Chapter 4 Institutional Factors of Corporate Personality

§ 1. The D-PIPOS Circumplex

Enlightened institution which conforms to human nature by intentional design must number among its design factors not merely the object-oriented tasks of Institutes but also factors of human nature found in all Societies. These involve a great deal of personal diversity found in the citizens of the Society. However, there are also important sources of diversity that arise from people's memberships in mini-Communities and these must also be taken into account. Further complicating the task of institution design is the fact that people are simultaneously members of more than one mini-Community. This section discusses an empirical tool for use in developing good design *téchne* for institution – namely, the D-PIPOS circumplex model.

Circumplex modeling was introduced as a psychological tool for evaluating personalities and personality-related disorders in the 1950s. Its mathematical technique was developed in the early research of Leary [Leary (1957)]. The D-PIPOS circumplex was introduced in Wells (2012), chap. 8. Figure 1 illustrates the model. In Wells (2012) it was shown that there is an empirical correspondence between three independently-developed circumplex models describing: (1) personality styles and disorders described by: (1) the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria [American Psychiatric Association (2000)]; (2) Kiesler's interpersonal circumplex [Kiesler (1983), (1985)]; and (3) the Wilson circumplex of social styles [Wilson (2011)]. It was further shown [Wells (2012), chap. 9] how an individual's manifold of rules can be characteristically mapped onto the D-PIPOS circumplex to relate its empirical characterizations to the mental physics of appetition. This psychological-to-appetition mapping is conceptually illustrated in figure 2.


Figure 1: The D-PIPOS circumplex of personality styles, interpersonal styles, and operationalizations.

Figure 2: Illustration of empirically mapping an individual's manifold of rules onto the D-PIPOS circumplex. A: Hypothetical full manifold set of an individual's manifold of rules at a particular time in his life. B: Hypothetical illustration of the active set of practical rules (purple colored) the individual is expressing in a particular social situation.

In general, that portion of an individual's manifold of rules that is activated at any particular time depends on his social situation and is co-determined with his 'decoding' of semantic messages (refer to chapter 3, figure 7, pg. 74). This situation-dependent activation of rules is hypothetically depicted in figure 2 B. Although the manifold of rules is a mathematical and super-sensible Object, observable expressions of personality style, interpersonal style, and expressed operationalizations can be used to 'place' the practical rules an individual appears to have formed on the D-PIPOS circumplex. One purpose for doing so is to gauge if the manner in which an Institute is operated and organized does or does not conflict with the practical human nature of individuals. There is, of course, a great deal of non-trivial research work in empirical psychology required before this possibility can be reduced to competent practice by trained psychologists. The methodology itself would properly be part of a social-natural science of organization design. We do not yet have such a science, but Critical epistemology and mental physics teach that such a science *is possible*. That which *presently* is called 'organization theory' would be more accurately called a pseudo-science and by any practical, results-oriented standard gauge would have to be called an expensive failure. This is amply demonstrated by the historical economic data presented in Wells (2013).

Social Institutes are never designed for or around one specific individual. Rather, they are and must be designed around their Society in the general and its affected mini-Communities in the particular. This practical fact nuances the previous paragraph's discussion in an important way. It means the design of an institution must be primarily concerned, not with the individual social atoms (human beings) *as* individuals, but rather with what can, without too much license, be called the 'corporate personality' of those social *Molecules* we call mini-Communities. The analogue of 'personality' in a mini-Community is constituted by the customs, mores, and folkways locally practiced by members of that mini-Community. Viewed in the context of this analogue, the operational expressions of a mini-Community have correspondences with those that are expressed by individuals (e.g., competitive vs. deferent, hostile vs. friendly, etc. in figure 1), bearing in mind that the Kiesler operationalizations have more or less specific technical definitions [Kiesler (1985)] and Kiesler's terminology cannot be equated to dictionary definitions.

Up to a point, D-PIPOS analysis of institution suppositions can be carried out from a starting point in psychological understanding of the three empirical models united in the D-PIPOS circumplex. As an illustration, let us consider one of the unquestioned common presuppositions that appeared in proposals for a national system of education in the post-American Revolution period of the 1780s and 1790s. This was the presupposition of the desirability for an institution of public education designed to emphasize "emulation." Enlightenment Era American political scientists regarded "emulation" as one of "the" dominating factors in human behavior. John Adams wrote,

> Men, in their primitive conditions, however savage, were undoubtedly gregarious; and they continue to be social, not only at every stage of civilization but in every possible situation in which they can be placed. As nature intended them for society, she has furnished them with passions, appetites, and propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual enjoyment and to render them useful to each other in their social connections. There is none among them more essential or remarkable than the *passion for distinction*. . . . Wherever men, women, or children are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected, by the people about him and within his knowledge. . . .
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> This passion, while it is simply a desire to excel another by fair industry in the search of truth and the practice of virtue, is properly called *Emulation*. When it aims at power as a means of distinction it is *Ambition*. [Adams (1790), pp. 338-340]

Americans today tend to be unaware of how influential a thinker John Adams was in the early United States. In the quote above, Adams makes some very sweeping psychological statements[1] that were widely accepted as "common knowledge" at the time. Adams himself did not actually say "Emulation" lay behind every person's actions (he said "the desire for distinction" did), but many other influential members of the American Philosophical Society (APS) did. Two of these were Samuel Harrison Smith and Samuel Knox. In 1797 the Smith Plan for the institution of education split the APS prize for best education plan with the Knox Plan. Both plans made "emulation" one of their cornerstones. In the Knox Plan, Knox wrote,

> Independent of these important considerations, *emulation*, which hath so powerful an influence on the human mind, especially in the season of youth, would lose its effects in promoting improvement, and the love of excellence, on any other plan than that of the academical. Indeed this consideration alone ought to be sufficiently decisive in its favor.
>
> Love of excellence predominates in every uncorrupted youthful breast; and where this principle is under the conduct of impartial and skillful directors, it is observed to have the happiest effects in promoting that intensity of application and persevering industry which the more abstruse and arduous departments of science necessarily require. . . .
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> Another argument in favor of an academical education is, that such as are tutored in private are apt to form too high an opinion of their own attainments and abilities. Owing to the want of an opportunity of observing the abilities or exertions of others, it is easy to conceive that such may most probably be the consequence of that mode of instruction. [Knox (1797), pp. 60-63]

While Knox favored public academies as the key part of the education system, Smith took this even further and proposed a plan featuring what we would today call 'boarding schools' where the pupils would live while in school. He, too, based his reasoning for this on "emulation":

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[1] In 1790 psychology was not yet a science, but human behavior was an essential part of the social-natural political science of that day. It was not until the mid-19th century that modern psychology had its start.

> The great argument, which may be called the center of all others urged, is the production of emulation by a public education; while the great objection made to public education is the sacrifice, alleged to be produced, of morality and honesty. [Smith (1797), pg. 60]

Although the emulation principle went more or less unquestioned, one look at the D-PIPOS circumplex (figure 1) immediately shows that this principle is unsuitable to serve as a general principle of education institution. One of the characteristic axes of the circumplex is the emulative axis, located at the -90° position. This axis describes the social style of just one group of people, who the Wilson circumplex calls the "Expressives." People who habitually adopt the Expressive social style would find an education institution tailored for emulation to be quite comfortable and to their liking. People whose habitual social style is the Analytic style, in contrast, would hate this same system of education because it is the polar opposite of their social style. The other two quadrants of social styles (Drivers and Amiables) would find the system less repugnant than the Analytics would, but emulation as a principle would not motivate them as it is orthogonal to their developed social habits and 'comfort zone.' I think it is worth remarking that some current and recent educational fads – e.g., the so-called 'self-esteem' movement (≈ idiosyncratic axis) – repeat precisely this same error, merely using a different D-PIPOS axis as a 'principle' of pseudo-psychological reasoning. Reasonings of this sort are nothing other than an adult restaging of the phenomenon of egocentrism – the unquestioned presupposition that others understand things and feel about things the same way *you* do. American education theory has a quite venerable 217-year tradition of repeating this mistake.

Applying circumplex methodology clearly requires the introduction of statistical methods if a corporate characterization of a mini-Community population is to result. This has been a subject of study for many years now. Examples of divers approaches and methods can be found in Plutchik & Conte (1997). One thing empirical studies have made very clear is that individual differences within a population do have non-negligible effects on correct interpretation and use of circumplex results. For example, a methodology proposed by Kloot & Kroonenberg (1982) found that individuals' circumplexes cannot merely be superimposed one on another but, rather, a more detailed analysis of variance must be carried out. It is not controversial to say much is still to be done, and is being done, on efforts to develop and prove accurate analysis methods. One thing for which circumplex models have been properly criticized has been the great amount of subjectivity in practices of choosing circumplex factor labels. What mental physics offers in the way of remediating this situation is the reference gauge defined by the D-PIPOS circumplex. Further, for the specific topic now under discussion, a social-natural basis (in Kant's moral categories – chapter 3 of this book) linked to the primitive *momenta* of reflective judgment and the process of appetition [Wells (2009)] orients analysis so as to bring it in line with human moral judgments, habitual behavior, and interpersonal expressions during communication transactions.

It can be expected that it will take quite some time before adequately successful modeling practices are achieved, but this is not an unusual situation in what Kuhn called "the establishment of scientific paradigms" [Kuhn (1970)]. The fact that this is a work-in-progress does not mean science is stymied; every science that has ever existed has gone through its incremental stages of development with useful, and often with particularly-fecund, preliminary results arising in early stages of theory development. As two examples among very many we have: (1) the empirical studies of the 19th century spectroscopists that were key to the development of the Bohr model of the atom – which in its turn was a key preliminary step to the development of quantum mechanics; and (2) the work of ancient Egyptian "practical geometers" whose work paved the way for and made possible the Greek development of Euclidean geometry and, indeed, all of mathematics into the middle-to-late 19th century. Kuhn documents a number of similar pre-developments in his book.

For the present discussion, one particular characteristic of the manifold-of-rules-mapping onto

the D-PIPOS circumplex is the phenomenon of narrow 'spikes' such as illustrated in figure 2. The significance of 'spike-like' characteristics in such a mapping is that they predict the person will exhibit a relatively inflexible reaction to evoking external stimuli. When a large-radius, narrow-angle 'spike' appears in an individual's mapping, it denotes a behavioral response pattern that psychiatry calls a 'personality disorder' (when it is an extreme departure from radii more commonly exhibited by others in the same social environment[2]). The 'spike' slightly clockwise from the Emulative axis in figure 2 A is meant to convey an example of this an individual might build into his manifold of rules structure. This is one finding in which mental physics and the D-PIPOS circumplex model contradict and correct an earlier implication of Leary's model (which implied that more extreme and rigid expressions of a personality disorder should have a *wider* arc in Leary's circumplex – a mathematical error in the mental physics of its construction).

Stepping back a bit from this level of abstraction to a more concrete example, one of the Kloot & Kroonenberg conclusions was that their subjects "used one common, possibly culturally shared Implicit Theory of Personality" [Kloot & Kroonenberg (1982)]. One way to rephrase this finding is to say the people in their study did share a more or less common set of expectations for how other people would/should behave based on cultural norms and customs. Kloot & Kroonenberg stated that individual behavioral variations were "fluctuations superimposed on the common structure" – the 'common structure' being what analogy would call a "corporate personality."

To bring this finding into sharper focus, let us suppose that a public school teacher made a personal opinion comment to a newspaper reporter to the effect that "there is nothing inherently evil about pederasty." I mentioned in chapter 3 that America's moral custom concerning pederasty is absolute and condemnatory. No newspaper reporter I have ever met would hesitate in the slightest to print this comment in his newspaper. Need I say how much of an uproar that would provoke from the citizens of the community? Calls for this teacher's dismissal would be the *least* extreme reaction from the public – and rightly so because one of the *expectations of authority* that goes with the job of being a public school teacher (at every level) is the expectation that teachers have a Duty *to the public* to act as role models for their pupils. 'Role model' *means* 'living example of how pupils are expected to integrate themselves into the general Society.' Even if our hypothetical teacher was only expressing a personal opinion, this opinion would be one that insults very basic mores held-to-be-binding by an overwhelming majority of American citizens. It would, therefore, be not only an imbecilic action to express this opinion publicly but would constitute a moral transgression of the teacher's Duty to the public. In public service, personal opinion *never* trumps public Duty.

Is this an absurdly hypothetical case? I will say "no" because actual cases of, for example, a school teacher engaging in sexual relationships with a minor pupil are a matter of public record. The pertinence of this example to public school institution is that it goes to the core of how the Institute's agents are expected *and required* to behave *by virtue of the public offices that have been entrusted to them*. It goes, in other words, to an implied pledge made *to the public* at the very moment our hypothetical teacher-agent accepted the job. There are very few present-day public Institutes I know of who factor in Duty-to-the-public *as part of their basic institution*.[3]

For example, most U.S. Presidents have added the (unconstitutional) phrase "so help me God" to the end of the oath of office. I don't have any issue with any person asking the deity recognized by his religion for help, but this should be a private request or else it is at root an avoidance of pledging the oath *to the public he is expected to serve* (made so by the First Amendment). A

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[2] Wider and shorter spikes ('bumps') imply what psychiatry calls 'personality styles' [Sperry (2003)].

[3] I have served with seven university presidents. Four out of the seven tended to forget that I and *all* my colleagues in faculty, staff, and administration positions were there to serve the public, not the president. The ratio is even worse among other hired-help administrators making up "the president's staff."

public institution must *never* be ambiguous about identifying who its pledgees really are. Nor should the institution be designed in ignorance of the mores and folkways of the mini-Communities the Institute serves or affects. This is nothing less than a social-natural *regulatory principle* of institution design. The D-PIPOS circumplex is an empirical tool of institution *téchne*.

§ 2. The Problem of Mini-Community Psychology and Personality

Although many books on the topics of industrial and management psychology exist, there has not been any book published dealing with the subject of the corporate psychology of mini-Communities. While one can expect there to be some amount of overlap between these topics, the phenomenon of mini-Community does present unique factors that do not fit within the simpler models that have been developed for management psychology theories.

