value *in an adaptation* of a vetoed action for the purpose of conflict resolution (practical subcontrarity);
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the notion of a practical act of intelligent limitation of an action;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the notion of a cause for ratio-expression accompanied by the veto of an act of motoregulatory expression;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of an act as containing the ground for a purpose in an act of ratio-expression.

An important thing to note here is that the practical notion of reevaluation triggers ratio-expression. To put it bluntly, a person doesn't *think about* (make cognizant) his actions unless he is responding to what more or less amounts to some sort of practical crisis where an act of reflective judgment has come into conflict with the manifold of rules. The notion of reevaluation is the epistemological ground for the conceptualization of ideas, including ideas of moral rules.

The notion of causality is a notion of Relation and so it is not surprising that the categories of Relation in practical judgment pertain to the human being's ability to be *spontaneous*, i.e., to act as his own agent and to Self-determine *all* his own actions, both physical and mental. Throughout this treatise I have written of purposes, ends and means. Perhaps it has already crossed your mind by now that such statements, if they are to be meaningful in any real context, must eventually be grounded in some epistemological *Realdefinition* for each of these terms. Broadly speaking, the notions of Relation in the categories of freedom are the notions that do precisely this task. The *Realdefinitions* of the categories of Relation are:

Maintenance of purpose –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of appetite through rhythmic action expression;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose subsisting in the Relation of the action to the categorical imperative;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of assimilating the acts of reflective judgment in a rule structure;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a final purpose;

Subordination of means to ends –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of appetite through the series of regulations of action expression;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose in the seriation of appetites;

- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of progressive organization of the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a series of efficient causes;

Coordination of rules in a means –

- from the logical-practical perspective, the practical notion of expression of appetite through groupings of rules;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, the practical notion of unity of purpose through reciprocal determinations of appetites;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a tenet organization;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of a determined equilibrium.

If we take the idea of "morality" in the restricted Piagetian connotation that "morality is the logic of actions," then in this restricted sense one can properly say that all practical judgments are "practically moral" judgments, i.e., practical judgments of what is "good" or "right" to do. We see this context exhibited behaviorally in the phenomenon of moral realism. However, it is quite wrong to presume that an individual has any *a priori* or preconceived *objective* ideas about "what is good" or "what is right." What we must replace this ontology-centered presupposition with is a Critical understanding that Modality in practical judgment pertains to the person's *anticipations of goodness (bonitas)* in the matter of connection of his manifold of rules. Again I stress that this is not the anticipation of any specific and objectified "goodness" but merely *how* the structure of the manifold of rules itself legislates what is held-to-be-practically-expedient under the formula of the categorical imperative. The *Realdefinitions* of the categories of Modality are:

***Bonitas problematica* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in the *unexpected* inexpedience of an actual consequence of an action;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, merely problematic judgment of the relationship of Desires with respect to the structure of the manifold of rules;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of the absence of connection between the action and the transcendental Ideal of *summum bonum*;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of the possibility of coherence of satisfaction, expedience, and desire;

***Bonitas pragmatica* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in an inexpedience of anticipation prior to the actual expression of an action;
- from the transcendental-practical perspective, assertoric judgment of coherence or incoherence of Desires with respect to the structure of maxims in the manifold of rules;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of a need to establish the connection of rule in the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the practical notion of the actuality of the coherence or incoherence of satisfaction, expedience, and desire in the structure of the manifold of rules;

***Bonitas moralis* –**

- from the logical-practical perspective, the notion that the act of practical judgment is grounded in conflict originating in the manifold of rules itself;

- from the transcendental-practical perspective, apodictic judgment of a made-necessary coherence or incoherence of Desires with respect to universal practical law;
- from the hypothetical-practical perspective, apperception of a necessitated accommodation of the structure of the manifold of rules;
- from the empirical-practical perspective, the notion of making a necessary coherence among satisfaction, expedience, and desire by means of the structure of the manifold of rules.

