Chapter 12 The Social Contract and *Volks*-society

§ 1. The Ideal of the Social Contract

Any science is a doctrine constituting a system in accordance with the principle of a disciplined whole of knowledge. In Critical epistemology a system is the unity of various knowledge under one Idea. An Idea is a pure concept made up entirely of notions, the Object of which is beyond the horizon of actual experience. This means that that the Object of any science is supersensible, and that means its object is a *noumenon*. A scientific Object: (1) lacks all ontological significance as a *physical* thing; (2) has for its object an object of mathematics; and (3) has no other kind of objective validity than *practical* objective validity [Kant (1783)]. ***Objective validity*** is *the real context of the concept of the object in which the object is valid and is placed under the acroams of Critical epistemology*. Outside of this context the concept lacks objective validity and its object is either non-real or unreal. These acroams are the transcendental Ideas of Critical metaphysics. Practical objective validity is objective validity from the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology. ***Practical*** means *pertaining to actions or to the determination of the appetitive power of a human being*.

The Critical *Realerklärung* of science means that all proper natural sciences are, at their roots, practical doctrines. All real meanings are, at root, practical. A practical doctrine is one that can be *reduced to practice and applied* to phenomenal objects of physical Nature. Any doctrine lacking all practical application to physical Nature has no *real use* to which it can be put and for that reason is called a *useless* doctrine. Aristotle made a fundamental error when he held that sciences could be divided into theoretical sciences and practical sciences. *All natural sciences are both practical and theoretical*. It was Francis Bacon who first got this right:

> Although there is a most intimate connection, and almost an identity between the ways of human power and human knowledge, yet, on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling upon abstractions, it is by far the safest method to commence and build up the sciences from those foundations which bear a relation to the practical division, and to let them mark out and limit the theoretical. . . .
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> We will lay this down, therefore, as the genuine and perfect rule of practice: that it should be certain, free and preparatory, or having relation to practice. And this is the same thing as the discovery of a true form; for the form of any nature is such, that when it is assigned the particular nature inevitably follows. It is, therefore, always present when that nature is present, and universally attests such presence, and is inherent in the whole of it. The same form is of such a character, that if it is removed the particular nature infallibly vanishes. It is, therefore, absent whenever that nature is absent, and perpetually testifies such absence, and exists in no other nature. Lastly, the true form is such, that it deduces the particular nature from some source of essence existing in many subjects, and more known (as they term it) to nature than the form itself. Such, then, is our determination and rule with regard to genuine and perfect theoretical axiom: that a nature be found convertible with a given nature, and yet such as to limit the more known nature, in the manner of a real genus. But these two rules, the practical and theoretical, are in fact the same, and that which is most useful in practice is most correct in theory. [Bacon (1620), II. iv., pp. 111-113]

The Idea representing that unity of knowledge for which a science is the doctrine is called the *topic* of that science. The topic of a science delimits the scope of the objective validity for all the theoretical findings and concepts of that science. When this topic is regarded as an individual thing that thing is called the Ideal of the science. An ***Ideal*** is *an Object by which the human being understands an Idea not merely in concreto but rather as an individual thing determinable through the Idea alone*. The specific topics of all special social-natural sciences, sciences that

pertain to human associations of whatever kind, stand under one Idea containing the notion of social-natural-science-in-general, and that Idea is called ***the Idea of the Social Contract***. Figure 12.1 illustrates the Idea structure of social-natural sciences. There is no *a priori* limit to the number of social-natural sciences possible under the Idea of the Social Contract. For example, education is not currently a recognized science, but there is ample reason to make it one.

The Idea of the Social Contract itself stands under a still-higher Idea, namely the Idea of an entirety of being-a-human-being. For a scientist, something that Alexander Pope wrote has such manifold bearing on and pertinence to his activities as a scientist that he might choose to make it a tenet of his profession:

> Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
> The proper study of mankind is man.
> Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
> A being darkly wise and rudely great:
> With too much knowledge for the skeptic side,
> With too much weakness for the stoic's pride,
> He hangs between; in doubt to act or rest;
> In doubt to deem himself a god or beast;
> In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
> Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;
> Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
> Whether he thinks too little or too much;
> Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd;
> Still by himself abus'd or disabus'd;
> Created half to rise, and half to fall;
> Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
> Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd;
> The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!
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> – Alexander Pope (1688-1744), *An Essay on Man, Epistle II, l. 1*



Figure 12.1: Manifold organization of the topical Ideas of the social-natural sciences.

The Idea of the Social Contract is *contained in* the Idea of every special social-natural science, and the Ideas of all social-natural sciences are *contained under* the Idea of the Social Contract. Thus, *in* the Idea of the Social Contract is contained all those concepts that are common to all social-natural sciences, and in the conceptualization of the Idea of the Social Contract abstraction is made of all concepts by which the social-natural sciences differ from one another. The Idea of the Social Contract is not an innate idea of the rationalists' school of philosophy. If this were the case, then every human being would understand the Social Contract perfectly and this treatise would have been utterly unnecessary. Standing at the very horizon of possible experience, its object is a *noumenon*, its concept a mathematical idea, and the context of its objective validity subsists in principal quantities of Critical mathematics by which the Idea is connected to sensible phenomena of Nature.

Regarded as a thing, the Idea of the Social Contract is a mathematical Ideal. As such, it can be formally *defined* because it is a made concept, originating as an unintended and accidental by-product of the motivational dynamic in human mental Nature. To what use does the power of Reason and the process of judgmentation put this Idea? The answer to this question is in one way extraordinarily simple and in another it is sublime: the Social Contract is an Object of perfection for the person's rational Self-determination of how to achieve that gossamer goal of an extended St. Martin's summer many of us come to call *the good life*. As an Object of perfection, it cannot be anything other than an orientation and direction for choices of appetitive power. The theoretical application of the Social Contract has none other than practical objective validity as a regulating principle of choices in a social environment.

Chapter 11 devoted a good deal of effort to examining the phenomena of social contracting. Now, all social contracting phenomena are empirical appearances. As such, their causality and dependency Relations can only be understood in terms of *physical* causality and dependency. Mathematically, this subsists in those forms of differential equations peculiar to causal and state-determined successions of appearances in time. The Social Contract *noumenon*, in contrast, is an Object whose *Existenz* is grounded in human Self-determination and for which all understanding of its causality and dependency Relations is *teleological* causality and dependency. This is represented mathematically in the form of integral equations that are constrained, by meta-physical requirements of Critical epistemology, to be such that the form of the equation obeys Margenau's Law. Consequently, the Social Contract is therefore *an optimization principle for the motivational dynamic* of human reasoning. All optimization principles contain: (1) a standard of optimization; (2) a process of optimization; (3) an Object that contains the idea of an object being optimized; and (4) an ideal[1], i.e., representation of a perfect instantiation of that idea.

The acroamatic constraint placed on the mathematical form of the Social Contract in regard to causality and dependency Relations means that, at every particular moment in time, regulation by the Idea specifies not an entire trajectory of Self-determination in the process of judgmentation but, instead, a differential of change – a *velocity* (direction and speed) if you will – for the process of the motivational dynamic. Out of the unlimited number of mathematically possible differential changes of motivational dynamic, the Idea specifies one in particular, namely, one that over the course from start to equilibrium optimizes the manner in which a practical purpose of pure Reason is actualized (made real). System theorists call this ***adaptive dynamic programming***.

The task immediately before us is to understand what purpose it is that the regulation of the process of pure Reason is aiming to realize and perfect. The task that immediately follows this first one is to understand *how* that perfecting is attempted. These speak directly to the matter and form of the Idea of the Social Contract.

[1] An ideal is an Object that exhibits in its representation *in concreto* the most perfect instantiation of an idea.

§ 2. The Concepts of Order and Progress

In undertaking these tasks, I continue to follow the procedural guidance of Aristotle's *dictum* that is employed throughout this treatise. We are seeking to understand a practical purpose, and that practical purpose must be understood in a manner that finds common exhibition in experience for all phenomena of actions occurring in the intercourses of civil association found in the divers social environments of man's experience.

Now, in all manifestations of actual *civil* association there is always found to be some *practical notion* of civil governance subsisting in human social interactions that are *actually civic*. A ***civic interaction*** is an operationalized social transaction between two persons in which each person is Self-regulating his action expressions on grounds of practical tenets or maxims that exhibit in the person's expressed behaviors a form of *obligatione interna* inherent in his behavior that can only be understood in relationship to a condition of some *obligatio externa* and some practical maxim of active pledging. Furthermore, although each of the transacting persons might hold to different practical maxims as well as to a different *obligatione interna* and a different condition of *obligatio externa*, the manners in which these are expressed are such that the individuals' actions seem mutually compatible in the semantic representations of each person. It matters not if their practical manifolds and their manifolds of concepts are not identical; what matters is that each perceives the social interaction *in appearance* as being mutually compatible. Thus, it is objectively valid to say that civic interaction exhibits the *Dasein* of some kind of practical co-determined governance regardless of howsoever unstated, vague and temporary this mutual governance might be. From the theoretical Standpoint it is objectively valid to regard governance as mutually co-determined Self-regulation of individuals' action expressions during civic interactions. Its exhibition in the simplest forms is called ***cooperation***.

Civic behavior, consequently, is the *real ground* for positing the *Dasein* of mutually co-determined governance in play between interacting persons, and for positing the *Dasein* of some *noumenal* social compact between them. Their individual action expressions are said to be *tolerable to* the other person. Governance, regarded again from the judicial Standpoint, is a set of co-determining emotivity operationalizations that characterize leader-follower dynamics purposively aimed at maintaining and perfecting a relationship of civil Community among a group of persons.

It follows from this *Realerklärung* that *uncivic* interaction is a real ground for positing the *Dasein* of a state-of-nature mutual relationship between persons at least insofar as the particular transaction is concerned. Suppose that you and I happen to meet on the street and I greet you by calling you some name that you judge to be personally offensive, insulting and intolerable by your practical maxims of Self-respect. Let us further suppose that you respond to this by punching me right in the mouth. Let us further suppose I intended no insult and was merely being bantering and flippant (a behavior I am known to exhibit). Your unanticipated (by me) behavioral expression is such that I *immediately* become cognizant that, at least at this particular moment, a state-of-nature relationship exists between us. If I further recognize your behavior was stimulated by my action – in this case, an unsuccessful leader's action on my part – and I desire to reestablish a civic relationship between us because I have also become cognizant that I have just committed a deontological moral fault, my next transactional operationalization is going to come *actio invita* in the form of an abject apology. If you find that acceptable and express this acceptance, I will then think that justice has been served and the rupturing of our social compact is healed. If not . . . well, that's a different social situation altogether. You might find it instructive at this point to compare this little hypothetical vignette with the Weaver's model of two-person interaction that is illustrated by figure 12.2 once more. The point of making this comparison is to reinforce the concept that interpersonal transactions of all kinds are effected by judgments of semantics.



Figure 12.2: Weaver's model of two-person interactions.

Governance in one or more forms, and either tacitly or explicitly instituted, is a necessary mark of every civil Community and always implicates the *Dasein* of a social compact of some sort. When it is explicitly instituted it is usually called a government. When its institution is tacit it is generally called moral custom (*Sittlichkeit*) if it is given any name at all. "Men must be governed" is an ancient and venerable aphorism but the statement is nonetheless untrue. It would be true if it were recast "men are governed" because all persons are governed in twofold fashion by: (1) Duties to themselves; and (2) Duty and Obligation incurred when different people unite themselves in any sort of social compact. A ***social compact*** is *any agreement between individuals pertaining to association with each other in a state of Community*.[2] It does not matter if the terms of such a compact are merely tacitly understood (such understanding always being the product of experience) or is formally codified (as in a *legal contract*).

I think it is likely true that most people would prefer entirely tacit governance if such were practicably feasible in their general social environment. Montesquieu wrote,

> There are two sorts of tyranny: one real, which arises from oppression; the other is seated in opinion, and is sure to be left whenever those who govern establish things shocking to the existing ideas of a nation. . . . Mankind are influenced by various causes: by the climate, by the religion, by the laws, by the maxims of government, by precedents, morals, and customs; whence is formed a general spirit of nations.
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> In proportion as, in every country, any one of these causes acts with more force, the others in the same degree are weakened. . . . Should there happen to be a country whose inhabitants were of a social temper, open-hearted, cheerful, endowed with taste and a facility in communicating their thoughts; who were sprightly and agreeable; sometimes imprudent, often indiscreet; and besides had courage, generosity, frankness, and a certain notion of honor, no one ought to endeavor to restrain their manners by laws, unless he would lay a constraint on their virtues. If in general the character be good, the little foibles that may be found in it are of small importance.
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> It is the business of the legislature to follow the spirit of the nation when it is not contrary

[2] The word "compact" derives from the Latin word *compactum*, an agreement.