Any mini-Community is an abstract person (a stereotype) and, in terms of its social-chemistry mathematics, a social Molecule[4]. Person-to-person social-chemical bonds within it have their origins from expressed or implied social contract Obligations members of the mini-Community either explicitly or implicitly establish among themselves. These, in turn, always back-refer to social chemical bonds that bind each specific individual to *his* self-defined personal society, a binding that is called the *person's* social molecule (lower case 'm'). The social-natural sociology of quantitatively modeling a mini-Community must, therefore, involve a rather complex *system* of sub-models containing contributions from the individuals' personal social molecules in order to achieve a mathematical representation of the mini-Communities within a general Society. This is a non-trivial task involving multiple layers of model-order reduction and scientific reduction.[5] There is a mathematical technique – embedding field theory [Grossberg (1968), (1969), (1971)] – for carrying out this modeling task. To date this technique has not been seriously applied to study the social-natural dynamics of Societies, but its methods are quite protean and no *fundamental* barriers to its application to social-natural sociology or social psychology are known to exist. I am not saying that doing so is easy; I know of no science that does not entail quite significant technical challenges as deeper levels of understanding of its topical phenomena are sought. But to presume the task is too monumental is to presume the sciences themselves are impossible. It is true that every science of social-natural phenomena will be more challenging than physics; but *every* other science is more challenging than physics. Yet molecular chemistry, biology, and civil engineering all exist thanks to methods of model-order reduction/scientific reduction.[6]

Industrial psychology and managerial psychology, as these empirical sciences are practiced at present, rely upon peculiar *context-determined* simplifications that can be applied to usefully approximate motivational factors acting as main effects within an organization's dynamics. Put

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[4] A social Molecule is the representation by an embedding field network of the social environments of a population of human beings. A social molecule (lower case) is the representation by an embedding field network of the social environment of a single individual and his personal society.

[5] There is a brief introduction to the methodology of model order reduction and scientific reduction, and their relationship, provided in Wells (2011).

[6] In the institution of organizations there is always a tradeoff decision to be made between the number of disciplinary specialists involved and the number of interdisciplinarians involved. Generally speaking, an Institute consisting only of disciplinarians and an Institute consisting only of interdisciplinarians are both poorly designed Institutes. This staffing problem has a number of commonalities with what psychologists call "the cognitive workload problem." In particular, the common issues rest on the fact that 'complexity' in a system is a characteristic of the system but 'simplicity' is a characteristic of the phenomenon of mind. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in technology and people's abilities to use it [Lew (2013), chap. 1, pp. 3-5]. The design objective for an institution is to provide both an adequate understanding of the 'complexity' of the institutional system and a 'simplicity' in its practices. A well balanced disciplinary vs. interdisciplinary expertise in the corporate agency is vital to achieving this objective.

another way, only *some* of the manifold structures of people's manifolds of rules are pertinent to the normal dynamics of the corporate persons studied by these sciences. Useful, but only approximate, reduced-order models can, consequently, provide the restricted scope within which these theories now operate. Shortcomings in both sciences rest primarily on two sources: (1) the use of objectively non-valid ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysics upon which model constructs are based; and (2) a general lack of dynamical mathematical modeling, particularly a non-use of embedding field theory models. These two factors combine to produce the disappointingly limited fecundity of these empirical sciences as they are presently practiced.

The institution of public education must be designed to cope with what, by analogy, can be called the psychology and personalities of mini-Communities insofar as these mini-Communities have a corporate interest in education. This is especially important in determining how a system of public education is to be governed both within its Institutes and in relationship to the general Society to which it belongs. Unfortunately, this is a topic for which its stage of scientific development can barely be called embryonic. At present the best that this treatise can be expected to provide is a rudimentary beginning and framework of general principles. The starting point for these principles is found in the Idea of the Social Contract. Figure 3 presents this Idea in its 4LAR form deduced in Wells (2012).

For any association or group of people to constitute a mini-Community, those people must share some implicit or explicit social contract that binds them in their union. Wells (2012) dealt with the social-nature of this binding as it is viewed from *within* the Community. Here, in this treatise, the required viewing point shifts from within the mini-Community to a practical *external* view from which the broader Society regards the mini-Communities it contains. According to the principles of Critical metaphysics, this necessitates a shift in the perspective from which we understand the social-nature of mini-Communities. Mini-Communities in great numbers and in great diversity are going to be found in any Society whose population rises above that of a small tribal group or isolated village, and the institution of public education must recognize this situation and the complications and challenges it presents. The problems of mini-Community are not problems one can banish by merely wishing them to go away.


Figure 3: 4LAR structure of the Idea of the Social Contract.

In Wells (2012), Communities were examined in an *internal* context of relationships because the topical concern in that treatise was with the inner social-nature of Communities. The topical interest in that treatise is with how a Community is possible and what principles govern Order and Progress in sustaining it. When topical interest shifts to the relationships between mini-Communities and overall Society, the focus of examination shifts from internal Community relationships to *external* relationships between mini-Communities as well as general Society.

By practical necessitation the principles being sought are principles taken from the *practical* Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. This can perhaps be best appreciated by looking at the general complexity possible in the social contracting that forms mini-Communities. Just at the formal structural level depicted in figure 3, there are over 43 *million* distinct *forms* of mini-Community (3^{16}) that are mathematically possible. Interactions among mini-Communities will reduce this number (because co-dependencies develop from interactions), but individual idiosyncrasies in the population members will work to increase the possible number of actually-distinguishable mini-Communities in terms of the empirical *matter* of their makeup. To approach the issue, then, from the *theoretical* Standpoint (as a Platonist or a rationalist would be inclined to do) is a *practical* impossibility. The recourse left open to science is to base institution *téchne* on general animating and organizing *practical* principles. This is, in point of fact, the approach that is taken in every empirical science[7]. Practical principles are what make the *practice* of science possible.

In seeking out and identifying appropriate practical principles, the empirical psychology of management and organization is a logical starting point for setting the scope of the problem in its proper practical context. Perhaps as good a summary perspective as any is that which was written by Stanford University psychologist Harold J. Leavitt. Leavitt specified four population scales at which different important empirical aspects of the problem emerge:

   a) people taken one at a time (the 'psychological units');
   b) people considered two at a time (problems of influence and authority);
   c) people in groups of three to twenty (efficiency and influence in groups); and
   d) people in hundreds and thousands (problems of organizational design). [Leavitt (1972)]

Leavitt's empirical population-size scale divisions provide probably as good a starting point as any for initially estimating degrees of abstractions in principles to be employed for reduced-order models and for establishing a general location on what is called 'the ladder of model-order reduction and scientific reduction' [Wells (2011)].

For the institution of public education, Leavitt's scale level (d) is rather clearly the obvious applicable level since towns, cities, counties, states, regions, and the nation constitute a size-hierarchical pyramid of complexities impacting successful public education institution. Within

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[7] In mathematics, the corresponding basic principles are called the axiom system. The community of physicists – or, at least, physics' public relations wing – tends to impress laypeople with the notion that everything in nature can be deduced from "the fundamental laws of physics." In fact, this is not true because the things in nature are so very complex that the "fundamental laws" (e.g., the laws of quantum mechanics), if one attempts to mechanically apply them, produce a mathematical problem that cannot be solved exactly. What physicists actually do in these cases (which constitute the vast majority of actual technical cases) is either: (1) make approximations based on empirical principles (e.g., 'semi-classical' models used in solid-state physics); or (2) leave the problem to some other branch of science (e.g., engineering). Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman once said, "Physicists always have a habit of taking the simplest example of any phenomenon and calling it 'physics,' leaving the more complicated examples to become the concern of other fields – say of applied mathematics, electrical engineering, chemistry, or crystallography" [Feynman *et al.* (1963), vol. II, chap. 31]. A person who only approaches physics using a mathematically mechanical approach will never be a good physicist. More is required, and this is what the old timers meant by "understanding the physics." Physics is not even remotely a "science of everything."

that scale level of a Society, the mini-Communities contained within it will appear either as smaller scale level 'd' populations or as scale level 'c' populations.

Leavitt modeled the organization design problem in terms of five reciprocally interacting factors: task, structure, people, technology, and the organization's environment (both physical and social). Figure 4 is an illustration of the Leavitt model [Leavitt (1972), pp. 259-265]. Although his specific focus was on the organization and management of commercial business entities, his factors easily generalize to Societies and Communities in general because a business entity which employs more than one person is merely a special case of a Society. It is for this reason that many of Leavitt's comments, hypotheses, and theories are applicable to the case of Institutes in general.

A Leavitt 'task' is any action carried out within the organization expressing the employment of tangible power (tangible *Personfähigkeit*), by any person or group of persons employed in it, for the purpose of accomplishing some objective of or within the organization. In the more general context of Societies, substitute the word 'Institute' for the word 'organization' and we have the general definition of 'task.' Leavitt uses 'structure' in the dictionary connotation of "the arrangement or interrelation of all the parts of the whole." This includes both tangible and intangible parts. Examples of the latter include the system of internal communications 'networks' and the management/reporting ('organization chart') system it employs. His usage falls within the general Critical definition of 'structure.' 'People,' of course, means the individual human beings who are employed by the organization (or the Institute) and who carry out their individual enterprise actions within its community. The environment is that part of the natural world (including people who are not employed by the organization) in reciprocal interaction with the organization (or the Institute) such that each affects and is affected by the other.


Figure 4: The Leavitt model of factors in organization design.

By 'technology' Leavitt meant both the physical assets (machinery, etc.) of the organization (or the Institute) and the 'information technology' used by the organization (or Institute). One of the points he emphasized – which was in 1972 a rather new notion for organizational psychology – was that the technologies utilized by an organization (or Institute) affects all the other factors of organization and is, in turn, affected by them. He paid especial attention to the information technology ("IT") aspect of technology because in 1972 the use of computers and computer networks was just beginning to be widely employed in businesses. IT then, as compared to now, was rather primitive (and expensive) but it was recognized by 1970 that this then-still-new technology was going to change the nature of organizations quite profoundly. In the four decades since then, not all his optimistic projections for the role of IT and what it would mean for organizations has come to pass, but it is nonetheless true that IT did profoundly change the way organizations operate. It also did, as Leavitt had said it must, profoundly affect the other factors of organizations.

Leavitt focused his attention on social psychology factors and their consequences within the organization (or Institute). A summary understanding of these is necessary and pertinent for gaining an understanding of the 'personalities' of Institutes as these appear to observers outside them and to whom Institutes appear as corporate persons. I will not attempt in this treatise to review all the social psychology factors covered by Leavitt, but I will review the ones that act as main effects in modeling the corporate 'personality' of an Institute as seen from the outside, and which partially determine the Institute's social Molecule interactions with the rest of the Society in which it is embedded.

§ 3. Leavitt's Principles[8]

Leavitt's principles are what I call the collection of empirical psychological findings Leavitt gathered together in his book (see footnote 8). None of these principles are especially profound but the fact he saw fit to write about them points out that for many people they are not especially obvious either. There are eight major Leavitt's principles of organization.

Principle 1: Organizations are volatile and everything triggers everything else. It is not unusual for people to presume that what happens in one part of an organization or Institute is insulated from what happens in other parts of it. Empirically, this is observed to be untrue. What psychologists have discovered in their studies of organizations is a manifestation of a general idea of social-chemistry brought out in Wells (2013), pp. 71-72, namely the idea of the **Enterprise protein**. An Enterprise protein is a particular class of social Molecule structure represented by an embedding field network characterized by: (1) the presence of one or more chains of mutual interactions between individuals or mini-Communities by which remote effects at one end of the chain are indirectly produced by actions at its other end; (2) interaction connections are bidirectional in the embedding field; (3) the functional connections are adaptive such that the network is self-organizing; (4) interaction functional connections linking the nodes in the network are effected by expressions of *Personfähigkeit*; and (5) new network nodes can be added and old ones deleted. Enterprise protein structures exist both within the overall Society and within sub-Societies and mini-Communities contained in the overall Society. Principle 1 points out that organizations (and Institutes) are composed as Enterprise protein structures. Some people who are naïve in their understandings of how an organization hierarchy actually behaves will assume that the "organization chart" depiction of an organization means actions and effects are only

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[8] Although I am calling them "Leavitt's principles," I must point out that Leavitt's book is an introduction to managerial psychology and in it he reports the accepted consensus of American scholars of that topic and of his day (or, at least, those of the 'Stanford school' of managerial psychology). He was not the discoverer or principal researcher who unearthed all these principles. Let this be my acknowledgement of and to the many unsung psychologists who contributed to the field's knowledge of the topic.

transmitted from the higher levels of the org chart to the lower levels. Bi-directionality means that effects are transmitted in both directions. For example, a work slowdown on a production line can and does affect the actions of top level executives at a manufacturing plant. The "Occupy Wall Street" movement of a few years ago rippled across the United States in just a few days to spark similar "Occupy" movements in a number of cities across the country. To share a personal perspective with you, I myself would have travelled from my home in Moscow, Idaho, to join the "Occupiers" in Seattle or, a few days later, in Boise if my Duty to my students had not required me to remain at my teaching post in Moscow. I was itching to go, but the itch could not be scratched[9]. The network of connections in an Enterprise protein is pervasive and the volatility of the organization often catches people in its authority figure positions with their pants down[10].

   Principle 2: The complexity of the communication network increases as the population of an organization or Institute increases. Leavitt did not have much to say about person-to-person communications in an organization because, "Experimental research in the field has only a short history. Many of the findings are highly tentative and not subject to ready generalization" [Leavitt (1972), pg. 189]. I am not convinced the current state of research today is much different from forty years ago. Leavitt devoted most of his discourse on this topic to what he called the *formal* communication network that is designed as part of an organization's structure. He does, however, note that an *informal* network (sometimes called 'the grapevine') is also a fact of real organization structure. It is a neglected aspect of organization *Existenz*, and this is a shortcoming of industrial and managerial psychology research. The informal network has as great or even greater effect on social-chemistry dynamics as the formal one does. It is one of the principal determiners of the leadership dynamic in every Society. Most interaction functionals in an Enterprise protein operate through direct person-to-person communication transactions. At the interpersonal level we must refer to Weaver's model representations to appreciate the nature of the overall dynamics of communication within a Society and its Institutes and mini-Societies. In terms of overall social structure, person-to-person networking phenomena have mathematical topology aspects as well as the psychological aspects of Kiesler operationalizations. In my opinion, most organizations operate in near-total ignorance of the fact that the real structure of any organization is determined to a significant degree by the informal communication sub-networks that its people set up for themselves. It is an aspect that design *téchne* for institutions ignores only at peril of failure of the design. Leavitt is clear that the complexity of communication networks increases as the population of an organization, an Institute, or a mini-Society grows. There is a mathematical upper bound to the number of specific communication links that can exist in an embedding field graph modeling N individuals[11] but the exact number is a function of the topological neighborhood structures of the personal societies in the overall population[12]. The stronger the social-chemical binding relationships are in a mini-Society, the more strongly connected the network of interpersonal communications within it can be expected to be, and the more accurately the mini-Society can be modeled by one or a few corporate person nodes in an embedding field model of the overall Society. System sensitivity analysis is a vital aspect of such modeling activities.

   Principle 3: Taylorism is a failed management method. Taylorism, the dominant management method used by large corporations and government, fails because of its disregard of people

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[9] I have an explicitly pledged social contract with my students; I had none with the Occupiers.

