

Chapter 2 Enlightened Institutions

§ 1. Institution as the Synthesis of a Social Molecule

In the theory of public education, I use the word **institution** to mean "an instituting or being instituted." The *verb* **institute** is used in the Latin connotation of *instituere*, (to set up, erect, construct). I use the *noun* "institute" to refer to that which is set up, erected, or constructed. Let us call this object an **Institute** to avoid confusion between the noun and the verb. Thus "institution" means the setting up of an Institute or a system of Institutes.

In technical terminology, then, an institution is an action producing an Institute. Mathematical treatment of the idea of institution then requires that the action be defined and represented from a primary foundation in the social atoms, i.e., in individual human beings. Formal mathematical expression of this idea uses embedding field theory [Wells (2012a), chap. 9, pp. 294-299] and the technique I have called the *social-chemistry model* [*ibid.*, pp. 299-312]. Explicit mathematical details involved in working with these two techniques need not detain us here in this treatise. I mention them because there is a useful metaphor for understanding institutions and Institutes in terms of the social atom, namely, the mathematical metaphor of a **social Molecule**. The technical definition of this term is: *the representation by an embedding field network of the social environments of a population of human beings*. However, for purposes of understanding the idea the metaphor's efficaciousness subsists in thinking about the social interactions a person experiences as either: (1) "bonding" him to other human beings to form a "molecule of persons" (analogous to the bonding together of divers atoms in a chemical molecule); or else (2) "anti-bonding" him with others (analogous to the antibonding forces when chemical atoms repel one another and either fail to form a molecule or break down an existing molecule).

Regarded in this fashion, the metaphor suggests that an institution is *a synthesizing of a social Molecule*. When we consider institution from the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics, this perspective sets up a useful way to look at an Institute as a corporate person, and in this way to tie the nature of an Institute and the act of institution to the mental physics of the human beings who *do* the instituting and/or interact with the Institute. Establishing such a connection establishes the objective validity of these otherwise mathematical Objects by grounding their ideas in the mental physics of human Nature. In chapter 1, Mill's and Emerson's remarks that Institutes are determined by people were quoted. In a loose manner of speaking, we make Institutes "in our own image" and so a scientific understanding of the act of instituting requires us to comprehend how this "image-making" process works when people carry out the design of their Institutes. The objective of this chapter is to explain: first, one important aspect of human judgmentation pertinent to institution; second, to use this understanding to derive the idea of an Institute-as-a-corporate-person; and, third, to deduce from this idea the functional *momenta* needed to complete the Enlightenment 2LAR from chapter 1. Once we have obtained objectively valid general ideas of institution, it is then a short step to specify that species of this genus which is the topical Object of this treatise, i.e., the institution of public education.

§ 2. The Synthesis of Standpoints

Because an institution is an act of synthesis aimed at producing a practical outcome, institution design consists of acts of thinking and judgmentation that form polysyllogisms [Wells (2011a)]. A polysyllogism is an act of judgmentation that produces a composite inference of reason as a *whole* which is constituted as ground-to-consequence or condition-to-conditioned *series* (chains) of sub-inferences [Kant (1800) 9: 133-134]. An act that makes a polysyllogism is carried out by a synthesis involving all three Standpoints defined in Critical epistemology: the theoretical Standpoint; the judicial Standpoint; and the practical Standpoint [Wells (2012b)].




Figure 1: First level synthetic representation (1LSR) of the synthesis of the Standpoints in transcendental Logic. The synthesis begins with the opposition of two poles – e.g., the theoretical Standpoint and the judicial Standpoint – and culminates in the third Standpoint (e.g. the practical Standpoint). For example, synthesis of a cognition and a belief produces a purpose and the synthetic act is called a synthesis of coordination in the construction of reasoning. Judgmentation for this case culminates in an action and hence this species of synthesis is adjudicated by the process of practical judgment in the practical Standpoint. For more on the transcendental Logic of the synthesis see Wells (2012b).

The 1LSR diagram of figure 1 illustrates the logical structure of the synthesis of Standpoints. Those readers who are familiar with Hegel's methods likely will note the superficial resemblance between this figure and the "Hegelian triangle" [Hegel (1827), pp. 223-296]. The primitive difference between Kant's transcendental Logic and the transcendental logics of Hegel or Husserl [Husserl (1929)] is metaphysical. Kant's transcendental Logic is epistemology-centered and constitutes a doctrine of rules (laws) of processes of human thinking and judgmentation. The transcendental logics of Hegel and Husserl are both ontology-centered and this dooms both of them to being merely formal methods of mathematical logics lacking the necessary ability to link their Objects to objects of sensible Nature. In consequence, both fall prey to transcendent flights of imagination destined to arrive at a fantasy world in which griffins are fierce and angels dance on the heads of pins. Kant's transcendental Logic has *real* objective validity and is necessary for the possibility of human experience; Hegel's and Husserl's transcendental logics lack real objective validity and are merely mathematics without necessary connection to experience¹.

The synthesis of Standpoints is important in science because knowledgeable awareness of this synthesis is vital to recognizing and avoiding ungrounded speculation in scientific theory. This includes theorizing in regard to the design of Institutes-that-do-not-have-built-in-violations of the social contract of the instituting Society. It is an essential factor for the later section of this chapter, wherein deduction of the *momenta* of the Enlightenment 2LAR of chapter 1 begins.

¹ I beg pardon from those readers who are unfamiliar with or uninterested in transcendental logic theories. I feel it is important to occasionally pass notes to those philosophers who do concern themselves with these, and this is my apology to you for this brief digression.




Figure 2: The structure of thinking and judgmentation in the mental physics of the phenomenon of mind.

A *cycle of reasoning* begins when a disturbance to a person's state of equilibrium stimulates a judgmentation cycle that culminates in an equilibrium-restoring chain of inferences of Reason in the manifold of concepts and/or the manifold of rules (figure 2). A *complete* cycle of reasoning succeeds in closing on itself after a threefold judgmentation process that originates from an act of one of the three processes of judgment (determining judgment, reflective judgment, or practical judgment) and returns to this point of origin after all three judgment processes come to a joint state of equilibrium. The term Standpoint refers to the use to which the power of representation is put in judgmentation. Re-equilibration synthesis takes the form of a closed cycle. For example, if the cause of the disturbance to equilibrium is a cognitive dissonance between the representation of a belief and a cognition of sensible experience, the cycle begins with an opposition of belief and cognition and proceeds, through the construction of reasoning depicted in figure 1, to the representation of a purpose. The formula for this is written

$$\text{belief} + \text{cognition} \rightarrow \text{purpose} \quad (\text{synthesis of coordination}).$$

The belief, having been challenged by the disturbance, must then be accommodated (or else it will continue to provoke disturbances) through a synthesis *a parte posteriori*,

$$\text{purpose} + \text{cognition} \rightarrow \text{belief}' \quad (\text{synthesis } a \text{ parte posteriori}),$$

and then the accommodated belief is assimilated into a new cognition via

$$\text{belief}' + \text{purpose} \rightarrow \text{cognition}' \quad (\text{synthesis } a \text{ parte priori}).$$

If equilibrium is re-established at this point, the cycle terminates. Otherwise, it is repeated until either a successful closure is reached or the cycle goes into rupture (type- α compensation) via an act of ignórance (the act of deliberately ignoring something). Kant made a somewhat obscure

reference to this cycle in *Critique of Practical Reason* when he wrote²,

When it has to do with determination of a particular power of the human soul according to its sources, embodiments, and bounds then, from the nature of human knowledge, one can begin only with the *parts*, with precise and complete presentation of them . . . But there is a second consideration, which is more philosophic and *architectonic*: namely, to grasp correctly the *Idea of the whole* and from this to grasp all those parts in their mutual reference to one another by means of their derivation from the concept of that whole in a pure capacity of reason. This examination and warranty is possible only through the most intimate acquaintance with the system; and those of erstwhile listless consideration of the first inquiry, proscribing, as not worth their toil, acquiring acquaintance, cannot reach the second stage, namely the subsequent reunion, which is a synthetic return to that which had come to be given analytically [Kant (1788) 5:10]

Put somewhat less obscurely, what Kant is talking about is what Piaget called the phenomena of syncretism [Piaget (1928), pp. 227-232; Piaget (1930), pp. 127-161] and juxtaposition [Piaget (1928), pp. 3-4, 221-227; Piaget (1930), pp. 119-124]. Syncretism in representation is, to use the words of William James, "the fusing together of everything that *can* be fused together" in a single representation. Syncretism is very pronounced in childish thinking. For example, a six-year-old might tell you the sun does not fall down "because it is hot." If he told you this you might say, "Huh?" but to the child it is a "perfectly obvious" conclusion [Piaget (1928), pg. 229]. For the child, "being the sun," "not falling down from the sky," and "being hot" are all intuitively merged in one and the same concept; the "parts" are not separated from each other in his thinking about "the sun." Thus before he can form more adult-like concepts of the sun, the *parts* must be made distinct, and this corresponds to the act of opposing the poles in figure 1.

Juxtaposition, on the other hand, merely sets representations side-by-side without forging any real connections between them. The phenomenon is vividly illustrated in many drawings made by very young children. A child might, for example, draw an eye next to a head but not connect them in any explicit way in his drawing; yet even so he will tell you the eye "goes with" the head. When he is presented with (or presents to himself) merely juxtaposed representations, a synthesis is required to combine them to make a single Object. Very young children have great difficulty doing this. As Piaget put it,

For if things are perceived in the light of the moment, without order or organization, if the work of rational attention is to deal with them one by one and not in groups, then the child will naturally juxtapose things and events in his mind without achieving their synthesis. M. Luquet has described this phenomenon under the name of synthetic incapacity in connection with the drawings of children. [Piaget (1928), pg. 221]

Analysis in scientific thinking is merely taking syncretic concepts and breaking them apart to obtain more specific and "mobile" concepts. Scientific ideas, on the other hand, are products of synthesis – a re-fusing of select parts to make a new whole. To do this requires the reasoner to first develop practical schemes of thinking (in the manifold of rules) for this synthesis of that-which-is-at-first-juxtaposed to make a syncretic whole. In the Kant quote above, this is what he was trying to say with his remark about the "second consideration." The transcendental Logic of doing so is the Logic of completing a synthesis of Standpoints.