The *Realdefinition* of the first Modal category of freedom employs a technical term, *summum bonum*, that we must discuss a bit. This term has a long history of usages in European scholastic theology that do not conform to the principles of Critical metaphysics or of mental physics. The real context of *summum bonum* is that it is an Ideal of pure Reason. Specifically, it is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the conditions demanded by the categorical imperative. It should be obvious by now that the human being has no preconceived idea of what this Ideal is; the judgments that are rendered are negative judgments. This is to say that practical judgment *can* assess when something conflicts with the demands of the categorical imperative but *cannot* pre-determine what will not eventually be found to conflict with it. It would probably be more correct (and easier to understand) if instead of this term we used the term *summum anti-bonum* as the name for this Ideal. However, Kant retained the older term (possibly because of his theocentric bias that we discussed earlier) and to change it now would be to begin unraveling the ties that bind mental physics to Critical metaphysics.

Something that is very important to note about the Modal categories is their essentially "crisis" nature. Each of them is grounded in *inexpedience*, not in expedience. Put another way, practical judgment swings into action "when something is wrong." Invocation of any act of practical judgment means that the equilibrium of the person has been consciously upset and the primitive law of the categorical imperative is, in a manner of speaking, driving him to change his condition. Because the acts of practical judgment *change the manifold of rules* this constitutes nothing less than the person *changing himself*. We are, each of us, the people we have *made ourselves* become. This has a profound implication for making social compacts because at the rock bottom of every such compact we always come up ultimately against those practical tenets that pertain to the person's core *personality* and what he will not merely expect but *require* of any association he chooses to have with others regardless of whether this association be outlaw, criminal or civic.

§ 4.5 Ratio-expression and Speculative Reason

In logical essence, ratio-expression is the evocation of all the processes of *nous* in the cycle of judgmentation. The acts of each process are reciprocally co-determined at every logical step in the processing, and this co-determination is regulated by the process of speculative Reason through a system of acroamatic regulative principles. These transcendental regulations were named *the transcendental Ideas* by Kant. However, it must be clearly understood that the transcendental Ideas are not the innate ideas of rationalist philosophy. Rather, they have objective validity *only* when regarded as regulative principles of the operation of judgmentation in general. In this context, the transcendental Ideas are knowledge; but the knowledge they *present* can only be called "know-how knowledge" – therefore practical knowledge – because they do not immediately pertain to knowledge of *any* objects in Nature. Instead, they are *constitutive* of that class of knowledge. Put another way, the transcendental Ideas are not ideas of ontology but, instead, are *principles of epistemology*. The ground of their objective validity is the Critical metaphysical requirement that the transcendental Ideas are those regulative principles found to be *necessary for the possibility of experience* as human beings come to know experience.




Figure 7.9: 4LAR structure of the system of transcendental Ideas. Each of the 16 regulative functionals operates simultaneously in three Standpoints (one for each process of judgment) for a total of 48 orders of regulative functionals in operation during ratio-expression and judgmentation. The four primary regulative functionals are called the transcendental Ideas of pure Reason. Each Idea pertains to representing a specific class of object-knowledge: physical, psychological, Nature, and Reality. The matter objects (physical and psychological) are called objects of sense; the form Objects (cosmological and theological) are called objects of Reason and are supersensible objects made to be understood conceptually as ideas.

The minimal depiction of the *system* of transcendental regulations requires a 4LAR structure. Figure 7.9 provides the overall depiction of this system. At the 2LAR division of transcendental Ideas we encounter the four *general* Ideas of Critical epistemology: the physical Idea, the psychological Idea, the cosmological Idea, and the theological Idea. Each of these is the governing acroam for a specific division of Critical metaphysics proper – respectively, Rational Physics, Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology²². In terms of regulating human understanding, the general Ideas are Ideas of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. It is sufficient to satisfy the aims of this treatise if we confine the treatment of Kant's theory to this level; the 4LAR breakdown and *Realdefinition* of the Ideas is provided in Wells (2009), chapter 2. The general Ideas are:

