Chapter 10 Social Compacting

§ 1. Society and Three Basic Forms of Social Relationships

There are three basic forms of social relationship, illustrated in figure 10.1, by which an individual, regarded as a social-natural atom, can coexist with that abstract social-macromolecule we generally call a society. All specific actual kinds of social relationships can be understood in terms of combinations in synthesis of these three basic forms. An understanding of these three relationships is central to understanding the Idea of the Social Contract.

To begin with, we must first deal with an idea I have already been making rather free use of since the beginning of this treatise, namely, the idea of "society." In doing so, I have been relying on an expectation that you have a generic notion of what a "society" is, and that this notion corresponds more or less closely to the standard dictionary definitions of that word. We have now reached the point where that will no longer suffice and we must obtain a crisp technical *Realerklärung* of that term. Let us begin by re-examining the typical contexts and connotations of the word "society." Webster's Dictionary provides nine pertinent definitions:

> **society**, *n*. [Fr. *société*; L. *societas*, from *socius*, a companion.]
>
> 1. partnership; participation; connection [Obs.]
> 2. a group of animals or plants living together under the same environment and regarded as constituting a homogeneous unit or entity; especially a group of humans regarded as forming a single community.
> 3. all people, collectively, regarded as constituting a community of related, inter-dependent individuals.
> 4. the system or condition of living together as a community; as, a primitive *society*.
> 5. company or companionship; as, I do not seek his *society*.
> 6. one's friends or associates;
> 7. any organized group of people joined together because of some interest in common.
> 8. the members of the wealthy, fashionable class.
> 9. the conduct, standards, activities, etc. of this class.

The last two definitions are the least pertinent to a technical understanding of the idea of society, but their presence gives us with an interesting hint concerning one effect of self-regard.



Figure 10.1: The three basic forms of social relationships. See text for the detailed discussion of these figures.

How do these definitions match up against the sociologist's definition of "society"? You might perhaps be a bit surprised to learn that sociologists have *no* technical definition for this term[1]. In the *Dictionary of Sociology* we find

> **society** The concept is a commonsense category in which 'society' is equivalent to the boundaries of nation states. While sociologists in practice often operate with this everyday terminology, it is not adequate because societies do not always correspond to political boundaries (as in 'Palestinian society'). Globalization, in particular, has exposed the limitations of traditional theories which equated society with the nation state. Some Marxists, in order to avoid this difficulty, substituted 'social formation' for 'society', but in practice these two terms are equivalent. It is more useful to argue that sociology is the analysis of the social, which can be treated at any level (e.g. dyadic interaction, social groups, large organizations or whole societies). [Abercrombie *et al*. (2006)]

Lack of clear definitions underlies a number of problems and issues of communications between different scientific fields. For example, historian Arnold Toynbee argued that a society should properly be defined as "a community of nations interacting with one another and in which are found common cultural features that enable us to define them as composing a cultural unit" [Toynbee (1946), pt. I, pg. 3]. We will call this a *Toynbee society*. A *Toynbee civilization* is a species of Toynbee society distinguished by some nominal convention from a *Toynbee primitive society*. Toynbee was never able to come up with any adequate distinguishing criterion for these ideas. He went on to remark,

> [A] human society is, in itself, a system of relationships between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another. A society . . . is a product of these relations between individuals, and these relations arise from the coincidence of their individual fields of action. This coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground. . . . Society is a 'field of action' but the *source* of all action is in the individuals comprising it. [*ibid*., pt. VII, pg. 211]

There is a degree of truth in this, but Toynbee's definition is not Critically correct. He goes too far, for example, by saying individuals "could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another." A great many hermits have managed over the years to get along quite well without being in any relationship with other human beings other than accidental ones. Toynbee is partially correct to say that a society is a system of relationships between human beings, but more than this is required to properly delineate the concept. For example, there is obviously a "system of relationships" in play between an armed robber and his victim, but we would not say they formed a "society" merely because they are in interaction with each other according to such relationships.

How, then, shall a society be defined? The deontological answer to this is mildly surprising in one way and not so surprising in another. Let us ask: defined by who? The psychologist defines this term as:

> **society** **1.** Inclusively, all of humankind taken as a whole. This meaning is rare these days. **2.** A collection of persons with: (a) a recognized set of norms, values, roles and institutions which forms the basis of a common culture; (b) a relatively well-circumscribed geographical region which they populate; (c) a sense of unity; and (d) a feeling of belongingness or relatedness to the cultural norms and customs in (a). **3.** Any organized, relatively long-lasting group of organisms of a species. This last definition, in a sense,

[1] As you become more familiar with more of the sciences, this will become less and less of a surprise. A curiously large number of sciences have no technical definition of their scientific topic. For example, computer scientists have no *technical* definition of the term "computer" and rely on "common sense."

> encompasses 2, but it is deliberately vague so as to include species other than *Homo sapiens*. That is, one might wish to state that bees have a society in sense 3 but surely not in sense 2. [Reber (2001)]

An economist, when speaking as an economist, does not bother with a definition of "society" at all. Neither does a mathematician *qua* mathematician or a physicist *qua* physicist. A biologist – in particular, a botanist or an ecologist – speaking *qua* biologist defines society as

> **society** (Bot.) Minor climax community with a consociation, arising as a result of local variations in conditions and dominated by species other than the consociation dominant. [Thain & Hickman (2004)]

To understand this last definition one must go elsewhere within Thain & Hickman and look up the definitions for climax community and consociation. The biologist's definition is stated in a way that makes something not quite so clearly presented in the others' definitions very vivid, namely, *these definitions are related to specific theories* used in these professional fields. This is so for Toynbee's definition, the psychologist's definition, and the biologist's definition. In the case of sociology, the lack of a specific nominal definition is symptomatic of the lack of an overall general theory that the community of sociologists as a whole has been able to coalesce around. Yet, as different as these different nominal definitions appear compared to one another, they all use the word "society" quite deliberately in order to also keep the concepts at least somewhat close to the Webster's definitions. Here is where the Webster's definition 8 above becomes pertinent – it, too, is a defined specialization of the term.

By noting that the specific specialized usages of the term are specialized *for use in specific contexts*, we arrive at an important Critical conclusion: ***society is the object of a mathematical concept formed by an individual and suitable for one or more of his specific purposes in formulating this concept***. We can be even more specific and say that ***this concept has its appearances of principal quantities represented by appearances of individuals***, typically other human beings. In a nutshell, a "society" is whatever a particular individual *thinks* it is. The concept is mathematical, is used in theorizing about its object, and the term "society" ***has no ontological significance whatsoever***. *It is in its* ***logical*** *essence a concept of relationships and associations*. A modern economist *qua* economist[2] or a physicist *qua* physicist has no need for the concept of "society" because none of his theories deal with any phenomena requiring its introduction for his purposes of speculation and theory-making.

Now that we have obtained this Critical *Realerklärung* of the idea of society, we can turn to the depictions in figures 10.1. The individual person depicted in these figures lives in an environment that includes at least one mathematical entity[3] that individual has conceptualized as being-a-society and which he represents in the specific by reference to particular other human beings. He understands himself to be involved in some set of interrelationships with this abstract thing he defines to be the society. It is important to note that the definition of what constitutes the society

[2] Here I put in the qualifier "modern" because the father of economics, Adam Smith, did *not* neglect the ideas of society or the social atom. If the science of economics is said to have begun with the publication of *The Wealth of Nations*, then it must also be said to have begun as a true social-natural science. Smith himself leaves us in no doubt of this, e.g., Smith (1776), pp. 1-3. Unfortunately, modern economics is no longer a social-natural science. That economics theory has no need for a definition of "society" testifies to the sad extent to which it has become a Platonic and largely unreliable mathematical non-natural science.

[3] Most individuals actually conceptualize more than one "society" and place themselves in relationships and associations with these divers objects. Note that *other* specific human beings are often regarded by the defining individual as belonging to *more than one* such society *at the same time*. Merely cataloging specific individuals does not serve to *define* a society but, rather, merely to *describe* one.

is peculiar to the specific individual who is defining it. In other words, we must always view the concept of "society" from the individual point-of-view of a specific person. A person's definition of what the society "is" is part of what I called his social-chemical isomerization in chapter 9.

Figure 10.1A depicts the case where the individual regards his association and relationships with society wholly in terms of practical rules standing under practical hypothetical imperatives of *Duties to himself with respect to his situation*. Society, he understands, is capable of affecting his person in some variety of ways, and he understands likewise that he can affect society. He regards all his relationships with the society in *a*social contexts, holds himself to be under no sort of obligation or commitment to others he places in that society *qua* their membership in that society, nor does he expect that society to hold itself to any commitments or obligations to him. We shall call this the ***outlaw relationship*** and designate the individual as an outlaw with respect to concepts of *mutual* relationships and associations between him and the society. It is particularly important to note that *this relationship is reciprocal*. To the people "in" the society, the individual is an outlaw *but to him the people "in" the society are also outlaws* insofar as any context of their *mutual* association or relationships are concerned. Figure 10.1A depicts the *Realerklärung* of ***the state of nature***.

Figure 10.1B depicts the logical opposite of this. Here the individual's ideas concerning his relationship and association with the society have been extended to include relationship concepts of *reciprocal Duties of the person with regard to the situation of another person* – specifically, another person who the individual identifies with the society. Furthermore, the individual likewise *identifies himself with that society*, i.e., he regards himself as belonging to it or being a member of it and regards other members of the society as holding-it-to-be-true that he too is a member of their association. We will call this relationship the ***citizenship*** relationship and call the individual a ***citizen*** of that society. The citizenship relationship is distinguished from the state of nature (outlaw) relationship by the citizen having: (1) constructed maxims and tenets in his practical manifold of rules; and (2) constructed some concepts of these in his manifold of concepts that he regards as concepts of *mutual* obligations and *reciprocal* duties. We first introduced these Critical ideas in chapter 6, where it was said that further elucidation of these ideas would be needed. We have come to that point in this chapter of this treatise. The *Dasein* of these tenets and maxims within the individual's manifolds is what is depicted by the additional green-colored third connection line depicted in figure 10.1B. This set of tenets and maxims constitutes the social bond between the individual (the citizen) and his macromolecule society.

It is important to stress that this social-chemical bond subsists only in the mental constructs of the citizen individual. A third person, observing a behavioral transaction between two other people, cannot immediately observe whether or not this bond is present within either of the observed individuals. Rather, he is forced to speculate about whether or not either or both of the people he is observing hold any such practical rules or conceptual ideas. Furthermore, it is in no way necessary that both individuals hold with the same tenets and maxims or, indeed, if the presence of such in one individual implies the presence of any such tenets or maxims in the other. Indeed, whether or not the citizen imputes the holding of any such tenets or maxims to the other person with whom he is interacting has an enormous practical bearing on the nature of their behavioral transactions and exchanges. The idea of citizenship has this peculiarity: it is at once the most *private* of mental objects but its concept is the most *public* of interpersonal relationship concepts. The *notion* of citizenship underpins the objective validity of all ideas of *civic* morality.

Figure 10.1C depicts the third formal relationship. This relationship can be regarded as a synthesis of the other two because it depicts a state of nature relationship in which the individual nonetheless endeavors to feign the appearance of a citizenship relationship between himself and the other people he regards as being part of the society. The individual has taken upon himself no tenets of reciprocal duty or obligation and his actions are all predicated under Duties to himself.



Figure 10.2: The granulated socialization structure.

This relationship is *anti*social in the typical connotations of that word. Because of this, and because the actions of the individual are deliberately designed to feign the appearance of being a citizen without any intention of taking up any duties of citizenship under a tenet of obligation, we will call this relationship the ***criminal relationship*** and we will call the individual a ***criminal*** with regard to the act of social compacting. The dual nature of the criminal relationship is depicted by the two additional connection lines in the figure – the one denoting the individual's expectations of the concrete benefits of citizenship relationships he hopes to obtain from the society, and the other denoting the maxims and tenets of Duty to himself upon which he actually bases his own actions in regard to the situation of others. Under this Critical *Realerklärung*, both Cyrus the Younger and Menon the Thessalian from chapter 2 are concrete examples of criminals in their relationships with Xenophon's Greeks. Artaxerxes, on the other hand, provides a concrete example of an outlaw with respect to relationships with Xenophon's Greeks, and theirs to him.

Figures 10.1 illustrate the basic mathematical forms of relationship, but the great majority of all actual empirical social relationships are composed as a complex mixture of these. Figure 10.2 illustrates this. We will call this social relationship organization ***granulated socialization***. Here the person regards every other person with whom he comes in contact as being, in some contexts, members of the abstract entity he defines as society-as-a-whole. However, he also makes further subdivisions in his logical characterizations of this society. With some, e.g. strangers, he holds himself to have no Relations of reciprocal Obligation or Duty aside from those he holds himself to *with respect to society-as-a-whole*. He is *locally non-bonded* to the sub-society. With others, he holds himself to more, and usually more specific, tenets and maxims of reciprocal duties and obligations in his relationships with the sub-society. This is denoted by the blue-colored connection line in the figure and constitutes *local bonding relationships*.

With still others, he holds himself to tenets and maxims of Duties *to himself* with respect to his situation in relationships with them but recognizes no *reciprocal* duties or obligations between himself and members of the sub-society except those he holds himself to with respect to society-as-a-whole. Further, he regard these other individuals as coexisting in some specific set of state-of-nature relationships with respect to himself *even as he holds they coexist in a citizenship relationship* with respect to society-as-a-whole. His particular tenets, maxims, and relationship ideas stand outside of or orthogonal to those he holds as defining the social compact between himself and society-as-a-whole. This is denoted by the red-colored connection line in the figure. This relationship therefore contains within it both *global* bonding and *local* anti-bonding concepts and rules. He does not necessarily regard the sub-society as criminals, but holds the relationship

to be something less than citizenship. These are *constrained outlaw relationships*. As you might suspect, this is a precarious and quasi-stable form of social relationship. It is the sort typical of the economics of what is usually mislabeled "free-market capitalism."