[10] When I was a manager in a large manufacturing business, I was astounded at how often it happened that we would make a controversial decision in a meeting and I would be intercepted on my way back to my desk afterwards by people who were concerned or upset about it but who had not been in the meeting (which typically had ended only minutes earlier). The grapevine seemed to be incredibly omniscient.

[11] # links $\leq 0.5 \cdot N!/(N-2)!$ where '!' denotes 'factorial'; the upper bound is a binomial coefficient.

[12] 'Topological neighborhood' is a technical idea in the mathematical theory of topology. For a technical explanation of this term, see Baum (1964) or another mathematics textbook on topology theory.

in the organization and its feudal/caste management structure. Among the results produced by Taylorism ever since its inception are work slowdowns, sabotage of operations by workers, and pegged production levels. The failure of Taylorism was proved in the 1920s during the landmark studies at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company. These studies gave rise to an alternate method called 'participatory management,' which promoted the use of groups of workers as a substitute for authoritarianism, and participation by workers in the making of decisions. However, as participatory management developed it came to be applied only within management ranks and tended to exclude non-management personnel. It also did not do away with the failure producing elements of Taylorism or with specialized industrial engineers and efficiency experts. When the Information Technology sub-organization came into being, Taylorism was made the managerial relationship between IT people and middle management. Leavitt wrote,

> Taylorism separated planning from doing, created the industrial engineering specialist, and generated unforeseen problems of human resistance. It has found its more lasting application (at least in its original form) at hourly levels.
>
> Participative management recommended planning and doing, but in groups. But though demonstrably applicable to hourly workers, it has had its great impact on managerial levels thus inadvertently contributing to an enlarged barrier to movement from worker to manager.
>
> Information technology has re-separated planning from doing in think-type jobs. It will affect all levels, and come into at least partial conflict with participative ideas as a partially alternative method for managing both managers and hourly jobs. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 277]

A landmark study published in 1982 by Peters and Waterman found that excellently-performing companies were companies whose practices were the opposite of Taylorism, while mediocre and poorly performing companies generally had adopted Taylorism as the dominant management paradigm. In the 20th century, Taylorism in the administration of schools became the dominant paradigm at all levels from the primary school up through the universities. Indeed, American universities are field laboratories where the incompetency of Taylorism can be readily studied.

Principle 4: Organizations, like individuals, are satisficing problem solvers. On the face of it, this is not a surprising principle. Determinations of decisions and actions within any organization are always determined by people and *all* people are satisficing problem solvers. Where organizations differ from individuals is that special interests of mini-Communities, as well as of individual managers and decision makers, can conflict. Consequently, decisions are swayed by competition among special interest groups and individuals. Leavitt remarked that this tends to lead over time to the institution of the rough equivalent of bodies of law in a system of courts as a way to try to prevent total breakdown of cooperation within the organization. Such quasi-legal-machinery has usually been instituted using Taylorism [Leavitt (1972), pg. 281]. It is an *ad hoc* legal system but not a *justice* system. *Uncivic* competition over special interests it promotes leads to granulation of the organization's Society and a disunity of purposes. Leavitt remarks,

> This is only to say that in most organizations there is not one goal but a diversity of goals. . . . One important fact is that the meaningful, operational goals that people really work at tend to be local goals. [*ibid.*, pg. 288]

This remark is important when governance of public education is discussed. Schooling institution in the U.S. has been granulated since the nation was founded, thus failing our *national* interests.

Principle 5: Organizations are communities. Leavitt points out that for the people working in an organization, the organization is like a residential neighborhood community in many ways. In some neighborhoods, the people who live there are more or less closely knit socially, they have

their own local folkways and even local mores all people in the neighborhood follow, and to a greater or lesser extent have neighborhood activities that most of the people take part in. There are other neighborhoods where even next door neighbors are virtually strangers to one another and the only things people in the neighborhood share are geographic location and, usually, common concerns for property values, zoning laws, and provision of city services such as water, garbage collection, and police and fire protection. Most neighborhoods tend to fall somewhere in between these extremes. The social behavior of a neighborhood can be likened to a corporate personality when viewed by others who are not residents of the neighborhood community. For example, in many American neighborhoods the social style most frequently expressed by its household mini-Communities[13] tends to fall into the quadrant centered on the gregarious axis, overlapping the Amiable and Analytic social styles of the D-PIPOS circumplex ranging from the avoidant to the schizoid personality styles [Wells (2012), chap. 8, pp. 272, 274].

However, as Leavitt points out [*op cit.*, pp. 290-291], organizations exert pressures on their people that are over and above the normal social pressures found in residential neighborhoods. These additional pressures affect the 'corporate personality' of the organization. If the gregarious quadrant of social/personality styles is the more commonly occurring case for American residential neighborhoods, the quadrant centered on the individualistic axis of the D-PIPOS circumplex is probably the more commonly occurring case in large corporations even if the people working there exhibit the gregarious quadrant styles when they are at home[14]. People's social styles are partially determined by their experiences with divers social environments, and they adapt their operationalized styles to fit different social environments. Among the special social pressures exerted by organizations, Leavitt focuses on three characteristics of organizations that tend to produce frustrations in their people: (1) effects produced in hierarchical, pyramid-like organization structures; (2) types of individual authority and responsibility expectations that go with specific roles and jobs within the organization; and (3) effects of population size and geographical extent of the organization. These factors lead to additional Leavitt's principles.

Principle 6: Pyramidal/hierarchical organizations tend to provoke uncivic competition for advancement between individuals and between mini-Societies within the organization. Leavitt does not distinguish between civic and uncivic competition (the idea had not been brought forth yet in 1972), but where he discusses problems and troubles pyramidal organizations bring upon themselves [Leavitt (1972), pp. 291-295], the competitions he describes are uncivic. He lists three empirical conditions he regards as necessary for internal competition to be beneficial to the organization. A few organizations (e.g., Little League) meet them, most do not:

1. the jobs of the competitors must be *independent*, not interdependent;
2. the standards for advancement must be *objective*, not subjective; and
3. *success* for one individual must be separable from *failure* for others. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 293]

The first of these conditions is often impossible to establish because the work people do within an organization usually tends to be inherently interdependent. If this is not so there are only a few reasons to construct an organization. (For Little League, 'having fun' is the main one). The second condition is unnatural if the standards are Platonic *noumena* unconnected to human nature. Taylorism is fatally infected with these. The third condition might be possible from the perspective of managers occupying jobs higher up in the hierarchy, but whether this is so from the perspectives of competitors is another matter altogether. Hierarchical organizations fostering competition for

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[13] Note that I make a distinction between a community and a Community. See the glossary for details.

[14] There have been no formal studies carried out to characterize the corporate personalities of either residential or workplace communities. My characterizations here of styles as 'probably the most common' is based on my observations of different places over the years. They are not to be taken as definitive findings.

advancement also generally wish to simultaneously produce cooperation in the workforce. However, if *uncivic* competition for advancement results – as it does when Leavitt's three conditions are not met – something very different happens. The nature of the competition provoked by the management method is one that provokes people to act upon the basis of Duties-to-Self rather than reciprocal Duties. If you are a manager, it is utterly useless to exhort your subordinate to "do your duty." *He always will*. The problem is that the structure of the organization ensures that these are duties-to-self and fails to evoke the establishment of corporate *civic* duties. *No person can lay any obligation on another person*. All obligations are made by the individual obliging *himself*. The pyramidal organization with its deliberate fostering of uncivic competition for advancement guarantees itself that the organization will be or will become an organization of civil outlaws unbound by a general social contract. All Taylorite organizations will fail to be civil Communities even if there are civil *mini*-Communities that spontaneously emerge within it. That is one of the major reasons why *all* Taylorite organizations *do* eventually break down and fall. The reason this goes unnoticed is that as it falls and a different one takes its place, the new organization tends to keep the old name. Hewlett Packard and U.S. Steel are two examples of this. HP was once a civil Community and no longer is[15]. U.S. Steel never was a civil Community and the naming label covers a series of several generations of different declining companies. The HP series can look forward to a future very much like the history of U.S. Steel.

Leavitt's assessment is not so direly expressed as I have just expressed it. In his book he does make a comment that reveals one of his own unquestioned presuppositions:

> So, despite all the difficulties that are consequent to the competition created by the pyramid, there is not sufficient reason for abandoning it, especially since no good substitute is available. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 295]

This statement is untrue. Merely because a form of institution has not been tried, this does not mean it is impossible or that it lacks *Dasein*. Breakdown *is* a sufficient reason to abandon pyramids. I later discuss a substitute for them, namely the ***Enterprise of enterprises*** structure.

Principle 7: Pyramidal management structure places most individuals into situations of dependency, toward which they feel ambivalence. Leavitt discusses the opposition of the concepts of 'authority' and 'dependency' [*ibid.*, pp. 295-300]. Leavitt's connotation of the idea of 'authority' is the traditional non-technical one and would be better called *rulership*. His usage reflects the widely-held misunderstanding of the social-nature of leadership [Wells (2010)]. Along with Principle 7, Leavitt presents three closely related sub-principles that can be likened to what mathematicians call 'lemmas':

> **Lemma 7.1: Power tends to follow the pyramid in a pyramidal structure.**
>
> **Lemma 7.2: Serious psychological trauma goes with dependency-ambivalence effects produced by pyramidal management structure.**
>
> **Lemma 7.3: The idea of being able to set up crisply delineated responsibilities is just a myth depicting an unreal Object.**

By 'power' Leavitt means a warrant to make decisions, give orders, determine assignments, set pay levels, and hire or fire people. This sort of 'power' is generally distributed within a large organization, with individuals placed higher in the hierarchy having more delegated to them than

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[15] The transformation of HP from a civil Community into a non-civil Society happened as a consequence of a devolution of its management practices into classical Taylorism from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. During this time the company lost its "HP Way" [Packard (1995)] and they never found it again.

individuals placed lower in the hierarchy. People in non-management positions typically have little to no such 'power.' This organization structure is ancient, having its roots in civilization's first armies and kingdoms. It is a structure rather like a feudal caste system with its equivalents of petty kings, dukes, viscounts, barons, etc. on down to the serfs at the base of the pyramid. The governance form is a monarchy form, in which there is generally no *one* social contract governing the organization as a whole. Companies that set up thorough-going systems of participatory management ameliorate the monarchy effect to a degree but almost never eliminate it. Employees even in such organizations are aware that the 'higher powers' can rescind the 'privilege to participate' any time they choose. The result is a Society that is not a Republic, nor is it a non-consensus democracy, nor is it compatible with the general Society of an American Republic.

This places the relationship between manager and managed (ruler and ruled) in a situation wherein the subordinate's actions are typically grounded in maxims of prudence. He has no Obligations determining and governing his interactions with his superior except his Obligations-to-Self. Leavitt comments,

> This distribution of authority[16] means that people lower in the organization probably feel more dependent on higher levels than the other way around. So the hierarchical system of authority, in serving other organizational purposes, also causes feelings of dependency.
>
> One important outgrowth of dependency . . . is ambivalence: the tendency simultaneously to like and dislike being dependent. . . . Dependency, by splitting people down the middle, can affect organizational behavior in important ways. It can cause tensions between subordinate and superior, limiting freedom to communicate and increasing concern about the meanings of the superior's behavior. The signs of these difficulties show up everywhere in industry. . . . Idiosyncrasies in the behavior of peers are passed over quickly, but the boss's oddities become legendary; his moods become prime subjects for gossip; his occasional offhand comments are scrutinized microscopically for their hidden but significant implications.
>
> These behaviors are clues to the subordinate's perspective on the same problem higher management usually defines in terms of merit rating or personnel evaluation. Both perspectives recognize the extent to which life in an industrial organization is life in a medium of dependency, of continuous evaluation – a partial replication of childhood when every act was judged to be good or bad by adults. Such a medium must necessarily draw some of the subordinate's attention away from job functions so he can focus it on methods of improving his position with superiors. To a greater or lesser degree, any assigned job becomes, in this medium, two jobs: One job is to carry out the assignment, to get the job done; the other (but not always secondary) job is to please the superior. . . . Partly to protect their relationships with their own superiors and partly on rational grounds, superiors tend to demand that subordinates objectively justify their actions, often in advance of the actions themselves. . . . This requirement may force people's dependency underground, so that they act more and more independently though they really would like a shoulder to weep on. The results of chronically unexpressible feelings of dependency can be serious, sometimes physically harmful, for the individual. [Leavitt (1972), pp. 295-297] [17]

The traditional pyramidal organization produces a neurotic Society in a state-of-nature only partly mediated by any social contract governing the overall Society in which it is embedded. One word that is very seldom heard within a pyramidal organization is "justice." The dependency ambivalence Leavitt describes is, on the whole, harmful to the corporate person of the organization overall. It follows that a non-neurotic organization would be one instituted to

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[16] Leavitt uses 'authority' and warrant of 'power' as synonyms. This is an unnatural equation.

[17] I note in passing that by about age 12 most American children feel the same dependency ambivalence toward parents, teachers, and other adult rulers. And children *do* form child mini-Societies of their own.

provide outlets for expressions of **both** independency **and** *co*-dependency, which is, of course, precisely what is being sought when associations of people form a social contract. In *Leadership* such an institution was called an ***Enterprise of enterprises*** [Wells (2010), chap. 8, pp. 313-315]. It is a paradigm of organization quite different from the traditional pyramidal organization. In it there are leaders and authority figures but no *rulers*, and its governance is *Republican*.

There is a strong psychological trauma that goes with chronic dependency ambivalence. A ***psychological trauma*** is, at root, a disturbance of the individual's equilibrium that is not brought to a re-equilibration by any means short of a major accommodation in the individual's manifold of rules. Minor traumas generally affect the manifold at its lower and intermediate levels of practical maxims. Major traumas affect the manifold at the level of its highest tenets and hypothetical imperatives. It is not going too far to say that a major psychological trauma is a situation in which changes are effected in the individual's moral personality. An organization instituted so as to set up a chronically traumatic environment is an organization in which the *Sittlichkeit* of its Society undergoes a steady devolution with moral secession toward the state-of-nature condition. Such an institution is an institution that produces social outlaws. It *will* eventually disintegrate.