² Kant, unfortunately for the rest of us, did not present a detailed treatise concerning the workings of his transcendental Logic as a topic in its own right. This left Kant scholars with having to resort to identifying the *en passant* explanatory remarks he tended to sprinkle into his various texts. The quote above is one such example. The first scholar to discover the presence of a system of perspectives at work in the Critical philosophy was Palmquist [Palmquist (1993)]. This was, in my opinion, a breakthrough discovery.

§ 3. Enlightened Institution as the Synthesis of a Corporate Person

§ 3.1 What is a Theory?

In order to design the systematic operational character of an Institute to be humane, civil, and republican, the process of institution must be understood from a basis in the mental physics of being-a-human-being. The Institute must be made to mirror republican Society if it is to properly serve a republican Society. This brings up a rather immediate issue. An Institute is not a living entity and it is no part of its nature to "have a mind of its own." The phenomenon of mind is a characteristic of the people who carry out the work of an Institute but saying this is not the same thing as saying the Institute *per se* exhibits the phenomenon of mind. If the Institute is to be republican, it cannot by design be made a mechanical extension of the mind of some authority figure; in that case the governance character of the Institute is most likely to be or to become that of a monarchy/oligarchy and not that of a Republic. Nor can some formal mathematical stand-in be artificially injected as a substitute for "mind" without introducing Spinoza-like or Neo-Platonist hogwash into the theory (thereby sacrificing real objective validity for the doctrine of institution). How, then, is a special doctrine of institution to be grounded in human nature?

This is an important question. John Dewey and the Progressive Education Movement (PEM) intended for the institution of education to be a humane institution. Dewey was, after all, one of the prominent academics in what was called the "humanism movement" of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Deweyan pragmatism and 20th century progressivism were both products of the semi-theological romanticism called humanism [Wells (2013a)]. Unfortunately for America, what grew out of the PEM was a set of Institutes that operated non-humanely, i.e., operated according to paradigms and policies that contradict human nature. The model Dewey picked for the institution of education reforms was that of Plato's *Politeia* [Plato (c. 4th century BC)], and this model is grounded in antisocial precepts of caste and servitude. The model produced a mis-institution, i.e., one that could not achieve the lofty goals PEM reformers envisioned for it. This phenomenon – failure of an institution caused by a non-humane model – is certainly not unique to Dewey and the PEM. Most large commercial corporations and government Institutes at the state and national levels are similarly mis-instituted for the same reason. It is symptomatic of a general failure of so-called "organizational theory."

How, then, is an Institute to be designed? What principles of its design are derivable directly from human nature (and thereby connect with this nature)? I am about to employ a theoretical construct called "the Institute as a corporate person." This is obviously a mathematical Object of a theoretical entity – which is to say the model is a product of a Critical theory of organization. But first it is prudent to ask, "What *is* a 'theory'? What does 'theory' mean?" These are questions typically taken for granted even by the physical sciences. Inasmuch as unreflective habitual usage of basic terms is a frequent breeding ground for fundamental errors in science, it is only a wise precaution to take the time to ensure we know what we're talking about.

As it turns out, different definitions for this term are used by philosophy, psychology, biology, and physics. Economics, sociology, chemistry, mathematics, history, and "organizational theory" do not bother to state *any* definition of the term – which implies their practitioners must default their personal definitions to one or more of the common dictionary usages. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (1962) provides the following usages for the term:

theory, *n.* [L. *theoria*, a theory, from Gr. *theōria*, a looking at, contemplation, speculation, theory.]

1. originally, a mental viewing; contemplation.
2. an idea or mental plan of the way to do something.
3. a systematic statement of principles involved.

4. a formulation of apparent relationships or underlying principles of certain observed phenomena which has been verified to some degree: distinguished from *hypothesis*.
5. that branch of an art or science consisting in a knowledge of its principles and methods rather than its practice; pure, as opposed to applied, science, etc.
6. popularly, a mere hypothesis, conjecture, or guess; as, my *theory* is that he never got the letter.

Those sciences that do take the trouble to define "theory" generally describe it as some mixture of these dictionary usages. Specifically, it has been defined:

by philosophy: A set of propositions which provides principles of analysis or explanation of a subject-matter. Even a single proposition can be called a theory. [Mautner (2000)];

by physics: In science, a law is a descriptive principle of nature that holds in all circumstances covered by the wording of the law. There are no loopholes in the laws of nature and any exceptional event that did not comply with the law would require the existing law to be discarded or would have to be described as a miracle. . . . A description of nature that encompasses more than one law but has not achieved the incontrovertible status of a law is sometimes called a *theory*. Theories are often both eponymous³ and descriptive of the subject matter. . . . A *hypothesis* is a theory or law that retains the suggestion that it may not be universally true. . . . Clearly there is a degree of overlap between the three concepts. [Isaacs (2000)];

by biology: Explanatory hypothesis, usually firmly founded in observation and experiment. They tend to have more consequences than do hypotheses, being of wider scope, and are tested by examining whether their consequences (predictions) are borne out by experiment and observation. [Thain & Hickman (2004)];

by psychology: This term has three distinct uses, ranging from the highly formal and precise of the philosophy of science to the loose and informal of popular language. To wit: **1.** A coherent set of formal expressions that provides a complete and consistent characterization of a well-articulated domain of investigation with explanations for all attendant facts and empirical data. Such a theory is ideally conceptualized as beginning with the induction of a set of primitive terms and axioms. These axioms are then used to deduce theorems, which are then tested for their truth value, their ability to encompass known facts and, one hopes, their ability to predict new phenomena the existence of which is not yet documented. Needless to say, such theories are rare indeed even in the more developed sciences; in the social sciences there are few contenders and none of any generality. However, psychology abounds with theories of the following variety: **2.** A general principle or a collection of interrelated general principles that is put forward as an explanation of a set of known facts and empirical findings. This is the pragmatic sense of the term and is widely applied to proposed explanations that fall well short of the formal criteria of meaning. . . . **3.** In popular parlance *theory* takes on exceedingly loose meanings. It even loses some of its explanatory connotations and becomes a kind of catchword for any reasonable set of ideas or principles that are deemed dismissible or suspect. [Reber & Reber (2001)]

If you thought you knew what scientists mean when they use the word "theory," do you still think so after looking at all these diverse "definitions"? Do you think they themselves clearly know?

Three things the technical usages above have in common are the ideas of: (a) some things called principles; (b) explanations; and (c) subject-matter (subject-matter being understood as the set of objects observed or experimented upon, which is the same as Reber & Reber's "domain of investigation"). There is just enough equivocation in these terms to open the door to almost any-

³ "Eponymous" just means the theory is named after someone, e.g. "Einstein's relativity theory." If that makes you wonder why this tidbit is part of physics' definition – well, I wonder about that, too.

one who wishes to dignify what it is he does by saying he employs a "theory" (for example, the "principle" that "the stars impel, they do not compel" used by astrologers). Perhaps it is obvious enough that all the usages of "theory" reviewed above have knowledge as their goal; therefore the term "theory" has some connection with epistemology. A Critical question is: what connection? If something called a science is predicated upon an ontology-centered metaphysic, one can downplay this question because "things" are taken to be primitives and epistemology becomes a vain attempt to explain "how things make us know about things." Those scientists who do not like to philosophize can then feel comfortable about dismissing annoying philosophers who harp about the issues this involves. Those scientists will presume that ultimately "the facts will speak for themselves." In actuality, facts *never* do. As soon as you say a fact "tells you" *anything*, there is more at work than just bare data of perception because an *interpretation* is now involved. More serious, though, is the fact that no ontology-centered metaphysic or pseudo-metaphysic is capable of grounding any science. Only an epistemology-centered metaphysic can do that and so the Critical question of connection is one not to be dismissed in science.

The idea of "subject-matter" has a straightforward-enough resolution. The subject-matter of a science is the Object the doctrine of the science takes for its topic of investigation. The question of what an "explanation" is turns out to be a bit trickier (and, in fact, has caused controversies from time to time). In Kant's system, an **explanation** (*Erklärung*) is a *cognition that binds and unifies the manifold of experience in external Relation*. As for a "principle" (*principium*),

A *principium* is a general rule which again contains other rules beneath it. If we take together all pure concepts which can be entirely separated from the empirical ones, then we attain thereby a science. [Kant (c. 1790-91) 28: 540]

A *rule* is an *assertion made under a general condition*. That which is said to be asserted by a rule is often called the "exponent" of the rule in the terminology of formal logic. A pure concept is a concept having a *noumenon* for its object (which is to say the object is supersensible, i.e., that all sensuous content has been abstracted out of its concept). By another name, a pure concept is called an **idea** and its object stands just at the horizon of possible human experience. Objective validity for such an object is always grounded in the category of causality & dependency, which means that the objective validity of the idea is grounded by making the idea a concept of a rule. From here it is an easy step to get a Critical definition of theory. A **theory** is a **systematic doctrine of all the principles and ideas determining the phenomenal exhibitions of an Object that stands as the subject-matter of the doctrine**.

§ 3.2 The Design of Institutes as Corporate Persons

Institutes are objects of a science of institution and so a *noumenal* Institute stands in the place of the subject-matter of such a science. A systematic doctrine for designing any Institute, if that doctrine meets the Critical definition of a science, is therefore a theory as this term has just been defined. Now, the Object of any design is both: (1) *theoretical* inasmuch as the product of a design is an empirical object (it is a real instantiation of the design); and (2) *practical* inasmuch as the designed object is always designed to fulfill some actual purpose. *The act of designing it*, therefore, is a synthesis of the form practical + theoretical → judicial. This means that a theory of institution must *primarily* assume the *judicial* Standpoint of Critical metaphysics⁴.

