

Chapter 17 The Social Studies Framework

§ 1. The Soft Grounding of Social Studies

Whatever else one might say about social studies in American education, diverse approaches to its instruction have more or less consistently maintained a general theme from the beginning of public education in Puritan New England to the present day. Specific contents and socio-political orientations within the social studies framework have, to be sure, exhibited significant variations over the years but the common theme has never quite lost its soft grounding in the notion that social studies has something to do with Society and something to do with the citizen-in-Society. At the same time, though, a quite noticeable degree of equivocation does exist regarding precisely what is to be taught within the framework and the purposes of specific instructional content and context. This has been especially the case since the Progressive Education Movement (PEM) reforms in the first half of the twentieth century.

What is 'social studies'? Prior to 1916, 'social studies' was not a term used to describe any part of public education. The idea for something to be called "social studies" originated in the Progressive Education Movement and, in particular, from Taylorite proponents of so-called "social efficiency" – term that does not mean what you might think it does. "Social studies" as a term first appeared in a 1916 report by the National Education Association's (NEA) Committee on the Social Studies [Dunn (1916)]. A reprint of this report is available via the Internet [Nelson (1994)]. Its explanation in that document seems straightforward enough on first sight:

The social studies are understood to be those whose subject matter relates directly to the organization and development of human society, and to man as a member of social groups. [Dunn (1916)]

It is hard to argue with this definition – or is it? Did "the organization and development of human society" mean a social-natural scientific explanation of *how* Societies become organized and *how* they develop? Did "man as a member of social groups" mean human interrelationships in a Community based on a social contract? If so, then "social studies" would be the empirical study of Societies and social interrelationships, and many people would find it difficult to object to such an idea of 'social studies.'

Or did "the organization and development of human society" mean something else? The 1916 report was devised following a theme known as "social efficiency," and, as I discuss below, this theme puts a quite different meaning to this and to what is meant by "man as a member of social groups." These meanings are Un-American and egregiously unjust under the American social contract. These meanings are Taylorite and encompass the worst aspects of tyranny under Dewey's peculiar notion of "democracy" and his promotion of Plato's *Politeia* [Plato (c. 4th century BC)] as a model for American Society [Wells (2013a)]. I discuss this in §2.

The 1916 "understanding" was apparently not so clearly understandable as the authors of the NEA-sponsored report appear to have assumed. The proof of this is that since 1916 there have been a variety of different "understandings" put forward to describe what "social studies" means. Professor James L. Barth, Emeritus Professor of Education at Purdue University, defined it as

Social studies is the interdisciplinary integration of social sciences and humanities concepts for the purpose of practicing problem solving and decision making for developing citizenship skills on critical social issues. [Barth (1992)]

Again, it is hard to argue with this explanation – aside from the relevant little issue of what "social sciences and humanities concepts" are those which are to be integrated and precisely what

is to be understood in the word "interdisciplinary." Does "interdisciplinary" mean a panel of representatives from different specialized disciplines trying to "integrate" different concepts? Or does "interdisciplinary" mean someone who has mastered all the divers disciplines well enough to be able to integrate those specialties? The word "interdisciplinary" is a popular undefined buzz word in academic circles these days and it is hard to find two people who agree on what it means.

Professor James J. Zarrillo of the Department of Teacher Education at California State University Eastbay in San Francisco defines social studies as

the study of people. Social studies should help students acquire knowledge, master the process of learning, and become effective citizens. [Zarrillo (2013)]

This would seem to cover just about everything except mathematics and the physical-natural sciences. Zarrillo's explanation is almost synonymous with "public education." It is too broad to be meaningful because "that which explains every thing explains nothing."

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines social studies as

a course of study that deals with human relationships and the way society works.

This definition is also vague. Does it include relationships among drivers stuck in a traffic jam? Does it exclude human relationships between soldiers from two different "societies" violently "interacting" on a battlefield? One can, of course, dictate by fiat what is or is not to be understood by this dictionary definition, but as soon as one starts defining by fiat what results is made a mathematical study rather than a study of a real Object. Does "course of study" include merely mathematical studies? This dictionary does go on to try to delimit context through examples by saying that a social studies curriculum "is usually made up of courses" in

1. history;
2. government;
3. economics;
4. civics;
5. sociology;
6. geography; and
7. anthropology.

However, to describe by example is not the same thing as a proper definition. I will also note that this dictionary says the term "social studies" was "first used in 1926," which is factually incorrect. It is an almost-understandable error because most education textbooks incorrectly credit PEM educologist Paul Hanna as the "originator" of social studies. In fact, Hanna can be credited with getting the state of Virginia to first formally introduce something called "social studies" into its state curriculum in the 1930s (and so he "originated" it in this sense of the word) [Ravitch (1987)]. Harold Rugg, a leading PEM reformer and later an important figure in the Social Reconstructionist Movement [Wells (2013b), chap. 14, pp. 536-537] published the first social studies textbook, *Man and His Changing Society*, in 1929. So, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary's factual error is *almost* understandable; but it is still sloppy scholarship.

Next we come to the description given by the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS):

Social studies is the integrated study of the social sciences and humanities to promote civic competence. [NCSS (2010)]

Of the divers explanations quoted here, this one seems to come the closest to a statement of the topic that is consistent with the purpose of public instructional education. Of course, one might

raise an eyebrow at the humbleness of merely "promoting" civic competence rather than doing everything that can be done to maximize it in the body politic of a Republic. In the context of the NCSS definition, the word "civic" refers to the term "civics" in the context of that word as

civics: the study of the great theoretical and practical aspects of citizenship, its rights and duties; the duties of citizens to each other as members of a political body and to the government. It includes the study of civil law and civil code. [Wikipedia (2014), "civics"]

The not-so-minor objection to this explanation is: in a Republic and under a social contract, the citizens do not owe *any* Duties to the *government*. The citizens as a body politic are *sovereign* and it is government that owes Duties to *them*, never the other way around. Every official of government in every capacity is a public *servant*. Citizens have reciprocal Duties *to each other*. Government merely codifies those which can be *justly* codified. As Montesquieu correctly noted,

We have said that the laws were the particular and precise institutions of a legislator, and the manners and moral customs the institutions of a nation in general. Hence it follows that when these manners and customs are to be changed, it ought not to be done by laws; this would have too much the air of tyranny; it would be better to change them by introducing other manners and customs. [Montesquieu (1748), vol. I, pg. 298]

The NCSS is a non-government organization formed in 1921 and is today firmly part of what I will call "the education establishment" in the United States. In 2010 it published its social studies standards framework [NCSS (2010)], which the NCSS intends to have incorporated into the Common Core State Standards Initiative (CCSSI).

The proposed framework calls out ten "themes" around which the NCSS thinks social studies curricula should be based. The descriptions for each "theme" are verbose and I think I cannot give a fair presentation of them in an abbreviated format here. For that reason I refer you to the official NCSS website at

www.socialstudies.org/standards/strands [update version as of Sept. 1, 2014]

for the complete descriptions. These descriptions draw heavily from technical terminology used by sociologists [Abercrombie *et al.* (2006)]. I use the acronym DOS (*Dictionary of Sociology*) to refer to this reference source in the thematic descriptions below. DOS technical references refer to what are, in effect, divers mini-theories of sociology. For that reason, you should not presume you understand what the "themes" mean until you have read the DOS reference entries I cite.

These "themes" include references to existing traditional courses from which subject matters are drawn. The themes, for the most part, do not refer to *individual* traditional courses; one can only assume the intent of the framework is for teachers teaching the divers courses to coordinate and integrate instructional presentations in such a way as to "cover" each theme. Each theme starts off with the descriptive phrase "experiences that provide for the study of" so that each theme reads "Theme X: experiences that provide for the study of . . ." My attempt to briefly encapsulate the 'spirit' of these themes is as follows.

1. culture and cultural diversity: see 'culture' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from courses in geography, history, sociology, and anthropology; the framework also calls for the continuation of the current type of elementary school social studies instruction that Ravitch has criticized as "tot sociology" [Ravitch (1987)];
2. time, continuity, and change – i.e., "the study of the past and its legacy": subject matters for this theme are drawn from history courses but the theme itself calls for more than just rote learning of history; in addition it calls for an *analysis* of how historical events led to later historical events, situations and consequences; as I discuss later in this chapter, this is an innovative improvement over ways history

- has traditionally been taught and a useful idea for instructional education;
3. people, places, and environment – i.e., relationships between human populations and the physical world; the idea seems to be an integration of 'demography' (see DOS), sociology, and anthropology; subject matters are drawn from geography, regional studies, and world cultures;
 4. individual, development, and identity: see 'identity' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from psychology, sociology, and anthropology;
 5. individuals, groups, and institutions: see 'institutional theory' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from sociology, anthropology, psychology, political science, and history;
 6. power, authority, and governance – specifically, "how people create, interact with, and change structures of power, authority, and governance": see the entries for 'power,' 'authority', and 'governmentality' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from courses in government, politics, political science, civics, history, and law;
 7. production, distribution, and consumption: this theme is basically what one finds in a typical introductory course in economics;
 8. science, technology, and society – specifically, the relationships among science, technology, and society: this appears to be 'new ground' for social studies in the sense that studying how technical advances in science and technology impacts people's lives and how people's lives influence developments in science and technology; the framework draws its subject matter from courses in history, geography, economics, civics, and government and "scholarly fields from the natural and physical sciences"; it is not clear what the latter "scholarly fields" are;
 9. global connections: see 'globalization' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from courses in geography, culture, economics, history, political science, government, and "may also draw upon the natural and physical sciences and the humanities, including literature, the arts, and languages"; and,
 10. civic ideals and practices: see 'citizenship' in DOS; subject matters are drawn from courses in civics, history, political science, cultural anthropology, global studies, law, and the humanities.

Aside from the perplexing question of what difference there might be between a "natural" science and a "physical" science (are some physical sciences unnatural?), a comparison of the lists of courses from which subject matters are to be drawn *versus* the list of social studies courses that are actually offered by real K-12 public schools in the U.S. (see next paragraph) reveals a major disconnect between what the framework calls for and what can be practically offered by every school district in every state. The likelihood that the full NCSS framework could actually be implemented in real public schools I assess to be nil; the framework is impracticable for real public instructional education. This is not because existing public schools in the divers states are delinquent; it is because the course load it would require of pupils and the fiscal requirements for its necessitated teacher staffing levels are ludicrous. It is well intentioned but fatally flawed due to the inherent delinquencies of Taylorism in the U.S. education establishment.

Identification of courses or "contents" that reflect long-existing traditional courses provides at least a empirical description of what "social studies" means because such courses can at least be examined to see what it is that is taught in them. Therefore we should take a look at what sort of offerings are actually found in the divers public schools. Referring to various "guidelines" posted by many different public schools on their websites, typical social studies courses that appear commonly in these divers guidelines are: U.S. and world history; U.S. government; and economics. The actual courses do depart from what PEM reformers were intending with the 1916 report. This departure, however, represents compromise between what the PEM wanted to do and what the divers state legislatures and members of the public either insisted on or agreed to accept.

What, if anything, is the common grounding theme reflected in these various descriptions of "social studies"? Three ideas appear, either explicitly or implicitly, in all of them: (a) people in a

social group; (b) "society"; and (c) citizenship. "Human relationships" arguably is also implicit in them but it can equally be argued that "human relationships" is part of what is meant by "people in a *social* group." Our word "social" comes from the Latin word *socialis*, which had three primary connotations in Latin: (i) of or involving a partner or partners; (ii) living in partnership with others; and (iii) belonging to a fellowship. Connotations (i) and (iii) more or less clearly pair up with ideas (a) and (c) provided that: (1) "social group" is understood as a group of people not merely living in the same vicinity or community but doing so in a mutual partnership; and (2) we understand citizenship to denote a special type of fellowship. These two pairings, taken together with emphasis on the condition that the people live in a condition of partnership with each other, describe what Rousseau called a Republic and implies the *Dasein* of a social contract to which each person has obligated himself [Rousseau (1762), pp. 14-15].

A problem is encountered arising from the undefined notion of "society." One might reasonably expect that "society" would have a technical definition to be found in the terminology of the field of sociology, but in fact present day sociology has no agreed upon common definition for either the terms "society" or "social" [Abercrombie *et al.* (2006)]. The *Dictionary of Sociology* has an entry for the term "society," but this entry merely admits the term is undefined:

society The concept is a commonsense category in which 'society' is equivalent to the boundaries of nation states. While sociologists in practice often operate within this everyday terminology, it is not adequate because societies do not always correspond to political boundaries (as in 'Palestinian society'). Globalization, in particular, has exposed the limitations of traditional theories which equate society with the nation state. [Abercrombie *et al.* (2006)]

This undefined status for the term "society" was one reason why the distinction between the terms 'society' and 'Society' had to be drawn in Wells (2012a). The DOS has no entry for "social."