One thing characteristic about uncivic institution of commercial entities is the supposition that it falls within the sphere of practical possibility to set up the structure of the organization in such a way that actual independent individual spheres of responsibility can be defined. This is a false supposition and contradicts the natural purpose of civil associating. Leavitt wrote,

> A third related characteristic of industrial organization is that they live by the principle of individual responsibility. This is the belief that a task can be subdivided into personalized pieces, each piece independent of every other and each piece just the right size for an individual. Some doubt exists about whether such an atomistic breakdown is possible in a complex modern organization, and some doubt also exists about whether organizational charts which purport to demonstrate such a breakdown are reality or mirage[18]. . . .
>
> Overlapping circles of responsibility seem to show up more and more as organizations increase in size and complexity. Individual jobs become more and more dependent on other previously unrelated jobs. Staff and service activities come into being, and defining their authority and responsibility becomes a nightmare.
>
> Within the general medium of continual personal evaluation, subordinates must come more and more to demand wider and wider realms of authority in order to fulfill their responsibility. Private little kingdoms begin to emerge. Department heads get protective about their prerogatives and about other people moving in on their territory.
>
> These complications are to be expected if a man knows he is being watched and judged continually and also knows that his job is defined in such a way that he cannot hope to do it adequately through his own efforts. He is dependent on his superiors for his promotion and advancement and dependent on his peers for help in getting the job done; but he is evaluated by his superiors as though he were not dependent on either. [Leavitt (1972), pp. 298-300]

Leavitt does not use the word "myth" to describe the institutionalized belief that 'authority' and 'responsibility' can be individually packaged in medium-to-large sized organizations. Clearly this is not merely possible but actual for a one-man enterprise (because there is no one else to *do* any task the enterprise requires). But the belief that this continues to hold as more people are added to the association can be correctly called nothing else than a myth.

Principle 8: Large groups are different in *kind* from small groups. The same organization that works for small groups does not necessarily work for larger ones, and in most cases does *not*

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[18] Mental physics removes this doubt. It is not possible and the organization chart does present a mirage.

work for them. Communication, for instance, is strongly affected by the population size and geographic people distribution of the organization. Messages sent from one person to another are always semantically re-represented by that other person (see the Weaver's model, figure 3.7) and this includes non-verbal as well as verbal operationalizations when the message is communicated face-to-face. However, as an organization becomes larger, written messages tend to dominate communication within its Enterprise protein, and written messages contain no non-verbal information for the receiver to interpret. Thus, *information loss* occurs in the transmission and this makes it less likely the receiver's semantic representation of the message will cohere with the sender's intended meaning. Furthermore, individuals in the organization who need to know and understand the matter being communicated frequently might not receive the message. Thus their needed cooperation does not happen. The result can be organizational behavior that often can be likened to and called a corporate homologue of conversion hysteria[19].

Larger population sizes produce greater uncertainty and insecurity in the individual. Both of these are sources of disturbance to individual equilibrium. A person *always* responds to disturbances to equilibrium, and the impatient character of his process of practical Reason insures that this will always be a *satisficing* response. Furthermore, the practical rules in his manifold of rules provoked by a disturbance are by necessity rules of his personal experience. These are closely tied to his interests, and it should not be surprising that these interests are preponderantly *local* interests. For that reason, one individual's satisficing response may very well provoke a disturbance to another person's equilibrium elsewhere in the organization. *His* response, in turn, is likely to provoke yet another disturbance to yet another's equilibrium, and so the effect ripples through the Enterprise protein. In embedding field theory, such a widespread, rippling effect is called a 'wave.' In addition, the sheer number of disturbing events rises with rises in the population size of the organization. Unless effective countermeasures to the psychological field effects of disturbances are instituted into the structure of the organization, the eventual result of population size growth can be likened to frothing waves of contradictory actions and behaviors of a sort that in a human being would likely be called a manic state. Leavitt remarks,

> In general, each of these characteristics [of present-day industrial organizations] carries a potential for intensifying conflict and frustration in individuals and for increasing psychological pressures on the manager. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 303]

It is little wonder that so many people refer to life in the workplace as a "rat race." Leavitt's principles do not *only* apply to industrial organizations. They apply equally to *all* social Institutes instituted by the traditional paradigms of Taylorite organization construction.

§ 4. The Nature of Corporate Personality Modeling

Leavitt's book provides good introductory coverage of issues of concern to institution *téchne* but it does have a major omission. He discusses issues at levels of two-person, small group, and large group organizations, and he takes care to relate these back to the individual. What he omits has to do with the fact that the social and organization-environment effects of Leavitt's principles *also alters the organization's mini-Societies as corporate persons*. When the effects described by Leavitt's principles alter 'corporate personalities' in the organization's mini-Societies, field effects resonating throughout the overall corporate Society change. As I have said, the problem of the phenomenon of mini-Communities and mini-Societies within general Societies is crucial, has been greatly underappreciated, and it has been inadequately studied.

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[19] Conversion hysteria is a psychological neurosis in which there is a loss of sensory or motor function without organic pathology. The mental physics of conversion hysteria is discussed in Wells (2006), chapter 22.

Figure 5: Simplified illustration of mini-Community molecular binding within an organized Society. The figure depicts five mini-Communities (MC), each composed of some number of individuals ('atoms') bound to one another as citizens within their mini-Community. MC A is presumed to be immediately bound to four other mini-Communities by persons 1-4, who are simultaneously citizens of two mini-Communities. MC B-E are each presumed to be bound to other mini-Communities by interactions between people who are not members (citizens) of the same mini-Communities. This is denoted by the arrows in the figure.

It is often usual for members of the same mini-Community to express particular social styles and exhibited operationalizations[20] *within* their mini-Community different from the interpersonal styles its members express when dealing with people *outside* their mini-Community. If an individual simultaneously belongs to two mini-Communities who interact with each another, if that individual has sufficient versatility[21] in his ability to modify his interpersonal style, and if that person is a direct 'ambassador' in whom the primary mini-Community binding is realized, mini-Community 'personality' homologues are less likely to be key determiners of social-chemical bonding between the mini-Communities as corporate persons. This is depicted in figure 5 by persons 1-4 in mini-Community A (MC A). The 'ambassador' is himself the bonding element. If he is equally a citizen[22] of both mini-Communities the social-chemical bonding between the mini-Communities is more likely to be a strong 'socially-covalent' bonding. This is because such an 'ambassador,' with his equal understanding of semantic expressions in both mini-Communities, is less likely to misinterpret semantic messages during communication transactions and more likely to be able to 'translate' the semantic language of one group into the semantic language of the other. He is also likely to better understand the divers special interests of the two mini-Communities, identify potential conflicts between them, and be able to mediate negotiations

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[20] Refer to figure 1. Kiesler operationalizations are shown in the innermost circle of the D-PIPOS circumplex. These behaviors are central to semantic messages in interpersonal communication transactions.
[21] Versatility is a measure of the degree to which an individual demonstrates an ability to modify his own interpersonal behavior style to conform to the habitual interpersonal styles of others.
[22] A citizen is a member of a Community who accepts mutual Obligations to and with its other members and who accepts the performance of acts of citizenship as a reciprocal Duty he owes to the Community.

between them that transform contradictory special interests into merely contrary interests that are not frustrated[23] by decisions and actions arrived at through the interactions of the mini-Communities.

In most cases within a medium-to-large Society, direct interaction between mini-Communities is carried out by people who do not belong (as citizens) to both interacting mini-Communities. The interacting individuals are not 'ambassadors' in the context used above, may exhibit different habitual social styles, and might not understand each other's mini-Community special interests. This is depicted in figure 5 by the arrows joining mini-Communities B-C, C-E, E-D, and D-B. The collective operationalizations and exhibited social styles employed by the interacting members of one mini-Community will produce a judgment by people in the other interacting mini-Community of an abstract 'corporate personality' of the first mini-Community. The members of each mini-Community *stereotype* **all** the members of the other mini-Community on the basis of their semantic judgments of communication transactions with the persons with whom their inter-Community contacts occur. The stereotype is *made* a model of a corporate personality.

Whether or not this stereotype is how the members of the other mini-Community view them-selves is utterly irrelevant. *I* think I am a very nice person and a good friend, but the fact that I think so does not matter in the least if *you* think I am a villainous swine. Your stereotype of me will bias all your semantic judgments of our interpersonal communication transactions, and these biases will usually tend to reinforce your understanding of me as a villainous swine. Bacon wrote,

> The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down . . . forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. . . . The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind, while it is very slow and unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances by which axioms are tried as by fire [Bacon (1620), pp. 23-24].

Early impressions count. A lot. Leary found that what Bacon said is true in regard to personality stereotyping. He defined several mathematical levels of personality data. One of his findings was:

> *Level I (Public Communication)* consists of the overt behavior of the individual as rated by others along the sixteen-point circular continuum[24]. These judgments are made by trained observers or by naive fellow subjects who observe the subject in interpersonal situations. They rate his interpersonal impact as it appears to them. . . . Level I data is objective or public – rather than private or subjective. It may or may not agree with the subject's own view of the situation. . . . The meaning of Level I rating thus depends on the cultural context and the category of the rater. [Leary (1957), pg. 77]

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[23] An interest is said to be 'frustrated' when an action or event contradicts actualizing a satisfaction of that interest and makes its satisfaction impossible to achieve. A frustrated interest provokes a disturbance to equilibrium and agitates the frustrated person into seeking to negate the action or event making satisfaction of the interest impossible to achieve. For example, a frustrated committee member will seek to thwart decided actions that produce the frustration of his interest, and to undermine successes of other committee members whose action decisions contradict satisfaction of his special interest. All consensus depends on non-frustration of the divers interests of the consenting parties. Non-frustration of interest means it is not made-impossible for a satisfaction of the interest to be actualized.

[24] Leary refers here to the circumplex model he and his colleagues developed during their research. His book contains many pages of measured empirical circumplex evidence confirming the phenomenon.

This finding – i.e. that others often judge a person's personality differently from how he judges himself – is an oft-confirmed psychological phenomenon that long ago became a central part of all interpersonal psychology theories. This empirical finding is wholly congruent with the mental physics of the process of judgmentation and traces back to the impatient character of the process of practical Reason in its relentless pursuit of equilibrium. Equilibrium is easier to maintain, as well as easier and quicker to reestablish after a disturbance, when a person has constructed stereotype concepts in his manifold of concepts that are symbolic of meanings implications he can use to orient judgmentation acts in ways that quickly bring closure to the judgmentation cycle.

One sees manifestations of the phenomenon quite frequently in the university setting in many exhibitions enacted by members of divers mini-Communities whose members have infrequent direct personal contact with members of other mini-Communities: humanities professors who 'know' engineers are semi-literate philistines devoted to the greedy and relentless pursuit of mammon; engineering professors who 'know' humanities professors are impractical romantics unable to design reliable solutions to real problems; English professors who 'know' freshman students are immature children unable to express themselves; staffers in the Dean of Students office who 'know' student members of fraternities are singly devoted to getting drunk and raising hell; engineering students who 'know' their professors deliberately burden them with difficult assignments and required courses of no practical value so that these professors can find excuses to flunk them. These are just a few of the ridiculous sorts of stereotypes found in abundance on every large university's campus. They all belong to the same class of constructed prejudice-by-stereotype as that of the Dame in a Puritan dame school, who 'knew' children were basically evil by nature and had to be given regular doses of humiliation and painful corporal punishments if they were ever going to learn anything or have any chance for the salvation of their souls.

There are, of course, useful stereotypes as well. Many years ago I was working as a product design engineer in a large Research and Development Laboratory in a large manufacturing company. The Lab employed several secretaries who were generally assigned to report to middle managers or the Lab manager, and were considered to "work for" their assigned manager. On the org chart, the secretaries were not a distinct workgroup other than for pay administration purposes. Nonetheless, the Lab's secretaries self-constituted their own distinct mini-Community within the Lab. One of the interesting things they did as a group happened whenever a new secretary was hired into the Lab. The other secretaries would always take their new colleague to lunch on her first day and "brief" her on what they regarded as the exotic peculiarities, strange habits, and quixotic behaviors of 'the Lab Engineer.' It was an unofficial 'new employee orientation' the secretaries themselves had instituted. Apparently it resembled a short course for an exotic kind of zoology. The Lab engineers, of course, were never privy to whatever instruction was provided to a new secretary but, whatever it was, it was thoroughly effective. The engineers in the Lab tended to obey the 'suggestions' and respond to the requests of the secretaries with considerably less reluctance than we tended to exhibit in obeying our own managers. The Lab secretaries were in fact key leaders in the Lab's leadership dynamic. Some of our managers even joked that they themselves worked for their own secretaries. Very few engineers ever seemed to be cognizant of the fact they were taking orders from the secretaries or how often the transactions resembled someone bottle-feeding a baby seal. I think the dynamic was a perfect illustration of one of Lao Tzu's leadership maxims:

> As for the best leader, the people do not even know he exists. [Lao Tzu (6th century BC), chap. 17]

The secretaries were a self-constituted *Gemeinschaft* mini-Community, within the overall Lab Community, exhibiting operationalizations corresponding to the Amiable quadrant of the D-PIPOS circumplex. To the engineers, this appeared to be their 'corporate personality.'

The corporate personality of the mathematical stereotype of a mini-Community will appear to be different to the divers other mini-Communities with whom it interacts. This 'personality' will be co-determined by operationalizations exhibited during these interactions as well as by the reputation a group is labeled with by past members of mini-Communities with whom it interacts. This might be called a 'folklore memory' retained by another mini-Community and it will tend to endure for years and through large turnovers in the memberships of the mini-Communities. *It is not so correct to say a mini-Community 'has' a personality as it is to say it exhibits multiple personalities*, each based on stereotype judgments by members of *other* mini-Communities.

This is an important factor in modeling the interaction functionals between mini-Communities in an embedding field model. That is because, as Kiesler tells us [Kiesler (1983)], particular exhibitions of operationalizations tend to 'pull' specific response operationalizations from the other person (or mini-Community) depending on the personalities of the *people* involved in inter-actions and the stereotype models each hold of the other and his mini-Community. The stereotype Object each conceptualizes of the other is accommodated in some degree during the transactions and, therefore, the functionals in the model are accommodated over time as *co*-determinations based on transaction experiences. This, in turn, alters the social-chemical bonding relationships (or, as the case may be, antibonding relationships) between mini-Communities. When bonding relationships are weakened, the corporate Molecule is made less stable and might even be dissolved or, worse for the overall Society, transformed into antibonding relationships. In either case, the effect is to produce granulation in the Society and, potentially, its social breakdown. Contrariwise, when antibonding relationships are transformed into bonding relationships, and when bonding relationships are strengthened by transactions, the social Molecule of the Society is made more stable and the likelihood of cooperations emerging is enhanced.

Field effects propagating through the Enterprise protein add another dimension to modeling with stereotypes. In this case, the effect of actions taken by one mini-Community on the situation of another mini-Community occurs without any immediate interaction between them. This can be mathematically modeled by the gear train analogy depicted in figure 6. If the remote action leads to a disturbance in the equilibrium of an affected mini-Community, the members of that mini-Community might or might not be able to correctly determine which other group's action caused this disturbance to their collective equilibrium. The group, however, will usually find *someone* to blame for the situation, and this will either alter the group's stereotype of whoever they blame or, more often, reinforce existing stereotyped prejudices. Typically it does not matter whether the affected mini-Community has correctly pinned the blame or not. If they find out later that a different group was responsible, there will usually be members who do *not* alter accommodations they have made to the stereotype of the group initially blamed. It is rather like a father having an imaginary argument with his son (in anticipation of how his son will react to something the father is going to tell him to do or not do), becoming angry over what he imagines his son is going to say or do, and then carrying this anger with him when he actually does talk to his son. His hostile operationalization will very likely 'pull' a hostile response from his son, which pulls another from the father, and *bingo!* the two are now in a heated *actual* argument.