1. the physical Idea: unity in the synthesis of appearances; (this is the logical ground for all understanding of objects of outer sense);
2. the psychological Idea: absolute unity of the thinking Subject, i.e., the individual human being who is doing the thinking; (this is the logical ground for all understanding of objects of inner sense);

²² Many people, including me, find Kant's names for Rational Theology and for the theological Idea rather irksome. His choice of names, although conforming to the naming conventions in use by the continental philosophers of his day, can also be regarded as evidence of Kant's theocentric bias. Neither Rational Theology nor the theological Idea pertain to God or religion in any way other than by religious speculation. Rather, the theological Idea is the acroamatic regulation governing how we come to understand things in that context we call Reality-in-general. The Object of the theological Idea is Reality, not God or gods.

3. the cosmological Idea: absolute completion in the series of conditions governing the representation of any object; (this is the logical ground for all systematic understanding of Nature);
4. the theological Idea: absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thinking in general; (this is logically equivalent to *coherence in Reality* and is the logical ground for all systematic understanding of Reality-in-general).

It can be useful to think of these regulative Ideas as "reference gauges" or "control settings" for pure speculative Reason's regulation of mental acts. The Ideas are ***regulations for perfecting*** human understanding and judgment, where we are to understand perfecting as the act of making more perfect (completing). Reason controls the phenomenon of mind; the Ideas are its *laws*.

The overall character of what judgmentation is doing can be adequately understood using the level of abstraction presented by the general Ideas. Each process (block) depicted in figure 7.2 has its own *local* governing acroams and rules of operation. However, each is also regulated, either immediately or mediately, by regulations imposed by acts of ratio-expression and the transcendental Ideas. For example, the process of determining judgment is a capacity of *nous* fully sufficient in itself to carry out the construction of the manifold of concepts, to receive concepts from the process of re-cognition in imagination, and to stimulate sensibility (process of apprehension) by re-introducing concepts into its synthesis via the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. Kant once described the laws of determining judgment as *local* laws of Nature. However, such local laws by themselves are inadequate to deal with comprehension of Nature as a whole. For this, *global* laws are required, and this is what the orientation of determining judgment through the regulation of thinking by speculative Reason provides (refer again to figure 7.2). Bluntly put, the process of determining judgment does not determine *its own* employment. It immediately serves the process of speculative Reason and mediately is *made to serve* the rational purpose of pure practical Reason. The latter is true for imagination, sensibility, and the process of reflective judgment. *Pure Reason is the executive power governing all non-autonomic acts of an Organized Being.*

The essential character of all acts of pure Reason in ratio-expression and the government of the process of judgmentation is conservative in its Nature. We see this made manifest empirically by the characteristics of equilibration human beings exhibit. Adaptation is equilibrium of assimilation and accommodation in human intelligence, and studies in developmental psychology find that this equilibrium is always one that conserves old structures even as it produces new ones and assimilates them *into* the old. Piaget wrote,

[The] only regulator we could assign to the cognitive regulations is an internal one. As their program is not hereditary, their existence can be attributed to mutual conservations inherent in the functional process of the assimilation. . . . [In] dealing with any biological or cognitive system, we must characterize the whole as primordial and not proceed from the assembled parts or the differentiations based on the assembling. Hence the whole possesses a force of cohesion and therefore characteristics of self-conservation which distinguish it from nonorganic physical-chemical totalities. . . . It is a significant fact in all vital and cognitive fields the total form appears more stable than its components. . . . In any cognitive system the laws governing the whole override the changing characteristics of the components. . . . Thus there is no [vicious] circle . . . predicated when we admit that a whole system plays the role of regulator for the subsystems, for it imposes on them an extremely restrained standard: to submit themselves to the conservation of the whole, i.e., to the closing of an interaction cycle, or be carried off in a general dislocation comparable to the death of an organism. . . . Certainly this is merely a functional programming yet it adapts itself to every situation. [Piaget (1975), pp. 22-24]




Figure 7.10: Adaptation of schemes in an equilibrium cycle. (A) Initial cycle in equilibrium. (B) Introduction of a disturbing factor x' that requires adaptation of existing scheme β . The new scheme $[\beta, \beta']$ loses none of its previous ability to assimilate aliment x but gains the ability to assimilate aliment x' .