The aforementioned problem is that neither 'society' nor 'Society' necessarily implies people living in a *civil Community*, i.e., an association of people sharing a civil convention (a social contract) having common civil rights and civil liberties within a common system of governance. The condition of partnership has no real meaning without a shared civil convention, i.e., without some at least tacitly agreed upon social contract. The idea of a society is a personal idea and every person self-defines his own society [Wells (2012a)]. A Society is a mathematical Object and any city or nation is generally composed of an aggregation of mini-Societies which might or might not share a common civil convention with other mini-Societies within it. For example, a Los Angeles street gang is a distinguishable mini-Society within the city of Los Angeles that exists in a mutual outlaw relationship with the other inhabitants of the city and, within its own peculiar limitations, is constituted as a civil Community within the gang itself [Block & Niederhoffer (1958)]. Therefore, there is a fundamental inconsistency between ideas (a) and (c) *versus* idea (b) in the common idea set traditionally used to describe what social studies as a framework is to be understood to be. The presence of this inconsistency has a direct impact on how we must understand what is and what is not appropriate and justifiable for public education.

Public education in America is instituted for two purposes: 1) to preserve and maintain Order in American Society; and 2) to promote Progress in American Society, both understood in the contexts of the American social contract and the American Republic, and both in service to the general common interest in preserving and perfecting the *Existenz* of American Society [Wells (2012b), chap. 3, pp. 67-75]. A proper definition of the social studies framework must, therefore, be one sufficient to meet these purposes. Because our existing institution of "social studies" grew out of PEM reforms in the first half of the 20th century, the analysis of this education framework should begin by analyzing what ideas and suppositions the PEM reformers used. What we will find is that these were egregiously flawed at their roots.

§ 2. The PEM's Social Efficiency Theme

I have stated previously [Wells (2013b), chap. 14, pg. 541] that the PEM reformers worked with good and noble intentions. It would be unfair and untrue to impute villainous motives to them. If serious and damaging mistakes were made – and they were – these were due to mistaken ideas and cultural prejudices that held sway during that period of our history. One of the most serious of these, and the root cause of what I just called egregious flaws at the roots of the social studies framework, was the idea known as "social efficiency." The theme of "social efficiency" was the orienting idea for all that developed into the PEM's social studies reform. The 1916 report of the Committee on the Social Studies explicitly stated that social efficiency was the basic theme of their study [Nelson (1994), pg. 17]. What was this theme?

The social efficiency idea predicated that education ought to be used as a tool for controlling society and for tracking pupils into adult occupations for which educologists deemed them to be best suited by their innate intelligence. The control proposition is one of rulership by an oligarchy comprised of an elite class. It is an idea taken directly from Plato's *Politeía* [Plato (c. 4th century BC)]. Such control contradicts the Idea of the American Republic by denying sovereignty to the citizens on the flimsy pretext that an elite knows better than they what the country needs. Tracking is predicated on a false pseudo-psychology and institutionalizes bigotry along ethnic or class divisions. It is grounded in the idea that intelligence is innately *fixed*, but this idea is false.

Probably the foremost advocate of the social control aspect was David Snedden. A summary of Snedden's doctrine has been provided by Ravitch:

Throughout his career, Snedden viewed education through the lens of social control doctrine. He believed that the needs of society determined the needs of individuals and that the primary aim of education was to adjust individuals or groups to carry out their social roles. Snedden advocated several interrelated ideas:

- First, he insisted that different groups, as defined by their likely occupation, required different kinds of education. A differentiated curriculum was democratic and socially efficient, he felt, because it supplied an appropriate education for girls, the college-bound, and youngsters destined for certain occupations.
- Second, he believed that most students, after the age of twelve, and not later than fourteen, should be in a vocational program preparing for a specific job or occupation.
- Third, he derided academic studies as useless, elitist, and of little value to a democratic society, except for the few students who had a specific occupational reason for studying them.
- Fourth, he believed that his own views reflected modern scientific thinking. He considered those who disagreed with him to be ignorant of modern science or "wrapped up in the cocoon of blind faiths, untested beliefs, hardened customs." [Ravitch (2000), pp. 81-82; Snedden (1918)]

"Democracy" as used here means "Deweyan democracy," which in turn means the antlike communism of Plato's *Politeía*. The hubris reflected in Snedden's opinions is breathtaking. In a nation founded on ideas of liberty with justice for all its citizens, the arrogant elitism of his notion that some body of so-called experts should sit in judgment of every child and pre-determine what his "destiny" was to be is staggering. How an entire reform movement could come under the spell of Snedden's despotic pseudo-science in a nation where the citizens are sovereign is a perplexing question for mob psychology. "Social control" means nothing else than rulership by a meritocracy of oligarchs over a population of economically enslaved Helots.

Snedden's first and second ideas reflect the presumptive bigotry attending the false idea that a

person's intelligence is fixed by heredity and his future is predestined. This was the premise behind PEM institution of the pseudo-science of "intelligence quotient" testing [Wells (2013b), chap. 15, pp. 548-555]. Ravitch recounts,

After World War I, even as the schools adopted group intelligence testing, there was a vigorous debate about the results of the mental tests the Army had administered during the war. Leading psychologists claimed that the average mental age of draftees had been only thirteen or fourteen. Intelligence, they said, was fixed and innate. Nativists and racists cited the Army test data to support their campaigns for restrictions on immigration and for a eugenics program. Their critics insisted that the test data had been deeply flawed and that the results had been misinterpreted. . . . The progressive sociologist Edward A. Ross, well known for his theory of social control, warned about the danger to American society of continued immigration from southern and eastern Europe and the Orient.

But whatever complaint was lodged against the new immigration, the clincher in the argument for immigration restriction was the Army mental tests, which supposedly offered scientific proof of the mental superiority of the Nordic stock from northern European countries. One commentator complained, "We are being swamped with the offscourings of Europe. Those at the lower end of the intellectual scale have brought us their social customs, their language, their political ideals. They cannot assimilate our ideals. . . . They cannot become citizens in the highest meaning of that word. . . . We do not need the ignorant, the mentally feeble, the moron."¹

In 1922, Lothrop Stoddard's eugenicist book, *The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man*, used the Army test results and the writings of Yerkes, Terman, and other prominent psychologists as evidence that the American racial stock was being threatened by the addition of inferior racial groups from southern and eastern Europe. Like other advocates of eugenics, Stoddard claimed that his views were founded on the scientific principles of evolutionary biology rather than on sentimental ideas about natural equality. . . . The Army tests, Stoddard declared, showed that nearly one half the population "will never develop mental capacity beyond the state represented by a normal twelve-year-old child." [Ravitch (2000), pp. 140-141]

I think most Americans born after around 1975 might find it astonishing and incredible that such views were once predominant in America and so similar to Nazi bigotry. It is true that institutionalized bigotry has not been eradicated in America, but it is beyond reasonable doubt that it is not as virulently rampant as it once was. The doctrine of mental physics teaches us the notion that evolutionary biology can say *anything* about intelligence with objective validity is groundless. The idea that any person is "destined" for any occupation or social role is in flat contradiction with a basic principle of epistemology-centered metaphysics, *viz.*, *in mundo non datur fatum* ("fate is not given in the sensible world"). The "sentimental idea of natural equality" is not a sentimental idea; it is a hard principle of the Critical theory of knowledge.

These were the pseudo-science premises of social efficiency doctrine. The doctrine had profound and thorough-going real effects on education reforms instituted by the PEM in the first half of the twentieth century. Many of the false conclusions reached from this doctrine are still institutionalized in American public education today. The horrors of Nazi eugenics from the 1930s until 1945, and national consciousness of racism and bigotry that came out of the civil rights movement and the civil war of the 1960s and early 1970s, have moderated many of the basic injustices and enormities "social efficiency" produced, but they have not eliminated them. The insidiousness of institutionalized bigotry subsists in inability of people to recognize it and in a natural and often aggrieved denial by individuals that their own actions are being shaped by it.

¹ Ravitch is quoting from Sweeney, Arthur (1922), "Mental tests for immigrants," *North American Review*, May, 1922, pg. 611.

Of course, bigotry was not what was *taught* in public schools. Rather, bigoted opinions were used to redefine public school curricula according to what trained so-called experts in curriculum design dictated. Radical public school curriculum proposals were designed under the sway of a system of Taylorite rulership practiced by the Progressive Education Association (PEA):

The PEA tried to show how every academic subject could be converted to meet the "needs of youth." For example, *Science in General Education* maintained that science teaching should center on practical problems young people were likely to encounter in their daily lives, especially problems of health, homemaking, sex, sanitation, living conditions, and understanding how familiar machines work. Studies such as chemistry and physics, it was suggested, relied too much on "mental discipline" and were organized according to "logical unity, internal consistency, and the maximum possibility of deduction," instead of dealing with "problems or issues of practical interest." Reorganized science courses would emphasize students' "pressing questions" such as "How may I keep in good health?" and "Do my religious views conflict with the teachings of science?" Or the sciences might be integrated into a core curriculum along with social studies, English, and mathematics to address broad themes such as "Problems of Social Living" or "The Progress of Man Through the Ages."

The point of these curricular reorganizations was to replace logically organized academic subject matter with contemporary social issues, exchanges of opinion, or useful information. The social studies program proposed by the PEA, for example, replaced history with studies of personal relationships and current events. This change was justified by the "changing character of the school population." Translated into plain language, this meant that certain forms of knowledge, such as history and chemistry, were too difficult to offer to the children of the masses, too far beyond their limited intellectual ken. It was ironic that the decision to provide curricular differentiation was called a victory for democratic values. Far from being democratic, it turned the academic curriculum into elite knowledge for the college-bound, while excluding the large majority of students from gaining any deep knowledge of scientific, social, and economic principles, from preparing for higher education or the professions, and from developing the ability to make an original contribution to the advancement of knowledge. At the very moment when science and technology were about to transform modern life, at the very time when the world was entering a prolonged period of political and military crisis, expert educators were insisting that most students needed a curriculum that limited their access to knowledge and narrowed their understanding to the practical problems of everyday life. [Ravitch (2000), pp. 275-276]

I will argue that it did not even succeed in providing learners with an "understanding of the practical problems of everyday life." The extremism of PEM reform might arguably be a thing of the past today, but habits and presuppositions of curriculum design are little different today than they were in the 1930s. One sees the habit of curriculum design for "pressing interests, studies of personal relationships, and current events" present still in the CCSSI framework and in the NCSS framework. The *habits* of curriculum design, which are institutionalized in college of education curricula as part of teacher training, are PEA institutions and are now, as they were then, habits and prejudices presupposing a static world, static sciences and technology, a static socio-political environment, and the job-centric antlike communism of Plato's *Politeía*.

You can be sure that the Taylorism institutionalized in the American education establishment was deliberate and is still a dominant and crippling factor in it. Ravitch tells us,

[Harold Rugg] declared passionately that "it is not refinement of existing 'subjects' that is most sorely needed; it is, rather, the radical reconstruction of the entire school curriculum." Rugg averred that this radical reconstruction must meld together a "comprehensive and scientific study of society" and "the interests and doings of children." The goal, he argued, must be to close the gap between the curriculum and "the content of American life – not

from the academic relics of Victorian precedents." He wanted the public school, through its curriculum, to become "a competent instrument for social improvement." Rugg cautioned that "the tasks of curriculum-making are manifold and difficult and can be carried on effectively only by professionally equipped specialists." In other words, this complex business of determining the needs of society and children was not to be carried out by ordinary teachers and local school officials; it could be done properly only by professional specialists who had been trained in university programs. [*ibid.*, pp. 191-192]

This is vintage Taylorism in its rankest form. The idea that narrow specialists are "equipped" to assess and determine the needs of an entire Society, or even of individual children, is pretentious hogwash of the grandest proportion. Outcomes for American Society *might* have been better than they were *if* the PEM had paused to actually *develop* a science of education, but they did not make the least effort to do so. They expected to be *handed* one ready-made, and they plunged ahead with reforms out of misinformation, opinions, judgments of taste, and raw enthusiasm.