Figure 6: Gear train model of propagating field effects in a large organization or Society. The persons depicted here correspond to mini-Community corporate persons.

The great diversity found in stereotype models must be systematized if an empirical science is to be able to deal with social phenomena exhibited by the divers mini-Communities making up the population of a complicated Society. Because the science must be a social-natural science if it is to speak with objective validity about social phenomena, this systematization must be made to be congruent with human nature and the mental physics of social contracting. As the task here is a formal task (that is, pertains to form-of-the-matter and form-of-the-form at the 2LAR level of mathematical structure), this task pertains to the two second-level form terms in figure 3 – the power of the corporate person and the anthropological corporate person [Wells (2012), chap. 13].

In the case of an individual human being, the power of the person (*Personfähigkeit*) is the organization of the capacities of the person for realizing or attempting to realize the objects of his appetites. A *corporate* person has no appetites nor an appetitive power of practical Reason, but it does have objectives it is set up to accomplish and, if it is a mini-Community, it also has common interests shared by all the people in its mini-Community. Corporate *Personfähigkeit* is therefore the organization of the capacities of the collective body politic of the Community for successfully meeting its objectives and satisfying the common interests of its members. The idea of the power of the person is in turn divided to present *Personfähigkeit* structure in a 2LAR depiction, shown in figure 7.

The character of a person who participates in a Community and undertakes processes of Community-building within it is his character as an anthropological person. ***Character of a person*** in this connotation means: (1) for the case of an individual human being, that person's patterns of behavior, which reflect his practical rules he has constructed in his manifold of rules; his behavior patterns express his self-constructed moral code and moral constitution; (2) for the case of a corporate person, the patterns of collective behaviors expressed by the actions of its members and exhibited to people and other corporate persons outside its Community. These patterns of behavior reflect its 'corporate personality' in the regard of observers outside its Community. A corporate person may exhibit multiple characters that are exhibited in context-dependent ways in interactions with divers outside people or corporate persons. Figure 8 depicts the 2LAR structure of the anthropological person.

The idea of the power of a corporate person is the idea of the animating principles of corporate personhood. These pertain to the abilities of a corporate person, as an object, to accomplish its aims. They do not immediately pertain to corporate personality. However, social personality is experientially constructed and *Personfähigkeit* pertains to what sorts of experiences these can be.


**Figure 7:** 2LAR structure of the idea of the power of the person.

Figure 8: 2LAR structure of the anthropological person.

The idea of the corporate anthropological person is an idea of a corporate person's organizing principles. These principles pertain directly to exhibitions regarded as reflecting its character. In this context they therefore are pertinent to understanding the 'corporate personality' and 'corporate psychology' of a group of people associating with one another in an abstract corporate person. These and its attributes of corporate *Personfähigkeit* are fundamental determiners for modeling interaction functionals in embedding field network models of a Society at levels where model-order reduction to the level of corporate persons is practically necessitated in order for the model and its theory to provide scientists with a capacity for studying and predicting the behavioral dynamics of a Society. Consequently, we must understand the principles of these two ideas.

§ 5. The Animating Principles of Corporate *Personfähigkeit*

§ 5.1: The physical power of the corporate person. *Personfähigkeit* is the organization of the capacities of a person for realizing or attempting to realize the objects of his appetites. Physical power of a person in the case of an individual human being subsists in the capacities of his body (strength, health, acuity of the senses, etc.). In the case of a corporate person, it subsists in the combined physical capacities of its body politic made to act in concert for the achievement of its goals and objectives. The ***animating principle of the physical power of the corporate person*** is: ***each person must be civilly active, attending to civic Duties to their Community*** [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 467-468]. Without this, the powers of the individuals cannot be effectively combined to achieve common ends, thus the population does not constitute a corporate person.

In general the physical power of a corporate person is not simply an additive total of the powers of individual persons. Individual efforts can oppose one another and lead to cancellations of the effects of individual actions, as is usually the case in *uncivic* competition. This is especially likely when people view their common circumstances in terms of a zero-sum game, i.e., under a supposition that success for one person *necessarily* means failure for another. Individuals' interests in this case are held to be in mutually contradictory relationships. Under these circumstances, a Community is said to exhibit *antisynergy* ("the whole is less than the sum of the parts"). An example would be an athletics team comprised of individual 'superstar' athletes that ends up in last place at the end of the season. In *Hamlet* the internecine competition among the Danes is what lets Fortinbras of Norway and his weaker army march into and conquer Elsinore.

On the other hand, individual efforts can combine in the group in such a way that they not only act in concert but in addition *amplify* individual efforts so that the net effect is more than what would be predicted simply by a sum of isolated efforts. When this happens, the Community is said to exhibit *synergy*. An example of this is provided by the battle of Gaugamela on October 1st, 331 BC. Here Alexander the Great and his 47,000-man Macedonian army decisively defeated and routed the 250,000-man Persian army of Darius III on a battlefield *Darius* had chosen as the place to confront Alexander. The Macedonian victory immediately ended the Persian Empire, which was a 'superpower' compared to tiny Macedonia. Synergy and antisynergy are always effects produced by the leadership dynamic happening within the corporate person [Wells (2010)]. Generals like Alexander are typically given the credit for the accomplishments of their armies, but in fact it is the leadership dynamic[25] at work rather than the general that should properly be credited. For example, Durant tells us,

> Marching back into Asia, [Alexander] met the vast polyglot army of Darius at Gaugamela, near Arbela, and was dismayed by their multitude; he knew that one defeat would cancel all his victories. His soldiers comforted him: "Be of good cheer, Sire; do not fear the great number of the enemy, for they will not be able to stand the very smell of goat that clings to us." [Durant (1939), pg. 545]

Taylorism tends to produce antisynergy by stimulating the formation of antibonding relationships within the Community. To use a simile, individual people are like the muscles and bones of the corporate body, but the leadership dynamic is like the nervous system. Taylorism is like multiple sclerosis. A synergistic leadership dynamic is not possible unless individuals in the corporate Community oblige themselves to act in fulfillment of mutual civic Duties implied by whatever they hold to be the social contract(s) of their association. Taylorism corrodes the social contract.

§ 5.2: The intellectual power of the corporate person. The intellectual power of a person subsists in his knowledge, intelligence, and judgment. A corporate person is a mathematical entity and has no knowledge, intelligence or judgment *per se* for these subsist only in its members. Intellectual power in a corporate person subsists in *coherence* of the knowledge, intelligence, and judgments of its members. This is not some mythical sum-total of the intellectual powers of individuals. It is exhibited in actions by which these powers are used in concert. *Communication* within the corporate person is the means by which this coherence is achieved. But communication is also the means by which *incoherence* occurs. The mere fact that people communicate with one another is not enough. *What* they communicate, *with whom* they communicate, and *when* they communicate are determining factors for the intellectual coherence of a corporate person.

Coherence (*Zusammenhalt*) is the necessary form of complete congruence among all Objects in the *nexus* of judgments under the principle of thorough-going determination[26]. For the specific case being discussed here, the Objects are the Community's people and the *nexus* of judgments subsists in the relationships among all their individual acts of judgment (objective, subjective, and practical). The animating principle of the intellectual power of a corporate person is the principle of how coherence through communication is possible in regard to the *what*, *with whom*, and *when* factors of intra-corporate communications. In every communication transaction, the individuals who are carrying out the transaction are the determiners of all three of these factors. Furthermore,

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[25] Leadership dynamic is the potential power of spontaneity in the reciprocal relationships between two or more people by which the Self-determinations of actions by followers are stimulated by the actions of momentary leaders. Leadership does not subsist in any one individual but rather in relationships between individuals [Wells (2010)].

[26] The principle of thorough-going determination states: *of all possible predicates of things insofar as they are compared with their contradictory opposites, one of these predicates must apply to the thing.* This is one of the Critical principles of metaphysics proper.

no static, formalized set of rules is capable of "solving all communication necessities" once and for all times and occasions. Thinking it can is a common and apparently well-favored egregious error of Taylorite thinkers. No management staff or governing body is capable of controlling all the communication transactions that are going to occur within the corporate body, and they cannot control the *informal* communication network at all. Communication comprises one of the factors implied by the Enlightenment principle of flexible institutions.

Because individuals are always the determiners of every aspect involved with communication transactions, the only thing the institution of a corporate person can accomplish is to provide the social environment in which individuals themselves understand the necessity for flexibility in making these determinations and the conditions under which these determinations are to operate if intellectual coherence in the corporate person is to be made actual. This is what the ***animating principle of the intellectual power of the corporate person*** addresses. The principle is: ***institution of civic education for all members of the Community*** [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 468-470]. Civic education means *education in the civil liberties, rights, Duties, and Obligations of citizenship in the Community*. Individuals always self-determine their own actions and do so from learned practical maxims in their manifolds of rules augmented by learned concepts in their manifolds of concepts. Coherence within the corporate person depends utterly on its members basing their self-determinations on what is required by the terms and conditions of their social contract. *Ceteris paribus*, it cannot be presumed that all individuals automatically understand these terms and conditions because social behavior *is not an innate human instinct* and all communal behavior is *learned* behavior grounded in practical mutual Obligations *a person obliges himself* to fulfill. Again, no person can commit another person to either Duty or Obligation. That door is locked and bolted from the inside. At best all the body politic of a Community can do is to instruct its new members (and remind its old ones from time to time) what is expected of them in their interrelationships with other members of the association. Civic education is a *deontological* moral education as well as a *practical* education.

In the original and older connotation of the word, prior to the now-common connotation given to it, this is a propaganda Institute within the corporate Community. The word "propaganda" in its original connotation meant "to propagate ideas, doctrines, and practices." The word itself comes from the gerundive of the Latin verb *propagare*, to propagate. 'Propaganda' did not come to carry its present day and generally negative connotations until World War II, when it was associated with the Nazi's Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels[27]. The institution of civic education called for by the animating principle is to be understood in the older connotation and required to be operated strictly according to the social contract. If it is not, its institution is a deontological moral crime perpetrated on the citizens of the association. The function of civic education is to pass on civic conventions for common judgment of semantic messages and sets of meanings implications. Among these are implications pertaining to duties for *what*, *with whom*, and *when* information must be propagated within the Society of the

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[27] It is trivial to comprehend that 'propaganda' was originally a neutral term. After all, what government would deliberately call one of its ministries the "Ministry of Propaganda" if that word carried *only* its modern connotations? Would *you* label part of your organization "the Office of Lies and Deceptions"? Today's organizations do not have "propaganda departments"; they have "public relations departments," "employee news letters," "advertising departments," etc. Sometimes these really are used to "spread the word," i.e., propagate ideas, doctrines, practices, policies, and news without an intention to deliberately mislead or deceive. But sometimes that is exactly what they are used to do. Cicero wrote the graduate level "how to" textbook on propaganda [Cicero (55 BC)]. One day many years ago, I sat in a meeting where our manager was discussing how we should "spin" the status of our project when our Board of Directors and top executive managers visited our division for our annual review. One of my colleagues blurted, "You can't lie to these guys!" The boss paused a moment before answering, "We're not exactly lying. We're re-establishing the truth." Hogwash and doublespeak. But Cicero would have been proud of him.

corporate person. It is an institution for flexible and Enlightened incorporation.

§ 5.3: The tangible power of the corporate person. The tangible power of a person subsists in his stock of tangible goods, fungible skills, and his stock of time[28] available for using them [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 470-474]. For a corporate person, tangible power of the corporate person subsists in the tangible assets available for use by the association and the intangible personal skills of its members that are employed to accomplish the objectives of the association. Stock of time is a meaningless concept in the context of a corporate person because a corporate person is not a living entity. However, stocks of time of the individual members are intangible factors in determining the operational and leadership dynamics of a corporate person because stock of time affects the behaviors and abilities of members of the corporate body through health factors, death, youthful exuberance, collective experience, and other factors of individual *Personfähigkeit*.

The ***animating principle of the tangible power of a corporate person*** is the principle of socio-economic utility optimization: ***minimization of uncivic social interactions within the Community***. *Utility* means *having the character of being usable as or for a wealth-asset*. Generalized social economy is a system of self-regulating transformations contained in a corporate person and actualized by means of interactions that employ the personal tangible powers of the interacting persons. No person joins in an association with others except for the purpose of serving Duties-to-Self. Because of this, every member of an association formed into a corporate person *must be regarded as an individual entrepreneur* who has chosen to invest some portion of his stock of time in activities deemed beneficial for Order and Progress in the corporate Community. *The traditional distinction between owner and employee is a merely mathematical convention* established by folkways of the general Society in which the corporate person is embedded [Wells (2010), chap. 8, pp. 305-315]. He joins to serve his own purposes, but in order to do so he must commit himself to particular duties to the corporate body politic. He self-commits to these *civic* duties, expecting in exchange greater security for his wealth-assets, and he expects particular civil rights to be recognized and upheld by the corporate association. This *quid pro quo* is a necessary condition of social contracting. Uncivic behavior contradicts it and harms the *entire* Community.

This correct *social-natural* understanding of socio-economic relationships is not the traditional *mis*understanding of the relationship imported to America in its colonial period from England. That is not surprising; the original colonial Americans predominantly came from England and were socialized by England's monarchical Society. Among the imported traditional concepts of the early American socio-economic system were concepts of "the master," "the servant," and the wage-laborer. America's post-1750 system of *uncivic* free enterprise developed from English class-system ideas. The very language used to describe it reveals its fundamentally uncivic paradigms. Salinger wrote,

> "Paternalism" best describes the master-servant relationship in early Pennsylvania. . . . Inequality permeated the master-servant relationship, but this did not prevent the expression of mutual concern and human warmth. Moreover, although servants were members of the master's household, the power relations were always clear. And while masters and servants worked side by side, masters controlled virtually every aspect of their servant's lives. The relationship between servant and master was different from that of employer and employee, for the lives of [masters and servants] "were intertwined, for better or worse," and no doubt from the servants' perspective, it was often for the worse. . . . Although early Pennsylvania society was organized around the household, it would be a mistake to assume that a family orientation replaced a class structure. Masters and servants worked and ate together, and often slept in the same room, but inherent in the relationship was the constant reminder of the vertical ordering of society. [Salinger (1987), pg. 25]

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[28] Stock of time is that part of a person's intangible wealth-assets that subsists in the use he can make of the time he has for his *Existenz* as a living human being.

