## Chapter 5  Institute Personality and Governance

### § 1.  Institutional Issues of Mini-Communities and Ghost Communities

There are three important relationship aspects that processes of institution should bear in mind regarding the parent Society, its embedded sub-Societies, and mini-Communities within them. One aspect is the corporate personality of a mini-Community viewed *internally* by members of its parent sub-Society. Another is the corporate personality of a mini-Community viewed *externally* by other mini-Societies who are outside the mini-Community's parent sub-Society but within the overall general Society in which that parent sub-Society is embedded. A third aspect concerns whether or not a particular group of people do constitute an actual mini-Community. It is pertinent in all three of these aspects to bear in mind that mini-Communities are not static social structures. Mini-Communities are formed spontaneously by choice of the people who come together in them, but they also disintegrate spontaneously – again by individual choices of their members. The mere fact that a group of people live in a common geographical area, or that their personal enterprises happen to fall within a common mathematical classification (such as, e.g., construction worker, teacher, manager, etc.), does not mean these people will necessarily choose to form an actual mini-Community instead of a non-unified aggregate population.

That mini-Communities spontaneously come into actual *Existenz* as well as spontaneously disintegrate and disappear is empirically suggested by the analysis of various economic data presented in Wells (2013), chap. 11, pp. 402-416. This presents a number of difficult technical challenges for any social-natural empirical science. The time period over which mini-Communities form or dissolve within a general Society can be surprisingly brief. In mathematical terms, this means that an embedding field model of a Society and its parts irregularly undergoes changes in its mathematical structure. System theorists call this *the structure identification problem*. In social-natural sciences, mini-Community genesis and destruction are non-negligible phenomena with which a social-natural scientist must be prepared to deal. The methodology of embedding field theory is capable of this, but techniques are at present underdeveloped because to date the theory has been primarily used for modeling and understanding man-made non-living systems or biological systems in mature quasi-static states – and in both cases genesis and destruction are negligible factors within the time frame of the analysis problem. Generally speaking, systems that are characterized by being both non-linear and time-varying present the most formidable mathematical challenges system theorists are called upon to handle.

Social-natural science is, additionally, called upon to deal with another social phenomenon that generally is not presented by other man-made systems or by biological systems. Even if there is no actual mini-Community shared by some identifiable group of people, other people will often stereotype them *as if they did* constitute a mini-Community or a mini-Society. This happens very often in political as well as economic situations. Frequent examples include such groupings as "*the* liberals" in politics or "*the* consumers" in economics and business.[1] When a set of people is mathematically grouped together and stereotyped by fiat, I call that grouping a ***ghost community***. As an Object, a ghost community has no real *Existenz*, is not a corporate person, has no corporate *Personfähigkeit*, does not constitute an anthropological person, and has no corporate homologue of a 'personality.' A ghost community is nothing but a mathematical fiction arbitrarily defined by someone for which there is no real grounding or basis in human nature[2].

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[1] If it has been awhile since you were a pupil in an English class, the word "the" is called "the definite article." When you use it, you are referring to some *singular* thing. To speak of "*the* liberals" is to speak of some singular Society or Community whose members all fit whatever the "liberal" label is used to describe. A competent propagandist will not tell you exactly what his label means and leave this to your imagination.
[2] Human beings are the social 'atoms.' Human nature is the basis of *all* social-natural phenomena.

But this does not mean ghost communities are not important factors in social dynamics. Quite the opposite is true. The fiction of a ghost community is very often employed as a propaganda tool, and quite often it is used to effect tactics of the kind that in the history of uncivic politics are known as *divide and rule* tactics. For example, politics in the state of Idaho has been dominated since the early 1990s by the Idaho Republican Party so thoroughly that it is not an exaggeration to say that its state politics conform to a system of one-party rule. It is apparently true that a great majority of Idahoans are, politically and fiscally, more 'conservative' than people living in many other states. Nonetheless, one thing we who live in Idaho can anticipate at every election is that Republican Party propaganda will vigorously (and viciously) attack "*the* liberals."

Who are "*the* liberals" of Idaho? No objectively real answer to this question can be given but one: They are a fictitious Society made the object of a propaganda label that is applied to any politician who is a member of the Democratic Party and to any citizen who voices opposition or criticism to legislation favored by Republican Party officials. There is no structured or organized *real* mini-Community in Idaho comprised exclusively of people who fit this political label. Most people I have met who belong to the Idaho Democratic Party would be labeled 'moderates' and some would even be 'conservatives' in many other states. "*The* liberals of Idaho" is a boogeyman.

The propaganda usually hints there is some great conspiracy by "the liberals" to tax every Idahoan into poverty, to deprive people of private property, and place so many exsanguinating regulations upon business owners that "free enterprise" in Idaho could never survive. The propaganda is very effective – so much so that Republican Party candidates proclaim their party affiliation boldly on campaign posters, while Democratic Party campaign posters almost never admit the candidates are running as Democrats (which, of course, is how a secret conspirator would behave). However, as a mini-Community "*the* liberals" does not actually exist in Idaho; it is a ghost community. Propaganda directed against it every two years is nothing but a ghost story used to frighten or anger voters. This propaganda seems to accomplish this with a skill that is as thoroughly persuasive as the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Nazis in Germany of the 1930s. It persuades many Idahoans to think the ghosts are real and menacing. If it was not such an antisocial behavior, a disciple of Cicero would praise this propaganda for its effectiveness.

Another example of ghost community propaganda takes the shape of pronouncements, usually by politicians, that goes something like, "I am not against teachers; I'm only against the teachers' union." If you hear this one, ask yourself, "Who comprises the membership of a teachers' union? Are they longshoremen? Furnace repairmen? Shoe salesmen?" Who are the people making up the "they" of the teachers' union the propagandist opposes? According to the propaganda, it seems they must be ghosts. Otherwise, this politician must necessarily be against at least *some* teachers. *Which* ones is, of course, not something he will tell you. To do that is a propaganda error[3].

My point is this: The phenomenon of ghost communities has real effects on social dynamics, and more often than not these effects are divisive and antisocial. I doubt most tyrannies could be sustained for long without ghostly villains no one knows *personally*. If someone speaks of "they" or "them," odds are good "they" are ghosts. Ghosts cannot be hurt by persuasion *Personfähigkeit* but real people can be. Every day many are.

## § 2. Society, Sub-Societies, and Communities

The distinction between a Society and a civil Community is that the latter is a union under a social contract agreed to by every member and is a subset of the former. A Society might not

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[3] "The orator . . . by his words greatly magnifies and exaggerates the grievousness of such things as in everyday life are thought evils and troubles to be shunned, while he enlarges upon and beautifies . . . whatever is commonly deemed delectable and worthy to be desired" [Cicero (55 BC), book I, pg. 157]

have *one* social contract and might not be a union. Even if a general Society does have a common social contract, the larger the population of that Society becomes the fewer the articles in its social contract must be. This is because mini-Communities each have their divers special interests other mini-Communities do not share. The consequence of this is that if a general Society is to be a civil Community it can be expected to have a layered structuring of smaller sub-Societies within it, each of which can have divers embedded mini-Communities. Of its sub-Societies, some of these may be bound to others by limited *local* social contracts agreed to by each and, at the same time, not be bound by local social contracts to still other sub-Societies embedded in the general Society. This leads to a rich diversity of possible granulated Society structures.