You might well be wondering how it is possible for an individual to achieve a state of equilibrium, however precarious, if the greater majority of his social relationships are as depicted by figure 10.2. The answer to this is not difficult. The person's idea of society-as-a-whole is a mathematical idea, has no ontological significance, and, therefore, has a degree of accommodative flexibility as he responds to disturbances with acts of ratio-expression in his motivational dynamic. Remembering that at root all meanings are practical, the typical adult concepts of society bear a strong resemblance to the young child's idea of "life" (which is another example of a *mathematical* idea). Piaget reports,

> What is of greater interest is to define the exact relationship which connects the notion of life to that of consciousness. As regards the signification of the two concepts the results are very clear. Two-fifths of the children questioned were found to be in the same stage in each series. These two-fifths were more advanced in their ideas concerning life, that is to say, they attributed life to fewer objects than they did consciousness. . . . In conclusion, therefore, the notion of consciousness seems to have a wider extension for the child than the notion of life.
>
> This result is particularly striking among the youngest. That is to say, children who are in the first or second stage when speaking of consciousness are generally found to be in a more advanced stage for ideas concerning life. The elder children, on the contrary, that is to say, those in the third or fourth stages, are usually in the same stage in the two parallel series. . . . [His] reflections on "life" accustom the child to regard the movements of nature as of different kinds, and this consideration of types (i.e. the type of spontaneous movement) comes gradually to influence his ideas on consciousness.
>
> It is evident from this that the explanation of movement is of extreme importance in the thought of the child. . . . For the time being, it need only be said that the extension of the notion of "life" seems to indicate the presence in the child's universe of a *continuum* of free forces endowed with activity and purpose. Between magical causality, according to which all things revolve around the self, and the dynamism of material forces the notion of life forms an intermediary link. Born of the idea that all things are directed towards an end and that this end presupposes a free activity as the means of attaining it, the notion of life gradually becomes reduced to the idea of force or of being the cause of spontaneous movement. [Piaget (1929), pp. 204-206]

As the young child uses the idea of "life" as an explanatory basis for a number of natural phenomena, so too many adults use the idea of "society" as an explanatory basis for a great many moral pronouncements, the justification of many laws, for setting objectives for government policies, for actions in business, etc. That society is a deontological and mathematical object is, consequently, a Critical factor of much importance for the Idea of the Social Contract.

§ 2. The Human Nature of Association Construction Within a Shared Society

In considering granulated socialization, there are two types of human objects the person is prone to conceptualize that have immediate pertinence to how he views his associations within a shared society. The first is the concept of another as a ***person***, the second the concept of another as a ***stereotype***. The former is an empirical concept of a specific real object (the other person) grounded immediately in direct experience. The latter is also an empirical concept, but it is in its logical essence a strictly *mathematical* concept in which abstraction is made of empirically real characteristics of specific individuals. The concept views others as abstracted entities (abstract people) nominally defined by the Ideal of an exemplar.



Figure 10.3: The three basic forms of bonding associations in a shared society.

In America the words "stereotype" and "stereotyping" have become habitually unpopular and tend to be presumed to be "bad things." A closely related idea is the concept of "labeling." In point of fact, neither the actions of stereotyping nor of labeling are necessarily bad or good. Without concepts of stereotypes and labeling judgments, it is impossible to even put forth a nominal description of a "society." The concepts can, of course, be misused in the sense of being applied maliciously, but applying a concept is an entirely different act from making a concept. For example, it is impossible to nominally define what an "American" is without stereotyping. It is likewise impossible to understand such ideas as "soldier," "baker," "plumber," or "politician" without the use of stereotyping. In the strict sense, the terms Driver, Expressive, Analytic, and Amiable are stereotypes. A stereotype is merely the Object of a logical class to which one assigns specific individuals on the basis of characteristics (whether perceived or presumed) the individual is regarded as having in common with the exemplar Object that operationally defines the stereotype Ideal. Whether you wish to admit it or not, *every human being stereotypes other human beings*. It is a natural act of determining judgment, and without it no higher social concepts would be possible for us at all because all such concepts require acts of abstraction. That is all a stereotype is: the object of an abstract *parástase*.

The act of stereotyping is necessary for the possibility of social contracts in societies where the size of the population exceeds the capacity of the individual to personally know every other person in that society. If you are a citizen of the tiny village of Deary, Idaho, it is possible for you to come to know every other person in Deary. If you are a citizen of Wisconsin, there is effectively no chance you will ever know every other citizen of Wisconsin. Yet if I tell you, "I am from Iowa," you will immediately stereotype me: "He is an Iowan." Don't be shy. I'm not offended when you do this. Although it will soon be forty years since I last lived there (these days, I am "an Idahoan"), I am rather proud to be an Iowan and stereotype *myself* as one.

It is important for us to understand the phenomenon of stereotyping because stereotyping is a factor involved in many social interactions. As an act of abstraction, the habits of stereotyping develop out of the individual's experience with forming personal social bonds and anti-bonds with other people. There are three basic mathematical forms of social bonding association. Figure 10.3 depicts these basic forms.

Figure 10.3A depicts the simplest and, in larger societies, most common form: the non-bonding association. Here Person 1 and Person 2 share no common personal bonds or anti-bonds and their association with each other is entirely indirect, mediated through their joint membership in a mutual society. If these persons come into experiential contact with each other, both will approach their social transactions on the basis of one or more stereotype Ideals.

Let us suppose three people arrive at my office at my university. For specificity, let us suppose they are a father, a mother and a high school aged son, and that they are visiting the campus as part of the son's process of deciding whether or not he will attend this university and/or major in the program in which I am a professor. They are strangers to me, and I to them. Our initial behavioral transactions are, therefore, going to hinge on stereotype concepts we each have that are pertinent to this social situation.

To each of them, I am "a professor" and they also regard me as partially representative of the academic environment students will experience at this university and in this program. The son's ultimate decision (and the parents' advice they will later offer him) is going to depend a great deal on how this social exchange is individually perceived by each of my three visitors. Eight times out of ten in my experiences of this sort, the very first operationalizations I perceive from them during the first seconds fall into Kiesler's taciturn class of Inhibited operationalizations. They don't know what to expect from me and most of my visitors apparently have formed both "good teacher" and "bad teacher" stereotypes. They know I am a teacher, but they don't know which kind yet. Making the dynamic even more interesting is that they each hold their own individual stereotypes of good and bad teachers, and these concepts are not necessarily the same.

For my part, the stereotypes I am employing are pretty obvious: they are "Mom," "Dad," and "prospective freshman." This means I begin our social transaction with a few prejudicial ideas concerning what sorts of things the father will think are important, what sorts of things the mother will think are important, and what sorts of things the son will think are important. These prejudices are based on my past experiences with this sort of situation. Dad, for example, is almost always interested in the question, "What kind of job prospects will my son have after he graduates?" Mom is almost always interested in the question, "Will you *really* care about my son?" The son's interests are almost always the most difficult to predict, plus his behaviors are partially conditioned by the presence of his parents. (Prospective freshmen who come to visit me without their parents almost always act very differently from those whose parents are with them). The son's initial operationalizations are most often Detached – possibly because he does not feel he has any control over the situation with his parents present. Experience has taught me that in most cases the son's immediate *first* interest is, "Are you gonna treat me like a kid or like an adult?" Most young people of this age tend to want to be recognized as an adult and as an equal.

Referring to the Kiesler categories in the interpersonal circumplex (figure 10.4), you will observe that the Kiesler "pull" reactions from these first operationalizations are the Mistrusting and the Cold operationalizations (which are the complementarity operationalizations). I never return these operationalizations in this situation because *I always seek to establish initial bonding associations of the type depicted in figure 10.3B*. The complementarity reactions are much more likely to pull anti-bonding associations from them. As my first operationalization, I'm going to give back a Friendly operationalization and try to "pull" them into that complementarity response. I immediately get up out of my chair, smile warmly, come around my desk, and give each of them a friendly handshake, always beginning with the son. I invite them into my office and to sit down with me at my *small* conference table. I sit down last, and I try to subtly steer things so that the son sits nearest to me. Typically the father also seats himself nearest to me, opposite his son at the table, and the mother seats herself opposite to me and next to her son at the other end of the table. The conversation*s* now begin (note the plural; typically I find myself involved in three quasi-independent ones because mother, father and son actually have different interests in play). The directions these take are piloted chiefly by the parents. I usually have to draw the son into a conversation – preferably one that eventually inclines him to exhibit Assured behaviors – because his parents' behaviors often incline him toward expressing Inhibited behaviors. I always keep my closest, yet covert, watch on how he is reacting to everything, while also reading the parents' reactions and making adjustments to them.



Figure 10.4: The complementarity circumplex.

Although every occasion of this type has its own unique differences, there is a rather reliable and somewhat ritual-like character these meetings tend to follow when all goes well. After all, how many different reasons are there for a family to come visit with a professor in his office when they have never met him or even heard of him before? My most immediate purpose in this situation is to move our interactions from being based entirely on stereotype to ones in which some beginnings are made in establishing *personal* relationships of the figure 10.3B type. My intent is to offer an initial social compact between the family and myself to seed the development of one between the family and my department and university. Establishing bonding associations is the first step because they will each form an Ideal of my school from their experience with me.

In describing this vignette, I have not concealed from you the deliberateness with which I go about determining my actions and behaviors. This will strike some as "disingenuous" because it is "not spontaneous." It is true this isn't unrehearsed; this is a situation with which I have had a lot of practice. It is not true that I am being disingenuous. I like meeting prospective students and their parents and it is a maxim of mine to make new friends, and avoid making new enemies, when the opportunity to do so is presented. I merely take advantage of the fact that I have been trained in managing interpersonal relationships and acknowledge that our common starting point in these situations is going to be initially based on stereotype concepts. Weighing in as an additional important factor is this: I am employed as a public servant and hold that a part of this necessitates taking on an Obligation to serve the interests of members of the public *as these are realized in the actual personal interests* of those I make it my Duty to serve in my public capacity as a professor and teacher. I do this best when the association is a *personal* bonding. In a nutshell, the tenets of my reciprocal Obligations are tied to the students – not to my Dean, not to my university president or provost, not to the State Board of Education, not to the governor of Idaho, and especially not to that ultimate mathematical abstraction called The People. I have never met an Abstract Person because there are none in the sensible world of real experience.

While I wouldn't say this tenet of mine is also held by each and every professor at my university, it is held by many of them – many enough that it might surprise you – and that is the principal reason I work here instead of at some other institution. Still, the vignette we have just

looked at is not the most common case involved in establishing the greater majority of personal associations. We must consider a broader scope of situations and also examine how anti-bonding associations come about. It is perhaps already obvious to you that the phenomenon of granulated socialization originates in large measure from these two types of association construction.

It is obviously impractical to analyze the formation of person-to-person bonding or anti-bonding at the lower levels of action determined by practical rules. Individuals' manifolds of rules are too complex and too varied from one person to the next at the lower levels. The individuality of personal experience is sufficient to account for the variability found among human beings. However, the mental physics of determination is a process common to all human beings who have not suffered some major brain trauma[4], and the commonality of the process ensures that some general principles apply to the construction of each person's manifold of rules. For this reason, some general empirical principles can be discovered when we examine the general character of social interactions set by structural and behavioral properties and manifestations of practical hypothetical imperatives. We will examine figure 10.3 from this basis.

The first thing we must note is that the vignette of the office visit I described earlier is not very typical of most social bonding or anti-bonding phenomena. Most people do not receive the specific training in managing interpersonal relationships or in empirical psychology that I exploit in the situations described by the vignette. Many people – I will estimate between 25% and 50% – develop interpersonal maxims and habits, similar to those I described, spontaneously as an outcome of their net personal experiences from childhood on without receiving any specialized training. Such self-developed maxims and habits tend to be found among people who the Wilson system categorizes as Expressives and Amiables. Indeed, it is their experience-driven and spontaneous self-development of interpersonal maxims and habits of this sort that leads to their classification as Expressives or Amiables in the first place. These are individuals we describe with such phrases as "he is a people person" or "people skills come naturally to him." The maxims governing ratio-expression in the motivational dynamic are those that tend to make their processes of semantic representing (refer to figure 10.5, the Weaver's model of the individual) highly attuned to "body language" and expressive cues provided by others during the course of social interactions. The schemes of ratio-expression they have developed are schemes that have provided successful reequilibrations from tension in their earlier experiences and have been reinforced by the frequency of these successes.

This, however, leaves probably 75% to 50% of the population who have not developed these kinds of maxims and ratio-expression schemes spontaneously to such a high level of development. Their successes in tension-reducing/eliminating reequilibration have come out of a different cast of experiences so that of them we do not say "people skills come naturally to him." In the Wilson classification system, Drivers and Analytics typify these cases. It is true that people



Figure 10.5: Weaver's model of the individual.

[4] e.g., stroke, viral encephalitis, psychological abuse, etc.



Figure 10.6: Empirical stages in the practice of rules and the cognizance of rules.

have various degrees of versatility in their interpersonal behavior schemes. People falling into the Wilson classifications of Driver or Analytic are not wholly without interpersonal skills. To think they completely lack such skills is as erroneous as to think an Amiable always lacks the needed techno-practical skills to pursue and achieve dead-matter vocational results. Nevertheless, the fact remains that roughly half or more of the population develop manifolds of rules in which their more deeply developed maxim systems are primarily non-interpersonal-interaction oriented. These individuals probably benefit more from training and education in personality psychology and managing interpersonal relationships than do those of the "Expressive" and "Amiable" type.

However, this in no way implies that "people persons" (Expressives and Amiables) do not likewise benefit from training-assisted development of their already considerable skills. This is because of the phenomenon of ***restaging*** in the practice of and cognizance of rules. Figure 10.6 repeats the earlier diagram of the empirical rule stages. ***Egocentrism***, in the technical connotation of that term, means presupposition that other people see the world as you do, that other people think like you do, and that experiential appearances to the contrary are ignored in semantic representing (type-α compensation behavior). Egocentric-stage rule practice is never completely abolished in the adult regardless of howsoever interpersonally sophisticated he might seem to others. Closely akin to egocentric-stage rule practice is ***moral realism*** in the cognizance of rules. The principal feature of moral realism is the basing of moral judgments (judgments of right vs. wrong, good vs. bad) on the objectivity of appearances without consideration of subjective intent. Thus an Amiable might regard a Driver as "villainous" because of the way he interprets the impact messages he semantically represents from the appearances of the Driver's actions; or the Driver might regard an Amiable as "lazy" or "unreliable" because of the way he semantically represents to himself suppositions about the Amiable's "attitude about accomplishing the task." Moral realism, like egocentrism, is never entirely eliminated in the adult because the structuring of the manifold of rules, like that of the manifold of concepts, is *conservative* and the rule structures and concept structures that underlie egocentric maxims and moral realism are laid down early in life. Piaget wrote,

> The child, like the uncultured adult, appears exclusively concerned with things. He is indifferent to the life of thought and the originality of individual points of view escapes him. His earliest interests, his first games, his drawings are all concerned solely with the imitation of what is. In short, the child's thought has every appearance of being exclusively realistic. [Piaget (1929), pg. 33]

Because morality *per se* is a mental object, the technical concept of morality is a mathematical concept (facet B) and for this reason Piaget was correct when he described morality as "the logic of actions." It is of course true that not every action or every thought is explicitly "moral" in appearance or is cognized in "moral terms." However, we must also recognize that all lower-level practical maxims ultimately stand under some one or more practical hypothetical imperatives, and no maxim can gainsay (contradict) the conditions imposed by these imperatives. It is not so much correct to say an individual's actions are moral or amoral as it is to say that the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason requires them to be "not-immoral."