> to the principles of government; for we do nothing so well as when we act with freedom and follow the bent of our natural genius. . . . Let them but leave us as we are, said a gentleman of a nation which had a very great resemblance to what we have been describing, and nature will repair whatever is amiss. She has given us a vivacity capable of offending, and hurrying us beyond the bounds of respect: this same vivacity is corrected by the politeness it procures, inspiring us with a taste of the world . . . Let them leave us as we are; our indiscretions joined to our good nature would make the laws which should constrain our sociability not at all proper for us. [Montesquieu (1748), pp. 293-295]

That complete *laissez-faire* governance has limits to its practicability is nothing more and nothing less than a lesson of experience shown most prominently when the social environment involves more than just a few people. *Laissez-faire* governance is the governance of personal friendship and is entirely instituted by the *Sittlichkeit* that co-develops as friendships do.

As the degree of friendship lessens in interpersonal relationships, less reliance can be placed on the tacit governance of *Sittlichkeit* and more must be placed on formal or explicit covenant. This is the genesis of institutions of govern*ment*. Authors as different in temperament as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Paine, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Emerson, and Thoreau all have their precepts of why human beings come to institute governments (and many of their special precepts are resolutely rejected by other people), but perhaps Hobbes came close to laying a hand on the social-natural cause of this when he wrote,

> The final Cause, End, or Design of men (who generally love Liberty and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Commonwealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of War, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shown) to the natural Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe . . . For the Laws of Nature (as *Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy*, and (in sum) *doing to others as we would be done to*,) of themselves, without the terror of some Power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural Passions that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. [Hobbes (1651), pg. 102]

Hobbes, like Machiavelli and Hamilton, often seems to have had a rather low opinion of other people, but such a view is not entirely unsanctioned by experience, and Pollyanna-like innocence running to the opposite extreme point of view is clearly gainsaid in experience. If we compare Montesquieu and Hobbes and look to extract from their theories the common factor of practical benefit found in all governance, we find it in two Objects that Mill properly identified [Mill (1861)]: Order and Progress. ***Order*** is *an Object subsisting in the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good people deem to already actually exist* (have actual *Existenz*). ***Progress*** is *an Object subsisting in increasing the kinds and amounts of good people deem to be possible to realize* (make actual). Both Objects are Ideals. In Critical epistemology, ***good***, understood in the positive context, is *the Object of practical Reason by which an object is represented as a necessary object of appetitive power*[3,4]. ***Good per se*** is an Object understanding both the realizing of positive good and the anti-realizing of negative good (evil)[5]. It is an Ideal and a *noumenon*.

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[3] Negative good is called ***evil***. The distinction is that evil is a practical Object of repugnance, i.e., the determination of appetitive power is directed to the actualizing the object's non-*Existenz*.

[4] In the context of the manifold of concepts, an Object of practical Reason is an Object the concept of which originated from acts of ratio-expression and not from receptivity of the senses. Practical Reason *per se* understands rules, not Objects, in the manifold of rules. All Objects of practical Reason are *noumena*.

[5] In practical perspective, ***to realize*** is to make actual the *Existenz* of an object; ***to anti-realize*** is to abolish or negate the actual *Existenz* of an object.

The making of a friendship is a social dynamic of cooperative actions whose Object stands under the general Object of Progress. The maintenance of a friendship is a social dynamic of cooperative actions whose Object stands under the general Object of Order. The same is true for the original instituting of a government (a social dynamic that stands under Progress) and for the maintenance of institutions of government (a social dynamic that stands under Order[6]). Order and Progress do not stand under the idea of government; that idea stands under them. They do, on the other hand, stand under the idea of governance in the theoretical Standpoint of epistemology. The concept of governance is a higher mark of recognition for both Progress and Order.

Mill wrote that the principal element of good government is "the improvement of the people themselves." Epistemologically, this is true but it is also incomplete. It is a principal factor for *the evaluation of good vs. bad governance*, i.e., governance insofar as the dynamic is conducive to or antagonistic to Order and Progress. But in what context or in what understanding are we to take the phrase "the improvement of the people themselves"?

Here the social-natural answer is unequivocal. The reason people make social compacts, the *grounding purpose* of the action, is to make more complete (act to perfect) individual *Personfähigkeit* (power of a person). A person's friends and his associates in civil Community benefit his *Personfähigkeit* by Relation, i.e., they *contribute to* his liberty in acquiring and keeping a significant fraction of his tangible power, and without them he finds his natural liberty to perfect his intellectual power and his physical power severely curtailed by lack of tangible power. Improvement (perfecting) his *Personfähigkeit* serves Order in the context of preserving all the sorts of goods he deems himself to already possess, and it serves Progress in the context of increasing and expanding them. A person *per se* is never another person's tangible *asset*, but his *actions* of cooperation and assistance *produce the sorts of intangible goods (benefits)* necessary for an individual to gain the liberty to acquire (Progress) or to keep (Order) assets of tangible power. Among all such assets, one of the most important of all – and, strangely enough, one of the most often overlooked – is the person's *stock-of-time*. The stock-of-time asset is one of such great importance for *Personfähigkeit* that I will discuss it in its own right in the next section.

It would be wrong (short-sighted) to presume one's friends and civil associates contribute *only* to Relation in *Personfähigkeit*. They make contributions both directly and indirectly to a person's physical power (Quantity) through, e.g., such direct actions as caregiving when a person suffers from an illness or traumatic injury, and by indirect ones such as laboring to produce or distribute medicines and devices that improve health and safety in the Community. Allies in civil Community likewise make direct contribution to each others' physical power through mutual defense against threats and enormities from people and other factors outside the Community.

They make contributions both directly and indirectly to a person's liberty to perfect his intellectual power (Quality). An example of a direct contributor is a teacher. Common indirect contributions are: (1) made by consequences of others' actions that liberate the person to expend a portion of his stock-of-time, which he would otherwise not be at liberty to so expend, on study, contemplation, and meditation; and (2) by providing ministrations (e.g., love, comradeship) that benefit his affective well-being.

They contribute indirectly to a person's perfecting of his power of persuasion (Modality). This happens through part of his experience in communal living because this experience provides him

[6] A somewhat interesting phenomenal byproduct of this is that people whose personality style is primarily Amiable tend to be the most conscientious of bureaucrats, a vocation not commonly associated with the contexts of the word "amiable." To notice this it is important to keep in mind that the function of a bureaucrat is not to *make* legislation but to *implement* it. In contrast, Analytics tend to be the most conscientious *legislators* when some clear objective is specified. Both vocations communally serve the purpose of Order. Drivers and Expressives tend to be poor bureaucrats and poor legislators in regard to these actual *tasks*.

with knowledge of what works, what does not work, and what sometimes works and sometimes does not for his successful pursuit of happiness. Thus, along with tangible power, one's friends and civil associates *provide intangible resources* by which he is able to maintain (Order) and expand (Progress) his liberty to perfect *Personfähigkeit*. Without them and the assistances they provide, he finds his life to be, as Hobbes said, "nasty, brutish and short."

§ 3. Stock-of-time

Of all a person's many asset-factors that taken together comprise his *Personfähigkeit*, the one asset-factor of greatest pertinence to the general Idea of the Social Contract is the one I call his stock-of-time. Other asset-factors have great pertinence in specific contexts of specific social situations. Asset-factors pertaining to a person's physical power are, in greatest degree, most pertinent to his Duties-to-Self considering that when a person's physical power is completely spent it means that he is dead. Asset-factors of physical power do affect numerous phenomenal aspects of whatever social contract or contracts the person binds himself to. They do have great pertinence for empirical sociology as a social-natural science. But insofar as the general Idea of the Social Contract is concerned it is sufficient to merely note that physical power *in its entirety* is one of the prime motivating factors for entering into social contracts but the *specific* asset-factors taken individually are each relatively minor factors in their pertinence to the Idea of the Social Contract. Asset-factors pertaining to a person's intellectual power have greater pertinence for the possibilities of different instantiations of Communities. But it is a person's *entire faculty* of intellectual power that imposes limitations on the extent to which he commits to Obligation and the extent of his liberty to carry out Duties *sufficiently to avoid* conflicts between Duty-to-Self and reciprocal Duty likely to lead to his making a decision to become a criminal. Similarly, the person's entire faculty of persuasive power limits Obligations of citizenship that others can reasonably expect him to assume under social contract, but, again, the individual asset-factors of persuasive power each have only very minor overall pertinence.

So, too, it is for the asset-factors of a person's tangible power save only his stock-of-time. This asset-factor is truly unique and the way in which a person expends it has fundamental effects that impact every facet of his liberty to perfect his *Personfähigkeit*. If we liken the way a person manages Order and Progress in perfecting his *Personfähigkeit* to the idea of the way economic systems work, the asset-factor of stock-of-time would play a role like that of money in the sense that stock-of-time can be regarded as a sort of "economic lubricant" for "the economics of living." The *principal specific benefit* association in a civil Community provides for every individual is the husbandry it affords him in the management and deployment of his personal stock-of-time.

§ 3.1 The Idea of Stock-of-goods

Stock-of-time is a stock-of-goods asset-factor. The origin in experience for a mathematical definition of the general idea of stock-of-goods comes from social-natural economics. Synthesis of this idea is made by inferences of induction in applying the economic idea to a broader scope of social situations. The idea of stock-of-goods is a made concept, therefore belongs to mathematical facet B of human understanding, and its general object is a *noumenon*.

Smith (1776) did not provide a specific definition for the idea of stock, probably because he assumed the term would be readily understood by everyone. In point of fact, the word *stock* derives from the Anglo Saxon words *stoc* or *stocc* and originally meant a stem, stick or block. Webster's Dictionary contains 26 different definitions for the noun "stock," and every one of them is a tightly specialized usage. To obtain the pertinent context for the noun we must look to the verb forms of "stock" and even there we find 7 definitions of the transitive verb. The one that is pertinent for the context of this treatise is

> **stock**, *v.t.*, 3. to keep or put in a supply of for sale or for future use.

It follows that stock is that which is kept or put in a supply of for sale or future use. How we ever got from "a stick" to the definitions that accord with this one is one of the English language's little mysteries.

Judging from comparing the descriptions applied to the term "stock" in various introductory economics textbooks, e.g. Lipsey & Steiner (1969), and the chain of not-entirely-consistent definitions in Bannock *et al*. (2003), the word "stock" apparently isn't as self-apparent to economists as Smith seems to have expected. The definition I use here, which is consistent with Smith's usages of the term, is:

> **stock** is an accumulation of economic goods.

An ***economic good*** is ***any physical object (tangible good), rendered economic service (kinetic intangible good), or capacity for rendering an economic service (potential intangible good) that can be exchanged for something else***. An economic good is called a "good" because it is "good for something." Specifically, it can be exchanged for something else. The addition of the idea of a potential intangible good (capacity for rendering a service) is a generalization that goes beyond the usages of the term "economic good" in present-day economics but nonetheless does account for a logically essential economic factor that modern economists tend to overlook or to think about as something other than an economic good. Without this factor one of the principal premises of economics, the idea of *scarcity of resources* (which makes economic systems *closed* systems), is violated. Economists are implicitly cognizant of the *Dasein* of potential intangible goods when they refer to such things as a "labor shortage." Their failure to *explicitly* recognize the *Dasein* of potential intangible goods is merely a case of practitioners being sloppy in the way they use mathematics.

The idea of rendering an economic service is the practical *Realerklärung* of the term ***laboring***. In general context, ***to labor*** is to render an economic service, i.e., to do something in such a way that either this action or the produce of this action (a tangible good) can be exchanged for something else. An ***economic service*** is the action that the person performs as a means of realizing (making actual) an economic good.

The phrase "economic service" can be abbreviated to simply "service" when the economic context of the usage is clear. Likewise, the word "commodity" can be used as a synonym for an economic good when the economic context of its usage is clear. The noun "labor" has a twofold set of usages. The first is as a synonym for any group of people who render economic services, and a "laborer" is any person who is regarded as part of such a group. The second is as a synonym for the economic service a laborer provides. For purposes of technical clarity, I use the term ***Labor*** to mean the first usage and the term ***labor*** to mean the second. Understood in this practical context, every person employed in a commercial entity, from its chief officer to its lowest-ranked provider of an economic service, is a laborer in a community of Labor.