⁴ I think perhaps it will seem reasonable to you that *doing* a design calls upon judgments a designer must make in dealing with the unknowns that are always present during any design process. Despite assistances crafts and sciences provide him, every designer must ultimately make his design decisions from *subjective* determinations of his reflective judgment. This is the "art part" of design in that connotation Aristotle called *τέχνη* (*téchne*) [Aristotle (c. 335-322 BC), pg. 4 (981^a1-15)]. Our word 'technique' comes from *téchne*.

Yet, although all designs are ultimately rooted in the subjective process of reflective judgment, this does not mean *téchne* (τέχνη) or 'design-art' follows *aesthetical* determinations of reflection. The making of a design is a purposive act and so the *rules* of design-art derive from *teleological* rather than *aesthetical* reflective judgment. This means that the metaphysics from which design-art originates are found in what Kant called **transcendental topic**:

Allow me to call the position that we assign to a concept, either in sensibility or in pure understanding, its *transcendental place*. In the same way, judgmentation of this position that pertains to every concept, in accordance with the difference in its use and guidance for determining this place for all concepts in accordance with rules, would be the *transcendental topic* . . . Transcendental topic . . . contains nothing more than the cited four titles of all comparison and differentiation, which are distinguished from the categories [of understanding] in that through them is presented: not the object according to what its concept makes out of it (magnitude, reality), but rather only the comparison of representations in all their manifoldness which precedes the concept of things. This comparison, however, first requires a reflexion, i.e., a determination of the place where the representations of things that are compared belong, thus of whether they are thought by pure understanding or the sensibility given in appearance. [Kant (1787), B324-325]

The "titles of all comparison and differentiation" in regard to a determined Object are called the general ideas of representation [Wells (2009), chapter 2], but it is design reflection that we have to be concerned with in the present context of the discussion. Kant tells us,

Reflection (*reflexio*) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relationship of given representations to our various sources of knowledge, through which alone their relationship among themselves can be correctly determined. . . . But all judgments, indeed all comparisons, need a reflection, i.e., a distinction of the power of knowledge to which the given concepts belong. The act through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the power of knowledge in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I call a *transcendental reflection*. [Kant (1787), B316-317]

This means that the general ideas of reflection in design-art *téchne* are those called the *momenta* of transcendental topic in Critical metaphysics proper [Wells (2009), chap. 8, pp. 318-327]. The second level analytic representation (2LAR) of transcendental topic is depicted in figure 3.




Figure 3: 2LAR structure of transcendental topic in judgmentation.

These ideas of transcendental topic will shortly be specialized and applied to the task of designing Institutes. However, to do this requires a specifying concept that delimits the context of the specialized ideas, and this must be discussed first. Because the Object of institution is an Institute, that is where the specifying concept is to be found.

Every Institute is a mini-Society of one kind or another and most contain within them smaller mini-Societies descending in scale until the level of individual human beings (its social atoms) is reached. For an Institute to do its appointed work well it seems reasonable that the Institute-as-a-Society should be a civil Community, i.e., a Community of people working cooperatively and without actions taken by any one part of it either being in real opposition to the actions taken by another part of it or being contrary to the terms and conditions of the social contract in effect for the parent Society whose Institute it is. If you have ever had the experience of managing any fairly large organization, I suspect you might be inclined to agree with me when I say this is something easier said than done. How, then, is a **civil** Institute to be organized?

There has grown out of the work of academics (mostly business school professors) a loosely knit sociological study of formal organizations, called "organizational theory," complemented by similarly scholarly treatments of "organizational behavior" studies and "human resources" studies. These studies have no uniform general definition of what "theory" is. None of these studies are constituted as social-natural sciences and none of them are grounded in the Idea of the Social Contract. Within these divers studies, organizations are defined as "social units of people that are structured and managed to meet a need or pursue collective goals." The term "human resources" is defined as "the set of individuals who make up the workforce of an organization, business sector, or economy." The term "human capital" is often used as a synonym for "human resources." This means these studies are *actually asocial* and are deontologically amoral because they treat citizens as means without also treating them as ends-in-themselves. The consequence of all this is that "organizational theory" and its "human resources" complement are unsuitable for use in a social-natural doctrine of institutions for a *civil* Community. Their precepts and speculations are, however, reasonably effective at producing *uncivic* outlaw associations.

Even so, the "organizational behavior" complement and a few aspects of "organizational theory" have some pertinence for a doctrine of civil institution. This is because these studies grew out of historical examinations of how organizations were put together for both commercial and governmental purposes, beginning from around the time of the Industrial Revolution, and have continued to be put together to the present day. History is the fact-gathering enterprise of social science (whether it be a social-natural science or not), and so the historical aspects contained in these studies do have their pertinent uses in regard to the purpose of this treatise. One thing this historical record documents is that, over time, both commercial and governmental organizations have followed a trend toward making larger organizations (absorbing smaller ones in the process) as well as a trend toward more centralized management and administration of these organizations. Both of these trends correspond to the trend toward what Toynbee called "the universal state," which is one of the principal symptoms displayed by civilizations undergoing breakdown *en route* to their disintegration and fall:

For the present . . . we are concerned with the universal state and we may begin by asking whether they are ends in themselves or means towards something beyond them. Our best approach to this question may be to remind ourselves of certain salient features of universal states that we have already ascertained. In the first place, they arise after, and not before, the breakdowns of the civilizations to whose social bodies they bring unity. They are not summers but 'Indian summers', masking autumn and presaging winter. In the second place, they are the products of dominant minorities; that is, of once creative minorities that have lost their creative power. This negativeness is the hallmark of their authorship and also the essential condition of their establishment and maintenance. This, however, is not quite the

whole picture; for besides being accompaniments of social breakdowns and products of dominant minorities, universal states display a third salient feature: they are expressions of a rally – and a particularly notable one – in a process of disintegration that works itself out in successive pulsations of lapse-and-rally followed by relapse . . .

Taken together, these features present a picture of universal states that, at first sight, looks ambiguous. They are symptoms of social disintegration, yet at the same time they are attempts to check this disintegration and defy it. The tenacity with which universal states, once established, cling to life is one of their most conspicuous features, but it should not be mistaken for true vitality. It is rather the obstinate longevity of the old who refuse to die. In fact, universal states show a strong tendency to behave as if they were ends in themselves, whereas in truth they represent a phase in a process of social disintegration and, if they have any significance beyond that, can only have it in virtue of being a means to some end that is outside and beyond them. [Toynbee (1946b), pp. 2-3]

What Toynbee says of 'civilizations' holds with equal veracity on the small scale of commercial businesses, education Institutes, trade unions, political parties, and other types of organized human associations. As the size of an organized association (as measured by its population) is scaled down, the main features and characteristics Toynbee documented for 'civilizations' continue to be found. Mathematicians call this scale phenomenon "self-similarity." It is, in a manner of speaking, a "fractal" quality of associations. Taylorism (misleadingly labeled 'scientific management') is the dominant paradigm today for the management and administration of large corporations and governmental Institutes. This paradigm makes a strong commitment to conglomeration and centralization, is thus a universal state paradigm, and thereby is identified as nothing else than a paradigm for organization suicide⁵. Taylorism is one aspect championed by present-day "organizational theory" that must be utterly rejected by every civil Community.

To design an Institute is to synthesize a special social Molecule. The social-natural sociology for understanding this synthesis, so that clear and distinct connections are made and kept with its social atoms (the individual human beings constituting it and its social environment), calls upon an idea of Social Contract theory called *the corporate person*. What is this idea?

§ 3.2.1 Persons and Corporate Persons

In Critical metaphysics, a *person* is the object of an objectively valid judgment that regards him as the agent of his own actions and justly holds him to be responsible for his actions because his actions are real effects for which the person is the efficient (original) cause. Without this deontological accounting of responsibility the idea of morality is utterly void of any real objective validity and the most heinous actions committed by any person can have no more moral significance than an earthquake or a tornado. With it, social morality becomes a real possibility.

A person is a real object in Nature, but a collective of persons in active association is only a *mathematical* Object. In the terminology of Critical metaphysics, a person is a *Sache*-thing (a thing-in-the-world) but a group of people is defined by what they collectively do, and this is understood as an *Unsache*-thing (an event or "happening"). When the idea of a corporate person is introduced, objectively valid understanding of this idea requires deduction from the fundamental acroams of Critical metaphysics proper. I have previously presented this deduction in chapter 13 of *The Idea of the Social Contract* [Wells (2012a), pp. 460-476]. Here I merely review the pertinent findings from this deduction. A corporate person is an Ideal of understanding (which means it is the Object in which its Idea is understood not merely *in concreto* but, rather, as

⁵ Most executives in most large organizations tend to regard the bigness of their Institutes as a mark of success and achievement. This has been called "the edifice complex." It is a *judgment of taste* reflective of nothing but the ancient and *false* Greek prejudice that "if a little is good, more is better and most is best."

an individual thing determinable from the Idea alone). A corporate person is a model of a Community of persons regarded as a body politic. Its ground for objective validity is the Critical acroam of *practical unity in the synthesis of appearances* in the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. As an *Unsache*-thing, it is understood in terms of the *animating principles* of the powers of the persons composing its Object when the powers of their persons are made to act in concert with one another. This concert is termed the **corporate Personfähigkeit** of the corporate person. The animating principles are principles of corporate *Personfähigkeit*. They are deduced from the fundamental regulative principles of Critical metaphysics (the transcendental Ideas), and there are four of them [Wells (2012a), pp. 467-476]:

1. the animating principle of physical power of the corporate person: each person in the Community must be *civilly active*, i.e., accept and attend to specific civic Duties for the performance of which he can justly be held accountable by the Community;
2. the animating principle of intellectual power of the corporate person: the civil Community must institute means for the civic education of every member of the Community; civic education means the teaching *and* learning of the civil liberties, civil rights, civic Duties, and civic Obligations of the Community;
3. the animating principle of tangible power of the corporate person: optimization of socio-economic utility; optimization of utility is exhibited by minimization of the degree of uncivic social interactions within the Community; and
4. the animating principle of persuasive power of the corporate person: corporate persuasive power is measured by the degree of generation/annihilation activity resulting from leadership events producing social-chemical bonding and antibonding interactions in an embedding field representation of the corporate person; the generation of bonding interactions and annihilation of antibonding interactions each indicate increase of corporate persuasive power, while the generation of antibonding interactions and the annihilation of bonding interactions each indicate loss of corporate persuasive power.