Salinger and other historians tend to call the colonial labor pool of America up to the time of the American Economy revolution of *circa* 1750 [Wells (2013), chap. 5] "unfree labor." This label is incorrect for a number of fundamental reasons. Indentured servants were people who had entered into a business exchange, often exchanging passage from Europe to America, food, clothing, and housing for a work contract (the indenture) binding them to work for their "master" for a fixed number of years. Although there were abusive "masters" and colonial laws governing indentured servitude gradually became increasingly biased in favor of the "masters," the system at first had more of the character of *civic* free enterprise than not. Furthermore, at the end of their term of indenture, the indentured servant of pre-1750 could and usually did become a "master" in his own right. The most significant factor underlying the pre-Economy-revolution system was a chronic shortage of laborers in colonial America. This shortage contributed to the development of the slavery system – which was also a British import – as well as the socio-economic character of indentured servitude and the apprenticeship system. It was when this labor shortage turned into a labor surplus that a rapid changeover from indentured servitude to today's familiar system of employer-employee relationships developed. Its predominant feature was the replacement of the provision for food, clothing, and housing by payment of wages and alienation of the master's power to command all the minute aspects of how the employee lived outside of the workplace. The wage-earner was neither more nor less "free" than before, but he did acquire a greater scope of civic *liberty*. What he *lost*, though, was most of his economic *security* under indentured servitude. To the extent that "serfdom" can properly be used to describe his condition, economically he was no less a "serf" to his employer than he had been to his "master" because unemployment meant homelessness and starvation. Overall, the result was a great loss in the tangible power of his person. What *America* suffered was weakening social-chemistry bonding relationships among its inhabitants and creation of a greater number of antibonding relationships. Salinger tells us,

> The transition from unfree to free labor altered labor relationships in Philadelphia. As a result both the lives of the workers and the organization of production changed dramatically. For workers, wage labor was often synonymous with vulnerability. During most of the colonial period, when free workers were in short supply, their wages were high and their choices were great. When high employment shifted to labor surplus, wage earners suffered. A large number of workers scrambled for fewer jobs. Wages fell. Employment periods were often short, which caused incomes to be insecure. . . .

> Former eighteenth century [indentured] servants were forced to make their way as free laborers just when this new system was forming. Their inability to succeed mirrored the difficulties of many urban wage earners. . . .

> As the paternalistic labor system was replaced by the more consistent use of wage earners, the outward unanimity of craft production collapsed. One result of this alteration in labor was that craft organizations appeared. In the prerevolutionary period, labor alliances existed but they were primarily groups of master craftsmen who organized to shore up their waning economic independence during increasingly hard times. These master mechanics sought legal controls over the prices and quality of their raw materials, and occasionally over the wages of their journeymen. . . .

> As master craftsmen moved away from consistent use of unfree labor, their roles within the establishment changed. Prosperous Philadelphia master craftsmen donned their leather aprons and picked up their tools less often. Instead they became primarily employers and merchant capitalists. This transformation began in the late colonial period and extended into the nineteenth century.

> Colonial craftsmen tended to make their products on custom order. This bespoke product was crafted with the artisan's own tools within his work space, and production centered around household labor. As craftsmen moved away from custom work, they purchased labor either in the form of servants and slaves, or occasionally, in the form of journeymen.

> If the shop produced a surplus, the role of the master craftsman shifted subtly as he combined his craft skills with the jobs of retailer and employer. . . . Capitalist wage labor altered productive relations in significant ways, had an enormous impact on the work environment, and exacerbated the effects of an uneven economy since a larger share of the work force labored for wages. [Salinger (1987), pp. 153-155]

This is a brief description of the shift of the American socio-economic system from one of predominantly civic free enterprise to one of predominantly uncivic free enterprise. In the years between then and now, legislation and court rulings have for the most part been biased in favor of preserving the conditions and privileges of what once was the social class of "masters" at the expense of and to the disadvantage of the growing population of wage laborers. Deontologically, under the social contract sketched by the U.S. Constitution, these acts of legislations and court rulings have been perpetuations of moral transgressions predominantly in the form of moral faults rather than moral crimes[29].

I have burdened you with this brief recapitulation of American history in order to better set out the implications of the animating principle of tangible corporate *Personfähigkeit*. The principle is a mathematical principle for which the root underlying idea is *value-satisfaction*. For individual human beings, value-satisfaction is *experience of a satisfaction resulting from an act of valuation in appetitive power*. For a corporate person, corporate value-satisfaction is what is measured by the degree of global non-equilibrium in the cycle of social interaction activities within the corporate person. Increasing degrees of non-equilibrium signify greater *lack* of value-satisfaction. The real root of value-satisfaction lies in reflective judgments by the individual members of the corporate body. A corporate person can be said to act purposively *only* insofar as its individual members employ the tangible powers of their persons cooperatively in ways promoting and/or not-opposing ***civic*** value satisfactions by all the members of the corporate body.

Taylorism is unremittingly antagonistic to value-satisfaction, both corporate and personal, and so opposes the socio-economic utility optimization principle of tangible corporate *Personfähigkeit*. The psychological factors and effects sketched out in Leavitt's principles likewise point to degenerative effects due to the traditional designs of organizations (corporate persons). These designs are made in ignorance of the human nature of social contracting and contrary to the animating principle of tangible corporate *Personfähigkeit*. This inevitably produces a Toynbee proletariat within it made up of those who morally secede from the corporate association[30]. It may take years before mounting perpetuated injustices produce a large enough Toynbee proletariat to bring about its disintegration and fall, but this is inevitably what such a corporate person, at *every* scale, will eventually come to. Public education alone cannot cure this gloomy situation, but public education is a *sine qua non* for any deontologically moral institution of a corporate person, whether this be on the scale of a business entity or the scale of an entire nation. The degenerative effects of our national ignorance of the human nature of civil association and of socio-economic utility is painted graphically by exhibited measures of the wasting decline in America's social-natural economy presented in Wells (2013), chap. 12.

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[29] A deontological moral fault is an unintentional transgression of the social contract. A deontological moral crime is an intentional transgression of the social contract.

[30] There has been no census taken, but my own observations over the years bring me to pose a hypothesis that corporate disintegration most often occurs in stages: People initially secede from the overall corporate person but still cling to a civil association with others and thereby form a sub-Community in an outlaw relationship with the original corporate person. Additional pressures of injustice in what is now a mixed Society of civil and state-of-nature conditions then brings about more splintering of the sub-Society as well as more breakdown in the original Society. *Ceteris paribus*, this process of disintegration continues until no general civil union remains. The original Society of a corporate person ceases to have real *Existenz* and an interregnum period ensues until all appearances of the fallen Society have finally vanished.

§ 5.4: The persuasive power of the corporate person. The persuasive power of a person subsists in his ability to sufficiently communicate his thoughts and ideas to other persons and thereby gain their consent, agreement, or cooperation. The persuasive power of a corporate person subsists in its leadership social dynamic. The ***animating principle of the persuasive power of a corporate person*** is: ***corporate persuasive power is measured by the degree of bonding-generation activity and the degree of antibonding-annihilation activity in leadership events in the embedding field representation of the corporate person*** [Wells (2012), pp. 475-476]. In understanding and applying this principle, it is important to remember that 'leadership' and 'leader' are not synonymous. Which person is acting as the leader of a group changes over short intervals of time and the word 'leadership' refers to this *dynamic* of group actions. The principal organizational expectation for the designated manager of a group is to see to it that the people most appropriate to lead at given moments do in fact "step up" and take appropriate leader's actions. The actual job of a designated manager is to initiate and guide the leadership dynamic in his corporate group [Wells (2010), chap. 8, § 2]. *Everything else he does* fades into real insignificance compared to this. Most current business schools reverse this priority.

The paradigm of Taylorism completely fails to understand the social-nature of leadership. It is a system of mismanagement that does almost everything conceivable to suppress leadership within the organization and then bemoans the lack of leadership its own practices produce. The "Little Caesars" of Taylorism seem to know little or nothing about the real Caesar:

> The fighting actually went on for more than six hours on end, and not only the strength but the missiles of the Romans were failing; the enemy were pressing on more fiercely, and beginning, as our energies slackened, to break down the rampart and fill in the trench. At this juncture Publius Sextius Baculus, the senior centurion . . . and with him Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune, a man of great sagacity and courage, went to Galba[31] and informed him that the only hope of safety was to try the last expedient in making a sortie. Galba accordingly summoned the centurions, and speedily instructed the troops to make a short pause in the fighting, and merely to intercept the missiles discharged against them, and to refresh themselves after their effort; then, upon a given signal, to burst from the camp and place all hope of safety in courage.
>
> They did as they were bid; and suddenly from all the gates a sortie was made, leaving the enemy no chance of learning what was afoot, nor of rallying. So there was a complete change of fortune; the Romans surrounded on every side and slew the multitude which had come in hope of capturing the camp, and of more than thirty thousand men (for that was known to be the number of natives who came against the camp) more than a third were slain, while the rest were driven into headlong flight, and not suffered to stand fast even on the higher ground. Thus all the forces of the enemy were routed [Caesar (*c*. 51 BC), pg. 145].

Galba, as officer commanding at Octodurus, was publically credited for this victory but Caesar clearly recognized that it was the leaders' action taken by Publius and Gaius that was *the* decisive action; for a brief time, Galba was *their* follower. Caesar's commentaries are filled with page after page of incidents like this where he identifies precisely who took the decisive leader's action upon which the victory turned. He seems to have had a particular talent for picking field commanders who knew how leadership dynamics work and understood how to make it work for them. Caesar was the greatest general in antiquity, after Alexander, not because he was a great leader but because he was a general who had the keenest understanding of leadership.

The animating principle of corporate persuasive power is stated in terms of how to measure it. To properly understand and use the principle, one must look at what is being measured. In any

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[31] commander of Caesar's Twelfth Legion

group, who is acting as the leader is constantly shifting and changing. Now, when as a result of a leader's action followers take actions congruent with the leader's intention, his action is termed a *successful* leader's action. However, if the followers' actions are contradictory to what the leader intended, the leader's action is called an *unsuccessful* leader's action. In persuading the Roman Senate to name him Dictator for Life, Caesar at the same time persuaded some of the senators to assassinate him – a rather unsuccessful leader's action on Caesar's part. Bill Oncken, a management training consultant in the 1970s, once said, "If the other members of your molecule get together and conspire to make *you* successful, there's nothing you can do to stop them." The first task of any appointed authority figure is to persuade others in the corporate person to 'conspire' to make the corporate person successful. It is *not* to get them to do what he tells them to do.

To do this, between members of the corporate person there must be bonding relationships that 'hold together' the social Molecule of the corporate person. This is why creation and strengthening of person-to-person bonding relationships within the corporate person, and annihilation of anti-bonding relationships, are measures of the power of persuasion for the corporate person. Bonding relationships are necessary for leaders' actions to be *successful* leaders' actions. Antibonding relationships, on the other hand, produce and promote *unsuccessful* leaders' actions. They also tend to spread like an infection through the body politic of the corporate person. A corporate person riddled with antibonding relationships has the leadership dynamic of a suicide pact.

§ 5.5: Scholium on *Personfähigkeit*. The animating principles just discussed pertain to *internal* relationships necessary for actual *Existenz* of a corporate person. An arbitrary aggregation of people under a mere label does not mean they coexist in the unity of a corporate person. The animating principles just discussed are, from the perspective of a science of institution, both principles for Institute design *téchne* as well as principles for the empirical *identification* of corporate persons and for empirically distinguishing a practical corporate person from a mere aggregate of individuals. This *identification problem* arose in volume II of this trilogy when the Critique of the institution of public education in the U.S. was confronted with questions dealing with whether or not particular occupational or industrial groups contained spontaneous mini-Communities constituting sub-Societies within them. If we are to address questions concerning the 'personality' of an Institute, we must first be able to verify that the Institute actually exists, i.e. *is* constituted *as* a corporate person. A mere aggregation of people *has* no 'personality' *per se*.

The Idea of the Social Contract (figure 3) is the Idea of the social optimization of human coexistence. The principles of *Personfähigkeit* are principles addressing the Object of institution – namely, the Institute *as* a corporate person. By contrast, a general Society is comprised not only of individual human beings but also individual corporate persons. The general design problem of social institution must deal as well with the *integration* of all these divers individuals to form the *totality* of a *union* of individuals in the Society of *one* civil Community. This idea is one that in name is familiar to American citizens for it is nothing else than the idea of *E Pluribus Unum*. Many Americans today presume this is a *fait accompli* passed down to us by our forefathers. It is not. *E Pluribus Unum* requires on-going renewal if it is to be preserved in the face of changing social circumstances and the confrontations of Toynbee challenges. Later chapters of this treatise discuss *téchne* for this renewal process in the context of public education.

§ 6. The Organizing Principles of the Corporate Anthropological Person

In the context of an individual person, the character of a person who participates in a community and undertakes Community-building processes *is* his character as an anthropological person [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 443]. The organizing principles of the anthropological person are principles that speak to conditions under which a group of persons will form a Community and act to preserve and improve it. These principles do not speak *directly* to the notion of a

corporate personality. Instead, their relationship to corporate personality inheres in the deductions of these principles. Corporate personality is judged by others *external* to the corporate person and is predicated on the empirical action exhibitions of agents of the corporate person.

We must recognize a fact of the phenomenon of mini-Community in a large Society. It is this: The mere fact that a particular group of people ally themselves in mini-Community does *not* imply they will extend the alliance to other people outside of their immediate group, *nor* does it imply outside people and groups are willing to ally *themselves* with that mini-Community. Co-determinations to cooperate arise, as Grossberg's theorem shows [Grossberg (1978, 1980)], out of *competitive* dynamics. But this same theorem also shows that cooperation does not *necessarily* arise out of competition. The scientific question of inter-Community cooperation is of the same class of problems as questions of mini-Community formation but differs in an important aspect: Inter-Community cooperation, *if it takes place*, must develop in an environment where person-to-person interaction is much more sparse between people belonging to the two (or more) mini-Communities involved. Among other things, this is partially dependent on Modality in social contracting – i.e., on the organizing principles of approval of taste (figure 3). However, to study and understand this the scientist must have a good grasp of determining factors for the union-formation of corporate anthropological persons[32].

The organizing principles of the anthropological person tell us about conditions for *forming* a corporate person but do not tell us how far this corporate person will advance from corporate egocentrism and moral realism to corporate decentration and cooperation with other persons (both individual and corporate). A just *public* Institute, though, *must* extend itself to co-operations with members of the public at large. If it does not, the Institute is a private Institute, not a public one, and cannot *justly* mandate public support *unless* the public body has *by consensus* agreed to support its institution. This does happen but it happens relatively rarely. It is a social contract issue that for many years dogged the establishment of high schools in the United States and is still a point of controversy for higher education. To put it bluntly, the institution of publically funded high schools in the 19th century United States was carried out over the objections of many U.S. citizens and was *at the time* an act of injustice.[33] Since then changing social conditions in the United States have led to public consensus that, yes, there should be public high schools. However, *details* concerning the institution of high schools are still points of controversy and high school institution to this day teeters on a fine line between just and unjust institution. We have yet to successfully meet the Toynbee challenges these pose to American Society.