If a Society is small enough in population, it becomes more feasible for it to be united by just *one* social contract such that the Society is an un-granulated civil Community without sub-Societies or mini-Communities embedded within it. *Gemeinschaft* Societies are sometimes found to be of this nature. Probably the best examples of this today are found in some BaMbuti Pygmy groups [Turnbull (1961)]. A BaMbuti group has *no* authority figures or Institutes (not even a government or a religious Institute). They are the premier example of a *consensus* democracy[4], and all decisions concerning the group are reached by the consent of every adult member of the group[5]. Turnbull tells us,

> There was a confusing, seductive informality about everything they did. Whether it was a birth, a wedding, or a funeral . . . there was always an unexpectedly casual, almost carefree attitude. There was, for instance, little apparent specialization; everyone took part in everything. Children had little or no voice in adult affairs, but the only adult activities from which they seemed to be rigidly excluded were certain songs, and of course the molimo[6]. Between men and women there was also a certain degree of specialization, but little that could be called exclusive.
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> There were no chiefs, no formal councils. In each aspect of Pygmy life there might be one or two men or women who were more prominent than others, but usually for good practical reasons. This showed up most clearly of all in the settling of disputes. There was no judge, no jury, no court. . . . Each dispute was settled as it arose, according to its nature. [Turnbull (1961), pg. 110]

The far more typical case is that of a Society which is granulated into divers sub-Societies and mini-Communities. A number of different structurings are empirically exhibited in history. Figure 1 illustrates schematically the most frequently-occurring case, namely that of a granulated caste Society. In this illustration, the Society contains one dominant caste of rulers structured as a mini-Community with its own social contract. This caste is not bound by any social contract to the others and *rules* over all of them by force. The dominated mini-Communities in this Society each have their own particular social contract. Mini-Communities 3 and 4 have bound themselves to each other by a fifth social contract which is not necessarily the same as either the MC 3 contract or the MC 4 contract. The overall Society can contain additional people who are outside the mini-Communities and constitute another sub-Society, one which is *not* a mini-Community.

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[4] There is a fundamental difference between a consensus democracy and a non-consensus democracy. The former is extremely rare outside of cases of small groups of close friends or relatives united with each other in a *Gemeinschaft* civil Community. A non-consensus democracy often takes a form called a 'democratic republic,' and these are usually not civil Communities (although they are Societies).

[5] When one considers the social structure of all BaMbuti groups taken together, this totality is a Society but one which is totally granulated. BaMbuti groups rarely have contact with one another and each group is a fully independent civil Community not united with any other BaMbuti group. Historically, this is typical of hunter-gatherer Societies.

[6] The molimo is a peculiar BaMbuti festival. Its purpose is 'to wake up the forest.' The BaMbuti believe bad things only happen 'when the forest is sleeping.' BaMbuti groups have no shaman, witchdoctor, or priest.

**Figure 1:** Simplified illustration of a typical form of caste Society composed of divers mini-Communities.

In generic form, figure 1 belongs to history's most frequently exhibited type of Society. For example, when Philip of Macedonia subjugated the divers city-states of ancient Helena, the Macedonians stood as the dominant ruling caste while the subjugated city-states remained distinct mini-Communities under the dominion of Macedonia. The death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC was the occasion for revolts by city-states throughout Helena, all of which the Macedonian general Antipater and his army put down by force. A similar caste-structured Society was established as the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great (539 BC). Division between a ruling caste and subjugated castes is a common theme throughout ancient history and into modern times.

The Roman Republic also was a caste-structured Society, divided into the Patrician caste and the Plebian caste. In this case, although the Patricians ruled Rome a social contract was set up between the two castes and the Plebian caste participated in Roman governance through a system of elected tribunes who were allowed to exercise a veto power in the Roman senate. This Society eventually fell and was replaced by the Roman Empire. Its fall marks the beginning of the fall of European civilization leading to the Dark Ages, although this was not recognized at the time.

Democratic republics, such as the present day United States, differ from this model in two principal ways. First, caste divisions are much less visible and people can more easily move from one caste to another – which are sufficient reasons these Societies substitute the word "class" for the more offense-giving word "caste." Second, who constitutes the ruling caste is made much more fluid and changeable by the mechanisms of political parties and elections. It still remains the case, however, that the ruling caste in democratic republics is usually a dominant *minority*. The fluidity of who rules produced by non-consensus democracy is an effective mask for concealing the minority-rule nature of democratic republics. It is very infrequent that a dominant caste faction in a democratic republic is actually comprised of a majority of its people.

As one example, the present day Republican Party is currently experiencing a power struggle between its three dominant sub-Societies (the so-called "Chamber of Commerce" republicans, so-

called "Tea Party" republicans, and so-called "Religious Right" republicans). In the Democratic Party, the so-called "Liberal democrats" faction currently holds dominance over the so-called "Blue Dog democrats" and so-called "Progressive democrats" factions. Both the Republican and Democratic parties are Societies but it is very apparent that both are granulated into sub-Societies, and that within each Party the sub-Societies are attempting to push each other into positions of subjugation. The sub-Societies within each are principally united only by common opposition to the other political party. Perhaps each party still has a tattered remnant of a social contract weakly binding its sub-Societies, but appearances tend to suggest these are more like treaties of alliance than social contracts. Both parties pay lip service to the sovereignty of American citizens but both seek to rule rather than serve. Propaganda by each is centered on the tactic of divide-and-rule and both vigorously employ ghost communities. Members of both parties will tell you it is not true that their party seeks to rule rather than serve, and most of them sincerely think this is so. But this is merely a case of equilibrium-maintaining self-denial by ignoring the party's actual behavior. As St. Bernard is alleged to have said, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions."

Many people will object to and deny the description I have just given, and will claim that the American public still holds sovereignty in the United States. Consider, however, these facts: (1) the only electable candidates ever presented to the public during elections are selected by the parties; (2) state legislatures and the Congress are organized according to rules designed to maintain party-based rulership in their internal governance; (3) the only three times in U.S. history when articles for impeachment of the President of the United States have been voted by the House Judiciary Committee, the House was controlled by the other party; (4) all committee chairmen in the legislatures and the Congress are members of the majority party; (5) all presidential electors are selected by the political parties; (6) the Vice President of the United States is always a member of the President's party; and (7) with only very rare exceptions, officials appointed to Cabinet posts by the President are members of the political party the President heads. The entire system, with the exception of the Supreme Court, is set up to ensure the parties, not the public, control the mechanisms of elections and legislation. That the Supreme Court is an exception is solely due to the fact that the Framers of the Constitution provided safeguards that have so far sustained its party independence.[7] The system denies representation to citizens who did not vote for a winning candidate. It perpetrates laws taking away from political minorities civil liberties that these citizens never agreed to alienate. Madison wrote,

> It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. . . . In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. [Hamilton *et al*. (1787-8), no. 51, pg. 290]

When political parties confiscate control of government, the result is inimical to free Society and to preservation of liberty with justice for all its citizens. It corrodes the civil Union and in time brings on its downfall. The party system that has been in place in the U.S. since the late 1820s can be truthfully called nothing else but a system of *party* rulership antagonistic to the social contract of an American Republic and guilty of perpetrating and perpetuating injustices. The democratic republic of the United States *is* a fluid example of the type of Society figure 1 presents.

To diagram the democratic republic of the present day United States one must also add a few

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[7] In some of the states, the state constitution does not provide for party independence of the state Supreme Court. For example, in Idaho the Idaho Republican Party occasionally campaigns against the reelection of state Supreme Court justices whose rulings irritate the Republican-controlled legislature. Idaho Supreme Court justices are elected for fixed terms, and it is not uncommon for candidates to be party affiliated.

other sub-Societies, all of whom are currently in the subjugated castes. These include so-called 'minor' political parties (the Green Party, the Communist party – whatever they are calling themselves today – various so-called "libertarians," etc.) and a large fraction of the U.S. population who ally themselves with no political party. There is also a sub-Society comprised of a fraction of the population, the size of which is unknown but is probably on the close order of the roughly one-third of voting-age citizens not participating in elections, who already constitute a Toynbee proletariat within the U.S. general Society. The actual *Existenz* of a large Toynbee proletariat is one of Toynbee's principal symptoms of a Society *en route* to disintegration.

