The Idea of the Social Contract

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© 2012

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Preface

It has long been noted by many with misgivings that the problems of human society have not been solved by science and technology, and that the social sciences have far lagged the physical sciences in contributing to human welfare. Indeed, social problems and ills have sometimes been exacerbated by advances in physical science and by technology. This has led some people to regard science and technology as more of a bane to man than a blessing.

This last point of view, while understandable, is misguided. Science and technology in and of themselves are neither good nor evil. They provide tools. What man does with those tools is up to man. Man is his own blessing and his own bane. Solutions to society's problems will never be effected by latter-day Luddites. Francis Bacon was correct to write,

> Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.
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> The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.
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> Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is subdued only by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule. [Bacon (1620), *Novum Organum*, Bk. I, I-III]

The engineering sciences take the discoveries of natural science and apply that knowledge to the development of tools and instruments. To be able to do so, the science that supplies the knowledge must be quantitative as well as qualitative, predictive of nature as well as explanatory of nature. It is very appropriate to call engineering generally *the technical arts* because the activities of engineers are wholly bound up with the art of transforming knowledge of nature into tools and instruments that satisfy human needs and better human conditions.

Traditionally the engineering sciences are generally associated with inanimate gadgetry – labor-saving appliances, entertainment devices, roads and bridges, water and sewer systems, earth moving machinery, etc. Even many engineers come to think of their arts in those terms. But at the core this is not truly so. Engineering is the art and science of solving practical problems. There is a simple reason the works of engineers have traditionally produced gadgetry and done nothing to solve the social and humane issues that, for humankind at large, are by far the more immediately pressing in life. Of the two great logical divisions of science – the physical sciences and the social sciences – only the former has brought forth from the study of nature the knowledge of root causes necessary for the invention of tools and instruments that exploit these causes to produce desired effects. This is so much so that the physical sciences – physics, chemistry, biology and their offspring – are typically but erroneously called *the* natural sciences, while the social sciences – sociology, economics, political science, and so on – are deliberately denied that label even by practitioners of those endeavors. The social sciences claim to study man, not nature.

I will not attempt to conceal from you the fact that I find this last claim nothing short of absurd. Does man stand outside of nature? Is there anything remotely "unnatural" about human daily activities, whether they be political, commercial, recreational or whatever else? To answer either of these questions in the affirmative requires a very strange and artificial definition of the idea of "nature." The reason the social sciences have so far lagged the physical-natural sciences is a simple one. The social sciences have looked upon man and not upon human nature. To be

fecund and produce the sort of knowledge of causes by which alone mankind might effect solutions to social problems, the social sciences must be remade. They must become social-natural sciences. This treatise is about how that can be accomplished.

In recent years the phrase "social engineering" has come into the popular vocabulary. Some people favor it, some people are aghast at the prospect. But whether you favor or oppose the notion, I think you should know that the notion you favor or oppose – as it may be in your own case – is nothing but an empty metaphor. I am a professional engineer, and I see nothing whatsoever in any endeavor called "social engineering" that is in the least part "engineering." To engineer is to design a solution, and real solutions are engineered in no other way than, as Bacon said, by submission to nature. The activities and actions that have been labeled "social engineering" are prompted by good intentions but based on nothing but opinion and guesswork. Real engineering sometimes involves guesswork, true enough, when not every pertinent fact is at hand. But it is not *founded* upon guesswork. Engineers are not known for engineering solutions to social problems simply because engineers have had no social-natural sciences to provide the knowledge necessary to invent instruments and tools for what Bacon called "the understanding."

Until recently, it has not been practically feasible to propose remaking the social sciences into social-natural sciences because "human nature" has long been one of the darkest and least understood phrases capable of passing through human lips. This situation has changed over the past half-dozen years. What has changed it has been the discovery and development of a new science, erected upon sturdy foundations, and devoted to understanding the nature of being-a-human-being. This science is called, by me, the science of mental physics[1].

The treatise you have before you now is not a treatise about mental physics. It is a treatise devoted to the fundamental nature of human-to-human interaction – in short, to the natural phenomena of human society and intercourse. The topic with which it deals stands at the root of every possible social-natural science, both those currently attempted by the existing non-natural social sciences and those that at present are struggling to become scientific doctrines seeking to provide answers for the social needs of humankind. This treatise must necessarily call upon the science of mental physics, but it is not about mental physics *per se*. To call upon it, I have had to introduce terms and concepts from the new science, but I have not digressed into the interior of that science. The principles of mental physics have been covered in my previous works, which you are at liberty to explore in more depth if you so desire after having read *this* treatise. I use, but do not derive, theorems of mental physics in this work because they are necessary to explain the Idea of the Social Contract. I explain at a broad and general level the implications of mental physics in a way I hope will be for the most part fully accessible to the general reader. But the topic of this treatise is the Idea of the Social Contract and the Social Contract is the foundation of all possible natural sciences of human social-nature.

Chapter 1 provides a first introduction to the phenomenon of social contracting and briefly reviews the principal historical figures contributing to social contract theory. It discusses why prior social contract theories have failed and the role that metaphysics plays in theorizing. After explaining what a science is in general, it addresses the idea of a social-natural science and what it is, what metaphysics is, and what mental physics is. The important idea of a Community is introduced and identified as one of the principal phenomenal topics of social contract theory. The traditional logical divisions of science and the organization of the modern U.S. university are used to illustrate the phenomenon of divided Communities. Later in the treatise this is called a

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[1] You should be made aware that there is another – and more widely known – *mis*usage of this term. It is employed by a little cult of mystics headquartered in California who call their claptrap "mental physics." This treatise, and the science of mental physics, have nothing whatsoever in common with this group other than the base fact that both your author and these mist-minded mystics are human beings.

granulated society and is a phenomenal marker of arrest and the possible decline and pending fall of a Community or a civilization.