This logically conservative character makes its appearance on a human being's natal day and persists throughout his life and in all spheres of it: intellectual, social, and affective. Regarded within the scope of this context, humanists who romance about "one's inner child" are, to a limited extent, correct to do so. The man or woman you *are* never entirely lost the boy or girl you *were*. Aspects of that "past person" subsist in the organization of your "present person" because the functioning of the cycle of judgmentation is conservative. Metaphysically, it can be no other way than this because, for each of us, the *I* of transcendental apperception is the *absolute* standard gauge of Reality in determination and judgment of all aspects of one's *Existenz*.

Conservation is effected by adaptation of action schemes (physical and mental). All determinations of human activity occur in cycles of activity, and the process of equilibration is carried out through adaptations in the schemes contained within these cycles. Piaget gave a concise and clear explanation of this [Piaget (1952), pp. 5-7], which figure 7.10 illustrates. Let α , β and γ denote action schemes fed by external aliments x , y and z , respectively. A simple scheme cycle in equilibrium is then mathematically symbolized as

$$\alpha + x \rightarrow \beta; \quad \beta + y \rightarrow \gamma; \quad \gamma + z \rightarrow \alpha; \quad \text{etc.}$$

as depicted in figure 7.10A. Now suppose some disturbing factor alters aliment x , producing a different aliment x' that cannot be immediately assimilated into scheme β . If the Organized Being is able to accommodate scheme β such that x' can be assimilated into a now-differentiated subscheme β' such that $\beta' + y \rightarrow \gamma$, then the equilibrium cycle is restored and the new *scheme-system* $[\beta, \beta']$ achieves the capacity to assimilate x' but *conserves* its previous capacity to assimilate x . Figure 7.10B illustrates this. Embedding field theory calls this *the stability-plasticity condition*.

This adaptation is effected in the manifold of rules by practical judgment. However, in order for this to be possible a great many other things must take place in the judgmentation loop. A new scheme structure, such as β' in this simple example, constitutes a new *meaning* and this in turn presupposes the depiction of a new *meaning implication* in the manifold of Desires along with a

new *symbolic* representation of this depicted in an intuition. But in order for those depictions to take place, speculative Reason must re-orient the activities of determining judgment in order to cause an accommodation in perception. **Motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation.** Reevaluation and ratio-expression in practical Reason sets in motion a global dynamic in *nous* to effect this basic reequilibration task and this is called the **motivational dynamic**. We take up this topic next.

§ 4.6 The Motivational Dynamic in Judgmentation

The theory of the motivational dynamic is covered in Wells (2009), chapter 10. It is useful and worthwhile at this point to remind ourselves of the extent of noetic process involvement at work in this dynamic. Figure 7.11 illustrates this on a gross scale of depiction. In this subsection I will fill in some of the details.

The first thing to note from figure 7.11 is that the synthesis of a new meaning implication calls upon an accommodation to the manifold of concepts effected through the free play of determining judgment, imagination, the synthesis of apprehension, and reflective judgment. During this free play, new intuitions are produced in sensibility and are taken in (via imagination) to the manifold of concepts, where the new concepts are connected by the process of determining judgment. This effects an adaptation of this manifold (as well as a change in the manifold of Desires; however the manifold of Desires is not a structure and so this change is transient and is not an adaptation). In essence this free play amounts to a *groping for equilibrium* activity driven by ratio-expression. It can lead to accommodations in the manifold of rules, but the judgmentation cycle and the motivational dynamic do not close until some new desiration *satisfies* appetite by producing an adaptation that *resolves* the initial rule conflict discovered in the manifold of rules.




Figure 7.11: Noetic and psychic processes in play during the synthesis of the motivational dynamic.