Now, as I said earlier, figure 1 and the examples just described are *simplified* illustrations. I think this is a good place to discuss one easy-to-make error in understanding Societies. It is this: **Every Society is *multi-dimensional***. What I mean by this is that there are many contextually different aspects ("dimensions") that interact to determine social phenomenon. The examples just concluded belong to what can properly be called a "political" dimension of a Society. It is a habit, formed from the way we have all been taught to think about Societies, to suppose that the divers sub-structures discussed above necessarily represent one-to-one mappings of specific people into specific groups. The "one man, one vote" principle of non-consensus democracy *and the habitual presupposition that this is adequate as a principle* are both based on thinking that for every one person there is one Society, thus one set of interests. However, *every person simultaneously belongs to more than one mini-Community or mini-Society*. Every person self-defines his own personal society, and personal societies are comprised of divers mini-Societies.

Consequently, individuals do not map one-for-one with Society structures. One *person* might be a member of the Republican Party, a member of the Methodist Church, a father with a family, an assembly line worker in a factory, and a Little League coach *all at the same time*. All these different sub-Societies are part of his personal society but it is, I think, clear enough there might be little or no overlap or commonality between, say, the special interests of his factory work Society and his Little League Society. We are habituated to thinking about social structures in terms of individual persons, *but this is not adequate for representing a Society*. Rather, the proper "basis function" for Objects used in models of Society structures is not the individual but, rather, mini-Communities and mini-Societies. ***Human beings are the social atoms, but mini-Societies and mini-Communities are the social Molecules*** and, to use a physics metaphor, the scientific problem is a problem for 'social-thermodynamics' rather than 'social-mechanics'.

One might have guessed this from the earlier descriptions *Chamber of Commerce* republicans, *Blue Dog* democrats, etc. These specifying labels are modifying adjectives of 'republican' or 'democrat,' and the modifications reflect different social dimensions of the overall phenomenon.

Is a "Chamber of Commerce republican" indifferent to, say, people who are homeless (as Democratic Party propaganda or his own rhetoric often suggests)? I'm pretty sure if you search hard enough you can probably find some who are. But I'm also very sure you'd be in for a hard search and along the way you'd find out that many Chamber of Commerce republicans' hearts "bleed for the plight of the homeless" just as much as any Liberal democrat. Why, then, do they not agree about what could/should be done about homelessness or poverty? The reason is, in part, because different Societies bring differences in individual experiences, and different individual experiences produce different manifolds of rules and different manifolds of concepts – and these are the roots of opinions, plans, tactics, subjective judgments of taste, and moral code constraints. The challenge to Progress in any large Society is reconciliation of divers empirical knowledge the real *Existenz* of mini-Societies and mini-Communities produces. Reconciliation is the social aliment necessary for sustaining Order and achieving Progress in human Society. The practical possibility (or impossibility) of reconciliation is rooted in how Society and its Institutes are structured and governed, and one key part of that is how to set up that structure and that governance in the teeth of the multi-dimensional character of a Society with its great diversity of

different types of mini-Communities and mini-Societies. The design challenge is how to structure Institutes in such a way as to adequately bring cooperation out of competition between special interests *by design*. To accomplish this, we must understand corporate homologues of personality.

### § 3.  Habitual Behavior Style Determinants of Corporate Personality

Wherever they are situated and embedded within an overall Society, one fact about mini-Societies I hope was clear enough in the preceding section is this: The behavioral style habits of any Society are different from the behavioral styles exhibited by its individual members. Furthermore, a Society's exhibited mores and folkways are often different from those exhibited by its individual members when these members act in the contexts of other personal societies each has made part of his unique overall personal society. For this reason, exhibited behaviors and interpersonal social styles that are observed by others and made part of 'corporate personality' stereotypes of a mini-Society are generally different from the behaviors and interpersonal social styles of many of its individual members. Furthermore, *who* the members of the corporate body of a mini-Society interact with outside its corporate boundaries affects exhibitions of behaviors that lead outsiders to stereotype it with a corporate personality. This is to say again that corporate persons exhibit multiple corporate personalities to various observers and do so in ways that depend on the contexts of their interactions.

Figure 2 illustrates the three logical Quantity relationships in situational bindings between a corporate person (CP 1) and others external to it within its general Society. These bindings can assume any of the three general forms of bonding, antibonding, or non-bonding relationships. The corporate person CP 1 can interact with: (1) individuals outside its corporate body, in which case the connection between CP 1 and the individual is logically singular; (2) CP 1 as a corporate person can interact with other groups of corporate persons, in which case the binding connections are logically particular; or (3) the corporate person CP 1 may view itself as having special binding relationships to an abstract person called 'Society in general.' This abstract person is generally some Ideal by which members of CP 1 come to view their own roles and Duties in regard to a "mission" its members see themselves as performing in or for the general Society.



**Figure 2:** Quantity binding between a corporate person and other general persons in its general Society.

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**Figure 3:** Outlaw, Criminal, and Community Quality categorizations.

The logically universal binding is a major context for semantic determinations by which the members of a corporate person interpret transactions and respond to them according to their own personal moral codes and their contexts of a social Ideal. Its members tend to make Quality classifications of other corporate persons and individuals based on judgments of taste oriented by the degree of agreement or disagreement between their semantic interpretations of these persons' behaviors and what they expect from an Ideal person. These judgments often exhibit adult moral realism in terms of both the absoluteness of the determined judgment and its objectivity (the tendency of the judgment to be based solely on consequences of the actions of the person being judged without taking into consideration whether or not the person intended for these outcomes to result). Indeed, the aggregate moral realism of a corporate person often tends to be re-staged in ways similar to that of a 7- to 10-year-old child [Piaget (1932), chap. 2; Wells (2012), chap. 5].

Quality in judgments of agreement, opposition, and subcontrarity largely defines three general categories by which the body politic of a corporate person stereotypes persons outside its corporation. Figure 3 illustrates these classifications. The person judged is held-to-be either: (1) a member of what the judging corporate person holds to be the civil Community-at-large; (2) an outlaw, i.e., a person living in the midst of the Society without being in its civil Community; or (3) a criminal, i.e., a person who was trusted as a fellow-member of the civil Community but whose actions have violated that trust. The distinction between (2) and (3) is a somewhat subtle one and in order to draw it the judging person must learn to draw the distinction between a person who has voluntarily made a Self-commitment to the Society's social contract and one who has not. It is the latter who is technically a deontological outlaw. A deontological criminal is one who has made a Self-commitment to a social contract and has intentionally transgressed its terms or conditions. In the present day United States, the majority of people are uninstructed in concepts of social contracts and base their private moral judgments on tenets of either consequentialist ethics or virtue ethics. In both cases, the technical distinction between a criminal and an outlaw is lost. This produces a child-like partitioning of persons into "good guys" and "bad guys." A high degree of ambivalence attends this incomplete distinctness. For example, because of the uncivic free enterprise customs practiced in the United States there are people who will characterize a

"big corporation" as a "criminal" without at the same time also categorizing its *members* as criminals – which is to regard them minimally as guilty of moral faults or at worst as outlaws abetting 'corporate criminality' under the long-standing legal and diplomatic tenet of *qui tacet consentire videtur ubi loqui debuit ac potuit* ("when he ought to have spoken and was able to, he who is silent gives consent"). This concept is old but it underlies such romantic notions as the 'heroism of the whistleblower.' It also has 'legal teeth' yet today in the form of laws forbidding "obstruction of justice" and making it a crime to act as an "accessory after the fact."

What all such stereotyping judgments have in common is that they are all based on judgments of semantic messages conveyed from action exhibitions that affect the person doing the judging by the person or corporate person being judged. No human being can read the mind of another human being, much less 'read the mind' of a mathematical entity such a corporate person. All that any human being can do is make judgments of semantic messages and, from these judgments, form objective and subjective judgments about the message-sender. Because the concept of any corporate person is a concept of analogy – a corporate person 'is like' a human person – people who conceptualize a stereotype of a corporate person use the same exhibitional signifiers they use when interpreting semantic messages received directly from another human being. Because these signifiers are the same, actions exhibited by a corporate person (through direct or indirect communication transactions with others outside the corporation) can be located on the D-PIPOS circumplex and used to construct a stereotypical model of corporate personality. For purposes of convenience of reference, figure 4 reproduces the D-PIPOS circumplex.