The frequently-encountered division of employees in a commercial entity into "management and labor" is an utterly fictitious division and tends to indicate that the commercial entity is governed by monarchy/oligarchy. "Management and labor" is nothing but a logical division in which laborers designated as belonging to "management" are regarded as the nobility in what practically equates to an economic feudal system. Andrew Carnegie, whose life resembled in a number of metaphorical ways tales of the lives of some of the famous Viking kings (minus any actual splitting of skulls with an ax), wrote,

> One great source of the trouble between employers and employed arises from the fact that

> the immense establishments of today, in which alone we find serious conflicts between capital and labor, are not managed by their owners, but by salaried officers who cannot possibly have any permanent interest in the welfare of the working-men. These officials are chiefly anxious to present a satisfactory balance sheet at the end of the year, that their hundreds of shareholders may receive the usual dividends, and that they may therefore be secure in their positions and be allowed to manage the business without unpleasant interference either by the directors or shareholders. It is notable that bitter strikes seldom occur in small establishments where the owner comes into direct contact with his men, and knows their qualities, their struggles, and their aspirations. It is the chairman, situated hundreds of miles away from his men, who only pays a flying visit to the works and perhaps finds time to walk through the mill or mine once or twice a year, that is chiefly responsible for the disputes that break out at intervals. [Carnegie (1886)]

This and various other articles and comments by Carnegie hint at the contempt he apparently felt (as a monarch) for the *hirdmen* who ran not only his Carnegie Company but other giant American companies of his day as well [Carnegie (1920); Nasaw (2006)].

The social-natural significance of the concept of stock-of-goods was a topic Smith devoted a great deal of attention to in *Wealth of Nations*. He wrote,

> When the division of labor has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labor can supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labor, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labor as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becoming in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society.
>
> But when the division of labor first began to take place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The former consequently would be glad to dispose of, and the latter to purchase, a part of this superfluity. But if this latter should chance to have nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made between them. . . . In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labor, must naturally have endeavored to manage his affairs in such a manner as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. [Smith (1776), pp. 19-20]

The by-far-most-popular historical solution to this problem was, of course, the invention of money. But although this is a popular solution, it is by no means the only one and, since the days when the Industrial Revolution began, it can be argued that it is not the most *common* solution. The latter, it can be argued, is where an individual hires himself out as a laborer rendering an economic service to some other person, group of persons, or to some nominally defined entity (a commercial community represented by an idea). He most commonly exchanges his labor for a payment of money, true enough, but the key point is that what *he* brings to the exchange is *himself* as the provider of an economic service.

There are different ways and means by which a person utilizes his stock-of-goods. These are distinguished by specific technical terms. Smith wrote,

> In that rude state of society in which there is no division of labor, in which exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides everything for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated or stored up beforehand in order to carry on the business of the society. Every man endeavors to supply by his own industry his own

> occasional wants as they occur. . . .
>
> But when the division of labor has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of a man's own labor can supply but a very small part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce of other men's labor, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchase cannot be made till such a time as the produce of his own labor has not only been completed but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore, must be stored up somewhere sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work till such time, at least, as both these events can be brought about. . . . This accumulation must, evidently, be previous to applying his industry for so long a time to such a peculiar business. . . .
>
> When the stock which a man possesses is no more sufficient to maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavors by his labor to acquire something which may supply its place before it be consumed altogether. His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labor only. This is the state of the greater part of the laboring poor in all countries.
>
> But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or years, he naturally endeavors to derive a revenue from the greater part of it; reserving only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is distinguished into two parts. That part which, he expects, is to afford him this revenue is called his capital. The other is that which supplies his immediate consumption; and which consists of either, first, in that portion of his whole stock which was originally preserved for this purpose; or, secondly, in his revenue, from whatever source derived, as it gradually comes in; or, thirdly, in such things as had been purchased by either of these in former years, and which are not yet entirely consumed; such as a stock of clothes, household furniture, and the like. In one, or other, or all these three articles, consist the stock which men commonly reserve for their own immediate consumption.
>
> There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed so as to yield a revenue or profit to its employer. First, it may be employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer while it either remains in his possession or continues in the same shape. The goods of a merchant yield him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, and it is only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges, that it can yield him any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating capitals.
>
> Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade, or in such-like things as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters or circulating any further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals. [*ibid*., pp. 241-244]

Understanding these technical distinctions – between consumption stock-of-goods and capital stock-of-goods, as well as the distinction between circulating capital stock-of-goods and fixed capital stock-of-goods – are crucial for understanding social-natural economics. They are likewise crucial to understanding social-natural economic environments and situations. There is one other crucial technical distinction as well, one Smith did not point out here, in regard to consumption stock-of-goods. This is the distinction between what I call ***non-liable consumption stock-of-goods*** and ***liable consumption stock-of-goods***. The first division, other than for some technical nuances we can safely relegate to the fine details of social-natural economics, is easy enough to comprehend. It consists of that portion of the person's consumption stock-of-goods we commonly say he "owns free and clear." Other persons have no acknowledged right to them, *ceteris paribus*, and he is at liberty to consume them howsoever he chooses without regard to any other person.

The second division, liable consumption stock-of-goods, is also easily apprehensible. It consists of consumption stock-of-goods obtained by one person's entering into some obligation to another person such that this other person is granted a legal warranty, *by that first person*, to some portion of his net stock-of-goods. In simple language, these are economic goods the person has obtained by means of a *debt obligation*. Whenever you borrow money from some other person, you are entering into a social compact and Self-assuming a debt obligation. You are, in effect, *giving up the ownership of some part of your stock-of-goods and transferring this ownership to the other person*[7]. It matters not in the least that the stock-of-goods in question might remain in your own physical possession. You have transferred your civil right to possess them to the lender. You have granted the lender a civil liberty, subject to whatever the specific terms of the contract are, to come and seize them at his discretion. You have also granted him a civil liberty to use force to effect a seizure in the event you resist it[8]. You have freely alienated a part of *your* civil liberty in exchange for liable consumption stock. Like it or not, *that* is the deontological social reality of the situation and it underscores one of the many real consequences of social contracting.

In the Great Britain of Smith's day it was nearly impossible for most people to obtain a loan for purposes of obtaining liable consumption stock, other than through the "good offices" of a loan shark. The usual penalty for being unable to repay a debt was debtor's prison, a legal penalty not free of injustice because it drew no distinction between a moral fault and a moral crime in regard to the reason a borrower was unable to meet his debt obligation[9]. How, then, was it possible for a typical young person just starting out on his own to, as Smith put it, store up an initial stock of consumption goods that would see him through until such time as his industry was able to supply him sufficiently with a revenue of goods to sustain himself? The answer, in Britain as well as in America from the colonial period until well into the 19th century, was *to sell himself* by making an agreement (a social contract) with another person in that peculiar institution of indentured servitude known as an apprenticeship. Adams and Vannest wrote,

> For the most part the free white worker in colonial days was an artisan or a journeyman. When young he was an apprentice working at his master's side and usually living in his master's home as a member of the family. When older, he worked for himself. [Adams & Vannest (1935), pg. 656]

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[7] For purposes of simplicity of discussion, I am going to ignore the fine point of the case where you borrow by means of the agency of some nominal entity such as a bank. Behind every loan there is, somewhere, some one or more specific people who originally fronted the money as circulating capital stock-of-goods and to whom will eventually return some circulating capital stock-of-goods indirectly obtained from *you*.

[8] If you do attempt to resist it in knowing violation of the terms you previously agreed to by any means other than by persuading the lender to agree to alter the original terms of the contract, then you are guilty of committing a moral crime and you are a criminal. The lender is under *no deontological obligation to agree* to changing the terms. I'm sorry to have to tell you this, but however much sympathy I might feel for you and a situation into which you may have gotten yourself, this is no more and no less than a deontological reality of social contracting. You have no deontological right to blame anyone but yourself for the situation. Every one of us *is* the person he *chooses* to become.

[9] In Smith's day as in ours many people were ignorant of social-natural economics (Smith had, after all, just written the first book on the topic), were foolish or lacked the intellectual power to prudently husband their own stock-of-goods, or simply were victims of some unforeseeable economic casualty. The injustice of the British system of debtor's prison was that it ignored the following: in a deontologically civil Community, it is a Duty of every citizen to aid a citizen-victim of a casualty and to forgive a moral fault subject to the condition that restitution is made. In our case, the lender must not be made to suffer from an unjust action. If there is no other way to accomplish this short of the entire Community contributing from their individual stocks-of-goods, then it is the Duty of every citizen, including the debtor, to ante up his justly proportioned or negotiated share. This is because every citizen has taken upon himself an Obligation ***to defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate*** [Rousseau (1762), pg. 13].

According to Tocqueville, the typical young person began his apprenticeship at fifteen years of age. The terms of this social contract generally provided him with his room and board, with a measure of family-like comradeship, and perhaps just enough revenue for himself so that when the time came he would be able to set up on his own. In exchange, he was committed to work for his master as his master directed for as long as the terms of the contract required. It was not unknown for a boy's family (specifically, his father) to arrange his apprenticeship and require the youngster to do it (which was outright serfdom), but it was also not unknown for a young person to make this arrangement all on his own (which was a free and civic social contract).

The Industrial Revolution would soon bring about a fundamental change of circumstances, and one which, as history played out, was in the main deontologically *uncivil* (although, as it happens, it did not have to come out this way; it just did). The principal social difference was the disappearance of the civic relationship between master and laborer in the economic environment. Adams and Vannest wrote,

> The factory system in itself has had many effects. The household system required practically no capital. A shoemaker, for example, could work in his own house or, as he frequently did, at that of his customer with a few simple tools and the leather for a pair or two of shoes. The shoe factory calls for the outlay of capital for buildings, machinery, large stocks of material, and credit to customers. Only those who have a fair amount of capital already can start such an enterprise. But, when started, they can far undersell the individual shoemaker. Even the early machine for making shoes could turn out 600 pairs a day.
>
> The individual craftsman thus found himself in many lines unable to compete with the capitalist manufacturer, and had to become a worker in his factory, while the capitalist made more capital rapidly by the use of his machinery. The shoemaker saw his customers buying the cheaper machine-made shoes and had little choice but to become a wage earner instead of having his own little trade. The hours he would have to work, the wages he would get, the conditions in the factory would all be beyond his control unless all the workers were so organized as to be on equal terms with the capitalists in bargaining.
>
> Before the machine age began, almost all Americans had enjoyed or had the chance of enjoying, a reasonable degree of economic independence. The rise of the mill, the factory, and the great industrial plant meant the simultaneous rise of a great class of workers who in time would become dependent on the wages allowed them by capitalists or corporations. [*ibid*., pg. 650]

It is not empty rhetoric to call the Industrial Revolution a revolution. In England, where the Industrial Revolution began, these conditions appeared before they did in America, and were present in Smith's day. Andrew Carnegie's father was one of those small craftsmen who lost his little independent trade to factory competition. This was the principal and perhaps the only reason the Carnegie family emigrated from Scotland to America when Carnegie was twelve years old. He was barely thirteen in 1848 when he began working twelve hours a day as a bobbin boy in a mill for the current-wage-equivalent of $1.82/hour.[10]

What the pre- and post-Industrial Revolution periods have in common is that most people in

[10] Modern myth notwithstanding, Carnegie's story is not a rags-to-riches story. His family was certainly not affluent, but neither were they ever destitute. By any accepted measure, young Carnegie exhibited extra-ordinary ability in terms of his intellectual power and power of persuasion, which he used to rise from lower-income laborer to become, in 1901, the world's richest man. At age 17 he was earning 50% more than present day laborers age 15-24 who occupy a comparable education bracket to what his was in 1852. In 1855 he became a capitalist (using money obtained for him by his mother from mortgaging their house). By the end of 1868 his net worth was equivalent to $40 million in today's dollars. Carnegie was 33 years old. [Wells (2010), chap. 11, pp. 436-439]

Western civilization had no resources at the start of their working careers other than themselves, with the support of their families, for establishing an initial stock-of-goods. This remains largely true today. It is not unusual that a young person finds himself driven to incur some amount of debt obligation when starting out; even Carnegie resorted to this in order to be able to make his first capital investment[11]. What has changed significantly in the United States over the past forty years is the increase in the amount of spending on liable consumption stock-of-goods Americans have been encouraged, and have made it a habit, to make.