Figure 7.12: Major sequences of logical steps in the synthesis of the motivational dynamic.

Although this synthesis process when viewed in mathematical fine detail can be enormously complicated, owing to the vast number of regulated acts of *nous* possible under the transcendental Ideas²³, the general structure of judgmentation in the motivational dynamic is relatively simple. (I did not say "trivial"; I said "*relatively* simple"). Figure 7.12 provides an overview illustration of this process. During judgmentation:

1. perception of some somato-environmental event or possible circumstance occurs in sensibility;
2. during the synthesis of this perception a manifold of Desires is assembled by impetuous reflective judgment;
3. during the synthesis of appetition, some desiration presented by reflective judgment is evaluated during the synthesis of appetition and, because of this desiration, practical judgment encounters a conflict within the manifold of rules;
4. the resulting disturbance to equilibrium is accompanied by a practical judgment of reevaluation, which
5. triggers ratio-expression aimed at carrying out an adaptation for resolving the conflict in the manifold of rules and restoring equilibrium;
6. speculative Reason is evoked by ratio-expression into re-directing and regulating the stimulation of thinking as a means of accommodating the manifold in perception;
7. determining judgment, brought into play by speculative Reason, initiates cyclic activity

²³ Having 48 distinct major regulations at the 4LAR level is daunting enough to the analyst. However, when 4LAR-level logical functions (*momenta*) are also brought into consideration, the number of distinct types of regulated actions undergoes a combinatorial explosion of up to $3 \times 3^{16} > 100$ million possible acts of regulation. Even cataloging such an array is hopelessly infeasible, which is why mental physics is forced to undertake the development of systems of *applied metaphysics* capable of delivering up procedural and algorithmic methods for mathematically dealing with the complexities of the system. That is, in fact, what we are doing in this treatise. A mental physicist is a *metaphysics engineer*.

in the free play of imagination and understanding by reintroducing concepts into the synthesis of reproductive imagination;

8. imagination alters sensibility (1'), which in turn initiates a new round of synthesis in affective perception (2') and objective perception (7' and 8'); the resulting accommodations in the manifold of Desires brings on a new outer loop of judgmentation; this process continues cyclically, producing accommodations in the manifold of rules, continuation of ratio-expression, and accommodations in the manifold of concepts until eventually either
 - (a) an accommodation of perception, a manifold of Desires and a manifold of rules is produced that satisfied the formula of the categorical imperative and equilibrium is restored, or
 - (b) the cycle goes into rupture (via compensating acts of ignorance) and some new focus of attention and judgmentation is found.

Case 8(b) calls to mind the Freudian doctrine of repression. The Organized Being has failed to find a suitable adaptation for dealing with the disturbance that launched the reevaluation cycle and has instead dealt with the violation of the formula of the categorical imperative by synthesizing a reactive maxim or imperative in the manifold of rules. The accommodated rule structure amounts to *denying* the triggering situation and could be called a kind of "flight response" in ratiocination. As in Freudian theory, this rule construct is unconscious (the manifold of rules is never perceived). Contrary, however, to Freud's theory, it is not correct to ascribe it to an "ego function" (speculative Reason and the free play of determining judgment, imagination, and the synthesis of apprehension) because appetite and practical judgment are more akin to the Freudian notion of the superego. If the repressing maxim is placed high enough in the manifold of rules (and especially if it is made a hypothetical imperative of practical Reason), it can be the seat of a number of psychological neuroses with various severities.

The overall motivational dynamic of judgmentation is describable in 2LAR form. Figure 7.13 presents this structure. It is the Critical basis underpinning human behaviors that have historically led psychologists and neuroscientists to posit the *Dasein* of what is usually referred to as "the motivational state" of mind-brain. It's four 2LAR headings are want, drive, drive state, and type-of-motive. The names of the functions under each of these functionals are, hopefully, sufficiently




Figure 7.13: 2LAR structure of the motivational dynamic.