**Figure 4:** the D-PIPOS circumplex model.

Personality theory and interpersonal style theory belong to the empirical study of psychology and their theoretical constructs are empirical theories. No doubt future empirical findings will improve our scientific understanding of the phenomena of personality styles and interpersonal styles[8]. For the present, however, an empirical social-natural science of institution design must use the tools available to it. It is also necessary to recognize the high degree of information loss and apprehensive uncertainty that attend empirical characterizations. For that reason, the usual 'crisp' ("point solution") mathematical methods that are most often used in circumplex modeling theory are not epistemologically sound. In their place, the methodologies of set membership theory mathematics must instead be employed[9]. To do otherwise would continue the perpetuation of one of the most pervasive of what Bacon called the idols of the theater.

The D-PIPOS circumplex locates the recognized personality styles derived from the DSM-IV manual [American Psychiatric Association (2000)]. However, there are three reasons why DSM characterizations are not appropriate for stereotyping corporate personalities. First, these locations in the circumplex are provisional and are based on analysis of limited empirical data [Wells (2012), chap. 8]. Second, psychiatrists recognize the provisional nature of personality disorder and personality style classifications and, therefore, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* is subject to on-going revision. Indeed, since the publication of the D-PIPOS circumplex, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* has been revised and a new edition, DSM-V, has recently been published. This does necessitate a revision and update of the DSM-IV characterizations located in the circumplex. Third, only two of the four quadrants of the D-PIPOS circumplex have "central" DSM-IV classifications. These are the Driver and the Expressive quadrants in figure 4. No "central" personality styles have yet been recognized by psychiatry for the remaining two quadrants (the Amiable and the Analytic quadrants). The DSM-IV personality styles are, therefore, inadequate to cover the scope of possibilities for corporate personality.

Fortunately, the same is not true for the Wilson interpersonal style descriptions and the Kiesler classifications of interpersonal communication transaction operationalizations. These empirical descriptions can be used for analysis to locate corporate personality stereotypes in the D-PIPOS circumplex despite the fact these were developed only for application to real people.

The Wilson and Kiesler characterizations deal with two different aspects of personality and interpersonal appearances. Each employs two orthogonal axes for describing appearances in order to obtain their circular systems of characterizations. In the Wilson model the two axes are called the "assertiveness" or "tell-directed vs. ask-directed" axis and the "responsiveness" or "task-directed vs. people-directed" axis [Wilson (2011), pp. 24-32]. These axes lie directly upon the "antisocial-social" and "idiosyncratic-emulative" axes of the D-PIPOS circumplex. *Assertiveness* in the Wilson context refers to the degree to which a person is perceived as trying to influence the

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[8] It is appropriate at this point to make mention of a bit of science fiction that has been gaining popularity through propaganda in recent years. This is the proposition that new brain imaging technologies can be used to "read minds." The hypothesis is that brain activity signifies mental activity and, therefore, brain imaging is also "mind imaging." It is true that brain activity is a signifier of mental activity. This is one of the acroamatic principles of mental physics. However, the linkage between brain activity and what the mental significance of this activity might be is based upon a pile of unproven speculations heaped upon more unproven speculations. The brain-mind models being used are wholly inadequate, and the proposition that brain imaging can be mapped down to the point where it makes "thought reading" possible is science-hogwash. If this specious pseudo-theory is introduced into the legal system, this will constitute as egregious an enormity perpetrated on human beings as one might possibly be able to imagine. The fact that some scientists believe the proposition is as telling a commentary on the failure of education as one might find.
[9] Sometimes this is called 'fuzzy set' modeling, although this is to a minor degree a mischaracterization. Fuzzy Set Theory is a subset of Set Membership Theory. For an example see Russell (1997). For a brief introduction to the paradigm of Set Membership Theory see Wells (2011a).

thoughts and actions of others. *Responsiveness* refers to the way others perceive a person when that person is expressing body actions held-to-be reflective of his feelings when relating to others.

The axes in the Kiesler model are called the "control" axis and the "affiliation" axis. Although these terms sound like they ought to be very similar to Wilson's "assertiveness" and "responsive-ness" axes, Kiesler's axes were deduced from ideas of motivation theory and carry slightly different connotations from the Wilson characterizations [Kiesler (1983)]. Kiesler's axes line up as the "hostile-friendly" and "submissive-dominant" axes shown in D-PIPOS the inner circle. These axes are rotated slightly relative to the Wilson axes and define sectors of the circumplex in terms of sixteen specific expressed operationalizations during communication transactions.

## § 3.1  The Driver Quadrant

The Driver quadrant is perceived as the most "antisocial" quadrant in contexts often meant when people ordinarily use the word "antisocial." Wilson describes Driver social style expression using the following characteristics [Wilson (2011), pg. 110]:

- Businesslike and results-oriented;
- Likes to take charge and take the initiative;
- Likes challenges; makes quick decisions;
- Direct and to the point; strong opinions and convictions;
- Hard-working, efficient, confident, and competent;
- Productively coordinates the work of others; likely to challenge new ideas; quick to respond;
- Inclined to correct, modify or add to others' ideas;
- Straightforward, responsible; makes things happen;
- Seeks to control the tangible resources of a project such as time, budget, people;
- Prefers to be given options and probabilities and allowed to make his own decisions; values receiving more authority, control or power over the situation or environment.

I again emphasize that these characteristics refer to how *other* people perceive the person. The social style 'personality' stereotype conveyed by a corporate person is in large degree an outcome of its governance/management style insofar as this style establishes people's behaviors within the leadership dynamic of the corporate person. Leadership in every organization, as the saying goes, "makes all the difference in the world" so far as the organization is effective in achieving its goals and succeeds in preserving its own real *Existenz*. The Wilson descriptions above characterize what psychologists call the 'normal range' of a personality style. Taylorism tends to produce Driver-like organizations, but in cases of Taylorism the corporate personality is more rigid, narrow, and could fairly be said to exhibit a personality *disorder* rather than a personality *style*. Psychiatrists define a *personality disorder* as "a mental disorder the essential features of which are deeply ingrained, enduring, maladaptive patterns of relating to, thinking about, and perceiving the environment that are so extreme they cause impairment of social and behavioral functioning" [Reber & Reber (2001)]. The paradigm of Taylorism treats people as "resources" and actively hinders leadership dynamics that are key to an organization meeting the challenges with which it is confronted. It seems to be the case that a majority of high-priced so-called "superstar CEOs" hired by boards of directors in the U.S. are Taylorites. Hiring one, in my opinion, is like the board of directors shooting the company in the head.

In the socially-normal range, the Driver style can be very effective and productive, although perhaps not quite as much as the next personality style I discuss. Even so, the style tends to breed mistrust and hinder the development of social bonding relationships between the corporate person and people outside it. This is because of operationalizations characteristic of Driver stereotypes.

In Kiesler's terminology, these are the Mistrusting, Cold, Hostile, and Detached operation-alizations. Kiesler described these terms as follows [Kiesler (1985)]:

- **Mistrusting:** engages others as Suspicious/Resentful (i.e., behaviors impress others as being vigilant, suspicious or jealous, cunning, secretive and resentful);
- **Cold:** engages others as Cold/Punitive (i.e., appears indifferent, unmoved or unfeeling and unaffectionate for others; appears to be uncompromising, strict and stringent in judging others, and to be a hard-hearted disciplinarian or judge);
- **Hostile:** engages others as Antagonistic/Harmful (i.e., impresses others as a person whose attitude towards others is unfriendly or even hostile, as being one whose only agenda is his own and who will oppose or hinder anyone who stands in its way; is contentious and argumentative, discourteous and brusque, and not hesitant to criticize, attack, injure or damage others if he feels it necessary or advantageous);
- **Detached:** engages others as Disinterested, Distant, and Preoccupied (i.e., comes across to others as a person who lacks any interest or concern for other people, as one who shuts himself off from the society of others, who frequently appears to be engrossed in thought, who tunes others out, and who attends primarily to his own private thoughts and feelings).