Chapter 2 introduces the important idea of the social-natural environment. It begins with the technical definitions of several important terms. Science in general and social-natural science are defined, and several important misconceptions about science are cleared up. The idea of a social environment is introduced along with its logical divisions of pure state-of-nature, state-of-civil-nature, and mixed-state-of-nature. It is explained that the real grounds for this logical division subsist in a mental Object called Obligation. Examples of the three divisions are provided. The chapter employs some specific examples to illustrate factors characteristic of social environments and social interactions. Among these is the phenomenon of leadership. A brief synopsis of the ideas of leadership, the leader and the follower is presented.

A brief history of the theories of evolution from the state-of-nature to the civil state by means of social compacting is provided. The opinions of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau on the question of why men form civil societies is synopsized. The social environment is individual and particular but a social-natural science requires a more general construct than this as the basis for a theory. This more general context is called the social-natural environment.

The chapter introduces the idea of social molecules and a theoretical methodology for studying social-natural science called social-chemistry. The methodology for study of the social-natural environment is mathematical and takes the form of mathematical graph theory. More specifically, it takes the specialized form of a graph called a *network*. The chapter discusses the elements of a social network and the real context for the mathematical constructs used in it. Lastly, the issue of scientific complexity is discussed and a methodology for addressing this important issue is introduced. This method is called the ladder of scientific reduction/model order reduction. The important methodology of embedding field theory and the method of minimal anatomies is introduced. These will constitute the methodology of social-natural science.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the topic of understanding the human being as the basic social atom. It introduced the Organized Being model of Critical metaphysics to provide an overview of how the phenomenon of Self-determination is effected in the *homo noumenal* aspect of being-a-human-being. It presents a high level overview of the major interconnected functions in the structure of human organized-being, and this system is used throughout the rest of the treatise. The chapter begins with a discussion of the problem of the social atom. The deep issues underlying the problem are metaphysical issues, and the chapter is therefore highly metaphysical. The principal objections and concerns over whether or not any kind of social science is even possible are reviewed. It is shown that these concerns apply no less to the physical-natural sciences, yet these are obviously possible. To understand why and how social-natural sciences are likewise possible one must understand what science in general is. Key to this is to understand that science is itself a human-determined phenomenon.

The possibility of human civil Community and civil Society is grounded in acts of social contracting. Acts of social contracting, in turn, take the real and practical ground for their possibility from the regulative principle called the Idea of the Social Contract, and they are manifested in the phenomena of human moral judgments. Chapter 4 is the beginning of the social-natural treatment of the moral judgment phenomenon. This is treated as a social-natural science by setting out principles of a deontological moral theory. The chapter begins with a review of the usages of the English word "moral" and its Latin roots. The topic of what moral judgments are judgments *of* is then discussed. Moral judgments ultimately reduce to judgments of good and evil. This raises additional questions, and to address them and the phenomena that occur pertaining to them, Weaver's model is introduced. Moral judgments are only one particular variety of human judgment, and to understand them we must first understand judgment as a type

of human Self-determination. Weaver's models provide a mathematical approach to accomplish this. A Weaver's model is a mathematical form of depiction of a human being as Organized Being that emphasizes the Critical semantics aspect of Self-determination.

Understanding the nature of social compacts requires understanding of the characteristics of determinations bound by the legislative structure of the individual's Self-constructed manifold of rules. The chapter discusses the logical organization and general structure of the roles that practical rules, concepts, and Desires play in the determination of behaviors that are often viewed from ethical perspectives. One byproduct of the structuring of rules is the functioning of part of the manifold of rules as a Self-developed moral code. Because this development is driven by the person's real empirical experience, every person's moral code is a *private* code of constructed necessitations unique to each individual. There is no one single universal moral code that applies to everyone. Furthermore, the individual's personal moral code is a deontological code.

It follows from this that practical moral judgments are deontological and grounded in the law of the practical categorical imperative of the process of pure Reason. The rule structuring process constitutes what Kant called the *metaphysica pura* or genuine metaphysic of moral custom. This is in contrast to the person's theoretical conceptualization of moral principles, which Kant called *philosophia moralis applicata* or applied moral philosophy. The proper and objectively valid context of the idea of Duty is set out in chapter 4, and the mental physics of Duty conceptualization is explained.

Chapter 5 continues the discussion of the phenomenon of moral judgment. Human beings form groups in which they associate with one another and, in turn, entire divers groups of people interact with each other in either a state-of-nature or a civil-state of interacting. Living in a civil association with other people requires the person to act on principles different from those adequate to serve his purposes in a state-of-nature. These new principles are precisely those social principles that are called moral in the context of social mores. Seen from this perspective, a social contract is always a moral compact of some sort. To study social phenomena, then, is to study the nature of the effects of human moral compacts and the effects of their absence.

What does one look for and what sort of manifestations in experience mark a judgment as a moral judgment? What stands as a ground for recognizing an Object of morality? These are issues that have always raised many perplexities insofar as efforts to seek general answers have been concerned. A deontological answer calls for recognizing that the practical meaning of morality is that it is a logic of actions. Just as logic proper is regarded as a system of rules for Self-directed objective intelligence, moral rules comprise a system for Self-directed affective life. This, then, is what one must look for: that which in expression of action implicates a logic of actions. Chapter 5 carries out a review of empirical psychological findings that collectively speak to and implicate the human nature of moral judgment.