What has this to do with egocentrism and moral realism? Let us consider what Wilson *et al*. had to say to the low-versatility Amiable or Expressive:

> Demonstrating your Versatility with Drivers – your ability to adapt your behaviors to make them feel more comfortable – requires behaviors on your part that accommodate their preference to be tell-directed on the assertiveness scale and task-directed on the responsiveness scale.
>
> What's the main strategy for moving your own behavior more to the tell-directed side of the assertiveness scale? Fewer questions, more answers. Tell more often. Ask less often.
>
> The main strategy for being more task-directed on the responsiveness scale will sound familiar: Focus on what must get done, with as little emotion as possible. Allow the Driver to take the lead on moving toward more personal topics. Task-directed people (the Drivers and Analytics) do talk about personal things, but usually after they feel that the task has been dealt with. Let Drivers decide when the task issues have been completed.
>
> People who are Amiable or Expressive try to influence with expression and feelings. Drivers often perceive this as the behavior of someone who is too emotionally involved in a situation. To influence Drivers, you must use a businesslike approach. You must be serious, but not appear cold or indifferent. [Wilson *et al*. (2011), pg. 118]

These sorts of behaviors do not "come naturally" to low-versatility Amiables or Expressives, any more than small-talk "comes naturally" to a low-versatility Driver or Analytic. The individual's *habitually satisficing* maxims of expression simply do not evoke these types of behaviors. Here we must remember that all human beings are satisficers, and maxims that have frequently succeeded by equilibration in a satisficing way in past experience become the maxims habitually provoked in present situations.

Egocentrism and moral realism work against the development of maxims of expression and underlie the development of the anti-bonding relationships in what Wilson *et al*. call "the poison relationships" (the Driver ↔ Amiable and Expressive ↔ Analytic interpersonal interactions). If what a computer scientist would call the "native mode" behaviors of two individuals are opposed to each other in one of these "poison relationships," the most common outcome of the interaction will be an anti-bonding outcome. Consistently "defaulting" one's interpersonal behaviors and operationalizations along egocentric rule practices is the hallmark character of low versatility.

Egocentrism and moral realism underlie another phenomenon that has been long noted by empirical psychology. Leary proposed measuring this phenomenon through methods that classify what he termed the ***levels of personality***. His methodology is worth quoting in detail:

> The fact that behavior exists at more than one level of awareness has been intuitively recognized for centuries. The discovery of unconscious motivation – in the sense of a formal theoretical statement – was first made by Sigmund Freud. This was an epochal landmark in the study of personality and human nature. . . .
>
> The concept of levels destroys the simple, unidimensional notions of behavior determined

by chains of stimulus-response reactions. All the major learning theories since Freud, however cognitive and physicalistic they may strive to be, have by necessity taken into account the multidimensional quality of motivation. . . . Accompanying the early positive rewards of the "unconsciousness theory" is a series of premature, intuitive concepts and logical fallacies. To deal with some of these illogical procedures, we have stated in the fifth working principle[5] that any statement about human behavior must indicate the level of personality data to which it refers.

When this postulate was applied to the varied mosaic of miscellaneous protocols obtained from the pilot study cases, the first task required was to classify them into discrete levels. The questions then became: How many levels of personality should be employed? What are they? And how shall they be defined?

Any solutions to these problems must be arbitrary, formal decisions. That is, we must assume no divinely instituted or platonically ideal number of personality dimensions. In selecting the number of levels, we are limited on the broad side by the practicalities of the empirical method and on the narrow side by theoretical adequacy, that is . . . if we have too many levels, the permutations and combinations become unwieldy. If we have too few, important nuances become lost by being compressed into general categories.

After reviewing the many types and sources of personality data, a classification into five levels was found to be the most effective. The decision is a notional procedure which seems to meet the functional criteria of the present time. When we say that it is convenient to conceive of five levels of personality, we do not imply that there is "really" or "eternally" such a structural division. . . .

These five general levels of personality data are: I. the Level of Public Communication; II. the Level of Conscious Description; III. the Level of Private Symbolization; IV. the Level of Unexpressed Unconsciousness; and V. the Level of Values. These levels are defined in terms of the operations which produce the pertinent data. That is, the source of the data automatically determines the level of classification. . . .

Level I (Public Communication) consists of the overt behaviors of the individual as rated by others along the sixteen-point circular continuum[6]. These judgments are made by trained observers or by naive fellow subjects who observe the subject in interpersonal situations. They rate his interpersonal impact as it appears to them. . . . Level I data is objective or public – rather than private or subjective. It may or may not agree with the subject's own view of the situation. . . . The meaning of the Level I rating . . . depends on the cultural context and the category of the rater. . . .

Level II (Conscious Descriptions) includes the verbal content of all the statements that the subject makes about the interpersonal behavior of himself or "others." His descriptions of himself and others are obtained from a variety of sources – conversations, therapy protocols, autobiographies, check lists. They are then rated along the same sixteen-point circular continuum. We are interested here in the subject's reported perceptions of himself and his interpersonal world. We are not interested at this level in the consensual accuracy of these perceptions or in the potential deeper meanings. We are concerned only with the phenomenological field – the way in which the subject reports his view of self and world. . . .

Level III (Private Symbolization) consists of projective, indirect fantasy materials. These data come from a variety of sources – dreams, fantasies, artistic or autistic productions, projective tests – which elicit imaginative expressions. The interpersonal themes of all these symbolic expressions are rated by two or more trained raters along the sixteen-point circular continuum. We thus possess a technique for systematically measuring the indirect autistic data of personality in terms of the same interpersonal variables which we use to

[5] refer to chapter 9 for the table of Leary's working principles.
[6] in other words, the Leary circumplex model.

> categorize the public or conscious aspects of behavior. . . .
>
> *Level IV (the Unexpressed Unconscious)* is defined by the interpersonal themes which are systematically and compulsively avoided by the subject at all the other levels of personality and which are conspicuous by their inflexible absence. Here we refer to those activities which are consistently and deliberately "not present" in the personality profile. These "unexpressed" aspects of personality are as yet unexplored. . . . The definition of Level IV is a problem not yet solved. . . .
>
> *Level V (Values)* consists of the data which reflect the subject's system of moral, "super-ego judgments," his ego ideal. We refer here to interpersonal traits and actions that the subject holds to be "good," proper, and "right" – his picture of how he should be and would like to be. These idealized interpersonal themes are obtained in the same manner as the conscious descriptions of Level II. We single out from interview, free association, check list, and questionnaire the expressions which concern his value-feelings. These are rated and scored according to the sixteen-point circular continuum. [Leary (1957), pp. 75-80]

As a doctrine of method, Leary's mathematical methodology can scarcely be faulted. It is an epistemology-centered method and has very little corruption by ontology-centered pseudo-metaphysical prejudices. Its classification criteria are reasonably concise (other than for the Level IV issues he stated). If there is a shortcoming to it, it is the absence of set-membership methods of mathematics in the analysis. Leary and his colleagues, however, cannot be faulted for this. The invention of fuzzy logic (the forerunner of set membership) by Lofti Zadeh was still several years away when Leary wrote these words, and the systematic development of set membership methods was two decades away. There do not appear to be any major problems in incorporating set membership into Leary's doctrine when empirical psychology at last sees fit to revisit the method.

There are two particularly important things I want us to note here within the rather long quotation just give. The first is brought out by Leary's distinction between Level I and Level II data. This distinction reveals quite vividly the impact of adult egocentrism in semantic representing. The second is the inclusion of Level V in the Leary methodology, because this level speaks directly to the role moral judgmentation plays in interpersonal phenomena.

The logical essence of good scientific methodology is the patient, "layer by layer" approach to the study of natural phenomena. This is what engineers often call "peeling the onion," but as a scientific dictum it dates back to Aristotle:

> When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.
>
> The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.
>
> Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sense-perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it like parts. [Aristotle, *Physics*, I. 1 ($184^{a}10$-$184^{b}10$)]

Although he was a frequent and harsh critic of Aristotle, Aristotle's dictum was retained by Bacon in his most important work on scientific methodology:

> Labor is well and usefully bestowed upon the anatomy of organized bodies, such as those of men and animals, which appears to be a subtle matter and a useful examination of nature. The species of anatomy, however, is that of first sight, open to the senses, and takes place only in organized bodies. It is obvious, and of ready access, when compared with the real anatomy of latent conformation in bodies which are considered similar, particularly in specific objects and their parts . . . A separation and solution of bodies, therefore, is to be effected . . . by reasoning and true induction, with the assistance of experiment, and by a comparison with other bodies, and a reduction to those simple natures and their forms which meet and are combined in the compound . . . This method will not bring us to atoms . . . but to the real particles such as we discover them to be. . . . [The] more inquiry is directed to simple natures, the more will everything be placed in a plain and perspicuous light, since we transfer our attention from the complicated to the simple, from the incommensurable to the commensurable, from surds to rational quantities, from the indefinite and vague to the definite and certain . . . The investigation of nature is best conducted when mathematics are applied to physics. [Bacon (1620), Bk. II, VII-VIII, pp. 116-119]

Successful and fecund science has followed this dictum in physics from Newton up through the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, in chemistry from the post-Lavoisier era of the 18th century, and in biology from the post-Bernard era of the mid-19th century.

For purposes of our present inquiries, "that which is clearer to us" insofar as social and interpersonal behaviors originating from the manifold of rules, ratio-expression and judgmentation is concerned, is discovered through analysis of behaviors and expressions that reflect the individual's logic-of-actions, i.e., his practical hypothetical imperatives and the privately Self-determined "moral code" he follows. This is because all lesser tenets and maxims are contained under the conditions set by the practically unconditioned practical imperatives. Yet before we inquire into the Nature of imperative structuring, we must first look at the *homo noumenal* aspect of being a human being that underlies all imperative: Self-determination.

§ 3. Freedom and Self-Determination

The fundamental Critical distinction between a living being and dead matter is the *Kraft*[7] (power) of the former to determine its own accidents of appearance, i.e. *to be the unconditioned cause of its own actions* and to take these actions according to laws of its own appetitive power. For dead matter, change in its appearances (what the ancient Greeks called *kinesis*) is determined through a physical chain of causality & dependency in which no empirically *unconditioned* cause can ever be discovered. Aristotle's famous "unmoved primer mover" was posited as a failed attempt to establish the *Existenz* of such an unconditioned first-cause. The attempt led, as it does in all ontology-centered systems of metaphysics, to the necessitated positing of some sort of divine agent – either a god[8] or nature-itself-as-a-god[9] or, as in some recent speculations of physicists, mathematics-as-a-god[10]. But such an agent is always a supernatural agent and, as such, has no place in science. The Critical *Realerklärung* of ***life*** is one of the deepest-lying conclusions of Critical metaphysics. For each one of us, as a living human being, our personal knowledge of our own *Dasein* – the ***I*** of transcendental apperception – is the absolute primitive ground upon which all the rest of our particular ontological ideas and notions depend for their objective validity. We shall not further pursue this metaphysical topic in this treatise; it is already and

[7] In the terminology of Critical metaphysics from the practical Standpoint, *Kraft* is the notion of the ability of a Critical substance to determine its own accidents of appearance [Kant (1783), 29: 770-771].
[8] e.g. Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Newton, Hegel, some present-day physicists
[9] e.g. Aristotle, the Stoics, many present-day physicists and other scientists
[10] e.g. a "vacuum fluctuation" posited to *be the cause* of the universe in some Big Bang speculations.

properly covered in Wells (2009) and Wells (2006). I bring it up here because it is the metaphysical backdrop for the phenomenon of human Self-determination.

When we regard a human being as *homo noumenon*, we are regarding him in terms of what we earlier saw Bloom call "that part of man which is not body." Bloom avoided the word, but the most frequent term for this "part of man which is not body" is, historically, "soul." It is a word Kant used quite frequently in his lectures and writings on metaphysics; but what did he mean by it? Kant himself answers us:

> Soul is the object of inner sense. . . . (Soul is called *pneuma*[11], but that means a wholly free and pure spirit; in proper ordinary circumstances it is called *psyche*[12] . . . The word soul properly means the interior of a subject-matter, e.g. with a feather, cannon)[13]. My thoughts are not an object of outer sense because, among other things, they have no figure. Of myself I have the body as an object of the outer senses. But this is to be distinguished from soul. Its determinations are quite different because the form of its intuition is different. The form of intuition with bodies is space, with soul [it is] time, for thoughts are not in space. [Kant (1783), 29: 876]

The "part of man which is not body" has long been a major source of controversy in ontology-centered empirical psychology. James, for example, wrote,

> Many readers have certainly been saying to themselves for the last few pages: "Why on earth doesn't the poor man say *the Soul* and have done with it?" Other readers, of anti-spiritualist training and prepossessions, advanced thinkers, or popular evolutionists, will perhaps be a little surprised to find this much-despised word now sprung upon them at the end of so physiological a train of thought. But the plain fact is that all the arguments for a 'pontifical cell' or an 'arch-monad' are also arguments for that well-known spiritual agent in which scholastic psychology[14] and common-sense have always believed. And my only reason for beating the bushes so, and not bringing it in earlier as a possible solution of our difficulties, has been that by this procedure I might perhaps force some of these materialistic minds to feel the more strongly the logical respectability of the spiritualist position. The fact is that one cannot afford to despise any of these great traditional objects of belief. . . . I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained. [James (1890), vol. 1, pp. 180-181]

James' point was that the theses put forth by scientific materialists to argue for materialism were precisely the same logical arguments that justified introducing the idea of a supernatural soul. The scientific position James took on the matter was "we just don't know the answer to this." From any metaphysical or pseudo-metaphysical starting point, the question of materialism vs. "soul theory" is *scientifically undecidable*. The situation is quite clear when we adopt epistemology-

[11] An Aristotelian term. In Greek the word meant "breath," as in "breath of life."
[12] Kant also paired the German word *Seele* (soul) with the Latin word *anima*, which, among its other connotations, means "the life of an individual" and is the root of the words "animal" and "animate." It really is uncharacteristically poor terminological practice on his part (which I suspect has something to do with Kant's theocentric bias), but it is from these usages that mental physics takes its mathematical term *psyche* for the faculty of animating principles in the Organized Being model [Kant (1773-79), 15:414-415].
[13] In German, the cavity of a gun, the inner strand of a cable, and many other similar things are called "a soul" (*Seele*). We have similar colloquial usages in English, such as, he is the *soul* of discretion. We likewise use the phrases "body and mind" and "body and soul" as synonymous phrases. So does Kant.
[14] Scholastic psychology was the only kind of "psychology" that existed in Kant's day. His position on it was that it was not and could never be a science. Okinawa received less of a shelling in World War II than scholastic psychology received from Kant in the 1780s and 90s.

centered metaphysics because here we recognize that the notion of "soul" has no objectively-valid ontological interpretation. Critical metaphysics and mental physics treat the notion as a purely mathematical concept, belonging to Slepian's facet B only as a secondary quantity, beyond the horizon of possible sensuous experience, and therefore *formally undecidable* in any *ontological* context. It was James' own ontology-centeredness that prevented him from offering any scientific resolution of the "body-and-soul" problem. All that he could productively accomplish was to demonstrate that the pseudo-philosophy of scientific materialism cannot provide any ontological answers to the "mystery" either. As Claude Bernard had pointed out, sometimes a scientist is *professionally required* to say, "I don't know," and that is what James did. By introducing "soul" into *The Principles of Psychology*, James was exhorting his fellow scientists to have the discipline to follow Newton's dictum:

> Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. . . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. [Newton (1726), pp. 442-443]

As *homo phaenomenon* a human being is a dead-matter object of the physical sciences. But these by themselves are inadequate to explain all of the phenomena of being a human being and, in particular, cannot offer *any* explanation of the *Existenz* of those facts of experience we call "mental phenomena," i.e., the phenomenon of mind. The human being as *homo phaenomenon* belongs to facet A, as *homo noumenon* he belongs to facet B. These ontologically inseparable aspects of being a human being are logically joined together at principal quantities of Critical mathematics in accordance with Margenau's Law because *homo noumenal* explanation requires a different form of causality & dependency than *homo phaenomenal* explanation – namely what Kant called the causality of freedom and what Piaget called psychological causality.