Figure 7.14: Weaver's model depiction of interpersonal interactions between two people.

descriptive for the reader to appreciate what they do. Detailed technical explanation of each can be found in Wells (2009), chapter 10. The theory of the motivational dynamic is the Critically proper real ground for empirical motivational psychology. That motivation is the accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is its assimilation is its basic animating principle.

§ 5. Judgmentation and Social Compacting

Intuitions produced in sensibility during the judgmentation cycle of figure 7.12 are made symbolic of meanings. To say this is to introduce the idea of semantics into the theory because semantics is the study of meaning in any and all of its manifestations. However, objective validity for a theory of semantics must begin from Critical foundations and, in particular, this means that classical semantics theory (e.g. Tarski, etc.) is irrelevant to mental physics. The mathematical theory of Critical semantics makes up most of the core topics of Wells (2011a) and (2011b).

It is not necessary for the purposes of this treatise to delve deeply into mathematical semantics. What is pertinent to the discussion is the relationship between the synthesis of the motivational dynamic just described and the Nature of human relationships in social situations. It is therefore appropriate to compare the foregoing explanation of judgmentation with the Weaver's model of interpersonal interaction, re-depicted here in figure 7.14 for convenience of referral. Every human being encounters every other human being as an object in physical Nature. Because human beings possess no specious powers of mental telepathy but *are* very keen observers of behavioral nuances (e.g. so-called "body language"), every person-to-person encounter is an exchange in which each person deems himself to be "informed" about the other via an impressive number of sensible communication pathways. It was this "communication" aspect of human interaction that formed the basis for Weaver's 1948 speculation that communication theory, information theory, and semantics are topics that are deeply interlinked, and which led to the development of a formal model of this linkage in Wells (2011c).

A system theorist is often more or less habituated, by the nature of his technical training, to viewing the process of figure 7.12 from a very discretized perspective that tends to lead to thinking of its details in a juxtaposed rather than a syncretic manner. We mean something like

this sort of narrowed focus of attention when we use the old aphorism about not being able to see the forest because of the trees. The Weaver's model of figure 7.14 gives us a "pullback in perspective," from the vantage point of which it becomes easier to take in a more holistic view of the forest. This is an important perspective for understanding the Nature of social compacting.

The first important distinction between the Weaver's model depiction and that of figure 7.12 is that whereas the latter is step-wise and discrete in its description, the former is more properly viewed as a kind of flow process – a perspective of continuum. Put another way, figure 7.12 is more addressed to the Quantity of judgmentation composition while figure 7.14 is more addressed to the Quality of judgmentation composition during the motivational dynamic. In the Weaver's model the synthesis of apprehension, comprehension and the free play of imagination and understanding is called *semantic representing* (representation of meanings *systems* that become "encoded" in a person's manifold of rules and manifold of concepts). The *parástase* of this process is a series of intuitions (in which symbolisms have been invested) connected in an overall totality of representation called a semantic message. A *message* is the persistent object of a succession of appearances that the objective *nexus* depends on for the comprehension of these appearances all in the same intuition²⁴. A *semantic message* is the *parástase* of a message that can be associated with emotivity and ratio-expression by a meaning implication.

An intuition of comprehension, once re-cognized as a concept in the manifold of concepts, has a large sphere of concepts standing under it that gives its object a very wide scope²⁵. Likewise, the affective perceptions accompanying the synthesis of an intuition of comprehension have a wide *nexus* of desires in the connected manifold of Desires. Psychologically, such representations seem to have the flow-like quality William James described in the following words:

I can only define 'continuous' as that which is without breach, crack, or division. . . . The only breaches that can well be conceived to occur within the limits of a single mind would be either *interruptions*, *time-gaps* during which the consciousness went out altogether to come into existence again at a later moment; or they would be breaks in the *quality*, or content, of the thought, so abrupt that the segment that followed had no connection whatever with the one that went before. The proposition that within each personal consciousness thought feels continuous means two things:

1. That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same self;
2. That the changes from one moment to another in the quality of the consciousness are never absolutely abrupt. . . .