Figure 12.3: Total (red) and revolving (blue) U.S. consumer credit outstanding in billions of dollars. Source: *Federal Reserve Bulletin*.



Figure 12.4: A – U.S. average per capita income (dollars). B – U.S. population (millions). Sources: (A) U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; (B) U.S. Census Bureau.

[11] In the mid-1960s the Great Society legislation passed by the U.S. government did establish a program of low-interest student loans for the purpose of helping more young people attend college. In addition, there were other financial aid programs established as well. The latter were open only to young people whose families had incomes below a specified level. Both are still available today. The student loan program has, over time, combined with faster-than-inflation increases in the price charged for attending college to produce a situation where a very large fraction of new college graduates have incurred high levels of personal debt before they ever begin their working careers. At my university today, it is not uncommon for new graduates to be carrying debt loads of from $30,000 to $50,000 on Commencement Day.

Figure 12.3 displays the total and revolving outstanding U.S. consumer credit figures for the years 1980 to 2005 according to data obtained from the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*. Figures 12.4 show average per capita U.S. income (in dollars) and the population of the United States (in millions) over the same period. These data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau, respectively. Consumer credit is the total outstanding balance, i.e. the total liable consumption stock-of-goods, incurred by the population of the United States. Revolving credit is the portion of that total liability from credit card accounts, borrowing under check credit and overdraft plans, and unsecured lines of credit. The data exhibit a nearly perfect exponential growth rate with an annual total growth factor of about 7.4% from 1980 to 2005.

Figure 12.4(A) shows that average per capita income from 1980 to 2000 grew at a linear rate, roughly tripling from about $10,000/year to about $30,000/year over the period. This is a much slower growth rate than the growth rate in liable consumption stock-of-goods (an annualized rate of about 2.9% on the average). Figure 12.4(B) shows that over this same timeframe the total U.S. population grew from 227.8 million people to 281.4 million people. Therefore, growth in the total liable consumption stock-of-goods incurred by the people of the U.S. can only be explained by saying that Americans chose to assume an historically higher level of debt obligation than at any previous time in U.S. history. This reflects, in my opinion, two factors: a pronouncedly high level of ignorance of social-natural economics, and a pronounced ignorance of the effects a high level of liable consumption stock-of-goods acquisition has (constricting an individual's power of his person; decreasing the degree of his civil liberty; and limiting his discretion in choosing how he expends his stock-of-time). Bluntly put, America becomes a nation of serfs from ignorance of social-natural economics and the human Nature of social contracts. To say Americans had been spending like drunken sailors on shore leave would be to insult drunken sailors.

Economic consequences of excessive consumption of liable goods are not difficult to predict. Smith wrote,

> As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of almost all the produce which the laborer can either raise or collect from it. His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labor which is employed upon land.
>
> It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has the wherewithal to maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally advanced to him from the stock of a master . . . who would have no interest to employ him unless he was to share in the produce of his labor, or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This profit makes a second deduction from the produce of the labor which is employed upon the land.
>
> The produce of almost all other labor is liable to the like deduction of profits. In all arts and manufactures the greater part of the workmen stand in need of a master to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labor, or in the value that it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed, and this is his profit. . . .
>
> What are the common wages of labor depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labor.
>
> It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorizes or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out

> much longer. . . . In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.
>
> We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combination of masters, though frequently of those of the workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit but constant and uniform combination not to raise the wages of labor above their actual rate. [Smith (1776), pp. 57-59]

I know people who have said to me, "Well, yes, that might be how it was then, but it is different today." Nonsense. Every commercial entity of any substantial size in the U.S. bases its wage and salary offers, and the raises in wages and salaries it occasionally concedes, on a statistic called "the market mean" for wages or salaries in a given line of work. Men do not need to conspire with whispers in dark corners to effect Smith's "combinations of the masters." All they have to do is consult statistics published by various trade, government and professional organizations. The price fixing target for wages or salaries is published there for anyone to see. Smith also wrote,

> The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his master; but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every kind must be such as may enable them, with one another, to continue the race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or stationary demand of the society may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave. [*ibid*., pg. 91]

Deontologically, what Smith describes is an ***uncivic free market***, i.e., commercial economics in what is largely a state-of-nature social environment. It is totally antagonistic to maintenance of a civil Community. This is not, and never has been, any sort of economic mystery. What has not been adequately understood is how antagonistic the effect of liable consumption stock-of-goods is to perfection of the power of a person. The individual, in effect, pays for this spending out of his tangible power, especially from an intangible part of it called his stock-of-time, and therefore pays for it by non-reciprocal alienation in ever increasing degree of his civil liberty in relationship to those who incur less debt obligation from liable consumption behavior. Little by little, he makes himself more and more a serf and less and less a civil free man. He squanders the very preservation of his personal liberty that was his condition for accepting to be a citizen in the first place. There is hardly anything that could be more foundationally Self-contradictory than this.

§ 3.2 The Idea of Stock-of-time

Stock-of-time is *that potential intangible good whose amount possessed by an individual is measurable by means of a principal quantity of Critical mathematics defined as the calendar duration of the person's lifetime*. It is a limited stock of uncertain quantity for every person. As of the year 2006, the statistical average life expectancy of a white American male was about 76 years, for the average white American female was about 81 years, and the average for Americans generally was about 75 years for males and 80 years for females (source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). In contrast, the average life expectancy at birth for a person born in Zambia was 45 years. The country with the current highest average life expectancy at birth is Japan (83 years), the lowest is Afghanistan (44), according to the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Against the backdrop of these averages are large individual variances. For example, the average for a white American male who is currently 76 years of age is 86. A very, very small number of people live to age 103, and some people die in infancy. No person knows the amount of his own stock-of-time before it is fully expended.

It is mere convention that stock-of-time is not regarded by economists as an economic good, and this convention is likely due to the fact that most people regard it as *the* good – what a philosopher is prone to call 'an end-in-itself' – for the quality of which all other goods are sought. Every action that a person undertakes is paid for by an expenditure of some part of his stock-of-time. In some few cases, renowned for their rarity, a person might deliberately risk an almost certain expenditure of his entire remaining stock-of-time to fulfill some Duty to which he has made a categorical Self-commitment. Less rarely but still uncommonly, a person might deliberately increase his risk of expending all his remaining stock-of-time by undertaking some highly dangerous action (such as enlisting in the Armed Forces during a time of war). When a person does so in a way others recognize as stemming from the ground of a Duty-to-others we honor that person and call his action meritorious. Such were the soldiers who died in the battle of Gettysburg. Lincoln eulogized them, saying "they gave the last full measure of devotion." When a person does so for reasons other people hold to be frivolous, they say that person is foolhardy and account his action demeritorious. You do not have to be courageous to die, but it seems that a degree of courage *is* needed to admit to yourself that you *are* certainly going to die.

Stock-of-time is a most singular economic good because it is an intangible good that is consumed but can never itself be *directly* exchanged. A person chooses to undertake any specific action to satisfy an expectation that, by expending a portion of his stock-of-time to realize that expectation, his compensation will be greater perfection in his pursuit of the happiness he *might* realize by expenditures of his remaining stock-of-time.

No one can buy so much as one second's worth of stock-in-time from the stock of another person. Indeed, all economic goods are so called only in Relation to stock-of-time as the unconditioned good which for quality's sake all other economic goods are sought and acquired. The *economic value* of stock-of-time subsists in its expenditure in realizing an exchangeable kinetic intangible good (service), an empirical realization for which expenditure of stock-of-time is necessary for its possibility. This is what is tacitly acknowledged by paying people by the hour. Stock-of-time is *an absolute subjective and objective condition* for naming anything else a "good." Its *investment* can never be *repaid in kind*, and this is perhaps the only investment a person can make that has this singular characteristic. Stock-of-time is the sole possession of which it is deontologically correct to say a person absolutely possesses it, because his stock-of-time can never be possessed by any other person. Any social-natural science of economics must reckon among its first principles that stock-of-time is a deontological economic good.

In the concept of employment of one's stock-of-time we find the underlying purpose both for why an employer hires employees and why a person chooses to accept such employment and place himself under the direction of another person. In both cases the objective is the same: to act in the best way a person knows to most efficiently invest that portion of his stock-of-time that he expends in the service in order that he may fulfill a Duty-to-himself to improve the quality of life (perfect his pursuit of happiness) he might then realize as an effect of this investment. Indeed, when a person chooses to invest some portion of his stock-of-time to provide an economic service, *he is effecting a conversion* of a part of his stock of time from an intangible commodity into intangible capital. In economic terms, this is not different in kind from having a yard sale and investing the proceeds from it in a savings account or in some other financial instrument, the sole distinction being that this intangible capital is always non-circulating capital (because stock-of-time *as such* can never be returned to its investor[12]).

Many people can find ways to invest this intangible capital in such a manner that the actions

[12] Some might argue that converted capital stock-of-time is circulating capital if it leads to a person living a longer lifetime. Mathematically this might be so, but it is empirically unverifiable because no person ever knows the extensive magnitude of his personal stock-of-time. The argument is merely Platonic.

of the exchange themselves provide an affective beneficial return on the investment. This is what is generally implied when one says he *enjoys* his work or another says of him, "He lives to work." On the other hand, many people do not find or discover means for making this investment such that the actions of exchange immediately offer such an affective benefit. If, in addition, the return on his investment is too meager to answer the needs of his other Duties-to-himself, and to those to whom he binds himself, a person can find himself come to the point of Quarles' lament,

> And what's a life? – a weary pilgrimage,
> Whose glory in one day doth fill the stage
> With childhood, manhood, and decrepit age.
> – Francis Quarles (1592-1644), *What Is Life?*

Such unrequited investment is often a consequence when a businessman forgets the purposes for which he ventured into business in the first place. Such is the essence of what Santayana called fanaticism: "Fanaticism consists in redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim" [Santayana (1905a), pg. 13]. Among the kindest advices one person can offer another is this: Be wary, my friend, that you do not become a fanatic. It is all too easy to do, yet to do so is to squander your stock-of-time.

Stock-of-time is peculiar among all economic goods in that it is the only one that can be consumed and invested at the same time in the same act. When it is employed to satisfy an immediate private purpose it is only consumed. But when it is consumed by conversion to action aimed at a subordinate purpose intended to serve a future satisfaction of happiness (or a future negation of unhappiness) it is *both* consumed *and* invested as a capital good.

§ 3.3 Stock-of-time and *Volks*-society

Because invested stock-of-time can never be repaid in kind (see footnote 12), its investment in civil associations must instead be aimed at some other return beneficial to one's pursuit of happiness. Santayana wrote,

> Civilization secures three chief advantages: greater wealth, greater safety, and greater variety of experience. Whether, in spite of this, there is a real – that is, a moral – advance is a question impossible to answer offhand, because wealth, safety, and variety are not absolute goods, and their value is great or small according to the further values they may help to secure. This is obvious in the case of riches. But safety also is only good when there is something to preserve . . . and when the prolongation of life can serve to intensify its excellence. . . . All desirable variety lies within the circle of perfection. Thus we do not tire of possessing two legs nor wish, for the sake of variety, to be occasionally lunatics. Accordingly, an increase in variety of function is a good only if a unity can still be secured embracing that variety . . . Whether civilization is a blessing depends, then, on its ulterior use. . . .
>
> For the Life of Reason, however, civilization is a necessary condition. Although animal life, within man and beyond him, has its wild beauty and mystic justifications, yet that specific form of life we call rational, and which is no less natural than the rest, would never have arisen without an expansion of human faculty, an increase in mental scope, for which civilization is necessary. Wealth, safety, variety of pursuits, are all requisite if memory and purpose are to be trained increasingly, and if a steadfast art of living is to supervene upon instinct and dream. [Santayana (1905b), pp. 61-63]

Although I do not personally rank volume 2 of *The Life of Reason* among Santayana's best works – it has its moments but in many places seems to lack that remarkably piercing insight that illuminates so many of Santayana's other works – the point he makes here is an important one.