§ 3. The Social Contract is the Hard Grounding for Social Studies Instruction

It is an elementary principle of civil engineering that the foundations for any building or bridge must be set solidly in firm bedrock or the structure will collapse. This principle is a metaphor for the institution of public instructional education. The bedrock for a social studies framework is and can be none other than a Society's social contract. Regardless of particular details, *all* social contracts are grounded in a fundamental contractual term and a fundamental contractual condition:

- The term: each associate is to put his person and all his power in common with those of the other associates under the supreme direction of the general will, and each associate, in his corporate capacity, is to regard every other associate as an indivisible part of their whole body politic;
- The condition: the association will defend and protect with its whole common force the person and goods of each associate in such a way that each associate can unite himself with all the other associates while still obeying himself alone. [Wells (2012a), chap. 2; Rousseau (1762), pp. 13-15]

The fundamental premises of the Progressive Education Movement were in contradiction with *both* this term and this condition. This contradiction was assured the moment that Dewey chose to make Plato's *Politeía* the foundation of his education philosophy and to define Deweyan "democracy" to mean this form of Society [Wells (2013a)]. In contrast, the twenty-four functions of public instructional education (figure 1) were deduced on the basis of foundations set firmly in this term and this condition [Wells (2012b)].

Just as the object of physical-natural science instruction in K-12 schooling is *not* to teach every learner to be a specialized chemist, biologist, physicist, etc. (because to do so is just another kind of job training), the object of social studies is not to teach learners to be specialized social scientists, e.g. psychologists, sociologists, economists, etc. The object of physical-natural science instruction was discussed in chapter 15. The object of social studies instruction is similar but is based on the human being as the social atom and on causative explanation from *psychological* causality. It is applied to cultivate different aspects of learner *Personfähigkeit*. Its proper framework is defined through the functions of public instructional education (figure 1).

This viewpoint resolves the issue I raised earlier in regard to ideas (a) and (c) – people in a social group and citizenship – *versus* idea (b) – "society." To make Society *per se* the object of social studies instruction is to instruct the learner as if he were to become a social-natural scientist but to instruct the learner in fundamental principles of what is normally meant by (a), (b), and (c) is to instruct him in corporal, intellectual, tangible, and persuasive functions in the social dimension of the learner and in some particular functions in the personal dimension of the learner.




Figure 1: The 3LAR structure of the basic functions of public instructional education.

Contrary to Rugg's passionate assertion, it is refinement of traditional social studies courses' subject-matters that is "most sorely needed" along with such adjustments to the curriculum design made necessary to better integrate these subject-matters in learner understanding. Integration, rather than differentiation, of subject-matters is essential for the cultivation of *Personfähigkeit* because without it all one achieves by instruction is a juxtaposition of isolated silos of concepts with large gaps of ignorance separating them. Furthermore, instruction *téchne* must be designed so as to take account of learners' stages of mental development at the divers grade levels.

Teachers must face some daunting design task challenges. First, education is not presently a social-natural science and it is very important that this science be developed, i.e., that teachers make themselves *become* education scientists even as they are developing instructional *téchne* and curriculum design *téchne*. Taylorism in the education establishment must be eradicated if this is to be possible because no natural science can be or has ever been brought into actual existence under the yoke of Taylorism. Second, the specialized social sciences taught at the college level are not social-natural sciences at present. Indeed, some of their own practitioners even deny they can *be* sciences, although this concept is false. The present social sciences consequently can be of little assistance for the task of teaching-practitioners' development of education science. No new science springs forth all completed; a long process of development always precedes its establishment. This process is always concurrent with pre-scientific practices of the craft and takes its aliments from empirical lessons the craft's practice brings to light. Bacon's maxim,

Although there is a most intimate connection, and almost an identity between the ways of human power and human knowledge, yet, on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling upon abstractions, it is by far the safest method to commence and build up the sciences from those foundations which bear a relation to the practical division, and to let them mark out and limit the theoretical [Bacon (1620), pg. 111]

is always pertinent to the development of any new empirical science.

Social studies subject-matters drawn from traditional course matters are selected, and lesson objects are designed, with regard to cultivating learner understanding of the social contract's term and condition in order to cultivate in the learner Self-commitments to mutual Obligations and Duties expected of a citizen. This goes much deeper than a mere abstract understanding of the contract. It goes to the cultivation of his intelligence in regard to socio-economic-political matters

and to cultivation of his tangible and persuasive skills in taking an *active part* in his Society in terms of both his actions in serving his own Obligations and Duties to himself and those which serve the general Society of the nation. Mere facts and objective doctrines are nothing more than means to these ends. Knowing that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066 AD only serves these ends if the *consequences* of William's victory for what followed afterwards are also taught and the pertinence these consequences had in shaping modern life are brought out. Knowing the laws of supply & demand or of economic leverage through division of labor only serves these ends if the relevance of supply & demand and the relevance of specialized division of labor cultivates the learner as an entrepreneur and cultivates his understanding of his own enterprise as a part of an Enterprise of enterprises in civic association with other entrepreneurs².

What sorts of Pertinences do the divers traditional course topics taught under the label of social studies hold for public instructional education? Let us examine this question by looking at the examples set by some of the existing social studies courses currently taught in public schools as well as some topical matters that are not currently taught but which have significant pertinence.

§ 4. History

Knowledge of technical objects is not the same thing as wisdom. We who live today know more about gadgets and technology than people who lived two or three millennia ago knew, but to think we are therefore wiser than they were is groundless vanity. There is no objectively valid basis to claim we are wiser now than, say, some merchant of ancient Ur. Wisdom subsists in the harmonization of a person's will with his final purposes [Kant (1797), 6: 441], and there is no reason to think the ancients had any less or any more capacity for wisdom than we do today.

History is knowledge from inquiry into past events and the people who took part in those events. The word itself derives from the Greek word *ιστορια*, which meant "knowledge from inquiry." The Greek term was Latinized by the Romans to become our word, "history." *Inquiry* is the key idea that separates history from folklore and storytelling in the tradition of what today is often called "oral history." It implies that what is recounted is based upon research and evidence and is not merely the product of speculative fantasizing. The first study of history in the Western civilizations was published by Herodotus, who Cicero not-unjustly called "the father of history."

Herodotus tells us why he undertook what appears to have been more than a decade of inquiry in the opening line of his *Histories*:

1. What Herodotus the Halicarnassian has learned by inquiry is here set forth: in order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by time, and that great and marvelous deeds done by Greeks and Barbarians and especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown. [Herodotus (c. 445 BC), Bk. I, pg. 3]

In this brief statement can be seen the key features of history. First is the feature of knowledge by inquiry. Second, Herodotus obliquely states that the purpose of the inquiry is to understand events and people in terms of causes and effects, i.e., so that "the reason why they warred against each other" will not be "blotted out from among men by time." When a recounting of people and events goes beyond recitation and seeks to discover causative explanation, the study of history passes from folklore and storytelling to the study of an empirical science. I will say more about this last point shortly.

Over time, usages of the word "history" in English have become popular and have been set out

² An entrepreneur is a person undertaking personal enterprise activity for the purpose of satisfying a Duty-to-himself in regard to the tangible power of his person. See the glossary for enterprise and Enterprise.

in various dictionaries in various ways. These generally reduce to three major derivative connotations for the root word:

1. the study of the past, specifically how it relates to humans.
2. the academic discipline which uses a narrative to examine and analyze a sequence of past events and objectively determine the patterns of cause and effect that determine them.
3. the whole series of past events connected with someone or something.

Specific usages given in divers dictionaries differ from these connotations only insofar as they attempt to more closely specify what sort of events are recalled or how the narrative is written. All these connotations, however, derive from the *Realerklärung* of 'history' given above.

Studying history provides the learner with *vicarious experience* in connection with human behaviors and the behaviors of divers groups of people. Every historical event has individual human beings for its root partial causes. I use the term 'partial causes' in the connotation that was given to it by physicist Henry Margenau when he introduced this term in the 1950s:

In summary, then, a cause becomes unique when it refers to a stage in a process involving the whole system under consideration. Or, to put it in terms of our previous analysis, it becomes unique when it refers to the entire *state* of a physical *system*.

The reason why the causal assignment of the first examples in our list was somewhat indefinite is that the causes did not embrace a sufficiently large situation. They were what we shall henceforth call *partial causes*. . . . Let it also be observed that a given total effect has an infinite number of total causes distributed through a temporal sequence, but only one total cause at a given instant. Every frame of a movie film picturing [a] murder presents a cause of situations presented in the later frames. [Margenau (1977), pg. 393]

Margenau's notion of partial causes is an important one for science. One of the most conspicuous aspects of scientific investigation is that we never come to a final explanation of any phenomenon because as soon as we think we have explained one thing in terms of other things, we then face the task of explaining those explanatory causative factors. Every causative explanation empirical science ever proposes is, in other words, only a *partial* causative explanation because then we have to explain the explanation. What science *practice* does is seek to compile and coalesce an *adequate* number of interconnected partial causes so that its description of nature is *accurate enough* to suit the purposes at hand. Any practitioner of science who thinks science can do more than this is a metaphysical Platonist – which means his understanding of the practice is flawed.

This is something most laypersons – and some scientists – do not understand about science. People like to have explanations wrapped up neat, tidy, and *final* in the sense that the explanation stands "once and for all." But empirical science *never* offers explanations of this sort. All empirical knowledge of nature is *contingent* knowledge, but once-and-for-all knowledge is judged to carry the Modality of *necessity*. Only mathematical Objects *can* be so judged and this is only because all mathematical Objects are *defined* (they are what they are because we say they are) and are not Objects of Slepian's facet-A (the natural sensible world) [Wells (2009), chap. 1].

Failure to understand this about science was an underlying factor in a great debate that broke out among historians at the beginning of the twentieth century. At issue was whether or not history was or could ever be a science. There were some eminent professors of history who claimed history was, or could be made into, a science. There were other equally eminent professors of history who claimed it was not and could never be. The key arguments raised by the latter were: (a) no recounting of history could ever be complete; (b) because of this it would never be possible to discover "causes" of historical events; and (c) people cause historical events and it was not possible to explain why people did what they did. "Causes," in this debate, meant

Margenau's *total* causes. Physical-natural sciences (chemistry, physics, biology) do not hold themselves to this standard; if they did they could not be sciences. Historians of the period were trying to set for themselves a standard impossible to meet because they did not adequately understand what a science is. Neither points (a) nor (b) prevent the study of history being made into a science. Point (c) was a factor fatally hindering the development of an empirical science of history, but the discovery of mental physics resolves this hindrance.

PEM reformers coupled their naïve and inaccurate understanding of what science is and does with their passionate enthusiasm for "scientific" education to institutionalize a firm and stubborn antipathy towards history. As instructional subject-matter, history fared very poorly under PEM reforms. In the enthusiastic mania for "utility" and "social efficiency" that fueled the Progressive Education Movement, history as subject-matter came under attack for lacking utility and social efficiency. The prevailing attitude within the movement was more or less the same as industrialist Henry Ford's contemptuous dismissal, "History is more or less bunk." There have been, and still are, many people who think history is without value (e.g., G.M. Trevelyan) or is useless (e.g. Wright Morris). Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "There is properly no history, only biography."

Some might view the PEM reformers' attitudes about history as astounding in view of the fact that the state of every Society in the present is an outgrowth of things that happened in the past. E.H. Carr said, "The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present." Santayana's most famous remark is, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." As for Emerson's remark, biography *is* one special case of history. It is important to remember that in their enthusiasm for IQ testing and profiling PEM reformers came to regard half the pupils in public schools to be of below-normal intelligence and unable to understand history. If you think intelligence is a fixed and innate trait, it will not occur to you that instructional education properly done will raise *any* pupil's capacity for intelligence.

The primary purpose of history instruction in public instructional education is to provide to the learners the benefits of vicarious experience. Specifically, the benefit is improving the learner's ability to understand what to expect from economic, social, political, and other current factors in his Society, and to understand the mistakes and successes in dealing with similar situations in the past. Mistakes – one's own and those of others – are one of the most valuable learning tools any person can have at his fingertips; all one need do is actually *learn* from them. We are not a different species now from what *homo sapiens* has been for far more than the past three thousand years. Analogous situations and events of the past would have been judged and responded to by those living then much like present events and situations will be judged and responded to by those living now. All those people responded to maxims of Duties-to-Self and, some of them, to maxims of reciprocal Duties between themselves and others. Duties as they saw them will not be greatly different from Duties as we see them, aside from differences originating from different moral customs of their Societies vs. those of our own. It is a matter of analyzing and understanding Duties and Obligations, in their similarities and differences among divers Societies, in order to learn what I like to call "the lessons of history." As Harry Truman was fond of saying, "The only thing new in the world is the history you don't know about" [Miller (1973)].