One of the most important facts to emerge from these studies is that human beings exhibit a staged progression of expressions of rule judgmentation. Human rule practice and cognizance of rules co-evolve side by side in a definite order of progression. Furthermore, this tight-knit structure of stages reoccurs again and again as a person encounters new situations during the course of adult life. Thus a person forms a network of developed mental schemes for the making of moral judgments that is experience-driven. There is a recurring regularity to these accidents of expression that points to a single underlying dynamical process in the mental evaluation of rules and concepts of maxims and tenets. Such phenomena give evidence of field effects in the social-chemistry of human interactions. The empirical phenomena, in turn, are understood through mental physics in terms of forms of reflective judgments called *values* and organizations within the individual's manifold of rules called *value structures*.

One very pronounced feature in the evolution of moral judgment is the phenomenon of moral

realism. The rigidity and uncompromising character of exhibitions of moral realism point to the irresistibility of stimulated practical hypothetical imperatives in the manifold of rules. In time, the child develops a better established understanding that other people differ from himself in the ways that they see things, the ways that they reason, and in the decisions they come to. He also comes to recognize that, in order to satisfy his own aims, wants and needs, he must sometimes help others to satisfy their aims, wants and needs as they, reciprocally, help him to satisfy his. It is at this juncture where *social* interactions are properly said to become cooperative, i.e. that two people must conjointly co-determine their action expressions. It is at this point where moral judgmentation becomes socialized.

The psychological findings demonstrate that there is an apparent linkage between cooperation and personality development. The empiricism of personality development is the topic taken up in chapter 8. Before taking up that examination, however, it is necessary to undertake a further and deeper analysis of the mental physics underlying the phenomenon of moral judgment. This begins in chapter 6 by examining the Critical practical real-explanations of morality-in-general, good, and evil. These explanations refer to the individual's practical hypothetical imperatives in his manifold of rules. The rule structure standing under these is called his pre-rational morality. Private morality and public morality can be logically distinguished, and it is the latter division that pertains to social compacts. Both private and public morality, however, have their genesis from the *homo noumenal* aspect of being-a-human-being. Both are manifested in appearances by estimations and expressions of values.

Chapter 6 then turns to the nature of sufficient grounds for the making of objective judgments. Here is where the Critical aesthetics of the process of reflective judgment come to exert powerful influences on the moralizing character of the process of practical judgment. Out of this comes the important consequence that every person is the author of himself, i.e., that be makes himself the person he chooses to become. Every person is in this sense the author of his own moral auto-biography. Also out of this, and again as a consequence, emerges the phenomenon of Duty. Duty can be logically divided into two classes. The first class is the class of Duties to oneself. The Critical importance of this class with regard to the Idea of the Social Contract is that this class of Duties grounds the making of all Duties belonging to the second, namely, public Duties.

There are three synthetic Duty Relations. The first is Duty to oneself with regard to one's own personality. The second is Duty to oneself with regard to one's situation. The synthesis of these two yields the third Relation, reciprocal Duties of personality in relationship to the situation of other people. This third Relation of Duty is the ground for the genesis of public Duty. Put another way, a person makes it a Duty to himself to assume an Obligation to others. In a manner of speaking, this is a kind of social-force-of-gravity that produces the accretion of societies.

Understanding the nature of private moral codes requires examination of both the conceptual formula of Duty and the practical formula for it in the manifold of rules. Chapter 6 deals with the conceptual formula and chapter 7 addresses the practical formula. The conceptual formula is provided by the idea of *officium*. There are two Critical Standpoints from which this idea must be viewed, namely, the theoretical Standpoint and the practical Standpoint. From the first comes understanding of *officium* in terms of concrete matter-of-duty and form-of-obligation. From the second comes understanding of *officium* in terms of a general notion of matter-of-Duty and form-of-Obligation. Chapter 7 deals with the latter Standpoint, chapter 6 with the former.

The practical focus of the Critical analysis is on the process of judgmentation and on the expressive mathematical quantities at the horizon of possible experience insofar as actions implicate moral judgments. To be able to tie mathematical principal quantities to appearances, we must have a context from which to examine appearances. Analysis of this context takes the form of a second-level analytic representation (2LAR) called Kant's moral categories. Chapter 6 first

discusses what these moral categories are *not*. They are not natural laws of mental physics. They are, rather, ideas of application and their application is aimed at establishing practicable systems of ethics and moral custom. Kant failed to provide more than a merely descriptive treatment of his moral categories. He did not provide for them the practical real-explanations that are required if they are to be of any scientific use or application. This shortcoming is addressed in chapter 6 and the required real-explanations are provided.

It is seen in chapter 6 that the idea of Obligation has a central role in social contracts. This role has historically proven to be very slippery for theorists to properly grasp in an objectively valid way. To do so requires a Critical analysis of the process of judgmentation, and this brings us to chapter 7. The science community has a long-demonstrated history of discounting, dismissing and ignoring the observations and opinions of humanists and romantics, spanning at least the time from Newton right up until the present. If we are talking about a matter of physics or of biology or of chemistry, this attitude is understandable and even excusable. But as soon as we are talking about matters of engineering and, even more especially, about matters of social-natural science, the long accustomed habit of ignoring the poet, the artist, or even the young person who bags your groceries is a habit so short-sighted that for a scientist to adopt it merits being called stupid. Physics would make very little progress if physicists ignored the appearances of atoms. In like manner, the engineer (whose chosen profession it is to design solutions to human problems) and the social-natural scientist (whose chosen profession it will be to discover knowledge of the nature of social systems) cannot afford to ignore anything that can be learned from appearances of any social atom. Social problems are of human creation and their resolution, without producing new social problems, calls for something we do not presently have, namely practices of social-engineering that are grounded in social-natural science rather than erected on unstable opinion.