Let us take 'safety' for an example. The empirical evidence that life is safer in a civil Community than in the state of nature appears to be incontrovertible if by "safety" we mean the empirical increase for a likelihood of living for a longer duration of years. In that connotation of meaning, it is safer to live in the place called America than to live in the place called Afghanistan, where the average life expectancy is currently 44 years. Yet some Americans choose to go and live in Afghanistan cut off from those resources readily obtainable in America that are thought to be principal causal factors in the phenomenon of average American life expectancy. Why?

Ask yourself this: If a doctor were to say to you, "I guarantee absolutely that if you take this medicine I offer then you will live for an extra hundred years; the only downside is that for that extra century you will be suffering extreme agony and torment," would you take him up on his offer? I can't speak for you, but I most certainly would not. Safety in and of itself is valued only relatively to what one weighs in the balance between what he expects as a benefit of a longer average duration of life vs. what disbenefits he expects to incur in that longer duration.

If wealth *per se*, safety *per se*, variety *per se* or other accidental qualities of living in the civil state are not primitive determining factors in choosing to enter into civil association, what are? When Santayana calls "civilization" a necessary condition for "the Life of Reason," what does he mean by this? To understand the former we must first understand what he means by the latter, and this he does tell us:

> Reflection is pregnant from the beginning with all the principles of synthesis and valuation needed in the most comprehensive criticism. So soon as a man ceases to be wholly immersed in sense, he looks before and he looks after, he regrets and desires; and the moments in which prospect or retrospect takes place constitutes the reflective or representative part of his life, in contrast to the unmitigated flux of sensations in which nothing ulterior is regarded. Representation, however, can hardly remain idle and merely speculative. To the ideal function of envisaging the absent, memory and reflection will add (since they exist and constitute a new complication in being) the practical function of modifying the future. Vital impulse, however, when it is modified by reflection and veers in sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past is properly called reason. Man's rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious. What is absent then works in the present, and values are imputed where they cannot be felt. Such representation is so far from being merely speculative that its presence alone can raise bodily change to the dignity of action. Reflection gathers experiences together and perceives their relative worth; which is as much as to say that it expresses a new attitude of will in the presence of a world better understood and turned to some purpose. . . .
>
> Thus if we use the word life in a eulogistic sense to designate the happy maintenance against the world of some definite ideal interest, we may say with Aristotle that life is reason in operation. The *Life of Reason* will then be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals – all conduct so controlled and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness. [Santayana (1905a), pp. 2-3]

When one applies due diligence to understand Santayana's terminology (such as "reflection" and "judgments") from the metaphysical grounds of Critical epistemology, what he says here is true of human Nature and is congruent with the theory of mental physics. Thus what he tells us here has practical and universal objective validity in the context of being a human being.

What, then, does he mean by "civilization"? I'm not too sure Santayana knew what he meant by it, but if he did, he did not choose to so-enlighten the rest of us. (This is one reason why I don't hold volume 2 of *The Life of Reason* to be one of his better works). He left it to his readers to dig out and discern his meaning, and this we must do by looking at the practical contexts around which he infrequently planted the term "civilization" *en passant*.

A logical place to start is at the one place where Santayana actually said something definite about the nature of "civilization." Interestingly enough, what he says here is more or less concordant with, and in some places identical to, Toynbee's general description of it, allowing for the fact that Toynbee couldn't define it either yet nonetheless seems to have accorded it with a reverence I would call near-religious. Santayana seems much less effervescent about it. He wrote,

> A state composed exclusively of such workmen and peasants as make up the bulk of modern nations would be an utterly barbarous state. Every liberal tradition would perish in it; and the rational and historic essence of patriotism itself would be lost. The emotion of it, no doubt, would endure, for it is not generosity that the people lack. They possess every impulse; it is experience that they cannot gather, for in gathering it they would be constituting those higher organs that make up an aristocratic society. Civilization has hitherto consisted in diffusion and dilution of habits arising in privileged centers. It has not sprung from the people; it has arisen in their midst by a variation from them, and it has afterward imposed itself on them from above. All its founders in antiquity passed for demi-gods or were at least inspired by an oracle or a nymph. The vital genius thus bursting forth and speaking with authority gained a certain ascendancy in the world; it mitigated barbarism without removing it. This is one fault, among others, which current civilization has; it is artificial. . . . Civilization, however, although we are wont to speak the word with a certain unction, is a thing whose value may be questioned. [Santayana (1905b), pp. 124-125]

Speaking for myself, when I read this I get the feeling that Santayana's contrast between barbarism and civilization feels like the contrast one might draw between ancient Rome – which makes everyone's list of civilizations – and the disorganization that characterized Dark Age Europe after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. What Santayana called the "variation from the people" Toynbee called "the creative personality." Toynbee wrote,

> What is the essential difference between the primitive and the higher societies? It does not consist in the presence or absence of institutions, for institutions are the vehicles of the impersonal relations between individuals in which all societies have their existence, because even the smallest of primitive societies is built on a wider basis than the narrow circle of an individual's direct personal ties. . . .
>
> Nor are civilizations distinguished from primitive societies by the division of labor, for we can discern at least the rudiments of the division of labor in the lives of primitive societies also. . . . An essential difference between civilizations and primitive societies *as we know them* (the *caveat* will be found to be important) is the direction taken by mimesis or imitation. Mimesis is a generic feature of all social life. Its operations can be observed in both primitive societies and in civilizations . . . In primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed towards the older generation and towards dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the back of the living elders, reinforcing their prestige. . . . On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities who command a following because they are pioneers. . . .
>
> But if we ask ourselves whether this difference between primitive and higher societies is permanent and fundamental, we must answer in the negative; for, if we only know primitive societies in a static condition, that is because we know them from direct observation only in the last phases of their histories. Yet, though direct observation fails us, a train of reasoning informs us that there must have been earlier phases in the histories of primitive societies in which these were moving more dynamically than any 'civilized' society has moved yet. [Toynbee (1946), pp. 48-49]

Whatever Santayana meant and didn't mean by "civilization," his somewhat cold remark about "current civilization" suggests that he thought about it in terms of what we could call "degrees of

being civilized." If so, "civilization" is a descriptive term denoting some degree of desirable or valuable attributes the *Existenz* of a particular society does or does not exhibit. If so, this would likewise be congruent with Toynbee's view of what a "society" is:

> Our brief examination of English history, though its result has been negative, has given us a clue. The chapters which caught our eye . . . were real chapters in some story or other, but that story was the history of some society of which Great Britain was only a part, and the experiences were experiences in which other nations besides Great Britain were participants. The 'intelligible field of study', in fact, appears to be a society containing a number of communities of the species represented by Great Britain . . . and the passage quoted from Acton[13] indicates the relation between these parts and that whole. [*ibid*., pg. 3]

Toynbee eventually got around to defining a "society" as a "field of action," i.e., "A society, we may say, is a product of the relations between individuals, and these relations of theirs arise from a coincidence of their individual fields of action. This coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground, and this common ground is what we call a society." This is a mathematical definition in terms of *forms* (Quantity and Relation). By itself, this is not a sufficient definition because form without matter is empty. Santayana, on the other hand, takes us an additional step beyond this:

> We have seen that society has three stages – the natural, the free, and the ideal. In the natural stage its function is to produce the individual and equip him with the prerequisites of moral freedom. When this end is attained society can rise to friendship, to unanimity and disinterested sympathy, where the ground of association is some ideal interest, while this association constitutes at the same time a personal and emotional bond. Ideal society, on the contrary, transcends accidental conjunctions altogether. Here the ideal interests themselves take possession of the mind; its companions are the symbols it breeds and possesses for excellence, beauty, and truth. Religion, art, and science are the chief spheres in which ideal companionship is found. [Santayana (1905b), pg. 205]

Civilization, then, would seem to be socializing advanced to a stage where it exhibits in some degree symbolic ideals that bind its people in their civil and civic associations. This, in point of fact, is a definition amendable to definition in terms of a set-membership formulation in Critical mathematics, and is thereby one that can be made to serve as a principal quantity. Toynbee's work can, likewise, be re-formulated in these terms if we add Santayana's matter to Toynbee's form in a synthesis of concepts. The outcome of this is something a German might describe with the word *Volk* – a word with no English equivalent. It doesn't precisely mean "nation" or "people"; to a German it carries a deeper connotation, something stronger than symbolism, a connotation of a necessary connection which, to a German citizen, is rooted in primitive tribal community based on common soil and common blood[14]. An American usually means something like this when he refers to "my kind of folk," although "folk" is not completely equivalent to *Volk*.

The aura of mysticism that tends to surround the notion of *Volk* is due to the word being used in an ontology-centered context. To banish the mysticism we must attend to a subtle nuance in how Santayana employed the word "society" in *Reason in Society*. Specifically, he doesn't use it

[13] "General history naturally depends on the action of forces which are not national but proceed from wider causes." The Acton to whom Toynbee refers is Lord Acton, John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (1834-1902). Most Americans today have never heard of him but have heard what is arguably his most famous quote: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

[14] In divers contexts, *Volk* can be rendered as people, nation, tribe, race, soldiery, troops, men, crew, herd (of beasts), flock (of birds), covey (of partridges, etc.), swarm (of bees), the common people, the lower classes, the crowd, the populace, or the rabble. It seems to be a very busy word.

in the context of a substantive noun but, rather, a peculiar sort of *verbal* noun. In the Life of Reason "society" is not an ontological thing but, rather, a *Unsache*-thing – a "happening" I call ***Volks*-society**. *Volks*-society is an Ideal that one can pick out in Santayana's progression from "natural society" to "free society" to "ideal society." Consider:

> Natural society unites beings in time and space; it fixes affection on those creatures on which we depend and to which our action must be adapted. Natural society begins at home and radiates over the world, as more and more beings become tributary to our personal being. In marriage and the family, in industry, government, and war, attention is riveted on temporal existences, on the fortunes of particular bodies, natural or corporate. There is then a primacy of nature over spirit in social life; and this primacy, in a certain sense, endures to the end, since all spirit must be spirit of something, and reason could not exist or be conceived at all unless a material organism, personal or social, lay beneath to give thought an occasion and a point of view, and to give preference a direction. Things could not be near or far, worse or better, unless a definite life were taken as a standard, a life lodged somewhere in space and time. [*ibid*., pg. 137]

By contrast,

> Free society differs from that which is natural and legal precisely in this, that it does not cultivate relations which in the last analysis are experienced and material, but turns exclusively to unanimities in meanings, to collaborations in an ideal world. The basis of free society is of course natural, as we said, but free society has ideal goals. Spirits cannot touch save by becoming unanimous. . . . It is in creatures of our own species that we chiefly scent the aroma of inward sympathy, because it is they that are visibly moved on the same occasions as ourselves . . . Though the ground for such feeling is animal contact and contagion, its deliverance does not revert to those natural accidents, but concerns a represented sympathy in represented souls. Friendship, springing from accidental association, terminates in a consciousness of ideal and essential agreement. [*ibid*., pp. 146-147]

And finally,

> Ideal society . . . is the society of symbols. . . . Symbols are presences, and they are those particularly congenial presences which we have inwardly evoked and cast in a form intelligible and familiar to human thinking. Their function is to give flat experience a rational perspective, translating the general flux into stable objects and making it representable in human discourse. They are therefore precious, not only for their representative or practical value, implying useful adjustments to the environing world, but even more, sometimes, for their immediate or æsthetic power, for their kinship to the spirit they enlighten and exercise. [*ibid*., pp. 196-197]

Thus, *Volks*-society does not simply spring into being from out of nothing. It is developed as a happening by the co-determinations of people and their mutual actions. This, outcome, however, requires investment by *each* person of stock-of-time. Thus we have glimpsed the result, but not yet the teleological cause of that investment. And that takes us to the next step.

§ 4. Taste, the Anthropological Person and *Volks*-society

When I was a little boy, I was a finicky eater. (I still am; just not as much). Before I would eat a sandwich, the bread crust had to be cut off. If a candy bar wasn't a Three Musketeers® candy bar, I wouldn't touch it. The only kind of proper ice cream was vanilla. The insides of a hamburger could not display the slightest hint of red. The only three cereals fit for human consumption were Cheerios®, Rice Krispies®, and Quaker Puffed Rice®. Potatoes had to be

mashed and topped off with butter or gravy *only*. If someone set a plate in front of me on which sat both a piece of chuck roast and a slice of ham or turkey, I'd eat the latter and leave the former untouched. Raw peas fresh out of the pod in the garden were a real treat; cooked peas were fit only to be fed to pigs. Same story with carrots. The only thing tomatoes were good for was *cream* of tomato soup, by which I mean tomato soup made with *milk*, not water. All other forms of soup were scummy pond water. A pie that wasn't a pumpkin pie wasn't a pie at all, and a cake that wasn't a white cake or an angel food cake wasn't a cake at all. Grape Nehi and orange soda were the only acceptable kinds of soda pop. Coca Cola® and Pepsi Cola® were obviously Communist-inspired poisons.