Sometimes people speak of "the soulless corporation" or "the unfeeling bureaucracy." These pejorative descriptions tend to be applied to Driver-personality-style stereotypes of corporate persons. In typical social interactions, where the actors express themselves by using habitual mannerisms with psychological naivety of interpersonal messaging dynamics, studies find that specific operationalizations "pull" what are called *complementarity responses* from other people. Figure 5 illustrates Kiesler's complementarity response pairs findings.



**Figure 5:** Complementarity pairs mapped onto the D-PIPOS circumplex model. Note that the axes in this figure have been slightly rotated counterclockwise to clearly present the Kiesler control and affiliation axes.

Figure 5 tells us hostile operationalizations tend to beget hostile operationalizations in return. The distinguishing feature of complementarity pairs is that the pairs co-locate on the control axis but are reciprocal (that is, rotated 180 degrees) on the affiliation axis. What this means for corporate persons stereotyped as having a Driver-personality in typical situations is that others "with a probability significantly greater than chance" [Kiesler (1983)] will respond by forming antibonding relationships with it. Kiesler noted that,

> Interpersonal behaviors, in a relatively unaware, automatic, and unintended fashion tend to invite, elicit, pull, draw, or entice from interactants restricted classes of reactions that are reinforcing of, and consistent with, a person's proffered self-definition. If complementary reactions are not forthcoming from interactants, the relationship will not endure or it will be altered in such a manner that complementarity is established. [Kiesler (1983)]

Driver-personality style corporate persons tend to bring their "bad guy" or "villain" reputations on themselves. An Institute that persistently cultivates or produces Driver stereotyping by others is a disintegrating force within a Society and will eventually be regarded by the rest of Society as either an outlaw or a criminal Institute.

In this regard, I think it is worth noting that post-1960s movies and television shows tend to depict corporate persons almost exclusively as Driver personalities. This cannot avoid provoking in members of the public educational Self-development lessons that imply this is a 'norm' and to teach people to distrust American government, social, and business institutions and regard them with wariness and latent hostility. It can even be argued that this is a primary education vehicle for Taylorism insofar as new generations of managers now grow up expecting the commercial world to be a jungle populated by predatory Driver entities. The stereotype becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Baseless conspiracy theories, which are more or less epidemic in the United States today, are also a symptom of this sort of educational Self-development. It does not help that many Institutes occasionally reinforce this stereotype by their actions, or that some reinforce it constantly, making themselves 'poster boys' for the stereotype. It bodes ill when a great fraction of a nation's population can no longer recognize crackpot theories as being crackpot.

## § 3.2  The Expressive Quadrant

Like the Driver social personality, the Expressive quadrant is also highly assertive and tell-directed. Unlike Drivers, Expressive responsiveness is people-directed. Wilson (2011) describes the Expressive social style in the following terms [Wilson (2011), pg. 147]:

- Energetic, inspiring, emotional, fast-paced;
- Comfortable with taking social initiative; engages freely in conversation before tackling tasks;
- Futuristic, talkative, and intuitive; willingly shares ideas, insights, dreams and visions;
- Risk-taking; competitive; creative; enthusiastic;
- Likes an audience; ambitious;
- Seeks to be highly visible and to stand out from the crowd, to be seen as unique and showing leadership;
- Values recognition for accomplishments, publicity, and symbols of accomplishment.

Some people, particularly those in the Analytic quadrant, see the Expressive style as "pushy" or arrogant rather than energetic and inspiring. The Expressive social style tends to deal in large and grand ideas but to be indifferent regarding attention to specific planning and details. Expressive operationalizations in interpersonal communication transactions are more humanely oriented, by which I mean they are more sociable and personal compared to those of the Driver personality

style. Kiesler operationalizations corresponding to the Expressive interpersonal style in the normal variant range of behaviors are:

- **Competitive:** engages others as Critical/Ambitious, i.e. by being energetic, enter-prising; by contesting with others for power, fame, wealth, a prize, profit, supremacy, or acknowledgement; by pursuing the winning of games or contests; and by finding fault with or belittling the accomplishments of others;
- **Dominant:** engages others as Controlling, i.e. by leading and influencing; by being active and self-assertive; by appearing strong and managing; and by taking charge;
- **Assured:** engages others as Confident/Self-Reliant, i.e. by presenting oneself as sure, clear, certain, firm and resolute, and as calm, tranquil or serene, competent, and poised in pursuing daily life or in interactions with others;
- **Exhibitionist:** engages others as Spontaneous/Demonstrative, i.e. by being inclined to talk freely or a great deal with others; being unreserved in speech; by easily joining in conversations, revealing one's thoughts, feelings, and beliefs; by speaking or acting passionately, letting one's feelings show; and by being inclined to be influenced easily by the ideas, plans, and opinions of others, and to conform one's own opinions, values, activities, etc. to direct, insinuated or implied pressure from others.

The social styles of Expressives and Drivers tend to be mutually balancing. What I mean by this is that personality style advantages of the one compensates disadvantages of the other. An Expressive's tendency to overlook detailed planning can be offset by a Driver's tendency to carry out detailed planning; a Driver's seemingly menacing behavioral exhibitions can be offset by an Expressive's comforting assuredness; a Driver's relative lack of creative new ideas can be offset by the Expressive's relative abundance of them; an Expressive's romantic tendency to trust that problems with his ideas will somehow naturally work out can be offset by a Driver's pragmatic habit of anticipating problems and ways to overcome them. One way to put this is to say Drivers tend to take given ideas and modify them in detail with an eye toward making them practicable, while Expressives tend to produce, or stimulate others to produce, visionary ideas of what could be without being too concerned about whether or how these ideas could be reduced to practice. When an Expressive and a Driver cooperate with synergy, leadership dynamics emerging from their combined efforts produces outcomes often far more beneficially effective than what would be expected from the effectiveness of either one by himself.

Related to this observation is another important one applicable to each of the four quadrants: Each quadrant has its polar opposite habitual social personality style, i.e. Driver vs. Amiable and Expressive vs. Analytic. Wilson *et al.* have called these pairings "poison relationships" because the habitual mannerisms comfortable to and appreciated by each of them are uncomfortable to and disliked by the other. Adult egocentrism – the habitual presupposition that others understand things the way you do and feel about them the same as you do – produces frictions and is an antagonist to social bonding between people whose habitual personality styles are aligned in one of the poison relationships. Corporate egocentrism – what William James once called the mind set of the shop – has the same effects in inter-corporate transactions.

## § 3.3  The Analytic Quadrant

A Driver personality style focuses relentlessly on results and outcomes but it is ambivalent about processes for achieving them. If one process is too slow or fails to quickly enough bring about the desired outcome, a Driver does not hesitate to cast that process aside and replace it with a more expedient-looking means. In contrast, an Analytic personality style tends to be relentlessly devoted to processes to such an extent he can seem to be unconcerned about achieving the result. But he is not really unconcerned; he just believes process is the *sine qua non* of results. Wilson describes the Analytic social style in the following terms [Wilson (2011), pg. 91]:

- Detail-oriented, deliberate and well-organized;
- Listens to and studies all information carefully before weighing all alternatives;
- Lets others take the social initiative; prefers an efficient, businesslike approach;
- Prefers information presented in systematic manner;
- Conservative and practical in business matters; technically oriented;
- Relies on structural approach and factual evidence;
- Seeks to enhance reputation as a technical expert by making the right decision in the right way; values being recognized for accomplishments and respected for expertise.