To effect such a new state of human affairs, we must follow Aristotle's dictum and Bacon's injunction by looking to sources of knowledge-of-experience in deducing our theories. Chapter 7 begins by considering the role played by maxims of prudence as a *Triebfeder* or main-spring of Self-determination. Prudence immediately concerns Relation with regard to one's situation and so pertains to Duties to oneself with regard to one's situation. Nonetheless, from maxims of prudence there can arise maxims of cooperation and Community. Phenomena of prudence implicate the *Dasein* [2] of a partial cause of cooperation and Community. To grasp the *Existenz* of this Object scientifically requires us to study observables of behavior and personality. Chapter 8 address this requirement. Chapter 7 provides several examples of behavioral manifestations of maxims of Duties to oneself that are relevant to competition and cooperation in social environments. The conceptual maxims underlying such behavior are classified as imperatives of prudence, imperatives of skill, and pragmatical imperatives. These are defined in chapter 7.

The mental physics behind these maxims and their accompanying expressions in behavior is described in chapter 7. The conclusion that is reached is that human behavior is fundamentally a *satisficing* behavior. Satisficing behavior can lead to cooperation in Community but it can also lead to destructive competition and the eventual arrest and breakdown of a Community. This happens when dynamics of satisficing behaviors begin to impose the social tastes of a majority of the Community's members upon a minority of them. The natural response of the minority is to resent the imposition and to begin to withdraw from Community cooperation.

About half of chapter 7 is devoted to discussing in more detail the mental physics of the

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[2] To predicate the *Dasein* of something is to predicate no more than that this something exists. To predicate the *Existenz* of something is to predicate the manner in which it exists. The first merely announces the existence of the subject of the predication and nothing more than this. The second predicates something as inherent in its appearance. The distinction between *Dasein* and *Existenz* is very important in Critical meta-physics.

processes of human judgmentation and Self-determination. It is the commonality of these processes in human Nature that opens the door to the real possibility of social-natural science. Objectivity, creativity, Self-continuity and Meaning are all grounded in these processes. These various processes combine in judgmentation to produce a motivational dynamic of Self-determination. The motivational dynamic is an adaptive synthesis that follows a logical sequence explained and illustrated in this chapter. It is the mathematical basis for all motivational psychology.

The motivational dynamic produces new cognitions that are made symbolic of meanings. Therefore the theory encompasses a theory of Critical semantics, including the Critical semantics of social interactions. One of the most important consequences this has is the idea that behavioral nuances in person-to-person interaction partially stimulate the individuals' semantic interpretations of the social situation. Weaver's models of interpersonal exchanges and social interactions are mathematical vehicles for the analysis of the roles personality styles play in social-chemistry. This is an important empirical factor that is the central topic of chapter 8.

Chapter 8 begins by considering the idea of gregariousness and the question of whether or not this is some sort of human trait. This leads into a more general exploration of the psychological notions of traits and characteristics. Many people presume that man has a social instinct and that he is social by his very nature. Critical analysis finds against this supposition. Man has no social *instincts* whatsoever. The idea of gregariousness as well as the other psychological concepts of personality traits are mathematical concepts having no other objective validity than practical objective validity for describing appearances. The analysis leads into the question of personality, which is an idea empirical psychology has found itself unable to come to terms with. The case is otherwise in Critical epistemology, where personality is recognized to be a mathematical Object.

Personality psychology is thus shown to be an applied mathematic. As such, its application to human beings requires mathematical tools for analyzing personality, interpersonal exchanges and interpersonal social styles. The chapter introduces such a modeling technique, the personality style circumplex or D-PIPOS circumplex model. The general technique of circumplex modeling is first presented and its history is reviewed. The new model is then synthesized from ideas from several older circumplex modeling schemas. These include: (1) the Leary interpersonal behavior circumplex; (2) the Wilson-Maccoby social styles circumplexes; (3) the Kiesler interpersonal circle; and (4) the Plutchik-Conte-Millon personality style circumplex. The latter three are discussed in chapter 8, while the Leary schema is reviewed in chapter 9. The Wilson-Maccoby circumplex and the Plutchik-Conte-Millon circumplex are themselves synthesized from the independent works of Wilson *et al*., Maccoby, Plutchik and Conte, and Millon. The terminology used in the resulting overall circumplex model is used throughout the rest of this treatise.

One very important factor in empirical circumplex analysis of social phenomena is the factor of versatility in social intercourse. This is a measure of the degree to which an individual demonstrates an ability to adapt or modify his own interpersonal behavioral style in order for it to better conform to the habitual styles of those with whom he interacts. Lack of versatility is indicative of more rigid habituated behavioral maxims and is thus a hallmark of the re-staging phenomenon, specifically the re-staging of egocentric rule practice in the making of moral judgments. The logical structures of the manifold of rules and the manifold of concepts is thus the root cause of a person's ability or lack of ability to exhibit versatility in his social style. Versatility is the exhibited empirical connection point between the Weaver's model representation of inter-personal interaction and circumplex modeling of the social-chemistry of embedding field models.