The causality of freedom refers to the individual's capacity for freedom of choice. Freedom of choice is the autonomy of appetitive power in regard to it not being strictly bound by sensuous stimuli and impulses. Kant wrote,

> All representations refer to the object as Object of knowledge, but they can also be regarded as acts, and then the ground of the production of the same Object lies in the representation. Herewith then corresponds the *capacity of the soul to become, through the representation of an object itself, the cause of the actuality of the object*, = and this is the appetitive power, which one can just as validly determine as *causality of the representation in regard to its Object*. [Kant (1794-95), 29:1012-1013]

The mathematics of representation and of mental acts belong to the logical division of *nous*, and the mathematical principles binding these *homo noumenal* acts to *homo phaenomenal* actions are the animating principles of *psyche*.

There is nothing so far in this that relates to ideas of morality other than the mathematical connotation of morality as subsisting in a *logic* of actions. One expresses psychological causality in terms of a *"because"* factor and never in terms of efficient causes in ontology. This is an immediate consequence of the fundamental acroam governing the process of reflective judgment in *nous*, namely, the principle of formal expedience in Nature. Indeed, one finds empirically that very small children base all of their earliest explanations of phenomenal events on notions of psychological causality & dependency – i.e., young children think things do what they do because they are, in a sense, morally bound to do them. It is not difficult to understand this because the child's empirical notion of causality & dependency arises from the point where he draws that first

crucial objective distinction between "me" and "not-me." Piaget's studies amply demonstrate that this notional division is the outcome of the fact that the child learns that his body responds to his wishes and intentions, whereas "not-me" objects do not. Psychological causality & dependency is the *first* form of causality & dependency the child knows in his experience, and he draws an inference of analogy between his own actions and those of "not-me" objects:

> Causality, like the whole of reality, is at first teeming with subjective elements. No distinction is drawn between motivation and physical causality . . . or between muscular and manual activity and mechanical action . . . or again between the influence of mind on body or of the body on itself, and the influence of external objects on each other. . . .
>
> The second process is peculiar to causality: it is the constitution of temporal series. What strikes one most about the child's more primitive forms of causality is the immediate and almost extra-temporal character of the reflection. . . . Not a thought is given to the question of distance or of how long the action would have to take in traveling from cause to effect. Joined to this relative immediacy is a remarkable absence of interest as to "how" phenomena occur. Thus, according to the very youngest children, the pedals [of a bicycle] make the wheels go around without being in any way attached to them, simply by influence. . . . There is no contact, during the primitive stages, between cause and effect. [Piaget (1930), pp. 267-268]

These characteristics of childish thinking in regard to physical causality & dependency are precisely the same as those required by Critical metaphysics in regard to the causality of freedom. I remember that when I was a three year old, riding my tricycle-car on the sidewalk, to me sidewalks were "little streets" and it made perfect sense to me that there had to be big streets for grownups and little streets for little kids, just as it made sense to me that grownups' cars had to be driven on big streets and little-kids' cars had to be driven on sidewalks – a rule of nature I never once questioned even for a moment "because that's what big streets and little streets are for." The possibility that tricycles could also be driven in the street never once entered my mind. My universe in those days was very neat and tidy that way.

The expressed combination of egocentrism and moral realism early in life is reflective of the earliest formation of a practical rule structure centered on practically hypothetical imperatives of Obligations-to-Self.[15] These are followed later by the development of theoretically categorical and hypothetical imperatives of Duties-to-Self in the early manifold of concepts. Neither Obligations-to-Self nor Duties-to-Self involve reciprocity between the person and another individual. The child can accurately be said to be "asocial" early in life and, in relationships with others, to be a little outlaw. Piaget thought that the child's early and more or less uncompromising tendency to obey its parents were indicative of what he called the "unilateral respect" a child feels toward his caregivers, typically his parents, other adults, and older children [Piaget (1932), 90-94]. Critical analysis shows that this interpretation is not quite correct. This point is one of those relatively rare instances where Piaget allowed some ontology-centered presuppositions to sneak into his theory.

The idea of respect that is in play in the cycle of judgmentation in these early experiences is that of Self-respect. The little child exhibits the literal obedience to and unquestioning trust of his parents that's Piaget's studies document *because* his earliest experiences find equilibrium in a constructed practical rule structure that *makes* this unquestioning obedience and trust an Obligation-to-Self with regard to his situation. Furthermore, *disobedience, temper tantrums, and whining arguments are also manifestations of Obligations-to-Self*. A Critical analyst concludes that, on the topic of the development of moral judgments, Piaget thought the young child is more passive-submissive than he actually is.

[15] Obligation (*Verbindlichkeit*) is an overall orientation of judgmentation in the determination of appetites.

Although he correctly deduced that the child's *conceptualization* of rules follows after the development of earlier motor habits, Piaget's notion of "unilateral respect" appears to miss the fact that there is a degree of truth in the old aphorism, "Spare the rod and spoil the child." Judging from his writings, Piaget and his wife did seem to be aware that there is also truth in a new aphorism, "Overuse the rod and criminalize the child." (Here it is important to recognize that "the rod" does not have to be a physical one and psychological "rods" sting far worse than a hickory switch). Ignore the first aphorism and the child's social development process will keep him an outlaw. Ignore the second and it will incline him to criminality. (I use both terms, outlaw and criminal, in the strict context of their Critical definitions as figures 10.1 depict).

For centuries many social theorists have held that the family – parents plus children – is the fundamental social unit. In an important context, this is not necessarily correct with regard to children if the term "social unit" is interpreted to *only* mean relationships such as that illustrated in figure 10.1B. *Citizenship*, whether it be only family-citizenship or citizenship in a broader social context, is *practically* defined by the person *binding himself* to rules of reciprocal Obligation in Relations of himself to the situation of others. Without such reciprocal Obligation and concepts of reciprocal Duties that go with it, there is no social compact and no *socialized* unit can properly be said to *actually* exist. The child instead finds himself in a state-of-nature environment in which Duties-to-Self are all that he develops and interpersonal interaction maxims are based on rules of prudence and pragmatic rules of Self-interest. If the child is to *make himself* a family-citizen, his early experiences must be such as to seduce him into Self-determinations by which he leads himself to Self-binding construction of practical rules of reciprocal Obligations and conceptualization of reciprocal Duties in his Relation with the other members of the family. It is important here to stress that the child *and the child alone* will determine whether or not he binds himself to reciprocal Obligations and Duties. *You* cannot place *someone else* under any Obligation or Duty whatsoever. The power to Self-bind in Obligation and Duty inheres strictly in the individual himself and is a product of his motivational dynamic in judgmentation.

Most parents who others in their common society regard as "good parents" appear to understand, at least intuitively, that their parenting role involves a large degree of practical social psychology. Very few parents ever receive any education or training to prepare them for this role, but throughout history most societies have provided external aids and assistances to parents. This has been, for example, one of the historically important roles filled by religions and churches. A society's common myths, fables and nursery rhymes likewise function as aids and tools that assist parents in this practice. I would say that, on the whole, the importance of these latter tools is greatly underestimated and goes too unappreciated in many Western societies today. There is no practical benefit to giving a small child a "lesson" he is not yet capable of understanding – and all "lessons" fall into this category that are based on abstractions and neglect concrete imagery that provokes *affective* judgments by the child. A little child is not very likely to understand one of Solomon's proverbs but is much more likely, at least within Western societies, to affectively assimilate a nursery rhyme such as

> Taffy was a Welshman; Taffy was a thief;
> Taffy came to my house and stole a piece of beef.
> I went to Taffy's house, Taffy wasn't in;
> Taffy came to my house and stole a silver pin.
> I went to Taffy's house; Taffy wasn't home.
> Taffy came to my house and stole a marrow bone.
> I went to Taffy's house and Taffy was in bed;
> So I picked up a poker and hit him in the head. – Anonymous, *Taffy Was a Welshman*

There is no particular shortage in present-day America of people who make it their duty to tell parents how to raise their children. This habit seems particularly pronounced among some people

who style themselves so-called "liberals." It also takes no particularly keen powers of observation to note that a great many parents reject their social formulae with a degree of hostility. Such a reaction, for example, is not too uncommon among those who style themselves so-called "conservatives." The Critical explanation of this phenomenon is not particularly obscure: A great many of these parenting precepts are mired up to the axles in adult moral realism and the more vocal protagonists exhibit clear manifestations of adult egocentrism. A significantly noticeable fraction of socio-political activists exhibit manifestations of low-versatility personality style within this particular social context. Because there is no objective validity in the proposition that there is some one universal moral code, and because every person formulates for him- or herself a private moral code inherent in their manifold of rules, it is not surprising to a Critical analyst that bitter social controversies would ensue.

When (and if) a person first formulates and binds himself to a rule of reciprocal Obligation, this action arises strictly from rules of Obligation-to-Self that person has previously made. Kant was correct to characterize Duty-to-Self as practically prior to reciprocal Duty. To expect any person to formulate and bind himself to a reciprocal Obligation utterly lacking any practical connection to practical Obligations-to-Self *in the formulation and practical judgmentation* of such a rule is to ignore one of the fundamental factors of human Nature. In this context, Ayn Rand and her little band of so-called "objectivists" were correct to call attention to and emphasize the "selfish factor" in socialization phenomena, despite the fact that this movement produced more or less childish theories that are in the main Critically unsound and ungrounded [Rand (1964, 1967)].

Critical analysis of formulation and Self-binding to reciprocal Obligations and Duties uses a mental physics construct called ***the power of a person*** (*Personfähigkeit*) [Wells (2010), chap. 7, pp. 260-267], [Kant (1793-4), 27: 593-602; (1797) 6: 443-444]. The power of a person is *the organization of his capacities for realizing (making actual) or attempting to realize the objects of his appetites*. These organized capacities are arranged under the usual four headings as:

> **Quantity –** the person's physical power, which subsists in the capacities of his body;
>
> **Quality –** the person's intellectual power, which subsists in his knowledge, intelligence, and judgment;
>
> **Relation –** the person's tangible power, which subsists in his stock of material personal goods, fungible skills, and personal stock-of-time available to him for using them; and
>
> **Modality –** the person's persuasive power, which subsists in his ability to communicate his thoughts and ideas to other persons sufficiently to gain their consent or cooperation.

A person uses the net combination of these abilities to recover from all the disturbances to equilibrium he experiences. Mental physics tells us that equilibrium is marked by establishment of a stable *limit cycle* of behavior – what people commonly call a "routine" [Wells (2009), chap. 4, pp. 159-162]. In adults this limit cycle can become very complicated and might not close and repeat for hours, days, or even longer after it is established. (Think of your normal weekly work routine). Any break or change in the limit cycle behavior marks the perception of a disturbing event and can indicate the presence of Critical tension felt by the individual[16]. Let us recall Leary's first working principle and main hypothesis, namely that all the social, emotional, interpersonal activities of an individual can be understood as attempts to avoid anxiety or to establish and maintain self-esteem. The act of forming an interpersonal bonding association with

[16] A state of tension is not inferred when some event is responded to by a compensation that re-establishes the equilibrium cycle without provoking scheme accommodation in the motivational dynamic. Saying "Good morning" to a stranger you pass in a hallway is a simple learned type-γ compensation.

another person is generally not a "routine" and involves a change in behavior pattern of the sort that manifests a disturbance and re-equilibration. Let us therefore examine in more detail Leary's terms "anxiety" and "self-esteem." Reber's Dictionary defines anxiety as:

> **anxiety 1**. Most generally, a vague, unpleasant emotional state with qualities of apprehension, dread, distress, and uneasiness. Anxiety is frequently distinguished from fear by its being often (*usually* say some, *always* insist others) objectless, whereas fear assumes a specific feared object, person or event. **2**. In theories of conditioning, the term is used to connote a secondary (or conditioned) drive that functions to motivate avoidance responding. Thus an avoidance response is assumed to be reinforced by a reduction in anxiety. **3**. In Freudian theory, anxiety is treated as 1, with the additional assumption that it acts as a signal that psychic danger would result were an unconscious wish to be realized or acted upon.

Critically, the "negative connotations" of "anxiety" that are called out in these definitions are not consistent with Leary's first principle because not all interpersonal activities necessarily involve "an unpleasant emotional state with qualities of apprehension, dread, distress, and uneasiness" or a conditioned response (learned behavior) that "motivates avoidance responding." As a specific example we can consider a typical day in my office at the university. My typical day bears some resemblance to a train or bus depot where neither trains nor buses arrive or depart according to any noticeably fixed schedule. I usually have a sporadic stream of visitors coming and going most of the day – advisees with problems, students with questions, other faculty members, university administrators, university staff people, and unexpected visitors from outside the university. Every one of these situations involves some social interaction and it is very, very rare that I experience anything that bears the least resemblance to "anxiety" as Reber defines it. The earlier example of the "visitors vignette" illustrates a situation where there is a marked break in my office routine (visitors like these usually do not come more than a few times a year), but my response is merely a learned type-γ compensation – temporarily suspending my routine for the duration of the visit – and I am quite certain that neither any unpleasant emotional state nor avoidance response is involved in these situations on my part.

What about "establishing or maintaining self-esteem" then? Reber's Dictionary defines this term as:

> **self-esteem** The degree to which one values oneself. Note that although the word *esteem* carries the connotation of high worth or value, the combined form, *self-esteem*, refers to the full dimension and the degree of self-esteem (high or low) is usually specified. Contrast [this] with self-appraisal, from which the evaluative component is missing.

I don't deny that I like having people like me or that it bothers me if it seems they do not. But I never think my own self-esteem is riding on any particular social interaction event nor do I look at these situations as an opportunity to increase my own evaluated self-worth or as a situation that threatens to decrease it[17]. My point in all this is merely that there seems to be strong empirical evidence for casting doubt on Leary's fundamental hypothesis. Contrariwise, the mental physics explanation – seeking to establish or maintain a state of equilibrium – empirically appears to fit all social interaction events that I have so far had the opportunity to Critically examine. *All* human non-autonomic actions are regulated according to the overriding formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. This is a Critical acroamatic principle.