One difference between a Driver style and an Analytic style can be put this way. A Driver knows details are important but is primarily concerned about achieving results without being particularly concerned about how these results are achieved. He cares about details only in terms of what they mean for the result he seeks. An Analytic personality, in contrast, is concerned about the methodical *process per se* of dealing with details. Note the clause in the last bullet item listed above: "the right decision *in the right way*." A Driver is unhesitant about "playing a hunch"; an Analytic would tend to see that as gambling and reckless behavior, and tend to be aghast at it. A Driver might say something like, "Let's finalize this decision *now*. We can always change it later." An Analytic would regard that as sheer nonsense, unjustifiably wild and irresponsible behavior, and a snub to his expertise. If 'process' were a virtue, an Analytic might be called a virtue ethicist; a Driver would be an ethical consequentialist for whom ends justify means. A Driver favors pragmatism; an Analytic favors Machian positivism.

As much as the Driver's attitude toward 'process' tends to irritate the Analytic, at least the Driver acknowledges that 'process' sometimes has value (as means to an end). In contrast, the Expressive's lack of interest in details is outdone by his total lack of appreciation for 'process.' His tendency to not value 'process' at all is a total anathema to the Analytic and contributes to the 'poison relationship' between these two quadrants. Three out of the four Analytic Kiesler operationalizations stand in complementarity to those of an Expressive – which means that the two personality styles tend to "push" each other deeper into their own stylized behaviors. The relevant Kiesler operationalizations for an Analytic are:

- **Inhibited:** engages others as Taciturn; these mannerisms are interpreted by others in a way that tends to pull a Mistrusting reaction from them;
- **Unassured:** engages others as Self-doubting/Dependent (mannerisms interpreted by others as expressive of doubt, uncertainty or misgivings, especially in regard to oneself, or as modesty or bashfulness); they tend to pull Competitive reactions from others;
- **Submissive:** engages others as Docile (following/complying, passive/acquiescent, weak/yielding, and obedient); these tend to pull Controlling reactions from others;
- **Deferent:** engages others as Respectful/Content, an operationalization interpreted by others in a way that tends to pull Assured reactions from them.

Competitive, Controlling (Dominant), and Assured are three Expressive operationalizations. As figure 5 shows, most habitual operationalizations of an Analytic pull Expressive-like operation-alizations from an Expressive and this is a major contributor to their 'poison' relationship.

The Analytic personality style is centered on the D-PIPOS idiosyncratic axis (figure 4). I can think of no keener illustration of this than a demonstration I personally witnessed once. A group of us, all from the same company, were in a Wilson management training class. It just so happened that in this particular class the only Expressive present was the class instructor. She had ordered us to split into groups defined by our social style classifications, and each group was assigned to come up with a group slogan. We were only a few minutes into the exercise when she called out, with discernable amusement, "Stop! Everyone look around the room. See what's going on?" I looked. The Drivers were spread out across the back of the room, leaning back in their

chairs, most with their feet up on the table, and doing what can best be described as 'jockeying for the throne.' The Amiables were standing in a tight little circle, facing each other, making small talk, and waiting for someone to make the first slogan suggestion so they could talk it over. The Analytics were gathered in a corner, none of them talking to anyone, each hunched over the table *individually* writing down his list of slogans with notes on why each one was appropriate for the *group's* slogan. I have no idea of when or how they would have eventually finished this step in the process or what the next step would have been if the exercise had continued.

As it turned out, the "assignment" was a ruse. The instructor couldn't have cared less if it was completed or not, and none of the groups did complete it. The Drivers and the Amiables didn't even start it. The Analytics didn't have time to finish their individual lists.

The instructor's real aim was to maneuver all of us into a situation where it was almost inevitable that each of us would exhibit our respective social styles, and then to call this to our attention. As a demonstration, it was extremely effective. Today, a third of a century later, I still remember this particular incident as if it happened yesterday[10].

## § 3.4  The Amiable Quadrant

It is true that Amiables behave amiably. But in some ways the name for this last quadrant can be deceptive if one assumes that a social style describes 'the real person.' It does not. It describes how *others* interpret a person's personality from those habitual actions he expresses during interpersonal communication transactions. In point of fact, 'being an Amiable' does not mean 'being a friend.' Their social style subsists in not *exhibiting* unfriendliness and not *provoking* unfriendly behavior. An Amiable expects *you* to do the same. He comes to you *open* to friendship, but he expects you to demonstrate your worthiness to be his friend. He is an unforgiving stereotyper if you fail to do so. He is a friendship-*facilitator* rather than a friendship-*maker*. Wilson characterizes Amiable social style expression as [Wilson (2011), pg. 127]:

- Quiet, unassuming, supportive, warm;
- Friendly listeners; easy to get along with; enjoys personal contact;
- Shares responsibility; is concerned about collaboration, providing support, and reaching agreement;
- Requires extensive data for decision-making; prefers to have consensus before moving ahead;
- Often focuses on personal ties before goals;
- Seeks and needs approval; seeks to promote or gain agreement from others and to be included as part of the group or team;
- Values receiving others' approval and having a positive impact on others.

An Amiable personality is very sociable and does *seek* social harmony and cooperation. As an Analytic values *process* above objective, an Amiable seeks foremost to *preserve the personal relationship*. This does not, however, mean he seeks to *establish* it. The personality style is unassertive, and this means he is going to judge *you* to see if *you* rise to *his* standards. If you do not, he is going to avoid you as much as possible. His Kiesler operationalizations *invite* friendship and amiable relations. But you won't get too many chances to *accept* that invitation before that door

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[10] At the time, I was very skeptical about the entire Wilson model. I certainly did not agree with how they had classified *me* and was expecting the entire business to be a waste of my time. I was there because my boss had decided I was going to be there. Yet, there I was, behaving during the exercise in precisely the way my classification had predicted I would. The same was true of everyone in the class. After that day, I was no longer skeptical and became very interested in personality psychology, a subject that continues to interest me to this day.

gets closed. Note carefully what the following descriptions say and pay attention to phrases like 'engages *as*,' '*shows*' interest, '*expresses*' agreeableness, 'does not *appear*' watchful, wary, etc. The Kiesler operationalizations corresponding to the Amiable interpersonal style in the normal variant range of behaviors are:

- **Sociable:** engages others as Outgoing, i.e., shows interest in and concern about others and their affairs, readily talks to or gets to know others, readily associates with others and be in the company of others, readily directs his attention outside himself;
- **Friendly:** engages others as Cooperative/Helpful, i.e., readily works or acts together with, or facilitates, aids, or assists others; expresses friendliness and agreeableness, readily agrees, consents, or conforms to others; readily accedes, assents to, or concurs with the opinions, feelings, or actions of others; shows awareness and regard, or positive, sincere and thoughtful consideration for others; speaks and acts with politeness and good manners; readily aids, assists, succors, supports, or is of service to others; expends time and resources to facilitate the actions or tasks of others;
- **Warm:** engages others as Warm, Gentle, and Lenient, i.e., readily shows cordiality, affection, tender feelings, fond attachment or liking to others; is affectionate and emotional in interacting positively with others; presents a relaxed, sunny, soft, inviting, or approachable bearing, manner, or appearance to others; comes across as mild and not hard or rough with others; is permissive and tolerant of others regarding conformity to principles, rules, requirements, and obligations; is easy, compromising, undemanding, and moderate in judging or interacting with others; tends to impose a soft, easy, and loose discipline on others; is inclined to overlook, minimize, excuse, or forgive transgressions by others of rules and regulations or violations of principles and obligations; is hesitant or reluctant to inflict or administer penalty or punishment on others for their transgressions;
- **Trusting:** engages others as Trusting/Forgiving, i.e., does not appear cautious, watchful, wary, or guarded against danger, harm, or undesirable actions by others; relies upon or is confident about the good intention of others; acts upon the belief that others are good, right, true, innocent, genuine, etc. based on little or no proof or evidence; is open, frank, guileless, straightforward, etc. and exposes to, not conceals from, others his motivations, goals, or the real purposes of his actions; is ingenuous or free from dissimulation and free from harmful intent or motive; readily pardons, excuses, or absolves others; ceases to feel resentment toward others for their offenses, injury, or wrongdoing against oneself [11].