To do this in instructional education, it is essential that history books and history lessons not be limited to mere recitations of facts. History lessons must include analysis, both of possible reasons people acted as they did in their situation and of how those events affected events that later transpired. It is this factor of analysis that is most often missing from history instruction today. But it is this factor that also provides a learner with *interests* in history – not because he really cares so much about, say, William the Conqueror but because, with cultivation, he can see how events similar to those surrounding the Battle of Hastings might affect him and those in his personal society who he cares about. Such kinds of knowledge cultivates more capable citizens. It

Table I
Worldwide Adherents of all Religions
mid-2011

Religion	World Population (billions)	Religion	World Population (billions)
Christians (all sects)	2.298	Nonreligious (agnostics)	0.665
(Roman Catholic)	(1.184)	Chinese folk-religionists	0.468
(Protestant)	(0.426)	Buddhists	0.468
(all other)	(0.688)	Ethnoreligionists	0.269
Muslims	1.560	Atheists	0.137
Hindus	0.960	All others	0.148
Total Population: 6.974			

Source: Barrett *et al.* (2012)

must also be recognized that history has *scales*, from biographies at one end to epics at the other.

§ 5. The Perennial Theology

This social studies topic has never been part of public education, although some aspects of religion were part of public education prior to the PEM reforms. I expect many to regard this section as controversial. Some oppose any mention of religion in public schools; others favor religious instruction – provided this instruction tightly conforms to the peculiar doctrines of their own particular religious sects. I will say at the outset that *religious* instruction is not the topic here. The topic is *social tolerance*, which is a necessary condition for domestic tranquility and cooperation in any Society whose social contract guarantees freedom of religion and whose people represent a multiplicity of different religious sects as well as no sect at all.

Regardless of whatever your personal views on religion may be, it is beyond reasonable doubt that religion has been a major social force since Man's earliest civilizations. Table I tabulates census figures for worldwide adherents to the divers species of religious affiliations. If we are to consider any aspect of religion as part of a *public* education curriculum, this can only be justly done if we have a *Realerklärung* of the term 'religion' that is based on objectively sufficient grounds. The Critical Philosophy provides one. Kant defined *religion* as *the contemplation of moral law as divine precept* [Kant (1776-95), 18: 515]. It is a definition congruent with doctrines of every organized religious affiliation. Objective validity for this definition is provided by the relationship between the phenomenon of human moral codes and the role organized religions undertake in doctrinal teachings of moral maxims and tenets. This is an epistemologically-centered relationship, not an ontology-centered one. What any of us can know by *experience* from *objectively sufficient* grounds about concepts of divinity is very different from what any of us can hold-to-be-true about concepts of divinity from *subjectively sufficient* grounds in judgmentation. Because we know from experience that human beings exhibit actions which they base on moral maxims and moral judgments, Kant's definition has objective validity insofar as religion is considered in contexts of an individual's reasons for undertaking actions he undertakes. Religious

theology, in contrast, is based on subjectively but not objectively sufficient grounds.

This treatise is not the place to discuss either religion's many civilizing and moral customs influences or the many roles it has had in wars, pogroms, and violent persecutions. In many countries a state-sponsored religion is merged into its government, most often in a role where its purpose is to support the actions and decrees of the nation's chief ruler. That role is codified in what is called "the divine right of kings." In other countries, a condition of religious tolerance for the coexistence of multiple sects exists with relatively little religious intolerance or persecution, although I know of no country where some degree of intolerance does not exist in the form of a dominant sect carrying out some degree of persecution of the other sects. The most common way such persecution is effected is through having the dominant religion's peculiar religious doctrines enacted into law. It has not been an uncommon characteristic of religious influence whereby a religious sect preaches tolerance while in the minority but upon becoming a dominant or majority religion practices intolerance. It is beyond reasonable doubt that this has occurred from time to time in the United States, especially in the forms of Protestantism vs. Catholicism, vs. Judaism, and, most recently, vs. Islam (the religion of the Sunnite and Shi'ite Muslim sects).

Table I provides a worldwide summary of census figures detailing the demographics of the number of adherents to divers religions, including figures on atheism and agnosticism, as of mid-2011 [Barrett *et al.* (2012), pp. 508-509]. Although Barrett *et al.* list agnosticism as 'nonreligious,' this is not wholly correct. Agnosticism takes three principal forms: agnostic atheism, agnostic pragmatism, and agnostic theism. Only the first two can properly be called 'nonreligious' in the context that holders of these viewpoints neither engage in religious worship or speculation, nor in membership in an organized church mini-Society.

However, in a different context – and this is the context for the discussion here – atheism and agnosticism of all three types *are all forms of faiths*. In Critical terminology *faith* is *holding-to-be-true on a subjectively sufficient ground with consciousness of doubt*. All matters of religious doctrine and all matters of religious theology are matters of faith because the Object of religion – a deity or deities – is an idea of a supernature. The object can never be either proved or disproved on objectively sufficient grounds because all real experience is experience of the sensible world. The supernatural is not given in the natural world. Therefore, if a person says, "There is no God" this is just as much a statement of faith as Aquinas' theological positions regarding the "nature" of God in *Summa Contra Gentiles* [Aquinas (1259-1264)]. Religion and theology stand in logically orthogonal relationships to science and epistemology-centered philosophy³.

It is readily apparent from Table I that the vast majority of human beings adhere to some form of religious theism (i.e., do not hold-to-be-true the views of atheism or agnostic pragmatism). Out of the 6.974 billion people estimated by the census figures, in excess of 6.172 billion of us hold-to-be-true the actual *Dasein* of some deity or deities. I think it is obvious enough that anything six out of every seven human beings are influenced by is a potent social force that cannot be ignored.

The divers religious sects do, of course, hold diverse views on doctrinal matters. Differences of opinion over matters of religious doctrine have always historically resulted in tension between members of different religious sects, and from time to time these tensions have led to some of the most appalling slaughters in Mankind's history. It is not, however, either possible or prudent to try to ban religions on this ground. In the first place, it is not possible to ban the individual's natural liberty to think what he will. In the second place, every such ban must ignore the equally valuable contributions organized religions have made and continue to make in Societies. In the

³ Philosophy is knowledge through concepts. In the strictest connotation of 'knowledge,' a theology can be regarded as a peculiar philosophy. However, I reserve the word philosophy for use in contexts of concepts of experience and in this context no concepts of the supernatural are admissible. Hence I make a Critical distinction between philosophy and theology. This distinction is absent in ontology-centered philosophies.

United States, freedom of religion is a civil liberty under our social contract and freedom from persecution or coercion over matters of religion is a civil right. An immediate consequence of the latter is that *all* religious laws – that is, laws codified by legislation and favoring the peculiar doctrine of one or some few religious sects over the doctrines of others – are violations of the social contract and are therefore and in all cases *acts of injustice*. Madison wrote,

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard society against the oppression of its rulers but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. . . . In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects, and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and the number of people comprehended under the same government. . . . In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can easily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger: and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition to submit to a government which may protect the weak, as well as themselves [Hamilton *et al.* (1787-8), no. 51, pp. 290-291].

Referendum democracy is a legislative form by which a stronger faction can easily unite. Public education belongs to the judicial branch of government. As the preservation of justice (not law) is the principal object of this branch, it is a Duty of public instructional education to educate and cultivate in the learners precepts of justice, civil liberties and civil rights in matters of religion. One tendency in Societies that govern by democracy and the precept of majority rule is a tendency over time for its members to forget that majority rule is tyranny when it violates the civil rights of any minority or hinders civil liberties the state exists to guarantee. Emerson wrote,

Society is an illusion to the young citizen. It lies before him in rigid repose, with certain names, men, and institutions, rooted like oak-trees to the center, round which all arrange themselves as best as they can. But the old statesman knows that society is fluid; there are no such roots and centers; but any particle may suddenly become the center of the movement and compel the system to gyrate around it . . . Republics abound in young civilians, who believe that the laws make the city; that grave modifications of the policy and modes of living, and employments of the population; that commerce, education, and religion may be voted in or out; and that any measure, though it were absurd, may be imposed on a people if only you can get sufficient voices to make it a law. But the wise know that foolish legislation is a rope of sand which perishes in the twisting; that the State must follow and not lead the character and progress of the citizen [Emerson (1844), pp. 275-276].

The mini-Societies embedded within a general one are the greatest sources of faction and civil strife and yet, because they arise from actions of natural liberty in individuals' makings of their personal societies, they cannot be eliminated from the social fabric. Religious mini-Societies are one of the most visible, prevalent, and non-negligible of all types of mini-Societies. The issue and challenge that confronts the institution of public education is this: How can such an aggregate of diverse mini-Societies, many of whose doctrines conflict with those of the others, be brought to an understanding that they all share a common interest that overrides their differences with one another? It is difficult enough, it seems, for Christian mini-Societies and Islamic mini-Societies to recognize common ground and common cause with one another. How much more difficult, then, is it for, say, Christian mini-Societies and Hindu mini-Societies to reconcile with each other? Do these mini-Societies in fact share in their faiths any essential common grounds whatsoever?

In fact, they do. Their essential common ground has a name, known through the centuries as

the perennial philosophy but more accurately called the Perennial Theology. In its raw, elemental and essential form, it consists of four core tenets of faith that are shared by every major religion in the world and most of the non-major ones as well⁴. These tenets are:

- the phenomenal world is the manifestation of a Divine Ground within which all partial realities have their *Existenz* and apart from which they would not exist;
- human beings are capable of having an intuitive cognition of the *Dasein* of this Divine Ground, and by this intuition can achieve unity with the Divine Ground;
- human beings possess a double nature, a phenomenal ego and an eternal Self which is the spark of divinity within the soul; it is possible for a person, if he so desires, to identify himself with this spirit and therefore with the Divine Ground;
- a person's life on earth has only one end and purpose, namely, to identify himself with his eternal Self and so come to unitive knowledge of the Divine Ground.

The term "perennial philosophy" was first used by Agostino Steuco in 1540 AD. He was, however, neither the first nor the last to give it scholarly treatment. Hegel's theology of Spirit is probably the most intense formal treatment Perennial Theology has received at the hands of any philosopher [Hegel (1807)]. Hegel's treatment lacks objective validity and it is incorrect to regard the Perennial Theology as either a phenomenology or a science, as Hegel does. His treatment is also one of the most mystically obscure, although in this regard the neo-Platonism of Plotinus gives it a good run for its money [Plotinus (c. 268 AD)]. Yet, notions of the Perennial Theology appear to go back to long before the neo-Platonists. Cicero, for example, appears to make a reference to it, using the description *religione omnium* (universal religious feeling):

Can you doubt that properly our ideal of human nature should be formed from the finest natures we meet with? What better type of nature therefore can we find among human beings than the men who regard themselves as born into the world to help and guard and preserve their fellow men? Hercules passed away to join the gods: he would never have so passed unless in the course of his mortal life he had built for himself the road he travelled. Such instances are by now time-worn and hallowed by universal religious feeling. [Cicero (45 BC), Bk I, xiv, pp. 38-39]

In more recent times, Aldous Huxley wrote a book treating it under the name "perennial philosophy." In his introduction he tells us,

Rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy may be found among the traditional lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, and in its fully developed forms it has a place in every one of the higher religions. A version of this Highest Common Factor in all preceding and subsequent theologies was first committed to writing more than twenty-five centuries ago, and since that time the inexhaustible theme as been treated again and again, from the standpoint of every religious tradition and in all the principal languages of Asia and Europe. [Huxley (1944), pg. vii]

Huxley's book, like other writings that treat "Perennial Philosophy," is mysticism and theology rather than proper philosophy. This is, however, irrelevant for public education because it is not

⁴ I use the term "major religion" to denote any religion with more than 350 million adherents worldwide. It is an arbitrary figure suggested by the difference in population between Buddhists and ethnoreligionists (a group comprised of a large number of tiny sects) in Table I. Any religion that is not labeled a major religion by this convention is by definition a non-major religion. This is a merely mathematical division. The words "major" and "non-major" imply nothing whatsoever beyond this merely numerical distinction.

this theology itself that constitutes the prime lesson-object of instruction. Rather, it is the fact that this theology lies at the roots of every major religion, most of the non-major ones, and provides a fundamental basis for common grounds among them despite their vast differences in derivative doctrinal matters. Religions incorporating the Perennial Theology include (but are not limited to): Christianity in all its sects; Islam; Judaism; Hinduism [Narayanan (2005)]; Buddhism [Eckel (2005)]; Taoism [Oldstone-Moore (2005a)]; and Confucianism [Oldstone-Moore (2005b)]. It has also been claimed to underpin Sikhism, the Bahá'í Faith, and Chinese folk-religion.