Food had to pass a visual inspection and then an olfactory test before it ever got a chance at a taste test. Come to think of it, there was an audio test, too. Anything with a name like "gizzards" or "squid" was done before it started. Sometimes my mother's patience with this would wear a little thin and she would tell me, "You won't know what's good if you don't try it." I was immune to this reasoning. "Begging your pardon, Mommy," my response would demonstrate, "but I'm not buying into that." If I didn't want to eat it, it didn't get eaten, period.

If McDonald's® hamburgers, which were something new and excitingly innovative at the time, had been available on bread, it's possible I wouldn't eat a hamburger bun (or bread crust) to this very day. Only peer pressure ever induced me to try a french fry, and it took another year after that to induce me to try one with ketchup on it. Today I like (crispy) french fries and I've conceded that tomatoes are also good for ketchup and for pizza sauce. I no longer surgically remove all the condiments from a McDonald's® hamburger before eating it, I accept that apple pie and banana cream pie are pies, and that *New England* style clam chowder is probably the supreme achievement of the human race. I eventually came around to accepting Mom's dictum and now I'm willing to at least try new things. That happened sometime during the time when I was in high school. Team sack lunches on the team bus en route to away games had a lot to do with it. A young athlete needs to carb up before a game. It's probably a good thing foreign delicacies have foreign names – *calamari* prepared *soovlahki* style, for example.

My reason for sharing this personal anecdote with you is because I wish to use it as a parable for that peculiar characteristic of *Homo sapiens* esthetics theorists call ***taste***. The *Dasein* of that *noumenal* something we call "taste" is grounded in behavioral experiences characteristic of an on-going process of perfection in human intellectual development. Kant noted,

> Taste is selection of that which is generally engaging according to laws of sensibility. It chiefly goes to sensuous form; for with respect to this there are rules that are valid for all[15]. [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 273]

> Taste is the power of judgment with regard to that which satisfies generally in accordance with laws of sensibility. It has a rule, but not through discursive knowledge, but rather through consideration-of-knowledge. [*ibid*., 15: 333]

The science of the laws of human sensibility and aesthetical reflective judgment is called Critical Æsthetics and it is grounded in the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. One thing that Santayana pointed out is that there is an intrinsic linkage between aesthetics and moral judgment. He wrote,

> Not only are the various satisfactions which morals are meant to secure æsthetic in the last analysis, but when the conscience is formed, and right principles acquire an immediate

[15] These rules are rules of the process of the synthesis of apprehension and apperception in sensibility. They are the transcendental *a priori* laws of mental physics for the human capacity for perception.

> authority, our attitude to these principles becomes æsthetic also. Honor, truthfulness, and cleanliness are obvious examples. When the absence of these virtues causes an instinctive disgust, as it does in well-bred people, the reaction is essentially æsthetic, because it is not based on reflection and benevolence, but on constituted sensitiveness. This æsthetic sensitiveness is, however, properly enough called moral, because it is the effect of conscientious training and is more powerful for good in society than laborious virtue because it is much more constant and catching. . . . But this tendency of representative principles to become independent powers and acquire intrinsic value is sometimes mischievous. It is the foundation of the conflicts between sentiment and justice, between intuitive and utilitarian morals. Every human reform is the reassertion of the primary interests of man against the authority of general principles which have ceased to represent those interests fairly, but which still obtain the idolatrous veneration of mankind. Nor are chivalry and religion alone liable to fall into this moral superstition. It arises wherever an abstract good is substituted for its concrete equivalent. [Santayana (1896), pg. 21]

Taste is an Object developed out of empirical experience. It plays a crucial role in the process of perfection (acting to make more complete) that is a hallmark character of ratio-expression and judgmentation. Kant noted,

> All perfection seems to subsist in the harmonization of a thing with freedom, hence in expedience, general usefulness, etc. Since all things properly in empirical understanding are only that in which they are taken to be in way of relationship to the law of sensibility, the perfection of objects of experience is a congruence with the law of the senses, and this, as appearance, is called beauty; it is, so to speak, the outer side of perfection [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 309].

Humanists' classical doctrines of esthetics are such that scientists *as* scientists tend to hold these doctrines to be of little or no value to science. Like moral theory, an ontology-centered theory of esthetics lacks real objective validity and can hardly avoid being accused of constituting nothing more than merely one person's (or one group of persons') opinion. Kant, however, tells us this is quite wrong from the *practical* Standpoint of Critical epistemology. He noted,

> Since sensations cannot be communicated (either in understanding or in participation) they have the lowest rank of aesthetic perfection. This is chiefly acceptable as an effect of the inclination to communicate. Intuition can be described and preserved in imagination. Sensation allows for no touchstone, with regard to it everybody is right, and it does not at all serve understanding. [*ibid*., 15: 330]

When you say to someone else, "I know how you feel," well, no. You don't. You know how *you* feel. The phenomenon in which the way one person operationalizes his affective condition stimulates a sympathetic effect in another person is called ***empathy***. As sensations hold the lowest grade of aesthetic perfection, so too empathy holds the lowest rank in the experience-guided development of social taste. It is, however, the original foundation for human co-development of what Santayana called natural society. Indeed, this practical role is what delineates phenomena of taste:

> Taste is a social (sensible) judgment about that which satisfies, but not immediately through sense and also not through general ideas of reason. Taste goes to the *agreeable*, the *beautiful* (noble), and the *touching*. . . . Taste enables enjoyment to be communicable; it is therefore a means and an effect of the union of people. [*ibid*., 15: 334]

It must be added that Kant describes here only taste in relationship to the feeling of *Lust*. There must also be taken into account its relationship to the feeling of *Unlust*, which is properly called ***distaste***. Displeasure and disagreeability are as communicable as their polar counterparts.

The *noumenon* of taste *per se* is the (mathematical) conditioning ground for the possibility of all those human behavioral exhibitions and affective experiences psychologists lump together under the label "emotional intelligence" [Salovey, *et. al*. (2000)]. It is likewise the conditioning ground for qualities of the motivational dynamic we loosely and improperly call "social instincts." There are two subjective aspects to this that are important for us to properly distinguish. These are called *moral* taste and *aesthetic* taste:

> Moral taste is the capacity to find satisfaction in that something by which good belongs to *universality*. Aesthetic taste: the capacity to find satisfaction in that by which sensuous satisfaction goes to universality.
>
> Moral taste concerns intentions, aesthetic taste the means to carry them out.
>
> Moral feeling is capability to be moved by the moral as mainspring. [*ibid*., 15: 335]

These distinctions, of course, are distinctions of the practical Standpoint (moral taste) and the judicial Standpoint (aesthetic taste). There is likewise a third *momentum* in play in the mental physics of human Self-determination belonging to the theoretical Standpoint. This one is not designated as a "taste" of any sort, but belongs to phenomena of *logical* perfection:

> The perfection of a cognition in consideration of the object is logical; in consideration of the Subject [the person] it is aesthetic. The latter, since it magnifies the consciousness of one's state through the relationship in which one's senses are placed toward the object and through appropriation, magnifies the consciousness of life and is therefore called lively. Abstract representation practically cancels the consciousness of life. [*ibid*., 15: 300]

Happiness judicially regarded is, you will recall, a consciousness of one's life and, more specifically, an empirical marker of the general perfection of it. Kant's last remark above is something Santayana also took notice of in much finer detail:

> We may therefore at once assert this axiom, important for all moral philosophy and fatal to certain stubborn incoherencies of thought, that there is no value apart from some appreciation of it, and no good apart from some preference of it before its absence or its opposite. In appreciation, in preference, lies the root and essence of all excellence. Or, as Spinoza clearly expresses it, we desire nothing because it is good, but it is good only because we desire it.
>
> It is true that in the absence of an instinctive reaction we can still apply those epithets by an appeal to usage. We may agree that an action is bad, or a building good, because we recognize in them a character which we have learned to designate by that adjective; but unless there is in us some trace of passionate reprobation or of sensible delight, there is no moral or æsthetic judgment. . . . If we appealed more often to actual feeling, our judgments would be more diverse, but they would be more legitimate and instructive. Verbal judgments are often useful instruments of thought, but it is not by them that worth can ultimately be determined.
>
> Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse[16], and from the irrational part of our nature[17]. The rational part is by its essence relative; it leads us from data to conclusions, or from parts to wholes; it never furnishes the data with which it

[16] "immediate and inexplicable" from grounds other than Critical epistemology and mental physics, that is.
[17] Strictly, Santayana isn't quite correct here. The cycle of judgmentation is an inherently rational process because it is governed by practical Reason. By "irrational part of our nature" we must understand him to mean that part of it which is subjective and due to the process of reflective judgment. Similarly, we must understand his "rational part" to mean the logical, cognitive, and objective part of judgmentation that is adjudicated by the process of determining judgment.

> works. If any preference or precept were declared to be ultimate and primitive, it would thereby be declared to be irrational, since meditation, inference, and synthesis are the essence of rationality. . . . In spite of the verbal propensity for saying that reason demands rationality, what really demands rationality, what makes it a good and indispensable thing and gives it all its authority, is not in its own nature, but our need of it both in safe and economical action and in the pleasures of comprehension.
>
> It is evident that beauty is a species of value, and what we have said of value in general applies to this particular kind. . . . To substitute judgments of fact for judgments of value is a sign of a pedantic and borrowed criticism. If we approach a work of art or nature scientifically, for the sake of its historical connexions or proper classification, we do not approach it æsthetically. . . . If the direct effect were absent, and the object in itself uninteresting, the circumstances would be immaterial. . . .
>
> In an opposite direction the same substitution of facts for values makes its appearance whenever the reproduction of fact is made the sole standard of artistic excellence. . . . We learn to value truth more and more as our love and knowledge of nature increase. But fidelity is a merit only because it is in this way a factor in our pleasure. It stands on a level with all other ingredients of effect. When a man raises it to a solitary preeminence and becomes incapable of appreciating anything else, he betrays the decay of æsthetic capacity. The scientific habit in him inhibits the artistic. . . .
>
> Even the scientific value of truth is not, however, ultimate or absolute. It rests partly on practical, partly on æsthetic interests. As our ideas are gradually brought into conformity with the facts by the painful process of selection . . . we gain vastly in our command over our environment. This is the fundamental value of natural science [Santayana (1896), pp. 13-16].

The perfection of taste occurs concurrently with the perfection of understanding but tends to go unrecognized in normal circumstances because it essentially belongs to that part of the motivational dynamic that is autistic in cognitive character. With increasing perfection in understanding human beings are able *ex post facto* through meditation and study to understand on the mathematical plane these autistic factors and communicate them to others to a degree. But it is the empirical development of taste that makes this possible.

The progression of the development of taste is mirrored by Santayana's progression from natural to free to ideal society. This latter progression also mirrors the development of moral judgment in passing from individualism to moral realism to rule cognizance (figure 12.5). Improved perfection of cognitive understanding is a process producing the symbolism that marks the development of ideal society out of free society, just as the development of moral taste from its foundations in aesthetic taste is the process that marks the development of free society out of natural society as unanimities in shared meanings become possible. Developments also depend on *spheres of context*, producing the phenomena of moral (and aesthetic) *re-staging* noted earlier.

This is one point where my little parable at the beginning of this section has its uses. In this humble form, if one keenly meditates on the way my youthful and individualistic finicky tastes slowly yielded to, e.g., peer pressures (free society) and later to logical reasonings (ideal society), one can catch a glimpse of the developmental track being discussed here.

It is not scientifically correct to call the development of taste a human "instinct" or "intuition" as Santayana occasionally does. This is rather like saying that child's play exhibits an instinct for a child to be a child – a useless tautology. Rather, the process of perfection overall is the rationality of pure practical Reason in its master regulation of non-autonomic human activities. It is not epistemologically correct to say either that man is a "social animal" or that he has a "social instinct" because the manifest behaviors that lead to these labels are *grounded* in the autonomous process of Self-determination under the formula of the categorical imperative.