The role of tension, an object of the motivational dynamic, provides a tie point between the motivational dynamic and a Weaver's model of semantic judgments. All psychological theories of interpersonal interactions and of social personality presuppose the capacity of the individual to

make meanings interpretations based on appearances of the interpersonal operationalizations and characteristics of the D-PIPOS circumplex. Tension is a basis function for a social-chemistry theory of societal phenomena. Chapter 9 first illustrates the relationship of the manifold of rules to the D-PIPOS circumplex. A Critical difference is found to exist between the social-natural circumplex theory and standard interpretations of circumplex models that have been made in traditional psychology. These traditional mathematical depictions are contrary to psychiatric facts, and the disagreement can be traced to ontology-centered presuppositions used in the conventional analysis. Leary's methodology, on the other hand, does not suffer from this defect. The chapter briefly reviews Leary's method.

The relationship between circumplex mathematics and the mental physics of the manifold of rules is illustrated in chapter 9 by means of a simplified example. One key concept brought out in this example is the diversity of evoked responses possible according to particular stimulation of specific rules in the manifold. The character of emotivity and ratio-expression is governed by a topological dynamic in the manifold of rules itself. The topological mathematics of the manifold of rules clearly informs us that social-chemistry and social-natural science must deal with the issue of complexity. That it is practically feasible for science to deal with this issue is hinted at by successes achieved in biochemistry. Nonetheless, full development of social-natural science requires an organized methodology. The chapter therefore discusses the systematic methodology of scientific reduction/model order reduction. The mathematical approach that the problem demands already exists. It was discovered by Grossberg in 1972. A brief description of this methodology, the theory of embedding fields and the method of minimal anatomies, is provided.

Chapter 9 goes into greater detail concerning the development of social-chemistry models. All complete scientific modeling must proceed by first establishing a qualitative model structure and next deducing a quantitative description that describes in specific detail consequences latent in the qualitative model. The rudimentary importance of the qualitative model must not go unappreciated and the model may not be made casually by fiat. Without a qualitative model, a quantitative model has no object. The principal social-chemistry ideas presented in chapter 9 are those of bonding, anti-bonding and non-bonding. These ideas will be seen to provide the theoretical basis of society formation. Chapter 9 discusses methodology requirements qualitatively then introduces the quantitative-directed embedding field schema known as the actor-critic model. It is next explained how these ideas are applied in social-chemistry modeling. One important factor in this is provided by the view of how basic psychological compensation behaviors are related to actor-critic policy and value functions, and how these in turn are related to accommodations in the manifold of concepts and the manifold of rules. It is pointed out that the system obeys a minimization principle and that this principle bears strong similarity to other such principles found in both physics and in system engineering.

Having now laid out the mental physics foundations of the Idea of the Social Contract, chapter 10 returns to the relationships in social compacting. Three basic forms of relationships by which an individual can live in *commercium* with other people and with societal groups as a whole are introduced: (1) the outlaw relationship; (2) the citizenship relationship; and (3) the criminal relationship. These relationships are understood in a context provided by the Critical real-explanation of *society* provided in chapter 10. These three forms of relationship are basic synthetic functions of social formation. The majority of all social relationships are constituted from mixtures of these three. This produces a social-natural environment called a granulated society.

Human beings each construct their own societies and the associations that give these definitions their empirical character. In doing so, the individual constructs his idea of society around two types of objects: (1) the person; and (2) the stereotype. A person is an empirical object recognized from grounds in direct experience. A stereotype, on the other hand, is an

abstract object grounded in speculation and reasoning. Stereotyping is a phenomenon found in many social interactions. Indeed, some kinds of social compacts would be impossible without it. Habits of stereotyping develop out of a person's individual experience of developing social bonding and anti-bonding associations with other people. Stereotype constructions are applied during interactions where the people involved stand in a third type of relationship to each other, the non-bonding association.

The role operationalizations play in the construction of bonding associations is illustrated by example. From this example the chapter expands to cover more general social situations. The D-PIPOS circumplex concepts discussed in chapter 9 are placed in context with the construction of individual society associations and with the Weaver's model in chapter 10. Here the phenomenon of re-staging of rule practice and rule cognizance in moral judgments is an important factor, particularly re-staging of egocentrism in rule practice and moral realism in rule cognizance. Understanding the dynamics of semantic representing enacted by individuals during social interaction exchanges requires an appreciation of what Leary termed "levels of personality." Chapter 10 reviews Leary's methodology.

A human being is the original agent of his own actions. This notion of agency belongs to man's *homo noumenal* aspect. Understanding it requires a Critical understanding of the causality of freedom in Self-determination. Considerations here lead to the important idea of the power of the person (*Personfähigkeit*). The individual employs the power of his person in responding to disturbances to his equilibrium and for reestablishing it. In every instance of building or altering social bonding or anti-bonding associations, practical imperatives and maxims perfect or maintain the power of the person in some way. Mutual obligations and reciprocal duties arise from this, and so every bonding relationship between two persons is *de facto* a type of social compact.

This consideration leads to the analysis of the human Nature of Obligation and the role of pledging in the formation of civic bonding relationships. To hold with objective validity, this analysis must remain properly deontological. What is required for this is extensively discussed. The analysis leads to the conclusion that all maxims of social Obligation are grounded in maxims of Obligation-to-Self. Furthermore, embedding field theory has produced a theorem stating that decision schemes of social obligation can develop out of a competitive social environment without the need to impose anything more than Obligation-to-Self on the system model.

Presumptions of obligations and pledges are one byproduct of egocentric rule practice and moral realism in the cognizance of rules. Indeed, if it were not for this naturally-occurring stage in the development of moral judgment, and its re-staging in adult life, the possibility of forming even primitive civic Communities would become rather dubious. Actions of pledging and commitments to Obligation play an essential role in the formation and maintenance of Societies. For this reason, chapter 10 provides an extensive coverage of these topics.