When these animating principles are exhibited in the association it acts in community and can then be regarded as constituting an organized body politic. When the principles are not adhered to the association is not a Community but, rather, merely a population of interacting individuals.

The animating principles just reviewed point to an important consideration for the theory of the corporate person and for how this idea is to be taken into a theory of institution. For an association of people to constitute a corporate person, I think it is sufficiently clear that these people not only interact and communicate with one another, but do so in such a manner that they *cooperatively* interact with one another. Now, cooperation is *not* an automatic consequence of social interaction. Whether or not cooperative interactions result depends on dynamics at the more fundamental level of each person's *semantic understanding* of social interaction events.

This aspect of social-natural science was previously introduced under the name of *Weaver's models* of social interactions [Wells (2011b)]. Figure 4 illustrates the case for two-person interaction and communication. A central idea in this model is the idea of each person's capacity for making *semantic representations* of his perceptions of the interaction taking place. This goes well beyond mere exchanges of words and also takes in the way each person interprets the others' tone of voice, how he interprets the other's body language, the context one person assumes for what the other person is saying, his past experiences involving this person, what other people have communicated to him about this person (i.e., this person's reputation), &etc.




Figure 4: Two-person Weaver's model of interpersonal interaction and interpersonal communication.

The key process in judging the semantic message a person understands from interactions with another is the process of reflective judgment and, especially, the judgments of taste he makes in the course of his making of semantic representations. For understanding the social-physics of corporate persons, this factor means that the key *momenta* in the Enlightenment 2LAR from chapter 1 are going to have to be deduced from corresponding factors involved in the making of subjective judgments of taste. This is where and why the 2LAR of transcendental topic presented earlier is pertinent and key to a social-natural theory of institution.

§ 3.2.2 Brief Further Elucidation of the Idea of the Corporate Person

Corporate person is the regulative Idea of the one-ness of the Community of a group of people who are regarded as a body politic. The object of a corporate person is this Community in its entirety. A Society establishes its public Institutes for the purpose of serving the common needs and objectives of its general Community, and its citizens expect from their Institutes civil benefits of Order and Progress in their Community overall. The expectations-of-authority that a Society *grants* to its Institutes requires nothing less than that the actions of each Institute be regulated according to the Idea of the Institute as a corporate person. What Rousseau said of governments in the particular applies equally as well to *all* public Institutes in the general:

[In] order that the government may have a true existence and a real life distinguishing it from the body of the State, and in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfill the end for which it was set up, it must have a particular personality, a sensibility common to its members, and a force and will of its own making for its preservation. . . . The difficulties lie in the manner of so ordering this subordinate whole within the whole, that it in no way alters the general constitution by affirmation of its own, and always distinguishes the particular force it possesses, which is destined to aid in its preservation, from the public force, which is destined to the preservation of the State and, in a word, is always ready to sacrifice the government to the people and never to sacrifice the people to the government. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 64]

Obviously Rousseau is being metaphorical when he says an Institute of any kind "must have a particular personality, a sensibility," etc. A corporate person is a mathematical Object and not an

entity in possession of a phenomenon of mind. Even so, the idea that a corporate person should be *like* a real person in some respects is a powerfully useful inference of analogy and one that has been used efficaciously in social-natural political science in the past. In speaking of the establishment of legislatures, John Adams wrote,

[The writings of various English political philosophers, e.g. Locke and Milton] will convince any candid mind that there is no good government but what is republican. . . . That, as a republic is the best of governments, so that particular arrangement of the powers of society, or, in other words, that form of government which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of republics. . . . In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws. The first necessary step, then, is to depute power from the many to a few of the most wise and good. But by what rules shall you choose your representatives? . . . The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be deployed, in constituting this representative assembly. It should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. [Adams (1776), pg. 235]

Here we see Adams personifying the idea of the legislature a Society sets up, just as Rousseau personified the idea of a government. A *scientific* employment of this analogy, however, cannot rest content with merely stating the analogy in a vague fashion. It must rather subject the analogy to Critique in order to ascertain the scope of contexts in which the analogy can be employed with objective validity. It must also ascertain limits for objectively valid employment of the analogy. An Institute is not a person, but treating and thinking about it using the analogy requires that it must in some way be a *homologue* of a person.⁶

If we generalize the idea of "government" (as one species of Institute) to the idea of Institutes in general, and likewise generalize the idea of law-making (the chief function of a representative assembly such as a legislature or a congress) to the idea of the special function of an Institute, we can begin to see from Adam's last two sentences how to begin to approach the analogue for what in an Institute would stand as a simile for a 'personality' as this is reflected by the decisions and actions of the corporate body of the particular Institute. It should be "just like us" insofar as "us" is definable by *common* interests, civil liberties, civil rights, and a common understanding of the Society's social contract. This requires that some characteristics of an Institute be regarded as homologues of characteristics of the Society's social atoms. Without this the idea of personifying an Institute is empty hogwash. But which characteristics are these? This is what is derived from the functions of transcendental topic (figure 3).

§ 4. The Homologues of an Institutional Corporate Person

In identifying what characteristics found in people are those which are to be reflected in the corporate person of an Institute, Critique calls for an initial reflection determining what earlier we saw Kant call the transcendental place for the idea of contextual homologues. Here, however, the peculiarity of dealing with a corporate person rather than a real person requires a brief reflection on how Kant's construct of transcendental place is to be related to an Object that is an *Unsache*-thing (a corporate person) instead of a *Sache*-thing (a human being). For human beings there are two choices of transcendental place: sensibility or understanding. For a corporate person we cannot say, other than by analogy, that a corporate person has either of these. What, then, does the notion of transcendental place entail for this *Unsache*-thing? There are two rather obvious choices here: (1) the understandings of the people who comprise the body politic of the corporate person;

⁶ I use the word "homologue" in the Greek context of *homologos*, i.e., as being able to speak of characteristics of something in a way that can be understood as agreeing with characteristics of something else. This is a broader scope for understanding this word than the specialized definitions found in a dictionary.

and (2) the collective actions attributed to the corporate person rather than to an individual member of its body politic. In terms of the logical divisions of organized being⁷, the latter operationally corresponds to what can be called the "corporate *psyche*" of the corporate person.

Kant, whose philosophy efforts were consumed in discovering the Critical Philosophy, never advanced his notion of an Organized Being to the point where he recognized the logical division of *psyche*. This does amply explain the absence of *psyche* in his remarks about transcendental place. Nonetheless, I think Kant was approaching the point in his development of the Critical Philosophy where, in my opinion, he would have sooner or later recognized *psyche* as a necessary logical division within the doctrine of the Organized Being. Kant often made remarks and references throughout the *corpus* of his work to notions of "soul" – not in religious or mystical connotations but in connotations of "soul" as a notion of mind-body reciprocity, e.g.,

The *Kräfte*⁸ of the human soul is divided into three major parts, namely: 1. faculty of knowledge; 2. *Lust* or *Unlust*⁹; 3. appetitive power. [Kant (1783), 29: 877]

Psyche is the logical division of an Organized Being dealing with adaptation to achieve a state of equilibrium, and this is the essential characteristic of *Lust per se*. In my opinion, if Kant had lived a few years longer in good health, he would have developed a theory of *psyche*. The reason I think so is because of what I take to be hints of it in the pages of his unfinished *Opus Postumum*.

Homologues for the corporate person must mirror ("reflect") results of acts of judgmentation by people within the corporate body as these acts appear in the corporate actions of that body. To say this is to say that the homologues are obtained from the synthetic unity of teleological reflective judgment and the 3LAR structure of *Lust per se* in *psyche* (figure 5) [Wells (2009), chap. 4, pp. 141-159]. This synthesis is effected through the judicial Idea and Meaning (figure 6).




Figure 5: 3LAR structure of *Lust per se* in *psyche*.

⁷ The Critical real-explanation of 'organized being' is that it is an Object in which its parts, in terms of their *Dasein* and form, are possible only through their interrelation in the whole, and in which each part must be regarded as being combined in the unity of the Object by reciprocal determination as effects of the other parts and, at the same time, as causes of the other parts [Kant (1790), pp. 372-374]. An organized being is not the same thing as an Organized Being; the latter refers specifically to human beings as special cases of the former.

⁸ the plural of *Kraft*. *Kraft* is the ability of a person to Self-determine his own accidents of *Existenz*.

⁹ *Lust per se*, the character of adaptation to achieve equilibrium. *Lust* is pronounced "loost." This German word has no English equivalent, and it most definitely does *not* mean the same thing as "lust" in English.




Figure 6: 3LAR-LSR structure of the synthesis in continuity of reflective judgment and *psyche*.

From figure 6 it is seen that the aforementioned synthetic unity is a unity of the synthesis in continuity between teleological reflective judgment (hence of transcendental topic) and the noetic and somatic organizations in *psyche* (hence the synthesis of the judicial Idea and the synthesis of Meaning). These connections mean the unity refers to *Lust*-organization in *Lust per se* (figure 5).