Furthermore, embedding field theory does not produce any logico-mathematical requirement

[17] This self-report is, of course, a Level II datum in Leary's system. However, Leary's hypothesis is one that makes a statement about Level II causation and so self-report data is pertinent to it.

for learned responses to be necessarily attended only the negative connotations attached to anxiety or avoidance. Grossberg has presented a family of embedding field schemata for modeling various sorts of conditioned responses [Grossberg (1972a, b)]. Although Grossberg's 1972 papers were specifically addressed at "punishment and avoidance" conditioning, in point of fact this specialization is due merely to a psychological interpretation of what his unconditioned stimuli represented (feelings of *Unlust*). The same embedding field networks work equally well if the unconditioned stimuli are oppositely regarded (feelings of *Lust*). He went on to show how various types of compensation response ("planning") networks can be constructed using these earlier embedding field networks as subcomponents [Grossberg (1978)]. He was furthermore able to extend the basic mathematical ideas contained in these embedding fields to complex situations involving many individuals in full or partial interaction with each other [Grossberg (1980)]. Grossberg later commented on this last extension,

> [Grossberg (1980)] summarizes some of the new mathematical and physical ideas about competition[18] that have emerged during the past eight years. Each of these ideas can be expressed in several ways. For example, every competitive system induces a decision scheme that can be used to analyze its global dynamics. Otherwise expressed, you learn a lot about a competition by keeping track of who is winning it! Otherwise expressed again, you can understand more about certain non-equilibrium systems by measuring where they change fastest rather than where they achieve equilibrium. . . . This article suggests that mass action competition is a universal design principle in its own right, which solves its own universal environmental problem and can be approached by its own unified mathematical method. . . . Thus the mathematics makes a statement about systems which induce decision schemes whether or not they are competitive. [Grossberg (1982), pg. 379]

To make proper use of an encompassing mathematical methodology it is a *sine qua non* that the proper psychological and mental physics interpretations be applied to the system under study prior to carrying out any mathematical analysis. That is what we are undertaking to do here. The first establishment of social bonding (or anti-bonding) interactions between two previously non-bonded people, or the establishment of new types of bonding or anti-bonding interactions between two already bonded (or anti-bonded) individuals, occurs under the direct regulation of practical hypothetical imperatives that constitute Self-obligations and is influenced by each person's manifold of concept structures involving ideas of Duties-to-Self. Put plainly, each person expects to benefit by gaining something he doesn't already have or avoiding something he wishes to avoid (perfecting or maintaining the power of his person in some way) and accepts that in order to acquire this benefit he must in turn commit himself to doing something. Thus, every bonding association between two persons is to be regarded as some form of social compact. This is easily understood by analogy with commonplace economic transactions. Smith wrote,

> In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from

[18] Evolutionary competition. Grossberg uses a specific mathematical definition for the word "competition." The term must not be taken too naively. "Work" to a physicist doesn't mean the same thing "work" does to a waitress.

> their own regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. [Smith (1776), pg. 13]

To understand the root Nature of human social compacting, then, we must understand the Nature of Self-determining persons in regard to the making of reciprocal Obligations and Duties.

§ 4. Persons, Obligations, and Pledging

In Critical metaphysics, a ***person*** is *that subject of a judgment who can be regarded with practical objective validity as the agent of his own actions and to whom these actions can be attributed*. This is as much as to say that a person is anyone or anything we regard as subject to being held accountable for his own actions because he is the immediate cause of these actions. As Kant put it,

> A *person* is that subject whose acts are liable to an attribution. *Moral* personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws. . . . From this it follows that a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others). [Kant (1797), 6: 223]

This is the beginning point for any theory of Social Contract and for any theory of justice and jurisprudence. The significance of the idea of *freedom* is that the person is regarded as a Self-determining being, and so if any action and its opposite are both possible and the person commits either one or the other, that person is responsible for the action he commits. To say a person *has a moral personality* is to say nothing more than to say that the person acts on grounds of *theoretical* imperatives he regards as necessarily defining what he holds to be right vs. wrong, good vs. evil, etc., *and that he always chooses to take the action that he holds to be right instead of that which he holds to be wrong and to do that which he holds to be good instead of that which he holds to be evil*. The significance of the qualifier *theoretical* imperative here is that he chooses his actions in full consciousness of concepts of what he holds he *ought to* do or not do. To characterize a person's personality as a moral personality *in a social context* cannot be done on grounds of *practical* imperatives because no person can gainsay a practical imperative he has set up in his practical manifold of rules.[19] There is no "I ought to" character in a practical imperative of pure practical Reason; these imperatives carry the force of an "*I will*" ***natural law***. An "I ought to" can only be attributed to a theoretical imperative in the manifold of concepts because the mere objective concept of a moral law carries no quality of what can be called a law of human Nature.

This is, of course, the root human-natural cause of the many centuries of controversy over ideas of morality and justice that humankind has witnessed. What people of one age and culture regard as decent and moral, people of another time and place often regard as barbaric and incomprehensible. The ancient Spartans were regarded in their day *by their fellow Greeks* as the most solidly and morally upright people in ancient Helena; every Western society of today regards most of the Spartans' common social practices as utterly reprehensible in moral terms. Here is one example. The Spartans had a rigorous system of public education, called the *agoge*, that every Spartan boy went through from age 7 to age 20. Any boy who did not successfully complete the *agoge* was denied Spartan citizenship and exiled. What do you suppose the popular

[19] He can *change* his practical imperatives by making an accommodation in his manifold of rules that brings what once stood as an imperative under the condition of a higher rule – a new imperative. This requires an act of re-evaluation in the motivational dynamic. But so long as a rule stands atop the manifold of rules as an imperative, he *cannot* act in contradiction of it because to do so violates the formula of the categorical imperative of pure practical Reason. The categorical imperative is the master regulation and fundamental *law* of *homo noumenal* human Nature governing all non-autonomic acts of a human being.

reaction today would be if someone were to propose the following Spartan practice be made part of every boy's schooling?

> The boys in Sparta were lashed with whips during the entire day at the altar of Artemis Orthia, frequently to the point of death, and they bravely endured this, cheerful and proud, vying with one another for the supremacy as to which one of them could endure being beaten for the longer time and the greater number of blows. And the one who was victorious was held in especial repute. This competition is called 'The Flagellation' and it takes place each year. [Plutarch (date unknown), *Ancient Customs of the Spartans*, 40]

This wasn't a punishment. *Every* Spartan schoolboy participated in 'The Flagellation.' Some of them died from shock and exsanguination during it. Usually their parents were spectators at this competition, cheering their sons on, exhorting them not to pass out and to keep going. As long as a boy could stay on his feet, he continued to be whipped. The last one standing won. The Spartans carried out this practice for centuries and it was by no means the practice that would be voted most morally outrageous in every Western society today[20]. How long do you suppose a high school football coach would keep his job today if he proposed that beating the boys bloody with whips until they passed out was a proper part of football practice?

The Critical definition of *person* is the starting point for the deontological evaluation of social compacts. Kant wrote,

> Now the human being as a reasonable *natural being* (*homo phaenomenon*) can be determined by his reason, as a *cause*, to deeds in the sensible world, and hereby the idea of Obligation does not come into consideration. But the same [human being] thought according to his *personality*, that is, as a being endowed with *inner freedom* (*homo noumenon*) is regarded as a being liable to commitment to obligation and, indeed, [to commitment-to-obligation] to himself (to the humanity in his own person); so the human being (regarded in these two different senses) can acknowledge a Duty to himself without falling into contradiction (because the idea of a human being is not thought in one and the same sense). . . .
>
> The first fundamental principle of Duty to oneself lies in the saying "live in conformity with nature" . . ., that is, *preserve* yourself in the perfection of your nature; the second, in the tenet "*make yourself more perfect* than mere nature has made you" (perfect yourself as an end, perfect yourself as a means). . . There are impulses of nature concerning man's **animality**. Through them [his] nature aims at: (a) his self-preservation, (b) preservation of the species[21], and (c) preservation of his capacity to enjoy life, though still on an animal level only. . .

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[20] In a popular vote on which Spartan educational practice would be held most morally outrageous today, the winner would probably be the Spartan practice of state-instituted pederasty. Various historians tell us that it was a state duty of every older, accomplished Spartan aristocrat to take an adolescent boy for a lover as part of that boy's essential training to become a Spartan citizen. Any eligible man who did not do so was fined. Any boy past the age of twelve who had not found a lover was regarded as being disgraced. It was the responsibility of the boys to request to be "mentored" by the older man. It remains an unsettled point of historical dispute whether or not the practice of Spartan educational pederasty extended beyond the point of consensual frotteurism, but there is little doubt it extended to at least this point. The Spartans described the practice as "chaste." Athenian playwrights didn't buy that and loved to lampoon this Spartan practice on stage. Today, at my university, the Philosophy Department has a kind of unwritten rule that forbids Plato's *Symposium* from appearing on any required-reading list, knowing the public uproar even that would cause.

[21] Human sexual Nature no doubt has "preservation of the species" as a by-product. But even as a deonto-logical principle, it is not objectively valid to say it is the fundamental Nature of a human being to aim at preservation of the species. Some societies *make* the preservation of at least their own culture a social Duty. Sparta was an example of this. A number of religions also hold this as a tenet.

> But a human being's Duty to himself as a moral being *only* (without showing his animality) subsists in what is formal in the congruence of the maxims of his will with the *dignity* of humanity in his person, thus in the prohibition against depriving himself of the *prerogative* of a moral being, namely that of acting according to principles, i.e., inner freedom. [Kant (1797), 6: 418-420]

Kant's "dignity of humanity in his person" is not objectively valid without further qualification because his idea of "humanity in his person" falls into Kant's ontological misstep in his moral theory. How are we to understand this phrase deontologically? Webster's Dictionary lists nine definitions for the word "dignity" and only one of these has deontological validity in this context. It is the now-obsolete definition of dignity as *a general maxim or principle; an axiom*. Yet even here we must pay very close attention to the metaphysical Standpoint in which we understand this idea. If we take this definition of "dignity" from the theoretical Standpoint, Kant would be saying a Duty to oneself "subsists in what is formal in the congruence of the maxims of his will with the general maxim or principle or axiom of humanity in his own person" – in other words, his conceptual maxim of Duty would have to be formally congruent with another conceptual maxim. *All* concepts in the manifold of concepts are objective, and if we take "dignity of humanity in his person" as a conceptual maxim, we have all the ingredients needed to set up a mere logical tautology with a strong risk we will commit an ontology-centered *diallelus* of reasoning[22].

The only deontological way of avoiding this trap is to regard "dignity-of-humanity-in-one's-person" from the practical Standpoint of Critical metaphysics. Here the "maxim or principle or axiom" is to be understood as *a maxim in the manifold of rules*, not one in the manifold of concepts. Kant's phrase then reads, "subsists in what is formal in the congruence of a conceptual maxim in the manifold of concepts with a rule-maxim in the manifold of rules." More specifically, the phrase must be interpreted as pertaining to the formal congruence of the concept with the tenet structure of an Obligation-to-Self constructed in the manifold of rules. A human being *cannot* "deprive himself of the prerogative" of acting according to his *practical* principles, because to say he is capable of doing so is to say he is not bound by his own manifold of rules – and this is an outright logical contradiction that renders the mathematical idea of the manifold of rules quite meaningless.

Furthermore, while it is quite possible *to discover* by actual experience that a conceptual maxim comes into conflict with a practical maxim, it is not possible *a priori* to know it is *impossible* for any particular conceptual maxim to potentially stand in conflict with the manifold of rules, *nor is it possible* to know *a priori* that a particular practical maxim will never run afoul of some future lesson of experience. This is because both constructs – the conceptual maxim and the practical maxim – are products of experience, and such products are always contingent. This is why the highest rules in the manifold of rules are *hypothetical* practical imperatives. They owe their standing atop the manifold of rules strictly to *lack* of any experience demonstrating the rule runs into a violation of the formula of the categorical imperative. As moral philosopher Onora Nell sagely observed, "We can make right decisions but not guarantee right acts" [Nell (1975), pg. 127].

To sum this up, the deontological *Realerklärung* of ***dignity of humanity in one's person*** is *a practical tenet in the manifold of rules pertaining to determination of an appetite orienting the person's action insofar as this action practically manifests an Obligation-to-Self*.

If one understands this phrase in this Critically correct and deontological way, the notions of human dignity and of a person's humanity acquire all the force Kant almost undoubtedly intended these notions to contain. At the same time, it liberates them from the lingering theocentric bias

[22] A *diallelus* is a circular argument. It proves nothing.

that many philosophers and moral theorists since Kant have found most objectionable in his moral theory. Every human being constructs his own manifold of rules, and this manifold establishes, as a by-product of its structure, the person's private moral code – his own "logic of actions" as Piaget put it. Understood in this way, we have to say that in his or her *logical essence* every human being is a moral being.

However, because every person's experience is different to some degree from those of every other person, there is no universal and objectively valid moral code that applies to all of human-kind without distinction. ***All social systems of morality are conventions mutually agreed to by the people who adopt it***. This is *the moral essence of all social compacts* and, in a manner of speaking, the glue that holds any society together as a society. If it were not for the deontological dignity-of-humanity-in-one's-person, it is doubtful that any society larger than at most a very few individuals would ever come into *Existenz* at all, and even more doubtful that any society would be durable and able to maintain itself for more than a very brief period of time. To take a bit of free license with Grossberg's phrase, social compacting and its underlying moral convention represents *an induced decision scheme for solving a universal environmental problem*, namely that of maintaining and perfecting one's personal power, that every human being faces. That is the crux and Critical significance of Kant's second paragraph quoted above.

We have just taken an important step toward understanding the Idea of the Social Contract, but we're not there yet. To make further progress, we must examine how this induced decision scheme appears to the individual person. For this we must make a closer examination of the ideas of theoretical imperatives, obligations, and the making of pledges.

We begin with the idea of theoretical imperatives in the manifold of concepts. Kant tells us,

> [A theoretical] imperative is a practical rule through which an act, in itself contingent, is *made* necessary. It differs from a practical law in that [a practical law] represents, to be sure, an act as necessary but takes no regard of whether this is peculiar to an inner necessity of the acting Subject . . . or is contingent to him (as in a human being); for the first is the case where there is no [theoretical] imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule for which its representation makes necessary a subjectively contingent act and hence represents the Subject as one who must be beholden (necessitated) to that in conformity with this rule . . . The ground of the possibility of [theoretically] categorical imperatives lies only in this: that they refer to no other condition of choice . . . than simply to its freedom. [Kant (1797), 6: 222]

Kant did not develop his theory far enough to the point where he recognized the distinction between practical imperatives and theoretical imperatives. When he says here that a theoretical imperative is a practical rule, we have to understand him to mean *a theoretical rule of the type the Greeks called a* ***praxis***. Kant scholars have gotten it right when they say, "praxis is the application of a theory to cases encountered in experience, but [which] is also ethically significant thought" [Blackburn (1996)]. By "ethically significant thought" I mean representation in sensibility, originating in the process of thinking, that affects the motivational dynamic by stimulating the invocation of practical tenets, in the manifold of rules, of actions that manifest the person's *Moralität* system.