Figure 12.5: Illustration of the stages of development of moral judgment. The stages of individualism, moral realism, and rule cognizance are practically linked to the development of the person's social knowledge, i.e., in natural society, free society, and ideal society, respectively. Underlying these as a ground is the person's development of aesthetic taste, moral taste, and logical perfection.

These linked developments are *empirically stimulated* because not one of them is innate *a priori* in the *homo noumenal* Nature of being a human being. Only the mental *processes* by which their construction is epistemologically possible are *a priori*, and this because they are necessary for the possibility of this construction. The constituted structures of taste, society (in Santayana's context), and individual morality therefore are co-dependent on actual and experienced outcomes. That the greater majority of human beings are "social" in character is only due to their circumstances, those tending to produce positive satisfactions, resulting in their development of inclinations to and taste for social associations. Social disposition is contingent upon the person's experience. There are, moreover, uncounted traumas, large and small, that, by the dissatisfactions he experiences in them, can equally incline a person to antisocial tendencies, a distaste for contract society, and a preference for state-of-nature living. This is why civic and civil factors in interpersonal situations hold a very high degree of practical importance for the formation and maintenance of civil Community.

At this point enough causal factors in the underlying mental physics have been unearthed to begin to address the question of why the individual would choose to employ his stock-of-time in the development of these intellective and practical structures, and why simple and hedonic abandonment to pursuits of sensuous pleasures without pursuit of rational satisfactions *is factually uncharacteristic of young children*. The increase of overall perfection is mandated by the fundamental law of practical Reason (the categorical imperative) because it serves the pure purpose of equilibration. The stage-wise development of taste, of society (in Santayana's context) and of empirical knowledge are all consequences of the person's acts of ratio-expression in dealing with disturbances to equilibrium that he experiences in his intercourse with empirical circumstances. The perfection of the power of his person is the unifying factor in bringing all of these together, and therefore this perfection is made a *primal* practical Duty-to-Self. Kant noted,

> Spirit is the inner (animating) principle of *animation* of thoughts (powers of mind). Soul is that which is animated. Consequently, spirit animates all talents. It commences a new series of thoughts out of itself. Hence Ideas.

> Spirit is original animation, namely that which comes from oneself and is not derived. (Naturalness is receptivity of the powers of mind, talent the spontaneity.) [Kant (1773-79), 15: 415]

Kant is telling us that the human Nature of mind-body reciprocity in actions lies in the logical division of *psyche* in the Organized Being model of being-a-human-being.

A theory of the noetic character of psychic animation pertaining to an *anthropology* of taste admits to a four-fold division. Kant outlined this as,

1. Movement (and occupation) of mind through sensation (sense),
2. Order through ideas (power of judgment),
3. Movement (and occupation) of mind through ideas (spirit),
4. Order through sensation (taste). [*ibid*., 15: 341]

We can see without much difficulty that (1) and (3) pertain to noetic matter while (2) and (4) pertain to noetic form. We can further see that there are actually only *two* basic divisions employed here: movement of mind and order. Kant goes on to say that movement and occupation of mind pertains to life and powers (*Kräfte*) of spontaneous human agency. Order pertains to generally valid representation, and from this it follows that it goes to perfection in representation.

Did Kant present this as a 2LAR (thus implying *analysis*)? Or did he thrown us a curveball by confounding two ideas of *synthesis* in a single list? If the latter, then he is up to his usual irritating trick of presenting only two out of three synthetic functional *momenta* and there are two terms missing from his list. The best clue comes from the context of the notes coming just before and just after this one. Kant was contemplating anthropology in the contexts of art and science, aesthetics and logic, and empirical vs. speculative topics (the major logical divisions of *procedural* natural science in general). This is a contrasting of judicially oriented vs. theoretically oriented subject matter. Conspicuous by its absence is reference to practically oriented subject matter. All *theories* are products of *synthesis*, and Kant was making notes pertaining to factors that go *into* a synthesis intended to *result* in a theory. He has thrown the curveball[18].

(1) + (3) pertain to the synthesis of patiency (the capacity of a human being to be both agent and patient in the same act of determination) and agency (the power to actualize a change in appearances). Agent is the object of a concept predicated to contain the cause of an effect. Patient is the object of a concept predicated to contain the effect of a cause. (1) therefore pertains to the power of Self-determination, (3) to appetitive power, and their synthesis is ***the Self-composing person*** (the person as Self-moving person).

(2) + (4) pertain to the synthesis of the power of judgment and taste, and, again, taste is social judgment. The product of the synthesis is *a human capacity to socialize*. But order, in both cases, pertains to perfection and so this capacity is *the capacity for Self-completion by socializing*. It is the practical Object in relationship to which movement and occupation of mind is the transcendental Object. Kant's theory of anthropology is to be *a doctrine for how a human being acts to perfect what he makes himself become by means of society*. It is ***moral anthropology***[19]

[18] A Kant scholar must make a habit of always asking if Kant is doing an analysis or a synthesis because he usually doesn't indicate which is the case. In the present case, it would be a bit unfair to let oneself get to be irritated with Kant because, after all, the man never intended these notes for publication. The only reason they are still extant is because Kant was one of the most famous intellectuals in Germany at the time of his death, and therefore people thought it important to preserve *everything* in his estate that was scholarly.

[19] Kant defined Critical anthropology as the science of man's actual behavior that has for its topic subjective laws of free choice [Kant (1798), 7: 119-122]. More specifically, it was to be the doctrine of "cognizance of the human being as the range of knowledge possible through observation" – an empirical science.

because it is to be an *empirical* science of "what man makes of himself, or can and should make of himself, as a free-acting being" [Kant (1798), 7: 119].

Unfortunately, Kant never actually completed this project. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* is little else than a compilation of Kant's lecture material. It is more or less generally the view of Kant scholars that this book was intended to be an introductory textbook for his course and not a major new unified treatise on the subject. It contains a number of more or less glaring shortcomings and more than a few of Kant's own peculiar views of foreigners, women, and aboriginal people that are clearly unscientific cultural prejudices. Fortunately, Kant's prejudices are irrelevant to this treatise.

We will call the synthesis (2) + (4) the *idea of* ***the orderly person***. Kant's word translated as "order" is *Anordnung*, and this word has two contexts in the synthesis. The first, pertinent to (2), is the idea of a manifold as a grouping or structuring of *nexus*, i.e., the predications of his connections *between* himself and the world. The second context, pertinent to (4), is the idea of a manifold as a *nexus* of dispositions and arrangements of determining factors in his connections of himself *in* the world. (2) is thus an idea of Relation, while (4) is an idea of Modality. The distinction between (2) and (4) is like the distinction between "me-and-you" *vs*. "us." The first contains a notion of form, the second a notion of matter. For terminological purposes, following the more or less common naming formula Kant frequently used, we will call the Idea of the order of mind through the power of judgment ***Anordnungsvermögen*** ("faculty of order"). We will call the Idea of the order of mind through taste ***Anordnungskräfte*** ("powers of order"). We might equally well call the idea of the orderly person the idea of the Self-connected person inasmuch as the person himself actualizes his connection of Self + World. This Object, the orderly person, logically subsists in the division of *nous* in the Organized Being model of being a human being. The idea of manifold synthesis contained in the Idea of the orderly person belongs to the division of synthesis Kant called a *dynamical* synthesis [Kant (1787), B:201-202 fn].

The idea of the Self-composing person is the idea that the person is the cause of himself and, at the same time, the effect of himself, not as an object-in-Nature but as an essential living being and a unique individual. The notion of receptivity in *psyche* is contained in (1) and the notion of motoregulatory expression in *psyche* is contained in (3). Thus this Object logically subsists in the division of *psyche* in the Organized Being model. The idea of movement (*Bewegung*) has a broad context that takes in the ancient Greek notion of *kinesis* (change of any kind). The idea of occupation (*Beschäftigung*) contains a notion of what one does that keeps him busy or occupied. In the contexts of (1) and (3), *Beschäftigung* is the notion of purposively filling or occupying one's mind, i.e., of determining the investment of one's own attentiveness (*attentio*). In effect, every act of mental occupation marks a choice of an investment of one's stock-of-time.

In regard to this last point, the transcendental place of the Self-composing person as an Object of *psyche* has an important consequence. *Psyche* is the faculty of animating principles of mind-body reciprocity. Spirit (*Geist*), as a technical term, means the inner principle of animation, and the Object of this idea is *psyche* ***as*** a faculty. The consequence of this is that investment choice pertaining to expenditure of stock-of-time is always a mixed choice involving both a factor of *arbitrium brutum* (brute choice) serving equilibrium-in-*soma* and a factor of *arbitrium liberum* (free choice) serving equilibrium-in-*nous*. Complete equilibrium, which is the final purpose of the formula of the categorical imperative, is *co*-perfection of equilibrium in both *soma* and *nous*.

For example, I personally Platonically begrudge the need to expend such a large fraction of my stock-of-time on the activity we call sleeping. If it were within my power to do so, I would choose stay active and consciously occupied 24-7 (twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week). However, like everyone else I empirically find that equilibrium in *soma* requires otherwise. Recall, too, that the acts of appetitive power in motoregulatory expression are fundamentally

negative acts, i.e., acts of "free-won't" rather than "free will." The adjudication of sensibility lies with the process of reflective judgment, and reflective judgments *per se* are never perceptions. If, therefore, by the principle of formal expedience in Nature (the governing acroam of reflective judgment) teleological reflective judgment vests sensuous expediency in favor of equilibrium in *soma*, and the act of impetuous teleological reflective judgment is one of motoregulatory expression of sleep-action, the actualization of this expression does not wait upon *approval* by practical Reason but needs only the *acquiescence* of practical Reason in the form of absence-of-veto. Pure Reason is a cognitively dark and affectively cold process and its only real interest is perfecting equilibrium. If this is better accomplished by motoregulatory expression of sleep-action than by conscious activity – well, then, good night everyone. Yet, although the receptivity of sense is a *factor* in this choice (determination of appetitive power), the *act* of Self-determination still resides with the power of pure *practical* Reason[20]. Kant drew a fine technical distinction between appetitive power being merely *bound to* sensibility (*determinieren*) versus it being *determined by* (*bestimmen*) sensibility. The distinction means sensibility is a *possible* factor in the determination of appetitive power but not necessarily a *deciding* factor.

(1) and (3), like (2) and (4) earlier, are ideas that contain a notion of matter (1) and a notion of form (3). Receptivity in *psyche* is paired up with adjudication by aesthetical reflective judgment in *nous*, and motoregulatory expression in *psyche* is paired up with adjudication by teleological reflective judgment in *nous*. I like to think of these pairings as "bridgeheads" in the real contact between the faculty of *psyche* and the faculty of *nous*. It therefore seems good terminology to name (1) the Idea of ***psyche*-aesthetics** and (3) the Idea of ***psyche*-teleology**. Metaphysically, the Idea of *psyche*-teleology recalls a remark William James once made in connection with the mind-body modeling problem of empirical psychology. The quote has come up before in this treatise, but it bears repeating and so here it is again:

> However inadequate our ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide of the mark when we say that our ideas and feelings have it than the Automatists are when they say they haven't it. As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all causes are obscure. But no one has the right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject, as the automatists do, and to say that *that* causation is unintelligible, whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes about *material* causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially *naïf* or impartially critical. If the latter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or 'meta-physical,' and will probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces in some translated form. [James (1890), vol. I, pg. 137]

The Idea of the Self-composing person is the Idea of synthesis of a manifold of what does not necessarily belong to each other, a type of synthesis Kant called a *mathematical* synthesis [Kant (1787), B:201-202 fn]. What this means is that movement-and-occupation and sensation are not necessarily-joined ideas, nor are movement-and-occupation and ideas necessarily-joined. The concept of their union is a synthetic concept of empirical science. In the combination (*conjunctio*) of the Self-composing person and the orderly person, the former stands as matter of composition (*compositio*) and the latter as form of connection (*nexus*). The combination is ***the anthropological***

[20] Sleep deprivation, which is a form of torture, is a tactic employed by torturers that exploits the fact that greater formal expedience for equilibrium by motoregulatory expression of conscious activity can be induced upon the victim of torture by external means. Have you ever been awakened from a sound sleep by the ringing of your telephone? By a convenient nominal fiction, sleep deprivation is euphemized by the term "psychological torture" – implying "not physical torture." Nonsense. *Nous-soma* reciprocity means a co-determination and there is no such thing as non-physical torture. Just because the victim isn't left with a visible bruise, scar or burn doesn't mean *soma* is unharmed. The brain is part of *soma* and we know from neuroscience that psychological torture produces injurious trauma in the brain [Begley (2009)].