[James next provides a number of psychological examples.]

Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. *In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.*

But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and between thoughts all of which alike have this same sense of belonging together, a kind of jointing and

²⁴ An intuition is perceived as a singular representation. However, intuitions can and do contain a manifold of more detailed latent intuitions, and the meaning implication for this gross intuitive *parástase* is made to depend, in part, on the meaning implications that were previously vested in the constituting intuitions in this intuitive manifold when their concepts were re-introduced into the synthesis of apprehension. Critical comprehension denotes representing an object in such a way that representation of this object is sufficient for realizing (making actual) a particular intention.

²⁵ For a more mathematically precise explanation of this, refer to Wells (2009), chapter 6.

separateness among the parts, of which this statement seems to take no account. I refer to the breaks that are produced by sudden *contrasts in the quality* of the successive segments of the stream of thought. If the words 'chain' and 'train' had no natural fitness in them, how came such words to be used at all? Does not a loud explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks in twain? Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object, or change in sensation create a real interruption, sensibly felt as such, which cuts the stream across at the moment at which it appears? Do not such interruptions smite us every hour of our lives, and have we the right, in their presence, still to call our consciousness a continuous stream?

This objection is based partly on a confusion and partly on a superficial introspective view.

The confusion is between the thoughts themselves, taken as subjective facts, and the things of which they are aware. . . . The things are discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before us in a train or chain, making often explosive appearances and rending each other in twain. But their comings and goings and contrasts no more break the flow of thought that thinks them than they break the time and the space in which they lie. . . .

The superficial introspective view is the overlooking, even when the things are contrasted with each other most violently, of the large amount of affinity that may still remain between the thoughts by whose means they are cognized. Into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder *pure* but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it. Our feeling of the same objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from what it would be were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder. The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence; but the *feeling* of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just gone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual concrete consciousness of man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an inkling of anything that went before. [James (1890), vol. I, pp. 237-241]

Comprehension in intuition is the Critical mathematical Object that contains James' point about consciousness, thought, etc. being sensibly continuous (a "stream" or "flow"). The continuity of discrete concepts is a synthesis product (specifically, in the case of temporal or logical series, a polysyllogism). The Critical Logic of this sort of synthesis is presented in Wells (2011d). It is further worthy of note that this point about sensible continuity in league with discrete representation was highlighted by neural network theorist Stephen Grossberg over forty years ago in his pioneering studies on a neural theory of learning:

Properties of discreteness and continuity coexist at every stage of learning. The continuous background is never wholly eliminated. We must study how certain processes superimposed on these backgrounds become increasingly discrete relative to an initially prescribed standard of continuity, and will have at our disposal at least two different levels of dynamical graining such that the degree of continuity of one level takes on a meaning only relative to the degree of continuity of the other. [Grossberg (1969)]

When we consider the *syncretic* character of judgmentation and the motivational dynamic, we find moment-by-moment perceptions, acts of appetite, and behavioral expression are dynamically linked by an overlaying Semantic set, i.e., *a subset of a meaning implications set regulated and delimited by a specific practical maxim in the manifold of rules*. Accommodations in the manifold of Desires and adaptations in the manifolds of concepts and rules are not globally discrete acts but, rather, have a unified direction and orientation under the regulation of speculative Reason and its transcendental Ideas. Those of greatest import for the phenomenon of social contracting involve syntheses of higher-placed maxims, tenets, and even hypothetical imperatives of practical Reason. *This is the character of social interactions that makes possible a*

useful theory of social compacting in the teeth of the overwhelming complexity of and variety in specific possible noetic actions in judgmentation.

To come to a solidly grounded and objectively valid understanding of such a theory, it is not wise to continue at this point with an abstract and primarily mathematical presentation. Rather, we should heed Bacon's dictum and carry out our investigation in a graduated and step-by-step fashion, adding, in his words, "lead weight and ballast to our understanding." Doing so makes up the body of chapter 8.

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