The moral faults inherent in issues that dog the institution of high schools (and higher education) subsist in poor (that is, too often unjust) design *téchne* that was applied to the institution. Flaws in the design are reflected in Institute behaviors that do not succeed in real extension of its

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[32] The reason I bring this up is because adopting the correct *perspective* in viewing the manifold issues is crucial. There is a difference between looking at *internal* conditions and principles, underlying establishment of one particular mini-Community or corporate person, and looking at *external* relationships involved in the alliance of two different mini-Communities to form a larger corporate person. *Primitive* factors of human nature are, of course, the same in both cases because human beings are the self-determining agents. But *empirical* conditions affecting the *co*-determinations of Community formation are also partial causes. Social-natural sociology is a special empirical science in its own right and as such must study contingencies of human social behavior. Correct scientific perspective is crucial for scientific questions to have objective validity. Critical mistakes in perspective lead to things like asking about angels dancing on pin heads.

[33] One of the principal objections to the institution of public high schools in the U.S. was that they were Institutes primarily intended to prepare young people to attend college. However, only a tiny minority of U.S. students in the 19th century attended college. It was argued that public funds were being used to pay for the higher education of an elite few. Countering this argument was the argument that there was an important *national* interest served by having *some* individuals knowledgeable in subjects that only a higher level of education could provide and, therefore, *public* high school education was in the national interest.

practices to produce social cooperations outside the boundaries of the Institute. While no one can guarantee a particular institution will *not* result in challenges to cooperation (because of the contingencies of empirical nature), what design *téchne* **must** do is to improve *by design* the like-lihood that the corporate person of the Institute *will* make this extension. Developing good design *téchne* for social institutions is – or, more accurately, *will be* – a science in its own right and will, among other things, require its design practitioners to understand the organizing principles of the anthropological person. Such a science can be accurately labeled a science of social-natural engineering. The Progressive Education Movement in the first half of the twentieth century did have, in its beginning, the intention of establishing this science. The effort, unfortunately, was bungled and what did happen back then cannot remotely be called "engineering." Neither can the disorganized gropings being undertaken today be truthfully so-labeled. There is far too much enthusiasm of taste and far too little science grounding these well-intentioned efforts to call any of them "engineering." That some people do label what they are trying to do "engineering" merely reflects a lack of understanding of what the actual practice of engineering is. One might as well call a barber a surgeon because he cuts hair.[34]

Deduction of the organizing principles of the anthropological person are grounded in Critical acroams of metaphysics proper (in particular, on the Ideas of Rational Cosmology in the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics). The principles make their necessary connection to human nature through the animating principles of *psyche* in the mental physics of mind [Wells (2006), chap. 16, pp. 1536-1555; Wells (2009), chap. 4, pp. 162-163]. With this introduction in hand, the discussion now turns to the principles themselves [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 483-487].

§ 6.1: The Quantity Principle of *Psyche*-teleology. All organizing principles of the anthropo-logical person pertain to the process of social optimization in a Society. This is a process by which, through the collective efforts of citizens, a civil Community undertakes actions aimed at perfecting its social Union, maintaining civil Order, achieving social Progress, and preserving its own *Existenz*. The principle of *psyche*-teleology is the Quantity principle for the anthropological person. It is an organizing principle for an homogenizing integration of individual liberties of action through interpersonal interactions [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pg. 483]. The principle itself is none other than the condition of social contracting, i.e., ***the civil association will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of each associate in such a manner by which each individual, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as he was before he joined the association***.

The "in such a manner" clause is at the root of the optimization process. The corporate person of a civil Community is a mathematical object. Consequently, the principle of *psyche*-teleology is a principle dealing with the *logical* optimizing of this object. The transcendental Logic of the principle's deduction has two parts: (1) the mathematical logic of the principle; and (2) the specifying concepts that set the context within which the principle is objectively valid. The math-ematical logic of the synthesis calls upon the three logical functions of judgment for Quantity in Kantian Logic [Kant (1787), B: 95] and the logical synthesis is made according to the formula

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[34] Among the relatively few present explanations offered for what 'engineering' is, probably as good as any is one provided (as of December, 2013) by Wikipedia: "Engineering is the application of scientific, economic, social, and practical knowledge in order to design, build, and maintain structures, machines, devices, systems, materials, and processes." There is truth in this description but it is incomplete, especially in regard to its separation of 'scientific knowledge' from other labeled items of knowledge. This segregation will lose what practical objective validity it currently holds when we have *social-natural* sciences. One notion missing from it is that of "objectively valid" knowledge. "Build" is likewise not very correct (but is a popular mal-description in Great Britain), although "maintain" is valid in the description. Wikipedia also explains "design" as "the creation of a plan or convention for the construction of an object or a system." This is partially correct but incomplete. Among its missing ideas is the idea of designs being purposive.

singular + particular → universal.

The objectivity of this synthesis is established by context-specifying concepts of the matter in each term in the synthesis. The matter in the singular term is the individual human being as a person. The matter in the particular term is composed of the aggregate of the people in the association. The matter in the universal term is the corporate person. In terms of these specifying concepts, the formula becomes

person + people → corporate person.

This, however, is not yet enough to set the full context of the synthesis because it does not yet account for the agency of human beings as self-determining causes of their own actions. For this we turn to Kant's idea of anthropological Quantity, which is the idea of *movement and occupation of mind through ideas* [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 341]. The idea applied to the principle specifies a context of *Community living*. There is, in addition, one more context concept for the synthesis. The Critical acroam of Quantity grounding the anthropological person calls for absolute completeness, i.e. perfection, in the composition of all *wants*. This pertains to the motivational dynamic in human judgmentation, and so the overall context for the principle includes: the concepts of what individuals hope and expect to get in exchange for alienating some of their natural liberties; and their commitments to obligations and duties in regard to the other members of the association. For each individual, it specifies a context for Progress in the power of his own person to meet Duties- and Obligations-to-Self. The means to this is achieved by interaction and cooperation with the other members of the Community (the particular term in the synthesis) which results in want-satisfactions for all members of the association.

Now, *perfection* is a direction and a journey, not a destination one expects to actually reach in his lifetime. Hence, we are dealing with an optimizing process, not a specifiable outcome, and hence the concept of 'teleology' is in the name of the principle. *If* the agents of an Institute are united in corporate personhood, this means they have achieved a civil union, through cooperation and interaction with others, by which the wants of each individual that are achievable from this union are sufficiently satisfied in regard to Duties- and Obligations-to-Self. A corporate anthropological person is, within its own boundaries, a deontologically moral Society.

Grounding this principle in human nature is its connection to the animating principle of Quantity in the logical division of *psyche* in the phenomenon of mind. This principle is: Self-determination of 'drivers of mind' (*elater animi*) in the expression of acts of aesthetical reflective judgment. By these acts the person composes the form of a personal system of values, desires, and interests [Wells (2009), chap. 4, pp. 162-163]. It is from this connection that the context of the principle of *psyche*-teleology acquires its deontologically moral orientation in Community formation. Rousseau's remark that a body politic is "a moral and collective body" [Rousseau (1762), pg. 14] thus finds real grounding in human nature.

This is Quantity in the social-natural anthropology of human Communities. For an overall Society containing divers mini-Communities, the challenge for a science of institution is ensuring the Society's Institutes are also united *with one another* by social contracts subordinate to yet congruent with the Society's *general* social contract. I discuss this in chapter 5.

§ 6.2: The Quality Principle of *Psyche*-aesthetics. The Critical acroam grounding the principle of *psyche*-aesthetics pertains to the primitive ground of values, i.e., to what is necessary for the possibility of a human being making representations that are valuable [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 484-485]. The necessity here is conformity of the person's manifold of Desires with his manifold of rules. To inquire into the origins of the principle of *psyche*-aesthetics is to ask, "On what grounds is the objective validity of a person's expectations for want-satisfaction by means of

entering into a social contract based?" Deduction of the principle again calls for a synthesis in transcendental Logic. This time the logical functions of judgment are those of the division of Quality [Kant (1787), B: 95-102] and the logical form of the synthesis is

affirmative + negative → infinite.

The infinite logical *momentum* does not refer to mathematical infinity but, rather, to *limiting the sphere of the Object* by excluding spheres of *other* Objects. For example, the negative judgment, "Fred **is-not** German," judges that the characteristics of "being German" *contradict* "being Fred." Infinite judgments are negative judgments regarded as positive ones, e.g., "Fred **is** not-German." They are judgments of *subcontrarity*, placing exclusions on "being Fred" without judging what it is to "be Fred." To say "Fred is not-German" is to say "being Fred" is contained in the unlimited sphere of concepts remaining after we exclude everything that characterizes "being German." The infinite function of judgment is necessary to understand concepts for which mathematical logic would otherwise produce antinomies of reasoning (paradoxes) [Kant (1787), B: 463-595].

The *form* of the synthesis, therefore, produces a principle of contrariety in Quality. As always in transcendental Logic, to complete the synthesis requires context-specifying concepts to fill in the matter in the terms of the judgment. To obtain these specifying concepts, we start with Kant's idea of anthropological Quality, which is *movement and occupation of mind through sensation* [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 341]. To place this idea in the context of its present application, it is further limited to its pertinence to *value and interest in and desire for social contracting*. Furthermore, its role in the motivational dynamic of judgmentation [Wells (2009), chap. 10] adds to it the context of motivational *drives*. To ask, "What drives social contracting?" is to ask, "What is it that is a common ground of *frustration* that individuals seek to overcome by means of social contracting?" Frustration is rupture in the cycle of judgmentation with initiation of a new cycle in an entirely different action orientation. Formulaic expression of the judgmentation can be put as "⟨action-X **is** frustrating⟩ **and** ⟨action-Y **is-not** frustrating⟩," which preserves judicial continuity.

Here enters the consideration that the principle of *psyche*-aesthetics must be a principle of subcontrarity. This means the original 'positive' question asked above, if it is to be expressed in a form objectively valid for human nature, must be reformulated to fit the nature of human judgmentation. This reformulation is: "Under what condition is social contracting not-a-driving-factor?" The answer to this is: *When there are unmet expectations of Self-fulfillment by means of social contracting*. Frustration of expectations drives the frustrated individual to make himself be not-a-citizen of the association. His valuing of social association, his interest in social contracting, and his desire for inclusion in the Community are all grounded in his expectation that through the civil association he will be able to better serve his Duties-to-himself. Without the satisfaction of these grounds, i.e. from unfulfillment of this expectation, the corporate anthropological person begins to disintegrate. If his membership in the association serves *some* of his Duties-to-himself but frustrates others, the person's *allegiance* to the association begins to break down piecemeal by alienation of *some* of his civic Duties even as he continues to fulfill others. ***The breakdown and disintegration of a Society begins with breakdown and disintegration of citizenship among its members***, eventually producing a Toynbee proletariat within the Society.

The organizing principle of *psyche*-aesthetics follows from this. It is ***the principle of justice***. *Unjust* is anything that violates a social contract. *Justice* is the negation of anything that is unjust. The principle of *psyche*-aesthetics is: ***living in a socially-contracted environment will not-frustrate expectations for fulfillment of the condition for social contracting***. This is the organizing principle of Quality necessary for continuing the real *Existenz* of a civil Community.

The organizing principle of *psyche*-aesthetics obtains its objective grounding in human nature from the animating principle of Quality in *psyche*. This principle pertains to energetics for

understanding and reasoning in structuring the individual's value system and orienting his actions. It states: reciprocity through somatic *Kraft* is determination of a condition, called an *elater animi*, through which the structuring of somatic actions expresses acts of aesthetical reflective judgment in the form of a system of values, desires, and interests. This is the source of the specifying concepts stated above and pertains directly to the psychology of people living in a community.

The earlier discussion of Leavitt's empirical principles made it clear that customary instituting of pyramidal organizations produces tensions among and frustrations in its agents. Managerial psychologists tend to regard this as a debilitating effect of organization that harms productivity. The principle of *psyche*-aesthetics tells us the effect is much more serious than this – not a mere organizational inconvenience but a threat to the continuation of the Institute. One thing customary institutions lack is a ***designed*** *justice system*. In most organizations, if there is a justice system at all it tends to be constructed *ad hoc* rather than designed. Possibly in part because so many of them were lawyers, state legislators, or state governors, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution took the judicial branch of the general government too casually and devoted much less deliberation to it than they did to the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. general government. This is demonstrated quite clearly in Farrand's *Records*. The consequence was that there were a number of severe problems related to the U.S. court system in the early days of the Republic [Walker & Epstein (1993), pp. 2-16]. A significant degree of dissatisfaction with what we *label* the justice system is still observable in the U.S. to this day. *The U.S. does not have a justice system*; it has a *legal system*, and *legal* is not the same thing as *just*. A *law* is always *legal* so long as it does not contradict the Constitution but many laws are *unjust*. Even more dissatisfaction, frustration, and injustice is observable in other U.S. public Institutes and private business organizations.

The lesson to be learned from the principle of *psyche*-aesthetics is, I think, rather starkly clear. A mere legal system or a static set of policy rules is not the same thing as, and is no substitute for, a Republican justice system. Without a properly designed justice system (to address and negate injustices, to be the guardian of civil liberty, and to check unjust legislative and executive actions) an institution must eventually fail and its corporate person break down and revert to state-of-nature relationships both within and without. Perpetration and perpetuation of civil enormities will be the consequence. A properly designed justice system safeguards Order in civil Society, without which no real social Progress is possible. Its role cannot be merely passive; it must be an *active* agency acting to preserve the Republic's social contract, *deny rulership* to *all* agents of the social Institute, and maintain the sovereignty of the citizens of the Republic. *And it will act as an education Institute insofar as the people will undertake acts of educational Self-development in reaction to the actions of their justice system*. If that system perpetuates enormity after enormity in breach of the social contract, it will teach the people that it is in their interest, in serving their Duties-to-themselves, for them to morally secede from the existing association. *That secession will be deontologically moral*. An unjust 'justice system' teaches people to become *outlaws* in their mutual relationships with a Society from which they have morally seceded.

§ 6.3: The Relation Principle of *Anordnungsvermögen*. The preceding organizing principles are both "matter" terms in the 2LAR of the anthropological person. *Psyche*-teleology is the form-of-the-matter principle of an anthropological person and *psyche*-aesthetics is the matter-of-the-matter principle of an anthropological person. The remaining two principles are "form" terms, i.e., *Anordnungsvermögen* is the form-of-the-form principle and *Anordnungskräfte* is the matter-of-the-form principle. The regulating idea of anthropological Relation is: *ordering of mind through the power of judgment* [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 341]. A corporate person *per se* has no phenomenon of mind and no power of judgment. The organizing principle of *Anordnungs-vermögen* is deduced from a Critical analysis of social structuring. Social structuring is manifested by cooperative actions.