Figure 12.6: 2LAR structure of the anthropological person.

person. This is the nucleating Idea of a social-natural science of anthropology. Figure 12.6 is the 2LAR depiction of the anthropological person.

I decline to guess how this topical Idea will be received by present-day anthropologists other than to say that I'm pretty sure some of them won't like it very much. Anthropology seems to be at least as vaguely defined in terms of its topical Idea as are any of the other social sciences. One definition, for example, offered by Haviland *et al*. is

> Anthropology is the study of humankind in all times and places. [Haviland *et al*. (2008), pg. 4]

Haviland *et al*. go on to make a tidy four-fold division of the field: physical anthropology, cultural anthropology, archeology, and linguistics. Well, I *do like* things neat and tidy. On the other hand, what precisely they mean by "humankind in all times and places" is a darkness to me, particularly because they go on to announce that anthropology only "focuses primarily" on *Homo sapiens* and also covers "our ancestors and close animal relatives for clues about what it means to be human." Not-neat. Not-tidy. What thing meeting the biology definition of life[21] now *couldn't* be a subject for study by an anthropology so described? A bee? If so, why not a bee? It just isn't science to answer, "Well, *naturally* I didn't mean a *bee*!" Naturally? How naturally?

What defines a "close animal relative"? *Any* definition a modern anthropologist can offer will be nothing but a mere definition-by-fiat. A chimpanzee is a "close animal relative" because chimpanzee DNA is more similar to human DNA than bee DNA is. Sorry, folks, but I don't buy the argument. I don't in fact recognize *any* of *my* relatives as *being* apes. Any of you have an Uncle Bonzo? I don't have a problem as a scientist if someone wants to make a classification system that goes *animalia* (kingdom), *chordata* (phylum), *mammalia* (class), *primates* (order), *hominidae* (family), *Homo* (genus) and *sapiens* (species). I don't mind if chimpanzees and gorillas are also listed under *hominidae*. It's just a list and there are no "sticks 'n stones" anywhere in it. As *natural history*, all this is fine. As *natural science*: well, none of my relatives are apes. As for "what it means to be human," no definition that fails to account for the *homo noumenal* as well as the *homo phaenomenal* aspects of being-a-human-being can ever serve as a *real* foundation for a social-*natural* science of anthropology. No ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysical prejudice can ground a natural science. "What it *is* to-be-human" is the topic mental physics deals with.

[21] "Complex physico-chemical systems whose two main peculiarities are (1) storage and replication of molecular information in the form of nucleic acid, and (2) the presence of enzyme catalysts."

But enough digression. Let's get back on topic. The 2LAR of figure 12.6 as shown above is incomplete because to complete it at the 2nd level of analysis requires the deduction of three functional *momenta* of synthesis for each of the four headings. This, however, is a specific task that belongs to an applied metaphysic of anthropology. The development of such a metaphysic is an important task, but it is also one that is subsidiary to the topic of our present treatise and is better relegated to another work. The present purpose of this treatise is already adequately served by the Ideas of the anthropological person, as I will show in the next chapter.

The relevance of the anthropological person for this treatise is this: *The character of a person who participates in a community and undertakes processes of Community-building is his character as an anthropological person*. His determining factors in all such undertakings are rooted in the *Anordnungskräfte* of his judgments of taste.

However, judgments of taste are empirically developed and for that reason are contingent upon personal experience. How, then, is Community-building and social contracting possible from such a subjective ground? Here there are two phenomena we must take into consideration. First, *Community-building and social contracting does not always happen*. For example, the members of a street gang, while they do constitute a Community among themselves, generally stand outside of the larger Community in which they are embedded and the members develop strong anti-bonding relationships with others who do not belong to their gang. Second, *Community-building and social contracting does frequently happen*. Empirical examples of this are so widespread that none need be stated here. The scientifically proper Critical question is then not so much the one stated above as it is, *What is necessary for the possibility of Community-building, notions of* Volks-*society and social contracting?*

One empirical ground for positing the *Dasein* of this necessary Object is found in what Kant called the *sensus communis* of human beings [Kant (1790), 5: 293-296]. ***Sensus communis*** is *the empirical property of human judgments of taste exhibited by the capacity of people to be able to sufficiently communicate their affective perceptions to others in such a way that others can recognize what is meant*. Kant wrote,

> One often gives the name of a sense to the power of judgment, when what is noticed is not so much its reflexion[22] as merely the result of that, and speaks of a sense of truth, a sense for propriety, for justice, etc., although one surely knows, or at least properly ought to know, that is it not a sense in which these concepts have their seat, and that these even less could have the least capability for the pronouncement of universal rules: but rather that a representation of truth, decency, beauty, or justice could never this way come into our thoughts if we could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher faculty of knowledge[23]. . . .
>
> By *sensus communis*, however, must be understood the Idea of a *communal* sense, i.e., a capacity of judgmentation that in its reflexion seizes in thinking (*a priori*) everyone else's act of taking into consideration an object as a matter of importance or respect, in order *as it were* to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on judgment. [Kant (1790), 5: 293-294]

This capacity of judgmentation is a developed capacity. Piaget called its development "decentrism," i.e., the passage from the egocentric stage of intelligence to the stage where a person recognizes that other people do not necessarily understand things the same way he does or

[22] Reflexion is an act in the synthesis of sensibility that performs an identification function for Meaning.
[23] Faculty of knowledge (*Erkenntnißvermögen*) is systematic structure of the human ability to make representations (*parástase*) of knowledge.

have the same viewpoint he does. Kant called *sensus communis* the *Idea* of a communal sense. By calling it an Idea, he means that, as an Object, *sensus communis* is a practical Object in which the objective validity is vested in regulative principles. By saying that a person develops a *sensus communis*, one is saying the person develops practical maxims of decentrism in his rule manifold.

That people exhibit behaviors that implicate the necessity of the *Dasein* of *noumenal sensus communis* is no more and no less than a lesson of real experience. That this *develops* is likewise no more and no less than an empirical phenomenon, and the fact that it develops means *sensus communis* is not innate. Rather, it is a gradually manifested capacity, by which I mean it manifests a personal development of judgments of taste. That it manifests in a way that can properly be called a "communal sense" reflects no more and no less the phenomenon that at very primal levels all *Homo sapiens* are more alike to each other than we are different. James wrote,

> Why do men always lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on hard floors? Why do they sit round the stove on a cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety nine times out of a hundred, with their faces toward the middle rather than to the wall? Why do they prefer saddle mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the world? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that every creature *likes* its own ways, and takes to the following of them as a matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find that most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more. If you ask him *why* he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at you for a fool. The connection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him absolute and *selbstverständlich*[24], an '*a priori* synthesis' of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own evidence. [James (1890), vol. 2, pp. 386-387]

This empirical character of developed and habituated behavior is a mark of recognition for the *Dasein* of developed practical maxims and for the recognition that the actions are regulated by such maxims. That they are carried out without engaging in any deep thinking before acting is what gives these behaviors the *selbstverständlich* character of which James spoke. The charity advertisement used as an example in the previous chapter attempts to exploit the fact every potential donor will recognize (affectively) that, if poor little Ernesto has never had anything but ditch-water to drink, how much happier his life will be because the donor's eighty cents per day contribution will provide him with wholesome milk and clean water (perhaps even some Grape Nehi!) to drink.

But all such maxims develop from the satisfaction of pure Reason's mandate for equilibrium. The real ground of their origination is therefore precisely the same as that of the maxims and tenets that constitute a person's private moral code. Moral judgment and aesthetic judgment of taste are, as Santayana pointed out, connected at a very primal level of human judgmentation. The Critical acroam of thorough-going mind-body reciprocity makes it a theorem of mental physics that, because physiologically all human beings are more similar than different, we must all likewise be more similar than different at the most primal levels in the development of judgments of taste. *This* is the real ground for the possibility of *sensus communis*, of Community-building, of social contracting, and of those empirical phenomena we understand by the notion of *Volks*-society.

It is empirically true that as the scientist, and also the layperson, digs ever deeper into an

[24] "self-evident."

examination of individual judgment of taste overall, individual judgment of taste *in detail* is just that – peculiar to the specific individual. I liked Grape Nehi; some people disliked it intensely. I mildly disapprove of the taxonomy metaphor of likening the level in between order and genus to the idea of family; obviously a great many people find the metaphor *selbstverständlich* in one or another way[25]. I wouldn't mind it if I found out my handwritten letter signed "poor little Ernesto" was written by Freddy Fundraiser, mass-produced with a high quality modern copier-printer, skillfully smudged with ink blots and fingerprints by Amy Artist, and distributed to five thousand other people besides me; some people would be morally outraged by it. What is *not* true is the old aphorism, "There's just no accounting for taste." If that were true, the phenomena would be so diverse that no one would think to lump them all under one category ("taste"). Taste *in general* is accounted for by the laws of mental physics.

§ 5. The Practical Context of the Idea of the Social Contract

Our Lewis-and-Clark expedition across the vast countryside of phenomena of human social-Nature has provided us with a great panoramic view of basic factors of *homo noumenal* and *homo phaenomenal* aspects of social-being. We have now come to the frontier of the Idea of the Social Contract itself, and in the next chapter will cross over into that besought country.

Our last task for this chapter is to bring this all under the common *practical* context in which the Idea has its objective validity. This context can be succinctly summarized: ***The Social Contract subsists in the process of perfecting*** **Volks-*society***. The undertaking of this process is motivated by developed human taste for a disposition to favor *Volks*-society as an Ideal. The factors of motivation arise out of contacts of experience with benefits of social interactions. Such benefits ultimately trace back to satisfactions in realizations of pure Reason's unrelenting push for the perfection of equilibrium through the construction of universal practical rules in the manifold of rules. Benefits of this sort provide for the *elater animi* to construct maxims of reciprocal Obligations and develop maxims of reciprocal Duty. The stage-wise development and perfection of the anthropological person is at the same time the stage-wise development of tenets and ideas of natural society, free society and ideal society – the last stage of which is the one where we begin to properly talk about *Volks*-society as an Ideal. This is the *positive* outcome of interpersonal social interactions that produce bonding relationships in the social-chemistry environment of the people involved. The earlier chapters covered modeling details of this.

But there is also the *negative* outcome, i.e. the outcome of experienced disbenefit in social interactions. The disbenefits are those where the actions seeking equilibrium and the satisfaction of the formula of the categorical imperative are thwarted and frustrated in actual specific cases. These are the situations where anti-bonding relationships are set up, enemy-building occurs, and granulated society is formed. Actuality of such occurrences is antagonistic to civil Community. Their moderation and diminution are, therefore, also necessitations for robust social contracting in civil Community and for the aims of social governance.

We have examined the root factors, all of which pertain to the human Nature of the social atom. The promotion of the positive benefit and the demotion of the negative are, in real practical context, the teleological aims of every social-natural science. Bloom was correct to say political

[25] That the levels go "order – family – genus – species" is the actual reason why and how anthropologists speak of other animals as being close or distant "relatives" of man. They *are* relatives in the *context* of being in the same taxonomic "family." I was deliberately exaggerating my objections a bit earlier by using a *different* context of "family" – an orator's trick going back to Cicero – to better bring out the difference between *real* distinctions and merely *mathematical* ones. Offended anthropologists can take this as my offer of apology for making fun of your vocation earlier. The apology had to wait until now in order to not blunt the earlier point I intended to make. Offending you was a risk I took, not an outcome I intended.

science is *an* authoritative arena of effective good and evil, but we can see that he fell a little short of being right by calling it *the* authoritative arena once we understand the Critical *Realerklärung* of the idea of authority. *Every* social-natural science is compelled to step into this arena because the real point of origin for the proper understanding of their topical ideas is the Idea of the Social Contract. The Objects of the special social-natural sciences are limitations of the Social Contract Object, delimited by topic.

Kant noted,

> In everything that is to be approved in accordance with taste there must be something that facilitates the differentiation of the manifold (patterning); something that promotes intelligibility (relationships, proportions); something that makes the pulling of it together possible (unity); and, finally, something that promotes its distinction from all other possibilities (precision). [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 271]

The next chapter deals with these headings of approval.

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