Human beings typically do not devote very much time or effort to codifying an understanding of their own moral codes. Some philosophers might do so as part of their philosophizing. Many more people pick up ideas for stating their moral beliefs from whatever teachings their church might offer, retaining those teachings that seem to fit with or at least seem not to contradict their own actual rule structure and conveniently ignoring other teachings that do not fit. This is a satisficing approach to codification and it is not an altogether ill-fitting analogy to say this is like a shopper buying his clothes off the rack at a department store. The majority of people simply

assimilate the moral customs of their community and society without bothering to codify their understanding of these customs or the reasons for them beyond popular aphorisms that are widely used and widely known in their society. Ignórance of the mores and folkways of one's immediate community often leads to interpersonal conflicts with others and produces tensions that simple conformity to custom avoids. One thing, however, that the greater number of human beings make habitual is the egocentric presumption that, in matters of mores and folkways, other people think and reason as they do and that those who seem not to *ought* to. We saw Emerson attack this habit earlier in this treatise. Is there a Critical accounting for this sort of moral egocentrism? Kant tells us there is:

> One need only dissect the judgment that men pass on the lawfulness of their acts: thus would one always find that, whatever inclination may say between times, their reason, incorruptible and though itself self-contained, always holds the maxim of the will in an act up to pure will; i.e., to itself inasmuch as it regards itself as practical *a priori*. Now this principle of morality, just because of the universality of the legislation that makes it the formal supreme ground of determination of will regardless of any subjective differences, reason accounts at the same time to a law for all rational beings so far as they generally have a will, i.e. a capacity to determine their own causality through the representation of rules, hence so far as they are capable of acts according to fundamental principles; consequently also according to practical principles *a priori* (for these alone have that necessity reason demands for fundamental principles). [Kant (1788), 5: 32]

History finds no shortage of free-thinkers and liberal essayists from the 18th century onward who have attacked this attributing for being the presupposition that it is. The young child really has no other choice but to follow this course because of the epistemological necessity by which he forms his very first mental separation between "me" and "not-me." That this is a form of egocentric thinking that is a natural and unavoidable stage in the development of thinking some essayists have ignored while others have accounted the habit to some hypothesized defect in the character of human beings generally. (This is, itself, a form of moralizing codified by classifying people into those who are said to be "enlightened" and those who are said to be "unenlightened"; even Kant was not innocent of this peculiar form of moralizing intellectual hubris). I do not condone rigid and dogmatic thinking either, but there is something that I think needs to be said in favor of this developmental habit: This same developed maxim of thinking is also a rational ground for the possibility of social compacting.

All social compacts depend fundamentally upon the following, usually unspoken, presumption being made by all contracting parties: "If I do *w*, then you *will* do *x*; if you do *y*, then I *must* do *z*." This is the logical and practical essence of the idea of *being obliged*. Without this there is no rational ground for expecting any kind of social compacting to work, and prudent concepts of Duties-to-Self would work against anyone taking the first action in putting the terms of a compact into effect. If you do not *presume* the other guy will hold up his end of the bargain, you would be called a fool for holding up your end of it. Every form of social compacting involves and requires, at some level of consciousness however vague and indistinct, the following factors in each contracting party: (1) the voluntary Self-assumption of some form of obligation; (2) the presumption that the other party also places himself under some form of obligation; and (3) the presupposition that the terms and conditions of the compact are enforceable by some means. In regard to (3), the more casual kinds of compacts often presume the terms and conditions are, in a manner of speaking, self-enforcing, i.e., "I know I will always do my part and therefore you will always do your part, too." This is, of course, a logical *saltus* in *objective* reasoning but *subjectively* it follows from the aforementioned habitual maxims of thinking in egocentric rule practice and moral realism in rule cognizance.

There is, in other words, always *at least the presupposition* of some form of pledging mutually

exchanged and some form of liabilities mutually accepted by the contracting persons. Indeed, this practical factor is an important part of the earlier *Realerklärung* of 'person,' namely, that a person is a being who can be held accountable for his own actions *including actions of omission*.

What, then, is the human Nature of obliging and pledging? If we are to understanding the human Nature of social compacting, it seems rather obvious that this understanding must take in a Critical understanding of the acts of obliging and pledging. Kant tells us about two forms of pledging: active and passive. He said,

> All Obligations to generous acts are active pledgings. I am bound to the act, although it is a service. Deeds whereby we can bind others if we perform them are services. We are bound to the act towards a person without being bound to the other [person]. *Obligati sumus ad actionem ita ut et illi non ogligati simus*.[23] We are bound to the act, not to the person. If I am bound to help the unfortunate, and thus to the act but not the man, that would be active pledging. But if I owe a debt to someone, I am bound not only to the act of payment but also to the creditor, and that is passive[24] pledging. It seems, however, that all pledging is passive for if I am bound then I am obliged. Yet with an active pledging there is a constraint of reason, and I am constrained by my own considerations, so there is nothing passive about it; and passive pledging must come about through another, whereas if a man is necessitated by reason, he rules himself. The distinction of Obligation is therefore right. *Obligatio passiva est obligatio obligati erga obligantem, obligatio activa est obligatio erga non obligantem*.[25] [Kant (*c*. 1784-85), 27: 260]

Kant used Latin in precisely the same way and for precisely the same reason as a modern scientist uses mathematics: to say something with great precision and exactitude. With living languages, such as English or German, the meanings of words tend to evolve and shift over the passage of time. Metaphorical connotations are added, old meanings are slowly dropped, contexts are added and changed so that after the passage of a sufficient length of time a writer's words are no longer interpreted by readers as the author meant them to be interpreted. By contrast, a dead language like Latin is no longer evolving and changing. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes* means the same thing today that it did to the ancient Romans. This is a feature that mathematics, as a language, shares with Latin. The principal difference is that mathematics has relatively few connotations for each mathematical term (often only one), whereas Latin was at one time a living language and so most of its words have the same breadth of connotations and implications as is found in every other living language. The translation process when technical precision is needed or desired places a greater burden on the translator.[26] It is one thing to take a degree of license in translating Ovid's *Metamorphosis* because having six different competent translations doesn't have all that much impact on what Ovid was trying to convey. It is entirely different when the translation is a translation of technical metaphysics. Where Kant drops into Latin, this is where he is taking pains to be technically precise about what he is saying. His Latin must be treated like mathematics.

Of the seven different definitions of the noun ***pledge*** given in Webster's Dictionary, the one pertinent to our present context is *a promise or agreement*. Of the seven different definitions of the verb ***to pledge*** given in Webster's Dictionary, the one pertinent to our present context is *to bind to the performance of some engagement or obligation by giving a pledge*. The language scholars who compiled the 1962 edition of Webster's speculated that the word "pledge" derives from the Latin verb *præbere*, to proffer. Pledging, of course, is the present participle of pledge.

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[23] "We are pledged to the action as such, and not pledged to the person."
[24] subject to passion or emotion
[25] "Passive pledging is pledging owed to an obliger, active pledging is not pledged to an obliger."
[26] The only way to fix the specific meanings of living-language terms is to specify the dictionary, including edition and year, from which the definitions are being taken. In making my Latin translations, I employ the 1997 printing of the unabridged *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, NY: Oxford University Press.

The Critical distinction between active and passive pledging lies in the Object made to stand as the pledgee. ***Active pledging*** is an *impersonal* pledging in the context that the pledger makes his pledge to an abstract Object or an ideal. Commonplace examples include "society," "my country," and "political freedom." There is no identifiable actual person at the pledgee end of the pledger's commitment even though the pledger is able to point out some actual exemplars he uses as illustrations of his idea of the pledgee Object. The pledger makes his own pledgee-Object.

In contrast, ***passive pledging*** is *personal* in the context that the pledgee is an actual and identifiable person. The compacting process is an interpersonal process and is subject to all the sensuous apprehensions that attend immediate interpersonal interactions. Affectivity in judgment-ation (what Kant calls "passion and emotion" in the previous quote) is signified by the intuition of a specific individual or identified group of individuals. A literary example of the latter is provided by the slogan of the Three Musketeers, i.e., "All for one and one for all." Kant calls this form of pledging "passive" pledging because the pledger orients himself by means of whatever subjective "passion and emotion" he associates with the specific people he identifies as pledgees[27].

If you were to devote enough time to the labors of Kant scholarship, sooner or later you will learn two things about Kant: (1) his key synthetical concepts always come in threes; and (2) he usually only tells you about two of them, leaving the third for you to deduce yourself from a synthesis of the two he does present. (2) is one of Kant's more irritating habits as an author and lecturer, although learning how to deal with it does eventually turn you into a better philosopher. It is probably more true than not to say, if you don't find Kant irritating, you're not studying him properly[28]. In addition to active and passive pledging there is a third form, unnamed and un-discussed by Kant, we must take into consideration. Let us call this third one ***proxy pledging***. In this one, the actual pledgee-Object is an abstraction – a mathematical entity – that the pledger has *personified* (i.e., he has made himself regard the proxy as if the proxy were an actual person).

For example, there is currently a fund-raising campaign that appears frequently on American television in which a charitable organization asks you to donate money to help poor children. The advertisements don't usually say where the poor children to be helped live, but they often leave the impression they live in Latin America. The ads usually feature two or three ragged, dirty and sad-looking little children who appear to be around five to nine years old, and one of them in particular is emphasized as the model child. This child is always depicted as living in a squalid trash heap of a slum, going to bed hungry every night, having no access to sanitary drinking water, and who dreams of going to school but can't because his or her family is too poor. The spokesman assures you that for some trifling amount of money, say 80 cents per day, *you* can provide this child with all the food he needs, clean drinking water, access to doctors, schooling, etc. The model child then reappears, cleaned up, happy looking, better clothed, better fed, and going to school. If he wasn't wearing shoes earlier, he is now. It is promised that your 80 cents per day will do all this for 'a child like poor little Ernesto.' In return, you'll feel better about yourself because you won't feel guilty any more that children like poor little Ernesto exist. By the way, if in fact you *don't* feel guilty that children like poor little Ernesto exist then, the ad implies, you *should* because any good person – especially an American – *would*.

I'm not saying this charitable organization doesn't provide real help to real people. I rather suspect they do, although I don't know that for sure. My point is this: the ad works very hard to stimulate you into thinking and feeling your pledge is going to help poor little Ernesto or a child 'just like him.' He becomes the personification of poor children everywhere, which is the abstract Object on "whose" behalf you're making your pledge. Of course, you don't send your 80 cents per

[27] Kant derives this terminology from the Greeks and, particularly, from applying his Copernican turn to the interpretation of the famous ten categories Aristotle presented in *Topics*.
[28] The same thing, by the way, can also be said of Plato and, especially, Aristotle.

day directly to poor little Ernesto; you send it to the charitable organization with the implied understanding that they will do all the work of identifying a child your donation will help. You are promised that you will receive a picture of a specific child you're helping and that he or she will write letters to you telling you all about how what you're doing is helping him or her. In point of fact, there is probably no direct connection between the specific money you send in and where it goes, nor necessarily between your donation and the specific child in the picture or behind the letter – assuming that the picture really is an actual needy poor child being helped, the letter is written by one, and you are the *only* person to whom that *particular* letter and picture is sent. The cost of keeping track of all those kinds of specifics is a lot greater than just assigning some one of the many children whose families are receiving charitable aid as "your" child whether or not your actual donation goes specifically to that actual child. If you are one of fifty recipients of the very same letter and picture, you'll never actually know it unless you and someone you know receive the same one and compare them.[29] "Your" pledgee is a proxy and you are, in effect, hiring the charitable organization to see to it your donation helps *somebody* – preferably *not* people who work for the charity – *and* "helps you feel good about yourself" in the process. This is impersonal pledging with a very personal feel to it. There are numerous other examples, such as "the bank you owe mortgage payments to[30]," that fall into this same category with varying degrees of how "personal" it feels.

The definition of ***pledging***, i.e. *binding oneself to some obligation by giving a pledge*, implies that a person has actually committed himself to do something or to behave in some particular way. This is the significance of the word "binding" in the definition. It is important to note that there is a technical distinction between "pledging" used in the metaphysical context – where the commitment is actual – and the casual usage of this word under which a person might or might not actually mean to keep a promise he has uttered or honor a commitment he has said he will honor. It's probably a safe bet to suppose everyone reading this book has had a personal experience in which someone has broken a promise he previously made or refused to do something he previously said he would do. We would call this a *false pledge* if the person intentionally uttered a pledge he never intended to keep, and a *non-pledge* if the person failed to understand he was making a pledge committing himself to do something. I am using Menon the Thessalian as a proxy poster-boy for the false-pledger in this treatise.

To see an example of non-pledging, let us consider the following anecdote. When I was in the second grade, the first thing we did in class every morning was to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. This wasn't a case of the teacher asking, "Johnny, can you recite the Pledge of Allegiance?" The entire class stood up, we put our right hands over our hearts, and repeated the words after the teacher. Now, a few of us knew we were making a promise of some sort, although it is fairly dubious if precisely what we were promising was very well understood by seven and eight year olds. But it is also true that some of my classmates had no idea whatsoever they were personally promising anything. To them the whole business was simply a school ritual and nothing more. Furthermore, no adult ever took our pledges seriously because they knew that most of us had no idea that this action had any sort of civic significance. We were just little citizens-in-training.

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[29] In point of cold hard fact, if the charitable organization actually is helping poor people, they can help a lot more of them by sending out a few "exemplar" letters and photographs to many donators, thus saving on costs that would otherwise be incurred in the process of helping you feel better about yourself. If you think the ends justify the means, you ought not to mind if the organization deceives you in this way because "it's just a little white lie." If you're a virtue ethicist, well, let's all hope you never find out any differently. *C'est la vie*. If you need to know for certain you're helping poor little Ernesto himself, give him the money from your hand directly to his. Then your pledging is actually personal. Not too practical, but personal.

[30] Actual people work in banks, but a bank is not an actual person. Somewhere there are actual people who fronted the money you borrowed, but you'll never know who they are and the bank people won't be able to tell you even if you ask them and they want to tell you. The bank *legally personifies* your real lenders.

In this treatise, the term pledging is hereafter used exclusively in the connotation of actual pledging, i.e., the conscious making of a commitment of some sort. This is pledging in the sense of the Latin word *obligatio*. The distinctions between active pledging, passive pledging and proxy pledging are distinctions of Quantity in the 2LAR depiction of the idea of pledging.