This establishes the *context* for what it means to liken an institutional corporate person to the people of the Society to which it belongs. In a connotation more romantic than scientific, what is desirable in the institution is for the corporate person to be made, as well as possible, in the image of what Adams' "most wise and good persons" in the Society would ideally be like. Yet this context is not without its Enlightenment qualities. Adams certainly recognized that a romantic vision of Society governed by "the most wise and good" faced baffling obstacles thrown up by what is *practical* in human nature:

There is a voice within us which seems to intimate that real merit should govern the world; and that men ought to be respected only in proportion to their talents, virtues, and services. But the question has always been, how can this arrangement be accomplished? How shall the men of merit be discovered? How shall the proportions of merit be ascertained and graduated? Who shall be the judge? When the government of a great nation is in question, shall the whole nation choose? Will such a choice be better than chance? Shall the whole nation vote for senators? Thirty million of votes, for example, for each senator in France! It is obvious that this would be a lottery of millions of blanks to one prize, and that the chance of having wisdom and integrity in a senator by hereditary descent would be far better. There is no individual personally known to an hundredth part of the nation. The voters, then, must be exposed to deception, from intrigues and maneuvers without number, that is to say, from all the chicanery, impostures, and falsehoods imaginable with scarce a possibility of preferring real merit. [Adams (1790), pg. 357]

But what could not be practical in the case of individuals considered individually might yet well

be practical *if institution builds into the Institute conditions that cultivate and habituate merit in the actions of its agents*. More commentators than one have remarked in awe about the Office of the President re-making its occupant. The actions of an individual-as-a-member-of-a-group are known to be often very different from what his actions would have been on his own. Just as the design of any Institute can throw up systematic problems wherein the fault lies with the system and not with its people, so too it is possible that systematic institution might set up an Institute that by its social-nature cultivates in its members merit they might not have exhibited on their own. ***If actual merit be not practically discoverable, then let it be produced by institution.*** It is not necessitated by human nature that romanticism and Enlightenment must stand in opposition to each other. The two *can* be synthesized to make a romantically-enlightened unity.¹⁰

This, as I just said, is the context. The next step is to ascertain what human characteristics are to be the basis for the homologue characteristics of the corporate person of an Institute. Here is where Critique turns to the 2LAR of transcendental topic (figure 3) for its clues.

§ 4.1 The Homologues of Quantity (Form of the Matter of Institution)

The first *momentum* of Quantity in transcendental topic is the logically-singular function of ***intentionally systematic*** judgmentation. In human judgmentation this function is the focusing of the energetics of affective perception into the expression of a singular action scheme. Perception is the making of empirical representation with consciousness; the representation itself is called a perception. An energetic is that which is characterized by being efficacious in arousing actions. An affective perception is a perception that cannot become part of the representation of an object. A scheme is that which can be generalized and repeated in an act or an action.

Now, an Institute *per se* has no perception. The first homologue required for a theory of institution is therefore something analogous to affective perception. Looking at figure 5, Quantity corresponds to *schemes* as the transcendental place of teleological Quantity in *Lust per se*; figure 6 shows us that the synthesis in continuity here is the synthesis of Meaning. This is the synthesis of continuity in the context of life and is an organizing function for activities congruent with the formula of the fundamental regulation of pure practical Reason. The required homologue is therefore: (1) something capable of serving in the role perception plays in the phenomenon of mind yet which is also something that is not part of the *action* of the Institute; (2) something that nonetheless is efficacious in arousing the Institute to carry out some action; (3) something that plays some part in the scheme of action that the Institute performs; and (4) something that provides for contextual continuity interrelating the Institute and its environment (i.e., the general Society). The role of the regulatory law is filled by the prime social objective of the Institute.

All of these homologue requirements are satisfied by means of the mental capacities of human beings. Because the first *momentum* of Quantity in transcendental topic is a logically singular function, it becomes clear at once that the first *momentum* of Quantity in enlightened institution subsists in a ***human agent*** of the Institute. At first brush, this might seem a trivial conclusion hardly worth the formal effort of deduction. However, there is nonetheless a key requirement Critique brings out in this regard, namely, that *human* agents making decisions and carrying out activities are necessary for the energetics and focus of the Institute. Put another way, the functions performed by agents of an Institute cannot be replaced by automation of the Institute's "perception" of the social environment in which it operates. Prior to the development of web site technologies and computerized answering machines, having a human being as the contact point between citizens and the Institute was a matter of logistical necessity. With modern technology, it has become commonplace today for Institutes to automate this contact function. However, this

¹⁰ I have personally worked in *two* organizations where precisely this synthetic unity had been achieved.

mechanization does not implement an analogue of affective perception in transcendental topic. Despite propaganda about so-called artificial intelligence, computational intelligence and so on, no machine to date has yet been designed that is capable of being a proxy for human mental ability. The Weaver's function of semantic representing is left undone by automation. Let me put this more bluntly: Whenever anyone tells you his machine or his software or his web site is "smart" or "has intelligence," he is trying to mislead you into thinking he means *human* intelligence and you should react as you would to any confidence man's pitch. To put it in the language of computer scientists, no machine has yet been built that passes the Turing test¹¹. Within an Institute, a human agent is necessary in every situation that involves communication with the Institute or the focusing of Institute action. It is one thing for an Institute to use an answering machine that routes your call to a human agent; it is something altogether different to have it route your call to another machine. Nor can Taylorite *process* replace agents' *judgments* because this is merely an attempt to turn agents into automatons – the essence of bureaucracy.

The second *momentum* of Quantity in transcendental topic is the logically-particular function of *intentionally contextual* judgmentation. Logically particular function is the differentiating of empirical meanings into a structure of sub-schemes. A structure is a system of self-regulating transformations with the properties that no new element engendered by their operation breaks the boundaries of the system, and that the transformations of the system do not involve elements outside the system of transformations. Context is the sphere of concepts, combined by judgment with the concept said to have the context, which delimits the applicable scope of that concept in Reality. A system is: (1) in Critical epistemology, the unity of various knowledge under one Idea (the object that contains this unity is called "the system"); (2) from the practical Standpoint of Critical ontology, a system is a set of interdependent relationships constituting an object with stable properties independently of possible variations of its elements. A transformation is an action in which one representation is changed into another representation.

In an Institute, transformations are effected by human agents. These agents are the determiners of empirical meanings in the operations of the Institute. We have a name for a system of co-working agents; we call it an *agency*. The second *momentum* of enlightened institution is therefore easy to deduce. An agency is a system of agents organized by the design of the Institute. This noun is derived from Critical agency (the power to actualize a change in appearances). *The agency* is the second *momentum* of enlightened institution. It is the organization of the Institute as a structured Object that subsists in the cooperative efforts of human agents.

The third *momentum* of Quantity in transcendental topic is the logically-universal function of *intentionally organized* judgmentation. The intentionally organized function of transcendental topic is the organization of perception through the generalization of action schemes. It is already established that the homologue of perception subsists in individual human agents of the Institute. Within an agency, each agent has particular tasks and responsibilities he carries out. The agency is the system in which the individual actions of agents are combined. But *how* are these actions to be combined? To say *how* they are combined is not the same as saying they *are* combined, and the concept of the former is different from the concept of the latter. To say how they are combined is to specify *organized Duties and procedures* by which the actions of all agents are *designed* to be cooperative. Thus, it is not sufficient for the institution merely to specify a list of Duties and procedures. The institution must also provide in its design the conditions under which

¹¹ The Turing test was proposed in 1950 by Alan Turing. In this test, a human subject engages in natural language communication with a second human being and a machine. The human subject is not told which of the latter he is communicating with at any time. If the human subject cannot reliably tell whether he is communicating with another person or with the machine, the machine is said to pass the test. No machine has ever passed this test. Until one is built that is made to contain all the functions of the mental physics of the phenomenon of mind, none will.

cooperation emerges from dynamical interactions among agents in accordance with the Grossberg theorem (chapter 1). This requires a basis in a set of common understandings, shared by interacting agents, of how their individual actions are to combine and be *co-determined* to fulfill the objectives and satisfy the purposes of the Institute. This can be called *a system of management by objectives* for the Institute¹² and points to the significance of saying Duties and procedures must be systematically and cooperatively *organized*. I discuss the details of this in chapter 9.

This leaves just the question of the teleological expedience of the organization. This, however, answers to the specifying concept of Quantity in enlightened institution, *viz.*, the principle of justifiable institutions. To repeat from chapter 1, this principle states: *All human institutions are justifiable only if they contribute to the advancement and welfare of civil Society*. The system of organized Duties and procedures – or, what amounts to the same, the system of management by objectives for the Institute – draws its practical and real objective validity from the principle of justifiable institutions. All sub-objectives, Duties, and procedures must be able to trace their roots back to this principle. Where any incongruence is discovered, the incongruent Duty, etc. must give way to the priority of justifiable institution. In a similar way, the investment of all expectations of authority in the agents of the Institute and the general organization of the agency must likewise be justified from a root basis in the Enlightenment principle. In practical terms, this means authority and organization can only be justified on grounds of their expedience for the Progress and welfare for the parent Society. In a public Institute no private interest unique to just the Institute or its members can take precedence over the common interests of its parent Society.

To summarize: the functions of Quantity in enlightened institution are

- **the agent;**
- **the agency;**
- **organized Duties and procedures.**

Each of these functions must be designed and specified as well as possible in the design of the Institute so that they are congruent with the prime objectives and purposes of the Institute. None of these functions are matters for casual satisficing judgmentation but, rather, must be objectively purposive because each of them pertains to the justification of the institution overall.

§ 4.2 The Homologues of Quality (Matter of the Matter of Institution)

The first *momentum* of Quality in transcendental topic is the logically-affirmative ***demand for agreement*** function. Demand for agreement is the placing of the demand for happiness in an act of reinforcement of an existing and present state of being. Demand for happiness is a determination of the transcendental place of acts serving to realize an affective state of satisfaction (*Wohlgefallen*) or negate an affective state of dissatisfaction (*Mißfallen*). The two German words translated as satisfaction and dissatisfaction here have peculiar connotations it is important to note. *Wohlgefallen* expresses satisfaction in a connotation of "oh, this is *not-bad*." *Mißfallen* expresses dissatisfaction in a connotation of "oh, this is *not-good*." Judgments of *Wohlgefallen* and *Mißfallen* are logically infinite judgments¹³ because the judgment places the

¹² Among most Taylorite managers the concept of "management by objectives" is looked down upon with disapproval and claimed to be a method that does not work. When I analyze objections to the concept, what I find is that these managers do not understand the concept and make it into something else. I agree that what they establish in place of an MBO system does not work. But what they establish is not MBO. Rather, it must be called management-by-rulership (MBR). It is a commonplace incompetence of Taylorism.