Lesson objects for public instructional education in this framework must be based on the functions of public education in the social dimension of the learner (figure 1) with an aim of cultivating learners' understandings of how much the divers religions have in common at their foundations, and to further cultivate their understandings of relationships between these theological premises and the moral customs and folkways of Society. A concrete aim of social studies in this instruction is to cultivate tolerance of others' religious faiths as a necessary condition of domestic tranquility in regard to all matters of religion.

Although public instructional education can never seek to provide instruction in specific matters of doctrine associated with any peculiar religious sect without committing an injustice, there is nothing in the American social contract that prohibits partnerships between public schools and particular churches or other organizations (such as a home-schooling network), through which any pupil may *choose* to receive doctrinal instruction in the sect of his choice (including agnosticism or atheism) *provided that* all such partnerships mutually pledge to speak in one voice regarding the Perennial Theology *and* the cost of *all* such extracurricular instruction is borne by those who choose to receive it without financial support from *public* funds. Public schools are not the sole Institutes of instructional education in America and have no monopoly over instruction.

§ 6. Economics and Business Occupation Enterprise

§ 6.1 Tangible Functions of Economics and Entrepreneurial Enterprise

After reading the previous few chapters, I suspect you will not be too surprised that by the terms economics, business, and enterprise I do not mean the stale *mathematica* Thomas Carlyle called "the Dismal Science," nor do I mean a mimesis of commercial businesses as they are usually set up, organized, and run in a system of uncivic free enterprise. The subject-matters of economics and business presented in public education have an overall aim of cultivating the learner's *capital skill* in regard to three chief Pertinences presented in Wells (2012b), chapter 8, pp. 232-233: (i) pursuit of happiness; (ii) Welfare; and (iii) tranquility. The present day social science of economics has a peculiarity it shares with political science, namely, that economics *began* as a social-natural science and was so treated by Adam Smith in *Wealth of Nations* [Smith (1776)]. It later *devolved* into the mathematical science of today, beginning with W.S. Jevons' *The Theory of Political Economy* (1871). With Smith we see economics treated as inquiry aimed at uncovering causative factors and explanations. In today's Jevons-Marshall tradition we see a science comprised of mathematical assumptions aimed at statistical analyses and forecasting. A statistic never has causative significance. Smith recognized human beings are the social atoms of economics. Today the human being has disappeared from economics, leaving behind a doctrine that is non-natural, tends towards mere behaviorism by use of mathematical models of dubious objective validity, and frequently displays inadequate capacity for causative explanation.

This treatise is not the proper place for a general treatment of social-natural economics. In the first place, the objective of tangible instructional education is not job-training for future professional economists. In the second place, such a treatment requires its own peculiar applied metaphysic, the theory of which is outside the context of this treatise. I plan to present a social-

natural metaphysic and theory in a future work, provisionally to be titled *Civic Free Enterprise*. For present purposes, rudimentary considerations of social-natural economics can be found in Wells (2010b), chapters 8, 9, and 14, and in Wells (2010a), chapter 7.

A human being joins with others in a *civil* association and remains a citizen of it on condition that *he* obtains benefits and protections by means of the united powers of its members. This is the *condition* of all social contracts. The *others* accept him as a member of their association and pledge themselves to him *only* if he in turn pledges himself to them and reciprocates with all his powers and abilities to their benefit. This is the *term* of all social contracts. It is a "one for all and all for one" association. As Rousseau put it,

[Each] man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not acquire the same rights as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has. [Rousseau (1762), pg. 14]

The overall power of a Society subsists in compounding the powers of all its members. It is therefore a remote interest for *every* member of a Society that the power of *each* member be as great as that member can achieve *within* with the term and the condition of their social compact. There is a civil expectation *for* each member individually to see to the perfection of his own *Personfähigkeit*, and, at the same time, an expectation *by* each member that, when he finds it necessary, he can call upon, and rely upon receiving, assistance from all the other members. If these expectations are chronically unmet, the bonds holding a Society's civil association together dissolve and eventually it undergoes breakdown and disintegration. This is a general consequence and it applies to mini-Societies at every scale, including commercial Enterprises.

A fundamental part of the power of a person is his tangible *Personfähigkeit*. There are two dimensions to this power: a personal dimension in the private exercise of this power; and a social dimension of his exercise of tangible *Personfähigkeit* in cooperation with others. The functions of public instructional education recognize this in four out of the six functions of tangible instructional education (figure 1): skills of enterprise; cooperations of social Enterprise; skills of civil liberty; and cooperation of skill enterprises (chapter 10, pp. 323-325). Social studies instruction in economics and business enterprise pertains most directly to these functions. These functions have the following explanations:

skills of civil liberty function – inclusion in the curriculum of lesson matters developing the learner's sense of self-respect by development and practice of basic skills that he can recognize as being pertinent to his ability to achieve Welfare success in life;

skills of enterprise function – inclusion in the curriculum of lesson matters perfecting learner self-actualization by practice in applying new skills in enterprise activities within social situations;

cooperation of skill enterprises function – inclusion in the curriculum of group exercises in which the learners have divers pre-selected skill roles to practice and must cooperate to achieve a group objective; and

cooperation of social Enterprise function – inclusion in the curriculum of group exercises in which the group is presented with an objective to be achieved and the learners must determine for themselves their own organization and plan for achieving it.

These are the primary functions for cultivating the learner's capital skill, i.e., the intangible stock of knowledge belonging to a person's tangible *Personfähigkeit* by means of which he acquires *the*

ability to acquire skill in some chosen art he can then use for barter in economic marketplaces.

§ 6.2 Capital Skill and Enterprise

I introduced the term *capital skill* in volume II [Wells (2013b), chap. 9, pg. 301]. Its possession empowers a person to achieve personal Progress by means of special skills he *chooses* to develop. It builds his capacity to successfully engage in capitalism through his choices of how to invest part of his stock of economic wealth-assets, beyond those he requires for consumption purposes, in order to produce a revenue of additional economic wealth-assets⁵. Any person who does so *is* a capitalist entrepreneur. Capital skill is the single factor in tangible *Personfähigkeit* capable of defeating poverty in a *civil* Society. Prior to the Economy Revolution in colonial America of *circa* 1750-1800 [Wells (2013b), chap. 5], almost every free American male was a capitalist entrepreneur. The class division between "capital vs. labor" (in the Marxist connotations of these terms) was a post-Economy Revolution phenomenon [Salinger (1987), pp. 153-171] and was the product of a *system* of uncivic free enterprise established in this revolution. One dire outcome of this was a gradual erosion of capital skill among Americans. Early nineteenth century education visionaries like Jefferson recognized the need for public education to maintain capital skills in America [Jefferson (1818)], but PEM differentiated curriculum and tracking reforms had effectively eliminated it from public education by the 1950s.

The tangible education functions listed above, and the nature of the skills they are used to cultivate, regulate teachers' choices of instructional subject-matters for economics. It is a Duty of public instructional education to prepare learners to function successfully as entrepreneurs after they enter the mainstream of American economic life. To properly understand this, it is important to understand the real explanations of the terms enterprise and entrepreneur, and to distinguish these real explanations from the propaganda corruptions of these terms in Marxist literature.

Any activity a person chooses to undertake with intent to obtain a revenue of economic wealth-assets *is* an economic enterprise. *Personal enterprise* is any undertaking actualized by an individual for reasons grounded in duties to himself or Duties to himself reciprocally with others to whom he has bound himself by *Obligation*. An *entrepreneur* is a person undertaking personal enterprise activity for the purpose of satisfying a Duty-to-himself in regard to the tangible power of his person. An *Enterprise* is the common Object of all the individual instantiations of personal enterprises carried out by a group of people associated with each other in a united Community. The idea of *organizing and regulating* a division of labor in and the governance of an Enterprise is called the *Enterprise of enterprises* Idea. This Idea recognizes the basic fact that individuals who have joined together in a common Enterprise do so in order to better fulfill their own personal Duties by cooperatively pooling their efforts with those of others to the mutual benefits of all. Lack of recognition of and commitment to the latter factor of mutual benefit distinguishes a civic Enterprise from an uncivic aggregate of commercial/occupational enterprises.

An Enterprise is a mini-Society and a *civic* Enterprise is a mini-Community bound together by a common social contract. The Hewlett Packard Company during the era of its founders was one example of a civic Enterprise [Malone (2007)]. In contrast, most large commercial corporations operate as uncivic Enterprises under Taylorite governance. This is a primary cause of why those organizations are empirically less economically effective and less successful than are small commercial proprietorships in the United States [Wells (2013b), chap. 11, pp. 399-401; chap. 12, pp. 434-435]. Taylorism is far less common in small Enterprises and uncivic behavior is far less characteristic of them because their entrepreneurs are more socially close-knit and each person's contributions to the general welfare is far more visible to every member-entrepreneur.

⁵ Refer to the glossary for explanations of the terms capital stock, capitalism, capitalist, entrepreneur, and wealth-assets.

In the economics context of public education, what basic skills are to be cultivated? First, these basic skills are **not** *job* skills. A progressive economy is an evolving dynamic in an evolving Society. Job skill training, in contrast, can only be targeted at static "snapshots" of enterprise. Many jobs that are financially lucrative today will not be so after a few years; more will not be so within the lifetimes of people who are now entering the workforce. The phenomenon of *annual* publications of lists of "best jobs" and "top salaries" are indicators of this because if an economy were static there would be no interest in annually tabulating what jobs are "hot" right now and what jobs are not, what jobs are "best paying" right now and what jobs are not. Furthermore, in a progressive economy many of the "best jobs" did not even exist only a few decades earlier. For example, today electronic game designer jobs are relatively lucrative; fifty years ago these jobs had not yet been invented. Some occupations, *e.g.* carpenter, have been more or less perennial, but most have been transitory. Evidence of this is seen in the fact that the U.S. Census Bureau finds it necessary to issue revisions of its classifications of occupations. It did so in 1967, 1972, 1977, 1987, and 2002 [U.S. Census Bureau (2011), pp. 375, 490]. Sometimes these revisions are so major that census data before and after the revision are not statistically comparable despite the Census Bureau's best efforts to maintain year-to-year data comparability in its statistics.

Still another empirical indicator was widely publicized after the 2008 economic recession when there were loud political calls for job re-training programs for the large number of people who were laid off during the meltdown and were unable to find new jobs because their job skills did not match the advertised requirements of jobs that were available. This was a reasonable way to try to deal with the economic emergency at hand, but in the long run it is an ineffective tactic because the proposed programs do not include capital skill cultivation. Job retraining produces wage laborers but it does not produce skilled entrepreneurs and therefore cannot address root causes of economic emergencies. They leave Society vulnerable to reoccurring *series* of crises.

Capital skill pertains to skillfulness in the ability to acquire skills in peculiar occupations. The types of skills that must be regarded as basic for public instructional education are therefore skills in the ability to acquire *ad hoc* occupational skills. An aspect of this is experience that is acquired by means of such activities as work-study programs, community service projects, and other extracurricular activities that require learners to engage in rudimentary job skill practices. I will go so far to say that extracurricular activities of these sorts are merely *academically* extracurricular, not *educationally* extracurricular. However, job skill training is merely a *means* of teaching capital skill, and is never an educational *end* in itself.

§ 6.3 Cultivation of a Capitalist Entrepreneur

More important *academically* than these are lessons aimed at cultivating in the learner the capacity to be a successful capitalist entrepreneur. This is because the ability to successfully engage in capitalism is key to empowering an individual to rise above the level of poverty at which almost *every* young person begins his or her economic life. What sorts of knowledge pertain to this in the context of economics and business subject-matters? Several broad concepts in the subject-matters of social-natural economics and business readily come to mind.

§ 6.3.1 Consumption revenue, capital revenue, and debt – Children do not clearly grasp the concept of what money is nor does it occur to them there is an important distinction between consumption revenue and capital revenue. Furthermore, they have little concept of the idea of debt or of the fact that acquisition of debt places the debtor in a condition of *obligatione externa* (outward legal liability) to the creditor. They do not understand that by accepting an *obligatione externa* they are freely alienating certain of their own liberties nor that they are granting a creditor the power to *justly compel* them to fulfill a duty they have pledged to the creditor *obligatio externa*. Acquisition of debt is, indeed, acceptance of a peculiar form of indentured servitude.