Chapter 11, the longest chapter in this book, takes up the topic of the social contract phenomenon in empirical appearances. The principal empirical manifestation of social contracts is the development of civil Communities. It addresses the questions of under what conditions Communities form and under what conditions Communities disintegrate. To study the nature of human Communities is to study the marks of the mental phenomenon of social contracting. The starting point for this examination is the child. Maxims of Community develop, if they develop at all, during childhood and do so alongside and with the child's development of moral judgment. Furthermore, in today's Western Societies they do so primarily through the child's social intercourse with other children. This fact has been neither properly nor adequately understood by Western social theorists, with the consequence that a great deal of what passes for social theory has historically consisted of myth and pseudo-science. There have been very few historical examples of successful and deliberate organized systems of youth socialization, and the most

prominent of these are generally considered unattractive and even repugnant models. The two most prominent effective systems in the history of the West were the *agoge* of ancient Sparta and the Hitler Youth of Nazi Germany. Both were state-instituted social education systems deliberately aimed at producing a specific designed Society with a specific civil convention, and both were aimed at molding their youths according to a specific ideal of the type of citizenship the educational experience was intended to produce. Both used deliberately designed competition to produce the kind of social cooperation the governments of Sparta and Nazi Germany intended to produce. Other states have implemented youth education programs with designed intentions but fell far short of the results they sought to achieve. Notable among these are the Hegelian-based programs in the former Soviet Union and the still-existing program in mainland China. Western countries have put far less effort into programs of social education.

At the root of all Community development is the primary factor of civil liberty. Its curtailment under conditions of vague pseudo-conventions leads to eventual Community disintegration. Its well-ordered promotion under general maxims of a civil convention promotes the formation and growth of Communities. The reason for this lies in the Self-determining Nature of human beings. Human Self-determination is always oriented to satisficing behaviors aimed to establish and keep the individual in a state of equilibrium. The person's ability to accomplish this depends on the liberty of action possible for him through the power of his person. Thus, the power of a person is one of the most fundamental factors in social phenomena. Both the *agoge* and the Hitler Youth were designed to produce specific personal maxims by which individuals would pursue the self-perfection of the power of their persons, and in large part succeeded in accomplishing this design. Other systems, most notably but not exclusively that of the old Soviet Union, failed to do so. In most Western cultures today, there is little or no organized social effort to do so at all and these cultures naively presume their cultural mores and folkways are automatically self-perpetuating.

The power of a person, or *Personfähigkeit*, is the foundation of all his natural liberties. It arises from the person's organized overall ability to satisfy the demands of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. Inability to satisfy this demand has the most severe adverse consequences for the individual. It is for this reason that perfection of one's *Personfähigkeit* is a *de facto* aim of the process of judgmentation. It is from this process of perfecting where we find the genesis of mutual Obligation and the origin of reciprocal Duty. These are, of course, the keystones of civil Community.

The power of a person is the basic context for all ideas of liberties and rights. This is so in the state-of-nature as well as the state-of-civil-Community. A person living in a state-of-nature environment has the greatest degree of liberty in the exercise of the power of his person. But this environment also severely limits and hinders the extent to which that power can be developed and the degree to which it can be perfected. Living in a civil association bound together by social contract imposes self-restrictions on his liberty but can greatly magnify the degree of the individual's development of his *Personfähigkeit* and enable him to improve the general state of his own well-being.

This consideration leads directly into a Critical discussion and deontological explanation of the concepts of natural liberty, civil liberty and civil rights. The first thing of note is that the concept of "rights" has utterly no context in the state-of-nature and the very idea is meaningless in that environment. Human beings living in civil Community possess civil rights and do so by virtue of making such rights conditions of their free association with others. Outside of a Community, no person has any civil rights and in the state-of-nature the poetic idea of human rights is an empty and Platonic fantasy. This conclusion will no doubt be displeasing to many people, but failure to recognize it is the first step towards losing one's civil rights.

All civil liberties are liberties of action constrained by civil rights possessed by all the

members of a Community. There is always a *quid pro quo* involved in individual consent to a restriction of his personal actions and the limitation of these to actions sanctioned as civil liberties by the Community. Civil rights establish the just conditions under which civil liberties are exercised. The pairing of civil liberty and civil right is the *primus motus* of acts of social contracting. Chapter 11 provides the deontological real-explanations of civil rights, civil liberties, and civil convention.

Civil Communities are always man-made cooperative organizations that rely upon some civil convention for their definition. All civil conventions are precisely that – i.e., conventions – and as such are premised on empirical foundations. There is no one universal civil convention suitable or expedient in every social environment or that pertains to all people everywhere. Furthermore, the degree of detail and the extensive scope of a just civil convention must, for this same reason, become lesser and more restricted as the span of governance authority increases over larger populations. The practices of centralization of power and authority are therefore antithetical to the sustainability of a Community. Hitler, for example, was himself the cause of the fall of the very Society he sought to establish as his so-called "thousand year Reich," although he is merely the most infamous of well-known historical examples of this. Over-centralization inevitably leads to the breakdown of a Society. This is an important facet of societal organization pertinent to civil governance at every level of a Society.

The phenomenon of governance in one of several divers forms is a logically-essential mark of recognition of the *Dasein* of a social contract and a civil Community. There are several primary pure forms of governance including consensus democracy, *Gemeinschaft* governance, republican governance, monarchy-oligarchy governance, non-consensus democracy, and, lastly, Tocqueville governance. Chapter 11 discusses each of these forms. Phenomena of governance are tightly linked to personality, both in terms of preferences for particular forms of governance and in terms of moral secession from a Community in which the institution of governance fails to satisfy the terms or meet the conditions of the Community's civil convention and social contract. The four most commonly encountered pure forms of governance and their alignments with personality styles is discussed.