¹³ "The infinite judgment indicates not merely that a subject is not contained under the sphere of the predicate, but that it lies somewhere in the infinite sphere outside [the predicate's] sphere" [Kant (1800), 9: 104].

object of the judgment *outside the sphere* of concepts of "that-which-is-bad" (*Wohlgefallen*) or "that-which-is-good" (*Mißfallen*).¹⁴

Determination of transcendental place is the assignment of a representation to either the power of receptivity or the power of spontaneity in a human being. For a corporate person, corporate homologues are needed for representation, receptivity, and spontaneity. Under the specifying concept of the Enlightenment principle of Quality (the principle of progressive education), the homologue of mental representation is straightforward enough. Corporate representation subsists in the complete exhibitions of the acts of the corporate agents and agencies. The homologue for receptivity subsists in corporate agents' understandings empirical situations. The homologue of spontaneity subsists in determining actions taken in response to a situation by the Institute.¹⁵ Both bespeak by analogy to energetics in *Lust* organization and the synthesis of Meaning (figure 6).

The first *momentum* of Quality is agreement understood in these contexts. Critical agreement is the relationship between two cognitions *A* and *B* such that: if the concept of *A* is a mark of an object *x* and the recognition of *x* does not sensibly preclude or cancel the representation of the concept of *B* being included in the representation of *x*, then *A* and *B* are in agreement. The object *x* in this case is the demand for happiness (as explained above) while *A* and *B* correspond to acts of reinforcement (*A*) and an existing and present state of being (*B*). The *momentum* is a *demand* function, i.e., a ***duty of the Institute*** to preserve and improve a situation that already exists. Such duties are the grounds by which the parent Society invests in the Institute an expectation of authority. Here a remark made by Mill is immediately pertinent to understanding the *momentum*:

What, for example, are the qualities in the citizens individually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society? Everybody will agree that those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence. But are these not, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth in these virtues in the community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence conduce alike to permanence and progression; only there is needed more of those qualities to make the society decidedly more progressive than merely to keep it permanent.

What, again, are the particular attributes in human beings which seem to have a more especial reference to Progress, and do not so directly suggest the ideas of Order and Preservation? They are chiefly the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. But are not all these qualities fully as much required for preserving the good we have as for adding to it? If there is anything certain in human affairs, it is that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success induces to relax their habits of care and thoroughness, and their willingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good fortune at its height. [Mill (1861), pp. 13-14]

Every public Institute, whether intentionally or not, exercises an educating function on the members of the parent Society because the actions of an Institute stimulate and provoke acts of

¹⁴ These are the only sorts of judgments of objective 'good' and 'evil' for which objectively valid determination is possible for human beings. Quite simply put, to say something is not-bad is not the same thing as saying "it is good," and to say something is not-good is not the same thing as saying "it is bad." In each case the former can be judged with objective validity while the latter cannot. This is why for centuries ontology-centered philosophers have tried and failed to explain "good" and "evil" in such ways as to recruit rational agreement with the explanations from all human beings and without resorting to mysticism.

¹⁵ Critical spontaneity is the capacity of an Organized Being (human being) for acting as the agent in affecting himself or his environment through the *production* of representations. Corporate spontaneity then follows as the organized capacity of the corporate person to originate corporate actions.

educational Self-development in the people affected by those actions. If an Institute fails to take an action legitimately expected of it, if it fails to act with complete integrity, to preserve justice, or undertakes imprudent actions, the lesson it teaches members of the public is that their Society cannot be trusted to fulfill its part of the social contract and protect the person and goods of *each* member of the civil Community with the full power of the association. In contrast, if the Institute takes action demanded by the expectation of authority vested in it, when it acts with complete integrity in its stewardship of the public trust, when it acts to preserve justice for all and its actions are prudent and well-measured, then the lesson it teaches is that every citizen has a Duty to do the same in his social intercourse with his fellow citizens. All this can be summed up by saying that the first *momentum* of Quality in enlightened institution is **reinforcement** of the social contract.

The second Quality *momentum* in transcendental topic is the logically-negative **demand for Widerstreit** (opposition) function. This is the placing of the demand for happiness in an action *negating* an existing and present state of being. The homologues identified for the first function are unchanged in this one. The only difference here is the direction of the action, opposing rather than reinforcing a situation. Unjust situations must be abolished, not tolerated or dismissed. If a disaster befalls a town, it is the Duty of the general Community to lend aid. If a criminal or outlaw harms a citizen, it is the Duty of the civil Community, acting through its Institutes of justice, to render the perpetrator incapable of further harm and to undo the effects of his enormities. The second function of enlightened institution is a function demanding justice be done by the Institute within the scope of its expectation of authority. *Unjust* is anything that violates the social contract of the Society, *justice* is the negating of anything that is unjust. The action the Institute is called upon to perform is a counteraction opposing an unjust circumstance or situation. Thus, the second function is the **counteraction** function. Again, counteraction fills an education function in Society; failure to take counteraction in defense of the social contract teaches affected citizens that the civil Community cannot be trusted to live up to its *obligatione externa* under the social contract – in other words, to fail to provide for civil rights. Failure of an Institute to take action when such action is expected of it by virtue of the expectation of authority vested in it is as much an enormity as when an Institute's actions pose an original violation of social contract.

The third momentum of Quality in transcendental topic is the logically-infinite **demand for equilibration** function. This is the placing of the demand for happiness in the balancing of the demands for agreement and *Widerstreit*. The homologues are again the same but this time the Institute is called upon to take some actions of reinforcement *and* some counteractions to preserve or restore justice. Thus the third function is called the **balancing** function of enlightened institution. Agents and agencies are called upon to be *problem solvers*.

In this context, Toynbee pointed out that the degree of fidelity is *observable* insofar as actions of Institutes of a Society conform or fail to conform to these functions of Quality. He wrote,

In studying the growths of civilization we found that they could be analyzed into successions of performances of the drama of challenge-and-response and that the reason why one performance followed another was because each of the responses was not only successful in answering the particular challenge by which it had been evoked but was also instrumental in provoking a fresh challenge, which arose each time out of the new situation that the successful response had brought about. Thus the essence of the nature of the growth of civilizations proved to be an *élan* which carried the challenged party through the equilibrium of a successful response into an overbalance which declared itself in the presentation of a new challenge. This repetitiveness or recurrency of challenge is likewise implied in the concept of disintegration, but in this case the responses fail. In consequence, instead of a series of challenges each different in character from a predecessor which had been successfully met and relegated to past history, we have the same challenge presented again and again. [Toynbee (1946a), pg. 363]

To summarize, the *momenta* of Quality in Enlightenment institution are:

- **reinforcement** of the social contract;
- **counteraction** of injustice;
- **balancing** of reinforcement and counteraction for social equilibrium.

§ 4.3 The Homologues of Relation (Form of the *Nexus* of Institution)

As illustrated in figure 5, the context for the homologues of Relation is itself related to practical causality in *Lust* organization and the synthesis in continuity of the judicial Idea. The judicial Idea (figure 6) is a synthesis of continuity in *Existenz*, i.e., capacity to gauge formal expedience of conditions for a purpose, and this synthesis pertains to both Relation and Modality.

The first *momentum* of Relation in transcendental topic is the logically-categorical **internal agent-patient** Relation. This is the determination of transcendental place as sensibility arising through internal Relation¹⁶ in the data of the senses. In mental physics it corresponds to phenomena of mind (*nous*) acting as the agent of changes in appearances of body phenomena (*soma*)¹⁷, an agent-patient relationship that can be written as the formula $nous \rightarrow soma$. *Sensibility* is the sensuous representation of an effect, the cause of which is attributed either to the capacity of receptivity and/or the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. The sensuous representation is composed of conjoint actions of the processes of the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of apperception. *Data of the senses* means representations in sensibility which stand in immediate relationship to body-state or condition (somatic signals). *Apprehension* means the making of sensuous representations and *apperception* means making what is apprehended in sensibility empirically conscious.

A corporate person has none of these abilities and so functional homologues are required for a theory of institution. The homologue of sensibility in a corporate person subsists in the processes by which its agents become informed of data and facts about the body politic of the general Community insofar as these data and facts pertain to the Institute's functions for serving Order and Progress in its Society. Institutional homologues of processes of apprehension and apperception subsist in the ways and means by which information is communicated within the Institute and related to the Duties and functions of the Institute. From such determinations the actions of the Institute in effecting changes to the body politic of the general Community are determined. The determinations are thus homologous to an Institute's **assimilation** of societal situations and circumstances. In this context, the first *momentum* of Relation in enlightened institution is the **assimilation of Society** function, not in terms of policy or procedure *as such* but rather in terms of how data gathering, communication and decision-making processes are *designed* for determining the Institute's effects on the general Society. Assimilation in this context is the connection of social situations and circumstances to action schemes that are expressed by

¹⁶ Relation is the form of connection in a manifold of representation. Modality is the matter of connection.

¹⁷ appearances as apprehended by the person, not by an observer observing the person. In speculative neuroscience the hypothesis that the state of the body is represented in the brain by signaling mechanisms has fairly wide acceptance by many neuroscientists. See, e.g., Damasio (1994), chap. 5. In mental physics, representation in sensibility is determined by joint actions of reflective judgment, determining judgment, and imagination – which are all noetic processes. Knowledge of *soma* is determined by the agency of *nous* in internal agent-patient Relation. Examples of this abound in athletics, e.g., in the case when an athlete does not become conscious of an injury until after the play is over. A few years ago I saw a Little League catcher break his ankle during a tag play at home plate. The player showed no signs of pain until *after* the umpire called the runner out. *Then* the boy reacted in pain to his broken ankle. In the *external* agent-patient Relation, somatic signaling acts as the agent in determining changes in noetic processes. The formula is then $soma \rightarrow nous$. In metaphysics an agent is the object predicated to contain the cause of an effect.

the Institute. Situations and circumstances are said to be *assimilated into action schemes*.