These concepts are fundamental to a future successful economic life. Furthermore, not having acquired these concepts as children, many adults remain in ignorance of them, sometimes with dire consequences for their personal welfare and overpowering hindrances to their liberties in regard to their individual pursuits of happiness. I think it is likely unnecessary to provide detailed discussion of the technical concepts of revenue, consumption, capital, and debt here. These are well covered in *Wealth of Nations*. I am not saying Smith's book is an effective text for teaching these concepts, although by the time the learner is nearing the end of high school level public education it might well be *if* the learner has been adequately prepared for it in the lower grades. I am saying that *teachers* are better prepared to develop instructional *téchne* by learning these concepts in the context of the social-natural setting of *Wealth of Nations*, especially in its Book II.

Children tend to regard money only in terms of simple consumption. While under the care and protection of their parents, their needs for money are only occasional and directly interested in immediate consumption Desires. This use of money, when it is the only one a child experiences, tends to provoke maxims in the manifold of rules that are made habitual to the later detriment of savings and investment habits and to indifference to accumulation of debt burdens. These habits lead to unwise patterns of consumption, tolerance of shoddy goods or incompetent services, and tend to produce habits of ignorance that leave individuals prey to predatory practices that characterize all systems of uncivic free enterprise and the state-of-nature economic environment it produces. All this is contrary to basic objectives of government, especially to the objectives of promoting the general welfare, ensuring domestic tranquility, establishing justice, and securing the blessings of civil liberty. These are connections between public education and governance justifying public instructional education in economics and business. Indeed, the linkages between them necessitates making economics instruction a *duty* of public education.

Rudimentary concepts of revenue, consumption, capital, and debt are not complicated or mysterious. Even children in the late stages of concrete operations are capable of starting to learn about these concepts, and children of middle school age (stage of formal operations) are capable of understanding them quite well with suitable instruction. Many lessons of vicarious experience accessible to middle school aged children are presented in Clason's book, *The Richest Man in Babylon* [Clason (1955)], in story formats simple enough to be grasped by children. Clason wrote his book for typical American business executives and, as a result, typical twelve-year-olds will have no great difficulty grasping its concepts. Paraphrased a bit to use the terminology of social-natural economics, the principal concepts he so clearly presents are:

- always set aside at least one tenth of all your revenue to serve as your capital stock;
- control your expenditures;
- make your capital stock of wealth-assets grow through prudent investments;
- guard your capital stock of wealth-assets from loss;
- own the place where you live; (note: 'own' means *own*; you own nothing upon which you still owe a debt to a creditor; refer to the glossary for the explanation of 'own');
- insure your future income;
- increase your ability to earn. [Clason (1955)]

Some people are inclined to regard these seven precepts as obvious platitudes. However, the fact that a large percentage of Americans do *none* of these things is sufficient empirical evidence that they are neither obvious nor platitudes. Clason provides *concrete* examples for each one.

Cultivation of capital skill begins with cultivation of learner understanding of these concepts. This is because these concepts are concepts of practical economic objectives, outcomes towards which enterprise efforts strive. Other aspects of capital skill, such as learning special crafts, are merely means to achieve these economic outcomes.

§ 6.3.2 **Division of labor** – The concept of division of labor is one of the oldest and one of the most important empirical concepts in economics. In an industrialized Society the phenomenon of division of labor is so commonplace that the concept is taken for granted. The phenomenon is far older than the study of economics; indeed, its first appearances are lost in the mists of pre-history. The concept was utterly taken for granted by the ancient Greeks and underlies the basic organizational premises Plato used in his *Politeía*. The topic of division of labor fills the first two chapters of the first book in *Wealth of Nations*.

The present day definition of the term given by Bannock *et al.* (2003) – namely, "the allocation of labor such that each worker specializes in one or a few functions in the production process" – has been made narrow and over-specialized by manufactory contexts. Smith explained the term by example rather than by attempting a formal (mathematical) definition:

In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armorer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or movable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbors, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and venison till at last he finds it in his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner, a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins . . . And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labor, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labor as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business. [Smith (1776), pp. 13-14]

The division of labor by specialized occupations is not the invention of some antediluvian genius but rather, as Smith pointed out, of a human propensity for trade and barter. He wrote,

This division of labor, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. [*ibid.*, pg. 12]

When I speak of Smith's work as being "social-natural economics," this is an example of what I mean and of what the difference is between it and the mathematical doctrine modern economics has devolved into. Smith addresses behavioral phenomena and refers his causative explanations to aspects of human nature. Modern economics theory does not, although its various statistical measures do try to characterize frequencies of outcomes of these behaviors.

The term "occupation" used above by Smith simply means "how one spends his time." To use terminology I previously introduced [Wells (2012a), chap. 12], "occupation" is an activity in which a person invests a part of his stock-of-time, i.e., "how he occupies himself." In social-natural terminology, **Labor** (capitalized) is any group of people who render economic services. A **laborer** is a person regarded as part of or belonging to a Labor group, and **laboring** is the rendering of an economic service. The noun **labor** (not capitalized) means the economic services a laborer provides. As a verb it means to render an economic service. In any commercial Enterprise, every person is a laborer, from the chief executive of the company to its most lowly paid wage-earner. Management is merely a peculiar species of labor. These are important contexts that

the modern day definition of the division of labor tends to conceal or obfuscate.

It doesn't take very much imagination to see the genesis of the master craftsman from Smith's explanation of the division of labor. A key aspect of the concept of division of labor is that, from the viewpoint of the individual, this division's only purpose is to facilitate his ability to satisfy all his consumption revenue needs (by barter and exchange of economic services), to *provide* savings revenue, and to *establish* capital revenue. Savings revenue provides for prudent welfare *security*; capital revenue provides for *Progress* in his tangible *Personfähigkeit*. It is not difficult to be a capitalist entrepreneur but it does require capital stock in order to become one. The great majority of young people starting their working lives think their initial incomes just suffice to meet their consumption requirements. Except for people living in conditions of poverty, this is generally not true and young people over-consume. For people living in poverty, this is often true but, as I said earlier, the only pathway out of poverty is to become a successful capitalist entrepreneur. The labor skills a person acquires and can exchange for wages are, for most people, the only means of first acquiring capital stock. Debt is not capital stock; it is the precise opposite of it.

Whether or not a particular craft can be used to realize a revenue of wages that is sufficient to establish capital stock is, as Smith pointed out, conditioned by the local accessible market for specialized labor services [Smith (1776), pp. 15-19]. It is an error for a person to make his determinations of what labor skills he chooses to develop without also considering the nature of the labor market for those skills. Furthermore, labor markets are notoriously fluid in regard to the likelihood a person can realize a capital surplus in his revenue of wages. A craft that was lucrative last year might not be lucrative at all next year. Smith pointed out five "principal circumstances" affecting the revenue a person can obtain in exchange for his labor services [*ibid.*, pp. 88-106]. Prudent entrepreneurial choices of *personal* divisions of labor rest on these. Briefly, these are:

1. the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, and the social honorableness or dishonorableness of the employment;
2. the easiness and cheapness or the difficulty and expense of acquiring the skill;
3. the constancy or inconstancy of employment for that economic service;
4. the degree of trust, either great or small, the employer of the service must repose in the person who provides it; and
5. the probability or improbability that the person can successfully provide the service.

Habit and custom tend to set individual's minds rather narrowly and rigidly in terms of how a person thinks – or, more accurately, does not think – about the division of labor and where within it he chooses to locate himself. For example, in colonial America fathers often bartered with local master craftsmen to obtain apprenticeship positions for their sons. Once apprenticed, it was often assumed that the apprentice would become a specialized craftsman or artisan providing the economic service he had been trained to provide *and no other*. This worked well enough when there was a pronounced shortage of laborers in America, but the custom proved to be disastrous for many people when the Economy Revolution swept through the colonies. Salinger tells us,

When artisans became employers, and journeymen supplanted [indentured] servants and slaves, the time each worker remained in a shop decreased. Slaves were bound for life and servants' terms were fixed at four or five years, but free workers passed through fleetingly, collected their meager wages, gathered up their tools, and moved on in search of the next job. . . . Such turnover not only precluded stable work relationships but helped define labor as a commodity to be hired and fired as consumer demand dictated.

Short employment periods contributed to a high rate of geographic mobility among

journeymen. . . . evidence suggests that workers shifted from shop to shop because they were forced to seek new work. . . . other indicators reveal that the frenetic movement of workers in late-eighteenth century Philadelphia resulted from the lack of opportunity. . . . The ultimate obscurity of free workers suggests that, like freed servants, they could not be located because they lacked economic substance. . . .

In addition to promoting labor turnover and residential mobility, the transition to free labor resulted in uncertainty of income for workers. No standard form of payment existed during this early period of wage labor. Samuel Ashton paid the typical wage, but it was often completely depleted by boarding and other expenses. He provided workers with everything from clothes (supplied from his brother's tailoring shop) to tobacco, tools, and occasional loans. Often, at the end of a pay period very little of the wage was left to claim. . . . Philadelphia's master mechanics paid either by the piece or by time, and each rate had its own set of risks and rewards. Employers usually controlled the form of payments, often to the disadvantage and chagrin of workers. During the early 1790s, for example, master carpenters insisted on a flat wage during the long summer days but a piece rate during the winter months, when shorter days meant smaller production. [Salinger (1987), pp. 157-159]

No small part of the economic disadvantages for wage-laborers that arose during the Economy Revolution was due to the fact that, by habit and custom, these people had been so narrowly specialized in their craft skills that they were unable to adapt to the rapidly changing conditions of the economy when the actual divisions of labor employed shifted from what they had been. The later development of the factory system and inventions of machinery that allowed employers and managers to effect a shift from skilled workers to unskilled machine operators further exacerbated the economic hardships experienced by many people who moved to the cities to find work during the American industrial revolution. All during this, the *habit* of accepting "jobs" as predefined and fixed by employers, with an accompanying failure to consider or investigate causative factors underlying the division of labor, gradually produced the sort of "factory mentality" reflected in the contemporary definition of "division of labor" cited above.

This state of ignorance is as common among laborers in that peculiar division of labor called "managers" as it is among non-managers. One example of this is the tendency under Taylorism for a manager to define the temporary divisions of labor within the organization he manages and then, going farther, to regard the laborers who fill the slots in this division as what has come to be called "human resources" – a derogatory term that exhibits an attitude of regarding people as mere commodities. This has given rise to the term 'man-hours,' the mythical concept of a quantity of work proportional to the number of people working multiplied by the number of hours they work. It is a widely used metric most managers think can be used to estimate the amount of labor required to accomplish some task. For piecework, as in an assembly line, there is some validity to the metric. But for most cases in modern workplaces, the concept is utterly misleading. Frederick P. Brooks first called it "mythical" in his well-known book, *The Mythical Man-Month*⁶. The myth is that adding people to a task or project leads to an earlier completion of it. Brooks found that in fact it often delayed its completion. The famous "Brooks Law" he introduced states "adding manpower to a late software project makes it later." The term 'man-hours' seems to have first appeared around 1912; Webster's Dictionary included it for the first time in the 1913 edition. The mythical man-hour remains to this day an erroneous concept typical of Taylorite thinking.

Instruction cultivating learner understanding of the division of labor, its real origins, the factors relating it to individual crafts, and the implications it holds for learner choices of what economic service skills he chooses to develop is an important part of cultivating capital skills in the learner. Among other things, this cultivation is important to the learner in making decisions

⁶ Brooks, Frederick P. (1975), *The Mythical Man-Month*, Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

concerning what capital investments he makes *in himself* for purposes of developing the fungible skills he uses to fulfill his Duties and for his personal pursuit of happiness.

§ 6.3.3 The marketing concept – The marketing concept is a business concept rather than a concept of economic theory. It comprehends economic dynamics and is vital for cultivation of the learner's capital skill because its precept is central to making prudent investment decisions. The marketing concept is stated thusly: *the goals of an enterprise or Enterprise are best achieved through identification and satisfaction of consumers' stated and unstated needs and wants.*⁷

At first glance the marketing concept seems simple and obvious. Nonetheless, I have found it surprising how often business people ignore its precept. This ignorance is something I have observed in the behaviors of high ranking corporate officers including division managers and vice presidents. When I first noticed this as a young man I was surprised by it because I had used the marketing concept, without knowing it by name, while I was still a junior high school boy selling newspapers. When economic times were normal and political or scientific innovations were pronounced, I sold more newspapers by 'hawking' the front page news items. When times were economically hard, I sold more newspapers by 'hawking' items in the want ads and sports section.