There is a population-size-dependent property that emerges in all civil associations as these rise above the level of small cliques of friendship and the smallest Communities. This is the spontaneous formation of mini-Communities within a larger Community. It is a direct immediate consequence of the fact that every person defines his own society. The phenomenon is further supported by the phenomenon of division of labor in the economic sphere of a Community, whether one is speaking of household economy or commercial economy. The phenomenon of mini-Communities has not been adequately recognized as the important social factor it is in every social-natural environment inhabited by more than just a few people. The political theories of the four traditional forms of governance institution have fatally ignored this phenomenon. This is because every mini-Community has its own set of special interests, the satisfaction of which the members of the mini-Community will not tolerate having gainsaid by the Community-at-large. The phenomenon of mini-Community has a generally granulating effect on Society.

Chapter 11 concludes by returning to the topic of governance in light of the mini-Community phenomenon. The *Existenz* of mini-Communities within a Society means there is no one pure form of universal governance institution suitable at all levels of Society. The mental physics of human Nature implicates the need for employing some decentralized and non-hierarchical mixed-form of a system of governance*s* in order for a larger Society to be sustainable and durable. Such a system of decentralized and non-hierarchical governance is named Tocqueville governance. The original idea and plan of the post-revolutionary American Republic was predicated on the presupposition of Tocqueville governance. Tocqueville's documentation of this is reviewed.

Every person self-defines his own society. The phenomenon of Society arises from the collective actions of the individual self-definitions. Chapter 12 considers the principle of this emergent mass action, and this is the Idea of the Social Contract. A Society is a unifying topical scientific Object of a social-natural science. The idea of Society contains under it all the specific phenomenal topics that the special social-natural sciences treat. The unity of the Idea of social-natural-science-in-general is the Social Contract, and the Idea itself is called the Idea of the Social Contract. The Social Contract is a mathematical Ideal, and chapter 12 addresses the underlying rational principles of the Ideal. It is an Object of perfection for the person's rational Self-determination of practices aimed at achieving a good life. Thus, the Social Contract has objective validity only as a practical regulating principle of choices in a social environment.

Regarded mathematically, the Social Contract is an optimization principle for the motivational dynamic of human reasoning. As such, it contains a standard of optimization, a process of optimization, an Object that contains the idea of an object that is being optimized, and an ideal for a perfect instantiation of that idea. The principal task of chapter 12 is to understand the purpose that the regulation of pure Reason is aiming to realize and perfect. The principles of the regulation are covered in chapter 13.

Governance of civic interaction is a mark of the *Dasein* of a social compact in place between individuals. Indeed, to say that an interaction is civic is to say that its dynamics are governed by civics rules. Chapter 12 therefore begins by examining the nature of spontaneous governance as exhibited by co-determined actions of civic intercourse. The idea of governance understands the ideas of Order and Progress in determinations of social interaction. Social compacts implicated by governance of behavior are put in place by individuals for the purpose of Order and Progress in each person's self-development of his own *Personfähigkeit* (power of his person). The ways in which other people contribution to his self-perfection of *Personfähigkeit* is discussed. One asset-factor of *Personfähigkeit* that has been too much overlooked by science is the individual's stock-of-time. Chapter 12 defines this asset-factor. Stock-of-time is a necessary factor in a person's liberty to perfect his *Personfähigkeit*. It is therefore of greatest pertinence to the general Idea of the Social Contract.

Civil Communities and Societies form when individuals discover cooperation allows them to realize better returns on their individual investments of stock-of-time. Out of this discovery arises the phenomenon of *Volks*-society. Although the development of a *Volks*-society occurs in a continuum of adaptations, three general levels in its development can be distinguished: natural society; free society; and ideal society. Civilization is the process of developing and evolving to higher levels of *Volks*-society. When the teleological cause of *Volks*-society is sought, it is found to subsist in that peculiar species of judgmentation Kant called "taste." The human capacity to make judgments of taste is an aesthetic capacity, but the Critical significance of taste goes well beyond a narrow limitation to esthetics and appreciation of the arts. Taste links and binds together aesthetic feeling with moral judgment to produce a subjective unity in judgmentation.

Chapter 12 provides a summary analysis of taste and its role in social phenomena. It lies at the root of those behavioral characteristics psychologists have recently come to label exhibitions of emotional intelligence. The Critical analysis leads to the discovery of the formal *a priori* structure of the anthropological person. The character of a person who participates in a community and undertakes processes of Community-building is his character as an anthropological person.

In chapter 12 we finally come to the practical Critical context of the Idea of the Social Contract. It is: the Social Contract subsists in the process of perfecting *Volks*-society. Under-standing this process requires the elucidation of its synthetic principles. Chapter 13 takes up this task and culminates in the presentation of sixteen general principles governing social contracting. These principles provide for the real-explanation for the Social Contract *noumenon*.

Every person self-limits his own liberty of actions according to maxims of his own making. The phenomenon of Society emerges from the collective commonalities of these self-limitations by a population of individuals. This phenomenal emergence is the product of individuals agreeing to be bound by a convention of behavior, and this is their social compact. There is always a condition demanded by each individual for entering into a civil association with others and a term each individual must agree to meet as the price he pays to gain entry into the association. Rousseau stated the condition and the term but left the general statement of the problem of the Social Contract ill-posed, which is why he failed to solve the overall problem his idea presents.