The second *momentum* of Relation in transcendental topic is logically-hypothetical **external agent-patient** Relation. Whereas the formula for the first *momentum* is *nous* → *soma*, the formula for the second Relation is *soma* → *nous*. In a human being this is the determination of transcendental place as sensibility arising from external Relation in the data of the senses, i.e., that *soma* contains the cause of determinations of noetic effects. (See footnote 17). Metaphorically speaking, for a corporate person the correspondence can be likened to "the body politic affecting the 'mind' of the Institute." Put more precisely, the corporate homologue of *soma* → *nous* is exhibited when the Institute *accommodates* itself in response to social circumstances. Institutional **accommodation to Society** thus constitutes the second *momentum* of Relation in enlightened institution. It is the function of making the Institute change to match changes that have occurred in its Society.

In this context, another of Toynbee's observations is very pertinent:

It is evident, then, that, whenever the existing institutional structure of a society is challenged by a new social force, three alternative outcomes are possible: either a harmonious adjustment of structure to force, or a revolution (which is a delayed and discordant adjustment) or an enormity. It is also evident that each and all of these three alternatives may be realized in different sections of the same society . . . If harmonious adjustments predominate, the society will continue to grow; if revolutions, its growth will become increasingly hazardous; if enormities, we may diagnose a breakdown. [Toynbee (1946a), pg. 281]

The need to provide for organized mechanisms of Institution accommodation because of lessons learned by experiences, in this case for the constitution of the general government of the United States, was recognized by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This consideration was written into Article V of the U.S. Constitution. Madison said of this article,

That useful alterations will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the [constitutional] convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the constitution too mutable and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables the general and the state governments to originate the amendment of errors as they may be pointed out on one side or on the other. [Hamilton *et al.*, no. 43, pg. 246]

The third *momentum* of Relation in transcendental topic is the logically-disjunctive **interior agent-patient** Relation. The formula for the third Relation is *nous* → *nous*, i.e., the phenomenon of mind is its own agent for effecting changes to itself. For example, an idea is a concept of a supersensible object (e.g., 'friendship') and no supersensible object can, by definition, act as an agent of changes in *soma*. The object of an idea can, therefore, never be an object known through receptivity of the senses. The homologue of the third *momentum* for a corporate person subsists in the Institute acting as the agent for changes to itself. It is the function for an Institute's self-transformation in making the agency equilibrate its effects on Society with Society's effects on the Institute. Let us call this the **social adaptation** function of Relation. In regard to this function, something else Mill said is useful for grasping the significance of the social adaptation function:

We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery [of government]. This

leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. . . . All government which aims at being good is an organization of some part of the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community for the conduct of its collective affairs. . . . The greater the amount of these good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in organizing, and the better the mode of organization, the better will be the government. [Mill (1861), pp. 19-20]

John Dewey wrote of his idea that "mind is the agent of reorganization" [Dewey (1916), pp. 318-334]. He based this on presuppositions of an Hegelian-based metaphysic and thereby fell into error [Wells (2013b)], but if one regards the body politic of Society as analogous to *soma* and the Institute as analogous to *nous*, then there is some metaphorical merit in Dewey's idea insofar as the Institutes of a Society *do act* as agents of reorganization. The Enlightenment principle of Relation is the principle of human determinability of Progress, i.e., men design the lines of human Progress. The functions of *assimilation of Society*, *accommodation to Society*, and *social adaptation* can be seen in this context as organizing functions for common lines of Progress in the general Society.

It must, however, be kept in mind that *adaptation is an equilibrium between assimilation* (effects of the Institute on Society) *and accommodation* (effects of Society on the Institute). It is, in other words, the function for reciprocal *co-determination* of Society and its Institutes. One of the great errors of the Progressive Education Movement was a commitment by some of its members to so-called social reconstructionism. The Social Reconstructionism Movement meant by this changing American Society according to educologists' opinions about what was best for Society. This is not reciprocal *co-determination*. It is unilateral determination by the Progressive Education Association of social changes to be imposed by fiat on American citizens – a usurping of the Sovereignty of American citizens and a fundamental enormity in violation of the American social contract. The tenets of the Social Reconstructionism Movement were Un-American, by which I mean they are enormities violating our social contract. The social adaptation function recognizes that a public Institute is a partial *cause* of its Society and *at the same time* an *effect* of its Society. Reciprocity of cause and effect is the essence of all Relations of community and the foremost characteristic of organized being.

The three *momenta* of Relation all clearly pertain to the Enlightenment principle of the human determinability of progress. To summarize, the *momenta* of Relation in Enlightenment institution are:

- **assimilation** of Society (social situations) by the Institute;
- **accommodation** to Society of the Institute;
- **social adaptation** of the Institute with its Society.

§ 4.4 The Homologues of Modality (Matter of the Nexus of Institution)

Judgments of Quantity, Quality, and Relation are judgments made about the object of the judgment. Judgments of Modality have the peculiarity that they add nothing to one's objective knowledge and only pertain to the relationship between the objective judgment and the state of mind of the judge. Again, a corporate person has no 'mind' and so homologues for the Modality functions of transcendental topic are again required. These functions must go to establishing the manner in which common understandings of social situations and Institute actions are produced.

Synthesis of matter in transcendental topic positions the *materia* of sensibility as that-which-is-determinable for perception. It is the logically-problematic function of Modality (connection in

the unity of consciousness of a proposition p in a "What if p ?" *nexus*). Metaphorical sensibility of an Institute subsists in its processes by which its agents grasp and become conscious of data and facts about the body politic of Society insofar as its duties and functions pertain to Order and Progress in Society. These data and facts are the determinable *materia* of corporate sensibility.

The *determinable* is that which can be used in a synthesis of determination but which has no logical context prior to this synthesis. A *determination* is a synthetic attribution to an Object of one of a pair of characteristics-propositions that are in opposition to one another. The first *momentum* of Modality is therefore a synthetic process of problematically apprehending data and facts about Society in preparation for the determination of meaning implications for them. The function goes beyond mere "data-basing" of pertinent facts and requires a process of relevance-setting within a general context of the Institute's role and mission. This, however, merely describes using other words a *research* function to be made part of the institution. Here I use the word "research" in its connotation of "careful, patient, diligent inquiry or examination."

Many Institutes have some sort of research function either directly incorporated into it or indirectly supplied to it by another Institute. The Census Bureau and the Office of Management and Budget are two examples of indirect suppliers instituted in the general government of the United States. Indirect supply is a frequent management practice in Taylorite organizations. The excuses for the practice are usually arguments of "efficiency." There is, however, significant concern that the practice has antisocial disbenefits. Most importantly, the indirect method sets up two distinct corporate persons – the Institute that carries out the research and the Institute that uses the research – but does not deal with the issue of making these two corporate persons function as a single unified corporate person in their interactions. Put another way, it neglects the Quantity and Quality functions of institution. The researching Institute usually does not have adequate knowledge pertaining to context and meaning implications important to the research-consuming Institute and its roles and mission. Context and relevance-setting, however, are key factors in the research function of Modality. This inadequacy is sometimes reflected in structures of actual Institutes. For example, the Office of Management and Budget is an office within the Executive branch of the U.S. general government. In 1974, however, Congress set up a separate Congressional Budget Office within the legislative branch – presumably because there were some members of Congress who felt that the OMB did not adequately provide the research function that Congress required. As another example, until the early years of the 21st century the Hewlett Packard Company maintained a corporate-level research function (Hewlett Packard Laboratories) but *also* maintained research and development laboratories in each of its product-producing divisions. The latter were much better integrated into the specific businesses carried on at these product divisions. These two examples are significant counterpoints to Taylorite maxims of organization and centralization of functions and control. Enlightened institution clearly favors *direct* institution of the research function. This is a finding borne out in the pages of the epic report by Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*.

The *synthesis of form* function of transcendental topic places *materia* in sensibility in determined positions within the form of a judgment. Form is the representation of a connection. Matter and form are the two poles in every complete representation, and the synthesis of form function produces the determination of the complete representation. The function is logically assertoric, i.e., produces a proposition p connected in the unity of consciousness as "I think p ."

The homologues of corporate personhood make their connections with the world through the actions externally expressed by the corporate person. This is in keeping with the context of *Lust per se* in *psyche* (figure 5). In this case, the context is judicial expedience, i.e. the suitability of the determination for satisfying a purpose. The assertoric homologue function of Modality is nothing other than *determination of actions* expedient in fulfilling the purposes for which the Institute is designed. This is the point at which the corporate person has its immediate connection

with Society. If the Institute is an Institute specifically established to provide public education, its actions would make up its *teaching function*. If it is a police department, this would be its *law enforcement function*. If it is a state legislature, this would be its *legislating function*. If it is a manufacturing Enterprise, this would be its conjoint *marketing-sales-production function*. If it is an army, this would be its *war-fighting function*¹⁸ insofar as war-fighting is used in service of its mission to provide for the common defense of its Society.

The third *momentum* of Modality in transcendental topic is ***presentation in belief***. This is the presentation of a condition of expedience for happiness. It is the logically-apodictic function, i.e., the judgment of a proposition *p* connected in the unity of consciousness as "I am certain *p*." This is perhaps the most difficult of the twelve homologous functions to deduce because a corporate person is not said to "be happy" or to "have desires" or to be "certain" about anything. At most we can liken "corporate happiness" to situations in which the corporate person is unaware, through the awareness of its agents, of unmet realizations of satisfactions or negations of dissatisfactions. To say this is to say that the metaphorical Object of happiness is domestic tranquility exhibited by the Society the Institute serves. *Domestic tranquility* is the collective tranquility in the members of a Society insofar as this tranquility¹⁹ pertains to the social Molecule within the Society's body politic. This, however, can only be judged in the negative. This is to say that *untranquility* can be observed through the actions of the members of a Society but individual tranquility is an inner state-of-being of a person and is unobservable by other persons. Merely because a person appears to be tranquil, this does not mean he actually *is* tranquil. Many a tyrant has had courtiers who appeared to him to be tranquil just before they assassinated him.