These mild-mannered and quiet social operationalizations are obviously very attractive. But they are also operationalizations that tend to deflect confrontation. Behind them, if the Amiable has decided you are a 'bad guy' his moral judgment can be as unforgiving as Leviticus. In the last clause of the Trusting operationalization above, do not fail to note that the clause reads *engages as* 'ceases to feel resentment.' Not showing resentment is not the same as not feeling resentment. An offended Amiable will not burst into combustion; he *will* remember the offense. A Driver, on the other hand, is a different story. Offend him and you're likely to feel some heat. The Driver-Amiable opposition is one of the poison relationships.

Amiables are not deliberately disingenuous or dishonest unless they think they need to be to avoid confrontation. They do value friendship but know that friendship is often a rare treasure. They are not the meek dependents more assertive personalities tend to mistakenly interpret them to be. If you pass their character test they can be, up to a point, as good a friend as you might reasonably ask for. If you don't, or if you violate their trust once it has been given, then that is

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[11] This last description of Kiesler's is a bit off. An Amiable does not *show* feelings of resentment; he can and sometimes will bear grudges that last 'unto the ending of the world.' What he won't do is actively seek vengeance against the transgressor, but he might passively allow some misfortune to befall him.

another matter altogether. But be you beloved or be you detested, an Amiable's *expressions* will *appear* the same. An Amiable will not tell you if you have passed or failed his test.

Amiable personality operationalizations tend to make them capable ambassadors to represent a corporate person in its dealings with outsiders. This is easy to see from the complementarity pairs in figure 5 that the Amiable expresses. An Amiable will not 'break the rules' to appease a person from outside the corporate body, but he will try to work with him and others within the Institute to try to find reasonable case-by-case accommodations if any are possible. Inasmuch as most rules have a degree of ambiguousness, he might also 'bend' them just a little, but not to the point where this damages personal relationships with others in the corporate body. An Amiable appreciates 'the spirit of the law.' An *ambassador*, however, is not the same thing as a *negotiator*.

By contrast, an Analytic tends to adhere rather rigidly to the 'letter of the law' rather than its 'spirit.' Analytics make better lawmakers than ambassadors. An Analytic is most comfortable with non-consensus democracy governance, an Amiable with *Gemeinschaft* governance, an Expressive with republican governance, and a Driver with monarchy/oligarchy governance *if* he is a member of the ruling caste. (If he is not, he will be an outlaw and might seek to overthrow the rulers).

## § 3.5  Versatility

Personality style expression is conditioned by external situation and context. At root, habitual actions and operationalizations are determined by the individual's manifold of rules, and this manifold is constructed through experience. Most people's practical manifolds have practical maxims and tenets across the full 360 degrees of the D-PIPOS circumplex. Only relatively rare persons said to exhibit personality disorder have narrow and rigid distributions of practical rules in just a few D-PIPOS directions. A person in the normal range of variants might be both a Driver at work and an Amiable at home because the circumstances and contexts differ.

Habitual behaviors and operationalizations bespeak of maxims and tenets that command a wide sphere of lower rules in the manifold and are stimulated by more external circumstances. This is why a person may exhibit a principal personality style. But the fact that his principal style is not his only style and the manifold of rules is adaptable through experience has an important consequence. It is this: individuals are capable of educational Self-development actions that bring them broader and more flexible practical suites of behaviors still capable of conforming to the absolute formula of the categorical imperative of practical Reason. Leavitt remarked,

> Frustration is a "feeling" rather than a "fact." It is a feeling that arises when one encounters certain kinds of blocks on paths to certain kinds of goals. These feelings arise when the block seems insurmountable and when failure to surmount it threatens one's personal well-being – when the goal involves the self. . . .
>
> Many obstacle situations are depriving rather than frustrating because the obstacles do not seem insurmountable or the goals are not central to the self. Some people may therefore meet fewer frustrations than others because they have more ways around obstacles or because they are self-confident enough so that their self-esteem does not have to be proved again by every new problem they encounter. [Leavitt (1972), pg. 38]

Why do some people 'have more ways around obstacles' or gain the 'self-confidence' others seem to lack? The root answer lies in how their manifolds of rules are constructed and what motivating concepts they have acquired in their manifolds of concepts to facilitate their ability to accommodate judgmentation to reach the equilibrium the categorical imperative mandates. These are all acquired and learned through experience. The learned outcomes are reflected in the social style phenomenon Wilson *et al*. call **versatility**.

   Versatility is a measure of the degree to which an individual demonstrates an ability to modify his interpersonal behavioral style to better conform to habitual interpersonal styles of other people [Wilson (2011), pp. 33-35]. The principal aim of the Wilson class I mentioned above is to train managers in how to raise their own capacities for versatility. In at least my own case, that class succeeded very well in accomplishing its aim[12].

   A measure of a person's versatility is also an indicator of his or her stage of social and moral development (see figure 6) [Piaget (1932); Wells (2012), chap. 5]. Low versatility denotes that the individual exhibits adult egocentrism in his social habits and moral realism in his assessments of situations. High measures of versatility are indicative of decentration (cooperation stage in figure 6) and a more mature stage of moral judgmentation. Both of these are indicative of a more well-integrated and robust rule structure in his manifold of rules, thus providing him with, as Leavitt might put it, "more ways around obstacles" and more possibilities for orientations in judgmentation by which he is able to be more discerning about stimuli and thereby reduce the numbers and types of stimuli likely to provoke practical hypothetical imperatives of Duties-to-Self in regard to his person. This means, in Leavitt-like terms, that he makes fewer situations into matters of self-esteem, which is key for emergence of cooperative behaviors from competitive situations. High stress, though, *can* cause a person to *revert* to an earlier stage of lower versatility.

   No personality style *per se* is essentially "good" or "bad." All human beings Self-develop their habitual personality styles from experiences going all the way back into early childhood. The manifold of rules each constructs for him- or herself is the outcome of re-equilibrations of disturbance situations and generally reflects the regulating operations of the impatient process of practical Reason, which is a satisficing regulator that knows no objects and feels no feelings. Every human being *makes himself the person he becomes* by means of this process.



**Figure 6:** Piaget's empirical model of stages of interpersonal social cognizance and moral judgment.

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[12] The basis for my saying this is an assessment carried out a few years later. A pool of persons qualified by direct interpersonal experiences with me was polled to get their assessment of my interpersonal style. Every one of the four Wilson quadrants was named as being "my" interpersonal style with an even distribution of identifications. *Prior* to the Wilson class, opinion was unanimous as to the *one* style I habitually presented. The later polling was conducted in another manager-development class sponsored by the company.

Low versatility severely handicaps the leadership dynamic in any Society of any size. The handicap exhibits its presence through behaviors that impede the emergence of cooperation out of competitive circumstances. One factor determining the versatility capability a person self-develops is the diversity of experiential situations he has encountered from childhood on. As a person gropes for re-equilibration after a disturbance, the process of practical judgment in practical Reason makes the first satisficing response it finds as a "rule" of behavior. If a person has not experienced very much social diversity – which is more or less the usual case for people living and growing up in a culturally homogeneous environment – his manifold of rule structure will tend to be accordingly narrow in its scope and orientation. This is conducive to development of a principal personality style (e.g., Driver, Amiable, etc.) with low versatility because in most of the situations that person encounters, the personality style he develops is sufficient to deal with equilibrium disturbances he experiences. The manifold of rules is a self-conserving structure, which means that the accommodations it undergoes *preserves its basic organization* and makes as little modification to that structure as is needed to produce satisficing results. As a person ages, new rules added to the structure become increasingly constrained by prior rules. The logical and mathematical consequence of this is that versatility is made progressively more difficult for the person to develop as he ages. Versatility-raising acts of educational Self-development always remain possible for a person to actualize, but the likelihood of him doing so under typical social circumstances becomes less and less as the person ages. William James remarked,

> Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. . . . It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our early nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees because there is no other for which we are fitted and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveler, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counselor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop,' in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. . . . If the period between twenty and thirty is the critical one in the formation of intellectual and professional habits, the period below twenty is more important still for the fixing of *personal* habits properly so-called . . . The great thing, then, in all education is *to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy*. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions [of habits] and live at ease upon the interest of the fund. *For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can,* and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. [James (1890), vol. I, pp. 121-122]

On the whole, James was very pessimistic about the likelihood of an older person being able to modify his long-standing habits. He seems to have been very much a disciple of the old adage, "You can't teach an old dog new tricks." Mental physics teaches that it is indeed increasingly more difficult for a person to accomplish this as he gets older, but it also teaches us the capacity is not wholly extinguished in the course of any person's life. It also teaches us that James was not mistaken in his assessment of the importance of early education, although he was not speaking explicitly of the importance this has for Society overall. *Versatility is a teachable human capacity* and good institution design should not overlook the teaching of it as an important ingredient in the overall design, whether in the public sector (where teaching it is a social Duty) or in the private sector (where it is important for the leadership dynamic within the organization).