§ 5. Relation in Pledging

There are also distinctions of Relation in the idea of pledging. Kant tells us,

> We have *Obligationes internas erga nosmet ipsos*[31], in regard to which we are outwardly quite at liberty; anyone can do what he will with his body, and that is no concern of anyone else; but inwardly he is not at liberty, for he is constrained by the necessary and essential ends of mankind.[32]
>
> All obligation is a kind of compulsion; if this compulsion is moral, then we are either forced from without, or we compel ourselves, and this is a *conditio interna*[33]. But it can be morally forced from without by others if another wrings from us, according to moral motives, an action we do reluctantly. If, for example, I am in debt to anyone, and he says, "If you be an honest man, you must pay me; I will not sue you, but I cannot let you off because I need it," then this is an outer moral compulsion by the choice of another. The more one can compel himself, all the more at liberty he is. The less he can be forced by others, all the more inwardly at liberty he is. We must here still distinguish between the capacity for freedom and the state of freedom. The capacity for freedom can be greater, although the state is worse. The greater the capacity my capacity-for-freedom is, and the more liberty from stimuli is, all the more at liberty is the man. If a man were not in need of self-compulsion, he would be wholly free, for his will would then be entirely good, and he might willingly do all that is good, since he would be in no need of forcing himself; but that is not the case with man. Yet one man can come nearer to it than another if, that is, the sensuous impulses, the stimuli, are stronger in the one than the other. The more one practices self-compulsion, all the more at liberty he becomes. [*ibid.*, 27: 269-270]

Obligatio interna (inner pledging) is a form of pledging in which the pledger and pledgee are one and the same person. *All* obligations are Self-determined[34]; *obligatio interna* makes an obligation (and the duties attending it as its matter) and makes it an obligation-to-Self. In terms of morality as the logic of actions, an *obligatio interna* is a logically *categorical* Relation. ***Obligatio externa*** (outward pledging), in contrast, is pledging where the pledgee is another person or group of persons. It is logically *disjunctive* and *obligatio externa* necessarily presupposes *obligatio interna* accompanies it. Put another way, the pledger makes it an obligation-to-Self to commit to a specific obligation-to-another and to carry out any duties combined with this obligation *if the pledgee requires it of the pledger*. Kant explained this distinction in the following words:

> All Obligation is either inward or outward. . . . Outward *obligationes* are greater than inner,

[31] "inner legal liability to ourselves," i.e. one can make his maxim a theoretical moral law for governing himself and hold himself liable to it. We call the feeling of *Unlust* experienced when transgressing such a law by the name "guilty conscience."
[32] in other words, constrained by human Nature in the aspect of man as *homo noumenon*. As Aristotle would have put it, "nothing that exists by nature can go against its own nature." Traditionally, most people think that Kant is speaking here of some noble brotherhood-of-man ideal, but epistemologically and from the judicial Standpoint that interpretation is nonsense even if, as your author is nearly certain, Kant thought that a proper science of morality and ethics might be able to bring such an ideal into phenomenal *Existenz*.
[33] "an inner preserving" of what we might call "the qualities of one's personality."
[34] Recall that an **obligation** (in German, *Obligation*) is the necessity of a free act under a theoretically categorical imperative as the act is represented in the manifold of rules and conceptualized in object-form in the manifold of concepts. An obligation can be regarded as a conceptual formula for acting-rightly.

> for they are simultaneously inward, but inner are not simultaneously outer. *Obligatio externa*[35] already presupposes that the action as such stands under morality, and is therefore *interna*[36]; for the *obligatio externa* is an obligation because the action is already one in the internal sense. For in that case the action is a Duty, that makes it an inward Obligation, but because I can still compel a man to this Duty by my choice, it is also an *obligatio externa*. In *obligatione externa*[37] I have to conform my action to the choice of another, and to this I can also be forced by others. *Obligatio externa* can also be pathologically forced by another; if he does not let himself be morally compelled, he has a warrant to compel pathologically. In general, every right has a warrant to compel pathologically. [*ibid*., 27:270]

In this quotation we find a splendid example of how Kant earned the reputation for being a notorious technical hair-splitter (as well as a splendid example of why his work is so notoriously difficult to translate). Note that "obligation" (in German, *Obligation*) and "Obligation" (in German, *Verbindlichkeit*) appear within the same argument. An Obligation is an overall orientation of judgmentation in the Self-determination of appetites. The term belongs to the practical Standpoint of Critical epistemology. An obligation, on the other hand, involves concepts of theoretically categorical imperatives and belongs to the theoretical Standpoint of Critical meta-physics. What makes this form of Relation logically disjunctive (in the context in which the term disjunctive is used in Kantian Logic) is that the obligation co-determines an obligation on the part of the pledgee, i.e., determining one obligation also determines another. The pledger's expression of the action (a duty) is at the same time a manifestation of a Duty he has placed himself under.

A new factor also appears in this quotation, namely the concept of *legal liability*. The first thing that must be stressed as this concept is introduced is that legal liability is to be understood in a *deontological context only*. This distinction is one in which the concept of legality is tied to the deontological *Realerklärung* of ***justice***, which is a topic we take up in the next chapter. It is probably true that the great majority of people in every country are familiar with the idea of legal liability in the context of "if you break the law, you can be held liable for doing so." What is true in every country is that the country's legal system contains some laws that are deontologically ***just*** and some that are deontologically ***unjust*** or ***non-just***. In America some lawyers and judges hold to a maxim that "the justice system is about the *law*, not about *justice*." Most political activists also hold to this maxim, and it is from such groups that the great majority of unjust laws are produced. As we will see later, this maxim is a cancer that destroys the social contract. Historically it leads to revolutions, civil wars and the disintegration of societies. The arguably-most-famous slogan of the American Revolution, "No taxation without representation," was a declaration by the colonial Patriots that England's colonial taxation policy was unjust law. If you sit back and think about it a little, does it not seem in retrospect an incredible blunder that Great Britain should have lost its American colonies in part because of a three-penny tax on tea? British statesman Edmund Burke famously said,

> Reflect how you are to govern a people who think they ought to be free, and think they are not. Your scheme yields no revenue; it yields nothing but discontent, disorder, disobedience; and such is the state of America, that after wading up to your eyes in blood, you could only end just where you begun; that is, to tax where no revenue is to be found [Burke (1774)].

Deontological legal liability is grounded in the *homo noumenal* Nature of human beings as Self-determining (free) agents. All *real obligations*, by which I mean obligations manifested by

[35] "outward pledging"
[36] "inner"
[37] "outward legal liability"

actual expressions of actions, are solely determined to *be* obligations by the individual. *You* can not *impose* a real obligation on *any* other person. If he doesn't determine himself to hold something to be an obligation, then it simply isn't a deontological obligation, period, and no *duty* can be imputed to him. He can, of course, be compelled to do something through, ultimately, the use or threat of force (either physical or social), but if he submits to the compulsion this is through an act of prudence under a Duty-to-Self. To think that anyone can place anyone else under an obligation through the use or threat of force is the constant error committed by tyrants and despotic governments throughout all of human history. Probably more important, though, is that it is an error of ignorance sanctioned by custom that can be found displayed even in governments whose officials would be horrified and offended to hear their governance called "despotic."

Here is an example. Many young American men born after 1966 are not aware that every male American citizen between the ages of 17 and 45 is a member of the reserve militia of the United States[38]. This means that by law they are liable for conscription into the armed forces, and that the United States government regards their service-at-call in the armed forces as an obligation of their U.S. citizenship. Most American men within this age range do in fact accept this as a citizen's obligation or would quickly accept it as an obligation if it were explained to them. Some, however, would say, "Hey, wait a minute! I never agreed to that!" Thousands did during the Vietnam War. The root cause of the situation is that every person who is born in the United States is automatically declared to be a citizen of the United States *without* being asked to accept any special duties or obligations of citizenship. Deontologically, this is to be called *entitlement citizenship* and, in social-natural political science terms, entitlement citizenship is an astonishingly stupid and even self-contradictory idea in any country that calls itself a republic. In point of fact, *no* U.S. citizen has a *deontological* moral liability for service-at-call in the armed forces of the United States *unless he has agreed to accept this as part of the price of his U.S. citizenship*. If he agrees, he is actively pledging an *obligatio externa*. This example is part of the scope of a larger Social Contract landscape we will discuss later in this treatise.

Why would any human being make a Self-obligation of *obligatio externa*? The answer is likely already clear to some readers, but for the others I will merely remark at this point that the answer is *because by doing so he benefits the power of his person*. How and why this is so we will discuss later in much more detail because this involves the terms and conditions necessary for the possibility of any social contract. What we most immediately need to discuss next is the deontological idea of *moral compulsion*. Kant tells us,

> We begin by noting of compulsion in general that the necessitation is of two kinds, objective and subjective. Subjective necessitation is the representation of the necessity of acts *per stimulos* [by sensuous stimulation], or through the impelling causes of the subject. Objective compulsion is constraint of a person through that which has the greatest constraining and moving power in his subject. Compulsion is therefore not a necessity, but a constraint to act. But the being who is constrained must be one who would not do this act without constraint, and would, indeed, have objections against it. . . . Compulsion is thus a constraint of an act reluctantly done.
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> This constraint can be objective and subjective. Thus we forego a thing reluctantly from one inclination, though we do it according to another; as a miser, for example, forgoes a small advantage if he thereby secures a greater; but reluctantly because he would sooner

[38] With the following exceptions: (1) the Vice President of the United States; (2) the judicial and executive officers of the United States, the 50 states, the U.S. Territories, and Puerto Rico; (3) members of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty or already serving in the organized militia (the National Guard and the Naval Militia); (4) customhouse clerks; (5) mailmen; (6) U.S. armory, arsenal and naval shipyard workers; (7) pilots of navigable waters; and (8) mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

> have both. All compulsion is either pathological or practical. Pathological compulsion is the making necessary of an act *per stimulos*; practical is the making necessary of an act reluctantly done *per motiva* [from motives]. No man can be pathologically forced because of free will. Human choice is an *arbitrium liberum*[39], in that it is not necessitated *per stimulos*. Brutish choice is an *arbitrium brutum*[40] and not *liberum* because it can be necessitated through *stimulos*; if a man, for example, is pressed into an act by numerous and cruel tortures, he still cannot be forced to do the acts if he does not will it; he can, after all, withstand the torture. Comparatively speaking, he can be forced, indeed, but not strictly; it is still possible to refrain from the act regardless of all sensuous impulses. That is the nature of *arbitrium liberum*. . . Hence a man can be pathologically forced but only comparatively speaking, e.g. by torture.
>
> An act is necessary if one cannot resist it; grounds are necessitating if human powers are not adequate to resist them. But a man can be practically forced *per motiva*, and then is not forced but moved. The compulsion, then, is not, however, subjective, for otherwise it would not, of course, be practical, and it is done *per motiva* and not *per stimulos*, for stimuli are subjective self-moving activities of the senses. [Kant (*c*. 1784-85), 27: 266-267]

To be "comparatively forced" is to decide to "choose the lesser of two evils." A *motive* is a ground of motion and, in relationship to volition, is "the reason one does something." A person acts out of motives and is said to be rationally ***Self-compelled***. Here, Kant tells us,

> Something is *done grudgingly* by a free being (1) insofar as there is present in him an inclination to the opposite of what he *wills* to do and (2) he nevertheless does what he *wills* as a free being. This is *actio invita*[41] in the moral sense. Elsewhere, to be sure, we also call *actionem invitam*[42] an action done *without willing*, *or not done willfully*, which has the name *actio involuntaria*[43]. Here, then, is a want of will itself, i.e. the [want of a] free alternative, and resolve to the action on grounds of reason, which is the proper *causa determinans*[44]; the action is done grudgingly only because of the mainsprings[45] to the contrary that lie in the physical nature of man. Instead of this, by *actio involuntaria* we have an absence or ignorance of the moving cause to action; it therefore does not belong among free actions, and *actio invita* must never be understood in that sense. [Kant (1793-4), 27: 519]

A person committing himself to an *obligatio externa* may have pledged himself to do something that he would not otherwise choose to do, and if such is the case then when he takes that action this is *actio invita*. The action is said to be done *willingly but grudgingly*. When the motive of this action is an outward legal liability (*obligatione externa*) following from an act of outward pledging, the person is not acting immediately on his own behalf but, rather, is acting from Kant's moral category of the reciprocal Relation that he has set up between himself and the situation of another person or of an abstract entity, i.e. "society," "the Greater Good," "the great Cause" or etc. In psychological terms, he has semantically represented an impact message that has for a meaning implication a necessitation (making necessary) of expressing the action he takes.

But *why* would he make such a commitment? Here Rousseau supplies the root answer:

> I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their

[39] free choice, choice that is determined or determinable independently of sensuous stimuli.
[40] choice that is determined through sensuous stimuli.
[41] "reluctant action"; action one takes contrary to one's own wishes or inclinations.
[42] same as *actio invita*; the difference is merely grammatical.
[43] "involuntary action"; action one would not take if any alternative choice was pragmatically feasible.
[44] "defining reason"
[45] *Triebfedern*: representations that serve as a condition for a *causatum* of activity

> preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert. This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together [Rousseau (1762), pg. 13]

Rousseau answers on a grand scale here. Lesser motives underlie the vast majority of cases when an individual commits to reciprocal *obligatio externa*: relief from loneliness, achievement of greater comfort by means of communal association with others, greater leisure for the individuals to attend to other personal matters, etc. Most instances are quite humble. I hire a crew of young men to mow my grass so that I do not have to spend part of my weekend doing it; they do it because they use the money I pay them for their own private benefits, whatever those may be. They do not skip mowing my grass, I do not skip paying them for it. Many students coming to see me outside of class for help with their studies for the first time do so with visible signs of reluctance. Often they find it emotionally painful to admit, even indirectly, that they are having trouble understanding the material and they dread humiliation. Yet they come despite this because of some Duty-to-Self. I help them with patience and encouragement because I made it my Duty to help young people prepare themselves for their futures, and because I know our mutual experience will build interpersonal bonding relationships between us. No man ever had too many friends[46,47]. After a few visits, most students lose their initial reluctance.