In general, cooperative actions may be placed in one of three general categories: *uncivic* co-

operation, *non-civic cooperation*, or *civic* cooperation. Acts of uncivic cooperation are predicated from grounds in Duties-to-Self and involve transgressions of the Society's social contract if the cooperating people are citizens of the same civil Society.[35] Non-civic cooperations are also predicated from grounds in Duties-to-Self but in this case the actions do not contradict the terms and conditions of the Society's social contract and are also not necessitated by a common social contract. Civic cooperations are predicated from grounds in mutual Duties, i.e. are cooperations *necessitated* by self-Obligation to the Society's social contract. They are deontologically moral actions. Uncivic cooperation is deontologically immoral, and non-civic cooperation is deontologically amoral.

Cooperation is a key context-specifying concept for the principle of anthropological Relation. Its Critical analysis calls upon the logical functions of Relation in judgment and the synthesis takes the logical form [Kant (1787), B: 95, 98-99]

categorical + hypothetical → disjunctive.

Cooperation is logically disjunctive because cooperative actions require each actor to choose *one* maxim of action out of a set of practical maxims for his cooperative expression of action and forego other maxims of action. Each of the cooperating actors must partially condition this choice based on what the *other* actors are categorically or hypothetically willing or not willing to do. Each actor, of course, *also* partially conditions his choice based on what *he* is categorically or hypothetically willing or not willing to do. Their joint syntheses of choices therefore are understood as taking their *primitive* ground of Relation from the **notion of community** in Kant's categories of understanding [Wells (2009), chap. 5, pp. 188-190; Kant (1787), B: 106]. The disjunctive logical function is the mathematical correspondent to the category of community, hence the logical formula above. It is, however, important and helpful to note that Relation and Modality belong to what Kant called the *dynamical* synthesis of a manifold, whereas Quantity and Quality belong to what he called the *mathematical* synthesis of a manifold [Kant (1787), B: 201-202fn]. The consequence of this distinction is that synthesis for the dynamical headings is easier understood from a basis in the categories (of Relation and Modality) rather than from the logical functions of understanding in judgment (which are mathematical notions). The *dynamical* formula for the principle of Relation in terms of the categories of understanding is

substance & accident + causality & dependency → community.

Real grounding of the principle of *Anordnungsvermögen* in the human nature of actions is by its connection to the animating principle of Relation in *psyche*, which states: motivation is accommodation of perception and motoregulatory expression is assimilation of perceptions by adaptation. Acts of civic cooperation service Duties-to-Self *by means* of Duties-to-others. In the motivational dynamic of judgmentation, this reconciliation of Duties is referenced to drive states, the functions of which are: (1) enforcement of law; (2) conditioning of Desires; and (3) organization of motivation [Wells (2009), chap. 10, pp. 394-402] (see figure 9). *Anordnungsvermögen* means "faculty of order," by which we are to understand the *organization* of the person's power to self-organize his behaviors. In the social contexts of the organizing principle of Relation, the principle is a regulative principle for: synthesizing the person's self-enforcement of his practical laws (in the manifold of rules); and accommodating his subjective judgments by conditioning his manifold of Desires such that his Desires and practical tenets are brought into mutual expedience. This is, of course, a process of self-organizing the individual's motivation.

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[35] If the cooperating individuals are not members of the same *civil* Society, the cooperation is non-civic because they share no social contract and so cannot violate any contractual terms or conditions.

Figure 9: 2LAR structure of the functions of the motivational dynamic in judgmentation.


Figure 10: 2LAR structure of the functions of commitment.

The deduction of the organizing principle of *Anordnungsvermögen* follows from these logical and contextual understandings. It is *the principle of civic cooperation*, which states: ***each person in the Community pledges himself to Obligations he acknowledges he owes to the Community***. Pledging was discussed in Wells (2012), chap. 10, pp. 336-353. The word 'pledge' when used as a noun has for its real explanation "an act of practical judgment constructed using the practical *momenta* {intellectual appetite, validation, coordination of rules in a means, *bonitas moralis*}" [Wells (2009), chap. 11, pp. 412-436]. Used as a verb, pledge means "to bind oneself to fulfillment of an act of obligation." Pledging implies the making of a commitment. The real explanation of the idea of 'commitment' is provided in terms of its 2LAR structure discussed in Wells (2010), chap. 10, pg. 353 and illustrated here by figure 10.

For many people today, pledging oneself to something has largely "gone out of style" and has become more or less a ritual not taken seriously by many adults. Children *do* take pledges very seriously; I think it likely we have all heard that aggrieved cry of a child, *"You promised!"* In the 18th century, people took exchanging pledges very, very seriously. Even today, oath-breaking is

still treated in some instances as a crime. Thus, witnesses in a court of law are required to pledge "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Elected officials are often required by law to pledge an oath of office, and newly commissioned officers in the armed forces are likewise required to pledge themselves to a formal oath. Originally many pledges and oaths were held to be "sworn to God," with implied dire consequences for oath-breakers "in the hereafter." Pledges were generally viewed either in terms of consequentialist ethics or virtue ethics or both. Much of the context of the word "honor" is taken from the ethics of pledging. Many people today do not fear any "divine retribution" for making-then-breaking a pledge, and when do they remain faithful to a pledge it is often with an eye on whatever legal penalties there might be to coerce their compliance. Save for one, I have yet to meet a politician, university president, or provost who seemed to regard pledges as binding in any way. I have yet to see a university administration show the slightest concern for or inclination to uphold the pledges of previous administrations whenever present contingencies made them inconvenient in the least.

The organizing principle of *Anordnungsvermögen* tells us, however, that pledging Obligations *must be regarded as an integral part of every social contract* and that intentional pledge-breaking must always be regarded and treated as a deontological crime. If it is a pledge tied to service in a public Institute, breaking that pledge is a deontological crime against the whole of the Society. A deontological pledge of institutional office is made to the sovereign of the civil Community, i.e., to the body politic of a Republic. It is not made to a deity or, in all cases of public Institutes, an individual. A corollary principle is: any individual unwilling to pledge himself to Obligations *of the public office to which he is to be appointed* is unfit to serve in that office.

§ 6.4: The Modality Principle of *Anordnungskräfte*. Modality judgments are always judgments of judgments. They add not one thing to the object of the judgment but, rather, tie its judgment to the state of the judging person. The regulating idea of anthropological Modality is the idea of *ordering of mind through taste* [Kant (*c*. 1773-79), 15: 341]. *Taste* in Critical metaphysics does not refer to food flavors or the chemical sensory modality called 'taste.' Rather, taste is *the aesthetical capacity for judgmentation of an object or mode of representation through a subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction in which there is no **objective** interest*.

A corporate person has no mind, no subjective state of being, no power of judgment, and no capacity of taste. What, then, is its appropriate corporate homologue? The Critical acroam in which the idea of *Anordnungskräfte* ("powers of order") is grounded states: "absolute completeness of the changeable in appearances is *sought* through apperception of *Existenz* in relationship to the transcendental Ideal of **summum bonum**." This is the acroam of perfection. An Ideal is an Object by which a human being understands an Idea not merely *in concreto* but rather as an individual thing that is determinable through the Idea alone. An Idea (capitalized) is a pure regulative principle of actions. *Summum bonum* is the Ideal of a perfect realization of the condition demanded by the categorical imperative of the process of pure practical Reason. This condition is **complete equilibrium**. It does not matter in the least that a state of complete equilibrium is not something human beings can expect to actually achieve because for it to be 'complete' means, among other things, that it would be permanent. Perfection, once again, is a direction and orientation for actions one undertakes rather than a destination one expects to reach. When Buddhism refers to *nirvana* it refers to an Ideal that carries the same essential connotation as *summum bonum* [Eckel (2005)]. Striving to progress in the direction of *summum bonum* was what poet Robert Browning described in *Andrea del Sarto.* There he wrote,

> Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
> Or what's a heaven for?   – Browning (1855)

Human beings unite in civil association when by doing so each can for himself better his own *Existenz* by uniting himself with others. A person with a disposition for philosophy might have

some cognizance that this betterment strives toward *summum bonum*, but if he does not it is of no consequence. The unrelenting regulation of human actions by the primitive law of the categorical imperative will steer him in this direction regardless. A person allies himself with others in a civil Community so that he might obtain for himself the manifold benefits living in the shelter of a civil Community makes possible.

A person can obtain these benefits for himself only by paying a price for them – namely, he must pledge himself to fulfill the terms of the social contract. All terms within any social contract rest upon its most basic term, which is nothing else than a Modal principle of social contracting called *the principle of citizenship*. This principle states: ***Each associate is to put his person and all his power in common with all his other associates under the supreme direction of the general will of the civil Community, and, in their corporate capacity, each associate is to regard every other associate as an indivisible part of the whole***. This is a "one for all and all for one" commitment, and it *is* the organizing principle of *Anordnungskräfte*.

The principal difficulty encountered by all theories of the Social Contract that are premised on systems of ontology-centered metaphysics has been the problem of understanding what this notion of "the general will" really means. It has proven to be a question no ontology-centered theory is able to answer with objective validity. *Epistemology*-centered metaphysics, on the other hand, does provide resolution of the issue. As it turns out, the idea of 'the general will' is not an idea belonging to the anthropological person but, rather, to approval of taste – the Modality heading at the 2LAR division of the Idea of the Social Contract (figure 3). The real explanation of 'the general will' is: *the unity in acting to improve the communal idea of the ethical and moral perfection of the association through on-going processes of review, evaluation, and refinement taking as their aliments all factors pertinent to the maintaining and sustaining of civil tranquility within the Community* [Wells (2012), chap. 13, pp. 487-490].

Expressed formally in transcendental Logic, the synthesis of the organizing principle of *Anordnungskräfte* is grounded in a synthesis of the categories of Modality of the form

$$\text{possibility} + \text{actuality} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{necessity.}$$

The corresponding logical functions of judgment present this synthesis as

$$\text{problematic} + \text{assertoric} \rightarrow \text{apodictic}$$

but because Modality belongs to the dynamical synthesis of a manifold the organizing principle is easier to understand when expressed in terms of the categories of Modality.

The necessity notion coming out of the synthesis refers to necessity of the Ideal of *summum bonum* as the determining factor in the organization of the anthropological person. Associations in which benefits and Progress in *Personfähigkeit* for one individual are obtained from loss of benefits and diminution of *Personfähigkeit* for another member provokes competition rather than cooperation between the association's members. But, as Lincoln said, a house divided against itself cannot stand. A corporate person is a *sustainable* instrument for individual benefits only if it serves as such an instrument for *all* the associates. The journey toward *summum bonum* is and can only be a parade march by all, not a foot race pitting individuals in a Community against one another.

The real connection of the principle of *Anordnungskräfte* to human nature is made by its context within the animating principle of Modality in *psyche*. The latter principle states: *equilibration is the activity leading to the closure (in a state of equilibrium) of the cycle of affective interaction*. Figure 11 illustrates the cycle of affective interaction. The significance this holds for

Figure 11: the cycle of affective interaction.

the dynamical synthesis is this. Actions of individuals in the body politic of the anthropological person first convey their effects to others through people's affective capacities – which is to say the first effects on individuals are the direct effects on their feelings of *Lust* and *Unlust* in reaction to changes in their external circumstances. These go directly to individuals' capacities of making judgments of taste. The changes effected in individual circumstances are disturbances to the equilibrium of the affected individuals and will provoke reactions (motoregulatory expressions) taken to restore the condition of equilibrium. Part of this reaction includes acts of cognition as individuals attempt to understand the new circumstances (intuitions), and these cognitions in turn alter affectivity and motoregulatory expression. The processes for affectivity, motoregulatory expression, kinaesthetic receptivity, and sensibility (which produces the *Gestalt* of an intuition) continue in free play with one another until all these capacities are made to harmonize with each other, establishing the closed loop cycle of judgmentation which defines practical equilibrium.

Now, within a corporate person each individual is a satisficing problem-solver. His reactions will propagate to others through the interpersonal linkages of the corporate person's social Molecule. Satisficing behavior by one individual can address his own local disturbance, but the nature of satisficing actions is such that the individual's *local* focus typically ignores remote effects his actions produce elsewhere in the corporate body. For the civil Community *as a whole* to be able to achieve a *corporate* re-equilibration, closure of individuals' cycles of interaction must be brought into cooperation so that the actions within the corporate body are *mutually* brought to the equilibrium of closure. For this some means of 'global' action-regulation is needed, and it is from recognition of this need that the notion of the general will, and of individuals' commitments to submit themselves to this general will, are introduced into the deduction of the organizing principle of *Anordnungskräfte*. In this context, the principle is that of a means of making a metaphysical *nexus* of individual self-determinations (*category of actuality*), each directed to making real the *possibility* of globally satisfactory resolutions of individual disturbances.

§ 6.5: Scholium on the Anthropological Person. Like the animating principles of *Personfähigkeit*, the organizing principles just discussed pertain to internal relationships necessary for actual *Existenz* of a corporate person. The capacities of corporate *Personfähigkeit* do bear on Society external to the corporate person because its capacities of *Personfähigkeit* bear upon its ability to contribute to Society as a whole, hence to its socially significant functioning in Society. The anthropological personhood characteristics of the corporate person, however, *affectively* bear upon external Society because the manners by which its members act in regard to terms and conditions of their local social contracting (by which they cooperate, or not, with each other and by which they make determinations expressing their corporate will) are going to affect how its agents are likely to behave toward and interact with people outside their mini-Community. Outside people and mini-Communities will judge and stereotype them and their mini-Community *directly* on the basis of these interactions and *indirectly* on the basis of what other outsiders communicate among themselves in regard to the 'reputation' of the mini-Community.

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There is what a mathematician might be inclined to call a "fractal quality" to interaction and relationship principles effected in the formation (or disintegration) of a mini-Community and those by which divers mini-Communities do (or do not) interact with one another in forming (or not forming) social aggregations into a larger Community. Just as at the level of interacting human beings, interests, values, and a local *Sittlichkeit* are at work in dynamical Community-building or Community-breakdown, so too there are interests, values, and moral customs at work between entire mini-Communities at the higher levels of Society. The difference – and it is an important one – is that these interests and values are, for the individuals involved, more *remote*, more *abstract*, and social networking has a greater tendency to rely on stereotypes.

This brings us to the need for and role of stereotyping the 'corporate personalities' of mini-Communities/Societies. *Institute* personality, and how it is affected by institution, is thus the next logical topic that this treatise takes up.

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