The task of identifying consumers' stated needs and wants under conditions of quasi-static economic circumstances can often be accomplished through surveys and by merely observing their spending habits. This is appropriate during interludes in which there is an relative absence of innovation. In many corporations one finds their application of the marketing concept goes no farther than this. However, *Progress* in a Society's economy depends on innovation and the latter often centrally depends on identifying people's *unstated* "needs and wants."

The notion that consumers might have unstated "needs and wants" might seem to be something of an oxymoron since this notion can seem to imply a consumer can have needs and wants of which he is unaware. After all, if he really "needs" or "wants" something, how can he not know it? However, even casual observations of human behavior point out the objective validity of this. For example, consider the sorts of spontaneous reactions exhibited by young children in a store upon seeing items in a toy section. Children often enough spot toys they have never seen before and spontaneously proclaim a "need" for them to their mother or father – sometimes rather loudly and insistently. As another example, have you ever browsed through a catalog and come across some new product and immediately "felt" a desire for it? It happens often enough in the normal daily commerce of advertising. The same thing happens with people in corporate Enterprises. In these cases, a product seems to promise to be a solution for some chronic problem that the organization might have been living with for years with no one giving a thought to ways in which that problem might be solved or some costly operation might be made less costly. How many of us "needed" the Internet prior to it appearing commercially before the eyes of the public?

People are challenged every day by numerous hindrances, large or small, that to some degree frustrate fulfillment of their satisfactions. In most cases, individuals develop minor maxims for coping with these hindrances. Often, upon settling on some coping maxim, an individual will give no further thought to the matter because the hindrance seems to be overcome. People are satisficing problem solvers and often seek no further for a solution than the first one they find. Having found a way to cope with a hindrance, type- α compensation (ignorance) often suffices to keep disturbances to a person's equilibrium small enough for reequilibration to be easy to achieve. One of the things that deeply impressed me as a factory manager was the alacrity with which workers on the production line found ways to cope with chronic design and process problems; the only problem with this was that the coping behaviors often carried unnecessary costs or limited

⁷ This statement of the marketing concept is modified from one given by BusinessDictionary.com. It has been reworded to use the terminology of social-natural economics.

the production capacity of the factory compared to what an engineered solution could achieve. Examples were abundant even with what might seem to be the "simple" process of moving material from one place to another within the factory. Unstated "needs and wants" are often unstated simply because type- α compensation suffices to maintain personal equilibrium while costs or other disadvantages of coping behaviors remain unapparent to those coping with problems.

When a new and more expedient solution to a problem is presented and people recognize its benefits or its alleviation of disbenefits, they are often quick to adopt it. An "unstated need or want" becomes a "stated need or want." The person who first develops a new solution of this sort is often called an "innovator" or is said to be "creative." There are some, such as Toynbee, who presume innovativeness or creativity is a special trait – a "gift" – possessed only by those who Toynbee called "the creative minority." Toynbee argued that

Growth is the work of creative personalities and creative minorities; they cannot go on moving forward themselves unless they can contrive to carry their fellows with them in their advance; and the uncreative rank and file of mankind, which is always the overwhelming majority, cannot be transfigured *en masse* and raised to the stature of their leaders in the twinkling of an eye. [Toynbee (1946), pg. 276]

Toynbee had what I will call a rather low opinion of mankind in general. Indeed, this attitude can be seen to underlie some egregious errors in his theory of civilizations and, perhaps, those flights of mysticism exhibited in his work that constitute what I will call the its rank and dreary parts. I will call his attitude a Nietzsche-like conceit of viewing the world in terms of *Übermenschen* and *Untermenschen* that is objectively false and in thorough-going contradiction with human nature. Where Toynbee made his most serious mistake is his failure to understand that every human being has the potential power (*Vermögen*) for creativity and innovation. A person's exhibition of that power is dependent upon maxims he develops that characterize what in chapter 16 I called *the art of discovery*. Here is a place where humanities and aesthetical arts meet up with social studies and, in particular, with cultivation of economic knowledge.

Left only as its raw statement above, the marketing concept is a platitude. The instructional task is to cultivate in the learner maxims for applying his capacities for aesthetical arts to his tangible *Personfähigkeit*. It can be fairly enough said that the humanities were born of the Romanticism movement while social studies were sired by the Enlightenment. These movements were antagonistic to one another; that antagonism left its mark in the on-going divide between the humanities and the social sciences and in artificial divisions between academic subject-matters. To teach learners about the marketing concept is to cultivate by instruction their connections between the two in the capacity to unite judgments of taste with objective concepts of economy.

§ 6.3.4 The concept of supply & demand and market models – The concept of supply & demand is one of the basic *qualitative* Ideas of economics. I call it "qualitative" quite deliberately because it is only in rare, and usually rather trivial, circumstances when anyone really has enough accurate data to: justify calling it a *quantitative* concept; actually construct *precise* supply *vs.* price and demand *vs.* price curves; and use them as suggested in most economics textbooks (*e.g.* Lipsey & Steiner (1969), pp. 96-97). I call it an Idea because in the practice of carrying out economic reasoning, "supply and demand curves" are used as regulative principles of reasoning intended to provide a somewhat reasonable guess for pricing decisions, investment in capital equipment and job requisition decisions, and other basic investment decisions business managers are generally called upon to make. For example, I used marketing forecasts to estimate capital investment costs when my engineering team designed a factory. The way in which these forecasts were used was to understand approximate average and peak demands our factory would have to be able to meet. We fully understood that what we knew was only *range* data and was not to be

regarded as anything any more precise than that.

A person who is faced with making decisions such as deciding what craft skills he will choose to acquire encounters similar broad uncertainties. If he is thinking about becoming a carpenter, he generally will not *know* if carpenters will be scarce or if there will be a glut of them by the time he himself has acquired the necessary skills of carpentry. The same is true for lawyers, engineers, insurance salesmen, and any other job one might care to name. He generally will not *know* what the level of demand for carpenters will be, nor will he know how the wages of carpenter-labor will be related to this. However, it is useful and often important for him to know and apply the basic qualitative principle of supply & demand, namely, that if supply is scarce relative to demand then being a supplier will be profitable and if the converse is true then being a supplier will be unprofitable. In consideration of things like this, Smith's "five factors" affecting the wages of labor [Smith (1776), pp. 56-78] are pertinent to an individual's decision-making and reasoning processes. Considerations similar to these are pertinent in other investment decisions, including deciding upon *self*-investment, in terms of time and costs, to learn a particular fungible skill.

My point here is that supply & demand theory is only a guideline for reasoning and decision-making when the concept of supply & demand is put to use by people who are not professional economists. Although economics theory tends to treat and present the concept of supply & demand as if it were a quantitative theory, the practical situation is that the concept can only be applied imprecisely. You should not teach a learner that any theory is more precise than it really is, nor should you neglect to instruct him in how to properly *use* it.⁸ The principles of contemporary economics are not laws of nature; only a social-natural science of economics can yield laws of economic-nature because such laws are understood as causative explanations. Contemporary mathematical economics theory does not have any such causative explanations. To the extent that professional economists make *hypotheses* about causative factors and explanations, this hypothesis-making relies upon their experience in the professional practice of economics, and this experience does not make it into the textbooks. It is as important to teach learners about the limitations of theory as it is to teach theoretical principles. Failure in education to do this led to the old aphorism, "that might work in theory but not in practice."

A companion concept, closely interrelated with the Idea of supply & demand, is the concept of a market model. The primary importance of economic market models is: there is widely available and reasonably accurate range data sufficient for an individual to adequately estimate what kind of economic market he is dealing with in his decision-making task. Textbook economic theory usually presents four idealized types of market models: perfect competition; monopolistic competition; oligopoly; and monopoly [Bannock *et al.* (2003); Lipsey & Steiner (1969), pp. 272-362]. Real markets rarely match these four stereotypical markets precisely, especially when local conditions are factored into account, but the "somewhere in between" cases characteristic of real economic situations can usually be grasped adequately enough by analyzing what the models grossly predict and comparing these model predictions with each other to estimate decision risk.

For example, a prominent characteristic of both perfect competition and monopolistic competition is that, in the long run, consumers fare the best but suppliers make no economic profit.⁹

⁸ When this precept is ignored, the presentation of a theory is Platonic and more likely to lead to mistakes and errors in judgment than it is to lead to sound decisions. Platonism and science are not compatible.

⁹ Economic profit is the difference between revenue and the sum of actual and opportunity costs. The latter, opportunity cost, is an invented quantity representing the minimum residual actual profit a supplier requires in order to make it worth his while to continue in his business enterprise. For example, if your economic profit is less than the amount of profit you would be able to make by simply investing in treasury bills, you would be better off to close your business and put your capital stock into T-bills. Your enterprise would be said to show a net loss in *economic* profit even if it does not show a real loss in your net worth.

Under monopoly the supplier fares the best but consumers fare the worst unless the monopoly is a regulated monopoly (regulated by government). Under oligopoly the economic advantage lies with the suppliers but consumers are less disadvantaged than they are in the case of monopoly.

One of the things I learned about life in large corporations after a few years of experience with it as a manager surprised me. It was how little high ranking managers (division general managers, corporate vice presidents) as a class knew about very basic economics. From the "insider's view" of a manager involved with policy-making decisions, I witnessed a number of disastrously mistaken decisions made by corporate officers that I doubt a 19-year-old economics major would make. As one example, I had the misfortune to witness at close range a general manager's decision to change his division's product strategy in such a way that would (and did) take us from an oligopoly-like market to a monopolistic competition market. No amount of argument – particularly the argument that this product strategy change was going to erase the relatively high profits the division had enjoyed since its founding and replace them with red ink – was able to dissuade him from his decision. Closed-mindedness like this is typical of Taylorite managers. Unfortunately for the people who worked there, this disaster to profits soon occurred, today that division is no longer in business, and about 1000 people have had to find work somewhere else.

Understanding market model concepts is vital to entrepreneurial success in the real world. It is also essential in its application to citizens' understandings of proposed government policies, regulations, and laws concerning corporate mergers – *all* of which tend to move markets towards oligopoly and, eventually, monopoly¹⁰. For a young person, his knowledge of market model characteristics can make a difference between a wise fungible skill acquisition choice and a poor one. For example, when I was an undergraduate a fad swept through my major. Its slogan was "the world is going digital." Professors encouraged students to sign up for and take a number of new "digital" courses – which required them to forsake other more fundamental courses. Most of my peers were swept up in the fad. I looked at what was going on and said to myself, "The older stuff isn't going to go away, and companies are going to be able to buy the guys taking these new courses by the dump truck load." The courses being forsaken were more difficult and a student really needed a teacher to learn them, whereas I thought the new courses weren't all that difficult. I decided to not be swept up in the fad and planned my coursework accordingly. My decision paid off handsomely at job-hunting time. The world, indeed, has undergone a "digital revolution," but the higher salaries still go to those who have acquired the older skills because these are the skills propping up the "digital revolution" and its technologies. Furthermore, the skills prerequisite to acquiring these same older skills (skills in mathematics and science) are also skills prerequisite to acquiring newly emerging skills and, thereby empowering professionals to adapt to emerging new economic circumstances and avoid technical or market entrepreneurial obsolescence. Such is the "cash value" of understanding market models and the Idea of supply & demand.

§ 7. Political Science, Government and Civics

For many decades the principal object in courses covering political science, government, and civics has been "how our government works." It is, of course, important to educate future citizens about this; I think that point requires no discussion here. However, "how our government works" is not and should not be the *principal* object of public instruction because that again presumes the

¹⁰ One reason why college textbook costs for science and engineering textbooks has gone up faster than the rate of inflation since *circa* 1975 is that today there are far fewer independent textbook publishers than there were in 1975. This shrinkage in the number of independent suppliers is primarily due to mergers. In the mid-1970s, typical new mathematics, science, and engineering textbooks cost around \$20. Today they cost around \$130 to \$150 or more for a new textbook. In comparison, the consumer price index increased by only a factor of 4.05 from 1975 to 2010. Along with this, the quality of textbooks has also declined.

institution of government is static. This is not true, although it has historically been the case that changes in government institution (local, state, and general) tend to be infrequent. Jefferson commented on this:

I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. [Jefferson (1816), pg. 559]

In order to cultivate citizens who are competent in the performance of their civic Duties, knowledgeable of civil rights, and capable of sound reasoning in participating in public debate and voting, the principal public interest in political social studies subsists in *how and why does a Republic work?* Citizens who do not know the how and the why of their Republic eventually lose their Republic and come under the yoke of the antisocial oppressions of rulership.