Belief is unquestioned holding-to-be-true. Judgments of belief are subjective judgments and ones that can be challenged by sensible experience. (A belief so challenged has doubts raised about it; before the challenge it is held-to-be-certain – because it is unquestioned – but afterwards, if it is still held-to-be-true, it ceases to be a belief and becomes an opinion). A logically-apodictic judgment is *understood* as a necessary judgment, e.g., "if *A* is true it is necessary that *B* is true." This, however, requires the judger to have constructed a deductive *model of a system*, in the contexts of which particular judgments are made conditioned under other concepts. This is an explanation of "necessity" that draws empirical support from psychology research into the logical function filled by the notion of necessity in human cognitive development. Piaget concluded,

The principal results of the present research can be summarized in the following three points: (1) Necessity pertains to the compositions carried out by the subject and is not an observable datum inherent in objects; (2) it is not an isolated and definitive state, but the result of a process (necessitation); and (3) it is directly related to the constituting of possibilities that generate differentiations, whereas necessity is related to integration – hence the two formations are in equilibrium. . . . In short, necessity does not emanate from objective facts, which are by their nature merely real and of variable generality and therefore subject to necessary laws to a greater or lesser extent. They only become necessary when integrated within deductive models constructed by the subject. The necessity of *p* can thus not be characterized only as the impossibility of not-*p*, since new possibilities can always emerge, but must be described in Leibniz's manner as the contradiction of not-*p*, and this relative to a specific, limited model. [Piaget (1983), vol. II, pp. 135-136]

¹⁸ War-fighting does not simply mean killing and destroying. There is much more to it than that. "Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities." – Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.

¹⁹ In regard to a human being, tranquility is a state of mind that results from being sufficiently satisfied in relationship to one's general state of life and desiring nothing more or different in this relationship.

This insight leads us to the homologue function. To have conditions held-to-be expedient for the domestic tranquility of the Society, the Institute must have laid down specific objectives that are to be fulfilled by the actions of its agency. This is properly called the **objectives-setting function** of the Institute. Note that this function is *understood* as a synthesis of the other two, i.e., the research function regarded as an assertoric determination.

Let us also note Piaget's comment that "new possibilities can always emerge." All human knowledge of experience is contingent knowledge; we never obtain a complete knowledge of everything we might encounter in experience, and future experience can and often does gainsay conclusions of past experience. The synthesis research + action determination → objectives-setting clearly illustrates that the Modality homologues are congruent with the Enlightenment principle of the necessity for flexible institutions.

In summary, the Modality functions of Enlightened institution are:

- **the research function;**
- **the determination of actions function;** and
- **the setting-of-objectives function.**

We have, then, the complete 2nd-level analytic representation of Enlightened institution illustrated by figure 7.

§ 5. Animating Principles and the Homologous Functions

The idea of a corporate person was introduced formally in chapter 13 of *The Idea of the Social Contract* [Wells (2012a), pp. 460-476]. It is a model deduced to explain Community behaviors insofar as the Community is regarded as a body politic. Corporate personhood for a Community is ultimately reducible to actions taken by individuals within the Community in the exercise of the individual powers of their persons (individual *Personfähigkeit*). As the actions of individuals might or might not cohere with one another, the corporate power of their association (corporate *Personfähigkeit*) can be either less than, the same as, or greater than the sum of the powers of the individual persons in the Community. The ground for objective validity in the idea of corporate persons is the acroam of practical unity in the synthesis of appearances in Critical metaphysics proper [*ibid.*, pg. 460]. A corporate person is understood as an Ideal governed by the acroams of the *Ideal for understanding* in Critical metaphysics, i.e., the acroams of:




Figure 7: 2LAR structure of the perfectibility of Man's institutions (Enlightened institution).

1. *entis realissimi*: a real object is a one-ness;
2. *ens originarium*: the *Existenz* of an object is predicated from grounds;
3. *ens summum*: all real things have a context within All-of-Reality;
4. *ens entium*: all real things are necessarily coherent in Reality.

These are acroams for understanding any Object as a real thing. A corporate person is an *Unsache*-thing, hence its reality and objective validity are judged *practically* according to actions within the context of the idea of its corporate *Personfähigkeit*. Accordingly, the homologous functions of corporate personhood in an Institute must cohere with the animating principles of corporate *Personfähigkeit*, which were presented earlier and are deduced from the acroams of the Ideal of understanding. A group of people whose collective actions do not accord with the principles of the Ideal above and the four animating principles does not constitute a corporate person, and no corporate person is defined outside the scope and extent to which the principles of the Ideal and of animating power are met. The reality of practical corporate personhood is thus always limited and is not an arbitrarily definable Object. When any corporate person ceases to meet the requirements of the principles, the Community has disintegrated.

The animating principle of Quantity states that the physical power of a corporate person subsists in its members being civilly active, i.e., in their acceptance and performance of specific civic Duties that each citizen can justly be held accountable for by the Community overall. The responsibility of individuals in an Institute is contained in the homologous function of the agent, and that of civic Duty is contained under the function of agency Duties. Because of the specification that these Duties are *civic* Duties, they are those Duties understood in common by the members of the association and are made characteristics of the structured agency. Thus, it is concluded that the homologous functions of Quantity are congruent with the animating principle of Quantity. It is this congruence that is understood in placing the functions of Quantity under the Enlightenment principle of justifiable institutions.

The animating principle of Quality states that intellectual power of a corporate person subsists in its institution as a means for the civic education of every member of the Community. Civic education is the teaching *and* learning of civil liberties, civil rights, civic Duties and civic Obligations of the Community under its social contract. For a *public* Institute, this Community extends to the entire citizenry of its Society generally. Now, it is obvious that most Institutes are not set up as teaching agencies, that is, as Institutes with public *instructional* education as their missions or as a part of their missions. Nonetheless, the actions of *every* public Institute *do* have an effect upon the educational Self-development of citizens who are affected by these actions. A public Institute is expected to obey the general will of the Sovereign of its Republic, and for this reason its actions are always judged according to the genuine fidelity of the Institute to the terms and conditions of its social contract. The just actions of a public Institute affirm the commitment of the Community to its social contract. Enormities perpetuated by public Institutes affirm the opposite and have the consequence of teaching members of the Society that their Obligations-to-Self and/or to one or more of the mini-Communities in which they are members *necessitate* moral secession from the greater Society because it has failed to uphold the terms of its social contract. Thus, every public Institute teaches members of the body politic civic lessons about the social-nature of their association. Because teaching these lessons subsists in actions of the Institute, the three *momenta* of Quality in figure 7 clearly cohere with the animating principle of intellectual *Personfähigkeit*. Because a just public Institute draws its expectation-for-authority from public expectations that it will maintain Order and advance Progress in Society overall, the homologous functions of Quality are in coherence with the Enlightenment principle of progressive education.

The animating principle of Relation states that tangible corporate power is exercised by the optimization of socio-economic utility. *Utility* means having the character of being usable as a

wealth-asset; a *wealth-asset* is any good for which its use negates unwealth; and *unwealth* is lack of what is practically needed to attain a state of satisfaction (*Wohlgefallen*). Socio-economic utility is the object of a concept of the overall state of *Wohlgefallen* being experienced within the body politic of Society. It does not require very much reflection to apprehend that optimization of this object can only be measured by its lack. The measure is necessarily a mathematical concept for which its object subsists in the degree of uncivic social interactions occurring within the general Community. All individual actions stand under practical imperatives of Obligation each person Self-constructs in his manifold of practical rules (figure 2).

For a public Institute, effective optimization of socio-economic utility necessarily requires that the Institute be, as Adams put it, "an exact portrait of the people at large." If it is not, its actions will give preferential treatment to some subset of the people in the Society to the detriment of other subsets of the people. This is not only antagonistic to Progress in Society; it is antagonistic even to the maintenance of social Order because it provokes formation of Toynbee proletariats. The functions of assimilation, accommodation, and social adaptation all go to making the Institute be a more perfect portrait of the people at large, and so these all fall under the animating principle of Relation. Just as clearly, the principle itself coheres with the Enlightenment principle of human determinability of Progress.

The animating principle of persuasive power (Modality) is a mathematical principle: corporate persuasive power is measured by the degree of generation/annihilation activity in bonding/anti-bonding leadership events in the embedding field representation of the corporate person. The abstract nature of this principle tends to make Modality in institution the most difficult to understand part of practical real institution. Bonding and antibonding relationships are ideas of social-chemistry in Society. Generation of bonding relationships make the social Molecule cohere, while annihilation of antibonding relationships remove hindrances that prevent civic cooperations from arising out of natural competition as individuals pursue their own Duties and fulfill Obligations to themselves and to those within personal societies. *Leadership* is a social dynamic that depends on reciprocal relationships between people (both individuals and corporate persons) by which followers' Self-determinations of actions are stimulated by the action of a leader [Wells (2010)]. *Leadership governance* is the management of the leadership dynamic in a group of people and is one of the expectations laid as a Duty for anyone appointed to a position as an authority figure.

It follows that the connection point between the mathematical principle and actions in human experience is made at the point where the corporate person of an Institute determines its actions insofar as these actions stimulate civic and civil reactions by citizens, i.e., promote acts of citizenship in the body politic. To do this in a way that maintains Order and promotes Progress in Society, the corporate person of the Institute must have knowledge of social situations existing in the Society (insofar as it lies within the scope of the Institute's expected authority). It must have the ability to determine just actions under the social contract. It must comprehend its own objectives and meet them with fidelity. But these are nothing else than the modal functional homologues of figure 7. Furthermore, awareness of social situations, determination of actions, and civil objectives inherently involve changes within the Institute as changes develop in social circumstances. Hence, institution must provide for the inherent flexibility of the Institute so that it self-makes harmonious adjustments to new social forces challenging the Society. The connection between the homologous functions and the animating principle of Modality is thus not an immediate connection but is, nonetheless, inherent in the general definitions of the functions. They go to the leadership role of Institutes in the determination of the general will²⁰ [Wells (2012a), chap. 13, pg. 490] as well as to its upholding and enforcement. These functions are

²⁰ General will is the unity in acting to improve the communal idea of ethical and moral perfection of the association through ongoing processes of review, evaluation, and refinement pertinent to civil tranquility.

congruent with the animating principle and with the Enlightenment principle of flexible institutions.

The objective of this chapter has now been met for a Critical theory of enlightened public institutions in general. I next turn specifically to institution of public instructional education.

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