The ground of Self-necessitation makes an enormous difference to the Self-determining person. Kant said,

> All necessitation is not only pathological but also practical. Practical necessitation is not subjective, but objective, for if it were subjective it would be a *necessitatio pathologica*[48]. No other necessitation than necessitation *per motiva*[49] is in keeping with freedom. These motives can be pragmatic and moral, the moral being drawn from the *bonitate absoluta*[50] of free will.
>
> The more a man can be morally forced, all the more at liberty he is; the more he is pathologically forced, though this only occurs in a comparative sense, all the less at liberty he is. It is peculiar: the more anyone can be forced in a moral sense, all the more at liberty he is. I compel a person morally through *motiva objective moventia*[51], through motives of reason, along with his greatest freedom, without any impulse. Hence it takes a greater degree of freedom to be morally forced, for in that case the *arbitrium liberum*[52] is more

[46] "Oh, come now!" someone is thinking, "you do it because that's what you're paid to do." It's true that I'm paid to do it and it's true that this is a big part of the motive for some professors. But I really mean what I said. I saw to my own financial needs years ago and I don't really need the salary I'm paid. I'd probably do it for free if I didn't have to occasionally put up with the antics of governors, legislators, State Board of Education politicians and university upper administrators. My salary is a fine I levy for having to do so. I work for these young people. You can believe this or not; frankly, Stranger, I don't care if you do or do not. Oscar Wilde wrote, "What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing." [*Lady Windermere's Fan, III*] I agree. My *duty* as a teacher is *to help students to learn*, not to teach them.
[47] "He who has a thousand friends has not a friend to spare, And he who has one enemy will meet him everywhere." – Ali ibn-Abi-Talib, *A Hundred Sayings*.
[48] "constraining from feelings or sensations"
[49] "from motives"
[50] "unqualified excellence"
[51] "motives that objectively stir the senses"
[52] "free choice," i.e., choice that is determined or determinable independently of sensuous stimuli

> powerful – it can be forced through motives and is free of [sensuous] stimuli. So the more anyone is free of stimuli all the more can he be morally necessitated. Liberty waxes with the degree of morality. . . .
>
> He who has less Obligation is freer [is more at liberty]. So far as anyone stands under obligation, so is he not at liberty; but if that obligation comes to an end he becomes at liberty. Our being at liberty therefore becomes diminished by obligation . . . Thus one is not at liberty if he has taken on benefactors.[53] Yet, comparatively, we can have more freedom in one respect than in another.
>
> One who stands under *obligatione passiva*[54] is less at liberty than one who stands under *obligatione activa*[55]. We cannot be forced to any action of magnanimity, yet for all that they are incumbent on all of us,[56] hence all of us stand under *obligatione activa*. To actions of bounden duty we can be forced, and stand then under *obligatione passiva*; he who henceforth stands under *obligatione passiva* to anyone else is less free [less at liberty] than he who can oblige him [to make good on that liability]. [Kant (*c*. 1784-85), 27: 268-269]

On first reading, Kant appears to contradict himself between the second paragraph and the third and fourth paragraphs. Let us take a look at this more closely. "He who has less Obligation is freer": This does not seem difficult. The less Obligation a person compels himself to be answerable for, the more his actions are said to be *freely taken at his own liberty*. This liberty of action is of the greatest degree when the person need not consider any interests but his own and has no obligation to anyone other than himself. This is what Locke called ***natural liberty***. What then of "The more a man can be morally forced, all the more at liberty he is"? This is a contradiction *if* we are talking about one and same kind of liberty, but Kant is not. This second case is called ***civil liberty*** and it is grounded in a social contract. Locke wrote,

> The *natural liberty* of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The *liberty of man*, in society, is to be under no other legislative power but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it. Freedom [of man in society] then is not . . . *a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws:* but *freedom of men under government* is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made over by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as *freedom of nature* is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature. [Locke (1690), pg. 17]

This, too, is the answer to Kant's *merely apparent* self-contradiction. Locke corrupted his thesis with a great many ungrounded and unnecessary presuppositions – and Kant, trying to repair these, ran afoul of his own – but Locke did get the key social premise right:

> Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put

[53] because in this case one places himself under a form of obligation called "being indebted to them"
[54] "legal liability subject to passion or emotion"; "legal" in the context of having assumed an obligation in return for a benefit and passionate in the context of the obligation directly involving another *specific* person
[55] "practical legal liability"; again "legal" in the context of having assumed an obligation but practical in the context that the obligation is assumed from inner motives of principle and not a specific relationship with another person
[56] This is to be interpreted to mean "we do indeed take on such actions" and not that someone else has a legitimate right to expect us to take them on or that we all necessarily have a duty to take them on. The proper context is no more than an observation of human nature, the latter two utterly lack objective validity.

> out of this state, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the *bonds of civil society*, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so *consented to make one community or government*, they are thereby presently incorporated and make *one body politic* [*ibid*., pg. 52]

The central issue and perennial puzzle behind all this is, of course, ***what is necessary for the possibility of men each giving their own consents to put aside natural liberties in exchange for civil liberties?*** Lock failed to answer this adequately, Rousseau likewise failed to do so, and Kant failed to do so (because of his transcendent notion of 'dignity-of-humanity'). The only possible solution to this problem is one that is grounded in fundamental human Nature.

This is the question we will next begin to squarely face in chapter 11. However, before we get to this, there is one last piece of unfinished business with Kant's theory of pledging and Obligation. Kant presents us with two forms of pledging, *obligatio externa* and *obligatio interna*. As I said before, Kant's synthetical functions always come in threes and we are still missing one. *Obligatio interna* is an idea of categorical Relation, *obligatio externa* is an idea of disjunctive Relation (determination of one part of the Relation co-determines the others as well). The missing Relation, unmentioned and unnamed by Kant, is the hypothetical Relation. We need a name for this term, and so we will call it ***obligatio deliberatus*** or "deliberate pledging."

Whereas *obligatio interna* pertains to Relations of Duties-to-Self with respect to one's own personality, *obligatio deliberatus* pertains to Duties-to-Self with respect to one's situation. The adjective *deliberatus* means "resolved upon or worked out" in the connotation of the Latin verb *delibero*:

> ***delibero*** *~are ~aui ~atum*
>
> 1. (a) to engage in careful thought, weigh the pros and cons, deliberate. (b) to take counsel, consult. (c) to consult.
> 2. (a) to consider a matter carefully, ponder, think over. (b) to consider what, whether, etc.; to consider whether to.
> 3. to have resolved upon after consideration; to have decided that or to.

Obligatio interna does not "go outside" the person's inner subjectively sufficient grounds for taking actions. It is concerned with the individual's ***self-respect***. Critical self-respect (*Achtung*) is the representation of a value prejudicial to ***self-love*** in the determination of appetitive power. Self-love means the determination of a choice on the subjective ground of happiness. The ***principle of happiness*** is an acroamatic principle of judgmentation. This principle states that the disposition to act on the basis of the matter of Desire (i.e., to make an appetite on the grounds of this matter) is a pure purpose of practical Reason. However,

> All material practical principles, regarded as such, are altogether of one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self-love or one's own happiness.
>
> The *Lust* from the representation of a thing-in-the-world, so far as it should be a ground of determination of desire for this thing, bases itself on the *receptiveness* of the subject because it *depends on* the *Dasein* of an object; hence it belongs to the senses (feeling) and not with understanding, which expresses a reference of the representation *to an Object* according to concepts, but not to the subject according to feelings. It is therefore practical only so far as the sensation of the pleasantness that the subject expects from the actuality of

> the object determines appetitive power. Now *happiness* is but the consciousness of a rational being of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole *Dasein*, and the principle to make this the highest ground of the determination of choice is the principle of self-love. [Kant (1788), 5:22]

In contrast, self-respect reflects the first pure and *a priori* interest of practical Reason, which is to act for the practical perfection of its structure of practical rules. Self-respect is an affective perception taking its transcendental place from the spontaneity of a human being and never from his capacity for receptivity. As an affective perception prejudicial to self-love, consciousness of self-respect has only a negative criterion; this is to say one becomes conscious of *lack* of self-respect. Self-respect, therefore, is always tied to a feeling of *Unlust*, whereas self-love can be tied to *psyche* either as a feeling of *Lust* or of *Unlust*. Kant wrote,

> Happiness is the gratification of all our inclinations (extensive as to its magnitude, intensive with regard to degree, as well as protensive in accordance with continuance). The practical law from the motive ground of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of prudence) . . . the [pragmatic law] is grounded on empirical principles; for other than by means of experience I can know neither which inclinations there are that would be gratified nor what the natural causes are which could bring out their gratification. [Kant (1787), B: 834]

Thus, *obligatio deliberatus* is pledging of a Duty-to-Self in regard to one's own situation. The vast majority of prudential and pragmatic tenets a person makes for himself have little or no connection to the nominal customs the average person typically associates with the notion of morality. Yet everything that a person holds-to-be a duty to himself is *de facto* a personal *more* because it is a determining factor in his logic of actions. The logic of prudence is reflected in the qualities of those actions we call either prudent or pragmatic. We get our word "prudent" from the Latin word *prudens*:

> ***prudens*** *~ntis*
>
> 1. (a) well aware of what one does or the consequences of one's action, acting deliberately, open-eyed. (b) having foreknowledge of, aware of. (c) well aware that, knowing that. (d) (of a state) brought about deliberately, intentional.
> 2. (a) exercising foresight, prudent, discrete. (b) (of actions, policy, etc.) characterized by prudence or good sense.
> 3. (a) having good understanding, sagacious, clever. (b) having a good practical understanding of or skill in.

Prudent actions and pragmatic actions both come down to us out from the Greek *pragma*, which means deed or act. The distinction we make in describing something as prudent vs. pragmatic is a distinction of Modality (the judgment of a judgment) with "prudent" bearing a problematical Modality and "pragmatic" bearing an assertoric Modality. The affective association we make that distinguishes the pragmatic from the prudent is reflected by the following connotations of the word *pragma*[57]: (1) occurrence, matter, affair; (2) thing, concrete reality; (3) *pragma ésti*, it is *advantageous* for me; (4) (a) thing of consequence or importance; (b) *pragma ésti moi*, it *concerns* me; (5) matter in hand, question.

Obligatio deliberatus is logically hypothetical in Relation because it addresses empirical matters and concerns of cause-and-effect. From the judicial Standpoint of Critical metaphysics,

> The idea of happiness is not one such as man has abstracted by chance from his instincts and so derived from the animality in himself; on the contrary, it is a mere Idea of a state to

[57] Liddell and Scott (1996)

> which he would make the latter [his animality] adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible). He sorts this out himself and indeed in different ways through his complicated understanding by imagination and the senses; yes, and what is more he amends these so often that this nature, even if it were to be totally subjugated to his choice, nevertheless could by no means undertake to determine general and firm law with this unstable concept, and so harmonize with the purpose that each arbitrarily intends for himself. But if we either reduce this to the genuine urge of nature in which our species generally agrees, or, on the other hand, raise our skill so high as an imagined purpose, yet even so what a man understands by happiness, and what is in fact his own natural purpose (not purpose of freedom), would never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the type to stop anywhere in progression and enjoyment and to be gratified. [Kant (1790), 5: 430]

As Kant put it elsewhere,

> happiness is not an Ideal of reason but rather of the power of imagination, founded merely on empirical grounds, from which one anticipates in vain that he should determine an act through which the totality of an endless series of results would be achieved. [Kant (1785), 4: 418-419]

Obligatio interna on the other hand is categorical. Frustrate a person's judgmentation that involves practical rules linked with *obligatio deliberatus* and you will encounter resistance; do that with rules linked with *obligatio interna* and you will engender hostility and anti-bonding. If you want to make an implacable enemy, attack his self-respect. You'll end up in as nasty an anti-bonding relationship as ever you could imagine.

When you end up in that situation, you will have participated in the other person's determination of an *obligatio interna*, the most extreme example of which is the case where he has decided that his optimum relationship with you involves ending your *Existenz*. Relationships between persons in the state of nature no less involves *obligatio* than do those of civic relationship. On the bonding relationship side of the picture, all those tenets that adults typically regard as examples of morality are tenets from pledging *obligatio externa*. Perhaps the easiest way to gain an understanding of *obligatio externa* is to look at this Relation as the synthesis of the other two. What is *obligatio deliberatus* regarded as *obligatio interna*?

Here the pledging is one in which the exterior situation (the relationship with the pledgee) is held by the pledger as *an exterior relationship that involves self-respect and also self-love*. It can hardly be put any plainer than by saying reciprocal obligation is mutual Relation wherein both persons serve themselves by serving the other. This has two aspects to it. The first is this: *the pledger anticipates and requires as a condition something from the pledgee that promotes his own happiness*. As the old saying goes, "there ain't no such thing as a free lunch." The second aspect is that *failure by the pledgee to meet the anticipated condition provokes a feeling of* Unlust *and is signified by a meaning implication antagonistic to tenets of self-respect*.

In this connection we speak of a third form of feeling. This form is called ***self-regard*** (*Selbstsucht*). One connotation of the German root word is egoism or selfishness, but Kant uses the term in a broader sense than just this. Whenever you "feel good about yourself," this is the feeling of self-regard. Self-regard is a feeling of *Lust*, whereas self-respect is tied to *Unlust*. Self-regard "pulls you toward" something; self-respect "pushes you away" from it. ***All obligatio externa are grounded in feelings of* Lust *that the person has associated through meaning implications with another person or proxy Object***. The logical Modality of self-regard is a judgment of the problematic regarded as assertoric. This should not properly be called apodictic in the objective sense but, rather, ***aesthetically apodictic***. It pertains to aesthetical, not logical or practical, Self-perfection.

Ontology-centered philosophers, moralists and theologians have sought without success for centuries to erect ***civic morality*** on coldly rational and objective grounds. When this has failed, they invariably resort to trying to govern people's actions by means of negative feelings of lack of self-regard. Hence, "you should feel guilty about refusing" to contribute to this worthy cause, help out at the church bazaar, help your schoolmate, etc. & etc. This might work for a time with some individuals, but it is an inherently unstable means of attempting to govern others' codes of behavior because ***the root of all civic morality is subjective in its grounds and objective only in the determination of specific duties and obligations***. The latter concerns the matter of expression, but the former goes directly to ***Duty and Obligation***, which is something else altogether. Perhaps nothing else in empirical science demonstrates the human Nature of this than Piaget's often-amusing case studies of the development of moral judgment in children [Piaget (1932)]. What makes the ontology-centered practices of teaching and governing civic morality unstable is that it is far too easy to, without deliberate intent, miss the mark of self-regard and hit the person in his self-respect instead. ***No person can determine for or even guide another person's Self-determination of his own self-respect***. Deontologically, this is the very moral essence of freedom in the *homo noumenal* character of man. You can provoke his feeling of self-respect, but you can't control it and it is important to remember that self-respect is always and only consciousness of a feeling of *Unlust*. Feelings of *Unlust* pertain to desirations for preventing or abolishing the *Existenz* of the Object that a person has made symbolic for *Unlust*. You cannot engineer *attractive* behavior by appealing to self-respect. All social compacting is immediately combined with semantic representing of self-regard.

§ 6. The 2LAR of Commitment

We have now completed a very lengthy discussion of topics that fall under the Critical idea of commitment. ***Commitment*** is *the human phenomenon of determining to commit oneself to some action*. Here I use the verb "commit" in the context of its Latin root, *committere*, to bring together. More specifically, ***to commit*** is: (1) from the theoretical Standpoint, to bring together concepts of acting understood by a concept of obligation; and (2) from the practical Standpoint, to actualize an action scheme. The idea of commitment is a mathematical idea and is defined by a 2LAR structure. Figure 10.7 presents the 2LAR structure of Critical commitment. You will note that the synthetical functions (*momenta*) depicted in this figure are terms we have already discussed. This concludes the work of the present chapter and we will now move on to face the issues involved with the making of social contracts.



Figure 10.7: The 2LAR structure of Critical commitment.

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