The real solution of this problem must take into account the mental physics of Self-determination. In particular, the solution can only be stated with objective validity by means of a system of regulative principles. This system of principles provides the real-explanation of the Social Contract *noumenon*. Critical analysis of its Idea proceeds through a series of logical analytic divisions. At the first level we come upon the ideas of a corporate person (the body politic) and the idea of organizing principles of society. The first idea in turn divides into a matter of equilibrium and a form of *Personfähigkeit*. The second idea divides into a matter of approval of taste and a form of the anthropological person. Each of these four headings in turn is divided twice more (a 2LAR) into four headings each. The Idea of the Social Contract is thus analyzed as a fourth level analytic representation (4LAR) structure governed by sixteen general principles.

The eight principles of the corporate person are called the animating principles of the corporate person. The remaining eight are called the organizing principles of society. Chapter 13 provides the Critical deduction of these sixteen general principles. The 2LAR structure of *Personfähigkeit* and of the anthropological person were presented in the earlier chapters. Chapter 13 completes the set by first analyzing the 2LARs of the approval of taste and equilibrium. Each of the four major headings of the Idea of the Social Contract yields four regulative principles. Deduction of the animating principles of *Personfähigkeit* in regard to the corporate person is presented first. Next the animating principles of equilibrium in regard to the corporate person are presented. These principles are mathematical principles first derived by Grossberg in 1978. The organized principles of the anthropological person in regard to social organization form the *nexus* of Relation in the Idea of the Social Contract and these are presented next. After this, the organizing principles of approval of taste in regard to determinations of social organization are deduced.

The deductions of the principles proceeds by means of the fundamental acroams of Critical epistemology. These are none other than the transcendental Ideas of the Critical philosophy regarded from the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. The Critical deduction calls upon some very technical aspects of mental physics. Chapter 13 explains and develops these aspects to a sufficient level of clarity to allow for the application of the principles to social-natural science. Deep distinction in one's understanding of the principles, however, requires a more in-depth study of Critical metaphysics and the principles of mental physics. Reference citations in chapter 13 point the reader to where this level of expertise can be obtained.

The organizing principles confirm Rousseau's insight into the nature of the general terms and conditions of social contracting. Furthermore, the deduction of the principles leads to a deontological real-explanation of the idea of the general will of a body politic. This real-explanation is found to be a practical explanation in terms of a process of perfecting institutions of formal social governance.

Chapter 13 formally completes the achievement of the objective of this treatise. Applying the Idea of the Social Contract calls for a few brief additional remarks and observations in chapter 14. One lesson that emerges from the deduction of the principles is that scientifically correct under-standing of social-natural phenomena comes from a holistic understanding of divers contexts.

Such a holistic understanding is not promoted by deeply specialized traditional divisions of these topics. Such specialized research findings have no global benefit if the findings are merely set in juxtaposition with each other. For social-natural science to benefit humankind, a scientific syncretism must be achieved, and achieving it is the antithesis of specialization. Achieving it is the proper task of philosophy-as-science

Although specialization in a scientific division of labor should never be organized with a meat axe, there is still significant efficacy in having specialist vocations in science so long as the specialists cooperate in a scientific team. Bringing social-natural sciences into *Existenz* is better practiced in an interdisciplinary environment. Natural science can never be isolated from Critical metaphysics because both objective validity and discipline in any science requires that science to be well grounded by an applied metaphysic deduced from Critical metaphysics proper. The philosopher-as-applied-metaphysician is thus an indispensable member of the science team.

Chapter 14 runs through a brief summary of the main findings brought out in this treatise. Man has neither a social instinct nor a competitive instinct. Cooperation and competition are both dynamics emerging from the *homo noumenal* Nature of Duties-to-Self. Order and Progress in Society both benefit from improvement in the general level of social intelligence in the population making up that Society. The development of true social-natural sciences will be a boost to this improvement. Furthermore, there is an emerging urgency to bringing them into being because there are unmistakable signs of a developing crisis in the current state of our civilization, the likes of which have not been seen in the West since the days of the Roman Empire.

The mathematical methodology proposed in this treatise is called the social-chemistry model. Chapter 14 recapitulates the general schema of this method. One major issue facing social-natural science is the complexity issue. An organized and systematic methodology exists for dealing with this issue, and this methodology is recapitulated in chapter 14. The idea of Society is a mathematical concept and its proper mathematical expression is made using the mathematics of point set topology. The basic definition of this is provided in the chapter.

Chapter 14 sets out the practical real-explanation of social-natural sociology and of the Critical idea of civilization. The Critical explanation reveals, among other things, why Toynbee was unable to find a suitable definition for civilization. The real-concepts of civilization genesis, arrest, and disintegration are defined in terms of the evaluation of *Volks*-society. Likewise, the concept of primitive society is provided with the proper context for its real-explanation. The real-explanation of governance is recapitulated, as is the concept of government. These explanations ground the topic of social-natural political science. Basic real-concepts are also provided that establish the topic of social-natural economics.

There are a number of institutional practices that can beneficially promote the development and growth of a Society. Some of the more prominent ones are briefly discussed in chapter 14. One of the most efficacious of these is an institution of liberal public education. The meaning of this term is explained in the chapter. The phenomenon of mini-Communities is recapped. Its crucial importance in the development and sustainability of a Society is reviewed. It is proposed in this treatise that the institution of a system of Tocqueville governance is the proper means by which social sustainability in the presence of mini-Communities can be brought into congruence with the goal of perfecting human Society overall. With this recapitulation, this treatise is concluded. The remaining material collects the cited references into a single list, and provides an abridged glossary of technical terms used in this treatise.

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