The most influential leaders among America's Founding Fathers knew this and often voiced this concern. These men – especially George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Benjamin Rush – were accomplished *social-natural* political scientists. Quite possibly they constituted the most accomplished *group* of social-natural political scientists any nation has ever produced. Their writings, along with the debates recorded in Farrand's *Records* [Farrand (1911)] and arguments in *The Federalist*, frequently address and re-address this point. We owe the very Idea of the American Republic to these men and their colleagues. Their views and arguments are as pertinent to American Society today as they were in the Revolutionary era.

Yet these views and arguments go untaught by today's public education system. This can only be judged a serious error of omission in the social studies framework. So too it is for the omission of subject-matters from other treatises and from which the Founders drew many of their ideas and innovations. Among these are: Locke (1690); Montesquieu (1748); and Rousseau (1762). Later important authors – Mill (1859; 1861), Thoreau (1849), Emerson (1841; 1844) – are wrongly omitted also from subject-matters presented in public instructional education. I am not saying these writings are necessarily suitable in their original forms for every learner; they are not because they are written for experienced adult readers. But not a single important idea or thesis found in these works cannot be re-presented in ways accessible by young learners.

The purpose of instruction in political science, government, and civics is not job-training for future professional political scientists, politicians, lawyers, or judges. It is education of citizens, a point well recognized by contemporary social studies educators. The issues and problems facing public instructional education in the social studies framework are not issues of purpose; they are issues and problems of context, subject-matter, and lesson objects.

The field of contemporary political science provides no help in accomplishing the public purpose. The American Political Science Association defines political science as "the study of governments, public policies and political processes, systems, and political behavior." There is nothing objectionable about this, but key questions that go with it are: what kinds of study? what unifying Idea knits together the topics and methods to make a science? what sorts of causative explanations does it seek to discover? This is where political science has broken down.

Like economics, political science was once a social-natural science. Its metamorphosis from a social-natural science to a non-natural social study took place in the period from 1882 to 1900 and

was a consequence of the re-institution of higher education in the U.S. during the Progressive Era of the 1890s to 1920s. The principal authors of this re-making of political science were Herbert Baxter at Johns Hopkins University, John Burgess and William Dunning at Columbia University, Woodrow Wilson at Princeton, and Albert Bushnell at Harvard. Among its prominent early "applied political scientists" were Charles A. Beard and Charles E. Merriam.

The principal error made by these pioneers in the genesis of 'progressive' political science was that they thought political science could be made into a natural science by copying the methods and thinking of the physical-natural sciences. This is an error because causative explanation in social-natural science differs in kind from that of the physical-natural sciences of dead matter. The social atoms of every social-natural science are individual human beings, thus *psychological* causality is the ground of causative explanations in all social-natural sciences. In the genesis of this new political science, the old methods of Adams, Washington, etc. came to be viewed as "political philosophy" – and "philosophy" was a naughty word for scientists of the 19th and early 20th centuries (a consequence of the positivism movement in the first half of the 19th century). By any objective scientific standard of judgment, contemporary political science has not been a success. Indeed, beneath the umbrella term "political science" there appears to be so many incompatible mini-theories that the term "science" cannot be correctly applied to the whole of the practices at all. Bloom was not-wrong in his criticism of contemporary political science:

A few words about political science and its peculiarities might help to clarify the problems of social science as a whole. To begin with, it is, along with economics, the only purely academic discipline that, like medicine, engages a fundamental passion and the study of which could be understood as undertaken in order to ensure its satisfaction. Political science involves the love of justice, the love of glory and the love of ruling. But, unlike medicine and economics, which are quite frank about their relations to health and wealth, and even trumpet them, political science turns modestly away from such avowals and would even like to break off these unseemly relations. . . . Political science's transformation into a modern social science did not further social science but did further the political intentions of modernity's founders. It has tried to reduce the specifically political motives into subpolitical ones, like those proposed in economics. . . .

Locke . . . was still much more a political scientist than an economist, for the market (the peaceful competition for the acquisition of goods) requires the prior existence of the social contract (the agreement to abide by contracts and the establishment of a judge to arbitrate and enforce contracts) without which men are in a state of war. The market presupposes the existence of law and the absence of war. War was the condition of man prior to the existence of civil society, and the return to it is always possible. . . . Political science is more comprehensive than economics because it studies both peace and war and their relations. . . . Political action must have primacy over economic action no matter what the effect on the market. . . .

Political science has always been the least attractive and the least impressive of the social sciences, spanning as it does old and new views of man and the human sciences¹¹. It has a polyglot character. Part of it has joined joyfully in the effort to dismantle the political order seen as a comprehensive order and to understand it as a result of subpolitical causes. Economics, psychology and sociology as well as all kinds of methodological diagnosticians have been welcome guests. But there are irrepressible, putatively unscientific parts of political science. The practitioners of these parts of the discipline are unable to overcome their unexplained and unexplainable political instincts – their awareness that politics is the authoritative arena of effective good and evil. . . . So political science resembles a rather haphazard bazaar with shops kept by a mixed population. [Bloom (1987), pp. 363-365]

¹¹ Bloom means contemporary political science here. His "always" only dates back to the 1890s.

There are two points Bloom makes here that bear especial emphasis. One is the relationship between political science and the Idea of the Social Contract. The other is his remark, "politics is the authoritative arena of effective good and evil." Both these remarks have direct bearings on the teaching of political science, government, and civics in public instructional education. Furthermore, his remark that "political science involves the love of justice, the love of glory and the love of ruling" bears a closer look. He does not name these as the *basic* topics of political science; he names them as important factors of partial causes in the understanding of Society and human interrelations in a Society. He does not say justice, glory or ruling are topics; he says the *love of* these things are important factors. This is true because to say "the love of" something is to reach down to try to grasp the affective and practical underpinnings of human actions. These speak to *values*, the individual's *value system*, and to his personal and private *moral code*. Individuals are the social atoms of social-natural science and causative explanations cannot ignore these factors.

The spokesmen for social studies are entirely correct when they say *citizenship* is an Object of social studies instruction. Indeed, *all* of public instructional education aims at learner perfection of *Personfähigkeit* self-bound and self-limited by Duties of citizenship. Seen in this context, it is likely not difficult for you to guess that instruction in politics, political science, government and civics broadly encompasses *all* of the functions of public instructional education in the social dimension of the learner (figure 1) in one way or another. But the breadth of this involvement in and of itself poses an important problem for developing instructional and curricular *téchne*. With such a broad scope, how is *téchne* to be developed without having this development result in fragmented pieces of methods and lesson objects?

The first thing one must comprehend before trying to answer this question is to understand that cultivation of citizenship and *Personfähigkeit* necessarily involves a gradual and progressive *process*. A *system* of learner practical maxims and theoretical concepts must be cultivated. This can only be done in gradual steps. Contemporary education reformers do recognize this and make it an underlying theme in all the divers framework proposals being offered. But what should be made the basis of this theme's actualization in instructional and curricular *téchne*?




Figure 2: The 2LAR structure of the axiom system of public instructional education.

Here the guiding principles lie less with the functions of public education and subsist in the *system of metaphysical axioms* from which these functions are themselves deduced (figure 2). The axiom system is deduced and explained in Wells (2012b), chapters 6-9. With regard to the topics of politics, political science, government, and civics, six of these axioms are prominent:

1. **the design objective of social outcomes axiom** [Wells (2012b), chap. 6, pp. 183-187] – *the objective of corporal empirical education is to orient and guide the learner's educational Self-development of his manifold of rules to produce a common system of meaning implications for laws of social intercourse that lead to congruent moral customs of behavior and maxims of Enterprise for which actual agreement to the laws of this system by every citizen in the Community is made possible;*
2. **the value axiom** [*ibid.*, chap. 6, pp. 187-188] – *corporal social education is effected through physical activities designed to provoke and orient the learner's development of a social value system congruent with the social contract of his Society;*
3. **the axiom of choice** [*ibid.*, chap. 7, pg. 214] – *chosen actions are non-contrary to the actor's value system;*
4. **the axiom of developed social taste** [*ibid.*, chap. 8, pg. 235] – *learner tastes are formable through instructional education;*
5. **the axiom of optimization** [*ibid.*, chap. 8, pg. 247] – *Progress in perfecting Personfähigkeit is achieved by means of a series of transforming learner activities regulated by a persistent sense of interest; and*
6. **the axiom of principled satisfactions** [*ibid.*, chap. 9, pg. 258] – *learners can and must be cultivated to act from a basis in general principles rather than on impulse and inclination.*

In a broad context, *téchne* development in **all** the frameworks must be grounded in the system of metaphysical axioms. This is because these axioms are deduced from the Critical metaphysics of human nature and it is through them that we make the social atom the foundation of a social-natural science of education. It seems to me especially important to clearly emphasize this in the present context because of the character of politics, government, and citizenship – hence their explicit relationship to *téchne* development I present here. Bloom's comments quoted above about the "polyglot nature" of political science have a flavor of disapproval to them. But that is unfair to the practitioners of contemporary political science because life in a great Society bound together by social contract *does itself exhibit this 'polyglot' character*. What seems not adequately appreciated within the community of educators is that we have developed an aggregated system in which its divers pieces are juxtaposed without unifying principles. The metaphysical axioms *are* these unifying principles for *téchne* in public education.

In the case of education about government, the understanding of government is understanding of the *objectives* common to government at every social level. There are six of these objectives for American government and they are stated explicitly in the Preamble of the Constitution. The Preamble is the great forgotten text of the Constitution. The social study of government properly is the study of the Preamble rather than the body text that follows it. This is because all of the specific *tactics* of the organization of the general government *only* bear upon the general government and are subject to amendment and evolution over time. The objectives stated in the Preamble are, in great contrast, perennial objectives for *all* levels of government. They are the reasons human beings agree to institute and then be governed by a government. They are the

basis for Lincoln's "government of the people by the people for the people" [Lincoln (1863)].

The starting point of political social studies is the same as that of all social-natural sciences in general: the Idea of the Social Contract. Civics, in the context of topic and subject-matter for instructional education, is not synonymous with "government," although civics courses have been and still are often taught as if "civics" and "government" are synonyms. Civics in the context of social studies instruction is essentially cultivation of understanding of and commitment to social Duties. It is, in this context, *moral* education. However – and this is absolutely essential – this moral education is not and cannot be an *ontology*-centered ethics education. Every person builds his own private moral code in his manifold of rules but ontology-centered ethics theory places the ground for moral custom *outside* the human being – a transcendent placement that makes all such theories lack real objective validity. Objectively valid civics education is *deontological* and comes under the *lessons of mos maiorum* function (figure 1): *inclusion in the curriculum of lesson-matters orienting the learner's Self-developed principles of mores and folkways to be in congruence with those of his Society*. Such lessons can only be derived and developed from a foundation in the deontological theory of social contracting [Wells (2012a)].

§ 8. Summary

This chapter has discussed rudimentary principles for the social studies framework for public instructional education. The coverage I have given to specific subject-matters in the social studies framework is less broad than the idealistic vision proposed by the NCSS but, on the other hand, the NCSS framework is impractical. Public schools have limited resources and even a brief inspection of what social studies offerings they *generally* provide, as documented in examples from sampled school district websites, shows that the NCSS proposal goes beyond their present fiscal and staffing capacities. Furthermore, the NCSS themes are largely a mix of sociology mini-theories and popular topical trends within the U.S. educational establishment – a continuation, in effect, of the social reconstructionism of Rugg, Brameld, Counts, and others [Wells (2013b), chap. 14, pp. 536-540; Brameld (1971)]. This is not social studies designed for and compatible with the American Republic. It is a continuation of educational Taylorism under an elite meritocracy started by the Progressive Education Movement nearly a century ago. As for those sociology mini-theories, contemporary sociology is not a natural science. It, too, must be remade into a true social-natural science before it can be of any fecund assistance to a social-natural science of education.

The framework laid out here is obviously only a beginning, not a completed package. As I have stressed throughout this treatise, curricular and instruction design belongs to practitioners of actual teaching – the teachers in the public schools – and not to the self-declared 'expertise' of any educologist body of academic specialists under Taylorism. The framework that is begun in this chapter is guided by what real public schools have demonstrated is within their present grasp generally. Some school districts, it is true, do more topically than what I have set out here. But for public education, the starting foundations must be what schools in every district are presently capable of doing.

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