## § 4. Corporate Personality and the Complementarity Principle

People outside of any given organization judge that organization from their experiences with

its agents with whom they interact and from their experiences with satisfying and dissatisfying actions the organization takes. The latter encompasses a broad scope of things including the person's judgment of the competency or incompetency of the organization's work, the ease or difficulty in communicating with 'it,' his judgment of whether the organization is responsive or unresponsive to his needs, etc. Whether an organization is a corporate person or merely an aggregate of coexisting distinct mini-Communities and real persons (a ghost community), the person on the outside will generally view the organization *as if* it were a corporate person.

Because any Institute or organization is a mathematical entity, direct assessment of it in terms of the Wilson interpersonal style descriptions or the Kiesler operationalizations presents a number of more or less obvious interpretational difficulties. For example, an Institute *per se* cannot frown at you or glare at you suspiciously. It can, however, take actions that might make you *feel* as if it did. Stereotyping judgments a person makes about an Institute or organization, which are the bases of that person's assessment of the corporate 'personality' of the Institute or organization, are judgments that at root depend upon the judging person's 'decoding' of semantic messages conveyed by his perceptions of its actions. This 'decoding process' is described by the Weaver's model of the mental physics of the process of a person's semantic interpretation and reaction illustrated by figure 7 [Wells (2011b)].

Furthermore, the homologue model of the Institute that the person constructs from these semantic interpretations will be the result of inferences of analogy – i.e., the person models the Institute using concepts that he also uses for judging the personalities of real people. Consider how often one hears someone describe, let us say, his local telephone company with phrases like, "*They* do this," or "*They* do that." His logical use of the word "they" carries the *universal* Quantity; he means *everyone* working for his phone company. Companies even encourage this stereotyping through their advertising propaganda, e.g., "Your business is important to *us*." Quite likely the night janitor working in the company's headquarters building has never heard of you and doesn't think you are important *to him* at all. If he thinks of "you" at all, he thinks of you in terms of an abstract person, e.g., "*the* customer."

Yet herein lies an empirical principle for understanding corporate personality stereotyping. In typical circumstances, the response "pulled" from a person by the organization's actions will be the complementarity reaction that is paired with a semantic interpretation of a *real* person's actions. If the person reacts with hostility, then the Institute's action is *practically* equivalent to a hostile operationalization exhibited by a real person. If his reaction is a submissive reaction, the action of the Institute or organization is *practically* equivalent to a dominant operationalization. Figure 5 depicted the complementarity pairs in the D-PIPOS circumplex. Regardless of how the people in any organization or Institute prefer to think of themselves, *corporate personality is determined by operationalizations pulled from the respondent by the organization's actions*. We can call this the **complementarity principle of personality stereotyping**.

This principle has important implications for institution design *téchne* for the structure and the



**Figure 7:** The Weaver's model of the process of a person's semantic interpretation and reaction.

governance of organizations and Institutes. In the great majority of most institutions, the issue of the organization's ways of relating to the outsiders with whom it has dealings is taken rather lightly and often defaulted to a reliance on "common sense" or left to such time-honored adages or slogans as "the customer is always right." Indeed, the *agents* of the organization do form their own stereotypes of 'customers,' 'the public,' 'the government,' etc., and nothing in the institution of the organization is set up to influence or train its agents' stereotyping judgments.

In fact, though, the success of its enterprise and its survival as a corporate person crucially depends on what sorts of corporate personality stereotypes the Institute *provokes* outsiders into making in their judgments of it. For every organization there is a twofold organizational aspect to be considered. First, there is the issue of internal stereotyping, which directly affects its internal leadership dynamic, its operational successes, and its survival as a Community. Second, there is the issue of external stereotypes, which directly affects its relationships within its greater Society and, again, impacts its own survival and its contribution – or anti-contribution – to Order and Progress in the Society and, therefore, to that Society's willingness or unwillingness *to allow the organization to continue to exist within it*.

In his model, Leavitt lumped organization structure and organization management together and regarded the latter as part of the former. Indeed, some corporate entities are designed by beginning with the management system design and then designing the rest of the organization's structure to fit the design of the management system. What it does not consider, however, is that the real purpose of each *is to achieve a leadership dynamic within the organization that optimizes both the performance of the tasks for which the organization is created and the achievement of Order and Progress for the organization's mini-Society*. Every action taken by its agents is a partial cause and, *at the same time*, a partial effect of practical internal corporate personalities actualized in the nature of its leadership dynamic. The principal responsibility of a manager or any other authority figure within an organization is to stimulate and guide this dynamic – to see to it that the right leaders step forward at the right time and persuade the right followers to take actions beneficially appropriate for the current situation. Most organization institutions fail to understand this or to make provisions for it. Robert Townsend, whose tenure as CEO of Avis (1962-65) saw that company achieve its first-ever profits after thirteen years of existence, wrote,

> "Top" management (the board of directors) is supposed to be a tree full of owls – hooting when management heads into the wrong part of the forest. I'm still unpersuaded they even know where the forest is. . . . In the giant companies it's an Elysian field where you put your old pros (and a few legacies) to get them out of the way of the young Turks and let them figurehead annual charity drives. It's a pleasant vague world of ceremony and ritual built around the regular board and committee meetings. . . . The best managers think of themselves as playing coaches. They should be the first on the field in the morning and the last to leave it at night. . . . In the business context, being there on the scene and available is simple necessity – an if-not-forget-it. [Townsend (1970), pp. 83-84]

Again, no personality style *per se* is either good or bad. Any personality style, and any corporate personality, is only compatible or incompatible with the personality styles of others. The persuasive power of any Institute or mini-Community determines its capacity for leadership in the leadership dynamic of the Society in which it is one part. What is essential for the Institute is not 'what its corporate personality is' – because this is a mathematical characterization of a mathematical entity – but, rather, whether or not its actualizations are compatible with and comfortable to the personality styles of the individual human beings with whom it has mutual relationships. Simply put, *an effective Institute is an Institute that exhibits high versatility*. It is perhaps not too poetic to say design *téchne* for institution must in part aim for accomplishing the task of *socializing mini-Societies*.

Corporate 'personality' *development* is a crucial task for its system of administration and governance. From the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics, **governance** is ***the exercise of authority in management and administration of the leadership dynamics within a Community*** [Wells (2010b), chap. 8]. The development of an Institute's capacity for versatility falls under and is partly determined by the governance of the Institute. With respect to its outer Society, governance at all levels within an Institute is practically bound to a Duty to hinder harmful stereotyping of the organization by outsiders and, especially, to prevent and counteract its being characterized in terms of antisocial ghost community illusions. Indeed, this is mandated in the general objective of *all* governments "to form a more perfect union." In Wells (2010a) this Duty was expressed in the form of a prime objective for government institution. That objective is: *To provide for representation in governance of the just corporate interest of mini-Communities existing within the general Community in a manner not prejudicial to the civil liberties of any individual citizen and congruent with preservation of the general social contract.*

It is here where the concept of corporate personality merges with the concept of institution of systems of governance. The discussions in this chapter set out contexts for an Institute's system of governance. In chapter 6 the discussion turns to designing Institute governance.

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